

URL Confusion When Scheme Not Supplied in medialize/uri.js



Valid

Reported on Mar 15th 2022

Description

This is a URL confusion vulnerability.

When parsing a URL without a scheme and with excessive slashes, like `///www.example.com`, URI.js will parse the hostname as `null` and the path as `/www.example.com`.

Such behaviour is different from that exhibited by browsers, which will parse

`///www.example.com` as `http://www.example.com` instead. For example, the following will cause a redirect to `http://www.example.com`:

```
window.location.href = "///www.example.com";
```

This can lead to a variety of vulnerabilities including open redirects, where the target host is parsed and validated using URI.js.

PoC

```
const uri = require('urijs');

let payload = "///evil.com";
console.log(new uri(payload));
```

Output:

```
URI {
  _string: '',
  _parts: {
    protocol: null,
    username: null,
    password: null,
```

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```

    },
    hostname: null,
    urn: null,
    port: null,
    path: '/evil.com',
    query: null,
    fragment: null,
    preventInvalidHostname: false,
    duplicateQueryParameters: false,
    escapeQuerySpace: true
  },
  _deferred_build: true
}

```

Node's WHATWG URL API and URL parsers of other languages would deem this as an invalid URL and throw an error.

Example of flawed validation and browser behaviour:

```

<html>
  <body>
    <script src="uri.js"></script>
    <script>
      let payload = "///www.example.com";
      let parsed = new URI(payload);

      if (parsed.hostname() === "www.example.com") {
        alert("Hostname not allowed");
      }
      else {
        window.location.href = payload;
      }
    </script>
  </body>
</html>

```

CWE-115: Misinterpretation of Input

Severity

Medium (6.5)

Visibility

Public

Status

Fixed

Found by



Zhang Zeyu

@zeyu2001

unranked ▼

This report was seen 683 times.

We are processing your report and will contact the **medialize/uri.js** team within 24 hours.

8 months ago

We have contacted a member of the **medialize/uri.js** team and are waiting to hear back

8 months ago

We have sent a follow up to the **medialize/uri.js** team. We will try again in 7 days. 8 months ago

We have sent a second follow up to the **medialize/uri.js** team. We will try again in 10 days.

8 months ago

A **medialize/uri.js** maintainer validated this vulnerability 8 months ago

Zhang Zeyu has been awarded the disclosure bounty ✓

The fix bounty is now up for grabs

A **medialize/uri.js** maintainer marked this as fixed in **1.19.11** with commit **88805f** 8 months ago

The fix bounty has been dropped ✗

This vulnerability will not receive a CVE ✗

A **medialize/uri.js** maintainer 8 months ago

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Thank you for reporting the issue. it has been solved and released as v1.19.11

Zhang Zeyu [8 months ago](#)

Researcher

Hi @admin will there be a CVE for this?

Jamie Slome [8 months ago](#)

Admin

We can assign and publish a CVE if the maintainer is happy to proceed with one.

@maintainer - are you happy to assign and publish a CVE for this report?

A [medialize/uri.js](#) maintainer [8 months ago](#)

Do I need to create a CVE via GitHub Security Advisory?

Jamie Slome [8 months ago](#)

Admin

No, we can take care of it for you! We are also able to assign and publish CVEs 👍 Shall I proceed?

A [medialize/uri.js](#) maintainer [8 months ago](#)

you decide, I'm good either way :)

Jamie Slome [8 months ago](#)

Admin

Sure, I will get it sorted for you now :)

Jamie Slome [8 months ago](#)

Admin

Assigned and published ♥

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