

New issue

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A malicious file upload vulnerability exists in File.php of the file management function module. #25

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metaStor opened this issue on Jan 19 · 0 comments

metaStor commented on Jan 19

This is the latest 3.0.2 version of taocms.

Organize and utilize steps in two steps:

Step1:

Audit the source code E:\xxx\taocms-3.0.2\include\Model\File.php, line 96, and find that there may be arbitrary new files vulnerability:

```
📅 File.php 🗙 🤲 Mysqli.php
TAOCMS-3.0.2


admin.php

index.php
                                                                                 echo file_get_contents($this->realpath);
                                                                            }
function create(){
    if(!$_GET['name']){
        Base::showmessage('请填写文件名/文件夹名');
        CET['name'];
 m adminframe.php
  editfile.php
                                                                                 if($_GET['isdir']==1){
    mkdir($file);
  main.php
 menu.php
                                                                                     $str='目录';
■ admin_array.inc
                                                                                      fopen($file,'a');
                                                                                  ,
if(!is_writable($file))Base::showmessage('新建'.$str.'失败');
                                                                                 $info=pathinfo($this->path.$_GET['name']);
Base::showmessage('新建'.$str.'成功','admin.php?action=file&ctrl=lists&path='.$info['dirname']);
 Sqlite.php
                                                                       Article.php
 Category.php Cms.php
 TO Datastore.php
```

Follow up \$this->realpath and find that it comes from \$this->path, and \$this->path can be passed in through the get parameter (where SYS_ROOT is the root directory of the website):

```
File.php - taocms-3.0.2 - Visual Studio Code
💝 File.php X 💝 Mysqli.php
include > Model > 💝 File.php > 😭 File > 🔑 $realpath
       <?php
       class File{
            public $table;
            public $tpl;
            public $path;
            public $realpath;
            function construct($table,$id=0){
                $this->table=$table;
                $this->path=$_REQUEST['path'];
                $this->realpath=SYS_ROOT.$this->path;
                $this->tpl=new Template();
            function sizecount($size){
                if($size > 1073741824) {
  14
                     $size = round($size / 1073741824 * 100) / 100 . ' G';
```


Here you can construct the request package for the new test.php file:




Step2: It is also the E:\xxx\taocms-3.0.2\include\Model\File.php file. It is found in line 77 that there may be an arbitrary file writing vulnerability:

```
File.php - taocms-3.0.2 - Visual Studio Code
♣ File.php X ♣ Mysqli.php
include > Model > ♥ File.php > 😭 File > ♡ save to to the transfer of the path;
                    unlink($path);
                $info=pathinfo($this->path);
                Base::showmessage('刪除成功','admin.php?action=file&ctrl=lists&path='.$info['dirname']);
            function save(){
                $path=$this->path;
                if(!is_writable($this->realpath))Base::showmessage('无保存权限');
                $filedata=get_magic_quotes_gpc()?Base::magic2word($_POST['filedata']):$_POST['filedata'];
              $status=file_put_contents($this->realpath,$filedata);
                if($status){
                    Base::showmessage('保存成功','admin.php?action=file&ctrl=lists');
            function download(){
                $info=pathinfo($this->path);
                header('Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="'.$info['basename'].'"');
                echo file_get_contents($this->realpath);
```

The written content \$_POST['filedata'] and the written target file \$this->realpath (mentioned above) are all controllable, so the data packet is constructed and written to the webshell:





INO OTIE assigned	
Labels	
None yet	
Projects	
None yet	
Milestone	
No milestone	
Development	
No branches or pull requests	
1 participant	