

From: Jincheng Wang <jc.w4ng@gmail.com>
To: u-boot@lists.denx.de
Subject: Out of bounds write vulnerability in the sqfs_readdir() function
Date: Thu, 26 May 2022 16:28:07 +0800 [\[thread overview\]](#)
Message-ID: <CALO=DHFB+yBoXxVr5KcsK0iFdg+e7ywko4-e+72kjbcs8JBfPw@mail.gmail.com> ([raw](#))

[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 1458 bytes --]

Hello u-boot list,

I found the sqfs_readdir() function is vulnerable to Out-of-Bound write, which will cause arbitrary code execution.

...

```
int sqfs_readdir(struct fs_dir_stream *fs_dirs, struct fs_dirent **dentp)
{
```

```
.....
```

```
/* Set entry name */
```

```
strncpy(dent->name, dirs->entry->name, dirs->entry->name_size + 1);
dent->name[dirs->entry->name_size + 1] = '\\0';
```

```
offset = dirs->entry->name_size + 1 + SQFS_ENTRY_BASE_LENGTH;
dirs->entry_count--;
```

```
.....
```

```
}
```

```
struct squashfs_dir_stream {
struct fs_dir_stream fs_dirs;
struct fs_dirent dentp;
size_t size;
int entry_count;
struct squashfs_directory_header *dir_header;
struct squashfs_directory_entry *entry;
.....
};
```

```
static int sqfs_search_dir(struct squashfs_dir_stream *dirs, char
**token_list,
    int token_count, u32 *m_list, int m_count)
{
```

```
.....
```

```
while (!sqfs_readdir(dirsp, &dent)) {
ret = strcmp(dent->name, token_list[j]);
if (!ret)
break;
free(dirs->entry);
dirs->entry = NULL;
}
```

```
.....
```

```
}
```

...

The sqfs_readdir() function use strncpy to set entry name, while the type of dirs->entry->name_size is defined as "u16" in the struct squashfs_directory_entry and dent->name is defined as "char[256]" in the struct fs_dirent.

We can overwrite `*dirs_header` and `*entry` in the struct `squashfs_dir_stream`, so that we can use the `sqfs_search_dir()` function to free a fake chunk which causes arbitrary code execution. You can see the Poc in the attachment.

```
host bind 0 test4.sqfs
ls host 0 /dirs
```

```
[-- Attachment #2: test4.sqfs --]
[-- Type: application/octet-stream, Size: 4096 bytes --]
```

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  --to=jc.w4ng@gmail.com \
  --cc=u-boot@lists.denx.de \
  /path/to/YOUR_REPLY
```

<https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html>

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