Talos Vulnerability Report

TALOS-2021-1374

Accusoft ImageGear TIFF parser heap-based buffer overflow vulnerabilities

FEBRUARY 23, 2022

CVE NUMBER

CVE-2021-21945,CVE-2021-21944

Summary

Two heap-based buffer overflow vulnerabilities exist in the TIFF parser functionality of Accusoft ImageGear 19.10. A specially-crafted file can lead to a heap buffer overflow. An attacker can provide a malicious file to trigger these vulnerabilities.

Tested Versions

Accusoft ImageGear 19.10

Product URLs

ImageGear - https://www.accusoft.com/products/imagegear-collection/

CVSSv3 Score

9.8 - CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

CWE

CWE-122 - Heap-based Buffer Overflow

Details

The ImageGear library is a document-imaging developer toolkit that offers image conversion, creation, editing, annotation and more. It supports more than 100 formats such as DICOM, PDF, Microsoft Office and others.

When a TIFF file, with specific tag requirements, is loaded, its data are parsed by the FUN_10074d50 function.

The essential tags required to reach this "parser":

- The value of the SamplesPerPixel tag, greater than 2
- The value of the BitsPerSample tag should be θxc (we will focus on this, but different values are parsed by the same function)
- The value of the PlanarConfiguration tag should be 2
- The presence of either TileOffsets or StripOffsets tag with N greater than 1

The funtion FUN_10074d50:

In this function the src_buff, which represents a "row" of data, is copied into the dest_buff. This function implements the data parsing for the supported BitsPerSample values. When BitsPerSample is 0xc the copy of the data is performed in a loop iterated SamplesPerPixel times. For every two iterations, there is a writing pattern where for each 3 bytes read from src_buff, there are 4 written into dest_buff. That loop is then iterated ImageWidth times.

The idea is that 16 bits (i.e., 2 bytes) of dest_buff are filled with 12 bits of src_buff. At [2] the first 12 bits of the source are manipulated, and the remaining 12, in order to complete 3 bytes read, are manipulated at [1]. It is important to note that the access to dest_buff is not sequential, but instead, it is calculated using sample_index as base offset, incremented each iteration by SamplesPerPixel, a value taken from the homonymous TIFF tag.

The call to FUN_10074d50 is originated by the TIFF_parse function, the "main" TIFF parser:

```
dst_buff = (byte *)0x0;
width_buff_size = 0;
 return;
  io_buff = (io_buffer *)
  AF_memm_alloc(param_2,(uint)*(ushort *)&TIFF_tags->ID_TIF_SAMPLES_PER_PIXEL * 0x34);
if (io_buff == (io_buffer *)0x0) {
    AF_err_record_set("...\..\\..\\Common\\Formats\\tifread.c",0x1799,-1000,0,0,0,(LPCHAR)0x0);
    AF_error_check();
return;
  src_buff = (byte **)AF_memm_alloc(param_2,(uint)*(ushort *)&TIFF_tags->ID_TIF_SAMPLES_PER_PIXEL <</pre>
  if (src buff == (bvte **)0x0) {
    sample_per_pixel_index = 0x17a1;
lpExtraText_00 = src_buff;
  else {
    OS_memset(src_buff,0,(uint)*(ushort *)&TIFF_tags->ID_TIF_SAMPLES_PER_PIXEL << 2);
   élse {
LAB_10177d86:
        if_(TIFF_tags->ID_TIF_PLANAR_CONFIG == 1) {
        élse {
          if (TIFF_tags->ID_TIF_PLANAR_CONFIG == 2) {
   if (TIFF_tags->ID_TIF_PHOTO_INTERP == IG_TIF_PHOTO_YCBCR) {
              [...]
            else {
              sample_per_pixel_index = 0;
if (*(short *)&TIFF_tags->ID_TIF_SAMPLES_PER_PIXEL != 0) {
                do {
                  lpExtraText_00[sample_per_pixel_index] =
    (byte *)((int)(ivar1 * (ivar1 >> 0x1f & 7U)) >> 3);
sample_per_pixel_index = (opp_index;
} while (loop_index < (int)(uint)*(ushort *)&TIFF_tags->ID_TIF_SAMPLES_PER_PIXEL);
                                                                                                             [3]
              }
width_buff_size = IO_raster_size_get(param_5);
dst_buff = (byte *)AF_memm_alloc(param_2,width_buff_size);
if (dst_buff == (byte *)a08) {
    AF_err_record_set("..\\.\\.\\.\\.\\Common\\Formats\\tifread.c",0x1843,-1000,0,
                }
            dVar3 = 0:
            uvaid = 0;
sample_size_index = 0;
piVar4 = io_buff;
if (*(short *)&TIFF_tags->ID_TIF_SAMPLES_PER_PIXEL != 0) {
                dVar2 = IOb_init(param_1,param_2,piVar4,(int)lpExtraText_00[sample_size_index] * 5,1
                if (0 < (int)dVar2) {
                  dVar3 = 1;
local_c = 1;
                   break;
                sample_size_index = sample_size_index + 1;
piVar4 = (io_buffer *)&piVar4->size_buffer;
              sample_per_pixel_index = 0;
param_5 = (HIGDIBINFO)0x0;
for (local_18 = 0;
              iVar1 = 0;
                piVar4 = io_buff;
                  perform_some_read_or_write_intofile
                             [6]
                   iVar1 = iVar1 + 1;
piVar4 = (io_buffer *)&piVar4->size_buffer;
                dVar4 = (1001Fet */gpivar4=>512e_00ffet;
dVar3 = local_c;
sample_per_pixel_index = (int)param_5;
} while (iVar1 < (int)(uint)*(ushort *)&TIFF_tags=>ID_TIF_SAMPLES_PER_PIXEL);
              local_28 = 0;
if (0 < (int)TIFF_tags->ID_TIF_ROWS_PER_STRIP) {
                   if ((int)TIFF_tags->ID_TIF_IMAGE_HEIGHT <= sample_per_pixel_index) break;</pre>
                  else {
```

This function is responsible for preparing the src_buff and dest_buff and calling the correct TIFF "sub-parser". At [5], SamplesPerPixel buffers are allocated, each with size calcualted at [3]. These buffers, in this specific scenario, are the same sizes, and each individually will be used as src_buff. The size of a src_buff is:

```
src_size = (((BitsPerSample & 0xffff) * width + 7) >> 3) * 5
```

Eventually, at [6] these buffers are filled.

At [4] the dest_buff is allocated, using as size the return value of the function IO_raster_size_get. The return value of IO_raster_size_get, in this specific case, can be simplified

```
dest_size = (((next_mult_of_8_of_BitsPerSample * SamplesPerPixel * ImageWidth) + 0x1f) >> 3) & 0xfffffffc
```

Where ImageWidth and SamplesPerPixel correspond to the homonymous TIFF tags. Instead, next_mult_of_8_of_BitsPerSample is the next multiple of 8 of BitsPerSample. That is, like the other two, a value directly taken from a TIFF tag.

The TIFF_parse then calls at [7] the FUN_1017c970 function, that essentially calls FUN_10074d50 with each dest_buff and sample_index, the variable used as base offset to access the src_buff that goes from 0 to SamplesPerPixel.

CVE-2021-21944 - TIFF parser - planar format. First 12 bits

A specially-crafted TIFF file can lead to a heap-based buffer overflow in the TIFF image parser, due to a missing boundary check.

Trying to load a malicious TIFF file, we end up in the following situation:

```
(dcc.182c): Access violation - code c0000005 (first chance)
First chance exceptions are reported before any exception handling.
This exception may be expected and handled.
eax=00000036 ebx=00000007 ecx=0bd58e08 edx=00000414 esi=000000fc edi=0bd5eef0
eip=70104f1f esp=0019f588 ebp=0019f5ac iopl=0 nv up ei pl nz na pe nc
cs=0023 ss=002b ds=002b es=002b fs=0053 gs=002b efl=00010206
igCore19d!IG_mpi_page_set+0x8eef:
70104f1f 66891471 mov word ptr [ecx+esi*2],dx ds:002b:0bd59000=????
```

 $This \ access \ violation \ take \ place \ at \ [2] \ in \ the \ FUN_10074d50 \ function, \ when \ trying \ to \ copy \ the \ first \ 12 \ bits \ from \ src_buff \ to \ dest_buff.$

From the allocation of src_buff and dest_buff, in the TIFF_parse, to [2], the program does not check, taking into account the writing pattern used, a possible out-of-bounds access.

For example:

```
sample_index = 0
ImageWidth = 0x24
SamplesPerPixel = 0x7
BitsPerSample = 0xc
```

We will obtain a dest_size of 0x1f8 and src_size of 0x10e.

At the fifth iteration of the outer loop in FUN_10074d50 (i.e., ImageWidth loop iteration 5) and the first of the inner one (i.e., SamplesPerPixel loop iteration 1) the element accessed at that iteration would be:

Because the dest_size is a 16 bits buffer, the element 0xfc is located at offset 0x1f8 and 0x1f9, and because the dest_size is only 0x1f8 bytes long we are accessing that heap buffer out-of-bound.

So based on the specific TIFF tags, the dest_buff could be bigger or smaller than a single src_buff. In either case a heap-base buffer oveflow could occur due to the specific writting pattern and the missing boundary check.

CVE-2021-21945 - TIFF parser - planar format. Second 12 bits

Trying to load a malicious TIFF file, we end up in the following situation:

```
(22a8.1bbc): Access violation - code c0000005 (first chance)
First chance exceptions are reported before any exception handling.
This exception may be expected and handled.
eax=00000006 ebx=00000007 ecx=0bd28fe0 edx=00000141 esi=00000015 edi=0bd48ff0
eip=6f3b4efd esp=0019f588 ebp=0019f5ac iopl=0 nv up ei pl nz na pe nc
cs=0023 ss=002b ds=002b es=002b fs=0053 gs=002b efl=00010206
igCore19d!TG_mpi_page_set+0x8ecd:
6f3b4efd 66891471 mov word ptr [ecx+esi*2],dx ds:002b:0bd2900a=????
```

This access violation takes place at [1] in the FUN 10074d50 function, when trying to copy the second 12 bits from src buff to dest buff.

From the allocation of src_buff and dest_buff, in the TIFF_parse, to [1], the program does not check, taking into account the writing pattern used, a possible out-of-bounds access.

For example with:

```
sample_index = 0
ImageWidth = 0x4
SamplesPerPixel = 0x7
BitsPerSample = 0xc
```

We will obtain a dest_size of 0x38 and src_size of 0x1e

At the first iteration of the outer loop in FUN_10074d50 (i.e., ImageWidth loop iteration 0) and the fourth one of the inner one (i.e., SamplesPerPixel loop iteration 4) the element accessed at that iteration would be:

```
(sample_index + SamplesPerPixel*SamplesPerPixel) * width_iteration +
    sample_index + (sample_per_pixel_iteration * SamplesPerPixel) =
    7 * 4 = 0x1c
```

Because the dest_size is a 16 bits buffer, the element 0x1c is located at offset 0x38 and 0x39 and because the dest_size is only 0x38 bytes long we are accessing that heap buffer out-of-bound.

Timeline

2021-09-10 - Initial contact

2021-09-14 - Vendor acknowledged and created support ticket

2021-09-21 - Vendor closed support ticket and confirmed under review with engineering team

2021-11-30 - 60 day follow up

2021-12-02 - Vendor advised release planned for Q1 2022

2021-12-07 - 30 day disclosure extension granted

2022-01-06 - Final disclosure notification

2022-02-23 - Public disclosure

CREDIT

Discovered by Francesco Benvenuto of Cisco Talos.

ULNERABILITY REPORTS PREVIOUS REPORT NEXT REPORT

TALOS-2021-1373 TALOS-2021-1375

