

[CVE-2021-39268] Stored XSS via SVG on SuiteCRM 7.11.18

After discovering the **Bypass Content-Type Filter** vulnerability on **SuiteCRM 7.11.18**, I discovered that SuiteCRM allowed uploading **SVG** files and performs filtering at **clean_file_output** function. However, this function only prevents redirecting to another domain by SVG file, it is unable to prevent client-side attacks.

I found an approach to perform a Client side attack after uploading an SVG file to the **SuiteCRM**.


The **\$upload_badext** variable does not define SVG extension and there is no protection method against viewing SVG files. By inserting malicious JavaScript code within the SVG file, malicious user then uploads it to SuiteCRM. When successful, it make the user's browser execute an arbitrary script once user viewing our malicious SVG file.

This is my Proof Of Concept:


1. Lines 2320-2331 at *utils.php*, function *clean_file_output* only prevents redirecting to another domain if the content-type is *image/svg+xml*

```
2320 function clean_file_output($string, $mime_type)
2321 {
2322     $patterns = [];
2323
2324     if ($mime_type == 'image/svg+xml') {
2325         $patterns[] = "/onload=\"\window.location=\"(.*)\"\"/";
2326     }
2327
2328     $string = preg_replace($patterns, '', $string);
2329
2330     return $string;
2331 }
```


2. Easily make the malicious SVG file



3. Upload the File we made



4. View this SVG file by using Preview feature on Download module



POSTED IN [UNCATEGORIZED](#).TAGGED [CVE](#), [CVE-2021-39268](#), [EXPLOIT](#), [SUITECRM](#), [XSS](#).

Blog at WordPress.com.