Potential Authentication Bypass through "autologin" feature

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TIMELINE



Jan 19th (2 years ago)

The vulnerability is located in the <code>/plugins/preloads/autologin.php</code> script:

```
Code 958 Bytes
                                                                                                                                  Wrap lines Copy Download
1 45.
               $uname = $myts->stripSlashesGPC($autologinName);
2 46.
               $pass = $myts->stripSlashesGPC($autologinPass);
3 47.
              if (empty($uname) || is_numeric($pass)) {
4 48.
                  $user = false ;
5 49.
              } else {
6 50.
                  // V3
7 51.
                   $uname4sql = addslashes($uname);
8 52.
                  $criteria = new icms_db_criteria_Compo(new icms_db_criteria_Item('login_name', $uname4sql));
9 53.
                  $user_handler = icms::handler('icms_member_user');
                  $users = $user_handler->getObjects($criteria, false);
11 55.
                  if (empty($users) || count($users) != 1) {
12 56.
                     $user = false ;
13 57.
                  } else {
14 58.
                      // V3.1 begin
15 59.
                     $user = $users[0] ;
                     $old_limit = time() - (defined('ICMS_AUTOLOGIN_LIFETIME') ? ICMS_AUTOLOGIN_LIFETIME : 604800);
16 60.
17 61.
                      list($old_Ynj, $old_encpass) = explode(':', $pass);
                     if (strtotime($old_Ynj) < $old_limit || md5($user->getVar('pass') .
18 62.
19 63.
                              ICMS_DB_PASS . ICMS_DB_PREFIX . $old_Ynj) != $old_encpass)
20 64.
                      {
21 65.
                           $user = false;
```

User input passed through the "autologin_uname" and "autologin_pass" cookie values is being used at lines 51-54 to fetch an user object from the database, and then at lines 62-63 to check the correctness of the user's password. The vulnerability exists because of an unsafe way of comparing those parameters, due to comparison operator [1=] is being used instead of [1==] within the "if" statement at lines 62-63. The latter operator returns "true" only if the compared values are equal and the same type, while the first compare the values after "type juggling". This might be exploited to bypass the authentication mechanism and login as any user without the knowledge of the relative password.

ImpressCMS branch:

The vulnerability has been spotted on ImpressCMS version 1.4.2 (the latest at the time of writing).

Steps To Reproduce:

Use the attached Proof of Concept (PoC) script to reproduce this vulnerability. It's a PHP script supposed to be used from the command-line (CLI). You should see an output like the following:

```
Code 243 Bytes Wraplines Copy Download

1 $ php auth-bypass.php http://localhost/impresscms/ admin

2 [-] Starting authentication bypass attack...

3 [-] 2021-01-20 022141

4 [-] You can autologin with the following cookies:

5 [-] Cookie: autologin_uname=admin; autologin_pass=2021-01-20 022141:0
```

NOTE: the script will try to send multiple requests with incremental dates within the autologin_pass cookie (that will be the value of the \$olid_Ynj variable), and this will generate a different MD5 hash for each request, until something like 0e174892301580325162390102935332 will be returned by the material () function. For this reason, the exploitation likelihood is very low, and the script execution might take days, months, or a theoretically infinite time.

Impact

 $This \, vulnerability \, could \, potentially \, be \, exploited \, to \, by pass \, the \, authentication \, mechanism \, and \, login \, without \, valid \, credentials.$

1 attachment: F1164379: auth-bypass.php

ammybe ImpressCMS staff changed the status to • Triaged.

Jan 30th (2 years ago

ello, thanks for the information. Its not high risk at the moment, so we will probably have to look into it later (we still have several higher priority fixes to do).

Jan 30th (2 years ago)

Jan 90th (2 years ago)

Jan 90th (2 years ago)

ammybe ImpressCMS staff closed the report and changed the status to **0** Resolved. This has been resolved and will be in ImpressCMS 1.4.3. Thank you!

Feb 2nd (2 years ago)

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