

Moderate Fasse published GHSA-xpqj-67r8-25j2 on May 20, 2021

Package	
No package listed	
Affected versions	Patched versions
4.0.3	4.0.4

Impact

A php web shell can be uploaded via the Documents & Files upload feature. Someone with upload permissions could rename the php shell with a .phar extension, visit the file, triggering the payload for a reverse/bind shell. This can be mitigated by excluding a .phar file extension to be uploaded (like you did with .php, .html, .php5 etc)

Someone with upload permissions can use the move to db ability to "get" local files and move to the Documents & Folders view. The mitigation to block "/" from file names works, but if you double encode it, it bypasses the check...

[http://127.0.0.1:8080/docs/index.php?mode=6&folder_id=1&name=%25e%25e%25f%25e%25e%25f%25e%25e%25f%25e%25e%25f%25e%25e%25f%25e%25e%25f%25e%25e%25fetc%25fpasswd](#)

This example should load /etc/passwd to the files and docs page for someone to download and read. This might be able to be mitigated by using a strip slashes type of function in php before the function is called. (I think line 341-342 in documents_files_function.php)

This is mostly a default apache config that could be considered a "misconfiguration" by users who install Admidio. If indexing in apache is allowed (it is by default), and an admin creates a db backup, then an attacker could view and download the db's .gz and extract the user hashes, messages, smtp creds and more. Since the passwords are required to be strong by default, and hashed, it would prevent an attacker from easily obtaining passwords...but could be done offline with time and a powerful GPU/CPU.

Upgrade to version 4.0.4 or above

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:

- [#993](#)
- [#994](#)

Moderate

CVE-2021-32630

No CWEs