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[SYSS-2019-039] Smartbear ReadyAPI/SoapUI Pro/jProductivity Licensing Unsafe Descrialization

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Advisory ID: SYSS-2019-039
Product: Protection Licensing Toolkit, SoapUI/LoadUI/ServiceV Pro
Manufacturer: JProductivity LLC, SmartBear Software
Affected Version(s): - ReadyAPI 3.2.5
Tested Version(s): ReadyAPI 3.2.5
Vulnerability Type: Unsafe deserialization/remote code execution (CWE-502)
Risk Level: High
Solution Status: Open
Manufacturer Notification: 2019-09-02
Public Disclosure: 2020-05-18
CVE Reference: CVE-2020-12835
Author of Advisory: Moritz Bechler, SySS GmbH

jProductivity Protection! is a solution for software vendors to implement licensing checks and management in their products.

The manufacturer describes the product as follows (see [1]):

"Protection! - is a powerful multi-platform Licensing Toolkit and License Manager that provides the ability to add licensing into custom applications or components only allowing the permitted use according to the supplied license."

ReadyAPI is a suite of web service testing tools. It is using the jProductivity Protection licensing solution.

The manufacturer describes the product as follows (see [2]):

"The ReadyAPI platform accelerates functional, security, and load testing of RESTful, SOAP, GraphQL and other web services right inside your CI/CD pipeline."

The jProductivity Protection Licensing Toolkit is using RMI-based network protocols to communicate with its network license server. These protocols are susceptible to deserialization attacks, which in the case of ReadyAPI can be exploited to gain remote code execution on the client side.

When trying to check out a remote floating license, the client softare, ReadyAPI, contacts the Licensing Server using the Java RMI protocol on port 1099. As there is no transport security, this service can be impersonated by an attacker in a suitable position on the network.

Java RMI, and the underlying JRMP protocol, heavily relies on Java serialization to transport method arguments, return values and exception data.

Java serialization has been shown ([5]) to in many cases allow the execution of arbitrary code when certain specially crafted object graphs are reconstructed during deserialization.

ReadyAPI contains multiple libraries with published gadgets that can be exploited in this way. $\label{eq:contains} % \begin{array}{c} \left(\frac{1}{2} \right) & \left$

While the license server suffers from the same vulnerability, no gadgets were identified that lead to direct code execution.

Proof of Concept (PoC):

Setup a JRMF/RMI service that returns a malicious serialized object graph. In this case, a gadget from the commons-beanutils library is used to get command execution. Other options exist on the ReadyAPI classpath.

\$ java -DproperXalanetrue \
-cp commons-beanutils-1.9.3.jar:target/ysoserial-0.0.6-SNAPSHOT-all.jar
ysoserial.exploit.JRMPListener 1099 CommonsBeanutils1 gnome-calculator
'Opening JRMP listener on 1099
Have connection from /192.168.56.102:34834
Reading message...
Sending return with payload for obj [0:0:0, 0]
Closing connection

When trying to check out a floating license from the rogue server, RMI calls are made which results in the deserialization of the attacker-provided serialized data. Here, this causes the gnome-calculator program to be run.

Avoid using Java serialization-based network prococols like RMI and deserializing untrusted data in general. If they cannot be avoided, strict whitelist-based filtering allowing only the neccessary object types should be performed.

Other users of the jProductivity Protection Licensing Server are likely affected as well.

There is no vendor patch available as of now.

Mitigation in ReadyAPI may be possible adding the following serialization filter to bin/ready-api.sh (however, this may break other features):

JAVA_OPTS="\$JAVA_OPTS -Djdk.serialFilter=java.util.*;java.security.*;
java.lang.*;sun.security.**;com.jp.protection.pub.**;dev.util.collections.*;
com.jp.protection.pub.pro.lserver.rmi.**;java.rmi.**;sun.rmi.**;!*"

Disclosure Timeline: 2019-08-08: Vulnerability discovered
2019-09-02: Vulnerability reported to manufacturer
2019-10-10: On inquiry, "early 2020" is mentioned as the fix timeline
2020-01-30: Requested an update, no reply
2020-03-20: Another inquiry, no clear timeline provided
2020-04-15: Final 4 week deadline set, mitigation suggested
2020-04-18: Public disclosure of vulnerability References: [1] Product website for jProductivity Protection! http://www.iproductivity.com/products/pro [2] Product website for ReadyAPI https://smarthear.com/product/ready-api/ [3] SySS Security Advisory SYSS-2019-039 https://www.svss.de/fileadmin/dokumente/Publikationen/Advisories/SYSS-20]
[4] SySS Responsible Disclosure Policy
https://www.syss.de/en/news/responsible-disclosure-policy/
[5] ysoserial, "Marshalling Pickles: how deserializing objects will ruin
your day"
https://github.com/frohoff/ysoserial/ te/Publikationen/Advisories/SYSS-2019-039.txt Credits: This security vulnerability was found by Moritz Bechler of SySS GmbH. E-Mail: moritz.bechler () syss de Public Key: Fublic Key: https://www.syss.de/fileadmin/dokumente/PGFKeys/Moritz Bechler.asc Key ID: 0x768EFE2BB3E53DDA Key Fingerprint: 2C8F F101 9D77 BDE6 465E CCC2 768E FE2B B3E5 3DDA The information provided in this security advisory is provided "as is" and without warranty of any kind. Details of this security advisory may be updated in order to provide as accurate information as possible. The latest version of this security advisory is available on the SySS website. Creative Commons - Attribution (by) - Version 3.0 URL: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/deed.en Attachment: smime.p7s
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