



CVE-POC / CVE-2020-8994.md



∷ 104 lines (70 sloc) | 3.98 KB ···

CVE-2020-8994

 $\longleftrightarrow \textbf{Code} \quad \textcircled{0} \;\; \textbf{Issues} \qquad \rat{1} \;\; \textbf{Pull requests} \qquad \textcircled{0} \;\; \textbf{Actions} \qquad \fbox{ Projects} \qquad \rat{0} \;\; \textbf{Security} \qquad \underrightarrow{ } \;\; \textbf{Insights}$

[Discoverer]

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[Description]

An issue was discovered on XIAOMI AI speaker MDZ-25-DT 1.34.36, 1.40.14.Attackers can get root shell by accessing the UART interface and then they can read Wi-Fi SSID or password, read the dialogue text files between users and XIAOMI AI speaker, use Text-To-Speech tools pretend XIAOMI speakers' voice achieve social engineering attacks, eavesdrop on users and record what XIAOMI AI speaker hears, delete the entire XIAOMI AI speaker system, modify system files, stop voice assistant service, start the XIAOMI AI speaker's SSH service as a backdoor.

[Attack Type]

Physical

[Product]

XIAOMI AI speaker MDZ-25-DT

[Version]

1.34.36 , 1.40.14

XIAOMI AI speaker MDZ-25-DT devices vulnerability

demonstration

Debug points exist in most of the equipment and are used for factory testing. By removing the case of the XIAOMI AI speaker, we can find the debug point on the UART port. Figure 1 shows how a laptop is connected to XIAOMI AI speaker via UART port.



Fig.1 A laptop is connected to XIAOMI AI speaker via UART port.

Since there is no any authentication procedure for the access to the UART ports, we can login as root with no password to be asked. Figure 2 shows the screenshot of login as root with no password to be asked.



Fig.2 Login as root with no password to be asked.

Impact demonstration from XIAOMI AI speaker MDZ-25-DT devices vulnerability

1. Read Wi-Fi SSID or password displayed in cleartext

Fig.3 Show the WIFI SSID and password.


2. Read the dialogue text files between users and XIAOMI AI speaker

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Fig.4 Part of the texts transferred from conversations between the user and XIAOMI AI speaker

3. Use Text-To-Speech tools pretend XIAOMI speakers' voice achieve social engineering attacks video: https://youtu.be/yCadG38yZW8

4. Eavesdrop on users and record what XIAOMI AI speaker hears



 $\label{fig.5} \mbox{ Fig.5 Recording the conversations and show the produced wave files.}$

5. Delete the entire XIAOMI AI speaker system

```
root@mico:-# mtd -r erase /dev/m

mem mtdlro mtd5 mtdblock3

memory_bandwidth mtd2 mtd5ro mtdblock4

miso mtd2ro mtd6 mtdblock5

mixer mtd3 mtd6ro mtdblock6

mtd0 mtd3ro mtdblock0

mtd0ro mtd4 mtdblock1

mtd0ro mtd4ro mtdblock1

root@mico:-# mtd - erase /dev/mtdblock2
```

Fig.6 The command to erase the entire speaker system.

6. Stop voice assistant service

```
root@mico:~#
root@mico:~#
root@mico:~# /etc/init.d/mediaplayer stop
root@mico:~#
```

Fig.7 The command to shut down voice assistant of XIAOMI AI speaker.

7. Start the XIAOMI AI speaker's SSH service as a backdoor

```
Reboot (SNAPSHOT, 70-1-1)

Reboot (SNAPSHOT, 70-
```

Fig.8 The command to use a RSA format SSH private key.



Fig.9 The command to remotely login in by SSH with no password to be asked.