Talos Vulnerability Report

TALOS-2021-1371

Accusoft ImageGear TIFF YCbCr image parser out-of-bounds write vulnerability

FEBRUARY 23, 2022

CVE NUMBER

CVE-2021-21942

Summary

An out-of-bounds write vulnerability exists in the TIFF YCbCr image parser functionality of Accusoft ImageGear 19.10. A specially-crafted file can lead to remote code execution. An attacker can provide a malicious file to trigger this vulnerability.

Tested Versions

Accusoft ImageGear 19.10

Product URLs

ImageGear - https://www.accusoft.com/products/imagegear-collection/

CVSSv3 Score

9.8 - CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

CWE

CWE-122 - Heap-based Buffer Overflow

Details

The ImageGear library is a document-imaging developer toolkit that offers image conversion, creation, editing, annotation and more. It supports more than 100 formats such as DICOM, PDF, Microsoft Office and others.

A specially-crafted TIFF file can lead to a heap-based buffer overflow in the TIFF YCbCr image parser, due to a missing size check. We will assume the following TIFF's tag values:

PlanarConfiguration == 1 and PhotometricInterpretation == 6, meaning the image data is in the YCbCr color space in chunky format.

Trying to load a malformed TIFF file, we end up in the following situation:

```
(1dec.1f7c): Access violation - code c0000005 (first chance)
First chance exceptions are reported before any exception handling.
This exception may be expected and handled.
eax=0b2c0000e obx=0000002a ecx=0000003b edx=0bce8ff8 esi=000000ff edi=0bca2ff0
eip=6f959aff esp=0019f578 ebp=0019f604 iopl=0 nv up ei pl nz ac pe cy
cs=0023 ss=002b ds=002b es-002b fs=0053 gs=002b efl=00010217
igCore1pd1IG_mpi_page_set+0x10dacf:
6f959aff 8808 mov byte ptr [eax],cl ds:002b:0b2c9000=??
```

The access violation originates at [1] in the TIFF_YCbCr_to_RGB function:

```
int TIFF YCbCr to RGB
                         (mys_tags_data *mys_tags_data,undefined4 param_2,byte **array_of_horiz_input,
                        byte **array_of_horiz_buff,uint param_5)
f . . . 1
 local_8 = DAT_102bcea8 ^ (uint)&stack0xfffffffc;
array_of_horiz_buff_ = array_of_horiz_buff;
probably_subsampling_factor = 0x10001;
LumaRed = 0.299;
LumaBlue = 0.114;
         Green_value = 0.587;
 else {
         .
.
sVar3 = TIFF_INDEX_TO_TYPE_SIZE[(uint)pTVar1->tag_type * 2] * pTVar1->count;
if (0x18 < sVar3) {
         sVar3 = 0x18;
       }
sVar3 = TIFF_INDEX_TO_TYPE_SIZE[(uint)pTVar1->tag_type * 2] * pTVar1->count;
         if (4 < sVar3) {
sVar3 = 4;
         OS_memcpy(&probably_subsampling_factor,(void *)pTVar1->ptr_value,sVar3);
sVar3 = 2;
        OS_memcpy(&YCBCR_pos_related,(void *)pTVar1->ptr_value,sVar3);
}
/* ID_TIF_REFERENCE_BLACK_WHITE */
if ((mys_tags_data->IFD_Record != (IFD_Record *)0x0) &&
        (pTVar1 = kind_of_lookup_tags(mys_tags_data->IFD_Record,0x4a,0), pTVar1 != (TIF_Record *)0x0))
         sVar3 = TIFF INDEX TO TYPE SIZE[(uint)pTVar1->tag type * 2] * pTVar1->count;
         if (0x30 < sVar3) {
sVar3 = 0x30;
        OS_memcpy(local_50,(void *)pTVar1->ptr_value,sVar3);
kind_of_lookup_tags(mys_tags_data->IFD_Record,0x4a,0);
do {
                (
Cb_value = (float)(int)(short)((*array_of_horiz_input)[local_70] - 0x80);
Cr_value = (float)(int)(short)((*array_of_horiz_input)[local_70 + 1] - 0x80);
n_of_vert_done = 0;
ds_ptr = array_of_horiz_buff_;
if (0 < (short)probably_subsampling_factor.vert) {</pre>
                 do f
                         n_of_horiz_done = 0;
                         if (0 < (short)probably_subsampling_factor.horiz) {
                                if ((int)temp_computation < 0) {
probably_B_value = 0;
                                else {
                                probably_B_value = temp_computation & 0xff;
if (0xff < (int)temp_computation) {
    probably_B_value = 0xff;
}</pre>
                                temp_computation =
    SEXT24((short)(int)((2.0 - LumaRed * 2.0) * (float)(int)Cr_value * Y_Value));
if ((int)temp_computation < 0) {</pre>
                                probably_R_value = 0;
                                probably_R_value = temp_computation & 0xff;
if (0xff < (int)temp_computation) {
    probably_R_value = 0xff;</pre>
                               }
Green_value = (float)(int)(short)(int)(((Y_Value - (float)probably_B_value * LumaBlue) - (float)probably_B_value * LumaBlue 
                                                                                                      (float)probably_R_value * LumaRed) /
                                                                                                      LumaGreen ):
                                if ((int)Green_value < 0) {
                                probably_G_value = probably_G_value & 0xffffff00;
                                 élse {
                                probably_G_value = (uint)Green_value & 0xff;
if (0xff < (int)Green_value) {
    probably_G_value = 0xff;</pre>
```

```
**dst_ptr = (byte)probably_R_value;
  *dst_ptr = *dst_ptr + 1;
  **dst_ptr = (byte)probably_G_value;
  *dst_ptr = *dst_ptr + 1;
  **dst_ptr = (byte)probably_B_value;
  *dst_ptr = *dst_ptr + 1;
  **dst_ptr = *dst_ptr + 1;
  n_of_horiz_done = n_of_horiz_done + 1;
  } while (n_of_horiz_done < (short)probably_subsampling_factor.horiz); [2]
[...]
}</pre>
```

The TIFF_YCbCr_to_RGB function converts an image from the YCbCr color space to RGB. Indeed, the crash at [1] is related to the G component of the RGB conversion. However, based on the TIFF file, it could have happend in any of the other two components.

The problem resides in the size of the buffers contained in the dst_ptr array. This variable has YCbCrSubsampleVert buffers that would contain the linear trasformation from YCbCr to RGB. From now on, a single buffer in dst_ptr will be called single_dst_ptr. The loop that populates single_dst_ptr, 3 bytes at a time, is performed YCbCrSubsampleHoriz times. So the single_dst_ptr should have a size greater than 3*YCbCrSubsampleHoriz. The data used to populate single_dst_ptr are contained in array_of_horiz_input.

The TIFF_YCbCr_to_RGB function is called at [6] in the TIFF_parse function, where the single_dst_ptr buffers and the array_of_horiz_input are allocated:

```
\label{local_param_2} void\ TIFF\_parse(mys\_table\_function\ *param\_1,uint\ param\_2,mys\_tags\_data\ *TIFF\_tags,undefined4\ param\_4,\\ HIGDIBINFO\ param\_5,subsapling\_Y\_Cb\_Cr\ *YCbCr\_subsamp)
 io_buffer *io_buff;
byte **src_buff;
byte **lpExtraText;
size_t width_allocation_buff_size;
byte *vert_buff;
int iVar1;
dword dVar2;
dword dVar3;
int horiz;
int iVar4;
io_buffer *piVar5;
int vert_index_;
int vert_index;
int width_index;
int local_28;
byte *multiplier;
byte *local_20;
byte **arr_of_dest_buff;
int local_18;
uint width_buff_size;
dword local_c;
int error code:
local_20 = (byte *)0x0;
local_20 = (byte *)0x0;
width_buff_size = 0;
local_c = 0;
multiplier = (byte *)0x0;
arr_of_dest_buff = (byte **)0x0;
if (*cushort *)6TIFf_tags->ID_TIF_SAMPLES_PER_PIXEL == 0) {
    AF_err_record_set("..\\..\\..\\..\\Common\\Formats\\tifread.c",0x1793,-0x80d,0,0,(LPCHAR)0x0);
    AF_error_check();
    return:
return:
src_buff = (byte **)AF_memm_alloc(param_2,(uint)*(ushort *)&TIFF_tags->ID_TIF_SAMPLES_PER_PIXEL << 2);
if (src_buff == (byte **)0x0) {
   horiz = 0x17a1;
   lpExtraText = src_buff;
      OS_memset(src_buff,0,(uint)*(ushort *)&TIFF_tags->ID_TIF_SAMPLES_PER_PIXEL << 2);
     if (lpExtraText != (byte **)0x0) {
     vert_index = 0;
if (0 < (short)YCbCr_subsamp->vert) {
                width_allocation_buff_size = width_buff_size + 0x80;
                                                                                                                                               [3]
                do {
    vert_buff = (byte *)AF_memm_alloc(param_2,width_allocation_buff_size);
    arr_of_dest_buff[vert_index] = vert_buff;
    if (vert_buff == (byte *)0x0) {
        arr_of_dest_buff = (byte **)0x0;
        error_code = 0x17db;
        goto LAB_10177d49;
    }
}
                vert_index = vert_index + 1;
} while (vert_index < (short)YCbCr_subsamp->vert);
            goto LAB_10177d86;
            ,
width_allocation_buff_size = (int)(short)YCbCr_subsamp->vert << 2;
            error_code = 0x17d1;
LAB 10177d49:
           //d49:
AF_err_record_set("..\\..\\..\\Common\\Formats\\tifread.c",error_code,-1000,0,param_2,
width_allocation_buff_size,(LPCHAR)arr_of_dest_buff);
AF_memm_free(param_2,io_buff);
AF_memm_free(param_2,src_buff);
      else {
LAB_10177d86:
           if (TIFF_tags->ID_TIF_PLANAR_CONFIG == 1) {
           [...]
           dVar3 = IOb_init(param_1,param_2,io_buff,(int)*lpExtraText * 5,1);
dVar3 = (dword)(0 < (int)dVar3);
width_index = 0;</pre>
          Jocal_28 = 0;
if (0 < (int)TIFF_tags->ID_TIF_ROWS_PER_STRIP) {
while (width_index < (int)TIFF_tags->ID_TIF_IMAGE_HEIGHT) {
    vert_buff = (byte *)get_data_from_file(io_buff,(uint)*lpExtraText);
    *src_buff = vert_buff;
                                                                                                                                               [5]
```

This function prepares the required arguments in order to call TIFF_YCbCr_to_RGB. At [3] the size of a single_dst_ptr is calculated, which is essentially 0x80 +

IO_raster_size_get(param_5), where IO_raster_size_get return value, in this specific context, can be simplified as ((((8 * SamplesPerPixel) * ImageWidth) + 0x1f) >>

3) 6 0xfffffffc, where SamplesPerPixel and ImageWidth are specified through the TIFF's tags. Instead, the array_of_horiz_input buffer is allocate at [5], and has as size the results of the computation at [4].

At [2] the condition of the loop is such that the number of iteration is equal to the YCbCrSubsampleHoriz value. In the loop, for each iteration, 3 bytes of a single_dst_ptr are filled. The problem is that the program does not enforce any relationship between ImageWidth, the value used to compute the size of a single_dst_ptr, and YCbCrSubsampleHoriz, the value that specifies how many triplets of bytes are going to be written into a single_dst_ptr. Because the program does not enforce any relationship between ImageWidth and YCbCrSubsampleHoriz, it would be possible to write more bytes than the ones that can be stored in a single_dst_ptr, leading to a heap-based buffer overflow. Because the values written in a single_dst_ptr are linear transformations of YCbCr data to RGB, an attacker is able to calculate which are, starting from the desired RGB value, the YCbCr values to provide.

The reported problem could have been avoided by enforcing the TIFF's specification. Indeed, this program, in the YCbCrSubSampling tag prospective, does not respect the specification. For example, the YCbCrSubSampling values and their relathionship with ImageWidth and ImageLength are not checked. By enforcing the specification, the sizing problem presented, which led to the heap-based buffer overflow, would hardly exist.

We considered only the branches involving PlanarConfiguration == 1, but the same bug, allegedly, is also present in the branch with PlanarConfiguration == 2.

```
0:000> !analyze -v
                    Exception Analysis
**************************
KEY_VALUES_STRING: 1
     Key : AV.Fault
     Value: Write
     Key : Analysis.CPU.mSec
     Value: 2468
     Key : Analysis.DebugAnalysisManager
     Value: Create
     Key : Analysis.Elapsed.mSec
     Value: 9869
     Key : Analysis.Init.CPU.mSec
     Value: 718
     Kev : Analysis.Init.Elapsed.mSec
     Value: 101983
     Key : Analysis.Memory.CommitPeak.Mb
     Key : Timeline.OS.Boot.DeltaSec
Value: 39115
     Key : Timeline.Process.Start.DeltaSec
Value: 101
     Key : WER.OS.Branch
Value: rs5_release
     Key : WER.OS.Timestamp
Value: 2018-09-14T14:34:00Z
     Key : WER.OS.Version
Value: 10.0.17763.1
     Key : WER.Process.Version Value: 1.0.1.1
NTGLOBALFLAG: 2000000
APPLICATION_VERIFIER_FLAGS: 0
APPLICATION_VERIFIER_LOADED: 1
EXCEPTION RECORD: (.exr -1)
ExceptionAddress: 6f959aff (igCore19d!IG_mpi_page_set+0x0010dacf)
ExceptionCode: c00000005 (Access violation)
ExceptionFlags: 00000000
NumberParameters: 2
Parameter[0]: 00000001
Parameter[1]: 0b2c9000
Attempt to write to address 0b2c9000
FAULTING THREAD: 00001f7c
PROCESS NAME: Fuzzme.exe
WRITE_ADDRESS: 0b2c9000
ERROR CODE: (NTSTATUS) 0xc0000005 - The instruction at 0x%p referenced memory at 0x%p. The memory could not be %s.
EXCEPTION CODE STR: c0000005
EXCEPTION PARAMETER1: 00000001
EXCEPTION_PARAMETER2: 0b2c9000
STACK TEXT:
0019ff28 0040668d
0019ff70 765f0419
0019ff80 777a72ed
                        00000005 05276f30 0527df50 Fuzzme!fuzzme+0x324
00291000 765f0400 0019ffdc Fuzzme!fuzzme+0x448d
00291000 96d6a6d3 00000000 KERNEL32!BaseThreadInitThunk+0x19
0019ffdc 777a72bd
0019ffec 00000000
                        ffffffff 777c65cf 00000000 ntdll!_RtlUserThreadStart+0x2f
00406715 00291000 00000000 ntdll!_RtlUserThreadStart+0x1b
STACK_COMMAND: ~0s; .cxr; kb
SYMBOL_NAME: igCore19d!IG_mpi_page_set+10dacf
MODULE_NAME: igCore19d
IMAGE NAME: igCore19d.dll
FAILURE_BUCKET_ID: INVALID_POINTER_WRITE_AVRF_c0000005_igCore19d.dll!IG_mpi_page_set
OS_VERSION: 10.0.17763.1
BUILDLAB STR: rs5 release
OSPLATFORM_TYPE: x86
```

OSNAME: Windows 10

IMAGE_VERSION: 19.10.0.0

FAILURE_ID_HASH: {39ff52ad-9054-81fd-3e4d-ef5d82e4b2c1}

Followup: MachineOwner

Timeline

2021-09-03 - Initial contact

2021-09-07 - Vendor acknowledged and created support ticket

2021-09-10 - Vendor closed support ticket and confirmed under review with engineering team

2021-11-30 - 60 day follow up

2021-12-02 - Vendor advised release planned for Q1 2022

2021-12-07 - 30 day disclosure extension granted

2022-01-06 - Final disclosure notification 2022-02-23 - Public disclosure

CREDIT

Discovered by Francesco Benvenuto of Cisco Talos.

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TALOS-2021-1368 TALOS-2021-1373