

Bug ~~1201949~~ - VUL-0: CVE-2022-37030: gromox: potential local privilege escalation

Status: RESOLVED FIXED

- [Create test case](#)

Classification: openSUSE

Product: openSUSE Tumbleweed

Component: Security

Version: Current

Hardware: x86-64 Linux

Reported: 2022-07-28 09:30 UTC by Filippo Bonazzi

Modified: 2022-08-05 07:58 UTC ([History](#))

CC List: 0 users

Priority: P3 - Medium **Severity:** Normal ([vote](#))

Target Milestone: ---

Assigned To: Security Team bot

QA Contact: E-mail List

See Also:

Found By: ---

Services Priority:

Business Priority:

Blocker: ---

URL:

Whiteboard:

Keywords:

Depends on:

Blocks: [1200165](#)

Show dependency [tree](#) / [graph](#)

Attachments

[Add an attachment](#) (proposed patch, testcase, etc.)

Note

You need to [log in](#) before you can comment on or make changes to this bug.

Filippo Bonazzi 2022-07-28 09:30:01 UTC

Description

During an audit of Gromox for inclusion in openSUSE Tumbleweed, a potential local privilege escalation was found as described in [bsc#1200165](#).

Filippo Bonazzi 2022-07-28 10:26:42 UTC

Comment 1

The following report describes a local privilege escalation vulnerability in Gromox[0] version 1.27 (latest). The vulnerability probably applies to previous versions as well, since it has to do with the way the application is packaged.

Introduction

Gromox is the central groupware server component of grommunio[1]. It is capable of serving as a replacement for Microsoft Exchange and compatibles.

Among its many features, Gromox provides a PAM module to authenticate non-Gromox processes to an authentication backend such as MySQL or LDAP. The PAM module allows runtime loading of plugins, and its configuration lives in ``/etc/gromox/pam`` or ``/etc/gromox``.

The interaction between this PAM module, its runtime loading of plugins and their configuration causes the vulnerability described in this report.

The Vulnerability

The RPM spec file packages the ``/etc/gromox`` directory with ownership ``root:gromox`` and mode 775, i.e. the directory is writeable by the unprivileged ``gromox`` group.

The directory contains, among others, the configuration file for the PAM module. When the authentication hook of the PAM module is invoked, the module loads the ``/etc/gromox/pam.cfg`` configuration file, which can contain a path and a list of filenames to be used to load plugins. The plugins are regular `.so` shared objects, which are then executed by the PAM module.

It is therefore possible for the ``gromox`` group to effectively have the PAM stack run arbitrary code upon execution of the ``pam_gromox.so`` module.

Assuming that the PAM stack is run as root, as it is likely, this results in the unprivileged ``gromox`` group being able to execute arbitrary code as root.

Proof of Concept Exploit

Attached is a proof of concept setup that has been tested on current openSUSE distributions.

The only precondition for the exploit is that gromox is installed and a target user is in the ``gromox`` group.

Suggested Fix

In order to prevent privilege escalation, an unprivileged user cannot be allowed to control paths and filenames that will be executed by other users (``root`` in the worst case).

Probably the best thing to do is to set the ``/etc/gromox`` folder ownership to ``root:root`` and mode 755 rather than 775, and only allow privileged users to modify the configuration.

References

[0] <https://gromox.com/>

[1] <https://grommunio.com/>

Filippo Bonazzi 2022-08-01 17:12:26 UTC

Comment 2

The issue has been assigned CVE-2022-37030.

Filippo Bonazzi 2022-08-05 07:58:26 UTC

Comment 3

CVE has been made public and report has been posted to OSS[0].

Closing this as we are unaffected.

[0] <https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2022/08/04/1>

