# GHSL-2021-125: Path traversal in SharpZipLib - CVE-2021-32840, CVE-2021-32841, CVE-2021-32842



## **Coordinated Disclosure Timeline**

- 2021-09-03: Report sent to sharpziplib@containrrr.dev according to security policy
- 2021-09-08: No response. The email repeated.
  2021-09-17: No response. Public issue created asking for the contact.
- 2021-09-17: Contact established.
- 2021-09-19: v1.3.3 with a fix was released.

### Summary

SharpZipLib allows full or partial (depending on the version) traversal of the extraction path.

## **Product**

SharpZipLib

### **Tested Version**

0.86.0-1.3.2, however according to the SharpZipLib security policy version 0.86.0 is no longer supported.

## **Details**

Issue 1: 0.86.0 <= SharpZipLib <= 1.2.0 TAR extraction doesn't validate if the destination path is under the expected extraction directory

The following code example from SharpZipLib wiki:

```
using System;
using System.IO;
using ICSharpCode.SharpZipLib.Tar;
public void ExtractTar(String tarFileName, String destFolder)
     Stream inStream = File.OpenRead(tarFileName);
     TarArchive tarArchive = TarArchive.CreateInputTarArchive(inStream);
tarArchive.ExtractContents(destFolder);
tarArchive.Close();
     inStream.Close();
```

A TAR file entry . . /evil.txt will be extracted in the parent directory of destFolder.

It leads to arbitrary file write that may lead to code execution.

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### Issue 2: 1.3.0 <= SharpZipLib <= 1.3.2 TAR extraction directory path is not enforced to be slash terminated

Starting versioin 1.3.0 a check was added if the destination file is under destination directory:

```
if (!allowParentTraversal && !Path.GetFullPath(destFile).StartsWith(destDir, StringComparison.InvariantCultureIgnoreCase))
       throw new InvalidNameException("Parent traversal in paths is not allowed");
```

However it is not enforced that destDir ends with slash. If the destDir is not slash terminated like /home/user/dir it is possible to create a file with a name that begins with the destination directory, i.e. /home/user/dir.sh.

Because of the file name and destination directory constraints the arbitrary file creation impact is limited and depends on the use case.

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# Issue 3: 0.86.0 <= SharpZipLib <= 1.3.1 ZIP extraction directory path is not enforced to be slash terminated

The following code example from SharpZipLib wiki:

```
using System;
using ICSharpCode.SharpZipLib.Zip;
public void TestFastZipUnpack(string zipFileName, string targetDir) {
     // Will always overwrite if target filenames already exist
fastZip.ExtractZip(zipFileName, targetDir, fileFilter);
```

Starting version 1.0.0 a check was added if the destination file is under destination directory:

```
 if (!\_allowParentTraversal \&\& !Path.GetFullPath(name).StartsWith(\_baseDirectory, StringComparison.InvariantCultureIgnoreCase)) \\
             throw new InvalidNameException("Parent traversal in paths is not allowed");
```

However it is not enforced that \_baseDirectory ends with slash. If the \_baseDirectory is not slash terminated like /home/user/dir it is possible to create a file with a name thats begins as the destination directory one level up from the directory, i.e. /home/user/dir.sh.

### Impact

Because of the file name and destination directory constraints the arbitrary file creation impact is limited and depends on the use case.

## CVE

• CVE-2021-32842

## Credit

This issue was discovered and reported by GHSL team member @JarLob (Jaroslav Lobačevski).

## Contact

You can contact the GHSL team at securitylab@github.com, please include a reference to GHSL-2021-125 in any communication regarding this issue.

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