

# OTF-003: Improper Access Control: Anyone with access to the chat environment can write messages disguised as another chat participant

Moderate micahflee published GHSA-gjj5-998g-v36v on Jan 18

## Package

**OnionShare** (OnionShare)

## Affected versions

>= 2.3

## Patched versions

2.5

## Description

Between September 26, 2021 and October 8, 2021, [Radically Open Security](#) conducted a penetration test of OnionShare 2.4, funded by the Open Technology Fund's [Red Team lab](#). This is an issue from that penetration test.

- Vulnerability ID: OTF-003
- Vulnerability type: Improper Access Control
- Threat level: Moderate


## Description:

Anyone with access to the chat environment can write messages disguised as another chat participant.

## Technical description:

### Prerequisites:

- Alice and Bob are legitimate users
- A third user has access to the chat environment



This screenshot shows Alice ( `glimpse-depress` ) and Bob ( `blinker-doorpost` ) joined a chatroom and are the only participants in the chatroom. Then the non-listed user `squad-nursing` writes a message in the chatroom without being visible in the list of users. The sending of the message itself is not required but was done here to show the initial access. The non-listed participant now renames himself to Bob and writes another message, seemingly coming from Bob.

This can be reproduced by slightly modifying the client-side JavaScript. The `joined` emit needs to be removed from the `socket.on(connect)` event handler. Therefore a client is not listed in the `userlist` and has no active session.

[onionshare/cli/onionshare\\_cli/resources/static/js/chat.js](#)

Lines 16 to 18 in d08d5f0

```
16     socket.on('connect', function () {
17         socket.emit('joined', {});
18     });
```

This can be done either via a crafted client or runtime modification of the `chat.js` script in the browser's internal debugger.

It is still possible to call the `text` method and send text to the chat via websocket.

[onionshare/cli/onionshare\\_cli/web/chat\\_mode.py](#)

Lines 131 to 139 in d08d5f0

```
131         @self.web.socketio.on("text", namespace="/chat")
132         def text(message):
133             """Sent by a client when the user entered a new message.
134             The message is sent to all people in the room."""
135             emit(
136                 "message",
137                 {"username": session.get("name"), "msg": message["msg"]},
138                 room=session.get("room"),
139             )
```

It is also possible to call the `update_username` function and choose an existing username from the chat.

[onionshare/cli/onionshare\\_cli/web/chat\\_mode.py](#)

Lines 141 to 162 in d08d5f0

```
141         @self.web.socketio.on("update_username", namespace="/chat")
142         def update_username(message):
143             """Sent by a client when the user updates their username.
144             The message is sent to all people in the room."""
145             current_name = session.get("name")
146             if message.get("username", ""):
147                 session["name"] = message["username"]
148                 self.connected_users[
149                     self.connected_users.index(current_name)
150                 ] = session.get("name")
151             emit(
152                 "status",
```

Afterwards the hidden user can send messages that are displayed as coming from the impersonated user. There is no way to distinguish between the fake and original message.

## Impact:

An adversary with access to the chat environment can impersonate existing chat participants and write messages but not read the conversation. The similar exploit described in OTF-004 (page 19) has only slightly more requirements but also allows for reading.

## Recommendation:

- Implement proper session handling

### Severity

Moderate

### CVE ID

CVE-2022-21692

### Weaknesses

No CWEs