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## An SSRF vulnerability leads to system access #22



New issue

○ Closed ViktorWkxStar opened this issue on Sep 7, 2020 · 6 comments

## ViktorWkxStar commented on Sep 7, 2020

By looking at the source code, we found a SSRF vulnerability that could read arbitrary files on a remote or local server and save them to a web server. Therefore, malicious users can download the malicious Trojan files to the web server to obtain the permissions of the web server.

public function downloadImage(\$url = '', \$name = '', \$type = 0, \$timeout = 30, \$w = 0, \$h = 0) { if (!strlen(trim(\$url))) return ''; if (!strlen(trim(\$name))) { //TODO 弦取要下载的文件名 称 \$downloadImageInfo = \$this->getImageExtname(\$url); if (|\$this->checkExtname(\$url, \$downloadImageInfo['ext\_name'])) { return JsonService::fail('文件后缀不合法'); } \$name = \$downloadImageInfo['file\_name']; if (!strlen(trim(\$name))) return ''; }

The above code is to get the name of the file to download

//TODO 获取远程文件所采用的方法 if (\$type) { \$ch = curl\_init(); curl\_setopt(\$ch, CURLOPT\_URL, \$url); curl\_setopt(\$ch, CURLOPT\_RETURNTRANSFER, false); curl\_setopt(\$ch, CURLOPT\_CONNECTTIMEOUT, \$timeout); curl\_setopt(\$ch, CURLOPT\_SSL\_VERIFYPEER, false); //TODO 跳过证书检查 if (stripos(\$url, "https://") !== FALSE) curl\_setopt(\$ch, CURLOPT\_SSL\_VERIFYPEST, 2); //TODO 从证书中检查SSL加密算法是否存在 curl\_setopt(\$ch, CURLOPT\_HTTPHEADER, array('user-agent:' . \$\_SERVER['HTTP\_USER\_AGENT'])); if (ini\_get('open\_basedir') == '' && ini\_get('safe\_mode' == 'Off')) curl\_setopt(\$ch, CURLOPT\_FOLLOWLOCATION, 1);//TODO 是否采集301, 302之后的页面 \$content = curl\_exec(\$ch); curl\_close(\$ch); } else { try { ob\_start(); readfile(\$url): \$content = ob get contents(): ob end clean(): } catch (\Exception \$e) { return \$e->getMessage(): } }

Since the default value of the \$type parameter is 0, it will skip the if judgment directly and jump to the else judgment. The readfile method reads the value of the \$url parameter and writes it to the output buffer. \$content gets the content of the output buffer through the ob\_get\_contents() method.

\$size = strlen(trim(\$content)); if (!\$content || \$size <= 2) return '图片流狭取失败'; \$date\_dir = date('Y') . DS . date('m') . DS . date('d'); \$upload\_type = sys\_config('upload\_type', 1); \$upload = new Upload((int)\$upload\_type, [ 'accessKey' => sys\_config('accessKey'), 'secretKey' => sys\_config('secretKey'), 'uploadUrl' => sys\_config('uploadUrl'), 'storageName' => sys\_config('storage\_name'), 'storageRegion' => sys\_config('storage\_region'), ]); \$info = \$upload->to('attach/' . \$date\_dir)->validate()->stream(\$content, \$name); if (\$info === false) { return \$upload->getError(); } \$imageInfo = \$upload->getUploadInfo(); \$date['path'] = str\_replace('\\', '/', \$imageInfo['dir']); \$date['name'] = \$imageInfo['name']; \$date['size'] = \$imageInfo['name'] | \$imageInfo['size']; \$date['mime'] = \$imageInfo['type']; \$date['image\_type'] = \$upload\_type; \$date['is\_exists'] = false; return \$date; } The rest of the code is to write the contents of the read file to the web server.

## Recurrence of loopholes:

1. http://localhost/admin/store.\_copy\_taobao/downloadImage

POST http://localhost/admin/store.\_copy\_taobao/downloadImage HTTP/1.1

Host: localhost

Content-Length: 77

Accept: application/json, text/javascript, /; q=0.01

X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest

User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/85.0.4183.83 Safari/537.36

Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

Origin: http://localhost

Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin

Sec-Fetch-Mode: cors


Sec-Fetch-Dest: empty

Referer: http://localhost/admin/store.copy\_taobao/index.html

Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate

Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9

Cookie: clear\_0.0.1=1; PHPSESSID=fa722bf27161fcf456f38e1f47750105; mapKey=%22%22; login\_back\_url=%22/cart%22



NicoleG25 commented on Dec 1, 2020

@FeiLiao-9 你好

这个问题曾经解决过吗?

请注意,该漏洞已分配给 CVE-2020-25466

提前致谢

ViktorWkxStar commented on Dec 1, 2020

Author

已解决

NicoleG25 commented on Dec 1, 2020

@ViktorWkxStar 你能指出我的解决办法吗?

ViktorWkxStar commented on Dec 1, 2020

Author

更新了新的版本取消了那个远程下载的功能

NicoleG25 commented on Dec 1, 2020

你有 commit ?

提前致谢!

@ViktorWkxStar

NiktorWkxStar commented on Dec 1, 2020

Author

no

@ evoxwht closed this as completed on Mar 23

Assignees

No one assigned

Labels

None yet

Projects

None yet

Milestone

No milestone

Development

No branches or pull requests

3 participants

