

## fix(hub): absolute Path Traversal due to incorrect use of `send_file` ...

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... call

A path traversal attack (also known as directory traversal) aims to access files and directories that are stored outside the web root folder. By manipulating variables that reference files with “dot-dot-slash (../)” sequences and its variations or by using absolute file paths, it may be possible to access arbitrary files and directories stored on file system including application source code or configuration and critical system files. This attack is also known as “dot-dot-slash”, “directory traversal”, “directory climbing” and “backtracking”.

### ## Root Cause Analysis

The ``os.path.join`` call is unsafe for use with untrusted input. When the ``os.path.join`` call encounters an absolute path, it ignores all the parameters it has encountered till that point and starts working with the new absolute path. Please see the example below.

```
...
>>> import os.path
>>> static = "path/to/mySafeStaticDir"
>>> malicious = "/.././.././.././etc/passwd"
>>> os.path.join(t,malicious)
'/.././.././.././etc/passwd'
...
```

Since the "malicious" parameter represents an absolute path, the result of ``os.path.join`` ignores the static directory completely. Hence, untrusted input is passed via the ``os.path.join`` call to ``flask.send_file`` can lead to path traversal attacks.

In this case, the problems occurs due to the following code :

<https://github.com/ChaoticOnyx/OnyxForum/blob/4077b499a1ca213f3eb55b8321a4733d83531750/modules/hub/hub/views.py#L493>

Here, the ``path`` parameter is attacker controlled. This parameter passes through the unsafe ``os.path.join`` call making the effective directory and filename passed to the ``send_file`` call attacker controlled. This leads to a path traversal attack.

### ## Remediation

This can be fixed by preventing flow of untrusted data to the vulnerable ``send_file`` function. In case the application logic necessitates this behaviour, one can either use the ``flask.safe_join`` to join untrusted paths or replace ``flask.send_file`` calls with ``flask.send_from_directory`` calls.


### ## References

- \* [OWASP Path Traversal]([https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Path\\_Traversal](https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Path_Traversal))
- \* [github/securitylab#669](#)

### This bug was found using \*[CodeQL by Github](https://codeql.github.com/)\*

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PR #63

 master (#63)

 porcupineyhairs committed on May 4

1 parent 4077b49 commit f25543dfc62a9694d7e4f67eebfa45e3de916053

Showing 1 changed file with 3 additions and 1 deletion.

Split

Unified

▼ 4  modules/hub/hub/views.py 

19	19	from flaskbb.extensions import allows, db, celery
20	20	from flaskbb.user.models import User, Group
21	21	from flaskbb.forum.models import Post
	22	+ from werkzeug.utils import safe_join
	23	+
22	24	
23	25	from hub.forms import ConfigEditForm, BanSearchForm, ConnectionSearchForm
24	26	from hub.permissions import CanAccessServerHub, CanAccessServerHubAdditional, CanAccessSe
489	491	if server is None:
490	492	abort(404)
491	493	
492		- file_path = os.path.join(server.logs_path, path)
	494	+ file_path = safe_join(server.logs_path, path)
493	495	return send_file(file_path, as_attachment=True)
494	496	
495	497	

0 comments on commit f25543d

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