

Bitrix WAF bypass

📅 On April 27, 2020 / By r0hack

In Russian: <https://blog.deteact.com/ru/bitrix-waf-bypass/>

UPD: CVE-2020-13758 assigned

Sometimes when exploiting reflected XSS the input parameters get injected directly into the body of the `<script>` tag. Typically, this means that the exploit is trivial: HTML entity encoding will not prevent it, and many firewalls (including now obsolete Chrome XSS Auditor) won't either. But CMS Bitrix has its own built-in proactive filter (WAF) for this case, and it operates similar to XSS Auditor.

WAF bypass

While fuzzing one of the Mail.ru services eligible for the Bug Bounty I encountered an entry point where the GET parameter was reflected in the body of `<script>...</script>` tag. But it was not possible to make a simple PoC because the application was built using Bitrix and the WAF module was activated.

Any attempts to insert an interesting code lead to the whole script body being replaced by the placeholder `<!-- deleted by Bitrix WAF -->`.


For testing purposes, we deployed a Bitrix CMS application with WAF module activated and added the following code to one of the pages (`/waf-bypass.php`):

```
<? $page = $_GET['page'];>

<script>
$(document).ready(function () {
  $('>$('.waf_bypass').text("<?=$page?>");
});
</script>

<div class="waf_bypass">Not loaded yet</div>
```

If a single quote (which terminates the JS string) and an `alert` call (as well as any other function) are passed to the vulnerable page parameter, the WAF cuts out the entire script:



However, during the fuzzing we found out that the mitigation does not work when the vulnerable parameter contains a *null byte* (`%00`):

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
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
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Thus, we get a full payload for XSS exploitation:

This is what the result looks like on the page:



The root cause

For some reason this module cuts out the null bytes from the input parameter values, so in our case the script tag body can't be matched against input parameter value since the body contains `\x00`, and the parameter value does not.

```

281 protected function addVariable($name, $value)
282 {
283     if(!is_string($value))
284         return;
285     if(strlen($value) <= 2)
286         return; //too short
287     if(preg_match("/^(?P<quot>[\"']?)[^,;+-*\\"{ }\[\] \\\| =\\\\\\\\]*(?P=quot)\\$/D", $value))
288         return; //there is no potentially dangerous code
289     if(preg_match("/^[0-9_-]*\\$/D", $value))
290         return; //there is no potentially dangerous code
291     if(preg_match("/^[0-9 \\n\\r\\t\\[\\]]*\\$/D", $value))
292         return; //there is no potentially dangerous code
293
294     //$this->variables->addVariable($name, $value);
295     $this->variables->addVariable($name, str_replace(chr(0), "", $value));
296 }

```

```

211     protected function isDangerBody($body)
212     {
213         $search = $this->findInArray($body, $this->quotedSearches);
214         if ($search !== null)
215         {
216             return $this->quotedSearches[$search];
217         }
218         else if (!empty($this->searches))
219         {
220             $bodyWithoutQuotes = $this->removeQuotedStrings($body, false);
221             $search = $this->findInArray($bodyWithoutQuotes, $this->searches);
222             if ($search !== null)
223             {
224                 return $this->searches[$search];
225             }
226         }
227     }
228     return false;
229 }

```

Remember that WAFs are almost always bypassable and they may contain weaknesses and vulnerabilities themselves. You should not rely on third-party mitigation solutions and firewalls, you should build a secure development process and regularly conduct [penetration testing](#) of applications.

Specifically in this case you can remove the *str_replace* call from the *addVariable* function (or to apply the same modification to the *\$body* variable in the *isDangerBody* function) to correct the weakness in the WAF itself.

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