## Talos Vulnerability Report

TALOS-2021-1350

# LibreCad libdxfrw dwgCompressor::copyCompBytes21 heap-based buffer overflow vulnerability

NOVEMBER 17, 202

CVE NUMBER

CVE-2021-21899

#### SUMMARY

A code execution vulnerability exists in the dwgCompressor::copyCompBytes21 functionality of LibreCad libdxfrw 2.2.0-rc2-19-ge02/3580. A specially-crafted .dwg file can lead to a heap buffer overflow. An attacker can provide a malicious file to trigger this vulnerability.

#### CONFIRMED VIII NERABLE VERSIONS

The versions below were either tested or verified to be vulnerable by Talos or confirmed to be vulnerable by the vendor.

LibreCad libdxfrw 2.2.0-rc2-19-ge02f3580

PRODUCT URLS

libdxfrw - https://librecad.org/

CVSSV3 SCORE

8.8 - CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

CWE

CWE-119 - Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer

#### DETAILS

Libdfxfw is an opensource library facilitating the reading and writing of .dxf and .dwg files, the primary vector graphics file formats of CAD software. Libdxfrw is contained in and primarily used by LibreCAD for the aforementioned purposes.

Libdxfrw is capable of reading in many different versions of .dwg files. The backwards compatibility is quite extensive, and likewise the particulars for each given version are also quite extensive. For today's vulnerability, we deal with the AC1021 version, the AutoCAD .dwg standard from 2007 through 2009.

To keep things relatively short, let's examine how libdxfrw reads in AC1021 .dwg headers:

As shown by [1], .dwg file headers start at offset 0x80, an example of which will soon be posted. At [2], the headers are read into a static buffer, and at [3] the headers are decoded. Thus, for an input file of:

We end up with a decoded input buffer of:

```
[~.~]> x/191wx fileHdrdRS
0x7fff66b00b70: 0x00e9f118
                                                       0x74000900
                                                                                   0x50006500
                                                                                                              0x54985c40
                                                                                   0x0000fcda
0x7fff66b00b80: 0x412dab01
                                                       0xe122a122
                                                                                                              0x00000000
0x7fff66b00b90: 0x00000000
0x7fff66b00ba0: 0x00000000
                                                                                   0x00000000
0x00000000
                                                       0×00000000
                                                                                                               0×00000000
                                                        0x00000000
0x7fff66b00bb0: 0x00000000
                                                       0×00000000
                                                                                   0×00000000
                                                                                                              0×00000000
0x7fff66b00bc0: 0x00000000
0x7fff66b00bd0: 0x00000000
                                                       0x00000000
0x000000000
                                                                                   0x00000000
0x00000000
                                                                                                              0x00000000
0x000000000
0x7fff66b00be0: 0x00000000
0x7fff66b00bf0: 0x00000000
0x7fff66b00c00: 0x00000000
                                                       0×00000000
                                                                                   0×00000000
                                                                                                              0×00000000
                                                       0x00000000
0x000000000
                                                                                   0x00000000
0x000000000
                                                                                                              0x00000000
0x000000000
0x7fff66b00c10: 0x00000000
0x7fff66b00c20: 0x00000000
0x7fff66b00c30: 0x00000000
                                                       0x00000000
                                                                                   0×00000000
                                                                                                              0x00000000
                                                       0x00000000
0x000000000
                                                                                   0x00000000
0x00000000
                                                                                                              0x00000000
0x000000000
0x7fff66b00c40: 0x00000000
0x7fff66b00c50: 0x00000000
0x7fff66b00c60: 0x0000ebf1
                                                       0x00000000
0x00000000
                                                                                   0x00000000
0x00000000
                                                                                                              0×00000000
                                                                                   0x40046b00
                                                       0x64007500
                                                                                                              0x18011da7
0x7fff66b00c70: 0x7827d154
0x7fff66b00c80: 0x00000000
                                                       0x548b9122
0x00000000
                                                                                   0x0000005f
0x00000000
                                                                                                              0x00000000
0x00000000
```

Immediately following the decoding, we populate two more variables, fileHdrCompLength and fileHdrCompLength2:

```
dwgRSCodec::decode239I(fileHdrRaw, fileHdrdRS, 3);
dint32 fileHdrCompLength = fileHdrBuf.getRawLong32();
dcint32 fileHdrCompLength2 = fileHdrBuf.getRawLong32();
```

Which get populated with 0x0000fcda and 0x00000000 respectively from the decoded buffer

Needless to say, the fileHdrCompLength variable is completely controlled by the input file. Continuing on within dwgReader21::readFileHeader():

The branch at [4] is for a .dwg file without compression, but frankly that's boring so it's skipped. At [5] we deal with the much more fun and compressed .dwg files. Since we control fileHdrCompLength, we have a choice of branch, and we go with compressed. At [6], a static sized buffer of 0x110 bytes is created to contain the resultant decompressed header bytes, and the decompression itself occurs at [7] in dwgCompressor::decompress21(), which we now examine:

To ellucidate and reiterate, the cbuf and csize arguments are fully controlled by the input file, while dbuf anddsize are a 0x110 sized allocation and corresponding size. This hopefully gives away the vulnerability, as the only real length checks are at the aptly-commented [8] and [11]. At [9] we find the length field to pass into the copyCompBytes21() function at [10] (assuming that length is currently 0x0, something fully within the file's control). To proceed, we first look at litLength21() and then copyCompBytes21:

Not worth going into too much detail; all we really care about is that the return length can be any value from 0x0 to 0xFFFFFFF. With that in mind we now peek at copyCompBytes21(cbuf, dbuf, length, srcIndex, dstIndex):

```
void dwgCompressor::copyCompBytes21(duint8 *cbuf, duint8 *dbuf, duint32 l, duint32 si, duint32 di){
         duint32 length =1;
duint32 dix = di;
duint32 six = si;
                 while (length > 31){
                 aout[alx+] = cour[l];
for (duint32 i = six+16; iscix+24; i++)
    dbuf[dix++] = cbuf[i];
for (duint32 i = six+8; iscix+16; i++)
    dbuf[dix++] = cbuf[i];
for (duint32 i = six; issix+8; i++)
    tbuf[dix++] = cbuf[i];
                  dbuf[dix++] = cbuf[i];
six = six + 32;
length = length -32;
         1
         switch (length) {
                  case 0:
                  break;
case 1: //0k
                            dbuf[dix] = cbuf[six];
                  break;
case 2: //0k
                           dbuf[dix++] = cbuf[six+1];
dbuf[dix] = cbuf[six];
                           break;
     //[...]
                 case 31:
//in doc: six+30, 26-29, 18-25, 2-17, 0-1
dbuf[dix++] = cbuf[six+30];
for (int i = 26; i<30;i++)
    dbuf[dix++] = cbuf[six+i];
for (int i = 18; i<26;i++)
    dbuf[dix++] = cbuf[six+i];
for (int i = 2; i<18; i++)
    dbuf[dix++] = cbuf[six+i];
// for (int i = 2; i<18; i++)</pre>
/*
                 oour[aix++] = cbuf[six+i];
for (int i = 10; i<18; i++)
    dbuf[dix++] = cbuf[six+i];
for (int i = 2; i<10; i++)
    dbuf[dix++] = cbuf[six+i];
dbuf[dix+-] = cbuf[six+1];
dbuf[dix] = cbuf[six];
hreak:</pre>
         default:
                  DRW_DBG("WARNING dwgCompressor::copyCompBytes21, bad output.\n"); break;
} }
```

As one can quite clearly see, still no length checks anywhere within this function. If we pass an input buffer that is greater than 0x110 bytes, or if we pass a compressed chunk when our dstindex is at 0x10F, we end up copying bytes directly from our fully controlled input buffer into the fixed 0x110 size heap buffer, resulting in a fully controlled heap buffer overflow.

### Crash Information

/root/boop/assorted\_fuzzing/librecad/LibreCAD\_master/libraries/libdxfrw/src/intern/dwgutil.cpp:272:9 #2 0x7f34d461feb2 in dwgReader21::readFileHeader()
/root/boop/assorted\_fuzzing/librecad/LibreCAD\_master/libraries/libdxfrw/src/intern/dwgreader21:cpp:167:9 #3 0x7f34d4128364 in dwgR::read(DRW\_Interface, bool)
/root/boop/assorted\_fuzzing/librecad/LibreCAD\_master/libraries/libdxfrw/src/libdwgr.cpp:156:24 #4 0x55073c in LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput
/root/boop/assorted\_fuzzing/librecad/fuzzing/dwg/\_dwg\_harness.cpp:65:9 #5 0x4587e1 in fuzzer::Fuzzer::ExecuteCallback(unsigned char const, unsigned long)
(/root/boop/assorted\_fuzzing/librecad/fuzzing/dwg/triaged/dwg\_fuzzer.bin+0x4587e1) #6 0x443f52 in fuzzer::RunOneTest(fuzzer::Fuzzer, char const, unsigned long)

(/root/boop/assorted\_fuzzing/librecad/fuzzing/dwg/triaged/dwg\_fuzzer.bin+0x443f52) #7 0x449a06 in fuzzer::FuzzerDriver(int, char\*, int ()(unsigned char const\*, unsigned long))

(/root/boop/assorted\_fuzzing/librecad/fuzzing/dwg/triaged/dwg\_fuzzer.bin+0x449a06) #8 0x4726c2 in main

(/root/boop/assorted\_fuzzing/librecad/fuzzing/dwg/triaged/dwg\_fuzzer.bin+0x4726c2) #9 0x7f34d37430b2 in \_\_libc\_start\_main /build/glibc-eX1ttMB/glibc-2.31/csu/../csu/.libc-start.c:308:16 #10 0x41e61d in \_start (/root/boop/assorted\_fuzzing/librecad/fuzzing/dwg/triaged/dwg\_fuzzer.bin+0x41e61d)

0x612000005d0 is located 0 bytes to the right of 272-byte region [0x6120000004c0,0x6120000005d0) allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x54da9d in operator new(unsigned long)
(/root/boop/assorted\_fuzzing/librecad/fuzzing/dwg/triaged/dwg\_fuzzer.bin+0x54da9d) #1 0x7f34d45ba38b in \_gnu\_cxx::new\_allocator::allocate(unsigned long, void const\*)
//usr/bin/../lib/gcc/x86\_64-linux-gnu/9/.../.../../include/c++/9/ext/new\_allocator.h:114:27 #2 0x7f34d45ba2b8 in std::allocator traits-std::allocator >::allocate(std::allocator&, unsigned long)
//usr/bin/../lib/gcc/x86\_64-linux-gnu/9/.../.../../include/c++/9/bits/alloc\_traits.h:444:20 #3 0x7f34d45ba2b8 in std::Vector\_base-unsigned char, std::allocator >::m\_d\_allocate(unsigned long)
//usr/bin/../lib/gcc/x86\_64-linux-gnu/9/.../.../../include/c++/9/bits/stl\_vector.h:343:20 #4 0x7f34d45ba3d6 in std::Vector</a> unsigned char, std::allocator >::m\_d\_default\_append(unsigned long)
//usr/bin/../lib/gcc/x86\_64-linux-gnu/9/.../.../../include/c++/9/bits/vector.tc:635:34 #5 0x7f34d45ba3d6 in std::Vector</a> unsigned char, std::allocator >::m\_d\_default\_append(unsigned long)
//usr/bin/../lib/gcc/x86\_64-linux-gnu/9/.../.../../include/c++/9/bits/vector.tc:635:34 #5 0x7f34d45ba3d4 in std::Vector</a> unsigned char, std::allocator >::m\_d\_default\_append(unsigned long)
//usr/bin/../lib/gcc/x86\_64-linux-gnu/9/.../.../../include/c++/9/bits/st\_vector.tc:635:34 #5 0x7f34d45ba3d4 in std::Vector</a> unsigned char, std::allocator >::resize(unsigned long)
//usr/bin/../lib/gcc/x86\_64-linux-gnu/9/.../.../../include/c++/9/bits/st/vector.tc:635:34 #5 0x7f34d45ba3d4 in std::Vector</a> unsigned char, std::allocator >::resize(unsigned long)
//root/boop/assorted\_fuzzing/librecad/fuzzing/librerad/fuzzing/librerad/fuzzing/librerad/fuzzing/librerad/fuzzing/librerad/fuzzing/dwg/triaged/dwg\_fuzzer.bin+0x4587e1 in fuzzer::Fuzzer::ExecuteCallback(unsigned char const\*, unsigned long)
//root/boop/assorted\_fuzzing/librecad/fuzzing/dwg/triaged/dwg\_fuzzer.bin+0x449a06 in fuzzer::Fuzzer:Fuzzer:Fuzzer: interver(int\*, char\*\*\*, int (\*)(

TIMELINE

2021-08-04 - Vendor Disclosure 2021-11-10 - Vendor Patched 2021-11-17 - Public Release

CREDIT

Discovered by Lilith >\_> of Cisco Talos.

VULNERABILITY REPORTS PREVIOUS REPORT NEXT REPORT

TALOS-2021-1351 TALOS-2021-1349

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