

Stored XSS on PyPi simple API endpoint

[HackerOne report #856836](#) by vakzz on 2020-04-23, assigned to @dcouture

Summary

The recently released PyPi package feature has a new endpoint at `/api/-version/projects/:id/packages/pypi/simple/*package_name` which exposes an HTML page listing the package versions. The `package_link`'s are generated using the following code:

[package_presenter.rb#L50](#)

```
def package_link(url, required_python, filename)
  "<a href=\"%#{url}%\" data-requires-python=\"%#{required_python}%\">#{filename}</a><br>"
end
```

The only sanitation on `required_python` is that it is less than 50 characters (db constraint), otherwise arbitrary html can be injected.

Steps to reproduce

- Create project
- Create a pypi package with `requires_python=""><script>alert(1)</script>`

```
curl -v "https://token:$TOKEN@gitlab.com/api/v4/projects/18315917/packages/pypi" -F content=@/tmp/lala.txt -F requires_python=2.7 -F version=1 -F name=package_test_1 -F requires_python=""
```

- Visit the simple api endpoint and see the injected code: https://gitlab.com/api/v4/projects/18315917/packages/pypi/simple/package_test_1

```
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
  <head>
    <title>Links for package_test_1</title>
  </head>
  <body>
    <h1>Links for package_test_1</h1>
    <a href="https://gitlab.com/api/v4/projects/18315917/packages/pypi/files/lala.txt#sha256" data-requires-python="">
  </body>
</html>
```

Currently will be blocked by the csp on gitlab.com

Impact

- An attacker could execute arbitrary javascript by sending a user or getting them to click on a url to the simple api endpoint

Examples

- https://gitlab.com/api/v4/projects/18315917/packages/pypi/simple/package_test_1

What is the current bug behavior?

The user supplied fields used by the `package_presenter` are not all sanitized

What is the expected correct behavior?

All of the user supplied fields in `package_presenter` should be sanitized before being turned into html

Output of checks

This bug happens on GitLab.com

Impact

- An attacker could execute arbitrary javascript by sending a user or getting them to click on a url to the simple api endpoint

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Tasks 0

No tasks are currently assigned. Use tasks to break down this issue into smaller parts.

Linked items 1

Relates to

Stored XSS on the Packages page

#217685

13.3 Jul 27, 2020

Activity

- GitLab SecurityBot added [HackerOne](#) [security](#) labels 2 years ago
- GitLab SecurityBot added [priority 3](#) [severity 3](#) scoped labels 2 years ago

GitLab SecurityBot @gitlab-security-bot · 2 years ago

Author

Report

[HackerOne comment](#) by vakzz :
The CSP bypass from <https://hackerone.com/reports/836649#activity-7513032> could be used by breaking up the injection into multiple versions (although it appears to be fixed for newly uploaded files if's files?)

```
curl -v "https://__token__$TOKEN@gitlab.com/api/v4/projects/18315917/packages/pypi" -F content=@/tmp/lala.txt -F  
curl -v "https://__token__$TOKEN@gitlab.com/api/v4/projects/18315917/packages/pypi" -F content=@/tmp/lala.txt -F
```

https://gitlab.com/api/v4/projects/18315917/packages/pypi/simple/package_csp_bypass

Links for package_csp_bypass

gitlab.com/api/v4/projects/18315917/packages/pypi/simple/package_csp_bypass

Links for package_csp_bypass

gitlab.com says
gitlab.com

Attachments

Warning: Attachments received through HackerOne, please exercise caution!

- Screen_Shot_2020-04-23_at_2.48.01_pm.png

Dominic Couture @dcouture · 2 years ago

Developer

[@jhampton](#) [@trizzi](#) An XSS was reported to us in the new PyPi package listing API.

John Hampton @jhampton · 2 years ago

Thank you for the ping @dcouture.

Tim Rizzi @timrzz · 2 years ago
Added to the [5132](#) milestone which will hit our due date of July 23.

Please [register](#) or [sign in](#) to reply

- Dominic Couture added group package , [devops package](#) scoped labels 2 years ago
- GitLab SecurityBot changed due date to Jul 23, 2020 2 years ago
- GitLab Bot mentioned in issue #215804 (closed) 2 years ago
- Tim Rizzi changed milestone to %13.2 2 years ago
- GitLab Bot added Accepting merge requests label 2 years ago
- GitLab Bot mentioned in issue #216398 (closed) 2 years ago
- GitLab Bot mentioned in issue #217258 (closed) 2 years ago
- GitLab Bot mentioned in issue #218177 (closed) 2 years ago
- GitLab Bot mentioned in issue #218919 (closed) 2 years ago
- Giorgenes Gelatti changed weight to 2 2 years ago
- Giorgenes Gelatti assigned to @qoelatt 2 years ago

Giorgenes Gelatti @qoelatt · 2 years ago Contributor

Async Issue Update

Status

- Complete: 50%
- Confidence: 50%

Notes

I've investigated a solution and I'm working on figuring out the exact format of the field for validation.

- Giorgenes Gelatti added workflow in dev scoped label 2 years ago
- GitLab Bot removed Accepting merge requests label 2 years ago

Giorgenes Gelatti @qoelatt · 2 years ago Contributor

Async Issue Update

Status

- Complete: 90%
- Confidence: 90%

Notes

I've pushed a fix MR.

Merge Requests

https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/security/gitlab/-/merge_requests/555 - 100% done, 90% confident, in review

- Giorgenes Gelatti added workflow in review scoped label and automatically removed workflow in dev label 2 years ago
- GitLab Bot mentioned in issue #219673 (closed) 2 years ago
- Tim Rizzi mentioned in issue #217685 (closed) 2 years ago
- Tim Rizzi marked #217685 (closed) as a duplicate of this issue 2 years ago
- Tim Rizzi marked this issue as related to #217685 (closed) 2 years ago
- GitLab Bot mentioned in issue #220706 (closed) 2 years ago
- Tim Rizzi mentioned in issue #220240 (closed) 2 years ago
- GitLab Bot mentioned in issue #222207 (closed) 2 years ago
- GitLab Bot mentioned in issue #223626 (closed) 2 years ago
- GitLab Bot mentioned in issue #225107 (closed) 2 years ago

Costel Maxim @cmamaxim · 2 years ago Developer

Issue fixed in 13.1.2

- Costel Maxim closed 2 years ago

GitLab SecurityBot @gitlab-securitybot · 2 years ago Author Reporter

This [HackerOne](#), [issue](#), was closed 30 days ago and may become public.

Please ensure the following items are true and add a ☒ reaction:

- Issue description and comments do not contain sensitive data belonging to GitLab.
- Issue does not reveal private information of the reporter (i.e session IDs, passwords).

If the issue needs to stay confidential, please add the [non-confidential](#) label.

If you removed confidential data from the issue description before making it public, make sure that the description history entry is deleted.

- Dominic Couture made the issue visible to everyone 2 years ago

GitLab SecurityBot @gitlab-securitybot · 2 years ago Author Reporter

[HackerOne report #B56836](#) was disclosed on 2020-09-09 @ 21:57.

- Bounty awarded: \$3000

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