

☆ Starred by 3 users

Owner: [reillyg@chromium.org](#)

CC: [adetaylor@chromium.org](#)
[tsepez@chromium.org](#)

Status: Fixed (Closed)

Components: Internals>Services>Device

Modified: Dec 16, 2020

Backlog-Rank: ---

Editors: ---

EstimatedDays: ---

NextAction: 2020-09-09

OS: Linux, Chrome, Mac

Pri: 1

Type: Bug-Security

Hotlist-Merge-Review
reward-10000
Security_Impact-Stable
Security_Severity-High
allpublic
reward-inprocess
VulnerabilityAnalysis-Requested
VulnerabilityAnalysis-Submitted
Target-85
M-85
merge-merged-4183
merge-merged-85
merge-merged-4240
merge-merged-86
Release-2-M85

Issue 1121836: Security: HeapOverflow in SerialHandle
Reported by [leecraso@gmail.com](#) on Tue, Aug 25, 2020, 8:31 PM EDT

🔗 Code

VULNERABILITY DETAILS

[StartWriting][1] could be called before the SerialPort is opened via IPC. The pending-check will be done in [OnFileCanWriteWithoutBlocking][2]. But before that, the illegal fd(-1) could be passed into [WatchWritable][3]. Eventually cause heap overflow at [4].

```
...  
  
...  
  
    evecp = &epollp->fds[fd]; //<<<-----  
    op = EPOLL_CTL_ADD;  
    events = 0;  
    if (evecp->evread != NULL) {  
        events |= EPOLLIN;  
        op = EPOLL_CTL_MOD;  
    }  
    if (evecp->evwrite != NULL) {  
        events |= EPOLLOUT;  
        op = EPOLL_CTL_MOD;  
    }  
    ...  
  
    if (ev->ev_events & EV_READ)  
        evecp->evread = ev;  
    if (ev->ev_events & EV_WRITE)  
        evecp->evwrite = ev;  
    ...  
  
[1].  
https://source.chromium.org/chromium/chromium/src/+master:services/device/public/mojom/serial.mojom;l=167;dr=97254d4f8844ae362125e62aee4b209c5fc67534;bpv=1; bpt=0?originalUrl=https:%2F%2Fcs.chromium.org%2F  
[2].  
https://source.chromium.org/chromium/chromium/src/+master:services/device/serial/serial\_io\_handler\_posix.cc;l=373;dr=4a991b979bb82defc403bba68c87405bf01ea70c;b pv=1;bpt=0?originalUrl=https:%2F%2Fcs.chromium.org%2F  
[3].  
https://source.chromium.org/chromium/chromium/src/+master:services/device/serial/serial\_io\_handler\_posix.cc;l=410;dr=4a991b979bb82defc403bba68c87405bf01ea70c;b pv=1;bpt=0?originalUrl=https:%2F%2Fcs.chromium.org%2F  
[4]. https://source.chromium.org/chromium/chromium/src/+master:base/third\_party/libevent/epoll.c;l=280;dr=c7ebe6daa79da2e351345065020cc7f216126f15;bpv=1;bpt=0? originalUrl=https:%2F%2Fcs.chromium.org%2F
```

VERSION
Chrome Version: M85 stable
Operating System: Linux

REPRODUCTION CASE

- 1. Apply the attached token.patch(").
- 2. \$ python ./copy_mojo_js_bindings.py /path/to/chrome/.../out/asan/gen \$ python -m SimpleHTTPServer \$ out/asan/chrome --enable-blink-features=MojoJS --user-data-dir=/tmp/xxxx "http://localhost:8000/poc.html"
- 3. Select any serial device and click the triggerButton.

* ps: Similar to <https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=998548>, the token.patch aims to solve a javascript bug in the mojo API mojoBinding.js, it has nothing to do with the vulnerability itself. This can be fixed from the renderer side or by using the cpp API.

FOR CRASHES, PLEASE INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Type of crash: browser
Crash State: see asan file

CREDIT INFORMATION

Reporter credit: Leecraso and Guang Gong of 360 Alpha Lab working with 360 BugCloud

asan
15.3 KB View Download
token.patch
679 bytes View Download
poc.html
1.0 KB View Download

Comment 1 by [tsepez@chromium.org](#) on Wed, Aug 26, 2020, 11:43 AM EDT Project Member

Status: Assigned (was: Unconfirmed)
Owner: [reillyg@chromium.org](#)
Labels: Security_Impact-Stable Security_Severity-High OS-Chrome OS-Linux OS-Mac
Components: Internals>Services>Device

reillyg - could you take a look? It looks like you've done some work in the past in this area with closed fds, or feel free to re-assign as appropriate. Thanks!

Comment 2 by [sheriffbot](#) on Wed, Aug 26, 2020, 2:04 PM EDT Project Member

Labels: Target-85 M-85

Setting milestone and target because of Security_Impact=Stable and high severity.

For more details visit <https://www.chromium.org/issue-tracking/autotriage> - Your friendly Sheriffbot

Comment 3 by [sheriffbot](#) on Wed, Aug 26, 2020, 2:45 PM EDT Project Member

Labels: Pri-1

Setting Pri-1 to match security severity High. If this is incorrect, please reset the priority. Sheriffbot won't make this change again.

For more details visit <https://www.chromium.org/issue-tracking/autotriage> - Your friendly Sheriffbot

Comment 4 by [rsesek@chromium.org](#) on Thu, Sep 3, 2020, 11:57 AM EDT Project Member

reillyg: Friendly ping. This is a high-severity vulnerability affecting stable.

Comment 5 by [reillyg@chromium.org](#) on Thu, Sep 3, 2020, 2:32 PM EDT Project Member

Sorry, I haven't been able to get to this because of Perf. I will have a fix today.

Comment 6 by [reillyg@chromium.org](#) on Thu, Sep 3, 2020, 3:56 PM EDT Project Member

Status: Started (was: Assigned)

A fix is out for review: <https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+2393001>

I have a more holistic fix planned as part of resolving ~~issue-1124774~~ but this is the minimal mergeable version.

Comment 7 by [bugdroid](#) on Tue, Sep 8, 2020, 3:30 PM EDT Project Member

The following revision refers to this bug:
<https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src.git/+adc731d678c4c795e7c4c74133a624310e7bc9ae>

commit [adc731d678c4c795e7c4c74133a624310e7bc9ae](#)
Author: Reilly Grant <[reillyg@chromium.org](#)>
Date: Tue Sep 08 19:29:40 2020

serial: Check that port is open before reading or writing

This change adds checks to the platform-specific implementations of Read() and Write() to make sure that the file descriptor is valid before. This makes the assumptions validated by later DCHECK correct.

This cannot be done in the platform-independent layer because test code depends on being able to call some SerialIoHandler methods without an actual file descriptor.

Bug: 1124826

Change-Id: If182404cf10a2f3b445b9c80b75fed5df6b5ab4b
Reviewed-on: <https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+2393001>
Reviewed-by: James Hollyer <[jameshollyer@chromium.org](#)>
Commit-Queue: Reilly Grant <[reillyg@chromium.org](#)>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#805016}

[modify] https://crrev.com/adc731d678c4c795e7c4c74133a624310e7bc9ae/services/device/serial/serial_io_handler_posix.cc
[modify] https://crrev.com/adc731d678c4c795e7c4c74133a624310e7bc9ae/services/device/serial/serial_io_handler_win.cc
[modify] https://crrev.com/adc731d678c4c795e7c4c74133a624310e7bc9ae/services/device/serial/serial_port_impl_unittest.cc

Comment 8 by [reillyg@chromium.org](#) on Tue, Sep 8, 2020, 3:47 PM EDT Project Member

Status: Fixed (was: Started)
Cc: [tsepez@chromium.org](#)
NextAction: 2020-09-09

Marking this issue fixed. I will request a merge to M-86 after validating the fix is stable on canary-channel tomorrow.

tsepez@, do you think this should be merged to M-86?

Comment 9 by sheriffbot on Wed, Sep 9, 2020, 3:09 PM EDT Project Member

Labels: -Restrict-View-SecurityTeam Restrict-View-SecurityNotify

Comment 10 by sheriffbot on Wed, Sep 9, 2020, 3:29 PM EDT Project Member

Labels: Merge-Request-85 Merge-Request-86

Requesting merge to stable M85 because latest trunk commit (805016) appears to be after stable branch point (782793).

Requesting merge to beta M86 because latest trunk commit (805016) appears to be after beta branch point (800218).

For more details visit <https://www.chromium.org/issue-tracking/autotriage> - Your friendly Sheriffbot

Comment 11 by sheriffbot on Wed, Sep 9, 2020, 3:35 PM EDT Project Member

Labels: -Merge-Request-86 Hotlist-Merge-Review Merge-Review-86

This bug requires manual review: M86's targeted beta branch promotion date has already passed, so this requires manual review. Before a merge request will be considered, the following information is required to be added to this bug:

1. Does your merge fit within the Merge Decision Guidelines?
- Chrome: https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src.git/+master/docs/process/merge_request.md#when-to-request-a-merge
- Chrome OS: <https://goto.google.com/cros-release-branch-merge-guidelines>
2. Links to the CLs you are requesting to merge.
3. Has the change landed and been verified on master/Tot?
4. Why are these changes required in this milestone after branch?
5. Is this a new feature?
6. If it is a new feature, is it behind a flag using finch?

Please contact the milestone owner if you have questions.

Owners: govind@ (Android), bindusuvarna@ (iOS), geohsu@ (ChromeOS), pbommana@ (Desktop)

For more details visit <https://www.chromium.org/issue-tracking/autotriage> - Your friendly Sheriffbot

Comment 12 by reillyg@chromium.org on Wed, Sep 9, 2020, 6:15 PM EDT Project Member

1. Does your merge fit within the Merge Decision Guidelines?

Yes.

2. Links to the CLs you are requesting to merge.

<https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+2393001>

3. Has the change landed and been verified on master/Tot?

Yes, I have validated the change on macOS and Windows with Chrome Canary.

4. Why are these changes required in this milestone after branch?

This is a Security_Severity-High issue which affects the M-86 branch.

5. Is this a new feature?

No.

6. If it is a new feature, is it behind a flag using finch?

N/A

Comment 13 by srinivassista@google.com on Wed, Sep 9, 2020, 7:26 PM EDT Project Member

Cc: adetaylor@chromium.org

reillyg@ does this need to be merged to M85 now? or can this wait for M86

+adetaylor@

Comment 14 by reillyg@chromium.org on Wed, Sep 9, 2020, 8:04 PM EDT Project Member

According to the severity guidelines[1] a high-severity issue this should be merged into the current stable milestone.

[1] <https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+master/docs/security/severity-guidelines.md>

Comment 15 by adetaylor@chromium.org on Thu, Sep 10, 2020, 11:52 AM EDT Project Member

Labels: -Merge-Request-85 -Merge-Review-86 Merge-Approved-85 Merge-Approved-86

Yes, I think this is sufficiently simple that we should follow the merge guidelines as normal. Approving merge to M86 (branch 4240) and M85 (branch 4183). We'll likely release this with the final M85 stable security refresh in about 10 days.

reillyg@ please wait for a day of canary coverage before merging anywhere.

Comment 16 by bugdroid on Fri, Sep 11, 2020, 7:31 PM EDT Project Member

Labels: -merge-approved-86 merge-merged-4240 merge-merged-86

The following revision refers to this bug:

<https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src.git/+e07e479165fc1237e42c755a9f77585affa5bf24>

commit e07e479165fc1237e42c755a9f77585affa5bf24

Author: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>

Date: Fri Sep 11 23:28:19 2020

serial: Check that port is open before reading or writing

This change adds checks to the platform-specific implementations of Read() and Write() to make sure that the file descriptor is valid before. This makes the assumptions validated by later DCHECK correct.

This cannot be done in the platform-independent layer because test code depends on being able to call some SerialoHandler methods without an actual file descriptor.

(cherry picked from commit adc731d678d4c795e7c4c74133a624310e7bc9ae)

Bug: 1424826

Change-Id: If182404cf10a2f3b445b9c80b75fed5df6b5ab4b

Reviewed-on: <https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+2393001>

Reviewed-by: James Hollyer <jameshollyer@chromium.org>

Commit-Queue: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>

Cr-Original-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@(#805016)

Reviewed-on: <https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+2406664>

Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/branch-heads/4240@{#632}
Cr-Branched-From: f297677702651916bbf65e59c0d4bbd4ce57d1ee-refs/heads/master@{#800218}

[modify] https://crrev.com/e07e479165fc1237e42c755a9f77585affa5bf24/services/device/serial/serial_io_handler_posix.cc
[modify] https://crrev.com/e07e479165fc1237e42c755a9f77585affa5bf24/services/device/serial/serial_io_handler_win.cc
[modify] https://crrev.com/e07e479165fc1237e42c755a9f77585affa5bf24/services/device/serial/serial_port_impl_unittest.cc

Comment 17 by [bugdroid](#) on Fri, Sep 11, 2020, 10:32 PM EDT Project Member

Labels: -merge-approved-85 merge-merged-85 merge-merged-4183

The following revision refers to this bug:
<https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src.git/+21069131d16de0a2e649cf0cb38860f1bbc8cff>

commit 21069131d16de0a2e649cf0cb38860f1bbc8cff
Author: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Date: Sat Sep 12 02:30:46 2020

serial: Check that port is open before reading or writing

This change adds checks to the platform-specific implementations of Read() and Write() to make sure that the file descriptor is valid before. This makes the assumptions validated by later DCHECK correct.

This cannot be done in the platform-independent layer because test code depends on being able to call some SerialIoHandler methods without an actual file descriptor.

(cherry picked from commit adc731d678b4c795e7c4c74133a624310e7bc9ae)

(cherry picked from commit e07e479165fc1237e42c755a9f77585affa5bf24)

Bug-1424836

Change-Id: If182404cf10a2f3b445b9c80b75fed5df6b5ab4b
Reviewed-on: <https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+2393001>
Reviewed-by: James Hollyer <jameshollyer@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Cr-Original-Original-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#805016}
Reviewed-on: <https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+2406664>
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Cr-Original-Commit-Position: refs/branch-heads/4240@{#632}
Cr-Original-Branched-From: f297677702651916bbf65e59c0d4bbd4ce57d1ee-refs/heads/master@{#800218}
Reviewed-on: <https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+2406151>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/branch-heads/4183@{#1813}
Cr-Branched-From: 740e9e8a40505392ba5c8e022a8024b3d018ca65-refs/heads/master@{#782793}

[modify] https://crrev.com/21069131d16de0a2e649cf0cb38860f1bbc8cff/services/device/serial/serial_io_handler_posix.cc
[modify] https://crrev.com/21069131d16de0a2e649cf0cb38860f1bbc8cff/services/device/serial/serial_io_handler_win.cc
[modify] https://crrev.com/21069131d16de0a2e649cf0cb38860f1bbc8cff/services/device/serial/serial_port_impl_unittest.cc

Comment 18 by [adetaylor@google.com](#) on Mon, Sep 14, 2020, 2:31 PM EDT Project Member

Labels: reward-topanel

Comment 19 by [adetaylor@google.com](#) on Wed, Sep 16, 2020, 7:15 PM EDT Project Member

Labels: -reward-topanel reward-unpaid reward-10000

*** Boilerplate reminders! ***

Please do NOT publicly disclose details until a fix has been released to all our users. Early public disclosure may cancel the provisional reward. Also, please be considerate about disclosure when the bug affects a core library that may be used by other products. Please do NOT share this information with third parties who are not directly involved in fixing the bug. Doing so may cancel the provisional reward. Please be honest if you have already disclosed anything publicly or to third parties. Lastly, we understand that some of you are not interested in money. We offer the option to donate your reward to an eligible charity. If you prefer this option, let us know and we will also match your donation - subject to our discretion. Any rewards that are unclaimed after 12 months will be donated to a charity of our choosing.

Please contact security-vrp@chromium.org with any questions.

Comment 20 by [adetaylor@google.com](#) on Wed, Sep 16, 2020, 7:18 PM EDT Project Member

Congratulations! The VRP panel has decided to award \$10,000 for this report.

Comment 21 by [adetaylor@google.com](#) on Mon, Sep 21, 2020, 1:18 PM EDT Project Member

Labels: Release-2-M85

Comment 22 by [adetaylor@google.com](#) on Thu, Sep 24, 2020, 1:36 PM EDT Project Member

Labels: -reward-unpaid reward-inprocess

Comment 23 by [mmoroz@chromium.org](#) on Tue, Sep 29, 2020, 2:19 PM EDT Project Member

Labels: VulnerabilityAnalysis-Requested

reillyg@, thank you for fixing this issue. Chrome Security team needs your knowledge to prevent that whole class of bugs from happening elsewhere. We would greatly appreciate if you could tell us more about the issue by filling out the following form: <https://forms.gle/VWKDUv9a8GXCCRWm7>

Comment 24 by [mmoroz@chromium.org](#) on Wed, Oct 7, 2020, 6:53 PM EDT Project Member

Labels: VulnerabilityAnalysis-Submitted

Comment 25 by [sheriffbot](#) on Wed, Dec 16, 2020, 1:51 PM EST Project Member

Labels: -Restrict-View-SecurityNotify allpublic

This bug has been closed for more than 14 weeks. Removing security view restrictions.

For more details visit <https://www.chromium.org/issue-tracking/autotriage> - Your friendly Sheriffbot