

## Stored XSS in DataDog Integration affects maintainers/owners

[HackerOne report #1257383](#) by shells3c on 2021-07-11, assigned to GitLab Team.

[Report](#) | [How To Reproduce](#)

### Report

#### Summary

The code: <https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/blob/master/app/models/integrations/datadog.rb>

```
def fields
  ...
  {
    type: 'password',
    name: 'api_key',
    title: _('API key'),
    non_empty_password_title: s_('ProjectService[Enter new API key]'),
    non_empty_password_help: s_('ProjectService[Leave blank to use your current API key]'),
    help: "<a href='\"#{api_keys_url}\"' target='\"_blank\"'>API key</a> used for authentication with Datadog",
    required: true
  }
  ...

def api_keys_url
  return URL_API_KEYS_DOCS unless datadog_site.presence

  sprintf(URL_TEMPLATE_API_KEYS, datadog_site: datadog_site)
end
```

The `api_keys_url` is not sanitized before being rendered, leads to XSS, affects any maintainer/owner of the project when they visit the DataDog Integration

#### Steps to reproduce

- Go to DataDog Integration setting: <https://gitlab.com/user/project/-/services/datadog/edit> (requires permission)
- In the **Datadog site** field, set the value to `<script>alert()</script>`, then **Save**
- Now XSS will be activated in <https://gitlab.com/user/project/-/services/datadog/edit>, send this link to victims

#### Impact


Stored XSS affects maintainers/owners

### How To Reproduce


Please add [reproducibility information](#) to this section:

- 
- 
- 


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Tasks 

No tasks are currently assigned. Use tasks to break down this issue into smaller parts.


Linked items 

Link issues together to show that they're related or that one is blocking others. [Learn more](#).

Related merge requests 

 [Revise helptext on Datadog page](#)

16639114.2👤🟢

 [Use v-safe-html for field help texts in integration form](#)


16789014.2👤🟢

### Activity

 [GitLab SecurityBot](#) changed due date to September 19, 2021 [1 year ago](#)

 [GitLab SecurityBot](#) added [HackerOne](#) [security](#) labels [1 year ago](#)


 [GitLab SecurityBot](#) added [Weakness](#) [CWE-79](#) [priority: 2](#) [severity: 2](#) scoped labels [1 year ago](#)

 [GitLab SecurityBot](#) @gitlab-securitybot · [1 year ago](#)

Author

Reporter


[HackerOne comment](#) by shells3c :  
After consideration, I believe the severity is high because I can create my own project, invite the victim to the project as maintainer and then send the link. So no privilege is required either the attacker and victim

 [GitLab SecurityBot](#) @gitlab-securitybot · [1 year ago](#)

Author

Reporter

[HackerOne comment](#) by prInceofpersia :  
Hi (@shells3c,  
Thank you for your submission. I hope you are well. Your report is currently being reviewed and the HackerOne triage team will get back to you once there is additional information to share.  
Have a great day!  
Kind regards, (@)princeofpersia

 [GitLab SecurityBot](#) @gitlab-securitybot · [1 year ago](#)

Author

Reporter

[HackerOne comment](#) by prInceofpersia :  
Hi (@shells3c,  
I am unable to reproduce the issue on my side, as seen below the payload is not accepted in the `Datadog site` field.  

Datadog

The form contains the following error:  
• Datadog site is invalid

Enable integration

☒ Active

Datadog site


Choose the Datadog site to send data to. Set to "datadoghq.eu" to send data to the EU site

Regards, (@)princeofpersia

Attachments

Warning: Attachments received through HackerOne, please exercise caution!

- [Screen\\_Shot\\_2021-07-12\\_at\\_3.15.31\\_PM.png](#)

 [GitLab SecurityBot](#) @gitlab-securitybot · [1 year ago](#)

Author

Reporter

[HackerOne comment](#) by shells3c :


Hi (@princeofpersia, please don't check the **Active** box

[GitLab SecurityBot](#) @gitlab-securitybot · 1 year ago  
[HackerOne comment](#) by princeofpersia :

Hi (@shells3c,

Thanks for the update!

I can insert the payload now, however the XSS is not triggered. I can see the payload in the source but it doesn't get executed (No CSP errors are displayed and I tried on an instance without CSP and it didn't work as well).



Regards, (@princeofpersia

### Attachments

**Warning:** Attachments received through HackerOne, please exercise caution!

• [Screen Shot 2021-07-17 at 3:24:56 PM.png](#)

[GitLab SecurityBot](#) @gitlab-securitybot · 1 year ago  
[HackerOne comment](#) by shells3c :

Hi (@princeofpersia,

I don't know why by somehow I was unable to execute the javascript code inside the `<script>` tag too, but I'm still exploit the XSS.

Payload:

```
" style=animation-name:blinking-dot onanimationstart=alert(document.domain) other
```

[GitLab SecurityBot](#) @gitlab-securitybot · 1 year ago  
[HackerOne comment](#) by princeofpersia :

Hi (@shells3c,

We were able to verify your report in our side, we forwarded the report to gitlab team, we will let you know once we hear back from them.

Regards, (@princeofpersia

[GitLab SecurityBot](#) @gitlab-securitybot · 1 year ago  
[HackerOne comment](#) by shells3c :

Hi, here is the CSP bypass payload:

```
">xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" srcdoc="<script src=https://gitlab.com/bugbountyuser1/csp/-/jobs/1
```

[GitLab SecurityBot](#) @gitlab-securitybot · 1 year ago  
[HackerOne comment](#) by dcourtne :

Upgrading severity given CSP bypass. The payload fires on an obscure page but it's not worse than a reflected XSS at this point.

[GitLab SecurityBot](#) added [security-request-missing](#) [security-triage-epic](#) labels 1 year ago

[Nikhil George](#) @ngeorge1 · 1 year ago [Developer](#)  
As this issue is related to integration, it looks like this belongs to the `--group:ecosystem` and [devops create](#). Adding the same group labels, but please feel free to change them.

[Nikhil George](#) added [group ecosystem \(DEPRECATED\)](#) [devops create](#) scoped labels 1 year ago

[GitLab SecurityBot](#) removed [security-request-missing](#) [security-triage-epic](#) labels 1 year ago

[GitLab SecurityBot](#) @gitlab-securitybot · 1 year ago [Author](#) [Reporter](#)  
[@mushakov](#) [@arturoherrero](#) [@leipert](#) [@mhenniken](#) This issue is ready for triage as per [HackerOne process](#).  
About this automation: [AppSec Escalation Engine](#)

[GitLab SecurityBot](#) added [security-epic-milestone](#) label 1 year ago

[Lukas 'Epi' Eipert](#) @leipert · 1 year ago [Developer](#)  
Interesting. This comes all down to us [allowing HTML in the help text of a field](#). We should definitely use `<safe-html>`.  
In this specific case the HTML is injected via <https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/blob/2b2c4e7ef60796603827218d90568174d5dad13/app/models/integrations/datadog.rb#L83>. I wonder if any other help text would be vulnerable to the same thing... and did a quick search and didn't come up with other places...

[Lukas 'Epi' Eipert](#) @leipert · 1 year ago [Developer](#)  
I think the smallest iteration to fix this: Just remove the link from the URL for now? Or maybe only use it during `spring` if it is actually valid.

[@troupeira](#) Could you have a look and see whether I am making sense?

Edited by [Lukas 'Epi' Eipert](#) 1 year ago

[Markus Koller](#) @troupeira · 1 year ago [Contributor](#)  
[@leipert](#) yes that makes sense, we don't really need to link from the help text and can just remove it! 🙌  
I'm not sure how to reproduce this vulnerability though, we have a format validation on `Datadog` site which only allows alphanumeric domain names. I do see the broken link while editing but can't get the form to save:

## The form contains the following errors:

- Api key can't be blank
- Api key is invalid
- Datadog site is invalid

## Enable integration

☒ Active

## Datadog site

Choose the Datadog site to send data to. Set to 'datadoghq.eu' to send data to the EU site

## API URL

(Advanced) Define the full URL, for your Datadog site directly

## API key

You can set the value directly in the DB but I don't think it's possible to circumvent through the app (UI or API), unless I'm missing something.

[@dcoupure](#) were you able to reproduce?

[Lukas Eipert](#) [@leipert](#) · 1 year ago  
[@tousseira](#) I was able to reproduce with

Developer

```
<iframe xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" srcdoc="<script src=https://gitlab.com/bugbountyuser1/csp/-/>
```

[Markus Koller](#) [@tousseira](#) · 1 year ago

Contributor

[@leipert](#) oh I missed the part about having to disable the integration, which also disables the validation [#336614](#) [comment 632494146](#)

I can see it now too, nevermind! 🙄

I'll give this a weight of 1 since the fix should be very straightforward.

[Markus Koller](#) [@tousseira](#) · 1 year ago

Contributor

We could also just hard-code the link to [https://docs.datadoghq.com/account\\_management/api-app-keys/](https://docs.datadoghq.com/account_management/api-app-keys/), and also add it in the alternate label where it's currently missing:

## Enter new API key

Leave blank to use your current API key

I think this would be useful because I was just trying to set up the Datadog integration and wondering where I get the token, and this is exactly the link I needed 🙏

[Justin Ho Tuan Duong](#) [@justin-ho](#) · 1 year ago

Maintainer

I agree that we should definitely be using `v-safe-html` here. I have this small diff that applies that (though I don't think I can do the full MR before going on leave). If [@tousseira](#) is already working on this, do you mind including this in your changes? We can maybe verify separately that this works without any backend changes.

```
diff --git a/app/assets/javascripts/integrations/edit/components/dynamic_field.vue b/app/assets/javascripts/integrations/edit/components/dynamic_field.vue
index 3655f94f06f..97058bec6fa 100644
--- a/app/assets/javascripts/integrations/edit/components/dynamic_field.vue
+++ b/app/assets/javascripts/integrations/edit/components/dynamic_field.vue
@@ -1,6 +1,12 @@
<script>
/* eslint-disable vue/no-v-html */
import { GFormGroup, GFormCheckbox, GFormInput, GFormSelect, GFormTextarea } from '@gitlab/ui';
+import {
+  GFormGroup,
+  GFormCheckbox,
+  GFormInput,
+  GFormSelect,
+  GFormTextarea,
+  GSafeHtmlDirective as SafeHtml,
+} from '@gitlab/ui';
import { capitalize, lowercase, isEmpty } from 'lodash';
import { mapGetters } from 'vuex';
import eventHub from '../event_hub';
@@ -14,6 +20,9 @@ export default {
  GFormSelect,
  GFormTextarea,
},
+directives: {
+  SafeHtml,
+},
+props: {
+  choices: {
+    type: Array,
+  },
+  @ -133,7 +142,7 @@ export default {
+    :state="valid"
+  },
+  <template #description>
+    <span v-html="help"></span>
+    <span v-safe-html="help"></span>
+  </template>
+  <template v-if="isCheckbox">
```

[Markus Koller](#) [@tousseira](#) · 1 year ago

Contributor

[@justin-ho](#) yes I can add that too and check if it's working, thanks! 🙏

[@leipert](#) I'll go ahead and add this to [%14.2](#) since the fix is small and we should have plenty of time until the security release after August 22.

[Lukas Eipert](#) [@leipert](#) · 1 year ago

Developer

[@justin-ho](#) Thanks for the patch!

[@tousseira](#) Feel free to tag me as a [reviewer](#) on the MR! With that patch we should check that all the helps are rendered nicely still 🙏

[Dheeraj Joshi](#) [@djadmin](#) · 1 year ago

Developer

[@tousseira](#) please note that the XSS might not be reproducible anymore with [f66391](#) [\(merged\)](#) changes. I think we would still need to [backport](#) the fix.

[@justin-ho](#) patch looks good to me, and there's a [separate issue](#) for that.


[Markus Koller](#) [@tousseira](#) · 1 year ago

Contributor

[@djadmin](#) oh indeed, thanks! 🙏

Just tested again and can't reproduce it anymore, the `href` gets HTML-escaped now.

I'll still submit an MR for `master` to hard-code the link since that seems like the cleanest solution, and will backport that to previous releases.

 **Dheeraj Joshi** @djadmim · 1 year ago

Sounds like a great plan 😊

Please [register](#) or [sign in](#) to reply

 **GitLab Bot**  added `section dev` scoped label 1 year ago

Markus Koller assigned to [@toupeira](#) 1 year ago

Markus Koller added Stretch label 1 year ago

 [GitLab Bot](#)  [@gitlab-bot](#) · 1 year ago

, please can you add a [type label](#) to this issue to help with [issue discovery in issue reports](#).

Dheeraj Joshi mentioned in issue [#241874 \(closed\)](#) 1 year ago

Arturo Herrero mentioned in issue [#328389 \(closed\)](#) 1 year ago

**Markus Koller** added `workflow` `in review` scoped label and automatically removed `workflow` `in dev` label 1 year ago

Markus Koller added [workflow](#) [verification](#) scoped label and automatically removed [workflow](#) [in review](#) label 1 year ago

GitLab SecurityBot @gitlab-security-bot · 1 year ago  
@mushakov @arturoherrero @mhenriksen This severity 2 security issue's milestone has expired.  
About this automation: [AppSec Escalation Engine](#)

Andrew Kelly closed 1 year ago

Arturo Herrero mentioned in issue [gitlab-com/www-gitlab-com#12147 \(closed\)](#) 1 year ago

 **GitLab Bot**  removed [devops](#) [create](#) label [1 year ago](#)

Dominic Couture made the issue visible to everyone 1 year ago

  removed 1 deleted label 3 weeks ago

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