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## Potential buffer out-of-bound read in gatt-database.c:cli\_feat\_read\_cb #70

🔒 Closed

zxtwonder opened this issue on Jan 4, 2021 · 7 comments

zxtwonder commented on Jan 4, 2021 · edited

bluez/src/gatt-database.c

Lines 1078 to 1079 in 35a2c50

```
1078 len = sizeof(state->cli_feat) - offset;
1079 value = len ? &state->cli_feat[offset] : NULL;
```

```
static void cli_feat_read_cb(struct gatt_db_attribute *attrib,
                             unsigned int id, uint16_t offset,
                             uint8_t opcode, struct bt_att *att,
                             void *user_data)
{
    ...
    size_t len = 0;
    ...
    len = sizeof(state->cli_feat) - offset;
    value = len ? &state->cli_feat[offset] : NULL;
```

Both len and sizeof() are unsigned and offset is an external input without validation. It seems like a malicious GATT client can cause out-of-bound read on memory locations after the given device\_state:cli\_feat pointer.

Similar validation like below should be sufficient:

bluez/src/gatt-database.c

Line 691 in 35a2c50

```
691 if (offset > 2) {
```

github-actions (bot) pushed a commit to BluezTestBot/bluez that referenced this issue on Jan 4, 2021



gatt: Fix potential buffer out-of-bound ...

9e6889d

BluezTestBot mentioned this issue on Jan 4, 2021

**[PW\_SID:408793] [BlueZ] gatt: Fix potential buffer out-of-bound** BluezTestBot/bluez#640🔒 Closed

github-actions (bot) pushed a commit to tedd-an/bluez that referenced this issue on Jan 4, 2021



gatt: Fix potential buffer out-of-bound ...

61ed28e

tedd-an mentioned this issue on Jan 4, 2021

**[PW\_SID:408793] [BlueZ] gatt: Fix potential buffer out-of-bound** tedd-an/bluez#839🔒 Closed

zxtwonder commented on Jan 4, 2021

Author

@Vudentz Thanks for the super quick update. One question on the change though - I only have a practical understanding on the BT spec, but should we only return BT\_ATT\_ERROR\_INVALID\_OFFSET when offset is strictly larger than sizeof(state->cli\_feat) - to give the server a chance to indicate the end of the data?

```
if (offset >= sizeof(state->cli_feat)) {
    ecode = BT_ATT_ERROR_INVALID_OFFSET;
    goto done;
}
```

Vudentz commented on Jan 4, 2021

Contributor

@Vudentz Thanks for the super quick update. One question on the change though - I only have a practical understanding on the BT spec, but should we only return BT\_ATT\_ERROR\_INVALID\_OFFSET when offset is strictly larger than sizeof(state->cli\_feat) - to give the server a chance to indicate the end of the data?

```
if (offset >= sizeof(state->cli_feat)) {
    ecode = BT_ATT_ERROR_INVALID_OFFSET;
    goto done;
}
```

If the offset is == sizeof(state->cli\_feat) it would be already past the end as the offset start at index 0 so valid offsets are in a range of 0 to size of attribute - 1.

zxtwonder commented on Jan 4, 2021

Author

Based on the previous code, I was under the impression that the client needs a return of 0 length to be sure the read is complete.

```
len = sizeof(state->cli_feat) - offset;
value = len ? &state->cli_feat[offset] : NULL;
```

But after a further look, it seems that gatt-database does not handle offset consistently.

Sometimes, it allows for empty read:

```
static void gap_appearance_read_cb(struct gatt_db_attribute *attrib,
...
    uint8_t appearance[2];
...
    if (offset > 2) {
```

But other times not:

```
static void gatt_ccc_read_cb(struct gatt_db_attribute *attrib,
...
    const uint8_t *value = NULL;
...
    if (offset) {
```

I guess it is all corner case now since these are all short values. I will have to read the spec to see what the client should expect then.

 **tedd-an** closed this as completed in [tedd-an/test-bluez@3a40bef](#) on Jan 5, 2021

**setharnold** commented on Jun 8, 2021

Hello, please use [CVE-2021-3588](#) for this issue. Thanks.

**jefferyto** commented on May 17

This issue appears to have been closed by a test commit and was never actually fixed.

**Vudentz** commented on May 17

Contributor

@jefferyto it has been pushed: <https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/bluetooth/bluez.git/commit/?id=3a40bef49305f8327635b81ac8be52a3ca063d5a>

**jefferyto** commented on May 18

Apologies for the noise (the fix was also replaced in [6a50b6a](#) ).

 **Haotian-Shi-cyber** mentioned this issue on Jun 1

[version 5.64 ]failed headphone connection #351

 Closed

Assignees

No one assigned

Labels

None yet

Projects

None yet

Milestone

No milestone

Development

Successfully merging a pull request may close this issue.

 [PW\_SID:408793] [BlueZ] gatt: Fix potential buffer out-of-bound  
BluezTestBot/bluez

 [PW\_SID:408793] [BlueZ] gatt: Fix potential buffer out-of-bound  
tedd-an/bluez

4 participants

