



ADVISORY

DATE

16 FEBRUARY 2021

# Telegram rlottie 6.1.1\_1946 VGradientCache::generateGradientColorTable Heap Buffer Overflow

## Summary

Telegram rlottie 6.1.1\_1946 is affected by a Heap Buffer Overflow in the VGradientCache::generateGradientColorTable function: a remote attacker might be able to overwrite heap memory out-of-bounds on a victim device. Note: we'll walk through the android app sources, but the issue applies to iOS and macOS Telegram apps too.

## Product Description (from vendor)

"Telegram is a cloud-based mobile and desktop messaging app with a focus on security and speed.". For more information visit <https://telegram.org/>.

## CVE(s)

- [CVE-2021-31320](#)

## Details

### Root Cause Analysis

Telegram uses a custom fork of [rlottie](#) to render [animated stickers](#). The bug is an heap-based buffer overflow in `VGradientCache::generateGradientColorTable` (starting at [https://github.com/DrKLO/Telegram/blob/release-6.1.1\\_1946/TMessagesPro/ni/rlottie/src/vector/vdrawhelper.cpp#L136](https://github.com/DrKLO/Telegram/blob/release-6.1.1_1946/TMessagesPro/ni/rlottie/src/vector/vdrawhelper.cpp#L136)); an out-of-bounds write access is caused by inaccurate boundary checks.

The `while` loop starting on line [https://github.com/DrKLO/Telegram/blob/release-6.1.1\\_1946/TMessagesPro/ni/rlottie/src/vector/vdrawhelper.cpp#L158](https://github.com/DrKLO/Telegram/blob/release-6.1.1_1946/TMessagesPro/ni/rlottie/src/vector/vdrawhelper.cpp#L158) does not limit `pos` size, which with a great enough input can become larger than `size` (which is the `colorTable` array size), leading to writing out-of-bounds 4 bytes.

Specifically, while `fpos` and `incr` are static, `curr->first` comes directly from the animated sticker, `colorTable` is an `uint32_t` array of size 1024, hence it is possible to overwrite an arbitrary amount memory after it by carefully using a specific float number as `curr->first` in the animated sticker file.

The written values are controlled via the sticker file too, but not 100% arbitrary because of ARGB codes constraints readable in `premulARGB0` ([https://github.com/DrKLO/Telegram/blob/release-6.1.1\\_1946/TMessagesPro/ni/rlottie/src/vector/vglobal.h#L292](https://github.com/DrKLO/Telegram/blob/release-6.1.1_1946/TMessagesPro/ni/rlottie/src/vector/vglobal.h#L292) and `getColorReplacement()` ([https://github.com/DrKLO/Telegram/blob/release-6.1.1\\_1946/TMessagesPro/ni/rlottie/src/rlottie/rlottiemodel.h#L99](https://github.com/DrKLO/Telegram/blob/release-6.1.1_1946/TMessagesPro/ni/rlottie/src/rlottie/rlottiemodel.h#L99)).

### Proof of Concept

A blogpost will be published soon on [our blog](#) with a PoC walkthrough and further details.

### Impact

A remote attacker might be able to overwrite Telegram's heap memory out-of-bounds on a victim device.

### Remediation

Upgrade to Telegram 6.2.0 (1984) or later.

## Disclosure Timeline

- 4/06/2020:
  - Telegram releases version 6.2.0 (1984) with a patch

## Credits

[podet](#) of Shielder

This advisory was first published on <https://www.shielder.com/advisories/telegram-rlottie-vgradientcache-generategradientcolortable-heap-buffer-overflow/>

### INFO

Shielder S.r.l.

P.I. 11435310013

REA TO - 1213132

Registered Capital: 81.000,00 €

Via Palestro, 1/C  
10064 Pinerolo (TO) Italy



### CONTACTS

[info@shielder.com](mailto:info@shielder.com)

Landline: (+39) 0121 - 39 36 42

Commercial: (+39) 345 - 30 31 983

Technical: (+39) 393 - 16 66 814



### SITEMAP

[Home](#)

[Company](#)

[Services](#)

[Advisories](#)

[Blog](#)

