


# ROYALTS SSH TUNNEL – AUTHENTICATION BYPASS [CVE-2020-13872]

Tempo di lettura: 7 minuti

Data pubblicazione: June 8, 2020

## Description


During a recent assessment I had to use the software in question (RoyalTS v4.3.61328 for Windows) to reach some servers via port forwarding. The software uses a “Secure Gateway” to create an authenticated tunnel (created by Royal Server), installed on a bridge server. Once installed, all you have to do is create an SSH connection to the target server and enter the IP address of the bridge server as Secure Gateway.




SSH Settings for the connection with the target host




Settings for the usage of the Secure Gateway



Secure Gateway Settings aka the tunnel settings




#### Credentials used for the tunnel



#### Royal Server Settings installed on the bridge host

The problem is that, once a SSH tunnel is created on the bridge host with a Secure Gateway, this tunnel will listen on the address 0.0.0.0 on the port opened ad hoc by RoyalTS (higher than 50000), leaving the possibility for anyone to exploit the tunnel without having to authenticate to it.

For example, if I want to connect to the Host C, through the Secure Gateway (Host B), RoyalTS would create a tunnel with the Royal Server on the Host B and open the SSH connection with Host C, as in the image below



#### SSH connection opened through the tunnel

But, if we look at the active connections on my host (Host A), we can see that RoyalTS.exe is open on 0.0.0.0 and anyone in my network could exploit the tunnel without authenticating to the Secure Server

```
C:\Users\m>netstat -aon | find /i "59349"
TCP    0.0.0.0:59349          0.0.0.0:0           LISTENING        3088
TCP    127.0.0.1:59349      127.0.0.1:59351     ESTABLISHED      3088
TCP    127.0.0.1:59351     127.0.0.1:59349     ESTABLISHED      3088

C:\Users\m>tasklist /fi "pid eq 3088"

Image Name                PID Session Name        Session#    Mem Usage
=====
RoyalTS.exe                3088 Console                1          352.188 K
```

#### The service is listening on 0.0.0.0

If we look at the settings, we can see that the section "Remote Ports accept Connections from other Hosts" is disabled

Tunnels	
Local Ports accept Connections from other Hosts	No
Remote Ports accept Connections from other Hosts	No

## Impact

An attacker, within the same network as host A, with a simple port scan, can immediately notice that non-standard ports are open. Before tunnel we've got the following situation, where 192.168.25.1 is the IP address of the target host A.

```
kali@kali:~/Documents$ sudo nmap 192.168.25.1 -p50000-60000 --open -sS
[sudo] password for kali:
Starting Nmap 7.80 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2020-05-28 09:27 EDT
Stats: 800042 elapsed; 0 hosts completed (1 up); 1 undergoing SYN Stealth Scan
SYN Stealth Scan Timing: About 14.40% done; ETC: 09:38 (0:02:57 remaining)
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 217.22 seconds
```

All ports are closed

After the creation of the tunnel, we can see the open port.


```
kali@kali:~/Documents$ sudo nmap 192.168.25.1 -p50000-60000 --open -sS
Starting Nmap 7.80 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2020-05-28 09:37 EDT
Nmap scan report for 192.168.25.1
Host is up (0.0004ms latency).
Not shown: 10000 filtered ports
Some closed ports may be reported as filtered due to --defeat-rst-ratelimit
PORT      STATE SERVICE
59349/tcp open  unknown
MAC Address: 00:50:56:C0:00:00 (VMware)

Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 39.02 seconds
kali@kali:~/Documents$ sudo nmap 192.168.25.1 -p59349 -sTV
Starting Nmap 7.80 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2020-05-28 09:39 EDT
Nmap scan report for 192.168.25.1
Host is up (0.0002ms latency).
PORT      STATE SERVICE VERSION
59349/tcp open  ssh      OpenSSH 5.3 (protocol 2.0)
MAC Address: 00:50:56:C0:00:00 (VMware)

Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 13.72 seconds
kali@kali:~/Documents$
```

The port 59349 is now open

Imagine a situation where a developer has a lot of open tunnels, like this



Three opened tunnel, on ports 59349, 59381 and 59384

An attacker could easily find the open ports, where each of which refers to one host:

- 59349 for the first;
- 59381 for the second;
- 59384 for the third;

```
kali@kali:~/Documents$ sudo nmap 192.168.25.1 -p50000-60000 --open -sTV
[sudo] password for kali:
Starting Nmap 7.80 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2020-05-28 09:56 EDT
Nmap scan report for 192.168.25.1
Host is up (0.0001s latency).
Not shown: 9996 filtered ports
Some closed ports may be reported as filtered due to --defeat-rst-ratelimit
PORT      STATE SERVICE VERSION
59349/tcp open  ssh      OpenSSH 5.3 (protocol 2.0)
59381/tcp open  ssh      OpenSSH 5.3 (protocol 2.0)
59384/tcp open  ssh      OpenSSH 5.3 (protocol 2.0)
MAC Address: 00:50:56:C0:00:00 (VMware)
```

Three ssh connections for the three hosts

The attacker could easily bruteforce the ssh login, or, even worse, if the servers aren't patched and, for example, the service RDP is open, he could use some known exploits, like [BlueKeep](#).

Another example could be:

I'm in a library with RoyalTS v4 opened with a tunnel (authenticated) and a connection through telnet (or ssh) with no credentials into host C.

Another person (the attacker), connected into the same network, could see the open port of my pc (with a port scan) and **use that tunnel (with no authentication, because it's established yet) to connect through telnet (or ssh) and gain access to the host A.**

If the host A has authentication, the attacker obviously need to bruteforce it or to exploit it, but the vulnerability is that the tunnel, that is listening on 0.0.0.0, is open to everyone without the authentication.

Also, if I connect to the host C on port 59349 exploiting the vulnerability



## Conclusion

**Risk Score: 8.8**

## Timeline

- 04-Jun-2020 - Reported to vendor
- 04-Jun-2020 - Vendor replied that it's a known bug and it's fixed on the last major version
- 06-Jun-2020 - [CVE-2020-13872](#) assigned
- 08-Jun-2020 - Public disclosure

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