

Closed Bug 1691153 (CVE-2021-23999) Opened 2 years ago Closed 2 years ago

Blob URLs loaded by system principal may be given the incorrect principal

▼ Categories

Product: Core ▾
Component: DOM: File ▾

Type:  defect

Priority: P1 Severity: S2

▼ Tracking

Status: VERIFIED FIXED
Milestone: 88 Branch

Tracking Flags:

firefox-esr78	88+	fixed
firefox86	---	wontfix
firefox87	---	wontfix
firefox88	---	verified

► **People** (Reporter: nika, Assigned: edenchuang)

► References

► **Details** (Keywords: csectype-priv-escalation, sec-moderate, Whiteboard: [post-critsmash-triage][qa-triaged][adv-main88+][adv-esr78.10+])

▼ Attachments

рост

2 years ago **Nika Layzell** [:nika] (ni? for response)
175 bytes, text/html

Details

Bug 1691153 - mochitest for testing Blob URL data is transmitted with correct principal type. r=asuth
2 years ago **Frederik Braun** [:freddy]
48 bytes, text/x-phabricator-request

RyanVM : **approval-mozilla-esr78+** [Details](#) | [Review](#)

Bug 1691153 - Using the blob's principal for BlobURLRegistrationData creation in ContentParent::TransmitBlobURLsForPrincipal. r?asuth
2 years ago **Eden Chuang**[[edenchuang](#)]
48 bytes, text/x-phabricator-request

RyanVM : **approval-mozilla-esr78+** [Details](#) | [Review](#)

advisory.txt

2 years ago **Tom Ritter** [:tjr]
261 bytes, text/plain

Details

Bottom ▾ Tags ▾ Timeline ▾



Nika Layzell [:nika] (ni? for response)

Description • 2 years ago

Reporter

1

Attached file **poc** — Details

STR (from a fresh browser)

1. Load the attached proof of concept. A blob URL will appear in the document, copy it to the clipboard.
2. Open a new tab, paste the blob URL in the address bar, and load it

Expected: The blob should load and display the string `undefined`

Actual: The blob loads and displays the string `[object BrowsingContext]`

Likely Cause

The reason behind this display being different is that the blob URL's document was loaded with the system principal, and thus has privileged access. This is caused by a series of errors in the code which transmits information about Blob URLs to content processes (thanks :asuth for helping me figure out what's going on here!).

1. The code in `ContentParent::TransmitBlobURLsForPrincipal` includes the wrong principal in the `BlobURLRegistrationData` to be sent to the content process. Specifically the registration is created with the principal `aPrincipal`, which is the principal passed to the function, rather than the principal `aBlobPrincipal` which was used to register the blob. (<https://searchfox.org/mozilla-central/rev/400614dec36182ba6d0bec2a18044c47df960a1f/dom/ipc/ContentParent.cpp#6123,6137>). This means that the wrong principal will be transmitted in cases where these principals don't match.
2. The code uses `aPrincipal->Subsumes(aBlobPrincipal)` instead of `--Equals`, meaning it will pass if `aPrincipal` is an expanded or system principal. This combines with the first issue to mean that if `aPrincipal` is the system principal, a registration will be transmitted with the system principal for all registered Blob URLs (<https://searchfox.org/mozilla-central/rev/400614dec36182ba6d0bec2a18044c47df960a1f/dom/ipc/ContentParent.cpp#6126>).
3. When [bug 1626753](#) was fixed, logic was added to various codepaths which can cause URLs to load from the parent process to try to force blob URLs to be registered in the content process before the load completes. Unfortunately, this code passes `triggeringPrincipal` as the principal to use (<https://searchfox.org/mozilla-central/rev/400614dec36182ba6d0bec2a18044c47df960a1f/docshell/base/BrowsingContext.cpp#1847-1848>, <https://searchfox.org/mozilla-central/rev/400614dec36182ba6d0bec2a18044c47df960a1f/network/ipc/DocumentLoadListener.cpp#1835>), which is the system principal in the case where the load is triggered by browser UI (e.g. through pasting a URL in the address bar). This combines with the previous two bugs to cause us to register blob URLs with the wrong (potentially system) principal.

Potential Fix

We should fix all 3 of these core issues in order to make sure we transmit the correct blob URLs with the correct principals. The first issue can be fixed by passing `aBlobPrincipal` instead of `aPrincipal` to the various callsites in the function. The second can be fixed by using `->Equals` instead of `->Subsumes`.

The third bug should be fixed by using the actual principal of the relevant blob URL rather than the triggering principal. This should be doable by removing the `aPrincipal` argument from `TransmitBlobDataIfBlobURL`, and instead implementing it as:

```
nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> blobPrincipal;  
if (BlobURLProtocolHandler::GetBlobURLPrincipal(aURI, getter_AddRefs(blobPrincipal))) {  
    TransmitBlobURLsForPrincipal(blobPrincipal);  
}
```

Exploitability

While this is a serious issue, we are fortunate that it is somewhat tricky to get full system-principal permissions with it. The user has to load the URL in question in a different process than the original page, and the triggering principal must be the system principal (which hopefully requires direct user intervention), such as the user pasting the blob URL into their address bar.

**Andrew Sutherland** [:asuth] (he/him)
Comment 1 • 2 years ago

—

I'm going to try and dig into understanding and enumerating the motivating use cases for the blob URL transmission to make sure we don't regress any current blob URL use cases without intent in addressing points 2 and 3. The highest priority is addressing point 1 of the Likely Causes, as that's the core of the problem and principal confusion, so if 2/3 look like they'll take longer, we should likely focus on addressing point 1.

Assignee: nobody → bugmail
Status: NEW → ASSIGNED
Priority: -- → P1

**Andrew Sutherland** [:asuth] (he/him)
Comment 2 • 2 years ago

—

Nika provided a pernosco trace on Friday as well: https://pernos.co/debug/U3Q4v_1wxjdpsFmKDDiyYw/index.html

**Andrew McCreight** [:mccr8]
Updated • 2 years ago

—

Group: ~~core-security~~

**Tom Tung** [:tt, ttung]
Comment 3 • 2 years ago

—

I am going to set the severity to S2 because the workaround doesn't seem to exist but it requires getting system principal which makes this harder to be exploited.

Andrew, please feel free to adjust the severity if you have different thoughts on this.

Severity: -- → S2

**Daniel Veditz** [:dveditz]
Updated • 2 years ago

—

Keywords: [csectype-priv-escalation](#), [sec-moderate](#)

**Frederik Braun** [:freddy]
Comment 5 • 2 years ago

—

Attached file [Bug 1691153 - mochitest for testing Blob URL data is transmitted with correct principal type. r=asuth](#) — Details

**Frederik Braun** [:freddy]
Comment 6 • 2 years ago

—

@asuth: started writing a test because of the dupe. Feel free to steal, when you get to this bug .

**Eden Chuang**[:edenchuang] Assignee
Updated • 2 years ago

—

Assignee: bugmail → echuang

**Eden Chuang**[:edenchuang] Assignee
Comment 7 • 2 years ago


—

Attached file [Bug 1691153 - Using the blob's principal for BlobURLRegistrationData creation in ContentParent::TransmitBlobURLsForPrincipal. r=asuth](#) — Details

**Phabricator Automation**
Updated • 2 years ago

—

[Attachment #9206345](#) - Attachment description: Bug 1691153 - wip test → Bug 1691153 - mochitest for testing Blob URL data is transmitted with correct principal type. r=asuth

**Sebastian Hengst** [:aryx] (needinfo me if it's about an intermittent or bailout)
Comment 8 • 2 years ago

—














Using the blob's principal for BlobURLRegistrationData creation in ContentParent::TransmitBlobURLsForPrincipal. r=asuth
<https://hg.mozilla.org/integration/autoland/rev/18e47349b0f0e1df159db0446cf5706b864a4f15>
<https://hg.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/rev/18e47349b0f0>











Group: dom-core-security → core-security-release
Status: ASSIGNED → RESOLVED
Closed: 2 years ago
[status-firefox88](#): --- → [fixed](#)
Resolution: --- → FIXED
Target Milestone: --- → 88 Branch


**Eden Chuang**[:edenchuang] Assignee
Updated • 2 years ago

—

Status: RESOLVED → REOPENED

Resolution: FIXED → ---		
	Release mgmt bot [:suhaib / :marco / :calixte] Updated • 2 years ago	<div>—</div>
status-firefox88: fixed → affected		
	:Gijs (he/him) Comment 9 • 2 years ago	<div>—</div>
Why was this reopened? There's no backout listed, is the fix not working?		
Flags: needinfo?(echuang)		
	Eden Chuang [:edenchuang] Assignee Comment 10 • 2 years ago	<div>—</div>
Reopen for landing test.		
Flags: needinfo?(echuang)		
	:Gijs (he/him) Comment 11 • 2 years ago	<div>—</div>
(In reply to Eden Chuang[:edenchuang] from comment #10)		
Reopen for landing test.		
But reopening means that the bug's resolution, release tracking fields and target milestone are all wrong, and will make it harder to deal with regressions from this bug, track backouts, track release notes / CVEs, track QA efforts, and so on.		
The easier thing to do is either keep the bug closed and just land tests from the closed bug in a few weeks/months time, assuming you don't forget, or file a new security-sensitive bug for the tests and then move the tests to that bug.		
Flags: needinfo?(echuang)		
	Eden Chuang [:edenchuang] Assignee Comment 12 • 2 years ago	<div>—</div>
Mark it as resolved-fixed. Keep ni for test landing.		
Using the blob's principal for BlobURLRegistrationData creation in ContentParent::TransmitBlobURLsForPrincipal. r=asuth https://hg.mozilla.org/integration/autoland/rev/18e47349b0f0e1df159db0446cf5706b864a4f15 https://hg.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/rev/18e47349b0f0		
Status: REOPENED → RESOLVED Closed: 2 years ago → 2 years ago Resolution: --- → FIXED		
	Eden Chuang [:edenchuang] Assignee Updated • 2 years ago	<div>—</div>
status-firefox88: affected → fixed		
Flags: needinfo?(echuang)		
	Eden Chuang [:edenchuang] Assignee Updated • 2 years ago	<div>—</div>
Flags: needinfo?(echuang)		
	Sebastian Hengst [:aryx] (needinfo me if it's about an intermittent or backout) Comment 13 • 2 years ago • Edited	<div>—</div>
mochitest for testing Blob URL data is transmitted with correct principal type. r=asuth https://hg.mozilla.org/integration/autoland/rev/bf0c333ee3906ad5fe9a7a86d6dcd390eacb1e39 https://hg.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/rev/bf0c333ee390		
	Julien Cristau [:jcristau] Updated • 2 years ago	<div>—</div>
status-firefox86: --- → wontfix status-firefox87: --- → wontfix status-firefox-esr78: --- → ?		
Flags: in-testsuite+		
	Brindusa Tot [:brindusat] Updated • 2 years ago	<div>—</div>
Flags: qe-verify+ Whiteboard: [post-critsmash-triage]		
	Eden Chuang [:edenchuang] Assignee Updated • 2 years ago	<div>—</div>
Flags: needinfo?(echuang)		
	Ryan VanderMeulen [:RyanVM] Comment 14 • 2 years ago	<div>—</div>
It looks like ESR78 may also be affected by this? If so, we'll probably want a rebased patch and an uplift request please :)		
Flags: needinfo?(echuang)		
	Eden Chuang [:edenchuang] Assignee Comment 15 • 2 years ago	<div>—</div>


Sure, will do that.
Flags: needsinfo (echuang)
<div>  <div> Julien Cristau [:jcristau] Updated • 2 years ago </div> <div>—</div> </div>
status-firefox-esr78 : ? → affected tracking-firefox-esr78 : --- → 88 •
<div>  <div> Eden Chuang[:edenchuang] Assignee Comment 16 • 2 years ago </div> <div>—</div> </div>
<p>Comment on attachment 9207771 [details] Bug 1694459 - Using the blob's principal for BlobURLRegistrationData creation in ContentParent::TransmitBlobURLsForPrincipal. r?asuth</p> <h3>ESR Uplift Approval Request</h3> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • If this is not a sec:(high,crit) bug, please state case for ESR consideration: Blob URLs can be loaded with system principal by a very tricky way. • User impact if declined: A malicious webpage can be loaded with a system principal and hack Firefox. • Fix Landed on Version: 88 • Risk to taking this patch: Low • Why is the change risky/not risky? (and alternatives if risky): The patch is not risky since it just uses the correct principal to load the blob URL. • String or UUID changes made by this patch: No <p>Attachment #9207771 - Flags: approval-mozilla-esr78?</p>
<div>  <div> Eden Chuang[:edenchuang] Assignee Updated • 2 years ago </div> <div>—</div> </div>
<p>Attachment #9206345 - Flags: approval-mozilla-esr78?</p>
<div>  <div> Cornel Ionce [:noni] [Hubs QA] Updated • 2 years ago </div> <div>—</div> </div>
<p>Whiteboard: [post-critsmash-triage] → [post-critsmash-triage] [qa-triaged]</p>
<div>  <div> Cornel Ionce [:noni] [Hubs QA] Comment 17 • 2 years ago </div> <div>—</div> </div>
<p>Reproduced the initial issue with the attached POC on Firefox 87.0.</p> <p>Confirming that the expected result is met on Firefox 88.0b5, buildID 20210330185720.</p> <p>Status: RESOLVED → VERIFIED status-firefox88: fixed → verified Flags: qa-verify</p>
<div>  <div> Ryan VanderMeulen [:RyanVM] Comment 18 • 2 years ago </div> <div>—</div> </div>
<p>Comment on attachment 9207771 [details] Bug 1694459 - Using the blob's principal for BlobURLRegistrationData creation in ContentParent::TransmitBlobURLsForPrincipal. r?asuth</p> <p>Thanks for rebasing. Approved for 78.10esr.</p> <p>Attachment #9207771 - Flags: approval-mozilla-esr78? → approval-mozilla-esr78+</p>
<div>  <div> Ryan VanderMeulen [:RyanVM] Updated • 2 years ago </div> <div>—</div> </div>
<p>Attachment #9206345 - Flags: approval-mozilla-esr78? → approval-mozilla-esr78+</p>
<div>  <div> Ryan VanderMeulen [:RyanVM] Comment 19 • 2 years ago </div> <div>—</div> </div> <div>uplift</div>
<p>https://hg.mozilla.org/releases/mozilla-esr78/rev/84e39acf7cdf https://hg.mozilla.org/releases/mozilla-esr78/rev/6bed6549f522</p> <p>status-firefox-esr78: affected → fixed</p>
<div>  <div> Tom Ritter [:tjr] Updated • 2 years ago </div> <div>—</div> </div>
<p>Whiteboard: [post-critsmash-triage] [qa-triaged] → [post-critsmash-triage] [qa-triaged][adv-main88•]</p>
<div>  <div> Tom Ritter [:tjr] Comment 20 • 2 years ago </div> <div>—</div> </div>
<p>Attached file advisory.txt — Details</p> <div></div>



Andrew Sutherland [:asuth] (he/him)

Comment 21 • 2 years ago


The advisory seems appropriately scoped for the fix that landed (bullet 1 of [comment 9](#)), thank you. I'll be spinning off bug(s) for points 2 and 3 this week(end).



Tom Ritter [:tjr]

Updated • 2 years ago


Whiteboard: [post-critsmash-triage] [qa-triaged][adv-main88+] → [post-critsmash-triage] [qa-triaged][adv-main88+][adv-esr78.10+]



Frederik Braun [:freddy]

Updated • 2 years ago

Alias: CVE-2021-23999




Andrew Sutherland [:asuth] (he/him)

Comment 22 • 1 year ago

(In reply to Andrew Sutherland [:asuth] (he/him) from [comment #21](#))

The advisory seems appropriately scoped for the fix that landed (bullet 1 of [comment 9](#)), thank you. I'll be spinning off bug(s) for points 2 and 3 this week(end).

These other bullets ended up getting addressed by [bug 1749184](#) which addressed points 2 and 3 by moving the subsumes check to an [equals-ish check based on origin hash](#) and ceasing to use the triggering principal as the basis for anything.



Daniel Veditz [:dveditz]

Updated • 1 year ago

Group: ~~core-security-release~~

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Top ↑