Incomplete Fix of Uninitialized Memory Use in kcm

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Summary

macOS 11.3 Beta 2 contains an apparent fix for a previously reported bug in kcm ("Uninitialized Memory Use in kcm", Follow-up: 758397982). This fix is unfortunately incomplete due to insufficient checking of a return value, and can still be used to leak uninitialized heap memory.

Tested on the following software version:

ProductName: macOS
ProductVersion: 11.3
BuildVersion: 20E5186d

PoC Details

This PoC works by sending 2 messages to kcm: first a malformed KCM_OP_CRED_LABEL_SET message that causes a heap allocation to be created but not initialized, and then a KCM_OP_CRED_LABEL_GET message that retrieves the still uninitialized contents of the heap allocation.

Repro Steps:

Build and run the PoC by running the following from the heap_leak folder: make

./heap leak

The PoC will print hex dumps of buffers of various sizes leaked from the server. Below you can see a buffer leaked with a pointer in it validated via lldb:

Bug Details

The apparent fix for the previously reported issue was to add a call to krb5_data_zero on the data object, which succeeds in stopping the use of uninitialized stack memory and prevents the crash triggered by the previously submitted PoC. However, when the data object is initialized by calling krb5_ret_data to read data from the request, the return value is still not checked.

By providing a request that specifies a size for the data, but ends abruptly after without a corresponding buffer, the heap buffer allocated will remain uninitialized.

```
static krb5_error_code
kcm_op_cred_label_set(krb5_context context,
              kcm client *client,
              kcm_operation opcode,
              krb5_storage *request,
              krb5_storage *response)
{
    struct kcm_ntlm_cred *c;
    kcmuuid_t uuid;
    krb5_data data;
    char *label = NULL;
    ssize t sret;
    krb5 data zero(&data); <-- Added initialization of data, prevents</pre>
crashing on free
    KCM LOG REQUEST(context, client, opcode);
    sret = krb5_storage_read(request, &uuid, sizeof(uuid));
    if (sret != sizeof(uuid)) {
    krb5_clear_error_message(context);
    return KRB5_CC_IO;
    }
    krb5_ret_stringz(request, &label);
    krb5 ret data(request, &data); <-- Return value not checked,</pre>
failing mid-function results in uninitialized buffer.
}
KRB5_LIB_FUNCTION krb5_error_code KRB5 LIB CALL
krb5 ret data(krb5 storage *sp,
           krb5 data *data)
{
```

```
int ret;
    krb5_ssize_t sret;
    int32 t size;
    ret = krb5 ret int32(sp, &size); <- Read size</pre>
    if(ret)
        return ret;
    ret = size_too_large(sp, size);
    if (ret)
        return ret;
    ret = krb5_data_alloc (data, size); <- Buffer is allocated</pre>
with size, not initialized
    if (ret)
        return ret;
    if (size) {
        sret = sp->fetch(sp, data->data, size); <- This call can</pre>
fail if size is greater than remaining bytes, leaving buffer
uninitialized
        if(sret != size)
            return (sret < 0)? errno : sp->eof_code;
    return 0;
}
```

In the PoC provided, the call to sp->fetch is made to fail, which results in returning from krb5_ret_data without initializing the buffer. Since the return value of krb5_ret_data is not checked, that uninitialized buffer will be used in the function to set a cred label, which can then be returned to the client via the KCM_OP_CRED_LABEL_GET message.

As mentioned in my previous report, this bug should be relatively easy to fix, by adding checks for the return values of krb5 ret stringz and krb5 ret data in the.