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QRadar Community Edition 7.3.1.6 Authorization Bypass

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QRadar Community Edition version 7.3.1.6 suffers from an authorization bypass vulnerability.

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TWAS Change Mirror Download Authorization bypass in QRadar Forensics web application Yorick Koster, September 2019 It was found that any authenticated user can access & use the QRadar Forensics web application, regardless whether they are granted permission to use the Forensics application. This bypass only requires that the user manually sets a cookie named QRIF with the same value as the user's session cookie. CVE-2020-4274 [2] 6189705 [3] - IBM QRadar SIEM is vulenrable to Authorization bypass (CVE-2020-4274) Tested versions Tested versions

This issue was successfully verified on QRadar Community Edition [4] version 7.3.1.6 (7.3.1 Build 20180723171558). IBM has released the following versions of QRader in which this issue has been resolved: ORadar / ORM / OVM / ONI 7.4.0 GA [5] (SFS)
ORadar / ORM / OVM / ORIF / ONI 7.3.3 Patch 3 [6] (SFS)
ORadar / ORM / OVM / ORIF / ONI 7.3.2 Patch 7 [7] (SFS)
ORadar incident Porensics 7.4.0 [8] (130)
ORadar incident Porensics 7.4.0 [8] (1356) Introduction

QRadar [10] is IBM's enterprise SIBM [11] solution. A free version of QRadar is available that is known as QRadar Community Edition [4]. This version is Imited to 50 events per second and 5,000 network flows a minute, supports apps, but is based on a smaller footprint for non-enterprise use. The QRadar Forensics web application is normally only accessible for users that are granted permission to use this application. A centralized control that checks if the user has permission is implemented in an include file that is included in most pages. This check can be bypassed by sending a QRIF cookle to the application. If this cookle is present and has the same value as the SEC cookle, the permission check is not performed. Consequently, any authenticated user can access & use the Forensics web application. Details

"Most PNP pages of the Forensics application (directly or indirectly)
include the PNP file includes/functions.inc.php. A number of checks have
been implemented in this file, including a check to validate the user's
session, a check to detect forens-fite Request Forgery attacks, and
permission check to validate if the user has permission to use the
Forensics application. This last check is implemented in the LoginUser()
method of the QRadarHelper class. global \$s, \$u, \$QR_HELPER_CODES; SorUserHasForensicsAccess = Sthis->GetORuserHasForensics(Sor user info['username']); The call to LoginUser() is executed from the LoginCurrentUser() method, which in turn is called form the functions.inc.php include file. if (!isset(\$qrh)) Sorh = new ORadarHelper(); SerrorMessage = "";
SuserLoggedIn = Sqrh->LoginCurrentUser(true, SerrorMessage); Before the call to LoginUser() is made, the LoginCurrentUser() method first checks if it has received a QRIF cookie. If the cookie is present and it has the same value of the SEC cookie (the session cookie) the call to LoginUser() is not made. Not calling LoginUser() also means that no check is made to validate of the user has permission to use the orensics application. fopt/ibm/forensics/html/DejaVu/qradar_helper.php:
public function LoginCurrentUser (\$remember, &SerrorInfo) ...] if(isset(\$ COOKIE['QRIF'])) //if the current cookie is the same as the session token that means user hasn't changed if update the expiry time if (S_COOKIF(GRIF) == Sthis->session_token) //if cookie is available that means it hasn't expired yet so we need to update it's expiry time if cookie expiry time is set to 0 (expire with browser) then we don't update it if(scookieExpiryTime > 0) unset(\$_COOKIE('QRIF'));
setcookie("QRIF", \$this->session_token, \$cookieExpiryTime, "/", \$_SERVER('HTTP_HOST'), true, true); return true; unset(\$ COOKIE['ORIF']); }
//first time through, login the user and set the cookie
\$loginSuccess = \$this->LoginUser(\$this->session_token, \$errorInfo);
if (\$loginSuccess && \$remember) {






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