Incorrect Authorization Checks in /include/findusers.php



TIMELINE



Jan 18th (2 years ago)

The vulnerability is located in the <code>/include/findusers.php</code> script:

```
Code 390 Bytes
                                                                                                                              Wrap lines Copy Download
1 16. include "../mainfile.php";
2 17. xoops_header(false);
3 18.
4 19. $denied = true;
5 20. if (!empty($_REQUEST['token'])) {
         if (icms::$security->validateToken($_REQUEST['token'], false)) {
6 21.
7 22.
              $denied = false;
8 23.
9 24. } elseif (is_object(icms::$user) && icms::$user->isAdmin()) {
10 25.
         $denied = false;
11 26. }
12 27. if ($denied) {
13 28. icms core Message::error( NOPERM);
14 29.
           exit();
15 30. }
```

As far as I can see, I believe this script should be accessible by admin users only (due to line 24). However, because of the if statements at lines 20-23, this script could be accessed by unauthenticated attackers if they will provide a valid security token. Such a token will be generated in several places within the application (just search for the string | icms::security-getTokenHTML()), and some of them do not require the user to be authenticated, like in | misc.php | at line 181.

ImpressCMS branch:

The vulnerability has been tested and confirmed on ImpressCMS version 1.4.2 (the latest at the time of writing).

Steps To Reproduce:

- $1. \, \mathsf{Try} \, \mathsf{to} \, \mathsf{access} \, \mathsf{the} \, \boxed{/\mathsf{include/findusers.php}} \, \mathsf{script} \, \mathsf{without} \, \mathsf{being} \, \mathsf{logged} \, \mathsf{into} \, \mathsf{the} \, \mathsf{application}$
- $2. You will see an error message saying \verb"Sorry", you don't have permission to access this area. "$
- $\textbf{3. Go to [/misc.php?action=showpopups\&type=friend]} \ and \ look \ at the \ HTML \ source \ code, search \ the \ string \ [XOOPS_TOKEN_REQUEST] \ and \ copy \ the \ value \ of the \ token \ copy \ the \ value \ of \ the \ token \ copy \ the \ value \ of \ the \ token \ copy \ the \ value \ of \ the \ token \ copy \ the \ value \ of \ the \ token \ copy \ the \ value \ of \ the \ token \ copy \ the \ value \ of \ the \ token \ copy \ the \ value \ of \ the \ token \ copy \ the \ value \ of \ the \ token \ copy \ the \ value \ of \ the \ token \ copy \ the \ value \ of \ the \ token \ copy \ the \ value \ of \ the \ token \ copy \ the \ value \ of \ the \ token \ copy \ the \ value \ of \ the \ token \ copy \ the \ value \ of \ the \ token \ copy \ the \ value \ of \ the \ token \ copy \ the \ value \ of \ the \ token \ copy \ the \ value \ of \ the \ token \ copy \ the \ value \ copy \ the \ valu$
- $4. \ Goto \ \ |\ \ | include/findusers.php?token=[TOKEN_VALUE] \ |\ \ and you will be able to access the script and e.g. search through the registered users are considered in the registered users and the registered users are considered in the registered users and the registered users are considered users are considered users are considered users and the registered users are considered users and the registered users are considered users and the registered users are considered users are considered users and the registered users are considered users and the registered users are considered users and the registered users are considered users and the registered users are considered users are considered users and the registered users are considered users and the registered users are considered users are considered users are considered users are$

Impact

This vulnerability might allow unauthenticated attackers to access an otherwise restricted functionality of the application, which in turn might allow an information disclosure about the CMS users (specifically, only the username and real name will be disclosed).

O-fiammybe ImpressCMS staff changed the status to O Triaged.

Jan 29th (2 years ago)



Feb 3rd (2 years ago)

the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures project (cve.mitre.org) has assigned the name CVE-2021-26598 to this vulnerability.



Dec 30th (12 months ago)

Just wanted to let you know I've retested this issue with version ${\bf 1.4.3-rc}$ and it's still exploitable!

skenow (ImpressCMS staff) posted a comment.

Dec 30th (12 months ago)

Thank you for testing and letting us know. The RC does not include the work being done on this issue and there will be an RC 2 release coming the release of the release

gix posted a comment. Hi @fiammybe @skenow, Updated Feb 11th (10 months ago)

 $I\,THINK\,this\,issue\,is\,not\,yet\,completely\,fixed.\,So, basically\,this\,is\,the\,new\,code:$

13 }

What if a non-admin user access this page providing a token retrieved in another page? I believe they will be able to access the findusers script, even though they are $not admin users - because the first \cite[if]{statement will be triggered and the token is valid, so \cite[state]{statement will be triggered and the token is valid, so \cite[state]{statement will be triggered and the token is valid, so \cite[state]{statement will be triggered and the token is valid, so \cite[state]{statement will be triggered and the token is valid, so \cite[state]{statement will be triggered and the token is valid, so \cite[state]{statement will be triggered and the token is valid, so \cite[state]{statement will be triggered and the token is valid, so \cite[state]{statement will be triggered and the token is valid, so \cite[state]{statement will be triggered and the token is valid, so \cite[state]{statement will be triggered and the token is valid, so \cite[state]{statement will be triggered and the token is valid, so \cite[state]{statement will be triggered and the token is valid, so \cite[state]{statement will be triggered and the token is valid, so \cite[state]{statement will be triggered and the token is valid, so \cite[state]{statement will be triggered and the token is valid, so \cite[state]{statement will be triggered and the token is valid, so \cite[state]{statement will be triggered and the token is valid, so \cite[state]{statement will be triggered and the token is valid, so \cite[state]{statement will be triggered and the token is valid, so \cite[state]{statement will be triggered and the token is valid, so \cite[state]{statement will be triggered and the token is valid, so \cite[state]{statement will be triggered and the token is valid, so \cite[state]{statement will be triggered and the token is valid, so \cite[state]{statement will be triggered and the token is valid, so \cite[state]{statement will be triggered and the token is valid, so \cite[state]{statement will be triggered and the token is valid, so \cite[state]{statement will be triggered and the token is valid, so \cite[state]{statement will be triggered and the token is valid, so \cite[state]{statement will be triggere$

I said "I THINK" because at the moment I can't test this on my local ImpressCMS installation: when I try to add new users I get an error message which says "Could not

skenow (ImpressCMS staff) posted a comment.

Feb 15th (10 months ago)

This report seems to be specific to the session authentication, which has been addressed. The SQLi issue (#1081145) is yet to be resolved.

Could we close this one?

mmybe ImpressCMS staff closed the report and changed the status to **0** Resolved. his was resolved in ImpressCMS 1.4.3

Feb 16th (10 months ago)



Feb 16th (10 months ago)

This report is about an Incorrect Authorization vulnerability, and not about "session authentication". Before your fix this issue could have been exploited by both authenticated and unauthenticated attackers; now it can only be exploited by authenticated users. But the issue still exists: non-admin users can access a feature which is intended for admin users only. I know the impact is quite low (information disclosure about the CMS users), but the vulnerability is still present in ImpressCMS and the contract of the contract o1.4.3.

skenow (ImpressCMS staff) posted a comment.

Feb 19th (10 months ago)

@egix - this is not an admin-only feature. It is also used in the front-end for user searches by authenticated users.

ix posted a comment.

Feb 20th (10 months ago)

K, sorry... I misunderstood then. In this case I would say this report is about an authentication bypass vulnerability, which is now resolved in ImpressCMS 1.4.3.

O-egix requested to disclose this report.

Feb 20th (10 months ago)

O- This report has been disclosed.

Mar 22nd (9 months ago)