

# SSRF in /service endpoint in jgraph/drawio

0



Valid

Reported on May 20th 2022

## Description

The problem came from [this line](#) of code

I ran `docker-drawio` with following command :

```
docker run -it --rm --name="draw" -e EXPORT_URL=http://somesite.com -p 8080:8080 -p 8443:8443 jgraph/drawio
```

if the drawio `EXPORT_URL` is set to an address without any `/` after the primary Hostname like `http://somesite.com` ( not like `http://somesite.com/something` or `http://somesite.com/` ), then an attacker can send a request to `127.0.0.1:4431` with a payload like `http://draio-instance/service/0/@127.0.0.1:4431`

## Proof of Concept

```
run docker run -it --rm --name="draw" -e EXPORT_URL=http://google.com -p 8080:8080 -p 8443:8443 jgraph/drawio and then docker ps and get the drawio hash name ( called HN)
run docker exec -it HN /bin/bash
run apt update && apt install netcat && netcat -l 4430
go to http://draio-instance:8080/service/0/@127.0.0.1:4431 you can see the http log on netcat had been recorded
```

it is a Full SSRF If you need another POC I can give you an HTTP logger script that returns some things to the attacker



Also, I don't know what exactly is `JSESSIONID` cookie? but I can receive its content in a My public IP after redirect too!

## Impact

The impact is achieved to all internal http webserver's contents if they host a file with a short and enumerable name! Or get cloud metadata, port scanning, and some special cases achieve RCE too!

However, it is an Open-redirect too.

about the CVSS: `Attack Complexity` is high because this vulnerability depends on some

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special configuration for EXPORT\_URL. **Availability** is none **Confidentiality** and **Availability** can be high as it is a full SSRF.  
I think 7.4 is a good score if you don't please tell me to change it, please.

CVE

CVE-2022-1815  
(Published)

Vulnerability Type

CWE-200: Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor

Severity

Medium (5.3)

Registry

Other

Affected Version

\*

Visibility

Public

Status

Fixed

Found by



amammad

@amammad

pro ▼

This report was seen 803 times.

We are processing your report and will contact the **jgraph/drawio** team within 24 hours.  
6 months ago

amammad modified the report 6 months ago

amammad 6 months ago

Hey David, can you ping somethings to me about this report?

Researcher

Chat with us

We have contacted a member of the **jgraph/drawio** team and are waiting to hear back  
6 months ago

**David Benson** 6 months ago

Hey. We're thinking about this one (please also consider it's the weekend and we're not working). I'd say the integrity affect is low, following the guidance on <https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss/v3-calculator>, since it's dependent on a number of server setup factor, the integrity effect is certainly not high in every case, and would be none for certain setups.

**amammad** modified the report 6 months ago

**amammad** modified the report 6 months ago

**amammad** 6 months ago

Researcher

I made a mistake. The attack complexity is not high because, as you say, because of the server setup factor, the integrity should be none, and also attack complexity about how we can exploit the founded vulnerability. Here the exploit is simple. even not need any server for DNS rebinds or redirection URLs.  
So do you agree with **5.3** ?

**David Benson** validated this vulnerability 6 months ago

Yes, I think medium overall is right for this issue. We'll investigate it today.

**amammad** has been awarded the disclosure bounty ✓

The fix bounty is now up for grabs

The researcher's credibility has increased: +7

**amammad** 6 months ago

Researcher

I'm glad to see we're on the same page!

**David Benson** marked this as fixed in **18.1.2** with commit **c287be** 6 months ago

The fix bounty has been dropped ✗

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This vulnerability will not receive a CVE 



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