

[New issue](#)[Jump to bottom](#)

# Deallocation of control->suffix corrupts Heap Memory #216

✓ Closed

pietroborrello opened this issue on Feb 24 · 5 comments

pietroborrello commented on Feb 24

The `suffix` field in the static `rzip_control` structure is initialized to point to global memory in [initialize\\_control](#)

[lrzip/lrzip.c](#)

Line 1341 in 64eb4a8

```
1341     control->suffix = ".lrz";
```

and in the lrzip [main](#).

[lrzip/main.c](#)

Line 496 in 6a1600b

```
496     control->suffix = optarg;
```

However the field is then treated as a heap allocated variable while freeing the `rzip_control` variable. Both in `rzip_control_free`

[lrzip/rzip.c](#)

Line 1269 in 465afe8

```
1269     dealloc(control->suffix);
```

and when setting a new suffix

[lrzip/liblrzip.c](#)

Line 439 in 465afe8

```
439     dealloc(lr->control->suffix);
```

## Impact

Corrupting the heap state may result in an exploitable vulnerability, especially if initialized with `optarg` that points to global RW memory.

## Fix

It is sufficient to initialize `control->suffix` using the return value of a `strdup` of the strings.

**pete4abw** commented on Feb 24

Contributor

Good grief! This has been around since v0.1 and rzip before, even before I became involved (v0.19). The `initialise` function should be used for setting constants or like-size variables, like compression level, etc. Setting `control->suffix` to equal `optarg` is probably a mistake if there will be recursion. I think the dealloc of `suffix` is incorrect too. It does not need to be. HOWEVER, the ability to pipe input to `lrzip` sort of makes recursion obsolete and unnecessary. `strdup` will work and I'll see about implementing it in `lrzip-next`. Thank you

**pietroborrello** commented on Feb 25

Author

Great, thank you! Will checkout `lrzip-next`


 **pietroborrello** closed this as completed on Feb 25

 **ckolivas** reopened this on Feb 25

**ckolivas** commented on Feb 25

Owner

Fixed in master.

 **ckolivas** closed this as completed on Feb 25

  **pete4abw** mentioned this issue on Feb 25

**#216 may have other issues #217**

 Closed

**carnil** commented on Apr 16

Retrospective note: This seems to have been a CVE assigned, which is [CVE-2022-28044](#).

utkarsh2102 commented on May 12

Hello, is there a simple reproducer for this one?

#### Assignees

No one assigned

#### Labels

None yet

#### Projects

None yet

#### Milestone

No milestone

#### Development

No branches or pull requests

5 participants

