

## Talos Vulnerability Report

TALOS-2020-0997

### Nitro PRO PDF nested pages remote code execution vulnerability

MAY 18, 2020

CVE NUMBER

CVE-2020-6074

#### Summary

An exploitable code execution vulnerability exists in the PDF parser of Nitro Pro 13.9.1.155. A specially crafted PDF document can cause a use-after-free which can lead to remote code execution. An attacker can provide a malicious file to trigger this vulnerability.

#### Tested Versions

Nitro Pro 13.9.1.155

#### Product URLs

<https://www.gonitro.com/>

#### CVSSv3 Score

8.8 - CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

#### CWE

CWE-416 - Use After Free

#### Details

Nitro PDF allows users to save, read, sign and edit PDF files on their machines.

The modules analyzed for this vulnerability are:

```
Mapped memory image file: C:\Program Files\Nitro\Pro\13\NitroPDF.exe
Image path: C:\Program Files\Nitro\Pro\13\NitroPDF.exe
Image name: NitroPDF.exe
Browse all global symbols functions data
Timestamp: Thu Dec 19 05:46:43 2019 (5DFB6323)
Checksum: 00932421
ImageSize: 00934000
File version: 13.9.1.155
Product version: 13.9.1.155
```

During the parsing of a PDF, a buffer is allocated for each page in the PDF. These pages are stored in a larger PDF object.

```
NitroPDF+0x98a5a
curr_page_number = 0;
result = PDDocGetNumPages(v2);
num_pages = result;
if ( !result )
{
    num_pages = 1;
    v3 = 1;
}
if ( num_pages > 0 )
{
    do
    {
        v7 = operator new(0xB8ui64);
        memset(v7, 0, 0xB8ui64);
        *((_DWORD *)v7 + 0x27) = curr_page_number;
        *((_BYTE *)v7 + 0x98) = v3;
        sub_98850(v1, (__int64)v7, curr_page_number, 0);

        // Saving the allocated page in the larger PDF object
        result = (*(__int64 (__fastcall *))(__int64, void *))(v1 + 0x5A8 + 72i64)(v1 + 0x5A8, 6v7);
        ++curr_page_number;
    } while ( curr_page_number < num_pages );
}
```

In the case of nested pages, it is possible to free this page in the overarching PDF object.

```

NitroPDF+0x9c13d
if ( (_DWORD)curr_pages == 1 )
{
    page_struct = (_BYTE *)sub_96E30(v10, 0i64, 1u);
    if ( page_struct )
    {
        if ( page_struct[0x98] )
        {
            LODWORD(curr_pages) = 0;

            // Freeing the original page allocated for the PDF
            (void (__cdecl *)(void *, int))j_j_free)(page_struct, 0xB8);
            *(_QWORD *)(v10 + 0x5B8) = *(_QWORD *)(v10 + 0x5B0);
        }
    }
}

```

With this page freed, a crafted PDF can cause an exception to occur. One way is to claim to have more pages in the PDF than given via the /Kids tag. An example of what causes this exception is below:

```

3 0 obj
<<
  /Count 2
  /Kids [ ]
>>

```

During the handling of this exception, a set of cleanup code is called for the main PDF object. In this code, various buffers are cleared, including the original buffer allocation for our page in the PDF.

```

NitroPDF+3154b6
.text:00000000003154B6      mov     [rsp+38h+var_28], rdx
.text:00000000003154B8      push   rbp
.text:00000000003154BC      sub     rsp, 30h
.text:00000000003154C0      mov     rbp, rdx
.text:00000000003154C3      mov     rax, [rbp+78h]
.text:00000000003154C7      mov     qword ptr [rax], 0
.text:00000000003154CE      mov     byte ptr [rax+98h], 1
.text:00000000003154D5      lea     rax, unk_988FB
.text:00000000003154DC      add     rsp, 30h
.text:00000000003154E0      pop     rbp
.text:00000000003154E1      retn

```

While the page was freed, it was never cleared from the original PDF object. A carefully crafted PDF could possibly setup the heap in a way to write an arbitrary null byte out of bounds which can lead to further memory corruption and possibly arbitrary code execution.

#### Timeline

2020-02-17 - Vendor Disclosure

2020-05-18 - Public Release

#### CREDIT

Discovered by Cory Duplantis of Cisco Talos.

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PREVIOUS REPORT

NEXT REPORT

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