

# Talos Vulnerability Report

TALOS-2022-1496

## InHand Networks InRouter302 console infactory hard-coded password vulnerability

MAY 10, 2022

CVE NUMBER

CVE-2022-27172

### Summary

A hard-coded password vulnerability exists in the console infactory functionality of InHand Networks InRouter302 V3.5.37. A specially-crafted network request can lead to privileged operation execution. An attacker can send a sequence of requests to trigger this vulnerability.

### Tested Versions

InHand Networks InRouter302 V3.5.37

### Product URLs

InRouter302 - <https://www.inhandnetworks.com/products/inrouter300.html>

### CVSSv3 Score

4.3 - CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N

### CWE

CWE-259 - Use of Hard-coded Password

### Details

The InRouter302 is an industrial LTE router. It features remote management functionalities and several security protection mechanism, such as: VPN technologies, firewall functionalities, authorization management and several other features.

The InRouter302 offers the telnet and sshd services. Both, when provided with the correct credentials, will allow access to the Router console.

```
*****
Welcome to Router console
Inhand
Copyright @2001-2020, Beijing InHand Networks Co., Ltd.
http://www.inhandnetworks.com
-----
Model           : IR302-WLAN
Serial Number    : RF3022141057203
Description      : www.inhandnetworks.com
Current Version  : V3.5.37
Current Bootloader Version : 1.1.3.r4955
-----
get help for commands
-----
type '?' for detail help at any point
=====
help           -- get help for commands
language       -- Set language
show           -- show system information
exit           -- exit current mode/console
ping           -- ping test
comredirect    -- COM redirector
telnet         -- telnet to a host
traceroute     -- trace route to a host
enable         -- turn on privileged commands
infactory      -- factory mode
Router>
```

A low-privileged user can login into this service. The Router console contains a command, called infactory. This functionality will request a password; if correct, a menu with several functions is accessed.

The infactory\_command:

```

undefined4 infactory_command(undefined4 param_1,char *provided_password)
{
    [...]

    if ((provided_password == (char *)0x0) || (*provided_password == '\0')) {
        provided_password = password_in_stack;
        uVar2 = get_help_string("input_pass");
        get_pass_wrap(uVar2,provided_password,0x40);
    }
    aes_decrypt_str(<REDACTED>,0x40,decrypted_password,0x80);
[1]
    password_len = strlen(decrypted_password);
    iVar1 = strncmp(decrypted_password,provided_password,password_len);
[2]
    if (iVar1 == 0) {
        change_view(view_cursor,&view_infactory);
[3]
        return 0;
    }
    [...]
}

```

This function will first, at [1], decrypt a hard-coded hex encoded string. Then, if the comparison between the described string and the provided password, at [2], returns zero, meaning the two string are equal, then the code at [3] will be reached. Then the “view” will be changed, which means that the available commands will change.

The aes\_decrypt\_str:

```

undefined4 aes_decrypt_str(char *data,uint data_len,char *output_buff)
{
    [...]
    IV._0_4_ = 0;
    IV._4_4_ = 0;
    IV._8_4_ = 0;
    IV._12_4_ = 0;
    if ((data_len & 0x1f) == 0) {
        __size = (int)data_len / 2;
        data_bin = malloc(__size);
        if (data_bin == (void *)0x0) {
            syslog(3,"out of memory!");
            uVar1 = 0xffffffff;
        }
        else {
            str2bin(data,__size,data_bin);
            AES_set_key(AES_key,<REDACTED>,128);
[4]
            uVar1 = IH_AES_cbc_encrypt(AES_key,data_bin,output_buff,__size,IV,0);
            free(data_bin);
        }
    }
    [...]
}

```

The hard-coded data provided at [1] are decrypted, at [4], using AES with a hard-coded key. An attacker, in possession of low-privileged user credentials, would be able to access the infactory functionalities.

#### Exploit Proof of Concept

Using the infactory command and providing the correct password will list the infactory functionalities:

```
Router> infactory
input password:
Router(factory)#
get help for commands
-----
type '?' for detail help at any point
=====
help          -- get help for commands
language      -- Set language
exit          -- exit current mode/console
reboot        -- reboot system
factory-model  -- hardware model configure
modem         -- modem test
reset-key     -- check the status of the reset button
com           -- detecting serial ports
port          -- FCT network port test
net           -- complete machine network port test
led           -- LED lights test
wlan          -- Wi-Fi test
mem           -- check memory
hw_wdg        -- check the hardware watchdog status
dio           -- detect digital I/O
stategridsec  -- detect stategrid security chip
Router(factory)#
```

## Vendor Response

The vendor has updated their website and uploaded the latest firmware on it. <https://inhandnetworks.com/product-security-advisories.html> <https://www.inhandnetworks.com/products/inrouter300.html#link4>

<https://www.inhandnetworks.com/upload/attachment/202205/10/InHand-PSA-2022-01.pdf>

## Timeline

2022-03-28 - Vendor Disclosure

2022-05-10 - Public Release

2022-05-10 - Vendor Patch Release

## CREDIT

Discovered by Francesco Benvenuto of Cisco Talos.

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VULNERABILITY REPORTS

PREVIOUS REPORT

NEXT REPORT

TALOS-2022-1495

TALOS-2022-1501