Bug 1177362 - (CVE-2020-8029) VUL-0: CVE-2020-8029: skuba: Insecure handling of private key

Status: REOPENED Classification: Novell Products Product: SUSE Security Incidents Component: Audits Version: unspecified Hardware: Other Other Priority: P3 - Medium Severity: Normal Target Milestone: ---Assigned To: Containers Team QA Contact: Security Team bot URL:

> Whiteboard: CVSSv3.1:SUSE:CVE-2020-8029:4.0:(AV:L... Keywords:

Depends on: Blocks:

Show dependency tree / graph

 Create test case · Clone This Bug

Reported: 2020-10-06 11:42 UTC by Johannes Segitz

Modified: 2021-04-16 07:45 UTC (History) CC List: 5 users (show)

See Also: Found By: ---Services Priority: **Business Priority:** Blocker:

Flags: rfernandezlopez: needinfo? (kkaempf)

Attachments

Add an attachment (proposed patch, testcase, etc.)

-Note

You need to log in before you can comment on or make changes to this bug

Johannes Segitz 2020-10-06 11:42:25 UTC

```
In internal/pkg/skuba/deployments/ssh/kubelet.go
err != nil {
125
                     return err
127 if _, _, err := t.silentSsh("chmod", "0400",
filepath.Join(kubernetes.KubeletCertAndKeyDir, kubernetes.KubeletServerKeyName));
err != nil {
                     return err
this uploads the key world readable, then sets secure permissions.
On node that will be joined as non-root user:
sles@jseg-caasp45-workerl:/tmp> id
uid=1000(sles) gid=100(users) groups=100(users),494(cdrom)
sles@jseg-caasp45-worker1:/tmp> while true; do cat /var/lib/kubelet/pki/kubelet.key
2>/dev/null; done
<now join the node>
----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----
MIIEOWIBAAKCAQEAOWG5F5sI9LzKrba8bUnV8vzjGY3C11Jp3BHpsM/BIUbS3BnH
Please have a look. As we're upstream for this I would assign a CVE from our pool
```

Johannes Segitz 2020-10-06 11:43:16 UTC

This is an embargoed bug. This means that this information is not public.

- talk to other people about this unless they're involved in fixing the issue - make this bug public

Consult with security team if you think that the issue is public and the bug is still private (e.g. subject still contains "EMBARGOED"). Please do NOT make the bug public yourself.

Please be aware that the SUSE:SLE-15-SP3:GA codestream is available via OBS, so do NOT submit there before this is public.

These are the steps that are asked from you: 1, Your primary responsibility is to submit a fix for this issue. Here's a how-to for submitting packages for maintenance releases in IBS:

https://confluence.suse.com/display/maintenance/How+to+Submit+Packages+or+Containers
Apart from the GA codestreams mentioned above, you can submit to IBS anytime.
This is private and allows us to start testing as soon as possible.

2, We also want to fix openSUSE if it's affected.

\$ is maintained \$PACKAGE
will tell you if the package is inherited from SLES or if it is branched for
openSUSE. There are two cases:

- It's coming from SLES: The update will automatically be released for openSUSE.
Nothing to do for you.

- It's branched for openSUSE: You need to submit AFTER the bug became public, to

the current openSUSE codestreams.

For openSUSE Factory please submit to the devel project of you package AFTER the bug became public.

Security will then take the following steps:

Description

Comment 1

- We wait for your submission and package them into an incident for QA testing. The QA tester might reach out to you if they find issues with the update.
- Once the coordinated release date (CRD), the date this issue should become public, is reached (or for internal findings: once we're done testing), we remove the EMBARGOED tag from this bug and publish the updates. - Only if the bug here is public you may submit to public repositories (OBS). You can contact us at: * IRC: irc.suse.de #security * RocketChat: https://chat.suse.de/channel/security
* Email: security-team@suse.de Internal CRD: 2021-01-04 or earlier



Adding Jenting to the issue.

@Johannes, I think this is indeed an issue. As for the approach for mitigating it, would setting a `umask` before the file is written be enough?

Johannes Segitz 2020-10-08 08:11:34 UTC

(In reply to Rafael Fernández López from comment $\sharp 2$) Thanks for the quick reaction!

Umask: You would need to try this. If this happens in one session than this should work. I would prefer an approach where the file is explicitly created with secure permissions first (e.g. 0600), written and then set to 0400 afterwards. This makes it implicit and has less potential to break.

Please use CVE-2020-8029 for tracking

Rafael Fernández López 2020-10-26 11:02:24 UTC

Adding David Ko.

129

ienting hsiao 2020-10-27 02:49:21 UTC

(In reply to Johannes Segitz from comment #3) > (In reply to Rafael Fernández López from comment #2)
> Thanks for the quick reaction! > Umask: You would need to try this. If this happens in one session than this > should work. I would prefer an approach where the file is explicitly created > with secure permissions first (e.g. 0600), written and then set to 0400 > afterwards. This makes it implicit and has less potential to break. > Please use CVE-2020-8029 for tracking if err := t.target.UploadFile(keyPath, filepath.Join(kubernetes.KubeletCertAndKeyDir, kubernetes.KubeletServerKeyName)); err != nil { 125 126 if _, _, err := t.silentSsh("chmod", "0400", filepath.Join(kubernetes.KubeletCertAndKeyDir, kubernetes.KubeletServerKeyName));
err != nil {

The above code upload the local key to the remote machine with file permission set to 0644 first and then set to 0400. So, the secure way is to create file permission "0600" and then set to "0400", or to create file permission "0400" directly. Am I unstandstand it right?

Johannes Segitz 2020-10-30 13:42:50 UTC

(In reply to jenting hsiao from comment \$5) The secure way is to set permissions on the file first, yes. If you need to write it later go for 0600

Rafael Fernández López 2020-10-30 15:04:45 UTC

(In reply to Johannes Segitz from comment #6) > (In reply to jenting hsiao from comment #5) > The secure way is to set permissions on the file first, yes. If you need to > write it later go for 0600

I think we can check whether we can add a mode parameter to 'UploadFile' (and to 'UploadFileContents'). Since 'UploadFileContents' writes the contents in the remote system by doing a 'echo <code><contents>|</code> base64 -d -w0 > <code>/target/file</code>, I think we could add the umask in this very same command so it impacts the redirection in case the redirection ends up creating fhe file because it didn't exist.

What do you think? Would this be enough?

jenting hsiao 2020-11-06 01:04:33 UTC

1. generate the file with specific permission mode `install -m <mode> /dev/null /target/file 2. write the content by `echo <contents> | base64 -d -w0 > /target/file In the private key case, it'd be
1. `install -m 600 /dev/null /var/lib/kubelet/pki/kubelet.key
2. `echo <contents> | base64 -d -w0 > /var/lib/kubelet/pki/kubelet.key v4.2 PR: https://github.com/SUSE/skuba/pull/1428 v4.5 PR: https://github.com/SUSE/skuba/pull/1416

Comment 2

Comment 3

Comment 4

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Swamp Workflow Management 2020-12-11 17:16:39 UTC

 ${\tt SUSE-SU-2020:3761-1: \ An \ update \ that \ solves \ four \ vulnerabilities \ and \ has \ 11 \ fixes \ is \ now \ available.}$

Category: security (important)
Bug References:
1172270,1173055,1173165,1174219,1174951,1175352,1176225,1176578,1176903,1176904,11773
CVE References: CVE-2020-15106,CVE-2020-8029,CVE-2020-8564,CVE-2020-8565
JIRA References:

JIRA References: SOURCES used: SUSE CaaS Platform 4.5 (src): caasp-release-4.5.2-1.8.2, cri-o-1.18-1.18.4-4.3.2, etcd-3.4.13-3.3.1, helm2-2.16.12-3.3.1, helm3-3.3.3-3.8.1, kubernetes-1.18-1.18.10-4.3.1, patterns-caasp-Management-4.5-3.3.1, skuba-2.1.11-3.10.1, velero-1.4.2-3.3.1

NOTE: This line indicates an update has been released for the listed product(s). At times this might be only a partial fix. If you have questions please reach out to maintenance coordination.



Johannes Segitz 2021-04-16 07:45:32 UTC

If that's correct then we can close this. Thanks for the effort

Comment 22

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