Remote code execution in dependabot-core branch names when cloning

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Description Impact Remote code execution vulnerability in dependabot-common and dependabot-go_modules when a source branch name contains malicious injectable bash code. For example, if Dependabot is configured to use the following source branch name: "/\$({cur1,127.0.0.1})", Dependabot will make a HTTP request to the following URL: 127.0.0.1 when cloning the source repository. When Dependabot is configured to clone the source repository during an update, Dependabot runs a shell command to git clone the repository: git clone --no-tags --no-recurse-submodules --depth=1 --branch=<BRANCH> --single-branch <GITHUB REPO URL> repo/contents/path Dependabot will always clone the source repository for go_modules during the file fetching step and can be configured to clone the repository for other package managers using the FileFetcher class from dependabot-common source = Dependabot::Source.new(provide: "github", repo: "repo/name", directory: "/", branch: "/\$({curl,127.0.0.1})",) repo_contents_path = "./file/path" fetcher = Dependabot::FileFetchers.for_package_manager("bundler"). Patches The fix was applied to version 0.125.1: #2727 Workarounds Escape the branch name prior to passing it to the Dependabot::Source class. For example using shellwords: require "shellwords" branch = Shellwords.escape("/\$({curl,127.0.0.1})") source = Dependabot::Source.new(provider: "github", repo: "repo/name". directory: "/", branch: branch,

Severity



CVE ID

CVE-2020-26222

Weaknesses

No CWEs

Credits

mrthankyou