# CVE-2022-23747

Sony OMX audio decoder • Sony Xperia series 1, 5 and Pro • Classic Buffer Overflow

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## Information

libstagefright\_soft\_somcalacdec.so HAL library is responsible for decoding the Apple iTunes ALAC/AAC-LC audio format on Sony Xperia smartphones. Privileged android.hardware.media.omx service loads the ALAC library when requested by an Android app, and then calls it to decode the supplied audio frames.

In the libstagefright\_soft\_somcalacdec.so, an out of bound memory access can occur due to lack of validation of the number of frames being passed during music playback.

The size of the internal output buffer mMixBufferU can be specified using the csd-0 configuration parameter. The numSamples audio parameter is encoded in the audio frame:

https://github.com/macosforge/alac/blob/master/codec/ALACDecoder.cpp#L252 (https://github.com/macosforge/alac/blob/master/codec/ALACDecoder.cpp#L252). We can write data outside the mMixBufferU output buffer because no size check is performed:

https://github.com/macosforge/alac/blob/master/codec/ALACDecoder.cpp#L320 (https://github.com/macosforge/alac/blob/master/codec/ALACDecoder.cpp#L320).

## Impact:

The vulnerability occurs in the context of the privileged media process. If exploited, the attacker can steal media data and gain control over the video and audio stream. On some Sony Xperia devices, the ALAC decoder implemented by Sony is the default decoder. So a malformed audio file can be used for RCE.

Crash trace:

```
Build fingerprint: 'Sony/XQ-BC72/XQ-BC72:12/61.1.A.2.211/061001A0020211
03147541197:user/release-keys'
Revision: '0'
ABI: 'arm'
Cmdline: media.codec hw/android.hardware.media.omx@1.0-service
pid: 10357, tid: 13216, name: mc.alac.decoder >>> media.codec <<<
uid: 1046
signal 0 (SIGSEGV), code 1 (SEGV_MAPERR), fault addr ------
    r0 ea0c1ec8 r1 00000008 r2 ec24ffff r3 00000017
    r4 00001ffd r5 00000008 r6 00000000 r7 00007ff4
    r8 ebec3fec r9 00000008 r10 ea0c1ec8 r11 41414141
    ip 00000007 sp e9189ea0 lr e9192eef pc e91926da</pre>
```

#### backtrace:

#00 pc 000046da /vendor/lib/libstagefright\_soft\_somcalacdec.so (BitBufferRead+8) (BuildId: 399af8c1929aa1d50e00f65fe9ff9434)

#01 pc 00004eeb /vendor/lib/libstagefright\_soft\_somcalacdec.so (ALACDecoder::Decode(BitBuffer\*, unsigned char\*, unsigned int, unsigned int, unsigned int\*)+1130) (BuildId: 399af8c1929aa1d50e00f65fe9ff9434)

#02 pc 00003ef5 /vendor/lib/libstagefright\_soft\_somcalacdec.so
(android::SoftALAC::onQueueFilled(unsigned int)+208) (BuildId: 399af8c1
929aa1d50e00f65fe9ff9434)

#03 pc 00008817 /vendor/lib/libstagefright\_softomx.so (android:: SimpleSoftOMXComponent::onMessageReceived(android::sp<android::AMessage > const&)+266) (BuildId: 95ea0acdaa7e72cc6a7c88be5f296aa9)

#04 pc 00009a15 /vendor/lib/libstagefright\_softomx.so (android:: AHandlerReflector<android::SimpleSoftOMXComponent>::onMessageReceived(android::sp<android::AMessage> const&)+52) (BuildId: 95ea0acdaa7e72cc6a7c88be5f296aa9)

#05 pc 0000fe05 /vendor/lib/vndk/libstagefright\_foundation.so (a
ndroid::AHandler::deliverMessage(android::sp<android::AMessage> const&)
+24) (BuildId: 96b372f41b97c8470a38f16dd9b85bef)

#06 pc 00012467 /vendor/lib/vndk/libstagefright\_foundation.so (a
ndroid::AMessage::deliver()+86) (BuildId: 96b372f41b97c8470a38f16dd9b85
bef)

#07 pc 0001057d /vendor/lib/vndk/libstagefright\_foundation.so (a
ndroid::ALooper::loop()+488) (BuildId: 96b372f41b97c8470a38f16dd9b85be
f)

#08 pc 0000ef61 /apex/com.android.vndk.v30/lib/libutils.so (andr

```
oid::Thread::_threadLoop(void*)+304) (BuildId: 373fcfc8fb18977f88e89ad0
9552a738)
    #09 pc 0000ea15 /apex/com.android.vndk.v30/lib/libutils.so (thre
ad_data_t::trampoline(thread_data_t const*)+256) (BuildId: 373fcfc8fb18
977f88e89ad09552a738)
    #10 pc 00080e57 /apex/com.android.runtime/lib/bionic/libc.so (__
pthread_start(void*)+40) (BuildId: 91ef3dc3105c19cbfe9eaa06c9cd1fcb)
    #11 pc 00039e33 /apex/com.android.runtime/lib/bionic/libc.so (__
start_thread+30) (BuildId: 91ef3dc3105c19cbfe9eaa06c9cd1fcb)
```

### References:

https://research.checkpoint.com/2022/bad-alac-one-codec-to-hack-the-whole-world/ (https://research.checkpoint.com/2022/bad-alac-one-codec-to-hack-the-whole-world/)

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