

## Talos Vulnerability Report

TALOS-2021-1248

### Accusoft ImageGear JPG format SOF marker processing out-of-bounds write vulnerability

MARCH 2, 2021

#### CVE NUMBER

CVE-2021-21784

#### Summary

An out-of-bounds write vulnerability exists in the JPG format SOF marker processing of Accusoft ImageGear 19.8. A specially crafted malformed file can lead to memory corruption. An attacker can provide a malicious file to trigger this vulnerability.

#### Tested Versions

Accusoft ImageGear 19.8

#### Product URLs

<https://www.accusoft.com/products/imagegear-collection/>

#### CVSSv3 Score

9.8 - CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

#### CWE

CWE-119 - Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer

#### Details

The ImageGear library is a document-imaging developer toolkit that offers image conversion, creation, editing, annotation and more. It supports more than 100 formats such as DICOM, PDF, Microsoft Office and others.

A write access violation can happen in the `handle_color_channel_with_high_precision` function, due to a buffer overflow caused by a missing size check for a buffer memory. A specially crafted JPG file can lead to an out-of-bounds write which can result in memory corruption.

Trying to load a malformed JPG file, we end up in the following situation:

```
(f4c4.216c): Access violation - code c0000005 (first chance)
First chance exceptions are reported before any exception handling.
This exception may be expected and handled.
eax=ffffba40 ebx=00000000 ecx=ffffd7d7 edx=0b353004 esi=000000ff edi=ffffddd5
eip=5bfe5549 esp=0019f728 ebp=0019f740 iopl=0         nv up ei pl zr na pe nc
cs=0023  ss=002b  ds=002b  es=002b  fs=0053  gs=002b             efl=00010246
igCore19d!IG_mpi_page_set+0xc97f9:
5bfe5549 66895afc      mov     word ptr [edx-4],bx      ds:002b:0b353000=????
```

This crash happens at LINE42 in the following pseudo-code of the function `handle_color_channel_with_high_precision`:

```

LINE1 void handle_color_channel_with_high_precision
LINE2 (undefined4 param_1,int width,short *param_3,short *param_4,short *param_5,
LINE3 short *raster_buffer,int param_7,int param_8)
LINE4 {
LINE5 [...]
LINE6 if (0 < width) {
LINE7 raster_buffer = raster_buffer + 2;
LINE8 do {
LINE9     short_3 = *param_3 + 0x800;
LINE10     iVar1 = *param_5 * 0x166e;
LINE11     iVar2 = *param_4 * 0x1c5a;
LINE12     short_1 = *param_4 * 0x582 + *param_5 * 0xb6d;
LINE13     short_2 = short_3 - ((int)(short_1 + (short_1 >> 0x1f & 0xffff)) >> 0xc);
LINE14     short_1 = (int)(iVar2 + (iVar2 >> 0x1f & 0xffff)) >> 0xc + short_3;
LINE15     short_3 = ((int)((iVar1 >> 0x1f & 0xffff) + iVar1) >> 0xc) + short_3;
LINE16     if (short_3 < 0) {
LINE17         short_3 = 0;
LINE18     }
LINE19     else {
LINE20         if (0xffff < short_3) {
LINE21             short_3 = 0xffff;
LINE22         }
LINE23     }
LINE24     raster_buffer[-2] = (short)short_3;
LINE25     if (short_2 < 0) {
LINE26         short_2 = 0;
LINE27     }
LINE28     else {
LINE29         if (0xffff < short_2) {
LINE30             short_2 = 0xffff;
LINE31         }
LINE32     }
LINE33     raster_buffer[-1] = (short)short_2;
LINE34     if (short_1 < 0) {
LINE35         short_1 = 0;
LINE36     }
LINE37     else {
LINE38         if (0xffff < short_1) {
LINE39             short_1 = 0xffff;
LINE40         }
LINE41     }
LINE42     *raster_buffer = (short)short_1;
LINE43     local_8 = local_8 + *(int *)(param_7 + 0x34);
LINE44     if (local_8 == param_8) {
LINE45         param_3 = param_3 + 1;
LINE46         local_8 = 0;
LINE47     }
LINE48     local_c = local_c + *(int *)(param_7 + 0x84);
LINE49     if (local_c == param_8) {
LINE50         param_4 = param_4 + 1;
LINE51         local_c = 0;
LINE52     }
LINE53     local_10 = local_10 + *(int *)(param_7 + 0xd4);
LINE54     if (local_10 == param_8) {
LINE55         local_10 = 0;
LINE56         param_5 = param_5 + 1;
LINE57     }
LINE58     raster_buffer = raster_buffer + 3;
LINE59     width = width - 1;
LINE60 } while (width != 0);
LINE61 }
LINE62 return;
LINE63 }

```

From the pseudo code we can easily see the write into raster\_buffer is performed by a do-while loop from LINE8 to LINE60, which is controlled by a variable named width. When the size of the allocated buffer raster\_buffer is smaller than the width multiplied by 3 (used to store the three short), an out-of-bounds write can occur.

In our case the buffer's size is 0x408 bytes, as we can see below:

```

0:000> !heap -p -a edx
address 0b353004 found in
_DPH_HEAP_ROOT @ 4d91000
in busy allocation ( DPH_HEAP_BLOCK:      UserAddr      UserSize -      VirtAddr      VirtSize)
                    b2f0820:      b352bf8          408 -      b352000          2000
5c20a8b0 verifier!AvrfdDebugPageHeapAllocate+0x00000240
7765ef8e ntdll!RtlDebugAllocateHeap+0x00000039
775c6150 ntdll!RtlpAllocateHeap+0x000000f0
775c57fe ntdll!RtlpAllocateHeapInternal+0x0000003ee
775c53fe ntdll!RtlAllocateHeap+0x0000003e
5bdddcff MSVCRI10!malloc+0x00000049
5bf161de igCore19d!AF_memmm_allloc+0x0000001e
5bfe334d igCore19d!IG_mpi_page_set+0x000c75fd
5bfd6152 igCore19d!IG_mpi_page_set+0x000ba402
5bfd005b igCore19d!IG_mpi_page_set+0x000b430b
5bfe7025 igCore19d!IG_mpi_page_set+0x000cb2d5
5bfe6ef5 igCore19d!IG_mpi_page_set+0x000cb1a5
5bfe4f91 igCore19d!IG_mpi_page_set+0x000c9241
5bfe66ea igCore19d!IG_mpi_page_set+0x000ca99a
5bef10d9 igCore19d!IG_image_savelist_get+0x00000b29
5bf30557 igCore19d!IG_mpi_page_set+0x00014807
5bf2feb9 igCore19d!IG_mpi_page_set+0x00014169
5bec5777 igCore19d!IG_load_file+0x00000047
004021f9 Fuzzme!fuzzme+0x00000019
00402504 Fuzzme!fuzzme+0x000000324
0040666d Fuzzme!fuzzme+0x0000448d
75c8fa29 KERNEL32!BaseThreadInitThunk+0x00000019
775e75f4 ntdll!_RtlUserThreadStart+0x0000002f
775e75c4 ntdll!_RtlUserThreadStart+0x0000001b

```

In this case the width variable which is controlling the loop in LINE60 is taken directly from the width value of a SOF marker and the value was 0x150. Let's see how information is carried with a SOF marker:

2 bytes Marker Identifier (0xFFC0)  
 2 bytes corresponding to the 'length' of data for the marker  
 1 byte corresponding to the 'precision' aka bits/sample and value can be 8, 12 or 16 (depending of each type of SOF)  
 2 bytes corresponding to the Image 'height'  
 2 bytes corresponding to the Image 'width'  
 1 byte corresponding to the number of components like 1 for grayscale, 3 for color YCbCr, 4 for color CMYK  
 data left for each component.

The values in SOF marker are used to compute the size of the raster\_buffer with a formula like:

$$(((precision * component * width) + 0x1f) / 8) \& 0xFFFFFFFf + 24$$

So effectively in function `handle_color_channel_with_high_precision` we can see the loop is going to overwrite the buffer as the buffer should have been sized at least  $0x150 * 6 = 0x7e0$  instead of  $0x408$ .

The SOF marker values are read from the file with the function `parse_SOF` with pseudo code below :

```

LINE64 int parse_SOF(jpeg_dec *jpeg_dec, read_buffer *read_buffer, SOF_object *SOF_object)
LINE65 {
LINE66     [...]
LINE73     kind_of_heap = jpeg_dec->kind_of_heap;
LINE74     data_from_file = (byte *)read_buffer->read_buffer_data;
LINE75     _index = 0;
LINE76     if (SOF_object == NULL) {
LINE77         _index = AF_err_record_set("..\\..\\..\\Common\\Formats\\jpeg_dec.c", 0x476, -0xd02, 0, 0, 0, NULL);
LINE78     }
LINE79     return _index;
LINE80 }
LINE81 wrapper_memset(SOF_object, 0, 0x14);
LINE82 (SOF_object->SOF).precision = (uint)*data_from_file;
LINE83 (SOF_object->SOF).height =
LINE84     (uint)(ushort)*(ushort*)(data_from_file + 1) << 8 | *(ushort*)(data_from_file + 1) >> 8;
LINE85 (SOF_object->SOF).width =
LINE86     (uint)(ushort)*(ushort*)(data_from_file + 3) << 8 | *(ushort*)(data_from_file + 3) >> 8;
LINE87 (SOF_object->SOF).component = (uint)data_from_file[5];
LINE88 if ((jpeg_dec->type_of_SOF == 0) &&
LINE89     ((SOF_object->SOF).precision == 16
LINE90     /* Enforce 8bit per channel */) {
LINE91     AF_err_record_set("..\\..\\..\\Common\\Formats\\jpeg_dec.c", 0x488, -0x128e, 1, 0x10, 0x10,
LINE92     "Precision of 16 is not allowed in JPEG Lossy, reading as 8");
LINE93     (SOF_object->SOF).precision = 8;
LINE94 }
LINE95 num_component = (SOF_object->SOF).component;
LINE96 pCVar1 = (ColorComponent *)
LINE97     AF_memmm_alloc(kind_of_heap, num_component << 4,
LINE98     (dword)"..\\..\\..\\Common\\Formats\\jpeg_dec.c");
LINE99 (SOF_object->SOF).colorComponents = pCVar1;
LINE100 [...]
LINE139 return _index;
LINE140 }
  
```

We can see the storage of precision, height, width and component are read from the file respectively in LINE83, LINE84, LINE86 and LINE88.

While this is a very long process we can summarize it by saying that the size for the buffer allocation is taken from an HDIB object. This object is created while parsing the SOF marker in function `create_HDIB_from_SOF` through the call to `CreateLPHDIB` in LINE335.

The precision, derived from `precision_bit_depth`, is read from the file at LINE135. The width and component are respectively read from the file at LINE149 and LINE151.

```

LINE64 void create_HDIB_from_SOF(jpeg_related *table_fields_name,uint jpeg_marker,undefined4 _store_result,
LINE65     byte *buffer_data_from_file,jpeg_dec *jpeg_dec,AT_MODE FORMAT_ID)
LINE66 {
    [...]
LINE100
LINE101     _jpeg_dec = jpeg_dec;
LINE102     _SOF_Marker_type = NULL;
LINE103     _kind_of_heap = jpeg_dec->kind_of_heap;
LINE104     SOF_DATASIZE = NULL;
LINE105     ___num_component = NULL;
LINE106     iVar1 = FUN_100422f8(0,0x15,&___num_component);
LINE107     iVar2 = FUN_10042460(0,(uint *)0x15,(int)"ACTUAL_BIT_DEPTH",0,NULL,NULL,&___buffer_data_from_file,
LINE108         4,(uint)___num_component);
LINE109     uVar8 = iVar1 + iVar2;
LINE110     local_30 = uVar8;
LINE111     if (___num_component != NULL) {
LINE112         FUN_10042420(___num_component);
LINE113     }
LINE114     switch(jpeg_marker & 0xffff) {
LINE115     case 0xffc0:
LINE116         _SOF_Marker_type = "SOF0";
LINE117         table_fields_name->SOF_TYPE = 0;
LINE118         SOF_DATASIZE = "SOF0_DATASIZE";
LINE119         break;
LINE120     case 0xffc1:
LINE121         _SOF_Marker_type = "SOF1";
LINE122         table_fields_name->SOF_TYPE = 0;
LINE123         SOF_DATASIZE = "SOF1_DATASIZE";
LINE124         break;
LINE125     case 0xffc2:
LINE126         _SOF_Marker_type = "SOF2";
LINE127         table_fields_name->SOF_TYPE = 2;
LINE128         SOF_DATASIZE = "SOF2_DATASIZE";
LINE129         break;
LINE130     case 0xffc3:
LINE131         _SOF_Marker_type = "SOF3";
LINE132         table_fields_name->SOF_TYPE = 1;
LINE133         SOF_DATASIZE = "SOF3_DATASIZE";
LINE134     }
LINE135     precision_bit_depth = (byte *) (uint) *buffer_data_from_file;
LINE136     if (___buffer_data_from_file != NULL) {
LINE137         precision_bit_depth = (byte *) (uint) ___buffer_data_from_file & 0xff;
LINE138     }
LINE139     precision = (byte)precision_bit_depth;
LINE140     if (((precision != 8) && (precision != 12)) && (precision != 16)) {
LINE141         buffer_data_from_file = precision_bit_depth;
LINE142         AF_err_record_set("../\\..\\..\\Common\\Formats\\jpgread.c",0x671,-0x12e3,0,
LINE143             precision_bit_depth,8,"Unsupported bit depth for channel.");
LINE144         AF_error_check();
LINE145         return;
LINE146     }
LINE147     height = (uint)(ushort)((*(ushort *) (buffer_data_from_file + 1) << 8 |
LINE148         *(ushort *) (buffer_data_from_file + 1) >> 8);
LINE149     width = (uint)(ushort)((*(short *) (buffer_data_from_file + 3) << 8 |
LINE150         (ushort)buffer_data_from_file[4]);
LINE151     component = buffer_data_from_file[5];
    [...]
LINE332     LPHDIB = (LPHIGDIBINFO)&table_fields_name->HDIB;
LINE333     /* Will create color table related data
LINE334     */
LINE335     CreateLPHDIB(LPHDIB,(uint)(ushort)width,height & 0xffff,uVar8,(uint)component,(uint)precision);
LINE336     copy_resolution_to_dib((HDIB)*LPHDIB,&table_fields_name->at_resolution);
LINE337     iVar1 = DIB_colorspace_get((HDIB)*LPHDIB);
LINE338     if ((char)iVar1 == '\\x03') {
LINE339         call_IGDIB::AllocatePaletteForDib((HDIB)*LPHDIB);
LINE340     }
LINE341 }
LINE342 AF_error_check();
LINE343 return;
LINE344 }

```

Please notice in this function in LINE140 that if the precision read from a SOF marker is not corresponding to the value of '8', '12' or '16', the function ends here without creating the HDIB object. The need to create an HDIB object is from my understanding to support multiple file formats, so this a common structure that is reused for several purposes, in this specific case it's used for the allocating raster\_buffer.

To understand why we land in the handle\_color\_channel\_with\_high\_precision function, we need to get into another function named jpeg\_raster\_set. We can see in LINE623 the function handle\_color\_channel\_with\_high\_precision is called passing width and raster\_buffer as parameters, that in turn were passed as parameters to jpeg\_raster\_set (LINE344). Note that the function handle\_color\_channel\_with\_high\_precision is only called if precision is not 8 (LINE568).

```

LINE344 void jpeg_raster_set(jpeg_dec *jpeg_dec,SOF_object *SOF_Object,jpeg_related *jpeg_related,
LINE345                      undefined4 param_4,int width,int height,byte *min_height,short *raster_buffer,
LINE346                      uint size_raster_buffer,int SOF_type,int param_11,int value_to_8,void *param_13,
LINE347                      int param_14,int param_15)
LINE348 {
    [...]
LINE393     if (SOF_type == 2) {
LINE394         _nr_comp = *(byte *)6(SOF_Object->SOF).component;
LINE395     }
LINE396     else {
LINE397         _nr_comp = *(byte *)6SOF_Object->possible_num_component_or_color_channel;
LINE398     }
LINE399     pbVar4 = (byte *)SOF_Object->nr_component_buffer_data;
LINE400     if (SOF_type == 0) {
LINE401         SOF_type_2:
LINE402         _num_component = (uint)_nr_comp;
LINE403         if (_num_component != 0) {
LINE404             puVar15 = (undefined4 *) (pbVar4 + 0x20);
LINE405             uVar8 = _num_component;
LINE406             piVar14 = local_18;
LINE407             while (uVar12 = _num_component, uVar8 != 0) {
LINE408                 uVar8 = uVar8 - 1;
LINE409                 *piVar14 = 0;
LINE410                 piVar14 = piVar14 + 1;
LINE411             }
LINE412             do {
LINE413                 *puVar15 = puVar15[-7];
LINE414                 puVar15 = puVar15 + 0x14;
LINE415                 uVar12 = uVar12 - 1;
LINE416             } while (uVar12 != 0);
LINE417         }
LINE418         /* -----
LINE419             Num of component = 1 e.g grayscale
LINE420             ----- */
LINE421         if (_num_component == 1) {
LINE422             [...]
LINE480         }
LINE481         else {
LINE482             if (_num_component == 3) {
LINE483                 YCbCr:
LINE484                     /* -----
LINE485                         3 components e.g YCbCr
LINE486                         ----- */
LINE560                 [...]
LINE561                 index = 0;
LINE562                 /* max_loop is 16 */
LINE563                 if (0 < max_loop) {
LINE564                     do {
LINE565                         _some_buffer = *(short **)(pbVar4 + 0x20);
LINE566                         _some_buffer_2 = *(short **)(pbVar4 + 0x70);
LINE567                         _some_buffer_3 = *(short **)(pbVar4 + 0xc0);
LINE568                         /* if precision is 8 but data is read from 2nd SOF not first one */
LINE569                         if ((SOF_Object->SOF).precision == 8) {
LINE570                             [...]
LINE571                         }
LINE572                         else {
LINE573                             /* precision is not 8 */
LINE574                             handle_color_channel_with_high_precision
LINE575                                 (0x10270680,width,_some_buffer,_some_buffer_2,_some_buffer_3,
LINE576                                 raster_buffer,(int)pbVar4,param_11);
LINE577                         }
LINE578                     }
LINE579                 }
LINE580                 [...]
LINE581                 return;
LINE582             }
LINE583         }

```

To invoke the described functions in the order that we described, you need to have a file containing two SOF markers, one totally valid to compute size and raster buffer and another SOF marker with some invalid precision value (like '0xD', for example) to hit LINE140 in create\_HDIB\_from\_SOF.

First, the first SOF marker is parsed and a valid HDIB object will be created (together with the raster\_buffer), based on the SOF marker values (width, precision, number of components). Next, the second SOF marker is parsed, but the HDIB object will fail to be allocated because of the invalid precision value in the second SOF marker, hence the raster\_buffer is not getting updated. Because the second SOF marker has a precision higher than 8, the function handle\_color\_channel\_with\_high\_precision will be called via jpeg\_raster\_set, where the values from the first SOF marker (width, precision, number of components) will be used, however this function is not supposed to be called with a precision value of 8. This makes the code run under wrong sizes assumptions for the raster\_buffer and the do-while loop will run past the end of the buffer, triggering the out-of-bounds write condition in the heap, which can lead to arbitrary code execution.

# Crash Information

```

0:000> !analyze -v
*****
*                                     *
*               Exception Analysis   *
*                                     *
*****

KEY_VALUES_STRING: 1

    Key : AV.Fault
    Value: Write

    Key : Analysis.CPU.mSec
    Value: 1280

    Key : Analysis.DebugAnalysisProvider.CPP
    Value: Create: 8007007e on DESKTOP-4DAOCFH

    Key : Analysis.DebugData
    Value: CreateObject

    Key : Analysis.DebugModel
    Value: CreateObject

    Key : Analysis.Elapsed.mSec
    Value: 10671

    Key : Analysis.Memory.CommitPeak.Mb
    Value: 71

    Key : Analysis.System
    Value: CreateObject

    Key : Timeline.OS.Boot.DeltaSec
    Value: 172399

    Key : Timeline.Process.Start.DeltaSec
    Value: 149

    Key : WER.OS.Branch
    Value: vb_release

    Key : WER.OS.Timestamp
    Value: 2019-12-06T14:06:00Z

    Key : WER.OS.Version
    Value: 10.0.19041.1

    Key : WER.Process.Version
    Value: 1.0.1.1

ADDITIONAL_XML: 1

OS_BUILD_LAYERS: 1

NTGLOBALFLAG:  2100000

APPLICATION_VERIFIER_FLAGS:  0

APPLICATION_VERIFIER_LOADED: 1

EXCEPTION_RECORD: (.exr -1)
ExceptionAddress: 5bfe5549 (igCore19d!IG_mpi_page_set+0x000c97f9)
ExceptionCode: c0000005 (Access violation)
ExceptionFlags: 00000000
NumberParameters: 2
   Parameter[0]: 00000001
   Parameter[1]: 0b353000
Attempt to write to address 0b353000

FAULTING_THREAD:  0000216c

PROCESS_NAME:  Fuzzme.exe

WRITE_ADDRESS:  0b353000

ERROR_CODE: (NTSTATUS) 0xc0000005 - The instruction at 0x%p referenced memory at 0x%p. The memory could not be %s.

EXCEPTION_CODE_STR:  c0000005

EXCEPTION_PARAMETER1:  00000001

EXCEPTION_PARAMETER2:  0b353000

STACK_TEXT:
WARNING: Stack unwind information not available. Following frames may be wrong.
0019f740 5bfe7c6b 5c120680 000000a4 0b344b50 igCore19d!IG_mpi_page_set+0xc97f9
0019f7f8 5bfe3471 0ad41f60 0019fab4 0ad3f720 igCore19d!IG_mpi_page_set+0xc97f9
0019f87c 5bfd6438 000001e6 0ad3f720 0ad41f60 igCore19d!IG_mpi_page_set+0xc97f9
0019fa94 5bfd005b 0ad41f60 0019fab4 5bfe2fa0 igCore19d!IG_mpi_page_set+0xc97f9
0019fb14 5bfe7025 0000ffdf 5bfe2fa0 0ad3f720 igCore19d!IG_mpi_page_set+0xc97f9
0019fb30 5bfe6ef5 0ad3f720 0ad41f60 0000ffda igCore19d!IG_mpi_page_set+0xc97f9
0019fb54 5bfe4f91 0ad3f720 0ad41f60 0019fb7c igCore19d!IG_mpi_page_set+0xc97f9
0019fb74 5bfe66ea 0019ffc2 1000001d 0ad3df70 igCore19d!IG_mpi_page_set+0xc97f9
0019fbba 5bfe10d9 1000001d 0ad3df70 00000001 igCore19d!IG_mpi_page_set+0xc97f9
0019fbec 5bf30557 00000000 0ad3df70 0019fc3c igCore19d!IG_image_savelist_get+0xc97f9
0019fe68 5bf2feb9 00000000 05325f90 00000001 igCore19d!IG_mpi_page_set+0xc97f9
0019fe88 5bec5777 00000000 05325f90 00000001 igCore19d!IG_mpi_page_set+0xc97f9
0019fea8 004021f9 05325f90 0019feb9 00000001 igCore19d!IG_load_file+0xc97f9
0019fec0 00402504 05325f90 05323fc0 05273f28 Fuzzme!fuzzme+0x19
0019ff28 0040066d 00000005 0526aee8 05273f28 Fuzzme!fuzzme+0x324
0019ff70 75c8fa29 00201000 75c8fa10 0019ffdc Fuzzme!fuzzme+0x448d
0019ff80 775e75f4 00201000 3dbd1269 00000000 KERNEL32!BaseThreadInitThunk+0xc97f9
0019ffdc 775e75c4 ffffffff 77607356 00000000 ntdll!_RtlUserThreadStart+0xc97f9
0019ffec 00000000 004066f5 00201000 00000000 ntdll!_RtlUserThreadStart+0xc97f9

STACK_COMMAND: ~0s ; .cxr ; kb

SYMBOL_NAME:  igCore19d!IG_mpi_page_set+c97f9

```

```
MODULE_NAME: igCore19d
IMAGE_NAME: igCore19d.dll
FAILURE_BUCKET_ID: INVALID_POINTER_WRITE_AVRF_c0000005_igCore19d.dll!IG_mpi_page_set
OS_VERSION: 10.0.19041.1
BUILDLAB_STR: vb_release
OSPLATFORM_TYPE: x86
OSNAME: Windows 10
IMAGE_VERSION: 19.8.0.0
FAILURE_ID_HASH: {39ff52ad-9054-81fd-3e4d-ef5d82e4b2c1}

Followup: MachineOwner
-----
```

#### Timeline

2021-02-09 - Vendor Disclosure

2021-03-02 - Public Release

#### CREDIT

Discovered by Emmanuel Tacheau of Cisco Talos.

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VULNERABILITY REPORTS

PREVIOUS REPORT

NEXT REPORT

TALOS-2020-1225

TALOS-2021-1226