

When downloading OBIS codes, the program does not verify that the downloaded files are actual OBIS codes and doesn't check for path traversal. This allows the attacker to send executable files and place them in an autorun directory (run after reboot), or to place DLLs inside the existing GXDLMS Director installation (run on next execution of GXDLMS Director). This can be used to achieve code execution even if the user doesn't have any add-ins installed.

Reproduction

- 1. Start an HTTP server.
- 2. Inside its root directory, create a directory called obis
- 3. Create a file $\mbox{obis/files.xml}$ with the following contents:

<files>

 $\label{linear_property} $$ \ensuremath{\mathsf{'file}}$ $$ \ensuremath{\mathsf{'$

- 4. Create a directory $\, {\tt Users/Public/Documents} \,$.
- 5. Create a file $\,$ Users/Public/Documents/test.txt .
- 6. On a Windows machine, edit the file C:\Windows\system32\drivers\etc\hosts and add the following line to it: 127.0.0.1 gurux.fi (if your HTTP server is not the same as your Windows machine, replace 127.0.0.1 with the server's IP).
- 7. Start Gurux GXDLMS Director. When prompted to download an update, accept.
- 8. Verify that $C:\Documents\$ now contains file test.txt.

Remedy

Update Gurux GXDLMS Director to the newest version.

Releases

No releases published

No packages published