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Status: Fixed (*Closed*)

Components: [Blink>JavaScript>Compiler](#)

Modified: Nov 9, 2021

Backlog-Rank: ---

Editors: ---

EstimatedDays: ---

NextAction: ---

OS: [Linux](#), [Android](#), [Windows](#), [Chrome](#), [Mac](#), [Fuchsia](#), [Lacros](#)

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Type: [Bug-Security](#)

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Issue 1234764: v8/Turbofan: Invalid rotate-right optimization + Typer hardening bypass

Reported by manfp...@gmail.com on Fri, Jul 30, 2021, 9:43 AM EDT

🔗 Code

Report description

v8/Turbofan: Invalid rotate-right optimization + Typer hardening bypass

Bug location

Which product or website have you found a vulnerability in?

Google Chrome

The problem

Please describe the technical details of the vulnerability

Tested on:
=====

- Chromium 92.0.4515.107 Arch Linux (other platforms affected too)
- v8/d8 on current main branch on Linux

Test case:
=====

Execute the following snippet in Chrome's Javascript console or d8:

...

```
function foo(a,b) {  
  a = a|0;  
  b = b|0;  
  return (a >>> b) ^ (a << (32-b));  
}
```

```
console.log(foo(1, 0));
```

```
for (var i = 0; i < 3e5; i++) foo(1, 0);
console.log(foo(1, 0));
...

```

The expected behavior would be to print "0" twice; instead "0" and "1" are printed.
I will show below how this can be used to construct mis-typed values, and achieve arbitrary code execution in the context of v8/Chrome's Renderer process using a typer hardening bypass.

Root Cause:
=====

The relevant optimization is `MachineOperatorReducer::TryMatchWord32Ror()`, around line 1838 of v8's `src/compiler/machine-operator-reducer.cc`:

```
...
Reduction MachineOperatorReducer::TryMatchWord32Ror(Node* node) {
  DCHECK(!rOpcode::kWord32Or == node->opcode() ||
    !rOpcode::kWord32Xor == node->opcode());
  Int32BinopMatcher m(node);
  Node* shl = nullptr;
  Node* shr = nullptr;
  // Recognize rotation, we are matching:
  // * x << y | x >>> (32 - y) => x ror (32 - y), i.e. x rol y
  // * x << (32 - y) | x >>> y => x ror y
  // * x << y ^ x >>> (32 - y) => x ror (32 - y), i.e. x rol y
  // * x << (32 - y) ^ x >>> y => x ror y
  // as well as their commuted form.
  ...
}
...

```

Consider the last two reductions with the case `y = 0` (or more generally, `y` divisible by 32).
In this case, both left and right shift are by an amount divisible by 32, but as shift amounts are truncated to their last 5 bits this is equivalent to no shift occurring at all, so the left-hand side actually reduces to `x ^ x = 0`.
However, the right-hand side reduces to `x ror 0 = x` (again, rotation amounts divisible by 32 are equivalent to 0), which is wrong for non-zero values of `x`.

Fix:
=====

The easiest fix would be to disallow the reduction for the `Word32Xor` operator.
However, the optimization can still be performed for the case where `y` and `32 - y` are constants and known to be non-zero (modulo 32).
It's of course enough to check this for `y`.
A suggested patch is attached as `machine-operator-reducer.cc.patch`.
Optimizing the case of `y` being constant 0 to `0` does not seem to make sense, as this should already be handled by the existing reductions for shifts and xor.

Note also that the `Word32Or`-case is unaffected by the bug, as `x << 0 | x >>> 32` is equal to `x | x = x`, which matches `ror(x, 0)`.

Exploiting the bug:
=====

The rest of this write-up will describe how exactly the bug was triggered in a way that causes a type confusion, and how this type confusion can be leveraged into arbitrary code execution using a new typer-hardening bypass.
A full exploit that executes a customizable shellcode (in the example, for Linux x64) is attached as `ror_rce.js`.
It can either be run with a current version of `d8` or embedded into a html file opened with `chrome --no-sandbox` (however the example shellcode has no observable effect when run in Chrome's renderer; there doesn't seem to be an easy portable way to pop a calc on Linux :).

To trigger the type confusion in the first place, some further primitives are needed that are now described.

Typer-opaque constants
=====

It is useful to have values that are unknown to the Typer-phase, but that can be fully reduced to constants during later phases like `EarlyOptimization`, where `MachineOperatorReducer` is first run.
This can be used to introduce uncertainty into types where needed to prevent e.g. constant folding.
This primitive can be obtained using the `LoadElimination`-phase: We use a local object `o` to hold a constant `c0` equal to zero; whenever we load this constant the typer can speculate that this is a number, but cannot reason about its exact value.

During `LoadElimination`, this is replaced by a constant `0` node, enabling further optimizations.
Note: For unknown reasons, the `LoadElimination` only seems to work properly when causing the function's optimization with a loop instead of the `"%PrepareFunctionForOptimization"/"%OptimizeFunctionOnNextCall"` intrinsics.

This primitive can also be used to introduce partially-known types: For example, `(o.c0 & 1)` can be typed to `Range(0, 1)` (and is later constant-folded into `0`).

Typer-transparent variables
=====

Sometimes, the opposite construct is useful: a value whose type is fully known to the typer, but that isn't constant-folded away.
This can be used to prevent unwanted optimizations, while maintaining type information that's as precise as possible.
To do this, speculative conversions can be abused to make the typer assume a certain branch being taken, which results in a constant type (this is not a bug in itself, as the speculative assumptions are appropriately guarded by checks).
The following construct seems to work well:

```
...
let c0a = arg_true ? 0 : "x";
let c0 = Math.max(c0a, 0) + c0a;
...

```

where `arg_true` is a function argument that is always set to `true` (giving `false` correctly leads to deoptimization).
It somehow results in `c0` having Type `Range(0, 0)` without being constant-folded away.
I did not investigate the exact reason for this construct having the desired effect.

Breaking the Typer
=====

There are still some obstacles in constructing a mis-typed value.
First, let's look at `TryMatchWord32Ror` in some more detail:

```
...
// Recognize rotation, we are matching:
// * x << y | x >>> (32 - y) => x ror (32 - y), i.e. x rol y
// * x << (32 - y) | x >>> y => x ror y
// * x << y ^ x >>> (32 - y) => x ror (32 - y), i.e. x rol y
// * x << (32 - y) ^ x >>> y => x ror y

```

```
// as well as their commuted form.
```

```
...
```

```
if (mshl.left().node() != mshr.left().node()) return NoChange();

if (mshl.right().HasResolvedValue() && mshr.right().HasResolvedValue()) {
    // Case where y is a constant.
    if (mshl.right().ResolvedValue() + mshr.right().ResolvedValue() != 32)
        return NoChange();
} else {
    Node* sub = nullptr;
    Node* y = nullptr;
    if (mshl.right().IsInt32Sub()) {
        sub = mshl.right().node();
        y = mshr.right().node();
    } else if (mshr.right().IsInt32Sub()) {
        sub = mshr.right().node();
        y = mshl.right().node();
    } else {
        return NoChange();
    }

    Int32BinopMatcher msub(sub);
    if (!msub.left().Is(32) || msub.right().node() != y) return NoChange();
}
```

```
node->ReplaceInput(0, mshl.left().node());
node->ReplaceInput(1, mshr.right().node());
NodeProperties::ChangeOp(node, machine()->Word32Ror());
return Changed(node);
...
```

It at first seems easiest to use the first case where both shift amounts are known constants, but there is a problem:

If either of the shift amonunts is a zero constant, the shift will be completely optimized away.

We could instead use shift amounts like -32 and 64; however having both shift amounts outside the interval `[0, 31]` will unfortunately in the end lead to an unconstrained output type due to internals of the typer described below.

Instead, we will use the described technique of "typer-transparent variables" and have one shift amount be equal to the constructed `'c0'` (which has type `'Range(0,0)'`), and the other one equal to `'32-c0'` (which has type `'Range(32,32)'`).

Those expressions precisely match the second case, while also giving fully transparent information about their values to the typer, but also not enabling optimization of `'x >> c0'` to `'x'`.

Now, let's look at the relevant pieces of `'operation-typer.cc'` that are responsible for giving our initial expression its type:

```
...
```

```
Type OperationTyper::NumberBitwiseXor(Type lhs, Type rhs) {
    DCHECK(!lhs.Is(Type::Number()));
    DCHECK(!rhs.Is(Type::Number()));

    lhs = NumberToInt32(lhs);
    rhs = NumberToInt32(rhs);

    if (lhs.IsNone() || rhs.IsNone()) return Type::None();

    double lmin = lhs.Min();
    double rmin = rhs.Min();
    double lmax = lhs.Max();
    double rmax = rhs.Max();
    if ((lmin >= 0 && rmin >= 0) || (lmax < 0 && rmax < 0)) {
        // Xor-ing negative or non-negative values results in a non-negative value.
        return Type::Unsigned31();
    }
    if ((lmax < 0 && rmin >= 0) || (lmin >= 0 && rmax < 0)) {
        // Xor-ing a negative and a non-negative value results in a negative value.
        // TODO(jarin) Use a range here.
        return Type::Negative32();
    }
    return Type::Signed32();
}
...
```

Unfortunately, this only computes sign information, so we need inputs where the optimization results in a value with the wrong sign bit.

Here is the typer for left shifts (the one for logical right-shifts is quite similar, except for the overflow-check):

```
...
```

```
Type OperationTyper::NumberShiftLeft(Type lhs, Type rhs) {
    ...

    lhs = NumberToInt32(lhs);
    rhs = NumberToUInt32(rhs);

    ...

    if (max_rhs > 31) {
        // rhs can be larger than the bitmask
        max_rhs = 31;
        min_rhs = 0;
    }

    if (max_lhs > (kMaxInt >> max_rhs) || min_lhs < (kMinInt >> max_rhs)) {
        // overflow possible
        return Type::Signed32();
    }

    double min =
        std::min(static_cast<int32_t>(static_cast<uint32_t>(min_lhs) << min_rhs),
                 static_cast<int32_t>(static_cast<uint32_t>(min_lhs) << max_rhs));
    double max =
        std::max(static_cast<int32_t>(static_cast<uint32_t>(max_lhs) << min_rhs),
                 static_cast<int32_t>(static_cast<uint32_t>(max_lhs) << max_rhs));

    if (max == kMaxInt && min == kMinInt) return Type::Signed32();
    return Type::Range(min, max, zone());
}
```

```
}
...
```

Problematic is the check `'max_rhs > 31'`: If the shift amounts have to sum to 32, one of them has to lie outside the range `'[0, 31]'`, which makes it completely unknown to the typer.

But there is one case that still works: consider `'x=-1'` and the expression `'(x>>>0) ^ (x<<<32)'`.

The typer can easily reason the left side to be equal to `'-1'` and thus negative; and for the right side it considers all possible shifts from `'x<<31'` to `'x<<0'`, which are still all negative.

Thus, both sides get typed to a range of negative 32-bit integers; which results in the xor-Result having type `'Unsigned31'`.

However, after the faulty optimization the result is actually `'ror(-1, 0) = -1'`, which is negative, thus breaking the typer's range-tracking.

There are two additional details:

First, because the logical right-shift works on unsigned 32-bit values, we have to supply the value `'2**32-1'` instead of `'-1'`, or else the typer's `'NumberToUint32'` operation couldn't reason about the result of the `Uint32`-truncation.

Conversely, we have to subtract `'2**32'` from the result (which has type `'Range(2**32-1, 2**32-1)'` at this point) to actually bring it in the negative range (in the view of the typer).

This is not actually a problem: After the `SimplifiedLowering`-stage decides that all relevant values can be truncated to 32-bit words the constants `'2**32-1'` and `'-1'` get merged (thus passing the check of `'TryMatchWord32Ror'` that the left-hand sides of the shifts are the same node), and the subtraction gets truncated to a `'Word32Sub(..., 0)'`, which gets optimized away.

Second, this new subtraction has the problem of getting constant-folded away; to prevent this, we can simply use the technique of "typer-opaque constants"; instead of subtracting `'2**32'` we subtract `'2**32 + (o.c0&1)'` which has type `'Range(2**32, 2**32+1)'`, but is known to be `'2**32'` after `SimplifiedLowering`.

This just widens the left-hand side's type to `'Range(-2, -1)'`, still maintaining the information that it is negative.

To make that wrongly-typed value a bit nicer we finally (arithmetically) right-shift by `'31'`, resulting in a type of `'Range(0,0)'` but a real value of `'-1'`.

The full PoC for breaking the typer is:

```
...

function foo(arg_true) {
  let o = {c0: 0};
  let c0a = arg_true ? 0 : "x";
  let c0 = (Math.max(c0a, 0) + c0a);
  let v01 = 2**32 + (o.c0 & 1);
  let ra = ((2**32-1) >>> c0) - v01;
  let rb = ((-1) << (32-c0));
  return (ra*rb) >> 31;
}

for (var i = 0; i < 3e4; i++) foo(true);
console.log(foo(true));
...
```

The resulting output is `'-1'`, while the the type of the final `'SpeculativeNumberShiftRight'` node is `'Range(0, 0)'`.

Typer hardening bypass

I additionally found a new typer hardening bypass to escalate this bug into arbitrary code execution.

Array accesses should all be guarded by appropriate `'CheckBounds'` nodes to prevent out-of-bound-accesses in case of typer bugs.

However, this is not the case when accessing an array via an iterator.

Consider `'JSCompiler:ReduceArrayIteratorPrototypeNext'` in `'src/compiler/js-call-reducer.cc'`; the only two index-checks performed are the following (around line 6250):

```
Node* check = graph()->NewNode(simplified()->NumberLessThan(), index, length);

...

index = etrue = graph()->NewNode(
  common()->TypeGuard(
    Type::Range(0.0, length_access.type.Max() - 1.0, graph()->zone())),
  index, etrue, if_true);
...
```

However, this is not enough: Due to the `LoadElimination` stage, the length of the array can actually be propagated directly from the value we give into the array constructor, which means that type information is also propagated.

This can result in the elimination of the `'NumberLessThan()'`-check, leading to an out-of-bounds-access.

Thus, we can simply construct an array with a length shorter than its type implies, construct an iterator and incrementally push it out-of-bounds with repeated `'next()'`-calls (for this we can't use a loop, as the type-constraints for the current index position have to propagate from each call to the next).

From there, read-write-access can be obtained into an adjacent array of a different type, which enables getting object addresses and constructing fake objects.

Then, well-known techniques can be used to obtain arbitrary read+write, get a `rw_x` page using web assembly, and execute shellcode (for details see `'ror_rce.js'`).

Fixing the bypass

To fix the bypass, the `'TypeGuard()'` could simply be replaced by a proper `'CheckBounds()'`-node.

A suggested patch is attached as `'js-call-reducer.cc.patch'`.

Please briefly explain who can exploit the vulnerability, and what they gain when doing so

An attacker running a malicious website can get arbitrary code-execution in the context of Chrome's renderer process.

The cause

What version of Chrome have you found the security issue in?

Chromium 92.0.4515.107 Arch Linux; current main branch of v8

Is the security issue related to a crash?

No

Choose the type of vulnerability

Remote Code Execution (RCE)

Please provide your credit information

Manfred Paul (@_manfp)

Comment 1 by manfp...@gmail.com on Fri, Jul 30, 2021, 9:43 AM EDT

ror_testcase.js
176 bytes [View](#) [Download](#)

ror_rce.js
7.7 KB [View](#) [Download](#)

js-call-reducer.cc.patch
337 bytes [View](#) [Download](#)

machine-operator-reducer.cc.patch
682 bytes [View](#) [Download](#)

Comment 2 by chrom...@appspot.gserviceaccount.com on Fri, Jul 30, 2021, 9:44 AM EDT Project Member

Labels: external_security_report

Comment 3 by meacer@google.com on Mon, Aug 2, 2021, 6:25 AM EDT Project Member

Status: Assigned (was: Unconfirmed)
Owner: neis@chromium.org
Labels: Security_Severity-High Security_Impact-Stable FoundIn-92 OS-Android OS-Chrome OS-Fuchsia OS-Linux OS-Mac OS-Windows OS-Lacros Pri-1
Components: Blink>JavaScript>Compiler

Comment 4 by neis@chromium.org on Mon, Aug 2, 2021, 6:48 AM EDT Project Member

Thanks for the detailed report.

Comment 5 by neis@chromium.org on Mon, Aug 2, 2021, 9:31 AM EDT Project Member

Status: Started (was: Assigned)

Comment 6 by sheriffbot on Mon, Aug 2, 2021, 12:47 PM EDT Project Member

Labels: M-92 Target-92

Setting milestone and target because of high severity.

For more details visit <https://www.chromium.org/issue-tracking/autotriage> - Your friendly Sheriffbot

Comment 7 by neis@chromium.org on Tue, Aug 3, 2021, 2:42 AM EDT Project Member

For the record, this bug has been around since late 2014.

Comment 8 by neis@chromium.org on Tue, Aug 3, 2021, 3:56 AM EDT Project Member

Cc: nichartmann@chromium.org

Comment 9 by Git Watcher on Tue, Aug 3, 2021, 4:15 AM EDT Project Member

The following revision refers to this bug:
<https://chromium.googlesource.com/v8/v8/+ca386a4b383165ccaed628c19a1366a273fa371e>

commit [ca386a4b383165ccaed628c19a1366a273fa371e](#)
Author: Georg Neis <neis@chromium.org>
Date: Tue Aug 03 07:04:09 2021

[compiler] Fix bug in MachineOperatorReducer::TryMatchWord32Ror

~~[Bug-chromium-1224764](#)~~

Change-Id: [Ie899f0e9247bdf67b59aa3ebb7def2948ccdb6a](#)
Reviewed-on: <https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/v8/v8/+3067332>
Reviewed-by: Nico Hartmann <nichartmann@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Georg Neis <neis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#76050}

[modify] <https://crrev.com/ca386a4b383165ccaed628c19a1366a273fa371e/src/compiler/machine-operator-reducer.cc>
[modify] <https://crrev.com/ca386a4b383165ccaed628c19a1366a273fa371e/test/unittests/compiler/machine-operator-reducer-unittest.cc>

Comment 10 by neis@chromium.org on Tue, Aug 3, 2021, 4:27 AM EDT Project Member

Labels: tests_pending

Comment 11 by Git Watcher on Tue, Aug 3, 2021, 4:28 AM EDT Project Member

The following revision refers to this bug:
<https://chromium.googlesource.com/v8/v8/+65b20a0e65e1078f5dd230a5203e231bec790ab4>

commit [65b20a0e65e1078f5dd230a5203e231bec790ab4](#)
Author: Georg Neis <neis@chromium.org>
Date: Mon Aug 02 20:14:20 2021

[compiler] Harden JSCompiler::ReduceArrayIteratorPrototypeNext

~~[Bug-chromium-1224764](#)~~

Change-Id: [I5b1053accf77331687939c789b7ed94df1219287](#)
Reviewed-on: <https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/v8/v8/+3067327>
Reviewed-by: Nico Hartmann <nichartmann@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Georg Neis <neis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#76052}

[modify] <https://crrev.com/65b20a0e65e1078f5dd230a5203e231bec790ab4/src/compiler/js-call-reducer.cc>

Comment 12 by neis@chromium.org on Tue, Aug 3, 2021, 4:31 AM EDT Project Member

Status: Fixed (was: Started)

Manfred, thanks again for the truly excellent reports. I have followed your suggestions for the fix and hardening.

Comment 13 by sheriffbot on Tue, Aug 3, 2021, 12:42 PM EDT Project Member

Labels: reward-topanel

Comment 14 by [sheriffbot](#) on Tue, Aug 3, 2021, 1:42 PM EDT Project Member

Labels: -Restrict-View-SecurityTeam Restrict-View-SecurityNotify

Comment 15 by [sheriffbot](#) on Tue, Aug 3, 2021, 2:07 PM EDT Project Member

Labels: Merge-Request-92 Merge-Request-93

This is sufficiently serious that it should be merged to stable. But I can't see a Chromium repo commit here, so you will need to investigate what - if anything - needs to be merged to M92. Is there a fix in some other repo which should be merged? Or, perhaps this ticket is a duplicate of some other ticket which has the real fix: please track that down and ensure it is merged appropriately.

This is sufficiently serious that it should be merged to beta. But I can't see a Chromium repo commit here, so you will need to investigate what - if anything - needs to be merged to M93. Is there a fix in some other repo which should be merged? Or, perhaps this ticket is a duplicate of some other ticket which has the real fix: please track that down and ensure it is merged appropriately.

For more details visit <https://www.chromium.org/issue-tracking/autotriage> - Your friendly Sheriffbot

Comment 16 by [sheriffbot](#) on Tue, Aug 3, 2021, 2:13 PM EDT Project Member

Labels: -Merge-Request-93 Hotlist-Merge-Review Merge-Review-93

This bug requires manual review: M93's targeted beta branch promotion date has already passed, so this requires manual review
Before a merge request will be considered, the following information is required to be added to this bug:

1. Does your merge fit within the Merge Decision Guidelines?
- Chrome: https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src.git/+main/docs/process/merge_request.md#when-to-request-a-merge
- Chrome OS: <https://goto.google.com/cros-release-branch-merge-guidelines>
2. Links to the CLs you are requesting to merge.
3. Has the change landed and been verified on ToT?
4. Does this change need to be merged into other active release branches (M-1, M+1)?
5. Why are these changes required in this milestone after branch?
6. Is this a new feature?
7. If it is a new feature, is it behind a flag using finch?

Chrome OS Only:

8. Was the change reviewed and approved by the Eng Prod Representative? See Eng Prod ownership by component: <http://go/cros-engprodcomponents>

Please contact the milestone owner if you have questions.

Owners: benmason@(Android), govind@(iOS), geohsu@(ChromeOS), pbommana@(Desktop)

For more details visit <https://www.chromium.org/issue-tracking/autotriage> - Your friendly Sheriffbot

Comment 17 by [neis@chromium.org](#) on Wed, Aug 4, 2021, 3:51 AM EDT Project Member

Rec [#c16](#):

- 1) Yes.
- 2) At least the one in [#c9](#) but ideally also the one in [#c11](#).
- 3) Yes (verified with unittest in v8, not with the full exploit in Chrome).
- 4) Yes.
- 5) Security bug fix.
- 6) No.

Comment 18 by [neis@google.com](#) on Mon, Aug 9, 2021, 3:10 AM EDT Project Member

Cc: [adetaylor@chromium.org](#) [pbomm...@chromium.org](#)

Hi, I'd like to merge this ASAP. Is there anything missing?

Comment 19 by [vahl@chromium.org](#) on Mon, Aug 9, 2021, 3:28 AM EDT Project Member

Labels: -Merge-Request-92 -Merge-Review-93 Merge-Approved-92 Merge-Approved-93

Please go head and merge [#c9](#) and [#c11](#) to V8 9.2 and 9.3 branches

Comment 20 by [Git Watcher](#) on Mon, Aug 9, 2021, 4:42 AM EDT Project Member

Labels: merge-merged-9.3

The following revision refers to this bug:

<https://chromium.googlesource.com/v8/v8/+e298903b7b05cb111b6ac2c02af1668097190af9>

commit [e298903b7b05cb111b6ac2c02af1668097190af9](#)

Author: Georg Neis <[neis@chromium.org](#)>

Date: Mon Aug 09 07:46:40 2021

Merged: [compiler] Fix bug in MachineOperatorReducer.:TryMatchWord32Ror

Revision: [ca386a4b383165ccaed628c19a1366a273fa371e](#)

~~[BUG=chromium-1334764](#)~~

NOTRY=true

NOPRESUBMIT=true

NOTRECHECKS=true

R=[nicohartmann@chromium.org](#)

Change-Id: [I4eff6275f8f956b2345714479954feab9a237ab](#)

Reviewed-on: <https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/v8/v8/+3080562>

Reviewed-by: Lutz Vahl <[vahl@chromium.org](#)>

Commit-Queue: Georg Neis <[neis@chromium.org](#)>

Cr-Commit-Position: refs/branch-heads/9.3@{#20}

Cr-Branched-From: [7744dce208a555494e4a33e24fadc71ea20b3895](#)-refs/heads/9.3.345@{#1}

Cr-Branched-From: [4b6b4cabf3b6a20cdfda72b369df49f3311c4344](#)-refs/heads/master@{#75728}

[modify] <https://crrev.com/e298903b7b05cb111b6ac2c02af1668097190af9/src/compiler/machine-operator-reducer.cc>

[modify] <https://crrev.com/e298903b7b05cb111b6ac2c02af1668097190af9/test/unittests/compiler/machine-operator-reducer-unittest.cc>

Comment 21 by [Git Watcher](#) on Mon, Aug 9, 2021, 4:44 AM EDT Project Member

Labels: merge-merged-9.2

The following revision refers to this bug:

<https://chromium.googlesource.com/v8/v8/+452d41efd7107bd17e9b9887657a6e1018bccd8>

commit [452d41efd7107bd17e9b9887657a6e1018bccd8](#)

Author: Georg Neis <[neis@chromium.org](#)>

Date: Mon Aug 09 07:52:11 2021

Merged: [compiler] Fix bug in MachineOperatorReducer::TryMatchWord32Ror

Revision: [ca386a4b383165ccaed628c19a1366a273fa371e](#)

[BUG=chromium:4234764](#)
NOTRY=true
NOPRESUBMIT=true
NOTREECHECKS=true
R=nicohartmann@chromium.org

Change-Id: I9cbe8646daa7137a33b13e19105b1679b0218f1c
Reviewed-on: <https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/v8/v8/+3080563>
Reviewed-by: Lutz Vahl <vahl@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Georg Neis <neis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/branch-heads/9.2@(#51)
Cr-Branched-From: 51238348f95a1f5e0acc321efac7942d18a687a2-refs/heads/9.2.230@(#1)
Cr-Branched-From: 587a04f02ab0487d194b55a7137dc2045e071597-refs/heads/master@(#74656)

[modify] <https://crrev.com/452d41efd7107bd17e9b9887657a6e1018bccd8/src/compiler/machine-operator-reducer.cc>
[modify] <https://crrev.com/452d41efd7107bd17e9b9887657a6e1018bccd8/test/unittests/compiler/machine-operator-reducer-unittest.cc>

Comment 22 by govind@chromium.org on Mon, Aug 9, 2021, 1:49 PM EDT Project Member

Please merge your change to M93 branch 4577 ASAP so we can take it in for this week Beta Release. Thank you.

Comment 23 by vahl@chromium.org on Tue, Aug 10, 2021, 2:32 AM EDT Project Member

This V8 only changes are already merged into V8 9.3 and is included in the V8 9.3 lkg: <https://chromium.googlesource.com/v8/v8/+log/refs/heads/9.3-lkg> which could be used for the Beta release.

govind@ please let us know in case there is a need to back merge the change anywhere else.

Comment 24 by neis@chromium.org on Tue, Aug 10, 2021, 3:13 AM EDT Project Member

Merge of the CL in #c11 is still missing. Coming today.

Comment 25 by vahl@chromium.org on Tue, Aug 10, 2021, 3:32 AM EDT Project Member

Right #c11 needs to land, but will do so today. This one is as well a V8 change, so will be part of <https://chromium.googlesource.com/v8/v8/+log/refs/heads/9.3-lkg> afterwards.

Comment 26 by Git Watcher on Tue, Aug 10, 2021, 4:31 AM EDT Project Member

The following revision refers to this bug:
<https://chromium.googlesource.com/v8/v8/+85fcc01d0bfbf4de666cbb3a6ea3147b479a5a20>

commit 85fcc01d0bfbf4de666cbb3a6ea3147b479a5a20
Author: Georg Neis <neis@chromium.org>
Date: Tue Aug 10 07:18:10 2021

Merged: [compiler] Harden JSCompiler::ReduceArrayIteratorPrototypeNext

Revision: [65b20a0e65e1078f5dd230a5203e231bec790ab4](#)

[BUG=chromium:4234764](#)
NOTRY=true
NOPRESUBMIT=true
NOTREECHECKS=true
R=vahl@chromium.org

Change-Id: I6c13c005efd3714b02e13db35fc1eb3311782620
Reviewed-on: <https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/v8/v8/+3084362>
Reviewed-by: Lutz Vahl <vahl@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Georg Neis <neis@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Georg Neis <neis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/branch-heads/9.3@(#23)
Cr-Branched-From: 7744dce208a55494e4a33e24fadc71ea20b3895-refs/heads/9.3.345@(#1)
Cr-Branched-From: 4b6b4cabf3b6a20cdfa72b369df49f3311c4344-refs/heads/master@(#75728)

[modify] <https://crrev.com/85fcc01d0bfbf4de666cbb3a6ea3147b479a5a20/src/compiler/js-call-reducer.cc>

Comment 27 by Git Watcher on Tue, Aug 10, 2021, 4:32 AM EDT Project Member

The following revision refers to this bug:
<https://chromium.googlesource.com/v8/v8/+fc6818160b390034c249b7329f6c0be8e4f5b11b>

commit fc6818160b390034c249b7329f6c0be8e4f5b11b
Author: Georg Neis <neis@chromium.org>
Date: Tue Aug 10 07:29:33 2021

Merged: [compiler] Harden JSCompiler::ReduceArrayIteratorPrototypeNext

Revision: [65b20a0e65e1078f5dd230a5203e231bec790ab4](#)

[BUG=chromium:4234764](#)
NOTRY=true
NOPRESUBMIT=true
NOTREECHECKS=true
R=vahl@chromium.org

Change-Id: I45faf253695011092de144c8e29bafac5337adec
Reviewed-on: <https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/v8/v8/+3084363>
Reviewed-by: Lutz Vahl <vahl@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Georg Neis <neis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/branch-heads/9.2@(#53)
Cr-Branched-From: 51238348f95a1f5e0acc321efac7942d18a687a2-refs/heads/9.2.230@(#1)
Cr-Branched-From: 587a04f02ab0487d194b55a7137dc2045e071597-refs/heads/master@(#74656)

[modify] <https://crrev.com/fc6818160b390034c249b7329f6c0be8e4f5b11b/src/compiler/js-call-reducer.cc>

Comment 28 by neis@chromium.org on Tue, Aug 10, 2021, 4:33 AM EDT Project Member

Labels: -Merge-Approved-92 -Merge-Approved-93

Comment 29 by amyressler@google.com on Wed, Aug 11, 2021, 2:25 PM EDT Project Member

Labels: -reward-topanel reward-unpaid reward-21000

*** Boilerplate reminders! ***

Please do NOT publicly disclose details until a fix has been released to all our users. Early public disclosure may cancel the provisional reward. Also, please be considerate about disclosure when the bug affects a core library that may be used by other products. Please do NOT share this information with third parties who are not directly involved in fixing the bug. Doing so may cancel the provisional reward. Please be honest if you have already disclosed anything publicly or to third parties. Lastly, we understand that some of you are not interested in money. We offer the option to donate your reward to an eligible charity. If you prefer this option, let us know and we will also match your donation - subject to our discretion. Any rewards that are unclaimed after 12 months will be donated to a charity of our choosing.

Please contact security-vrp@chromium.org with any questions.

Comment 30 by amyressler@chromium.org on Wed, Aug 11, 2021, 2:39 PM EDT Project Member

Another congratulations, Manfred! The VRP Panel has awarded you \$21,000 for this report (V8 exploit + patch bonuses). Thank you for the detailed and excellent report for this issue!

Comment 31 by amyressler@google.com on Fri, Aug 13, 2021, 11:39 AM EDT Project Member

Labels: -reward-unpaid reward-inprocess

Comment 32 by amyressler@google.com on Mon, Aug 16, 2021, 10:10 AM EDT Project Member

Labels: Release-2-M92

Comment 33 by amyressler@google.com on Mon, Aug 16, 2021, 10:20 AM EDT Project Member

Labels: CVE-2021-30598 CVE_description-missing

Comment 34 by rzanoni@google.com on Tue, Aug 17, 2021, 7:45 AM EDT Project Member

Labels: LTS-Security-90 LTS-Merge-Request-90

Comment 35 by rzanoni@google.com on Thu, Aug 19, 2021, 11:28 AM EDT Project Member

Labels: LTS-Size-Small LTS-Complexity-Trivial

Comment 36 by gianluca@google.com on Fri, Aug 20, 2021, 3:28 AM EDT Project Member

Labels: -LTS-Merge-Request-90 LTS-Merge-Approved-90

Comment 37 by [Git Watcher](#) on Fri, Aug 20, 2021, 11:49 AM EDT Project Member

Labels: merge-merged-9.0

The following revision refers to this bug:

<https://chromium.googlesource.com/v8/v8/+fe05610f4425d1d79c79c16c68cfd308a115e56c>

commit [fe05610f4425d1d79c79c16c68cfd308a115e56c](#)

Author: Georg Neis <neis@chromium.org>

Date: Tue Aug 03 07:04:09 2021

[M90-LTS][compiler] Fix bug in MachineOperatorReducer::TryMatchWord32Ror

(cherry picked from commit [ca386a4b383165ccaed628c19a1366a273fa371e](#))

~~[Bug-chromium:1234764](#)~~

No-Try: true

No-Presubmit: true

No-Tree-Checks: true

Change-Id: [Ie899f0e9247bdf67b59aa3ebb7def2948ccdb6a](#)

Reviewed-on: <https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/v8/v8/+3067332>

Commit-Queue: Georg Neis <neis@chromium.org>

Cr-Original-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#76050}

Reviewed-on: <https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/v8/v8/+3099688>

Reviewed-by: Georg Neis <neis@chromium.org>

Reviewed-by: Artem Sumaneev <asumaneev@google.com>

Commit-Queue: Roger Felipe Zanoni da Silva <rzanoni@google.com>

Cr-Commit-Position: refs/branch-heads/9.0@{#71}

Cr-Branched-From: [bd0108b4c88e0d6f2350cb79b5f363bd02f3eb7](#)-refs/heads/9.0.257@{#1}

Cr-Branched-From: [349bcc6a075411f1a7ce2d866c3dfeefc2efa39d](#)-refs/heads/master@{#73001}

[modify] <https://crrev.com/fe05610f4425d1d79c79c16c68cfd308a115e56c/src/compiler/machine-operator-reducer.cc>

[modify] <https://crrev.com/fe05610f4425d1d79c79c16c68cfd308a115e56c/test/unittests/compiler/machine-operator-reducer-unittest.cc>

Comment 38 by [Git Watcher](#) on Mon, Aug 23, 2021, 7:18 AM EDT Project Member

The following revision refers to this bug:

<https://chromium.googlesource.com/v8/v8/+de534edddb8e06ba060746375d296956cb40d5d>

commit [de534edddb8e06ba060746375d296956cb40d5d](#)

Author: Georg Neis <neis@chromium.org>

Date: Mon Aug 02 20:14:20 2021

[M90-LTS][compiler] Harden JS_CallReducer::ReduceArrayIteratorPrototypeNext

(cherry picked from commit [65b20a0e65e1078f5dd230a5203e231bec790ab4](#))

~~[Bug-chromium:1234764](#)~~

No-Try: true

No-Presubmit: true

No-Tree-Checks: true

Change-Id: [I5b1053accf77331687939c789b7ed94df1219287](#)

Reviewed-on: <https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/v8/v8/+3067327>

Commit-Queue: Georg Neis <neis@chromium.org>

Cr-Original-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#76052}

Reviewed-on: <https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/v8/v8/+3099689>

Reviewed-by: Georg Neis <neis@chromium.org>

Reviewed-by: Artem Sumaneev <asumaneev@google.com>

Commit-Queue: Roger Felipe Zanoni da Silva <rzanoni@google.com>

Cr-Commit-Position: refs/branch-heads/9.0@{#73}

Cr-Branched-From: [bd0108b4c88e0d6f2350cb79b5f363bd02f3eb7](#)-refs/heads/9.0.257@{#1}

Cr-Branched-From: [349bcc6a075411f1a7ce2d866c3dfeefc2efa39d](#)-refs/heads/master@{#73001}

[modify] <https://crrev.com/de534edddb8e06ba060746375d296956cb40d5d/src/compiler/js-call-reducer.cc>

Comment 39 by rzanoni@google.com on Mon, Aug 23, 2021, 7:20 AM EDT Project Member

Labels: -LTS-Merge-Approved-90 LTS-Merged-90

Comment 40 by amyressler@google.com on Thu, Aug 26, 2021, 1:44 PM EDT Project Member
Labels: -CVE_description-missing CVE_description-submitted

Comment 41 by neis@chromium.org on Tue, Sep 21, 2021, 4:56 AM EDT Project Member
Cc: mslekova@chromium.org

Comment 42 by Git Watcher on Tue, Sep 21, 2021, 5:18 AM EDT Project Member

The following revision refers to this bug:
<https://chromium.googlesource.com/v8/v8/+db9c2e058b46594ffa101b059dad6d3d53a8aa9f>

commit db9c2e058b46594ffa101b059dad6d3d53a8aa9f

Author: Georg Neis <neis@chromium.org>
Date: Tue Sep 21 08:43:44 2021

[compiler] Add some regression tests

Bug: chromium:1228407, ~~chromium:1234764~~, ~~chromium:1234770~~, chromium:1247763
Change-Id: I1e8ffaa04eeda22b71ece2f59038e5c92861fde0
Reviewed-on: <https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/v8/v8/+3172751>
Commit-Queue: Georg Neis <neis@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Maya Lekova <mslekova@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Georg Neis <neis@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Maya Lekova <mslekova@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/main@{#76955}

[add] <https://crrev.com/db9c2e058b46594ffa101b059dad6d3d53a8aa9f/test/mjsunit/compiler/regress-crbug-1234764.js>
[add] <https://crrev.com/db9c2e058b46594ffa101b059dad6d3d53a8aa9f/test/mjsunit/compiler/regress-crbug-1247763.js>
[add] <https://crrev.com/db9c2e058b46594ffa101b059dad6d3d53a8aa9f/test/mjsunit/compiler/regress-crbug-1234770.js>
[add] <https://crrev.com/db9c2e058b46594ffa101b059dad6d3d53a8aa9f/test/mjsunit/compiler/regress-crbug-1228407.js>

Comment 43 by neis@chromium.org on Tue, Sep 21, 2021, 5:20 AM EDT Project Member
Labels: -tests_pending

Comment 44 by sheriffbot on Tue, Nov 9, 2021, 1:30 PM EST Project Member
Labels: -Restrict-View-SecurityNotify allpublic

This bug has been closed for more than 14 weeks. Removing security view restrictions.

For more details visit <https://www.chromium.org/issue-tracking/autotriage> - Your friendly Sheriffbot