Improper integrity protection of server-side encryption keys

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TIMELINE

ahe submitted a report to Nextcloud.

Nov 8th (3 years ago)

he submitted a report to Nextcloud.

The public keys used for the server-side encryption are not integrity-protected. These can easily replaced by anyone who has access to the data-at-rest data (even when the per-user-keys are enabled, as described in https://nextcloud.com/security/threat-model/). This holds true for all key types - from the master key, the peruser-keys as well as for the (optional) recovery key.

Attack scenarios may look like this:

- · A recovery key is set by the admin and users enabled the recovery feature (or it was mandatorily set by adding the corresponding configuration to the oc_preferences | table for all users). As it is unlikely that the recovery key is used very often, a person that has access to the data directory (even if at rest) is able to replace the public recovery key with a newly generated one. Each newly added file and each modified file will also be encrypted for the newly generated recovery
- · A per-user-key encryption scheme is introduced and organizational shared folders are set up. To better handle access management all organizational shared folders are owned by the admin that also handles access management requests. As it is unlikely that the admin account will be used to access the individual files, a person that has access to the data directory (even if at rest) is able to replace the public key of the admin account with a newly generated one. Each newly added file the public key of the admin account with a newly generated one. Each newly added file the public key of the admin account with a newly generated one. Each newly added file the public key of the admin account with a newly generated one. Each newly added file the public key of the admin account with a newly generated one. Each newly added file the public key of the admin account with a newly generated one. Each newly added file the public key of the admin account with a newly generated one. Each newly added file the public key of the admin account with a newly generated one. Each newly added file the public key of the admin account with a newly generated one. Each newly added file the public key of the admin account with a newly generated one. Each newly added file the public key of the admin account with a newly generated one account with a new or the new or theand each modified file that is put into any of the organizational shared folders will also be encrypted for the newly generated admin account key.

The mentioned attack scenarios may also be executed by an external storage provider if the folder that is used as the data directory is stored at this external storage provider. Administrative access to the actual Nextcloud server is **not** necessary to mount this attack.

Impact

After mounting the attack the person would be able to read and modify all newly created files as well as files that have been modified since the attack was launched.

Preventing this attack could look as follows:

- · The fingerprints of public and private key files that have been generated by the application could be stored in the database.
- Whenever public or private key files are read from disk the fingerprint of that file is checked against the value stored in the database.

An alternative approach for ${\bf preventing}$ this attack could look as follows:

- For each public and private key file that has been generated by the application a MAC could be calculated.
- The key for the MAC could be derived from the instance id, the instance secret and the relative file name of the corresponding key file.
- · The MAC could be stored directly in the corresponding key file.
- Whenever a public or private key file is read from disk the MAC of that file could be calculated and compared with the MAC stored in the file.

1 attachment:

F629444: nextcloud_poc2.mp4

OT: posted a comment. hanks a lot for reporting this potential issue back to us! Nov 8th (3 years ago)

Our security team will take a look at this issue as soon as possible. We will reply to your report within 72 hours, usually much faster. For obvious reasons we'd like to ask you to not disclose this issue to any other party.



Administrative access to the actual Nextcloud server is not necessary to mount this attack.

First of all, having access to the file system where Next cloud runs is actually "having administrative access", as you can simply add a user which is part of the admin strative access.


The mentioned attack scenarios may also be executed by an external storage provider if the folder that is used as the data directory is stored at this external storage

Our idea for this problem is to allow to change the location of the key storage.

 $\textbf{Check} \ https://docs.nextcloud.com/server/17/admin_manual/configuration_files/encryption_configuration.html \# occ-encryption-commands and the property of the property of$

Wrap lines Copy Download 1 occ encryption:show-key-storage-root 2 Current key storage root: default storage location (data/)

Move keys to a different folder, either locally or on a different server. The folder must already exist, be owned by root and your HTTP group, and be restricted to root and your HTTP group. Further the folder needs to be located somewhere in your Nextcloud data folder, either physically, or as a mount. This example is for Ubuntu Linux. Note that the new folder is relative to your occ directory:



Hi, I know had time to look at this again. Your documentation says:

Further the folder needs to be located somewhere in your Nextcloud data folder, either physically, or as a mount.

So your idea for this problem wouldn't work in cases where the whole data directory is stored at an external party as - according to the documentation - the keys have to reside in the data directory.

llzer posted a comment.

Nov 25th (3 years ago)

Nov 15th (3 years ago)

ike the idea of storing the fingerprints in the database and comparing them.

I'll see what I can do. But it might take a while as the 18 wrap up is consuming a lot of time.

O- rullzer changed the status to • Triaged.

Nov 25th (3 years ago)

she posted a comment.

Jan 21st (3 years ago)

Hi, I guess that now that Nextcloud 18 has been published there will be the time to look into the issues of the server-side encryption? My plan is to to submit a talk about the Nextcloud server-side encryption to the upcoming Gulaschprogrammiernacht (May 21st to May 24th). This should be enough time to fix the issues.

he posted a comment.

May 27th (3 years ago)

Hello, this issue hasn't seen any update for 4 months. We approached the end of May without a fix. Do you still intend to work on this problem?

zer posted a comment

May 29th (3 years ago)

Yes this is still on our list but right now we don't have a good way to solve it.

Cheers,

--Roeland



Aug 11th (2 years ago)

So I'm back form my holiday and am continuing on https://github.com/nextcloud/server/pull/21529

Since keys can be moved for files etc. Linking the data in the database is tricky. However in this new approach the keys are encrypted with the system secret. And hence the attacker can't modify them.

Would you have the possibility to check out that PR?

Cheers. --Roeland

ahe posted a comment

ale posted a comment.

think that the solution goes in the right direction, but I see a certain flow: If I understand it correctly, it is still possible to replace the public key of one user with the $public \, key \, of \, another \, user. \, So \, the \, given \, solution \, improves \, on \, the \, currently \, existing \, problem \, but \, does \, not \, completely \, fix \, it.$

Unfortunately, you currently have no possibility to have integrity-protected metadata for public key files. If you switched the process around to: $encrypt(json_encode(\$data)) \quad you could have integrity-protected metadata. Then, a possibility to fix this problem completely would be to not only introduce the problem of the problem$ \$data["key"] value but also a [\$data["user"] value containing the name of the associated user. This could be checked on usage to make sure that the key actually belongs to the correct user. Thanks to the EtM encryption taking place at the end, the key as well as the metadata would be integrity-protected.



Aug 11th (2 years ago)

Thanks for the quick analysis.

Right turning it around would indeed make more sense. Let me do that.

 $I\, need \, to \, think \, about \, your \, comment. \, I \, think \, you \, are \, right \, and \, we \, can \, indeed \, store \, the \, user \, key \, with \, the \, uid.$

In any case with this in place the attack scopes limits significantly in the sense that the attacker now must have an account on the system and access to the external storage. However lets fix it properly now that we are touching the code in any case.

I need a break now since it is way to hot here. I'll get back to you tomorrow.

Cheers

--Roeland



Aug 12th (2 years ago)

I updated the PR. Now it also stores the UID in the userkeys (and null in the systemkeys). This is then all encrypted. It needs some cleanup but I think this now goes in the right direction.

Cheers.

--Roeland


he posted a comment

Aug 12th (2 years ago)

Hi, I had a short look at the current version in the PR. IMHO this is coming together quite nicely.

Iam, however, a bit confused with the additional encodings going on. Of course, you may have certain reasons to double- and tripple-encode data, but I just wanted to the properties of the pr $mention\ what Isee.\ Is tumbled\ over this\ kind\ of\ (in\ my\ opinion)\ unnecessary\ file\ increases\ before\ with\ the\ 35\%\ size-increase\ of\ the\ encrypted\ content\ files.:$

• What I don't understand is why you Base64-encode the encrypted content again before storing it in a file here only to Base64-decode it here when you read the file back in. I really don't see the benefit of this additional Base64-encoding. file_get_contents() and file_put_contents() are perfectly able to handle binary data without precautionary encoding.



ahe posted a comment.

ahe posted a comment.

CVE-2020-8159 is already taken. Maybe that's just a typo.

Right, it's https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2020-8259

ckvergessen Nextcloud staff posted a comment.

Oct 7th (2 years ago)

Nov 5th (2 years ago)

Oct 7th (2 years ago)



