

## **Ultimate Member callback functions**

The sink function is call\_user\_func() in several PHP files.

I found several vulnerabilities, some allows attracker to execute any command he want remotely, however some only allow attacker to execute specific PHP functions, just like *phpinfo()*. The detail will be showed below.

## remote command execution vulnerability

RCE vulnerabilities are caused when two parameters of call\_user\_func() are all controlled by attacker in class-fields.php and class-form.php

These callback functions are used to help users defined their own functions. However, the parameters are not filtered.

There are several sink functions:

 $\label{lem:callback()} get\_option\_value\_from\_callback(), get\_options\_from\_callback(), edit\_field() \ in \ class-fields.php \\ ajax\_select\_options() \ in \ class-form.php$ 

Take get\_option\_value\_from\_callback() as an example:

```
function get_option_value_from_callback( $value, $data, $type ) {

if ( in_array( $type, array( 'select', 'multiselect' ) ) && ! empty( $data['custom_dropdown_options_source'] ) ) {

    $has_custom_source = apply_filters( "um_has_dropdown_options_source__{$data['metakey']}", false );

if ( $has_custom_source ) {

    $opts = apply_filters( "um_get_field__{$data['metakey']}", array() );
    $arr_options = $opts['options'];

} elseif ( function_exists( $data['custom_dropdown_options_source'] ) ) {
    if ( isset( $data['parent_dropdown_relationship'] ) ) {
        $_POST['parent_option_name'] = $data['parent_dropdown_relationship'];
        $_POST['parent_option'] = um_user( $data['parent_dropdown_relationship'] );

    $arr_options = call_user_func( $data['custom_dropdown_options_source'], $data['parent_dropdown_relationship'] );
}
}
```


\$data['custom\_dropdown\_options\_source'] and \$data['parent\_dropdown\_relationship'] are not filtered in this function.

This function is called by um\_option\_match\_callback\_view\_field() in um-filters-fields.php


This function does not filter \$data['custom\_dropdown\_options\_source'] too

This function is called when processing select/multiselect field


Fileds can be added here




The core part is Choices Callback, which corresponds to  $data[custom\_dropdown\_options\_source']$  Then I capture the packet and add parameter  $\_parent\_dropdown\_relationship=ls$ 



## Then I reload this page



And the result can be found in every users' profile  $% \left( 1\right) =\left( 1\right) \left( 1\right) \left$ 



Other functions may be called in some other methods. I have not tested them. Thus, I just show how to use get\_option\_value\_from\_callback() to RCE here.

## specific PHP functions execution vulnerability

Some call user func() in ultimate member only has one parameter, just like populate dropdown options() in class-admin-builder.php

```
function populate_dropdown_options() {
    UM()->admin()->check_ajax_nonee();

if (! is_user_logged_in() ||! current_user_can( 'manage_options' ) ) {
    wp_send_json_error( __( 'This is not possible for security reasons.', 'ultimate-nember' ));
}

$arr_options = array();

// we can not use 'sanitize_key()' because it removes backslash needed for namespace and uppercase symbols

$un_callback_func = sanitize_text_field( $_POSIT('un_option_callback'] );

// removed added by sanitize slashes for the namespaces


$un_callback_func = wp_unslash( $un_callback_func );

if (empty( $um_callback_func ) ) {
    Sarr_options('status') = 'empty';
    $arr_options('status') = 'empty';
    $arr_options('function_maxists') = function_exists( $um_callback_func );
}

$arr_options['data'] = array();
if (function_exists( $un_callback_func ) ) {
    Sarr_options['data'] = call_user_func( $um_callback_func );
}

wp_send_json( $arr_options );
}
```

This function can only execute non-parameter PHP function, just like phpinfo()



I think some filters can be added to filter parameter to avoid the execution of unexpected functions