Information

Advisory XSA-316 Public release 2020-04-14 12:00 Updated 2020-04-14 12:00

Version 3

CVE(s) CVE-2020-11743

Title Bad error path in GNTTABOP map grant

Files

advisory-316.txt (signed advisory file) xsa316/xsa316-linux.patch xsa316/xsa316-xen.patch

Advisory

---BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----

Hash: SHA256

Xen Security Advisory CVE-2020-11743 / XSA-316 version 3

Bad error path in GNTTABOP_map_grant

UPDATES IN VERSION 3

Public release.

Grant table operations are expected to return 0 for success, and a negative number for errors. Some misplaced brackets cause one error path to return 1 instead of a negative value.

The grant table code in Linux treats this condition as success, and proceeds with incorrectly initialised state.

A buggy or malicious guest can construct its grant table in such a way that, when a backend domain tries to map a grant, it hits the incorrect error path.

This will crash a Linux based dom0 or backend domain.

VULNERABLE SYSTEMS

Systems running any version of Xen with the XSA-295 fixes are vulnerable. Systems which have not yet taken the XSA-295 fixes are not vulnerable.

Systems running a FreeBSD or NetBSD based dom0 or driver domain are not impacted, as they both treat any nonzero value as a failure.

The vulnerability of other systems will depend on how they behave when getting an unexpected positive number from the ${\tt GNTTABOP_map_grant}$ hypercall.

MITIGATION

Applying the Linux patches alone is sufficient to mitigate the issue. This might be a preferred route for downstreams who support livepatching Linux but not Xen.

This issue was discovered by Ross Lagerwall of Citrix.

RESOLUTION

Applying the appropriate Xen patch will resolve this issue.

Additionally, a Linux patch is provided to make Linux's behaviour more robust to unexpected values.

We recommend taking both patches if at all possible.

Note that patches for released versions are generally prepared to apply to the stable branches, and may not apply cleanly to the most recent release tarball. Downstreams are encouraged to update to the tip of the stable branch before applying these patches.

xsa316/xsa316-xen.patch xsa316/xsa316-linux.patch Xen 4.9 - xen-unstable Linux

\$ sha256sum xsa316*/*

* d572bc6c77cd3a2e40<u>41eefd2fa703f4130e998b58dd xsa316/xsa316-linux.patch</u>

DEPLOYMENT DURING EMBARGO

Deployment of the patches and/or mitigations described above (or others which are substantially similar) is permitted during the embargo, even on public-facing systems with untrusted guest users and administrators.

But: Distribution of updated software is prohibited (except to other members of the predisclosure list).

Predisclosure list members who wish to deploy significantly different patches and/or mitigations, please contact the Xen Project Security Team.

(Note: this during-embargo deployment notice is retained in post-embargo publicly released Ken Project advisories, even though it is then no longer applicable. This is to enable the community to have oversight of the Xen Project Security Team's decisionmaking.)

For more information about permissible uses of embargoed information, consult the Xen Project community's agreed Security Policy:

http://www.xenproject.org/security-policy.html
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