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## Reduced purmutations on encryption

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### TIMELINE



realguymano submitted a report to [Nextcloud](#).

Apr 18th (3 years ago)

`OC\Security\SecureRandom::generate`

#### Reduced Permutations

`OC\Security\SecureRandom::generate` will by default use `a-Z0-9+/` (64 bytes) character set. The numbers are not predictable, due to the use of `random_int`.

Most notably the `OC\Security\Crypto::encrypt` method uses an IV with a [length of 16 bytes](#). It is chosen randomly via `OC\Security\SecureRandom::generate` with the default character set. There are 256 possible bytes, but in this case it is *actually* 64 bytes. The permutations is  $64^{16}$  (instead of  $256^{16}$ ), which equates to a 12-byte, or 96-bit IV (instead of the expected 16-byte, or 128-bit IV). **Use raw bytes when doing cryptographic operations, via `random_bytes`.**

Do not use `OC\Security\Crypto::generate` for cryptographic keys.

#### Cache Timing Attacks

It is *potentially* vulnerable to [cache timing attacks](#) because the secret number is used as an index to look up a byte value in string. [Read more about cache-timing attacks here](#).

#### Impact

1. Reduced permutations increase the chances of IV re-use (which can destroy confidentiality), and bring encryption key strength down (chances are still too low with a 256-bit encryption key).
2. If the complex cache timing attack vector exists, and is abused: it is possible to determine secret values generated with `OC\Security\SecureRandom::generate`.



OT: posted a comment.

Apr 18th (3 years ago)

Thanks a lot for reporting this potential issue back to us!

Our security team will take a look at this issue as soon as possible. We will reply to your report within 72 hours, usually much faster. For obvious reasons we'd like to ask you to not disclose this issue to any other party.



realguymano posted a comment.

Apr 21st (3 years ago)

If there is anything wrong with the report, please let me know. Have a good day.



nickvergessen (Nextcloud staff) posted a comment.

Apr 22nd (3 years ago)

We are currently still checking and investigating the details of your report.



rullzer posted a comment.

May 11th (3 years ago)

Hi @lynn-stephenson,

I'm tackling this now. I'll get back once I have a PR.

Cheers,  
--Roeland



rullzer posted a comment.

May 11th (3 years ago)

Hi @lynn-stephenson,

<https://github.com/nextcloud/server/pull/20915> Should fix this I believe.

Mind to have a quick look?

Cheers,  
--Roeland



rullzer changed the status to **Triaged**.

May 11th (3 years ago)



nextcloud rewarded realguymano with a \$150 bounty.

May 13th (3 years ago)

Congratulations! We have determined this to be eligible for a reward of \$150.

Thanks a lot for making the internet a safer place and keep hacking. Please keep in mind that we didn't release a patch for the vulnerability yet, so please do not share this information with any third-parties.



nickvergessen (Nextcloud staff) closed the report and changed the status to **Resolved**.

May 13th (3 years ago)

Thanks a lot for your report again. This has been resolved in our upcoming maintenance releases and we're working on the advisories at the moment.

Please let us know how you'd like to be credited in our official advisory. We require the following information:

- Name / Pseudonym
- Email address (optional)
- Website (optional)
- Company (optional)

realguymano posted a comment.

May 23rd (3 years ago)



[nickvergessen](#) Nextcloud staff posted a comment.

Jun 8th (3 years ago)

Advisory will be published around 4th of july on <https://nextcloud.com/security/advisory/?id=NC-SA-2020-023>



[nickvergessen](#) Nextcloud staff changed the report title from Reduced Purmatations and Potential Cache Timing Attacks to Reduced purmatations on encryption.

Jun 8th (3 years ago)



[nickvergessen](#) Nextcloud staff requested to disclose this report.

Sep 28th (2 years ago)



This report has been disclosed.

Oct 28th (2 years ago)