Talos Vulnerability Report

TALOS-2021-1423

Reolink RLC-410W cgiserver.cgi session creation denial of service vulnerability

JANUARY 26, 2022

CVE NUMBER

CVE-2021-40406

Summary

A denial of service vulnerability exists in the cgiserver.cgi session creation functionality of reolink RLC-410W v3.0.0.136_20121102. A specially-crafted HTTP request can lead to prevent users from logging in. An attacker can send an HTTP request to trigger this vulnerability.

Tested Versions

Reolink RLC-410W v3.0.0.136_20121102

Product URLs

RLC-410W - https://reolink.com/us/product/rlc-410w/

CVSSv3 Score

7.5 - CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

CWE

CWE-400 - Uncontrolled Resource Consumption

Details

The Reolink RLC-410W is a WiFi security camera. The camera includes motion detection functionalities and various methods to save the recordings.

The RLC-410W maintains an in-memory session list. The cgiserver.cgi will keep the session list updated, removing the out of date sessions and the invalid ones.

A specially-crafted HTTP request can pollute the sessions list with a non-removable session, possibly filling the session list up and preventing the users from logging into the camera.

The cgiserver.cgi uses the parse_incoming_and_check_command function to parse the URL and body data. For many APIs their data can be specified either through the URL or trough the request body. For the Login API the body request looks like the following:

Since it is possible to provide a list of commands, the body request is composed of a JSON array of JSON objects. Each object represents a command with its parameters.

The function $parse_incoming_and_check_command$:

```
int \ parse\_incoming\_and\_check\_command(cgi\_request \ \star req)
{
     [...]
     Json::Reader::Reader(ison reader):
     Json::Value::Value(&json_value,0);
iVar1 = parse_request(req);
     if (iVar1 == 0) {
           if (((int))req->CONTENT_LENGTH < 1) || (req->is_commands_in_body == 0)) {
    /* no body is present */
           std::basic_string<char,std::char_traits<char>,std::allocator<char>>::basic_string
          AVar3 = param error;
           post_data_is_valid_json = Json::Value::isArray(&json_value,pbVar4);
json_idx = 0;
if (post_data_is_valid_json != 0) {
                 pust_uata_is_vatiu_json != 0) {
for (; total_number_of_elements = Json::Value::size(&json_value),
    json_idx < total_number_of_elements; json_idx = json_idx + 1) {
[... parse a JSON command object and insert it into the command list ...]</pre>
                                                                                                                                                 [1]
                goto LAB_0043ccbc;
           AVar3 = protocol;
           req->req_status = AVar3;
     LAB_0043ccbc:
Json::Value::~Value(&json_value);
Json::Reader::~Reader(json_reader);
     return iVar1:
```

At [1] a single command is parsed and inserted into a list of commands that will later be iterated on, and each command will be executed. Later on, in the case of the Login API, a session is created. If the Login data are not provided in the URI, the associate_session_to_request will be executed to create the session:

```
undefined4 associate_session_to_request(c_cgiserver_obj *cgi,cgi_request *req)
      dword dVar1;
      API_status_code AVar2;
cgi_session *session_;
int iVar3;
      cgi_session *session;
      session_node *session_node_cur;
dword apStack56 [4];
      session_node_cur = (cgi->session_node).session_node_start;
      while( true ) {
   if (session_node_cur == (session_node *)δ(cgi->session_node).session_node_end) {
           cal - Tvarby ;
cgi->next_session_ID = cgi->next_session_ID + 1;
apStack56[2] = session_->session_ID;
apStack56[3] = (dword)session_;
_Rb_tree<unsigned_int,std::pair<unsigned_int_const,c_cgisession*>,std::_Select1st<std::pair<unsigned_int_const,c_cgisession*>>,std::less<unsigned_int>,std::allocator<std::pair<unsigned_int_const,c_cgisession*>>> ::_M_insert_unique((pair *)apStack56,&cgi->session_node,(dword)(apStack56 + 2));
                                                                                                                                                                 [2]
                        c_cgisession::cgi_req_proc(session_,req);
                  session_->session_status = INVALID;
AVar2 = login failed;
                   else {
                   AVar2 = max session;
            req->req_status = AVar2;
return 0xffffffff;
            [...]
     req->session_ID = session->session_ID;
dVar1 = time((time_t *)0x0);
session->last_time_checked = dVar1;
session->lease_time = dVar1 + 0xe10;
c_cgisession::cgi_req_proc(session,req);
      return 0:
```

At [2] is called the function that will iterate over the commands provided and execute them. Based on the Login API results, the session_status field of the sessions will be set, either to VALID or INVALID.

An unhandled logic case exists in the Login API execution flow. Indeed, if the provided URI cmd is Login, but then an empty array is provided as body, a session is created nevertheless. Because the list of commands is empty, the Login request will not be performed.

Since the session initialization does not set the session_status and assumes it will be set later on elaborating the provided command, the session will have an unknown state.

Following the manage_existing_sessions function, responsible for keeping the session list updated:

The manage_existing_sessions function does only handle the VALID and INVALID states respectively at [3] and [4]. That means that the invalid created session will never be removed. This can fill up the session list, effectively blocking the login to the device.

Timeline

2021-12-06 - Vendor Disclosure

2022-01-19 - Vendor Patched

2022-01-26 - Public Release

CREDIT

Discovered by Francesco Benvenuto of Cisco Talos.

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