From

Greg Kroah-Hartman <>

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Jon Hunter Greg Kroah-Hartman Patch in this message

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```
Subject [PATCH 4.14 21/59] crypto: authenc - fix parsing key with misaligned rta len
                            Mon. 21 Jan 2019 14:43:46 +0100
  Date
 4.14-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
commit 8f9c469348487844328e162db57112f7d347c49f upstream.
Keys for "authenc" AEADs are formatted as an rtattr containing a 4-byte 'enckeylen', followed by an authentication key and an encryption key. crypto_authenc_extractkeys() parses the key to find the inner keys.
 However, it fails to consider the case where the rtattr's payload is
longer than 4 bytes but not 4-byte aligned, and where the key ends before the next 4-byte aligned boundary. In this case, 'keylen -= RTA ALIGN(rta->rta | en)' underflows to a value near UINT MAX. This causes a buffer overread and crash during crypto_ahash_setkey().
Fix it by restricting the rtattr payload to the expected size.
Reproducer using AF ALG:
                      #include <linux/if_alg.h>
#include <linux/rtnetlink.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
                       int main()
                                             struct {
    struct rtattr attr;
    _be32 enckeylen;
    char keys[1];
} _attribute__((packed)) key = {
    .attr.rta_len = sizeof(key),
    .attr.rta_type = 1 /* CRYPTO_AUTHENC_KEYA_PARAM */,
                                             fd = socket(AF_ALG, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0);
bind(fd, (void *)&addr, sizeof(addr));
setsockopt(fd, SOL_ALG, ALG_SET_KEY, &key, sizeof(key));
                      BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffff88007ffdc000
PGD 2e01067 P4D 2e01067 P4D 2e04067 PMD 2e05067 PME 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
CPU: 0 PTD: 883 Comm: authenc Not tainted 4.20.0-rcl-00108-g00c9fe37a7f27 #13
Hardware name: (2EMU Standard Pc (1440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.12.0-20181126 142135-anatol 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:sha256_ni_transform+0xb3/0x330 arch/x86/crypto/sha256_ni_asm.S:155
                    RIP: 0010:sha256 ni transform-0xb3/0x330 arch/x86/crypto/sha256 ni [...]

[...]

Call Trace:
sha256 ni finup+0x10/0x20 arch/x86/crypto/sha256 ssse3 glue.c:321 crypto shash finup+0x1a/0x30 crypto/shash.c:178
shash digest unaligned+0x45/0x60 crypto/shash.c:186 crypto shash digest unaligned+0x45/0x60 crypto/shash.c:202 hmac setkey+0x135/0x1e0 crypto/bmac.c:66
crypto shash setkey+0x10/0x20 crypto/shash.c:223 crypto ahash setkey+0x10/0x20 crypto/shash.c:223 crypto ahash setkey+0x10/0x20 crypto/shash.c:223 crypto authenc setkey+0x86/0x100 crypto/shash.c:202 crypto authenc setkey+0x86/0x100 crypto/ahash.c:202 crypto aead setkey+0x2a/0xc0 crypto/ahash.c:202 aead setkey+0x2a/0xc0 crypto/algif aead.c:526 alg Setkey crypto/af alg.c:23 [inline]
alg setsockopt+0xfe/0x130 crypto/af alg.c:256
sys setsockopt+0xfe/0x130 crypto/af alg.c:256
asys setsockopt+0xfe/0x130 crypto/af alg.c:256
asys setsockopt+0xfe/0x30 net/socket.c:1910 [inline]
se sys setsockopt+0xfe/0x30 net/socket.c:1910 [inline]
x64 sys setsockopt+0xff/0x30 net/socket.c:1910 do syscall 64+0x4a/0x180 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290 entry_SYSCALL 64 after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
Fixes: e2364a89a2f ("[CRYPTO] authenc: Move enckeylen into key itself")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v2.6.25+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <hebert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
   crypto/authenc.c | 14 ++++++++--
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/crypto/authenc.c

+++ b/crypto/authenc.c

80 -58,14 +58,22 80 int crypto_authenc_extractkeys(struct cr

return -EINVAL;

if (rta->rta_type != CRYPTO_AUTHENC_KEYA_PARAM)

return -EINVAL;

- if (RTA_PAYLOAD(rta) < sizeof(*param))
                     /*

* RTA_OK() didn't align the rtattr's payload when validating that it

* fits in the buffer. Yet, the keys should start on the next 4-byte

* aligned boundary. To avoid confusion, require that the rtattr

* payload be exactly the param struct, which has a 4-byte aligned size.

*/
                       if (RTA PAYLOAD(rta) != sizeof(*param))
                      return -EINVAL;
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(*param) % RTA ALIGNTO);
                       param = RTA_DATA(rta);
                        keys->enckeylen = be32 to cpu(param->enckeylen);
                      key += RTA_ALIGN(rta->rta_len);
keylen -= RTA_ALIGN(rta->rta_len);
key += rta->rta_len;
keylen -= rta->rta_len;
                      if (keylen < keys->enckeylen)
    return -EINVAL;
```

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