Talos Vulnerability Report

TALOS-2020-1091

ERPNext frappe.desk.reportview.get SQL injection vulnerability

AUGUST 18, 2020

CVE NUMBER

CVE-2020-6145

SUMMARY

An SQL injection vulnerability exists in the frappe.desk.reportview.get functionality of ERPNext 11.1.38. A specially crafted HTTP request can cause an SQL injection. An attacker can make an authenticated HTTP request to trigger this vulnerability.

CONFIRMED VULNERABLE VERSIONS

The versions below were either tested or verified to be vulnerable by Talos or confirmed to be vulnerable by the vendor.

ERPNext 11.1.38

PRODUCT URLS

ERPNext - https://erpnext.com/

CVSSV3 SCORE

6.4 - CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N

CWI

CWE-89 - Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')

DETAILS

ERPNext is a free and open-source integrated Enterprise Resource Planning software developed by Frappé Technologies Pvt. Ltd. and is built on MariaDB database system using a Python based server-side framework. ERPNext is a generic ERP software used by manufacturers, distributors and services companies.

The field parameter in the frappe.desk.reportview.get handler is vulnerable to SQL injection.

Below is an example post that will trigger the vulnerability:

```
POST / HTTP/1.1
Host: [ip]
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:74.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/74.0
Accept: application/json
Accept-Language: en-GB,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8
X-Frappe-CSRF-Token: fd9dfd2d0ac5e0ccf137d6de7d9c5b0d45fb828d636fe379efc121ce
X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest
Content-Length: 862
Origin: http://[ip]
DNT: 1
Connection: close
Referer: http://[ip]/desk
Cookie: user_image=; user_id=[User]; system_user=yes; full_name=[User]; sid=9ddfcdd569616e3f62f147517220861e1d12edeeaff2db5ffd4a6d10;
io=gJKBCzo-R8XbxV-nAAAD

doctype=Lead&fields=%5B%22%60tabLead%60.%60mame%60%22%2C%22%60tabLead%60.%60owner%60%22%2CC%22%60tabLead%60.%60creation%60%22%2CC%22%60tabLead%60.%60creation%60%22%2CC%22%60tabLead%60.%60creation%60%22%2CC%22%60tabLead%60.%60creation%60%22%2CC%22%60tabLead%60.%60creation%60%22%2CC%22%60tabLead%60.%60creation%60%22%2CC%22%60tabLead%60.%60creation%60%22%2CC%22%60tabLead%60.%60creation%60%22%2CC%22%60tabLead%60.%60creation%60%22%2CC%22%60tabLead%60.%60creation%60%22%2CC%22%60tabLead%60.%60creation%60%22%2CC%22%60tabLead%60.%60creation%60%22%2CC%22%60tabLead%60.%60creation%60%22%2CC%22%60tabLead%60.%60creation%60%22%2CC%22%60tabLead%60.%60creation%60%22%2CC%22%60tabLead%60.%60creation%60%22%2CC%22%60tabLead%60.%60creation%60%22%2CC%22%60tabLead%60.%60creation%60%22%2CC%22%60tabLead%60.%60creation%60%22%2CC%22%60tabLead%60.%60creation%60%22%2CC%22%60tabLead%60.%60creation%60%22%2CC%22%60tabLead%60.%60creation%60%22%2CC%22%60tabLead%60.%60creation%60%22%2CC%22%60tabLead%60.%60creation%60%22%2CC%22%60tabLead%60.%60creation%60%22%2CC%22%60tabLead%60.%60creation%60%22%2CC%22%60tabLead%60.%60creation%60%22%2CC%22%60tabLead%60.%60creation%60%22%2CC%22%60tabLead%60.%60creation%60%22%2CC%22%60tabLead%60.%60creation%60%22%2CC%22%60tabLead%60.%60creation%60%22%2CC%22%60tabLead%60.%60creation%60%22%2CC%22%60tabLead%60.%60creation%60%22%2CC%22%60tabLead%60.%60creation%60%22%2CC%22%60tabLead%60.%60creation%60%2
```

60%22%2C%22%60tablead%60.%60parenttype%60%22%2C%22%60tablead%60.%600%22%2C%22%60tablead%60.%60jdx%60%22%2C%22%60tablead%60.%600mpany_name%60%22%2C%22%60tablead%60.%600tablead%60.%60lead_owner%60%22%2C%22%60tablead%60.%60lead_owner%60%22%2C%22%60tablead%60.%60lead_owner%60%22%C%22%60tablead%60.%60lead_owner%60%22%C%22%60tablead%60.%60lead_owner%60%22%C%22%60tablead%60.%60l

The parameter get passed to the frappe/frappe-bench/apps/frappe/frappe/desk/reportview.py source file, where first the function get is called to parse all structures in the request, along with JSON queries, as seen on line 22, before separate compress and execute functions are called as seen on the same line:

```
17 @frappe.whitelist()
18 @frappe.read_only()
19 def get():
20     args = get_form_params()
21     data = compress(execute(**args), args = args)
23     24     return data
25     26 def execute(doctype, *args, **kwargs):
27     return DatabaseQuery(doctype).execute(*args, **kwargs)
```

Function 'execute' will then simply call 'DatabaseQuery' function in 'frappe/frappe/model/db_query.py' where on line 93, function to create specific SQL query is called:

```
89
90 if query:
91 result = self.run_custom_query(query)
92 else:
93 result = self.build_and_run()
```

Before final execution in the 'frappe/frappe/model/db_query.py' source file as seen below, where the original parameter is passed to create a specific SQL Query::

TIMELINE

2020-06-09 - Vendor Disclosure 2020-08-18 - Public Release

CREDIT

Discovered by Yuri Kramarz of Cisco Talos.

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