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[SYSS-2022-003]: Verbatim Keypad Secure USB 3.2 Gen 1 Drive - Missing Immutable Root of Trust in Hardware (CWE-1326) (CVE-2022-28383)

From: Matthias Deeg <matthias.deeg () syss de>

Date: Wed, 8 Jun 2022 15:42:16 +0200

Advisory ID: SYSS-2022-003
Product: Keypad Secure USB 3.2 Gen 1 Drive
Manufacturer: Verbatim
Affected Version(s): Part Number #49428
Tested Version(s): Part Number #49428
Vulnerability Type: Missing Immutable Root of Trust in Hardware (CWE-1326)
Risk Level: Medium
Solution Status: Open
Manufacturer Notification: 2022-01-27
Solution Date: -
Public Disclosure: 2022-06-08
CVE Reference: CVE-2022-28383
Author of Advisory: Matthias Deeg (SySS GmbH)

Overview:

The Verbatim Keypad Secure is a USB drive with AES 256-bit hardware encryption and a built-in keypad for passcode entry.

The manufacturer describes the product as follows:

"The AES 256-bit Hardware Encryption seamlessly encrypts all data on the drive in real-time with a built-in keypad for passcode input. The USB Drive does not store passwords in the computer or system's volatile memory making it far more secure than software encryption. Also, if it falls into the wrong hands, the device will lock and require re-formatting after 20 failed passcode attempts." [1]

Due to insufficient firmware validation, an attacker can store malicious firmware code for the USB-to-SATA bridge controller on the USB drive which gets executed.

Vulnerability Details:

When analyzing the USB drive Verbatim Keypad Secure, Matthias Deeg found out that the validation of the firmware for the USB-to-SATA bridge controller INIC-3637EN only consists of a simple CRC-16 check (XMODEM CRC-16).

Thus, an attacker is able to store malicious firmware code for the INIC-3637EN with a correct checksum on the used SPI flash memory chip (XT25F01D), which then gets successfully executed by the USB-to-SATA bridge controller.

For instance, this security vulnerability could be exploited in a so-called "supply chain attack" when the device is still on its way to its legitimate user.

An attacker with temporary physical access during the supply could program a modified firmware on the Verbatim Keypad Secure, which always uses an attacker-controlled AES key for the data encryption, for example.

If, later on, the attacker gains access to the used USB drive, he can simply decrypt all contained user data.

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#### Proof of Concept (PoC):

SySS was able to read and write the SPI flash memory containing the firmware of the INIC-3637EN controller (128 KB) using a universal programmer.

By analyzing the dumped memory content, SySS found out that the INIC-3637EN firmware is stored from the file offset 0x4000 to the file offset 0x1BFFB, and that the corresponding XMODEM CRC-16 is stored at the file offset 0x1FFFC.

Matthias Deeg developed a simple Python tool for updating the checksum of modified firmware images before writing them to the SPI flash memory chip.

The following output exemplarily shows updating a modified firmware image:

```
$ python update-firmware.py firmware_hacked.bin
Verbatim Secure Keypad Firmware Updater v0.1 - Matthias Deeg, SySS GmbH (c) 2022
[*] Computed CRC-16 (0x03F5) does not match stored CRC-16 (0x8B17).
[*] Successfully updated firmware file
```

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Solution:

SySS GmbH is not aware of a solution for the described security issue.

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#### Disclosure Timeline:

2022-01-27: Vulnerability reported to manufacturer  
2022-02-11: Vulnerability reported to manufacturer again  
2022-03-07: Vulnerability reported to manufacturer again  
2022-06-08: Public release of security advisory

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References:

[1] Product website for Verbatim Keypad Secure

<https://www.verbatim-europe.co.uk/en/prod/verbatim-keypad-secure-usb-32-gen-1-drive-64gb-49428/#>

[2] GitHub repository of flashrom

<https://github.com/flashrom/flashrom>

[3] SySS Security Advisory SYSS-2022-003

<https://www.syss.de/fileadmin/dokumente/Publikationen/Advisories/SYSS-2022-003.txt>

[4] SySS GmbH, SySS Responsible Disclosure Policy

<https://www.syss.de/en/responsible-disclosure-policy>

Credits:

This security vulnerability was found by Matthias Deeg of SySS GmbH.

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Public Key: https://www.syss.de/fileadmin/dokumente/Materialien/PGPKeys/Matthias_Deeg.asc

Key fingerprint = D1F0 A035 F06C E675 CDB9 0514 D9A4 BF6A 34AD 4DAB

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