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stack_based buffer #219



⊙ Open x00x00x00x00 opened this issue on May 27, 2021 · 0 comments

 $-0.0x7fb3c462c2bf in \ gattlib_connect\ /home/zero/newfuz/gattlib/dbus/gattlib.c:136$

```
x00x00x00x00 commented on May 27, 2021 • edited ▼
Hi Team,
 Stack based buffer overflow is observed in read_write.c and gattlib.c while fuzzing GATTLIB (releases - master, v0.3-rc1, dev, various-fixes) using CLANG with AFL FUZZER
Vulnerable code from read_write.c -
     connection = gattlib_connect(NULL, argv[1], GATTLIB_CONNECTION_OPTIONS_LEGACY_DEFAULT);
    if (connection == NULL) {
	fprintf(stderr, "Fail to connect to the bluetooth device.\n");
                     return 1;
Vulnerable code from gattlib.c -
get_device_path_from_mac(adapter_name, dst, object_path, sizeof(object_path));
// Transform string from 'DA:94:40:95:E0:87' to 'dev_DA_94_40_95_E0_87'
strncpy(device_address_str, mac_address, sizeof(device_address_str));
 for (int i = 0; i < strlen(device_address_str); i++) {
if \ (device\_address\_str[i] == ':') \ \{\\
device_address_str[i] = '_';
 Steps to Reproduce -
mkdir build && cd build
cmake \ .. \ -DCMAKE\_CXX\_FLAGS = "-fsanitize = address \ -fsanitize = leak \ -g" \ -DCMAKE\_C\_FLAGS = "-fsanitize = address \ -fsanitize = leak \ -g" \ -DCMAKE\_C\_FLAGS = "-fsanitize = leak \ -g" \ -DC
 ASAN output -
 READ of size 22 at 0x7ffc83cd4d95 thread T0
 -0.0x42efb8\ in\ strlen\ (/home/zero/newfuz/gattlib/build/examples/read\_write/read\_write+0x42efb8)
 -1 0x7fb3c462c532 in get_device_path_from_mac /home/zero/newfuz/gattlib/dbus/gattlib.c:114:22
\hbox{-2 0x7fb3c462c532 in gattlib\_connect /home/zero/newfuz/gattlib/dbus/gattlib.c:150:2}\\
\hbox{-3 0x4c471b in main /home/zero/newfuz/gattlib/examples/read\_write/read\_write.c:} 71:15
 -4.0x7fb3c394e0b2\ in \_libc\_start\_main\ /build/glibc-eX1tMB/glibc-2.31/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:308:16
 -5\ 0x41c38d\ in\_start\ (/home/zero/newfuz/gattlib/build/examples/read\_write/read\_write+0x41c38d)
Address 0x7ffc83cd4d95 is located in stack of thread T0 at offset 53 in frame
```

	This frame has 3 object(s):
	[32, 53] 'device_address_str.i' (line 103) <== Memory access at offset 53 overflows this variable
	[96, 104] 'error' (line 140)
	[128, 228] 'object_path' (line 141)
	HINT: this may be a false positive if your program uses some custom stack unwind mechanism, swapcontext or vfork
	(longjmp and C++ exceptions are supported) SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: stack-buffer-overflow (/home/zero/newfuz/qattlib/build/examples/read_write/read_write+0x42efb8) in strlen
	Shadow bytes around the buggy address:
	3/1800/ U7/2596: 0.0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
	0x100010792970: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0
	0x100010792980: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0
	0×100010792990: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0
	0x1000107929a0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 11 f1 f1 f1
	=>0x1000107929b0: 00 00[05]f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00
	0x1000107929c0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 4 f3 f3 f3 f3 f3 f3 f3 f3
	0x1000107929d0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0
	0x1000107929e0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 11 f1 f1 f1
	0x1000107929f0: 00 f2 f2 f2 f8 f2 f2 f2 f8 f8 f8 f8 f2 f2 f2
	0x100010792a00: f2 f2 f8 f8 f8 f8 f3 f3 f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00
	Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):
	Addressable: 00
	Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa
	Freed heap region: fd
	Treed itea regions. In
	Stack mid redzone: f2
	Stack right redzone: f3
	Stack after return: f5
	Stack use after scope: f8
	Global redzone: f9
	Global init order: f6
	Poisoned by user: f7
	Container overflow: fc
	Array cookie: ac
	Intra object redzone: bb
	ASan internal: fe
	Left alloca redzone: ca
	Right alloca redzone: cb Shadow gap: cc
	Shauow gap. CC
	Request team to implement proper patch and validate
ls.	signees
	sujires

1 participant

