

rConfig 3.9.4 multiple vulnerabilities

07 Sep 2020

exploit web

Overview

During my [OSWE](#) journey I used to try to re-discover known vulnerabilities by watching exploit-db stream to narrow the scope.

Later last year [vikingfr](#) worked on rConfig 3.9.x and had found a neat path from zero to root starting with a pre-auth sql injection.

To refresh my code audit skills, this march I decided to make some practice again: let's start the timer and see what I can find.

Flow

Without reading too much information to avoid spoilers (I already know there is at least one sql injection so I'm BiASed), I installed the app and started crawling the tree to get confident with the structure.

The source is quite clean and separated between exposed pages, classes included out from the document root, data, and so on. Of course what I'm most interested in, at first, is a pre-auth bug. I choosed to see how authentication works before to look for [IDOR](#).

Login

Login process uses a class Process defined in file `www/lib/crud/userprocess.php`, which handles login requests by calling a `login()` function from class Session defined in file `classes/session.class.php` (line 137 circa), that invokes `checkLogin()`.

```
function login() {
    // Check session, if yes:
    if ($this->session->is_logged_in) {
        $result = $this->session->login($_POST['user'], $_POST['pass'], $this->session->remember);
        // Login successful
        if ($result) {
            header('Location: ' . $this->session->referrer);
        } else {
            // Login failed
            $this->session->error_message = $this->session->getErrorMessage();
            header('Location: ' . $this->session->referrer);
        }
    }
}
```

By looking at the file, I saw that it's not possible to invoke any of these functions by calling them from the file, so if I'll find something vulnerable I also have to find a sink.

As soon as the class is constructed, she runs `startSession()` that runs `checkLogin()`. The first thing `checkLogin()` does is to check for some cookies, I'll be back on this later.

She now checks if there is an LDAP server configured. Because I don't have it ready I'll skip (spoiler: there could be another vulnerability here because \$subuser has never been sanitized before it's used at line 137, but timer said I must stop, if somebody has time to dig please let me know.) and go for the else branch at line 213.

The function `confirmUserPass()` is defined at `classes/userdatabase.class.php` and looks like safely queries the database by using a prepared statement.

```
function confirmUserPass($username, $password) {
    // Verify that user is in database
    $result = $this->db->query("SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = '$username'");
    if ($result->num_rows > 0) {
        // User exists
        $row = $result->fetch_assoc();
        // Verify password
        if ($result->fetch_row() && $password == $row['password']) {
            // Password correct
            // Return success
            return true;
        } else {
            // Password incorrect
            return false;
        }
    } else {
        // User not found
        return false;
    }
}
```

If you look closely, you'll spot a possible [PHP type juggling vulnerability](#) (I didn't validated/exploited this one, ping me if you do): we cannot control the second part of the check (`$dbarr['password']`) but we can partially control the first one. I think it's not exploitable because user controlled value is hashed as md5, and as far as I remember it will be possible to have a 32byte string or an empty \$password.

I also saw that `confirmUserPass()` receives the password as md5 string, and I saw that the comparison is made on the field retrieved from the database, therefore we know that passwords are stored as md5. This could be an issue because md5 is deprecated and not safe nowadays, but I'll notice later that Config requires strong passwords so it's not interesting now, but worth a fix in my opinion (I'm a fan of <https://github.com/defuse/password-hashing>, that has a huge pro: dev can change algorithm/round/salt size very easily). Of course if it was a real review I've **strongly** suggested to get rid of md5 as soon as possible, but this is another sort of exercise.

`login()` function checks for return and exit if user or password isn't valid. SQL queries are good, and given that I haven't found anything useful here I'll note md5 and type juggling and move forward.

```
function login() {
    // Check session, if yes:
    if ($this->session->is_logged_in) {
        // Check error codes
        $result = $this->session->login($_POST['user'], $_POST['pass'], $this->session->remember);
        // Login successful
        if ($result) {
            header('Location: ' . $this->session->referrer);
        } else {
            // Login failed
            $this->session->error_message = $this->session->getErrorMessage();
            header('Location: ' . $this->session->referrer);
        }
    }
}
```

Remember me

As previously said, the function `login()` checks if `rememberme` flag has been checked: if it's true, she sets two cookies for later usage.

```
function login() {
    // Check session, if yes:
    if ($this->session->is_logged_in) {
        // Check error codes
        $result = $this->session->login($_POST['user'], $_POST['pass'], $this->session->remember);
        // Login successful
        if ($result) {
            header('Location: ' . $this->session->referrer);
        } else {
            // Login failed
            $this->session->error_message = $this->session->getErrorMessage();
            header('Location: ' . $this->session->referrer);
        }
    }
}
```

Before going back where these cookies are validated I'll check where `userid` value used at line 250 came from.

I saw that it comes from a `generateRandID()` function, which generates a new ID of 16chars for this purpose:

```
function generateRandID() {
    // Generate a new ID of 16chars for this purpose
    $result = $this->db->query("SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = '$username'");
    if ($result->num_rows > 0) {
        // User exists
        $row = $result->fetch_assoc();
        // Verify password
        if ($result->fetch_row() && $password == $row['password']) {
            // Password correct
            // Return success
            return true;
        } else {
            // Password incorrect
            return false;
        }
    } else {
        // User not found
        return false;
    }
}
```

During the login phase, that actually does some sort of random by using a known vulnerable `mt_rand()` function (see [more here](#)) and generates an md5 out of it.

```
function generateRandID() {
    // Generate a new ID of 16chars for this purpose
    $result = $this->db->query("SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = '$username'");
    if ($result->num_rows > 0) {
        // User exists
        $row = $result->fetch_assoc();
        // Verify password
        if ($result->fetch_row() && $password == $row['password']) {
            // Password correct
            // Return success
            return true;
        } else {
            // Password incorrect
            return false;
        }
    } else {
        // User not found
        return false;
    }
}
```

The verification process takes place somewhere around `checkLogin()`, where `userid` taken from cookie `cookieid` is checked with what's stored in the database, and if it's false passes over to standard auth.

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confirmUserID() function looks safe, still a type juggling one, but I think again not exploitable so I'll move on.

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68 + confirmUserID - Checks whether or not the given
69 + username is in the database. If so it checks if the
70 + email exists in the same table in the database.
71 + For that user, if the user doesn't exist or if the
72 + email one is null or is, returns the error code
73 + (1 or 2). On success it returns 0.
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```

Anyway I think it could be possible to bypass login by abusing mt_rand() weakness, but we need some value to get the seed, therefore a valid account. Plus, we don't know if somebody has logged in using rememberme function. Still a vulnerability I'd fix, but not useful to me right now.

Will add this mt_rand() and a new type juggling to my notes, just in case.

Password reset

Back at [www/lib/crud/userprocess.php](#) to review procForgotPass() function, I see that she generates a 8chars string using mt_rand() again

```
570
571 + generateRandStr - Generates a string made up of randomized
572 + letters (lower and upper case) and digits, the length
573 + is a specified parameter.
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Then she loads user information and sends an email with the new password.

I don't see any other weakness but mt_rand() usage, that would still need some valid value as far as I know, and a weak password generation (new password length is 8 chars). An attacker could try to bruteforce the password online, but it would generate a lot of noise, and the user would receive a notification for the change as soon as she checks her email. Again vulnerabilities I would fix, but again out of scope now.

Registration

The function in charge of registering new users is procRegister(), defined in file [www/lib/crud/userprocess.php](#).

What's really interesting here is the call at line 96: function register() is called with usual value (user, password, password confirm, email) plus an interesting one: ulevelid.

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If you open file [classes/userSession.class.php](#) you can see that, after doing some sanity checks for username, password, and email (the regex looks not valid to me, but we don't care about it right now) the function addNewUser() is called with the same argument.

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And this is the case of a incomplete fix we still have two unescaped variable taken from the GET and passed to the exec call, both \$searchTerm and \$grepNumLineStr are used with no sanitization.

[illegible]

NOTE: this vulnerability has been fixed in 3.9.6, please read [Update](#)

Sql Injection

Rushing, I'll grep for `SELECT/UPDATE/INSERT` with a match on `$` to look for queries done with a variable. Of course it could be escaped before, but it's a good starting point (note: I have my own script that greps with a context, so I'm *sure* I won't miss multiline queries).

- www/compliancepolicies.inc.php
- www/compliancepolicyelements.inc.php
- www/devices.inc.php
- www/snippets.inc.php

Vulnerable code looks like

[illegible]

Looking at the file itself, we know that it's reachable from the webserver. Reading it from the beginning also shows that it can be used without authentication, leading to at least four pre-auth sql injection.

This could have huge impact on the network, because devices' data are encrypted with an hardcoded key.

This vulnerability has been assigned four CVEs, one for each vulnerable endpoint: CVE-2020-10546 CVE-2020-10547 CVE-2020-10548 CVE-2020-10549.

This attack is not over yet; if you notices that `Sdb2` handler, it pointed me to also review how that object is built and if it's abusable, and I think this will lead to another blog post about a stacked sql injection.

This could've been a good playground for OSWE preparation, not so complex and with some pathes from zero to root by chaining multiple vulnerabilities.

I've not fully tested two RCE, and did not look for more "public" pages. There is still room for analysis, please ping me if you do some so we can share knowledge.

This journey also reminded me of a very very important thing: **never** trust a patch, always review because it's partial/incomplete or maybe introduced more bugs.

Stephen Stack, lead dev of rConfig, was kind enough to follow up with a fix for some of the reported vulnerabilities with version 3.9.6 and hoply in 3.9.7 later.