Jump to bottom New issue

## Upload delay resulting in DoS #33

⊙ Open ) mmmds opened this issue on Feb 17, 2020 · 3 comments

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mmmds commented on Feb 17, 2020
There is a vulnerability which allows to perform DoS attack against the application
 server. The problem lies in handling delay parameter when upload is
 initiated ( gwtupload.server.UploadServlet#parsePostRequest ). Value from
 this parameter is used as an argument for Thread.sleep invocation.
 Malicious user can specify even max integer value 2147483647, which
 would cause a thread to sleep for almost 25 days
( gwtupload.server.AbstractUploadListener#update ). Additionally, the
 value from delay parameter is assigned the field which in case of
servlets behaves as a global variable. It means every further request
 will use this value and also will be put to sleep. Putting a thread to
 sleep excludes it from a limited set of available threads, so after a
 suitable number of upload requests (Tomcat by default has limit of 200
 threads) the whole application will become unresponsive and will not
accept any new requests.
https://github.com/manolo/gwtupload/blob/master/core/src/main/java/gwtupload/server/UploadServlet.java
       protected String parsePostRequest(HttpServletRequest request, HttpServletResponse response) {
                         String delay = request.getParameter(PARAM_DELAY);
String maxFilesize = request.getParameter(PARAM_MAX_FILE_SIZE);
                         \label{eq:maxSize} \verb| maxFilesize| = maxFilesize| = maxFilesize| * maxFilesize| = maxFilesize| = maxFilesize| * maxFilesize| = maxFilesize|
                         uploadDelay = Integer.parseInt(delay);
                   } catch (Exception e) { }
              protected AbstractUploadListener createNewListener(HttpServletRequest request) {
                  int delay = request.getParameter("nodelay") != null ? 0 : uploadDelay;
                   if (isAppEngine()) {
                         return\ new\ MemoryUploadListener(delay,\ getContentLength(request));
                  } else {
                        return new UploadListener(delay, getContentLength(request));
https://github.com/manolo/gwtupload/blob/master/core/src/main/java/gwtupload/server/AbstractUploadListener.java/gwtupload/server/AbstractUploadListener.java/gwtupload/server/AbstractUploadListener.java/gwtupload/server/AbstractUploadListener.java/gwtupload/server/AbstractUploadListener.java/gwtupload/server/AbstractUploadListener.java/gwtupload/server/AbstractUploadListener.java/gwtupload/server/AbstractUploadListener.java/gwtupload/server/AbstractUploadListener.java/gwtupload/server/AbstractUploadListener.java/gwtupload/server/AbstractUploadListener.java/gwtupload/server/AbstractUploadListener.java/gwtupload/server/AbstractUploadListener.java/gwtupload/server/AbstractUploadListener.java/gwtupload/server/AbstractUploadListener.java/gwtupload/server/AbstractUploadListener.java/gwtupload/server/AbstractUploadListener.java/gwtupload/server/AbstractUploadListener.java/gwtupload/server/AbstractUploadListener.java/gwtupload/server/AbstractUploadListener.java/gwtupload-gwtupload-gwtupload-gwtupload-gwtupload-gwtupload-gwtupload-gwtupload-gwtupload-gwtupload-gwtupload-gwtupload-gwtupload-gwtupload-gwtupload-gwtupload-gwtupload-gwtupload-gwtupload-gwtupload-gwtupload-gwtupload-gwtupload-gwtupload-gwtupload-gwtupload-gwtupload-gwtupload-gwtupload-gwtupload-gwtupload-gwtupload-gwtupload-gwtupload-gwtupload-gwtupload-gwtupload-gwtupload-gwtupload-gwtupload-gwtupload-gwtupload-gwtupload-gwtupload-gwtupload-gwtupload-gwtupload-gwtupload-gwtupload-gwtupload-gwtupload-gwtupload-gwtupload-gwtupload-gwtupload-gwtupload-gwtupload-gwtupload-gwtupload-gwtupload-gwtupload-gwtupload-gwtupload-gwtupload-gwtupload-gwtupload-gwtupload-gwtupload-gwtupload-gwtupload-gwtupload-gwtupload-gwtupload-gwtupload-gwtupload-gwtupload-gwtupload-gwtupload-gwtupload-gwtupload-gwtupload-gwtupload-gwtupload-gwtupload-gwtupload-gwtupload-gwtupload-gwtupload-gwtupload-gwtupload-gwtupload-gwtupload-gwtupload-gwtupload-gwtupload-gwtupload-gwtupload-gwtupload-gwtupload-gwtupload-gwtupload-gwtupload-gwtupload-gwtupload-gwtupload-gwtupload-gwtupload-gwtuplo
                   // Just a way to slow down the upload process and see the progress bar in fast networks.
                   if (slowUploads > 0 && done < total) {
  try {</pre>
                               Thread.sleep(slowUploads);
                         } catch (Exception e) {
                               exception = new RuntimeException(e):
The same way the servlet accepts maxFileSize parameter, but its abuse will only prevent from uploading files; the server won't suffer.
```

Author https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2020-13128

Mik317 mentioned this issue on Jun 18, 2020

[Fix DOS issue] Updating the AbstractUploadListener.java file 418sec/gwtupload#1

Merged
 Me

jduo added a commit to jduo/gwtupload that referenced this issue on Jun 19, 2020 🛈

## Fix manolo#33, CVE-2020-13128, DOS attack due to delay param ...

e05acf5

🔀 🦺 jduo mentioned this issue on Jun 19, 2020

Fix #33, CVE-2020-13128, DOS attack due to delay param 418sec/gwtupload#2

( I tosed )

huntr-helper commented on Jun 19, 2020

This fix has been provided through the https://huntr.dev/ bug bounty platform.

3 participants

Development

No branches or pull requests

Security Fix for Denial of Service (DoS) - huntr.dev #35

