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TP-Link Cross Site Scripting

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Posted Mar 26, 2021

Multiple TP-Link devices suffer from an unauthenticated persistent cross site scripting vulnerability. Affected models include TD-W9977, TL-WA801ND, TL-WA801N, TL-WR802N, and Archer-C3150.

 tags | exploit, xss

 advisories | CVE-2021-3275

 SHA-256 | e35e1937104dc66eacb185dee5eb8adeeab2b99d9f05fd8364987d6dd5a729bd

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Unauthenticated Stored Cross-site Scripting in Multiple TP-Link Devices							
Overview	Overview						
Overview """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""							
Tested Version: : Access Points incl	Multiple versions of DSL & DSL Gateway, WIFI Routers and uding:						
Model	Firmware Version						
TD-W9977							
TD-W9977v1_0.1.0_0 TL-WA801ND	1.9.1_up_boot(161123)_2016-11-23_15.36.15 TL-WA801NDv5_US_0.9.1_3.16_up_boot[170905-re156404]						
TL-WA801N	TL-WA801Nv6_EU_0.9.1_3.16_up_boot[200116-re161815]						
	TL-WR802Nv4_US_0.9.1_3.17_up_boot[200421-re138950]						
1	ArcherC3150(US)_V2_170926)						
Severity: Med-High							
About the Product:							
* The (products fi	om above list) are high performance WIFI						
Routers.	CC routers), Access Points, ADSL + DSL Gateways and						
Extender mode.	rration modes: Access Point mode, Router Mode, Range and other interfaces to meet the access requirements of						
different devices. * It can provide ?	high-performance functionalities, services for home users,						
individual users, * Supports multipl Configuration, SNN	and businesses. Le functionalities including CWMP management, TR069 UP management, Traffic statistics, etc.						
Description:							
	overed, common to all the TP-Link products including WIFI CC routers), Access Points, ADSL + DSL Gateways and						
Routers. This affected TD-W	19977v1,TL-WA801NDv5, TL-WA801Nv6, TL-WA802Nv5, Archer						
	syload if injected in hostname of Wireless Client devices ink device, allows remote attackers to execute						
unauthenticated ma hostname. Some of	slicious scripts because of improper validation of the pages including dhcp.htm, networkMap.htm,						
hostname function	dhcpClient.htm, qsEdit.htm, qsReview.htm and others use this vulnerable hostname function(setDefaultHostname()) without sanitization and push the						
covering LAN, WAN	value of hostname (\$defaulthostname) directly to the ACT stack along with other parameters. The ACT stack is called on for multiple operation ids covering LAN, WAN and while initialisation of multiple tables (arp, dhcp,						
is called while dr	is the device. For example, ACT_SET stack for WAN_IP_CONN scop operation, during which value of vulnerable is being assigned to parameter X TP Hostname and pushed to						
defaulthostname is being assigned to parameter X_TP_Hostname and pushed to stack. This causes XSS at all the endpoints which display hostname for example:							
Wireless client information table, ARP bind table such as networkMap, DRCP.							
Additional Informa							
validation for Nor	The hostname value is only validated on ASCII characters, while there is no validation for Non-ASCII characters which allows hostname with XSS payload say " <script>alert('XSS)'</script> " to execute.						
This value of host address and MAC ac	his value of hostname is pushed to an array as plain text along with IP ddress and MAC address in initClientListTable() function, and other tables						
use the same value of hostname accross the device. This array is then returned to the callback function which in turn is called from proxy.js. This data is pushed to stack corresponding to operation: "LAM MOST ENTRY"							
(vary for different firmware), operation id: "gl" (gl is getList function). As client initiates request with operation id: "LAN_HOST_ENTRY" and oid:							
and sends data to	and S.act is called which fetches the corresponding stack ajax call. The crafted value of hostname is sent to the in execution of payload.						
[Affected Componer	V+1						
hostName parameter ArpBind, networkMa	: inside different htm pages including DHCP, DhcpAP, up.						
[Attack Type] Remote							
(Impact Code execution) true							
[Attack Vectors]	[Attack Vectors] Malicious psyload execution on initiating request for Wireless Client List						
[Vulnerability Typ	e)						
1	Stored Cross-site Scripting How to Reproduce: (POC):						
command (for Linux	1. Change the default hostname of wireless client by using following command (for Linux):						
a. vi /eto	c/dhcp/dhclient.conf and change the value of hostname to xss payload						



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				1	2
3					
4	5	6	7	8	9
10					
11	12	13	14	15	16
17					
18	19	20	21	22	23
24					
25	26	27	28	29	30
31					

31						
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malvuln 11 files						
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Julien Ahrens 4 files						
T. Weber 4 files						

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Proof of Concept (2,291)	iPhone (108)
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Ruby (594)	Mandriva (3,105)
Scanner (1,631)	NetBSD (255)
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Shell (3,103)	RedHat (12,469)
Shellcode (1,204)	Slackware (941)
Sniffer (886)	Solaris (1,607)

2. Renew IP address by sending DHCP request to TP-Link device via
following command: a. vi /etc/network/interfaces
b. Add these lines:
auto wiano
iface wlan0 inet dhcp
c. On Terminal run command: ifup wlan0
3. Login to the router web interface, navigate to DHCP settings or
Wireless Client tab.
4. As soon as DHCP or Wireless client table is requested Xss payload executes and pops up alert box.
caccates and pops up are to box.
Mitigation
Model Firmware Version
Mitigation Comments
TL-WA801ND
Patched
TL-WA801N
Fatched TL-WR802NV4 US 0.9.1 3.17 up boot[200421-re138950]
Patched
Archer-C3150
EOL Product
TD-W9977
TD-W9977v1_0.1.0_0.9.1_up_boot(161123)_2016-11-23_15.36.15 EOL Product
Link for patched software version for products:
1. TL-WA801ND -
https://tp-link.com/beta/2021/202101/20210120/TL-WA801NDv5_US_0.9.1_3.16_up_boot[210119-re161453].zip 2. TL-WA801N -
2. TL-WAROUN - https://tp-link.com/beta/2021/202101/20210120/TL-WAROUNV6 EU 0.9.1 3.16 up boot[210119-re162190].zip
3. TL-WR802N -
https://tp-link.com/beta/2021/202101/20210120/TL-WR802Nv4_US_0.9.1_3.17_up_boot[210119-re163071].zip
l
[Vendor of Product] TP-LINK (https://www.tp-link.com)
IF-DINK (HCCPS://www.LP-IIIK.Com)
Disclosure Timeline:
24-July-2020 Discoverd the vulnerability
11-Aug-2020 Responsibly disclosed vulnerability to vendor 15-Aug-2020 Vendor Acknowledged the disclosure
13-Aug-2020 Communicated with vendor after 90 days for updates
19-Nov-2020 Vendor asked for model and version details
20-Nov-2020 Provided the required details to vendor
25-Nov-2020 Vendor provided software build to verify the issue
9-Dec-2020 Issue not fixed in the provided software. 4-Jan-2021 Asked Updates on the status of the issue.
4-Jan-2021 Asked Updates on the Status of the issue. 20-Jan-2021 Vendor provided software build to verify the issue.
20-Jan-2021 Issue found fixed in the provided software.
20-Jan-2021 Issue found fixed in the provided software. 21-Jan-2021 Requested for CVE-ID assignment
25-March-2021 CVE-ID Assigned.
Land the second
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