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Contributor

CVE-2020-8446: analysisd: syscheck decoder location path injection. #1813

cpu commented on Jan 15, 2020 • edited ▼

New issue

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The ossec-analysisd 's syscheck decoder (src/analysisd/decoders/syscheck.c) performs unsafe path handling using the received agent name when trying to get the agent file. The DB_File function uses the agent name unsanitized when building a file name to be used with fopen ossec-hids/src/analysisd/decoders/syscheck.c Lines 212 to 216 in abb36d4 212 /* Get agent file */ snprintf(sdb.buf, OS_FLSIZE , "%s/%s", SYSCHECK_DIR, agent); 215 /* r+ to read and write. Do not truncate */ 216 sdb.agent_fps[i] = fopen(sdb.buf, "r+");

Processing a syscheck message like 8:a/../../etc/shared/test.txt:aaaaaaa aaaa' from an agent named test sending from localhost results in an open for queue/syscheck/(test) 127.0.0.1->a/../../etc/shared/test.txt

This will fail with ENOTDIR because the part of the path the attacker can't control remotely ((test) 127.0.0.1->a) is not a directory. Creating it first by sending a message like 8:a:aaaaaaa aaaa seems like a potential solution at first but won't work because while the file queue/syscheck/(test) 127.0.0.1->a will be created it won't be created as a directory but a regular file.

I suspect this means that the bug is only useful to local attackers (that can write directly to the ossec gueue). Writing directly to the gueue allows full control of the 1f->location used as the agent argument to fopen and can cause the syscheck DB file to be created in an attacker controlled location within the chroot. Remote attackers can not control the full 1f->location since the ossec-remoted ensures the prefix of agent name and source IP is always present.

Likely the best fix is to use the w_ref_parent_folder function from src/shared/file_op.c on the location field populated by os_cleanMSG and rejecting any values that have a 1 return from that

cpu mentioned this issue on Jan 15, 2020

OSSEC-HIDS Security Audit Findings #1821

(⊘ Closed)

epu changed the title analysisd: syscheck decoder location path injection: CVE-2020-8446; analysisd: syscheck decoder location path injection. on Jan 30, 2020

cpu commented on Jan 30, 2020 Contributor Author This was assigned CVE-2020-8446

Assignees No one assigned

Projects

Milestone No milestone

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1 participant

