

Talos Vulnerability Report

TALOS-2021-1296

Accusoft ImageGear TIF IP_planar_raster_unpack improper array index validation vulnerability

JUNE 1, 2021

CVE NUMBER

CVE-2021-21833

Summary

An improper array index validation vulnerability exists in the TIF IP_planar_raster_unpack functionality of Accusoft ImageGear 19.9. A specially crafted malformed file can lead to an out-of-bounds write. An attacker can provide a malicious file to trigger this vulnerability.

Tested Versions

Accusoft ImageGear 19.9

Product URLs

<https://www.accusoft.com/products/imagegear-collection/>

CVSSv3 Score

9.8 - CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

CWE

CWE-119 - Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer

Details

The ImageGear library is a document-imaging developer toolkit that offers image conversion, creation, editing, annotation and more. It supports more than 100 formats such as DICOM, PDF, Microsoft Office and others.

There is a vulnerability in the IP_planar_raster_unpack function which occurs with a specially crafted TIF file, leading to an out-of-bounds write which can result in code execution. Trying to load a malformed TIF file, we end up in the following situation:

```
This exception may be expected and handled.
eax=00000000 ebx=00000002 ecx=00000005 edx=00000004 esi=0b98d000 edi=00000004
eip=5c194b4c esp=0019f484 ebp=0019f4a0 iopl=0         nv up ei pl zr na pe nc
cs=0023  ss=002b  ds=002b  es=002b  fs=0053  gs=002b             efl=00010246
igCore19d!IG_mpi_page_set+0x8dfc:
5c194b4c 8806          mov     byte ptr [esi],al          ds:002b:0b98d000=??
```

This is corresponding to the following pseudo code :

```

LINE1  undefined * __cdecl
LINE2  IP_planar_raster_unpack
LINE3      (int SamplesPerPixel,int index_up_to_sampleperpixel,dword BitsPerSample,
LINE4      int sample_per_pixel_multiply_width,void *src_buffer,void *dest_buffer,
LINE5      size_t size_memory_buffer)
LINE6
LINE7  {
LINE8      [...]
LINE31  switch(BitsPerSample) {
LINE32  case 1:
LINE33  case 2:
LINE34  case 4:
LINE35      nb_bits_BitsPerSample = (int)(8 / (longlong)(int)BitsPerSample);
LINE36      index_larger_loop = 0;
LINE37      _index_larger_loop = 0;
LINE38      _mask_bitpersample = (char)(1 << ((byte)BitsPerSample & 0x1f)) + -1;
LINE39      if (0 < sample_per_pixel_multiply_width / nb_bits_BitsPerSample) {
LINE40          do {
LINE41              bVar2 = *(byte *)(_index_larger_loop + (int)src_buffer);
LINE42              if (0 < nb_bits_BitsPerSample) {
LINE43                  iVar9 = (nb_bits_BitsPerSample + -1) * BitsPerSample;
LINE44                  _bit_to_process = nb_bits_BitsPerSample;
LINE45                  do {
LINE46                      bVar4 = (byte)iVar9;
LINE47                      iVar9 = iVar9 - BitsPerSample;
LINE48                      *(byte *) (index_up_to_sampleperpixel + (int)dest_buffer) =
LINE49                      bVar2 >> (bVar4 & 0x1f) & _mask_bitpersample;
LINE50                      index_up_to_sampleperpixel = index_up_to_sampleperpixel + SamplesPerPixel;
LINE51                      _bit_to_process = _bit_to_process + -1;
LINE52                  } while (_bit_to_process != 0);
LINE53              }
LINE54              index_larger_loop = _index_larger_loop + 1;
LINE55              _index_larger_loop = index_larger_loop;
LINE56          } while (index_larger_loop < sample_per_pixel_multiply_width / nb_bits_BitsPerSample);
LINE57      }
LINE58      nb_bytes = (SamplesPerPixel * sample_per_pixel_multiply_width) / nb_bits_BitsPerSample;
LINE59      module_bytes = (SamplesPerPixel * sample_per_pixel_multiply_width) % nb_bits_BitsPerSample;
LINE60      if (0 < module_bytes) {
LINE61          nb_bytes = (uint)src_buffer & 0xffffffff00 |
LINE62          (uint)*(byte *) (index_larger_loop + (int)src_buffer);
LINE63          if (0 < module_bytes) {
LINE64              _oobw = (byte *) (index_up_to_sampleperpixel + (int)dest_buffer);
LINE65              puVar6 = (undefined *)
LINE66              ((uint)CONCAT21((short)((ulonglong)(8 / (longlong)(int)BitsPerSample) >> 0x10),
LINE67              *(byte *) (index_larger_loop + (int)src_buffer)) << 8);
LINE68              nb_bits_BitsPerSample = (nb_bits_BitsPerSample + -1) * BitsPerSample;
LINE69              do {
LINE70                  bVar2 = (byte)nb_bits_BitsPerSample;
LINE71                  nb_bits_BitsPerSample = nb_bits_BitsPerSample - BitsPerSample;
LINE72                  result = (byte)((uint)puVar6 >> 8) >> (bVar2 & 0x1f) & _mask_bitpersample;
LINE73                  puVar6 = (undefined *)((uint)puVar6 & 0xffffffff00 | (uint)result);
LINE74                  *_oobw = result;
LINE75                  _oobw = _oobw + SamplesPerPixel;
LINE76                  module_bytes = module_bytes + -1;
LINE77              } while (module_bytes != 0);
LINE78              return puVar6;
LINE79          }
LINE80      }
LINE81      [...]
LINE174 }

```

and the crash is happening at LINE74. The oobw variable is derived from the dest_buffer passed as an argument as you can see at LINE64

The out-of-bounds write is happening through the loop performed between LINE69 and LINE77 controlled by the module_bytes which in our case is 4 as this is the rest of the division in LINE59. The issue is there is no control against the size of _oobw computed in LINE75 while adding the value of SamplesPerPixel.

Now let's see how the buffer size is computed.

When looking at the memory buffer allocated corresponding to oobw we can see the size of '4' bytes in our cases:

```

0:000> !heap -p -a esi
address 0b98d000 found in
_DPH_HEAP_ROOT @ 3f11000
in busy allocation ( DPH_HEAP_BLOCK:      UserAddr      UserSize -      VirtAddr      VirtSize)
                        9fe2104:      b98cff8          4 -      b98c000          2000
5ce2a8b0 verifier!AVrfDebugPageHeapAllocate+0x00000240
77dcef3e ntdll!RtlDebugAllocateHeap+0x00000039
77d37080 ntdll!RtlpAllocateHeap+0x000000f0
77d36ddc ntdll!RtlpAllocateHeapInternal+0x0000104c
77d35d7e ntdll!RtlAllocateHeap+0x0000003e
5ccdcfff MSVCRT110!malloc+0x00000049
5c1861de igCore19d!AF_memmm_alloc+0x0000001e
5c297518 igCore19d!IG_mpi_page_set+0x0010b7c8
5c29721a igCore19d!IG_mpi_page_set+0x0010b4ca
5c29c353 igCore19d!IG_mpi_page_set+0x00110603
5c2962cb igCore19d!IG_mpi_page_set+0x0010a57b
5c1610d9 igCore19d!IG_image_savelist_get+0x00000b29
5c1a0557 igCore19d!IG_mpi_page_set+0x00014807
5c19feb9 igCore19d!IG_mpi_page_set+0x00014169
5c135777 igCore19d!IG_load_file+0x00000047
00498a3a Fuzzme!Fuzzme+0x0000004a [C:\Users\etach\Documents\work\gitlab\ImageGear\Fuzzme\Fuzzme.cpp @ 282]
00498e36 Fuzzme!main+0x00000376 [C:\Users\etach\Documents\work\gitlab\ImageGear\Fuzzme\Fuzzme.cpp @ 477]
004daa53 Fuzzme!invoke_main+0x00000033 [d:\agent\work\57\src\vc\tools\crt\vcstartup\src\startup\exe_common.inl @ 78]
004da8a7 Fuzzme!_scrt_common_main_seh+0x00000157 [d:\agent\work\57\src\vc\tools\crt\vcstartup\src\startup\exe_common.inl @ 288]
004da73d Fuzzme!_scrt_common_main+0x0000000d [d:\agent\work\57\src\vc\tools\crt\vcstartup\src\startup\exe_common.inl @ 331]
004daad8 Fuzzme!mainCRTStartup+0x00000008 [d:\agent\work\57\src\vc\tools\crt\vcstartup\src\startup\exe_main.cpp @ 17]
75bfbfa29 KERNEL32!BaseThreadInitThunk+0x00000019
77d57a6e ntdll!_RtlUserThreadStart+0x0000002f
77d57a1e ntdll!_RtlUserThreadStart+0x0000001b

```

The buffer corresponding to dest_buffer is allocated in a very-large previous function named allocate_table_buffer_related_sample_per_pixel with the following pseudo-code in LINE378:


```

LINE398     _io_buff = (io_buffer *)6_io_buff->size_buffer;
LINE399     } while (_look_index < (int)(uint)*(ushort *)6mys_tags_data->ID_TIF_SAMPLES_PER_PIXEL)
LINE400     ;
LINE401     }
LINE402     pIVar3 = (HIGDIBINFO)0x0;
LINE403     higidibinfo = (HIGDIBINFO)0x0;
LINE404     local_18 = 0;
LINE405     while ((loop_index_temp == 0 &&
LINE406             (local_18 < (int)mys_tags_data->from_ID_TIF_STRIP_OFFSET_or_ID_TIF_TILE_OFFSETS))
LINE407             ) {
LINE408         if ((mys_tags_data->ID_TIF_TILE_OFFSETS != 0) &&
LINE409             (*(short *)6mys_tags_data->ID_TIF_SAMPLES_PER_PIXEL != 0)) {
LINE410             _look_index = 0;
LINE411             _io_buff = io_buff;
LINE412             do {
LINE413                 perform_some_read_or_write_intofile
LINE414                     (_io_buff,*(int *) (mys_tags_data->ID_TIF_TILE_OFFSETS +
LINE415                                     (mys_tags_data->
LINE416                                         result_strip_tile_offset_divided_sample_per_pixel *
LINE417                                             _look_index + local_18) * 4) +
LINE418                                     mys_tags_data->IFD_Offset,0,0);
LINE419                 _look_index = _look_index + 1;
LINE420                 _io_buff = (io_buffer *)6_io_buff->size_buffer;
LINE421                 loop_index_temp = local_c;
LINE422                 pIVar3 = higidibinfo;
LINE423             } while (_look_index <
LINE424                     (int)(uint)*(ushort *)6mys_tags_data->ID_TIF_SAMPLES_PER_PIXEL);
LINE425         }
LINE426         strip = 0;
LINE427         if (0 < (int)mys_tags_data->ID_TIF_ROWS_PER_STRIP) {
LINE428             do {
LINE429                 local_c = loop_index_temp;
LINE430                 if ((int)mys_tags_data->ID_TIF_IMAGE_HEIGHT <= (int)pIVar3) break;
LINE431                 _look_index = 0;
LINE432                 pIVar3 = higidibinfo;
LINE433                 if (mys_tags_data->ID_TIF_PHOTO_INTERP == IG_TIF_PHOTO_YCBCR) {
LINE473                     [...]
LINE474                 }
LINE475                 else {
LINE476                     _io_buff = io_buff;
LINE477                     if (*(short *)6mys_tags_data->ID_TIF_SAMPLES_PER_PIXEL != 0) {
LINE478                         do {
LINE479                             src_buff = (byte *)get_data_from_file(_io_buff,(uint)*
LINE480                                 p_size_memory_buffer_00);
LINE481                             table_ptr_byte_from_file[_look_index] = src_buff;
LINE482                             if (src_buff == (byte *)0x0) {
LINE483                                 AF_err_record_set("..\\..\\..\\..\\Common\\Formats\\tifread.c",0x1881,
LINE484                                                         -0x803,0,(AT_INT)*p_size_memory_buffer_00,0,(LPCHAR)0x0)
LINE485                                 ;
LINE486                                 loop_index_temp = loop_index_temp + 1;
LINE487                                 break;
LINE488                             }
LINE489                             _look_index = _look_index + 1;
LINE490                             _io_buff = (io_buffer *)6_io_buff->size_buffer;
LINE491                         } while (_look_index <
LINE492                                 (int)(uint)*(ushort *)6mys_tags_data->ID_TIF_SAMPLES_PER_PIXEL);
LINE493                     }
LINE494                     local_c = loop_index_temp;
LINE495                     if (loop_index_temp != 0) break;
LINE496                     will_iIG_IP_planar_raster_unpack
LINE497                         (mys_tags_data,some_buffer,table_ptr_byte_from_file,
LINE498                             (uint *)p_size_memory_buffer_00,dest_buffer);
LINE499                     loop_index_temp =
LINE500                         IO_raster_set(mys_table_function,dest_buffer,higidibinfo,_raster_size);
LINE501                     higidibinfo = (HIGDIBINFO)((int)6higidibinfo->igdbstd_vftable + 1);
LINE502     LAB_101777e4:
LINE503         pIVar3 = higidibinfo;
LINE504         local_c = loop_index_temp;
LINE505         if (loop_index_temp != 0) break;
LINE506         }
LINE507         strip = strip + 1;
LINE508         pIVar3 = higidibinfo;
LINE509         local_c = loop_index_temp;
LINE510         } while (strip < (int)mys_tags_data->ID_TIF_ROWS_PER_STRIP);
LINE563     } [...]

```

The size of dest_buffer which is represented by _raster_size is computed through the function IO_raster_size_get as you can see at LINE377

```

LINE565     uint IO_raster_size_get(HIGDIBINFO higidibinfo)
LINE566     {
LINE567         dword bit_depth;
LINE568         uint _raster_size;
LINE569
LINE570         bit_depth = IGDI8Std::DIB_bit_depth_get(higidibinfo);
LINE571         if (bit_depth == 1) {
LINE572             /* return size_X + 0x1f >> 3 & 0xfffffff; */
LINE573             _raster_size = DIB1bit_packed_raster_size_get(higidibinfo);
LINE574             return _raster_size;
LINE575         }
LINE576         /* indirect call to some computer_raster_size */
LINE577         _raster_size = DIBStd_raster_size_get(higidibinfo);
LINE578         return _raster_size;
LINE579     }

```

The _raster_size is computed differently according to the bit_depth of the image. In our case the bit_depth is greater than '1' and so is computed through the function call DIBStd_raster_size_get at LINE577. This function is a wrapper to land finally into a function named IGDI8Std::compute_raster_size with the following pseudo-code:

```

LINES80  uint __thiscall IGDIBStd::compute_raster_size(HIGDIBINFO this)
LINES81  {
LINES82      longlong lVar1;
LINES83      uint uVar2;
LINES84      ulonglong uVar3;
LINES85
LINES86      lVar1 = (longlong)(int)(this->mys_struct_table_color).ptr_bits_per_channel_table *
LINES87              (longlong)(int)(this->mys_struct_table_color).ptr_channel_count;
LINES88      uVar3 = __allmul((uint)lVar1,(uint)((ulonglong)lVar1 >> 0x20),this->size_X,
LINES89              (int)this->size_X >> 0x1f);
LINES90      lVar1 = (longlong)(uVar3 + 0x1f) >> 3;
LINES91      uVar2 = (uint)lVar1 & 0xffffffffc;
LINES92      if ((-1 < lVar1) && ((0 < (int)((longlong)(uVar3 + 0x1f) >> 0x23) || (0x7fffffe < uVar2)))) {
LINES93          wrapper_throw_exception
LINES94              ((undefined *)0xfffffe6f,(char *)0x0,(undefined *)0x0,(undefined *)0x0,
LINES95              (undefined **)0x1022fa38,(undefined *)0x29);
LINES96      }
LINES97      return uVar2;
LINES98  }

```

The result which lead to '4' is based on values taken from directly from the file and computed along the program and finally are associated into the following variables

ptr_bits_per_channel_table, ptr_channel_count and size_X. The following TIFF tags must be present: - A planar configuration with a value of '2'. - A photometric tag with some specifics values

The value written into the memory are indirectly controlled from the bytes we can have from the malformed file and the size of the allocation buffer is also controlled through the values of the files.

Crash Information

```
0:000> !analyze -v
*****
*                                     *
*               Exception Analysis   *
*                                     *
*****

KEY_VALUES_STRING: 1

    Key : AV.Fault
    Value: Write

    Key : Analysis.CPU.mSec
    Value: 2405

    Key : Analysis.DebugAnalysisManager
    Value: Create

    Key : Analysis.Elapsed.mSec
    Value: 29571

    Key : Analysis.Init.CPU.mSec
    Value: 3624

    Key : Analysis.Init.Elapsed.mSec
    Value: 32534

    Key : Analysis.Memory.CommitPeak.Mb
    Value: 171

    Key : Timeline.OS.Boot.DeltaSec
    Value: 279515

    Key : Timeline.Process.Start.DeltaSec
    Value: 31

    Key : WER.OS.Branch
    Value: vb_release

    Key : WER.OS.Timestamp
    Value: 2019-12-06T14:06:00Z

    Key : WER.OS.Version
    Value: 10.0.19041.1

    Key : WER.Process.Version
    Value: 1.0.1.1

NTGLOBALFLAG:  2100000

APPLICATION_VERIFIER_FLAGS:  0

APPLICATION_VERIFIER_LOADED: 1

EXCEPTION_RECORD: (.exr -1)
ExceptionAddress: 5c194b4c (igCore19d!IG_mpi_page_set+0x00008dfc)
ExceptionCode: c0000005 (Access violation)
ExceptionFlags: 00000000
NumberParameters: 2
   Parameter[0]: 00000001
   Parameter[1]: 0b98d000
Attempt to write to address 0b98d000

FAULTING_THREAD:  0000254c

PROCESS_NAME:  Fuzzme.exe

WRITE_ADDRESS:  0b98d000

ERROR_CODE: (NTSTATUS) 0xc0000005 - The instruction at 0x%p referenced memory at 0x%p. The memory could not be %s.

EXCEPTION_CODE_STR:  c0000005

EXCEPTION_PARAMETER1:  00000001

EXCEPTION_PARAMETER2:  0b98d000

STACK_TEXT:
WARNING: Stack unwind information not available. Following frames may be wrong.
0019f4a0 5c142d4d 00000004 00000000 00000001 igCore19d!IG_mpi_page_set+0x8dfc
0019f4c4 5c29c17f 00000004 00000000 00000001 igCore19d!IG_thread_image_unlock+0x4b5d
0019f4f8 5c297712 0019f5c4 0b418d68 099e4ff0 igCore19d!IG_mpi_page_set+0x11042f
0019f544 5c29721a 0019fb30 10000021 12688ff0 igCore19d!IG_mpi_page_set+0x10b9c2
0019f56c 5c29c353 0019fb30 10000021 0019f5c4 igCore19d!IG_mpi_page_set+0x10b4ca
0019f594 5c2962cb 0019fb30 10000021 0b418d68 igCore19d!IG_mpi_page_set+0x110603
0019faa8 5c1610d9 0019fb30 0b418d68 00000001 igCore19d!IG_mpi_page_set+0x10a57b
0019fae0 5c1a0557 00000000 0b418d68 0019fb30 igCore19d!IG_image_savelist_get+0xb29
0019fd5c 5c19feb9 00000000 05414f88 00000001 igCore19d!IG_mpi_page_set+0x14807
0019fd7c 5c135777 00000000 05414f88 00000001 igCore19d!IG_mpi_page_set+0x14169
0019fd9c 00498a3a 05414f88 0019fe0c 004801a4 igCore19d!IG_load_file+0x47
0019fe14 00498e36 05414f88 0019fe8c 004801a4 Fuzzme!fuzzme+0x4a
0019fee4 004daa53 00000005 05354f20 0535df20 Fuzzme!main+0x376
0019ff04 004da8a7 b039b859 004801a4 004801a4 Fuzzme!invoke_main+0x33
0019ff60 004da73d 0019ff70 004daad8 0019ff80 Fuzzme!__scrt_common_main_seh+0x157
0019ff68 004daad8 0019ff80 75bbfa29 0035e000 Fuzzme!__scrt_common_main+0xd
0019ff70 75bbfa29 0035e000 75bbfa10 0019ffdc Fuzzme!mainCRTStartup+0x8
0019ff80 77d57a4e 0035e000 a98e2324 00000000 KERNEL32!BaseThreadInitThunk+0x19
0019ffdc 77d57a1e ffffffff 77d788fd 00000000 ntdll!_RtlUserThreadStart+0x2f
0019ffec 00000000 004801a4 0035e000 00000000 ntdll!_RtlUserThreadStart+0x1b

STACK_COMMAND: ~0s ; .cxr ; kb

SYMBOL_NAME:  igCore19d!IG_mpi_page_set+8dfc

MODULE_NAME:  igCore19d

IMAGE_NAME:  igCore19d.dll

FAILURE_BUCKET_ID:  INVALID_POINTER_WRITE_AVRF_c0000005_igCore19d.dll!IG_mpi_page_set
```

```
OS_VERSION: 10.0.19041.1
BUILDLAB_STR: vb_release
OSPLATFORM_TYPE: x86
OSNAME: Windows 10
IMAGE_VERSION: 19.9.0.0
FAILURE_ID_HASH: {39ff52ad-9054-81fd-3e4d-ef5d82e4b2c1}
Followup: MachineOwner
-----
```

Timeline

2021-05-10 - Vendor Disclosure

2021-05-31 - Vendor Patched

2021-06-01 - Public Release

CREDIT

Discovered by Emmanuel Tacheau of Cisco Talos.

VULNERABILITY REPORTS

PREVIOUS REPORT

NEXT REPORT

TALOS-2021-1276

TALOS-2021-1308