

☆ Starred by 3 users

Owner:	<a href="#">caseq@chromium.org</a>
CC:	<div><div></div><div><a href="#">karandeepb@chromium.org</a> <a href="#">adetaylor@chromium.org</a> <a href="#">rdevl...@chromium.org</a> <div><div></div><div><a href="#">benmason@chromium.org</a> <a href="#">tjudkins@chromium.org</a> <a href="#">pbomm...@chromium.org</a> <a href="#">caseq@chromium.org</a> <a href="#">dgozman@chromium.org</a> <a href="#">achuith@chromium.org</a> <a href="#">sa...@chromium.org</a> <a href="#">solomonkinard@chromium.org</a></div></div></div></div>
Status:	Fixed (Closed)
Components:	<a href="#">Platform&gt;Extensions</a>
Modified:	Apr 10, 2020
Backlog-Rank:	----
Editors:	----
EstimatedDays:	----
NextAction:	----
OS:	<a href="#">Linux</a> , <a href="#">Windows</a> , <a href="#">Chrome</a> , <a href="#">Mac</a> , <a href="#">Fuchsia</a>
Pri:	1
Type:	<a href="#">Bug-Security</a>
<div><div>Hotlist-Merge-Review</div><div>reward-5000</div><div>ReleaseBlock-NA</div><div>Security_Impact-Stable</div><div>Security_Severity-Medium</div><div>reward-decline</div><div>allpublic</div><div>CVE_description-submitted</div><div>Target-79</div><div>M-79</div><div>merge-merged-3987</div><div>merge-merged-80</div><div>Release-0-M80</div><div>CVE-2020-6392</div></div>	

Issue 1030411: JavaScript injection via malicious WebExtension in CWS

Reported by [jun.k...@microsoft.com](#) on Tue, Dec 3, 2019, 4:23 PM EST 

Project Member

Code

#### VULNERABILITY DETAILS

Chrome is protecting privileged origins like <https://chrome.google.com/webstore/category/extensions> against modifications by malicious WebExtensions. These protections include the prohibition of intercepting requests via the WebRequest functionality or injecting custom JavaScript via Content or Background scripts. Additionally Chrome does not allow to attach a debugger to these origins. In case a tab is already debugged when a privileged origin is loaded, the debugger gets disconnected. It was discovered that this protection can be bypassed, which allows a WebExtension to execute JavaScript in these origins via the debugger functionality.

At first a malicious WebExtension loads a new about:blank tab and attaches a debugger. The debugger registers interception so it is able to modify any HTTP responses received inside this tab. Now the WebExtension can load an API endpoint like <https://chrome.google.com/webstore/category/extensions> as the top origin in the debugged tab. The WebExtension is not only able to see the request but also able to return a custom HTTP response for this endpoint. By simply returning an HTML payload, it is possible to execute JavaScript in <https://chrome.google.com/webstore/category/extensions>. Afterwards the debugger gets finally disconnected from the tab, but the custom response was already rendered. It must be noted that this attack scenario works for other privileged origins like the NTP as well.

It is recommended that a debugger gets detached as soon as a request to a privileged origin is triggered. This ensures that the current security design handles top navigations as well and therefore protects these origins properly.

VERSION

Chrome Version: 79.0.3945.56 beta

Operating System: Windows 10

REPRODUCTION CASE

1. Extract attached ZIP file

2. Load the folder as unpacked extension

3. Observe an alert in CWS

interception.zip

2.7 KB [Download](#)

**Components:** Platform>Extensions

Just FYI, this bug was found internally by someone else, but I'm reporting on behalf of him.

[Comment 2](#) by [metzman@chromium.org](mailto:metzman@chromium.org) on Wed, Dec 4, 2019, 10:52 AM EST

**Cc:** [rdevl...@chromium.org](mailto:rdevl...@chromium.org) [karandeepb@chromium.org](mailto:karandeepb@chromium.org)

**Labels:** Security\_Severity-Medium OS-Chrome OS-Fuchsia OS-Linux OS-Mac OS-Windows Pri-1

[rdevlin.cronin@](mailto:rdevlin.cronin@) or [karandeepb@](mailto:karandeepb@) could one of you please take a look?

Thanks!

[Comment 3](#) by [rdevl...@chromium.org](mailto:rdevl...@chromium.org) on Wed, Dec 4, 2019, 2:46 PM EST

**Status:** Assigned (was: Unconfirmed)

**Owner:** [caseq@chromium.org](mailto:caseq@chromium.org)

Thanks for the report!

Over to caseq for devtools / debugger API. Is there a way we could prevent the extension from intercepting requests to origins it doesn't have access to (at least, top-level requests like this?). It seems like that would be a good generic check, in addition to protecting the webstore.

[Comment 4](#) by [sheriffbot@chromium.org](mailto:sheriffbot@chromium.org) on Thu, Dec 5, 2019, 9:57 AM EST

**Labels:** Target-79 M-79

Setting milestone and target because of Security\_Impact=Beta and medium severity.

For more details visit <https://www.chromium.org/issue-tracking/autotriage> - Your friendly Sheriffbot

[Comment 5](#) by [sheriffbot@chromium.org](mailto:sheriffbot@chromium.org) on Thu, Dec 5, 2019, 10:02 AM EST

**Labels:** ReleaseBlock-Stable

This is a serious security regression. If you are not able to fix this quickly, please revert the change that introduced it.

If this doesn't affect a release branch, or has not been properly classified for severity, please update the Security\_Impact or Security\_Severity labels, and remove the ReleaseBlock label. To disable this altogether, apply ReleaseBlock-NA.

For more details visit <https://www.chromium.org/issue-tracking/autotriage> - Your friendly Sheriffbot

[Comment 6](#) by [gov...@chromium.org](mailto:gov...@chromium.org) on Thu, Dec 5, 2019, 10:19 AM EST

**Cc:** [adetaylor@chromium.org](mailto:adetaylor@chromium.org) [pbomm...@chromium.org](mailto:pbomm...@chromium.org)

+[adetaylor@](mailto:adetaylor@) (Security TPM).

This is security severity "Medium" and no fix available. Can we please target this for M80?

[Comment 7](#) by [adetaylor@chromium.org](mailto:adetaylor@chromium.org) on Thu, Dec 5, 2019, 12:19 PM EST

This is marked as Security\_Impact-Beta, which implies it is a serious regression between 78 and 79. I doubt that's the case. [caseq@rdevlin.cronin@](mailto:caseq@rdevlin.cronin@) - can you confirm this affects M78 and earlier too?

[Comment 8](#) by [caseq@chromium.org](mailto:caseq@chromium.org) on Thu, Dec 5, 2019, 5:35 PM EST

**Status:** Started (was: Assigned)

**Labels:** -ReleaseBlock-Stable

Thanks for the report, that's an impressive trick -- we'll work on fixing this soon! However, I don't think this is new for m79, the API being exploited has been around for a while. Removing RB-Stable based on this, but will still treat this as P1.

[Comment 9](#) by [jun.k...@microsoft.com](mailto:jun.k...@microsoft.com) on Thu, Dec 5, 2019, 5:37 PM EST Project Member

I did see Stable build blocking this attack. I think this is a regression. Have you tested in Stable build?

[Comment 10](#) by [caseq@chromium.org](mailto:caseq@chromium.org) on Thu, Dec 5, 2019, 9:40 PM EST

**Labels:** ReleaseBlock-Stable

[Comment 11](#) by [caseq@chromium.org](mailto:caseq@chromium.org) on Thu, Dec 5, 2019, 9:47 PM EST

Jun, you're right, I couldn't reproduce this on m78 so far. My understanding is that this is prevented by the check for current \_visible\_ URL of the tab being debugged, which happens to be new (not yet committed URL of the privileged origin) in m78 and old (about:blank) in m79. Bringing RBS back for the time being, although I "think" m78 may be exploitable as well with some modifications, let me try...

[Comment 12](#) by [pbomm...@chromium.org](mailto:pbomm...@chromium.org) on Fri, Dec 6, 2019, 12:25 PM EST

**Cc:** [benmason@chromium.org](mailto:benmason@chromium.org)

[Comment 13](#) by [caseq@chromium.org](mailto:caseq@chromium.org) on Fri, Dec 6, 2019, 5:30 PM EST

**Owner:** [tjudkins@chromium.org](mailto:tjudkins@chromium.org)

**Cc:** [tjudkins@chromium.org](mailto:tjudkins@chromium.org) [sa...@chromium.org](mailto:sa...@chromium.org) [caseq@chromium.org](mailto:caseq@chromium.org)

I bisected this down to this CL: <https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+1737819>. Over to [tjudkins@](mailto:tjudkins@) whether the side effect that we have is expected and whether fixes in other places are required.

For some background, DebuggerFunction::InitAgentHost() somehow started using the last committed URL (about:blank) instead of new, not-yet-committed, restricted URL in a call to ExtensionCanAttachToURL() here: [https://cs.chromium.org/chromium/src/chrome/browser/extensions/api/debugger/debugger\\_api.cc?rcl=11f4508e563f02e900ad9f963e7c4e90a4c1d637&l=431](https://cs.chromium.org/chromium/src/chrome/browser/extensions/api/debugger/debugger_api.cc?rcl=11f4508e563f02e900ad9f963e7c4e90a4c1d637&l=431). I don't see what exactly in the CL lead to this behavior, but are we using the right web contents there?

We can fix this by having checks elsewhere in DevTools, but I'd like someone who's more familiar with extensions code to assess whether there may be a similar problem elsewhere.

[Comment 14](#) by [adetaylor@chromium.org](mailto:adetaylor@chromium.org) on Fri, Dec 6, 2019, 6:01 PM EST

**Labels:** -ReleaseBlock-Stable ReleaseBlock-NA

Discussed with Devlin. It's essentially too late to wait for a fix here for M79, so the only option is to revert [issue-094628](#). But that would be a horrendous revert - it's a huge change and has developer-visible consequences. I am removing RBS for that reason.

So, we will unfortunately need to ship with this regression in M79. However we should include this in the first stable update of M79 as it's a regression, even though it's only medium severity. Once this is fixed, please add Merge-Request-79.

Consequences of this bug potentially include spoofing extensions or triggering extension installation flow. There might be other protected origins with even more serious consequences. But this can only be triggered from a malicious extension, and there will still be a native confirmation dialog which cannot be bypassed, so it remains medium severity.

[Comment 15](#) by [caseq@chromium.org](mailto:caseq@chromium.org) on Fri, Dec 6, 2019, 6:05 PM EST

I'm not suggesting we have to revert this as a fix, there may be other fixes available. Also, my understanding that the observed change may be due to this:

[https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+1737819/31/chrome/browser/extensions/api/tabs/tabs\\_api.cc](https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+1737819/31/chrome/browser/extensions/api/tabs/tabs_api.cc)

In which case there's a chance there's a chance this exploit can be slightly modified to work on m78 as well (investigating this right now).

Comment 16 Deleted

Comment 17 by caseq@chromium.org on Fri, Dec 6, 2019, 6:14 PM EST

... a-and it's so indeed. So basically the good news is that this is not a regression. The bad news is that we have this problem in earlier versions as well.

What [crrev.com/c/1737819](https://crrev.com/c/1737819) does essentially is that it switches the extension-initiated navigation to be treated as the renderer-initiated one. So if we update the exploit to use renderer-initiated navigation to navigate about:blank, we get it working for the older versions as well.

I'll grab this and implement a check upon initiating navigation request in the DevTools land.

Comment 18 by adetaylor@chromium.org on Fri, Dec 6, 2019, 6:15 PM EST

Labels: -Security\_Impact-Beta Security\_Impact-Stable

Thanks caseq@!

Comment 19 by caseq@chromium.org on Mon, Dec 9, 2019, 7:40 PM EST

Cc: dgozman@chromium.org

Comment 20 by bugdroid on Mon, Dec 9, 2019, 11:28 PM EST

The following revision refers to this bug:

<https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src.git/+0788b1d419f78050f114ffefd1f68cd88d1dab>

commit 0788b1d419f78050f114ffefd1f68cd88d1dab

Author: Andrey Kosyakov <[caseq@chromium.org](mailto:caseq@chromium.org)>

Date: Tue Dec 10 04:28:11 2019

DevTools: check session can inspect URL we're about to navigate to

[Bug: 1030444](#)

Change-Id: I0696686982f1a089dc554013847ab4a2dafce83b

Reviewed-on: <https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+1956529>

Reviewed-by: Devlin <[rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org](mailto:rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org)>

Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <[dgozman@chromium.org](mailto:dgozman@chromium.org)>

Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <[caseq@chromium.org](mailto:caseq@chromium.org)>

Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#723234}

[modify] [https://crrev.com/0788b1d419f78050f114ffefd1f68cd88d1dab/chrome/browser/extensions/api/debugger/debugger\\_api.cc](https://crrev.com/0788b1d419f78050f114ffefd1f68cd88d1dab/chrome/browser/extensions/api/debugger/debugger_api.cc)

[modify] [https://crrev.com/0788b1d419f78050f114ffefd1f68cd88d1dab/content/browser/devtools/devtools\\_instrumentation.cc](https://crrev.com/0788b1d419f78050f114ffefd1f68cd88d1dab/content/browser/devtools/devtools_instrumentation.cc)

[modify] [https://crrev.com/0788b1d419f78050f114ffefd1f68cd88d1dab/content/browser/devtools/render\\_frame\\_devtools\\_agent\\_host.cc](https://crrev.com/0788b1d419f78050f114ffefd1f68cd88d1dab/content/browser/devtools/render_frame_devtools_agent_host.cc)

[modify] [https://crrev.com/0788b1d419f78050f114ffefd1f68cd88d1dab/content/browser/devtools/render\\_frame\\_devtools\\_agent\\_host.h](https://crrev.com/0788b1d419f78050f114ffefd1f68cd88d1dab/content/browser/devtools/render_frame_devtools_agent_host.h)

[modify] [https://crrev.com/0788b1d419f78050f114ffefd1f68cd88d1dab/content/public/browser/devtools\\_agent\\_host\\_client.cc](https://crrev.com/0788b1d419f78050f114ffefd1f68cd88d1dab/content/public/browser/devtools_agent_host_client.cc)

[modify] [https://crrev.com/0788b1d419f78050f114ffefd1f68cd88d1dab/content/public/browser/devtools\\_agent\\_host\\_client.h](https://crrev.com/0788b1d419f78050f114ffefd1f68cd88d1dab/content/public/browser/devtools_agent_host_client.h)

Comment 21 by meacer@google.com on Thu, Jan 2, 2020, 1:29 PM EST

Andrey, thanks for the fix. Just checking if there is any remaining work here.

Comment 22 by caseq@chromium.org on Thu, Jan 2, 2020, 1:43 PM EST

Status: Fixed (was: Started)

Ah, sorry, no, there's no more work to do. The fix is there, I just forgot to close the bug.

Comment 23 by sheriffbot@chromium.org on Fri, Jan 3, 2020, 10:43 AM EST

Labels: -Restrict-View-SecurityTeam Restrict-View-SecurityNotify

Comment 24 by natashapabrai@google.com on Mon, Jan 6, 2020, 12:57 PM EST

Labels: reward-topanel

Comment 25 by sheriffbot@chromium.org on Tue, Jan 7, 2020, 11:09 AM EST

Labels: Merge-Request-80

Requesting merge to beta M80 because latest trunk commit (723234) appears to be after beta branch point (722274).

For more details visit <https://www.chromium.org/issue-tracking/autotriage> - Your friendly Sheriffbot

Comment 26 by sheriffbot@chromium.org on Tue, Jan 7, 2020, 11:14 AM EST

Labels: -Merge-Request-80 Merge-Review-80 Hotlist-Merge-Review

This bug requires manual review: M80's targeted beta branch promotion date has already passed, so this requires manual review  
Before a merge request will be considered, the following information is required to be added to this bug:

1. Does your merge fit within the Merge Decision Guidelines?  
- Chrome: <https://goto.google.com/chrome-release-branch-merge-guidelines>  
- Chrome OS: <https://goto.google.com/cros-release-branch-merge-guidelines>
2. Links to the CLs you are requesting to merge.
3. Has the change landed and been verified on master/Tot?
4. Why are these changes required in this milestone after branch?
5. Is this a new feature?
6. If it is a new feature, is it behind a flag using finch?

Please contact the milestone owner if you have questions.

Owners: govind@ (Android), Kariahda@ (iOS), dgagnon@ (ChromeOS), srinivassista@ (Desktop)

For more details visit <https://www.chromium.org/issue-tracking/autotriage> - Your friendly Sheriffbot

Comment 27 by srinivassista@google.com on Tue, Jan 7, 2020, 11:54 AM EST

caseq@ pls help answer the questions in [comment #26](#) for merge-review.

Comment 28 by caseq@google.com on Tue, Jan 7, 2020, 12:21 PM EST

> 1. Does your merge fit within the Merge Decision Guidelines?

> - Chrome: <https://goto.google.com/chrome-release-branch-merge-guidelines>

This is a security fix, so I defer to security team for judgement on how critical this is. It should be mostly harmless, but it technically does introduce additional checks that may cause an extension to get disconnected, so potentially some extensions "may" be broken, although the chances of breaking some useful behavior appear pretty slim to me.

> 2. Links to the CLs you are requesting to merge.

<https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+1956529>

> 3. Has the change landed and been verified on master/Tot?

Yes

> 4. Why are these changes required in this milestone after branch?

This is a fix for a security problem.

> 5. Is this a new feature?

> 6. If it is a new feature, is it behind a flag using finch?

This is not a feature.

[Comment 29](#) by [srinivassista@google.com](#) on Tue, Jan 7, 2020, 1:10 PM EST  
adetaylor@ can you chime in your thoughts if we should take this merge to M80?

[Comment 30](#) by [adetaylor@chromium.org](#) on Tue, Jan 7, 2020, 2:36 PM EST  
I'd say yes. This is not serious enough to want to merge to stable, but a merge to beta would be good, to get the fix out a bit sooner.

[Comment 31](#) by [srinivassista@google.com](#) on Thu, Jan 9, 2020, 1:00 AM EST  
**Labels:** -Merge-Review-80 Merge-Approved-80  
merge approved to M80 branch:3987

[Comment 32](#) by [natashapabrai@google.com](#) on Thu, Jan 9, 2020, 11:51 AM EST  
**Labels:** -reward-topanel reward-unpaid reward-5000  
\*\*\* Boilerplate reminders! \*\*\*  
Please do NOT publicly disclose details until a fix has been released to all our users. Early public disclosure may cancel the provisional reward. Also, please be considerate about disclosure when the bug affects a core library that may be used by other products. Please do NOT share this information with third parties who are not directly involved in fixing the bug. Doing so may cancel the provisional reward. Please be honest if you have already disclosed anything publicly or to third parties. Lastly, we understand that some of you are not interested in money. We offer the option to donate your reward to an eligible charity. If you prefer this option, let us know and we will also match your donation - subject to our discretion. Any rewards that are unclaimed after 12 months will be donated to a charity of our choosing.

Please contact [security-vp@chromium.org](#) with any questions.  
\*\*\*\*\*

[Comment 33](#) by [natashapabrai@google.com](#) on Thu, Jan 9, 2020, 11:57 AM EST  
Congrats! The Panel decided to reward \$5,000 for this report!

[Comment 34](#) by [natashapabrai@google.com](#) on Thu, Jan 9, 2020, 11:58 AM EST  
**Labels:** -reward-unpaid reward-decline

[Comment 35](#) by [bugdroid](#) on Thu, Jan 9, 2020, 11:47 PM EST  
**Labels:** -merge-approved-80 merge-merged-3987 merge-merged-80

The following revision refers to this bug:  
<https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src.git/+a8264ba685f1bdfde1a1e8b17ec30ef6194a0dec>

commit [a8264ba685f1bdfde1a1e8b17ec30ef6194a0dec](#)  
Author: Andrey Kosyakov <[caseq@chromium.org](#)>  
Date: Fri Jan 10 04:45:57 2020

DevTools: check session can inspect URL we're about to navigate to

TBR=[rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org](#)

(cherry picked from commit [0788b1d419f78050f1114fffd1f68cd88d1dab](#))

~~Bug=1030444~~

Change-Id: [I0696686982f1a089dc554013847ab4a2dafce83b](#)  
Reviewed-on: <https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+1956529>  
Reviewed-by: Devlin <[rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org](#)>  
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <[dgozman@chromium.org](#)>  
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <[caseq@chromium.org](#)>  
Cr-Original-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#723234}  
Reviewed-on: <https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+1992764>  
Reviewed-by: Andrey Kosyakov <[caseq@chromium.org](#)>  
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/branch-heads/3987@{#456}  
Cr-Branched-From: [c4e8da9871cc266be74481e212f3a5252972509d](#)-refs/heads/master@{#722274}

[modify] [https://crrev.com/a8264ba685f1bdfde1a1e8b17ec30ef6194a0dec/chrome/browser/extensions/api/debugger/debugger\\_api.cc](https://crrev.com/a8264ba685f1bdfde1a1e8b17ec30ef6194a0dec/chrome/browser/extensions/api/debugger/debugger_api.cc)  
[modify] [https://crrev.com/a8264ba685f1bdfde1a1e8b17ec30ef6194a0dec/content/browser/devtools/devtools\\_instrumentation.cc](https://crrev.com/a8264ba685f1bdfde1a1e8b17ec30ef6194a0dec/content/browser/devtools/devtools_instrumentation.cc)  
[modify] [https://crrev.com/a8264ba685f1bdfde1a1e8b17ec30ef6194a0dec/content/browser/devtools/render\\_frame\\_devtools\\_agent\\_host.cc](https://crrev.com/a8264ba685f1bdfde1a1e8b17ec30ef6194a0dec/content/browser/devtools/render_frame_devtools_agent_host.cc)  
[modify] [https://crrev.com/a8264ba685f1bdfde1a1e8b17ec30ef6194a0dec/content/browser/devtools/render\\_frame\\_devtools\\_agent\\_host.h](https://crrev.com/a8264ba685f1bdfde1a1e8b17ec30ef6194a0dec/content/browser/devtools/render_frame_devtools_agent_host.h)  
[modify] [https://crrev.com/a8264ba685f1bdfde1a1e8b17ec30ef6194a0dec/content/public/browser/devtools\\_agent\\_host\\_client.cc](https://crrev.com/a8264ba685f1bdfde1a1e8b17ec30ef6194a0dec/content/public/browser/devtools_agent_host_client.cc)  
[modify] [https://crrev.com/a8264ba685f1bdfde1a1e8b17ec30ef6194a0dec/content/public/browser/devtools\\_agent\\_host\\_client.h](https://crrev.com/a8264ba685f1bdfde1a1e8b17ec30ef6194a0dec/content/public/browser/devtools_agent_host_client.h)

[Comment 36](#) by [adetaylor@google.com](#) on Sat, Feb 1, 2020, 8:13 PM EST  
**Labels:** Release-0-M80

[Comment 37](#) by [adetaylor@google.com](#) on Mon, Feb 3, 2020, 3:59 PM EST  
[jun.kokatsu@microsoft.com](#) - in #c1 you mention this was found by someone else. By default, I'll credit you in the release notes, but if you'd like the original reporter to be credited, please let me know the correct attribution in the next hour or two. Thanks!

[Comment 38](#) by [jun.k...@microsoft.com](#) on Mon, Feb 3, 2020, 4:32 PM EST Project Member  
Hi, please use "Microsoft Edge Team" as a credit.

[Comment 39](#) by [adetaylor@chromium.org](#) on Mon, Feb 3, 2020, 4:36 PM EST  
Will do, thanks!

[Comment 40](#) by [adetaylor@chromium.org](#) on Mon, Feb 3, 2020, 6:47 PM EST  
**Labels:** CVE-2020-6392 CVE\_description-missing

[Comment 41](#) by [adetaylor@chromium.org](#) on Mon, Feb 10, 2020, 4:37 PM EST  
**Labels:** -CVE\_description-missing CVE\_description-submitted

[Comment 42](#) by [adetaylor@google.com](#) on Wed, Mar 4, 2020, 1:44 PM EST  
**Cc:** [achuith@chromium.org](#)

[Comment 43](#) by sheriffbot on Fri, Apr 10, 2020, 1:54 PM EDT

**Labels:** -Restrict-View-SecurityNotify allpublic

This bug has been closed for more than 14 weeks. Removing security view restrictions.

For more details visit <https://www.chromium.org/issue-tracking/autotriage> - Your friendly Sheriffbot