Talos Vulnerability Report

TALOS-2020-1123

Google Chrome DrawElementsInstanced information leak vulnerability

OCTOBER 22, 2020

CVE NUMBER

CVE-2020-6555

SUMMARY

An information disclosure vulnerability exists in the WebGL functionality of Google Chrome 83.0.4103.116 (Stable) (64-bit) and 86.0.4198.0 (Developer Build) (64-bit). Specially crafted JavaScript can cause an out-of-bounds read. The victim must visit a specially crafted, malicious web page to trigger this vulnerability.

CONFIRMED VIII NERABLE VERSIONS

The versions below were either tested or verified to be vulnerable by Talos or confirmed to be vulnerable by the vendor.

Google Chrome 83.0.4103.116 (Stable) (64-bit)

Google Chrome 86.0.4198.0 (Developer Build) (64-bit)

PRODUCT URLS

Chrome - https://www.google.com/chrome/

CVSSV3 SCORE

6.8 - CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:L

CWE

CWE-125 - Out-of-bounds Read

DETAILS

Google Chrome is one of the most popular and feature-rich web browsers and supports the newest technologies and extensions, one of which is WebGL.

This vulnerability is in ANGLE, a compatibility layer between OpenGL and Direct3D used on Windows by Chrome browser and other project.

While executing the supplied PoC, Chromium browser crashes inside ConvertIndexArray from IndexDataManager. Snippet of this function is as follows:

```
void ConvertIndexArray(const void *input,
                                       gl::DrawElementsType sourceType,
void *output,
gl::DrawElementsType destinationType,
 3:
4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:
10:
                                       GLsizei count.
                                       bool usePrimitiveRestartFixedIndex)
            const InputT *in = static_cast<const InputT *>(input);
DestT *out = static_cast<DestT *>(output);
11:
12:
13:
             if (usePrimitiveRestartFixedIndex)
                  InputT srcRestartIndex = static_cast<InputT>(gl::GetPrimitiveRestartIndex(sourceType));
14:
15:
16:
17:
18:
19:
                  \label{eq:destribetartIndex} DestT \ destRestartIndex = static\_cast<DestT>(gl::GetPrimitiveRestartIndex(destinationType)); \\ for \ (GLsizei \ i = 0; \ i < count; \ i++) \\
                       out[i] = (in[i] == srcRestartIndex ? destRestartIndex : static cast<DestT>(in[i])):
20:
21:
22:
            else
{
                  for (GLsizei i = 0; i < count; i++)
23:
24:
25:
                       out[i] = static_cast<DestT>(in[i]);
                 }
26:
27: }
             }
```

Function crashes at line 17 due to wrong memory address because value provied for variable in comes directly from function void ext.drawElementsInstancedANGLE(mode, count, type, offset, primcount); At this point two values are directly and fully controlable from JavaScript. The value of in at line 8 which is offset in JavaScript and value count at line 15 which corresponds to variable count in JavaScript.

Values provided for offset variable in JS are in the range from 00000000 to 7fffffff.

Unchecked boundaries for these values can lead to out of bounds read and if the value can be freely returned JavaScript, this vulnerability could be turned into info leak to be abused to bypass mitigations.

Crash Information

Windbg output from Chromium x64 head:

```
Exception Analysis
KEY VALUES STRING: 1
    Key : AV.Dereference
Value: String
    Key : AV.Fault
Value: Read
    Key : Analysis.CPU.mSec
Value: 8421
          : Analysis.DebugAnalysisProvider.CPF
    Value: Create: 8007007e on DESKTOP-JNM9A2J
        : Analysis.DebugData
    Value: CreateObject
        : Analysis.DebugModel
    Value: CreateObject
        : Analysis.Elapsed.mSec
    Value: 48086
         : Analysis.Memory.CommitPeak.Mb
    Value: 2262
        : Analysis.System
    Value: CreateObject
    Key : Timeline.OS.Boot.DeltaSec
    Value: 22813
    Key : Timeline.Process.Start.DeltaSec
Value: 39
    Kev : WER.OS.Branch
    Value: vb_release
        · WER OS Timestamn
    Value: 2019-12-06T14:06:00Z
    Key : WER.OS.Version
Value: 10.0.19041.1
ADDITIONAL_XML: 1
OS_BUILD_LAYERS: 1
EXCEPTION RECORD: (.exr -1)
ExceptionFlags: 00000000
NumberParameters: 2
   Attempt to read from address 0000000041414141
FAULTING THREAD: 000013b0
PROCESS NAME: content shell.exe
READ ADDRESS: 0000000041414141
ERROR_CODE: (NTSTATUS) 0xc00000005 - The instruction at 0x%p referenced memory at 0x%p. The memory could not be %s.
EXCEPTION CODE STR: c0000005
EXCEPTION_PARAMETER1: 0000000000000000
EXCEPTION PARAMETER2: 0000000041414141
STACK TEXT:
000000a8`5c14b050 00007ffa`4897d1d9
                                          : 000000a8`5c14b430 00000000`0000001 00000000`00000000 0000027a`9986b580 : libglesv2!rx::`anonymous
: 0000027a 00000000 0000027a 00000001 00000000 00000039 00000000 : libglesv2!rx:: anonymous
                                          : 0000d87a`5d1ac6fd 00000000`0000001e 00000000`a0f6fa0f 0000027a`a0f6f950 : libglesv2!rx::`anonymous
namespace'::StreamInIndexBuffer+0x27b
000000a8`5c14b5a0 00007ffa`4897b43d
                                          : 00000001`5c14b998 00000000`00000012 0000d87a`5d1ac49d 00000000`00040000 :
libglesv2!rx::IndexDataManager::streamIndexData+0x2ec
000000a8`5c14b7b0 00007ffa`48b4143d : 0000d87a`5d1a
libglesv2!rx::IndexDataManager::prepareIndexData+0x2ad
                                          : 0000d87a`5d1ac94d 00007ffa`485a6b83 000000a8`5c14bf0c 000000a8`5c14c0a8 :
                                          · 0000027a`9966cc60 00000001`95cd0000 0000d87a`5d1acf3d 00007ffa`48408a4c ·
000000a8`5c14he30 00007ffa`48h40503
libglesv2!rx::StateManager11::applyIndexBuffer+0x16d
000000a8`5c14bf50 00007ffa`48ab1f6f : 0000000a8`5c14c5d8 00000000 00000000 0000007a 301ac15d 00007h1a 40400atc l
libglesv2!rx::StateManager11::updateState+0x733
000000a8`5c14c4c0 00007ffa`48ab2258 : 000000
libglesv2!rx::Context11::drawElementsImpl+0x5af
                                            00000000`a0eb21d0 3fffffff`7cfbfffa 0000027a`99375bd0 0000027a`a0eaf3c0 :
000000a8`5c14c720 00007ffa`4855015f
                                          : 00000004`0036baf0 00000000`00000000 0100027a`a0eaf3c0 00007ffa`489440ff :
libglesv2!gl::Context::drawElementsInstanced+0x12f
000000a8`5c14c880 00007ffa`484eb5cb : 00007ffa`4957927a 000000000 00000008 00007ffa`49758900 00007ffa`49758978 : libglesv!gl:librawFlementsInstanced+0x27b
00000008 5c14c960 00007ffa 5904547d
libglesv2!glDrawElementsInstanced+0x4b
00000088 5c14c9b0 00007ffa 6f365441
                                          : 00007ffa`49758978 00007ffa`49758978 0100027a`a0ea98e8 0000027a`a0eaf3c0 :
                                           00000000`00000000 00007ffa`59043302 0000027a`a0ea9e70 0000027a`a0ea7b58 :
gl_wrapper!gl::GLApiBase::glDrawElementsInstancedANGLEFn+0x7d
000000a8`5c14ca20 00007ffa`6f38cfe5 : 0000027a`a0ea7a00 000
                                           0000027a`a0ea7a00 00000005`a0ee8500 00001401`0b2b9d09 0000027a`a0ea7a40 :
gles2!gpu::gles2::GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::DoDrawElementsInstancedANGLE+0x91 0000000a8`5c14caa0 00007ffa`6f31cfa6 : 00008cc1`c560c678 00007ffa`6f3275c0 000
                                          : 00008cc1`c560c678 00007ffa`6f3275c0 00000000`00000100 000000a8`5c14cc38 :
gles2!gpu::gles2::GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::HandleDrawElementsInstancedANGLE+0xf5
                                          : 00007ffa`6f8905b0 01000000`0000000a 0000027a`a0ea7a40 0000027a`a0ea7a78 :
000000a8`5c14cb30 00007ffa`6f31c67d
gles2!gpu::gles2::6LES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::DoCommandsImpl:0>+0x286
0000000a8`5c14cbe0 00007ffa`85421721 : 00000000`0000000 00000000`00
                                          : 00000000`0000000 0000000`0000000 0000027a`99699a50 00007ffa`6f333786 :
```

```
gpu_ipc_service!gpu::CommandBufferStub::OnAsyncFlush+0x766
000000a8`5c14d1d0 00007ffa`56a31c4b : 000000a8`5c14d3d0 00007ffa`56a31a2b 0000007a`998a1230 000000a8`5c14d2f8 :
gpu_ipc_service!base::DispatchToMethodImpl<gpu::CommandBufferStub *,void (gpu::CommandBufferStub::*)(int, unsigned int, const
std:__1::vector<gpu::SyncToken, std::__1::allocator<gpu::SyncToken> > 6),std::_1::uple<int,unsigned
int,std::_1::vector<gpu::SyncToken,std::__1::allocator<gpu::SyncToken> > >,0,1,2>+0x9e
000000a8`5c14d240 00007ffa`56a3193f : 0000000a8`5c14d3d0 0000000a8`5c14d3c8 0000000a8`5c14d3c8 :
gpu_ipc_service!base::DispatchToMethod<gpu::CommandBufferStub *,void (gpu::CommandBufferStub::*)(int, unsigned int, const std::_1::vector<gpu::SyncToken,std::_1::allocator<gpu::SyncToken> > 6),std::_1:tuple<int,unsigned
int,std:_1::vector<gpu::SynrToken,std::_1::allocator<gpu::SynrToken>>>>+0x6b
000000a8`5c14d2b0 00007ffa`56a249ca : 00000000`00000000 00000008`5c14d5d0 00000000`00000000 00000008`5c14d5d0 :
gpu_ipc_service!IPC::DispatchToMethod<gpu::CommandBufferStub,void (gpu::CommandBufferStub::*)(int, unsigned int, const
gpu_ipc_service!IPC::MessageT<GpuCommandBufferMsg_AsyncFlush_Meta,std::__1::tuple<int,unsigned
int,std::__1::vector<gpu::SyncToken,std::__1::allocator<gpu::SyncToken> >
>,void>::Dispatch<gpu::CommandBufferStub,gpu::CommandBufferStub,void,void (gpu::CommandBufferStub::*)(int, unsigned int, const</pre>
gpu_ipc_service!gpu::GpuChannel::HandleMessageHelper+0x79
0000000a8`5c14d750 00007ffa`56a57af9 : 000000a8`5c14d9f8 00007ffa`853e1e97 0000027a`994cb4a0 0000027a`998a1220 :
gpu_ipc_service!gpu::GpuChannel::HandleMessage+0x21e
000000a8`5c14db00 00007ffa`8543896b
                                              : 000000a8`5c14dbc8 00007ffa`86cb4307 000000a8`0000000 00007ffa`86e85708 :
gpu!base::OnceCallback<void ()>::Run+0x7c
                                              : 0000027a`998ae4c8 00007ffa`8544af93 0000027a`998ae4c8 00007ffa`8544b293 :
gpu!gpu::Scheduler::RunNextTask+0x92b
000000a8`5c14de40 00007ffa`8544d53b
                                              · 0000027a`998ae4c8 00007ffa`8544af4b 000000a8`5c14df78 000000a8`5c14df58
gpu:base::internal::FunctorTraits<void (gpu::Scheduler::*)(),void>::Invoke<void (gpu::Scheduler::*)(),base::WeakPtr<gpu::Scheduler>>+0x1f
000000a8`5c14de80 00007ffa`8544d4c9
                                               000000a8`5c14df30 00007ffa`86cb64e7 000000a8`5c14df40 00007ffa`86f902a5
gpu!base::internal::InvokeHelper<1,void>::MakeIt5o<void (gpu::Scheduler::*)(),base::WeakPtr<gpu::Scheduler>>+0x4b
000000a8`5c14dec0 00007ffa`8544d46d : 00007ffa`872b3468 00007ffa`872b3468 0000939c`b71d3e4c 00007ffa`86cb6423
gpu!base::internal::Invokervbase::internal::BindState
gpu!base::internal::Invokervbase::internal::BindState
gpu!base::internal::Invokervbase::internal::BindState
gpu:base::internal::Invokervbase::internal::BindState
gpu:base::weakPtr<gpu::Scheduler>>,void ()>::RunOnce+0x5d
000000a8`5c14df60 00007ffa`86ea530f : 0000027a`95cf98d0 00007ffa`86cb42de 0000027a`95cf98c8 00007ffa`86ec1faa :
base!base::OnceCallback
ypu:base::weakPtr<gpu::Scheduler>>,void ()>::RunOnce+0x5d
000000a8`5c14df60 00007ffa`86ec1faa :
base!base::OnceCallback
000000a8`5c14dfc0 00007ffa`86ef9162
base!base::TaskAnnotator::RunTask+0x70f
000000a8`5c14e1d0 00007ffa`86ef86de
                                             : 00000000`00000000 00007ffa`86f902a5 00000000`00000000 000000a8`5c14e268 :
                                              : 0000939c`b71d046c 00000000`00000000 00000000`00c62f84 00000000`00c62f84 :
base!base::sequence_manager::internal::ThreadControllerWithMessagePumpImpl::DoWorkImpl+0x802
000000a8`5c14e550 00007ffa`86d67e1e : 0000027a`95d0cf40 000000a8`5c14e6c8 0000027a`95d0cf48 000000a8`5c14e6c8 :
base!base::sequence manager::internal::ThreadControllerWithMessagePumpImpl::DoWork+0xfe
000000a8`5c14e640 00007ffa`86efa18f
base!base::MessagePumpDefault::Run+0xae
                                              : 0000027a`994f5df8 00007ffa`86d2ae1b 00000000`00000000 00000001`00000000 :
000000a8`5c14e6e0 00007ffa`86e2e012
                                              : 00000000`0000000 0000000`000000e6 0000939c`b71d086c 00007ffa`870613f8 :
base!base::sequence_manager::internal::ThreadControllerWithMessagePumpImpl::Run+0x36f
000000a8`5c14e930 00007ffa`7b81d414 : 00000000`000003d8 00000000`00000600 00000000`00000000 00000008`5c14eb00 :
base!base::RunLoop::Run+0x342
000000a8`5c14ea70 00007ffa`7fa2e470
content!content::GpuMain+0xaf4
                                              : 0000027a`95d0f920 0000027a`95d13080 000000a8`5c14f000 0000027a`95d13080 :
000000a8'5c14efb0 00007ffa'7fa2f7f7
                                              content!content::RunOtherNamedProcessTypeMain+0xe0
000000a8 5c14f020 00007ffa 7fa2a1d7
                                              content!content::ContentMainRunnerImpl::Run+0x2f7
000000a8`5c14f120 00007ffa`51282498
                                               0000027a`95cd0000 00007ffa`40000062 00000000`0000009c 00000000`000000b0 :
000000a8`5c14f628 000000a8`5c14f628 000000a8`5c14f628 00000000`00000000
                                              : 00007ff6`e6037eb8 00007ff6`e59b2447 00007ff6`e5410930 00007ff6`e602ecc0 :
content!content::ContentMain+0x88
000000a8`5c14f550 00007ff6`e59b49d2
                                              : 00000000`00000000 00007ff6`e59b260d 00000000`0000000 00007ff6`e5ce4508 :
content shell!wWinMain+0x139
                                              : 00007ff6`e5ce4400 00007ff6`e5ce44e0 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 :
000000a8`5c14f650 00007ff6`e59b4b0e
content shell!invoke main+0x32
000000a8`5c14f690 00007ff6`e59b4b8e
                                              content_shell!__scrt_common_main_seh+0x12e
000000a8`5c14f700 00007ff6`e59b4ba9 :
                                              content_shell!__scrt_common_main+0xe
000000a8`5c14f730 00007ffa`ecb86fd4
                                              content shell!wWinMainCRTStartup+0x9
000000a8`5c14f760 00007ffa`ed01cec1
KERNEL32!BaseThreadInitThunk+0x14
                                              000000a8`5c14f790 00000000`00000000
                                              ntdll!RtlUserThreadStart+0x21
FAULTING\_SOURCE\_LINE: C: \Work\Browsers\chromium\_stable\src\third\_party\angle\src\libANGLE\renderer\d3d\IndexDataManager.cpp
FAULTING_SOURCE_FILE: C:\Work\Browsers\chromium_stable\src\third_party\angle\src\libANGLE\renderer\d3d\IndexDataManager.cpp
FAULTING_SOURCE_LINE_NUMBER: 44
FAULTING SOURCE CODE
                  InputT srcRestartIndex = static_cast<InputT>(gl::GetPrimitiveRestartIndex(sourceType));
DestT destRestartIndex = static_cast<DestT>(gl::GetPrimitiveRestartIndex(destinationType));
     41:
                   for (GLsizei i = 0; i < count; i++)
     43:
44:
                      out[i] = (in[i] == srcRestartIndex ? destRestartIndex : static cast<DestT>(in[i])):
     46:
     47:
              else
                  for (GLsizei i = 0: i < count: i++)
SYMBOL NAME: libglesv2!rx::`anonymous namespace'::ConvertIndexArrav<unsigned char.unsigned short>+b4
MODULE NAME: libglesv2
IMAGE NAME: libglesv2.dll
```

STACK_COMMAND: ~20s ; .cxr ; kb

 $FAILURE_BUCKET_ID: \quad NULL_POINTER_READ_c0000005_libglesv2.dll!rx::_anonymous_namespace_::ConvertIndexArray_unsigned_char,unsigned_short_unsigned_short_unsigned_char,unsigned_short_unsigned_char,unsigned_short_unsigned_char,unsigned_short_unsigned_char,unsigned_short_unsigned_char,unsigned_short_unsigned_char,unsigned_short_unsigned_char,unsigned_short_unsigned_char,unsigned_char,unsigned_short_unsigned_char,unsigned_$

OS_VERSION: 10.0.19041.1
BUILDLAB_STR: vb_release
OSPLATFORM_TYPE: x64
OSNAME: Windows 10
IMAGE_VERSION: 2.1.0.0

FAILURE_ID_HASH: {b019e0bb-749b-f43f-cf2e-5250983065ba}

Followup: MachineOwner

TIMELINE

2020-07-13 - Vendor Disclosure 2020-07-15 - Vendor patched 2020-10-13 - Public Release

CREDIT

Discovered by Marcin Towalski of Cisco Talos.

VULNERABILITY REPORTS PREVIOUS REPORT NEXT REPORT

TALOS-2020-1050 TALOS-2020-1148