

Out-of-bounds read in radareorg/radare2

0

✓ Valid

Reported on Apr 1st 2022

Description

Out-of-bounds (OOB) read vulnerability exists in analop function in Radare2 5.6.7

Version

```
radare2 5.6.7 27722 @ linux-x86-64 git.5.6.6
commit: e876eef2a2f758157dd6028fb01809bcedacf00f build: 2022-04-01__07:03:3
```

Proof of Concept

```
radare2 -q -A poc
```

poc

ASAN

```
==2143069==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x6020000a2a17 thread T0
READ of size 1 at 0x6020000a2a17 thread T0
```

```
#0 0x7fabd14c6e66 in analop /root/fuzzing/radare2_fuzzing/radare2/libr/
#1 0x7fabd15ee0b7 in r_anal_op /root/fuzzing/radare2_fuzzing/radare2/li
#2 0x7fabd2edd954 in anal_block_cb /root/fuzzing/radare2_fuzzing/radare
#3 0x7fabd1618bab in r_anal_block_recurse_depth_first /root/fuzzing/rac
#4 0x7fabd2ede480 in r_core_recover_vars /root/fuzzing/radare2_fuzzing/
#5 0x7fabd2cf8d40 in r_core_af /root/fuzzing/radare2_fuzzing/radare2/li
#6 0x7fabd2ee2f29 in r_core_anal_all /root/fuzzing/rada
#7 0x7fabd2d33ac1 in cmd_anal_all /root/fuzzing/radare2_
#8 0x7fabd2d3bc5b in cmd anal /root/fuzzing/radare2 fuzzing/radare2/li
```

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#9 0x7fabd2eb7d8a in r_cmd_call /root/fuzzing/radare2_fuzzing/radare2/l
#10 0x7fabd2dece8c in r_core_cmd_subst_i /root/fuzzing/radare2_fuzzing/
#11 0x7fabd2de4103 in r_core_cmd_subst /root/fuzzing/radare2_fuzzing/rc
#12 0x7fabd2df3792 in run_cmd_depth /root/fuzzing/radare2_fuzzing/radar
#13 0x7fabd2df4002 in r_core_cmd /root/fuzzing/radare2_fuzzing/radare2/
#14 0x7fabd2df4b2c in r_core_cmd0 /root/fuzzing/radare2_fuzzing/radare2
#15 0x7fabd54f93ca in r_main_radare2 /root/fuzzing/radare2_fuzzing/radare2
#16 0x5652f8dde5f8 in main /root/fuzzing/radare2_fuzzing/radare2/bin/r
#17 0x7fabd52f97fc in __libc_start_main ../csu/libc-start.c:332
#18 0x5652f8dde179 in _start (/root/fuzzing/radare2_fuzzing/radare2/bin/r

```

0x6020000a2a17 is located 0 bytes to the right of 7-byte region [0x6020000a2a10:0x6020000a2a17] allocated by thread T0 here:

```

#0 0x7fabd59fe7cf in __interceptor_malloc ../../../../src/libsanitizer/
#1 0x7fabd2edd2ef in anal_block_cb /root/fuzzing/radare2_fuzzing/radare2/anal/anal_block.c:117
#2 0x7fabd1618bab in r_anal_block_recurse_depth_first /root/fuzzing/radare2_fuzzing/radare2/anal/anal_block.c:117
#3 0x7fabd2ede480 in r_core_recover_vars /root/fuzzing/radare2_fuzzing/radare2/core/core_recover.c:117
#4 0x7fabd2cf8d40 in r_core_af /root/fuzzing/radare2_fuzzing/radare2/lib/libradare2.so.2
#5 0x7fabd2ee2f29 in r_core_anal_all /root/fuzzing/radare2_fuzzing/radare2/core/core_anal.c:117
#6 0x7fabd2d33ac1 in cmd_anal_all /root/fuzzing/radare2_fuzzing/radare2/lib/libradare2.so.2
#7 0x7fabd2d3bc5b in cmd_anal /root/fuzzing/radare2_fuzzing/radare2/lib/libradare2.so.2
#8 0x7fabd2eb7d8a in r_cmd_call /root/fuzzing/radare2_fuzzing/radare2/lib/libradare2.so.2
#9 0x7fabd2dece8c in r_core_cmd_subst_i /root/fuzzing/radare2_fuzzing/radare2/core/core_cmd.c:117
#10 0x7fabd2de4103 in r_core_cmd_subst /root/fuzzing/radare2_fuzzing/radare2/core/core_cmd.c:117
#11 0x7fabd2df3792 in run_cmd_depth /root/fuzzing/radare2_fuzzing/radare2/core/core_cmd.c:117
#12 0x7fabd2df4002 in r_core_cmd /root/fuzzing/radare2_fuzzing/radare2/core/core_cmd.c:117
#13 0x7fabd2df4b2c in r_core_cmd0 /root/fuzzing/radare2_fuzzing/radare2/core/core_cmd.c:117
#14 0x7fabd54f93ca in r_main_radare2 /root/fuzzing/radare2_fuzzing/radare2/core/core_main.c:117
#15 0x5652f8dde5f8 in main /root/fuzzing/radare2_fuzzing/radare2/bin/radare2
#16 0x7fabd52f97fc in __libc_start_main ../csu/libc-start.c:332

```

SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow /root/fuzzing/radare2_fuzzing/radare2/anal/anal_block.c:117:10 Shadow bytes around the buggy address:

```

0x0c048000c4f0: fa fa fd fa fa fa fd fa fa fa fd fa fa fa fd fa
0x0c048000c500: fa fa fd fa fa fa fd fa fa fa 06 fa fa fa fd fa
0x0c048000c510: fa fa fd fa fa fa fd fa fa fa fd fd fa fa 00 05
0x0c048000c520: fa fa 00 fa fa fa 00 02 fa fa fd fd fa fa 00 05
0x0c048000c530: fa fa 00 05 fa fa 00 05 fa fa fd fd fa fa fa fa
=>0x0c048000c540: fa fa[07]fa fa fa 04 fa fa fa 03 fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x0c048000c550: fa fa 03 fa fa fa 03 fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x0c048000c560: fa fa 03 fa fa fa 03 fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa

```

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
```
0x0c048000c560: ta ta ta ta ta ta ta ta ta ta ta ta ta ta ta ta
0x0c048000c570: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x0c048000c580: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
```

```
0x0c048000c590: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
```

Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):

```
Addressable:          00
Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
Heap left redzone:    fa
Freed heap region:    fd
Stack left redzone:   f1
Stack mid redzone:    f2
Stack right redzone:  f3
Stack after return:   f5
Stack use after scope: f8
Global redzone:       f9
Global init order:    f6
Poisoned by user:     f7
Container overflow:    fc
Array cookie:         ac
Intra object redzone: bb
ASan internal:        fe
Left alloca redzone:  ca
Right alloca redzone: cb
Shadow gap:          cc
```

==2143069==ABORTING



Backtrace

```
#7  0x00007ffff3149e67 in analOp (a=0x61a000000680, op=0x7ffffffffffd170, addr
#8  0x00007ffff32710b8 in r_anal_op (anal=0x61a000000680, op=0x7ffffffffffd170
#9  0x00007ffff4b60955 in anal_block_cb (bb=0x611000014e00, ctx=0x7ffffffffffc
#10 0x00007ffff329bbac in r_anal_block_recurse_depth_first (block=0x61100001
#11 0x00007ffff4b61481 in r_core_recover_vars (core=0x7ffffef60f800, fcn=0x6
#12 0x00007ffff497bd41 in r_core_af (core=0x7ffffef60f800, addr=65536, name=
#13 0x00007ffff4b65f2a in r_core_anal_all (core=0x7ffffef60f800) at canal.c:
#14 0x00007ffff49b6ac2 in cmd_anal_all (core=0x7ffffef60f800
#15 0x00007ffff49bec5c in cmd_anal (data=0x7ffffef60f800, inp
#16 0x00007ffff4b3ad8b in r_cmd_call (cmd=0x620000000080, input=0x6020000a2
```

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```

#17 0x00007ffff4a6fe8d in r_core_cmd_subst_i (core=0x7ffffef60f800, cmd=0x602e
#18 0x00007ffff4a67104 in r_core_cmd_subst (core=0x7ffffef60f800, cmd=0x602e
#19 0x00007ffff4a76793 in run_cmd_depth (core=0x7ffffef60f800, cmd=0x621000e
#20 0x00007ffff4a77003 in r_core_cmd (core=0x7ffffef60f800, cstr=0x7ffff719e
#21 0x00007ffff4a77b2d in r_core_cmd0 (core=0x7ffffef60f800, cmd=0x7ffff719e
#22 0x00007ffff717c3cb in r_main_radare2 (argc=4, argv=0x7ffffffffffe468) at r
#23 0x00005555555555f9 in main (argc=4, argv=0x7ffffffffffe468) at radare2.c:9
#24 0x00007ffff6f7c7fd in __libc_start_main (main=0x555555555581 <main>, ar
#25 0x000055555555517a in _start ()

```

Analysis

The buffer is allocated at `/libr/core/canal.c:3452` with `bb->size`

```

static bool anal_block_cb(RAnalBlock *bb, BlockRecurseCtx *ctx) {
    if (r_cons_is_broke()) {
        return false;
    }
    if (bb->size < 1) {
        return true;
    }
    if (bb->size > ctx->core->anal->opt.bb_max_size) {
        return true;
    }
    ut8 *buf = malloc (bb->size);
    if (!buf) {
        return false;
    }
    (void) r_io_read_at (ctx->core->io, bb->addr, buf, bb->size);

```

Then at `/libr/core/canal.c:3502`, `pos` value is added to the pointer `buf` before being passed to `r_anal_op` function

```

#else
    pos = (opaddr - bb->addr);
    if (r_anal_op (core->anal, &op, opaddr, buf + pos,
        break;
}

```

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`r_anal_op` function passes the arguments to `op` function without any validation on `data`

```
ret = anal->cur->op (anal, op, addr, data, len, mask);
```

The OOB read happens at `/libr/anal/p/anal_cris.c:65` when it tries to read `buf[1]`

```
static int analop(RAnal *a, RAnalOp *op, ut64 addr, const ut8 *buf, int len,
                 default:
                 switch (buf[1]) {                                // <<<<< OOB read
                 case 0x00:
                     op->type = R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_CJMP; // BCC
                     break;
```

Suggested Fix

Validate `buf` size after adding `pos` at `/libr/core/canal.c:3502`

Impact

This vulnerability allows attackers to read sensitive information from outside the allocated buffer boundary.

CVE

CVE-2022-1207

(Published)

Vulnerability Type

CWE-125: Out-of-bounds Read

Severity

Medium (6.6)

Registry

Other

Affected Version

5.6.7

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Visibility

Public

Status

Fixed

Found by



hmthabit

@hmthabit

unranked ▼

Fixed by



pancake

@trufae

maintainer

This report was seen 638 times.

We are processing your report and will contact the [radareorg/radare2](#) team within 24 hours.

8 months ago

hmthabit modified the report 8 months ago

hmthabit modified the report 8 months ago

hmthabit modified the report 8 months ago

pancake validated this vulnerability 8 months ago

hmthabit has been awarded the disclosure bounty ✓

The fix bounty is now up for grabs

pancake marked this as fixed in **5.6.8** with commit **605785** 8 months ago

pancake has been awarded the fix bounty ✓

This vulnerability will not receive a CVE ✗

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