Talos Vulnerability Report

TALOS-2021-1230

Trend Micro, Inc. Home Network Security tdts.ko chrdev_ioctl_handle privilege escalation vulnerability

MAY 24, 2021

CVE NUMBER

CVE-2021-32457

Summary

A privilege escalation vulnerability exists in the tdts.ko chrdev_ioctl_handle functionality of Trend Micro, Inc. Home Network Security 6.1.567. A specially crafted ioctl can lead to increased privileges. An attacker can issue an ioctl to trigger this vulnerability.

Tested Versions

Trend Micro, Inc. Home Network Security 6.1.567

Product URLs

https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/forHome/products/homenetworksecurity.html

CVSSv3 Score

7.8 - CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

CWE

CWE-121 - Stack-based Buffer Overflow

Details

The Home Network Security Station is a device used to monitor and protect home networks from security threats as well as offer simple network management features. The Station provides vulnerability scanning, web threat protection, intrusion prevention, as well as device-based access control for all devices on a home network.

This vulnerability is caused by the lack of input validation on a user's ioctl request from user land. The upper 16 bits from the ioctl request (AND with 0x3FFF, so 14 bits total) are blindly used as input to __memzero to a stack-based buffer in kernel space. The stack-based buffer is smaller than the maximum ioctl request copy size of 0x3FFF and thus overflows. A user can leverage this to write \x000 to a large portion of the kernel stack causing a kernel panic and in turn, a denial of service. This could potentially also be leveraged into a privilege escalation vulnerability.

```
chrdev_ioctl_handle:
0000074c 10402de9 push
00000750 5034e7e7 ubfx
00000754 be0053e3 cmp
00000758 1800e013 mvnne
0000075c 38004de2 sub
00000760 2900001a bne
                                                       \{r4, lr\} \{\_saved_lr\} \{\_saved_r4\}
                                                       r3, r0, #0x8, #0x8
r3, #0xbe
r0, #0x18 {0xffffffe7}
                                        ubfx
                                       cmp
mvnne
                                                       sp, sp, #0x38
0x80c
                                       sub
// Check that the bits 8-15 are 0xbe in the IOCTL request 00000764 ff0010e3 tst r0, #0xff 00000768 1500e003 mvneq r0, #0x15 \{0xffffffea\} 0000076c 26000000 beq 0x80c
00000770 0d20a0e1
                                                       r2, sp {var_40}
00000774 000050e3 cmp r0, #0
00000778 7f3dc2e3 bic r3, r2, #0x1fc0 {var_40}

// Extract the size of the buffer encoded in the IOCTL request
00000775 6528ede7 ubfx r2, r0, #0x10, #0xe
0000078 3f30c3e3 bic r3, r3, #0x3f
00000784 380000ba blt
// Sanity checks to make sure that the encoded size is not negative 0000086c 084093e5 ldr r4, [r3, #0x8] 00000870 020091e0 add.s r0, r1, r2
                                      sbc.slo r0, r0, r4
movlo r4, #0
cmp r4, #0
beq 0x794
00000874 0400d030
00000878 0040a033
0000087c 000054e3
00000880 c3ffff0a
00000794 083093e5
                                       ldr
                                                       r3, [r3, #0x8]
00000794 020091e0
0000079c 0300d030
000007a0 0030a033
                                       add.s r0, r1, r2
sbc.slo r0, r0, r3
movlo r3, #0
000007a4 000053e3
000007a8 2a00000a
                                        beq
 // Ensure that r2 is not zero
000007ac 000052e3 cmp
000007b0 3400001a bne
                                                 r2, #0
0x888
// Vulnerable __memzero with user provided length and set size stack-buffer
00000888 0d00a0e1 mov
0000088c 0210a0e1 mov
00000890 b16901eb bl
                                                       r0, sp {var_40}
r1, r2
                                                       __memzero
```

```
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000000
 Undote to hadrote kernet woll pointer dereference at v
pgd = 8faac000
[00000000] pgd=6b222831, pte=00000000, ppte=00000000
Internal error: Oops: 80000017 [#1] SMP ARM
Modules linked in: kmdiamond(0) tdtsudb(PO) tdts(PO)
 CPU: 0 PID: 1539 Comm: poc2 Tainted: P
task: 8f966000 ti: 8fad2000 task.ti: 8fad2000
PC is at 0x0
                                                                                                                                                   0 3.10.70 #2
LR is at 0x0
pc : [<00000000>] lr : [<00000000] psr: 00000013
sp : 8fad3f28 ip : 000000000 fp : 7efffc24
r10: 000000000 r9 : 8fad2000 r8 : 8fae9540
r7 : 000000003 r6 : 8fae9540 r5 : ffffffff r4 : 00000000
r3 : 00000000 r2 : 000000000 r1 : ffffffff r0 : ffffffff
Flags: nzcv IRQs on FIQs on Mode SVC32 ISA ARM Segment user
Control: 10c53c7d Table: 6faac06a DAC: 00000015
Process poc2 (pid: 1539, stack limit = 0x8fad2238)
Stack (0x8fad4f28 r6 0x8fad4000)
  LR is at 0x0
 Code: bad PC value
   Code: bad PC value
---[end trace 7b9adcd427e025e9]---
[end tra
 Dec
 Dec 2 21:12:17 Diamond user.warn kernel: LK is at 0x0

Dec 2 21:12:17 Diamond user.warn kernel: pc : [<000000000] lr : [<0000000000] psr: 00000013Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 000000000 pgd = 8fa88000
 PC is at 0x0

RR is at calltimerfn.isra.35+0x24/0x84

pc: [<00000000] lr: [<8002cabc>] psr: 60000113

sp: 8fa61d90 ip: 00000000 fp: 00000000

r1: 000000001 rp: 850548894 r8: 805140c0

r7: 000000001 r6: 000000100 r5: 8fa60000 r4: 8fa60010

r3: 8fa61d90 r2: 000000000 r1: 000000000 r0: 000000000

Flags: nZCv IRQs on FIQs on Mode SVC32 ISA ARM Segment user

Control: 10c53c7d Table: 6fa6806a DAC: 00000015

Process syslogd (pid: 559, stack limit = 0x8fa60238)

Stack: (0x8fa61d90 to 0x8fa62000)

1d80: 00000000 00000002 8f805
 1d80: 0000000 00000022 8f8059c0 80548080
1da0: 8fa61db0 00000000 00200200 8002cc9c 8fa61db0 8fa61db0 ffffbfcc 00000101
 1dc0: 88514084 00000004 85a60000 00000100 85a60018 8002602c 000000001 00015220 1de0: 00000000 885166c0 80547e40 00000000 ffffbfcd 805140c0 80526524 00400040 1e00: 00000000 60000193 00000022 00000000 f8200100 8f1d7e00 8f86f410 a0000013
  1e20: 8f87e061 80026ea4 80510cc4 800270e0 80510cc4 8000ee44 f820010c 8051a7f8 1e40: 8fa61e60 8000857c 803aaf18 60000013 ffffffff 8fa61e94 8f1d7e00 8000db80
 [[<80026ea4>] (dosoftirq+0x50/0x58) from [<800270e0>] (irqexit+0x5c/0x94)
[[<800270e0>] (irqexit+0x5c/0x94) from [<8000e44>] (handleIRQ+0x44/0x90)
[[<8000e44>] (handleIRQ+0x44/0x90) from [<80000857c>] (gichandleirq+0x2c/0x5c) from [<80000857c>] (gichandleirq+0x2c/0x5c)
[
Exception stack(0x8fa61e60 to 0x8fa61ea8)
1e60: 8f86f410 60000013 00000070 00006adc 00000000 8f819000 00000000 00000061
  1e80: 8f1d7e00 8f86f410 a0000013 8f87e061 00000000 8fa61ea8 801daac8 803aaf18
   1ea0: 60000013 fffffffff
   [<8000db80>] (irqsvc+0x40/0x50) from [<803aaf18>] (rawspinunlockirqrestore+0x1c/0x20)
  [[803aaf18>] (rawspinunlockirqrestore+0x1c/0x20) from [<<pre>[<801daac8>] (uartwrite+0xb0/0xd0)
[[{801daac8>] (uartwrite+0xb0/0xd0) from [<<pre>{801c4b2c>] (nttywrite+0x2cc/0x450)
[{801c4b2c>] (nttywrite+0x2cc/0x450) from [<</pre>
[{801c1a04>] (ttywrite+0x10c/0x2b4) from [<</pre>
[801c1a04>] (ttywrite+0x10c/0x2b4) from [<</pre>
[*801c1a04>] (tywrite+0x10c/0x2b4) from [<</pre>
[*8001c1a04>] (tywrite+0x10c/0x2b4) from [<</pre>
 [<800bf350>] (vfswrite+0xbo/0x194) from [<800bf84>] (SySwrite+0x3c/0x78) [<800bf84>] (retfastsyscall+0x0/0x30) Code: bad PC value
 ---[end trace 7b9adcd427e025ea ]---
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt***
```

```
Timeline
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```
2021-01-22 - Vendor Disclosure
2021-04-06 - 75+ day follow up
2021-04-20 - Talos granted timeline extension for disclosure
2021-05-20 - Vendor Patched
2021-05-24 - Public Release
```

Discovered	bv Carl	Hurd and	Kelly L	euschner	of Cisco	Talos

VULNERABILITY REPORTS

PREVIOUS REPORT

NEXT REPORT

TALOS-2020-1142

TALOS-2021-1231