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CVE-2020-10262

[Discoverer]

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[Description]

An issue was discovered on XIAOMI XIAOAI speaker Pro LX06 1.58.10. Attackers can activate the failsafe mode during the boot process, and use the mi_console command cascaded by the SN code shown on the product to get the root shell password, and then the attacker can (i) read Wi-Fi SSID or password, (ii) read the dialogue text files between users and XIAOMI XIAOAI speaker Pro LX06, (iii) use Text-To-Speech tools pretend XIAOMI speakers' voice achieve social engineering attacks, (iv) eavesdrop on users and record what XIAOMI XIAOAI speaker Pro LX06 hears, (v) modify system files, (vi) use commands to send any IR code through IR emitter on XIAOMI XIAOAI Speaker Pro (LX06), (vii) stop voice assistant service, (viii) enable the XIAOMI XIAOAI Speaker Pro's SSH or TELNET service as a backdoor, (IX) tamper with the router configuration of the router in the local area networks.

[Attack Type]

Physical

[Product]

XIAOMI XIAOAI speaker Pro (LX06)

[Version]

1.58.10

XIAOMI XIAOAI speaker Pro devices vulnerability

demonstration

A ttackers can activate the failsafe mode during the boot process, and use the mi_console command cascaded by the SN code shown on the pro duct to get the root shell password.



Fig.1 The SN code shown on the XIAOMI XIAOAI speaker Pro

Fig.2 Get root shell password in the failsafe mode

```
[ 15.67913381] wlan: wlan0 START SCAN
[ 17.8063886] wlan: Connected to basid 78:XX:XX:a5:d8 successfully
[ 22.49917882] pdm_dolk1 is: 0
[ 22.499781681] invalid fred_arc
[ 23.6982180] pdm_dolk1 is: 0
[ 23.70024081] invalid fred_arc
mico login: root
[ 23.70024081] invalid fred_arc
mi
```

Fig.3 Login root shell

Impact demonstration from XIAOMI XIAOAI speaker Pro devices vulnerability

1. Read Wi-Fi SSID or password displayed in cleartext

```
root@mico:~
root@mico:~# cat /data/wifi/wpa_supplicant.conf
ctrl_interface=/var/run/wpa_supplicant
ap_scan=1

network={
    ssid="AP_MI_AI"
    psk="2010x105"
    scan_ssid=1
    key_mgmt=WPA-PSK
}
root@mico:~#
```

Fig.4 Show the WIFI SSID and password

2. Read the dialogue text files between users and XIAOMI XIAOAI speaker Pro

```
coordmicon:-# cat /smp/sipns/sibrain/sibrain_sat.log
("mekai":typs="ressult_sat;" ressult_sat;" respectable(")
("mekai":typs="ressult_sat;" ressult_sat;" respectable(")
("mekaine":typs="ressult_sat;" respectable(")
("actione":0,1 final*ity="ressult_sat;" ressult_sat;" respectable(")
("actione":0,1 final*ity="ressult_sat;" ressult_sat;" ressult_sat;" ressult_sat;" ressult_sat;" ressult_sat;" ressult_sat;" ressult_sat;
("actione":0,1 final*ity="ressult_sat;" ressult_sat;" ressult_sat;" ressult_sat;
("actione":0,1 final*ity="ressult_sat;" ressult_sat;" ressult_sat;
("actione":0,1 final*ity="ressult_sat;" ressult_sat;" ressult_sat;
("actione":0,1 final*ity="ressult_sat;" ressult_sat;
("actione":0
```

Fig.5 Part of the texts transferred from conversations between the user and XIAOMI XIAOAI speaker Pro

3. Use Text-To-Speech tools pretend XIAOMI XIAOAI speaker Pro' voice achieve social engineering attacks

4. Eavesdrop on users and record what XIAOMI XIAOAI speaker Pro hears

Fig.6 Recording the conversations and show the produced wave files

5. Stop voice assistant service

```
root@mico:~#
root@mico:~#
root@mico:~#
root@mico:~#
root@mico:~#
root@mico:~#
```

Fig.7 The command to shut down voice assistant of XIAOMI speaker

6. Enable the XIAOMI XIAOAI speaker Pro's SSH service as a backdoor




Fig.8 The command to use a RSA format SSH private key

Fig.9 The command to remotely login SSH

7. Enable the XIAOMI XIAOAI speaker Pro's Telnet service as a backdoor




Fig.11 The command to remotely login Telnet

8.Use command to send any IR code through IR emitter on XIAOMI XIAOAI Speaker Pro



Fig.12 The IR emitter on XIAOMI XIAOAI Speaker Pro

Fig.13 The command to send any IR code

9. Data tampering with the configuration of the router in local area network




Fig.14 The router configuration before data tampering




Fig.15 The command for data tampering with the router configuration



Fig.16 The router configuration after data tampering