

New issue

[Jump to bottom](#)

Two Integer Overflow bugs in image.cxx #471

✓ Closed

Zzero00 opened this issue on Mar 10 · 5 comments

Assignees



Labels

bug priority-high

Milestone

📌 Stable

Zzero00 commented on Mar 10 • edited ▾

Hi, there is two integer overflow bugs in the latest version of htmldoc.
They are similar to [CVE-2021-20308](#).

os: ubuntu 20.04
version: 1.9.16(the latest)

First

First, in image_load_jpeg function, image.cxx.
When it calls malloc, 'img->width' and 'img->height' are enough large to cause an integer overflow
So, the malloc function may return a heap block smaller than the expected size, and it will cause a buffer overflow/Address boundary error in the jpeg_read_scanlines function.

[htmldoc/htmldoc/image.cxx](#)

Lines 1390 to 1395 in cb4cdee

```

1390     static int                /* 0 - 0 = success, -1 = fail */
1391     image_load_jpeg(image_t *img, /* I - Image pointer */
1392                     FILE      *fp, /* I - File to load from */
1393                     int       gray, /* I - 0 = color, 1 = grayscale */
1394                     int       load_data)/* I - 1 = load image data, 0 = just info */
1395     {
    
```

[htmldoc/htmldoc/image.cxx](#)

Lines 1452 to 1466 in cb4cdee

```

1452     img->pixels = (uchar *)malloc((size_t)(img->width * img->height * img->depth));
1453
1454     if (img->pixels == NULL)
1455     {
1456         jpeg_destroy_decompress(&cinfo);
1457         return (-1);
1458     }
1459
1460     jpeg_start_decompress(&cinfo);
1461

```

Asan report:

```

./htmldoc --webpage -f out.pdf ./test.html
PAGES: 4
Corrupt JPEG data: premature end of data segment
AddressSanitizer:DEADLYSIGNAL
=====
==1326478==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x621000020000 (pc 0x7f0bd38812e1 bp
0x7ffd6a49c500 sp 0x7ffd6a49c460 T0)
==1326478==The signal is caused by a WRITE memory access.
#0 0x7f0bd38812e1 (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libjpeg.so.8+0x422e1)

AddressSanitizer can not provide additional info.
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: SEGV (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libjpeg.so.8+0x422e1)
==1326478==ABORTING

```

And this is the poc file:

[poc1.zip](#)

Second

There is another integer overflow bug in image_load_png function, image.cxx, similar to the first one.

[htmldoc/htmldoc/image.cxx](#)

Lines 1631 to 1647 in cb4cdee

```

1631     img->pixels = (uchar *)calloc(1, (size_t)(img->width * img->height * depth));
1632
1633     /*
1634     * Allocate pointers...
1635     */
1636
1637     rows = (png_bytep *)calloc(png_get_image_height(pp, info), sizeof(png_bytep));
1638
1639     for (i = 0; i < (int)png_get_image_height(pp, info); i++)
1640         rows[i] = img->pixels + i * img->width * depth;
1641

```

It calls calloc to get heap block.

However, the width and height of the png file are both four bytes long, so 'img->width' and 'img->height' are enough large to cause an integer overflow.

The calloc function may return a heap block smaller than the expected size, and finally cause a heap overflow in the png_read_rows function when memcpy.

This is the Asan report:

```
./htmldoc --webpage -f out.pdf ./test.html
PAGES: 4
=====
==1327797==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x602000008631 at pc
0x000000434be3 bp 0x7ffc5424be70 sp 0x7ffc5424b630
WRITE of size 196608 at 0x602000008631 thread T0
    #0 0x434be2 in memcpy (/root/fuzz_workdir/htmldoc/install/bin/htmldoc+0x434be2)
    #1 0x7f847c9e379c (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libpng16.so.16+0x1d79c)
    #2 0x7f847c9d680b in png_read_row (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libpng16.so.16+0x1080b)
    #3 0x7f847c9d81d8 in png_read_rows (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libpng16.so.16+0x121d8)
    #4 0x5e8c0b in image_load_png(image_t*, _IO_FILE*, int, int)
/root/fuzz_workdir/tmp/htmldoc/htmldoc/image.cxx:1647:5
    #5 0x5e169d in image_load /root/fuzz_workdir/tmp/htmldoc/htmldoc/image.cxx:845:14
    #6 0x54314f in write_image(_IO_FILE*, render_str*, int)
/root/fuzz_workdir/tmp/htmldoc/htmldoc/ps-pdf.cxx:10305:5
    #7 0x55015e in pdf_write_page(_IO_FILE*, int) /root/fuzz_workdir/tmp/htmldoc/htmldoc/ps-
pdf.cxx:2695:13
    #8 0x5175c6 in pdf_write_outpage(_IO_FILE*, int) /root/fuzz_workdir/tmp/htmldoc/htmldoc/ps-
pdf.cxx:2607:9
    #9 0x5175c6 in pdf_write_document(unsigned char*, unsigned char*, unsigned char*, unsigned
char*, unsigned char*, unsigned char*, tree_str*, tree_str*)
/root/fuzz_workdir/tmp/htmldoc/htmldoc/ps-pdf.cxx:2321:5
    #10 0x5175c6 in pspdf_export /root/fuzz_workdir/tmp/htmldoc/htmldoc/ps-pdf.cxx:910:7
    #11 0x4e30ca in main /root/fuzz_workdir/tmp/htmldoc/htmldoc/htmldoc.cxx:1291:3
    #12 0x7f847c3d60b2 in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-sMfBJT/glibc-2.31/csu/./csu/libc-
start.c:308:16
    #13 0x41e86d in _start (/root/fuzz_workdir/htmldoc/install/bin/htmldoc+0x41e86d)

0x602000008631 is located 0 bytes to the right of 1-byte region [0x602000008630,0x602000008631)
allocated by thread T0 here:
    #0 0x499c42 in calloc (/root/fuzz_workdir/htmldoc/install/bin/htmldoc+0x499c42)
    #1 0x5e897d in image_load_png(image_t*, _IO_FILE*, int, int)
/root/fuzz_workdir/tmp/htmldoc/htmldoc/image.cxx:1631:26
    #2 0x5e169d in image_load /root/fuzz_workdir/tmp/htmldoc/htmldoc/image.cxx:845:14
    #3 0x54314f in write_image(_IO_FILE*, render_str*, int)
/root/fuzz_workdir/tmp/htmldoc/htmldoc/ps-pdf.cxx:10305:5
    #4 0x55015e in pdf_write_page(_IO_FILE*, int) /root/fuzz_workdir/tmp/htmldoc/htmldoc/ps-
pdf.cxx:2695:13

SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow
(/root/fuzz_workdir/htmldoc/install/bin/htmldoc+0x434be2) in memcpy
Shadow bytes around the buggy address:
 0x0c047fff9070: fa fa 00 02 fa fa 00 02 fa fa 00 02 fa fa 00 02
 0x0c047fff9080: fa fa 00 02 fa fa 06 fa fa fa 06 fa fa fa 07 fa
 0x0c047fff9090: fa fa 06 fa fa fa 02 fa fa fa 00 07 fa fa fd fd
```

```
0x0c047fff90a0: fa fa fd fa fa fa fd fa fa fa fd fa fa fa fd fd
0x0c047fff90b0: fa fa fd fa fa fa fd fd fa fa fd fa fa fa fd fa
=>0x0c047fff90c0: fa fa fd fa fa fa[01]fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x0c047fff90d0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x0c047fff90e0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x0c047fff90f0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x0c047fff9100: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x0c047fff9110: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):
Addressable:          00
Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
Heap left redzone:    fa
Freed heap region:    fd
Stack left redzone:    f1
Stack mid redzone:    f2
Stack right redzone:   f3
Stack after return:    f5
Stack use after scope: f8
Global redzone:        f9
Global init order:     f6
Poisoned by user:      f7
Container overflow:    fc
Array cookie:          ac
Intra object redzone:  bb
ASan internal:         fe
Left alloca redzone:   ca
Right alloca redzone:  cb
Shadow gap:           cc
==1327797==ABORTING
```

And this is the poc file:

[poc2.zip](#)



(wrong poc)

This is the correct poc:

[real_poc2.zip](#)

  **michaelsweet** self-assigned this on Mar 10

  **michaelsweet** added **bug** **priority-high** labels on Mar 10

  **michaelsweet** added this to the **Stable** milestone on Mar 10

 **michaelsweet** added a commit that referenced this issue on Mar 10

 Fix a potential integer overflow bug in the JPEG and PNG loaders (Issue ...

✖ 31f7804

michaelsweet commented on Mar 10

Owner

I wasn't able to reproduce the issue with poc2, but I added range checks to the JPEG and PNG load functions to limit images to <4GiB - a little lazy but for the intended usage I don't see a problem limiting images like this.

[master [31f7804](#)] Fix a potential integer overflow bug in the JPEG and PNG loaders (Issue [#471](#))



michaelrsweet closed this as completed on Mar 10

Zzero00 commented on Mar 10 • edited ▾

Author

I wasn't able to reproduce the issue with poc2, but I added range checks to the JPEG and PNG load functions to limit images to <4GiB - a little lazy but for the intended usage I don't see a problem limiting images like this.

[master [31f7804](#)] Fix a potential integer overflow bug in the JPEG and PNG loaders (Issue [#471](#))

Oh, I'm sorry, this is the correct poc2 file:

[real_poc2.zip](#)

I forgot to modify the html file in the above poc2 file.

As follows:

```
$ unzip real_poc2.zip
Archive:  real_poc2.zip
  inflating: poc.png
  inflating: test.html
$ ls
htmldoc*  htmldoc_noasan*  poc.png  real_poc2.zip  test.html
$ ./htmldoc_noasan --webpage -f out.pdf ./test.html
PAGES: 4
fish: “./htmldoc_noasan --webpage -f o...” terminated by signal SIGSEGV (Address boundary error)
$ ./htmldoc --webpage -f out.pdf ./test.html
PAGES: 4
=====
==1369912==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x602000008631 at pc
0x000000434be3 bp 0x7ffe31cc2070 sp 0x7ffe31cc1830
WRITE of size 196608 at 0x602000008631 thread T0
.....
```

michaelsweet commented on Mar 14

Owner

Re-confirmed that the changes I pushed also address this test file.

BrianInglis commented on May 21 • edited ▼

Currently tracked as `htmlDoc` **1.9.16** vulnerability [CVE-2022-27114](#) score **5.5 MEDIUM**.
Please consider making an updated release soon or ask to have the affected version corrected.

michaelsweet commented on May 22

Owner

@**BrianInglis** a release was done a few days ago.

Please refamiliarize yourself with the license terms of this free software that comes with no warranties or guarantees of any kind!

Repository owner locked as **resolved** and limited conversation to collaborators on May 22

Assignees



michaelrsweet

Labels

bug `priority-high`

Projects

None yet

Milestone

Stable

Development

No branches or pull requests

3 participants

