

Stored XSS on the Error Tracking page

[HackerOne report #859888](#) by [mike12](#) on 2020-04-26, assigned to [@jeremymatos](#):

Hello Gitlab!



Steps to reproduce

1. Set up a Sentry server or **just use this server**: [http://REDACTED](#).
 1. Install Sentry Server, use this [doc](#)
 2. Connect to the Sentry container: `docker exec -it sentry_onpremise_web_1 /bin/bash`
 3. Install Vim: `apt update && apt install vim -y`
 4. Open `stacktrace.py` file: `vim /usr/local/lib/python2.7/site-packages/sentry/interfaces/stacktrace.py`
 5. Replace `"colNo": self.colno`, with `"colNo": ""`, on line 210

```
def get_api_context(self, is_public=False, pad_addr=None, platform=None):
    from sentry.stacktraces.functions import get_function_name_for_frame

    function = get_function_name_for_frame(self, platform)
    data = {
        "filename": self.filename,
        "absPath": self.abs_path,
        "module": self.module,
        "package": self.package,
        "platform": self.platform,
        "instructionAddr": pad_hex_addr(self.instruction_addr, pad_addr),
        "symbolAddr": pad_hex_addr(self.symbol_addr, pad_addr),
        "function": function,
        "rawFunction": self.raw_function,
        "symbol": self.symbol,
        "context": get_context(
            lineno=self.lineno,
            context_line=self.context_line,
            pre_context=self.pre_context,
            post_context=self.post_context,
        ),
        "lineNo": self.lineno,
        "colNo": self.colno,
+        "colNo": "<img src=x onerror=alert(1)>",
        "inApp": self.in_app,
        "trust": self.trust,
        "errors": self.errors,
    }
    if not is_public:
        data["vars"] = self.vars
```

6. Exit from the container
7. Restart the container: `docker restart sentry_onpremise_web_1`
8. Create a new Sentry project, use this [doc](#)
9. Capture an error using Sentry SDK. Use docs: [Initialize Sentry SDK](#) and [Capture Your First Error](#)
10. Generate a Sentry auth token, use this [doc](#)
2. Run Gitlab: `docker run --detach --hostname gitlab.example.com --publish 443:443 --publish 80:80 --publish 22:22 --name gitlab gitlab/gitlab-ce:latest`
3. Create a new Gitlab project
4. Go to **Settings->Operations->Error Tracking** and connect Sentry to the Gitlab project
 1. Check the "Active" checkbox
 2. Sentry API URL: [http://REDACTED:9000](#) (or your Sentry server URL)
 3. Auth Token: REDACTED2 (or your Sentry auth token)
 4. Project: Sentry | javascript (or your Sentry project)
5. Go to **Operations->Error Tracking** and open details for an error.



My GitLab version

```
root@gitlab:/# gitlab-rake gitlab:env:info
```

System Information

```
System:
Current User: git
Using RW: no
Ruby Version: 2.6.5p114
Gem Version: 2.7.10
Bundler Version: 1.17.3
```

```

Gitlab information
Version:      12.10.1
Revision:    e58772bd6d3
Directory:   /opt/gitlab/embedded/service/gitlab-rails
DB Adapter:  PostgreSQL
DB Version:  11.7
             http://gitlab.example.com
HTTP Clone URL:  http://gitlab.example.com/some-group/some-project.git
SSH Clone URL:  git@gitlab.example.com:some-group/some-project.git
Using LDAP:    no
Using Omniauth: yes
Omniauth Providers:

Gitlab Shell
Version:      12.2.0
Repository storage paths:
- default:   /var/opt/gitlab/git-data/repositories
Gitlab Shell path:      /opt/gitlab/embedded/service/gitlab-shell
Git:                    /opt/gitlab/embedded/bin/git

```

An attacker can:


1. Perform any action within the application that a user can perform
2. Steal sensitive user data
3. Steal user's credentials

Warning: Attachments received through HackerOne, please exercise caution!


- [2.png](#)
- [1.png](#)

Edited 2 years ago by Jeremy Matos

 Drag your designs here or [click to upload](#)

Tasks  0


No tasks are currently assigned. Use tasks to break down this issue into smaller parts.

Linked items  0

Link issues together to show that they're related or that one is blocking others. [Learn more.](#)

 GitLab SecurityBot added [HackerOne](#) [security](#) labels [2 years ago](#)

 GitLab SecurityBot added priority: 4 severity: 4 scoped labels 2 years ago

 [@gitlab-security](#) [@gitlab-security](#) 2 years ago
[HackerOne comment](#) by jmatos_bg7vf:
Hello @jmk12,
Thank you for this report. I confirm that a XSS alert can be triggered when visiting Operations/Error Tracking page if sentry contains an error with such content. Yet I am struggling to assess the impact.
Do you have in mind a scenario where

- victim has configured its project with its own sentry instance/project
- attacker is able to push an error with such content in this sentry instance/project

Best regards, GitLab Security Team

[GitHub SecurityBot](#) @[github-security-bot](#) · 2 years ago

[HackerOne comment](#) by [mlke12](#) :

Thank you for your response!

Yes, I have an attack scenario using this vulnerability

1. Create a new GitHub project
2. Connect Sentry to the GitHub project using the instructions above
3. Go to **Settings->Members** and add a victim to the project. In my case, I added **root** user
 1. GitHub member or Email address: root
 2. Choose a role permission: Reporter (or higher)
4. Now we should convince the victim to visit the page with stored XSS. We can simply send a link to the Error Tracking page to the victim.


But, I think we have a better alternative

1. Go to **Operations->Error Tracking**
2. Open the error details and click on the "Create issue" button
3. Assign the created issue to the victim
4. The victim will be notified about the assigned issue
5. The victim opens the assigned issue
6. The XSS fires on the issue page

Warning: Attachments received through HackerOne, please exercise caution!


- [scenario1.png](#)

gitlab SecurityBot added [secure-ctypes-misc](#) [security-triage-assess](#) labels 2 years ago

 **Jeremy Matos** @jeremymatos 2 years ago Contributor

[@sarahwheeler](#) [@ClemMastersApp](#) Confirmed by using the (modified) sentry server of the reporter. Even if this scenario is not easy to exploit, it should be output encoding any data coming from Sentry to avoid XSS (cf https://docs.gitlab.com/ee/development/secure_coding_guidelines.html#xss-guidelines)


Edited by [Jeremy Matos](#) 2 years ago



Clement Ho


@ClemMakesApps · 2 years ago

Yes, we should be sanitizing the data. This is an interesting one by compromising the Sentry data.



@ohoral


 could you help determine if this is [frontend](#) or [backend](#) so that we can set the right labels? I don't remember if we just pass the error data through the API to the frontend or whether the backend can do processing. Thinking out loud, it would probably be a good idea to sanitize on both frontend and backend if available



Sarah Waldner

@sarahwaldner · 2 years ago

Thanks [@jeremymatos](#), I will let [@ClemMakesApps](#) and [@crystalpool](#) help determine when we should work on this.




Olena Horal-Koretska

@ohoral · 2 years ago

I think the primary security issue here is that hacker gets access to Sentry server code and can update it. This should be addressed first. If it still happens, that Sentry instance is hacked, any field should be sanitized. As far as I know, BE doesn't do any processing of data coming from Sentry (besides stack trace code). [@seanarnold](#) could you confirm this, please?

Also, it makes me think that any 3rd party we integrate with can be compromised 🙄

I'll still have to discuss it more with BE engineers to decide which side should take care.




Sean Arnold

@seanarnold · 2 years ago

It looks like the data is escaped when returned from the API:

```
{ "error": { "Issue_Id": "474088", "date_received": "2020-05-03T07:40:04.274Z", "stack_trace_entries": [ { "function":
```

I tried adding that to a few other fields (title, file path) & I didn't get an XSS with the alert showing. Maybe there is something different with how the [sanitize](#) is handling & rendering the `colNo` vs other data into the page?




Clement Ho

@ClemMakesApps · 2 years ago

@ohoral

 could you help investigate what level of effort is needed here so that we can determine when to schedule this work?



Peter Leitzner

@splattaei · 2 years ago


@seanarnold

I tried adding that to a few other fields (title, file path) & I didn't get an XSS with the alert showing.

Have you tried `11nNo` ? 🙄

Maybe there is something different with how the [sanitize](#) is handling & rendering the `colNo` vs other data into the page?

👉 My first impression was that `errorPositionText()` might be missing some `escape` ing similar what we've done in `errorFnText()` , 👉



Allison Browne

@allison.browne · 2 years ago

It looks like we are interpolating directly into a string of html and then calling v-html on the whole thing which will render user input as html/code even if escaped:

https://oqitab.com/oqitab-/blob/d12e63eb59d24a5fcc821b4de1dae664a9128b16/app/assets/javascripts/error_tracking/components/stacktrace_entry.vue#L70

https://oqitab.com/oqitab-/blob/d12e63eb59d24a5fcc821b4de1dae664a9128b16/app/assets/javascripts/error_tracking/components/stacktrace_entry.vue#L135

Only use v-html on trusted content and never on user-provided content.

- <https://vuejs.org/v2/api/#v-html>


JSFiddles demonstrating:

[with v-html](#)

versus without

[without v-html](#)

Edited by [Allison Browne](#) · 2 years ago




Sean Arnold

@seanarnold · 2 years ago

Confirmed this also happens on `11nNo`. [@splattaei](#)

Great find [@allison.browne](#) - that indeed seems like the issue. Thanks for providing JSFiddles too.



Olena Horal-Koretska


@ohoral · 2 years ago

Great find [@allison.browne](#) - that indeed seems like the issue indeed, good catch

thank you [@seanarnold](#) [@splattaei](#) and [@allison.browne](#) for your help

[@ohoral](#) could you help investigate what level of effort is needed here so that we can determine when to schedule this work?


[@ClemMakesApps](#) this would be a small [security](#) change. But as this is a security issue, we'd have to follow security flow with creating backports to 3 latest releases. The deadline for security fixes for the next security release is May 28th. I'd say we still have some time



Clement Ho

@ClemMakesApps · 2 years ago

Since it's a -P4, there isn't any pressure to push for May 28th due date. I'd be happy to include this into [%13.1](#) planning where we have some more capacity compared to right now (may still end up making the May 28 due date but not committing to it). [@sarahwaldner](#) thoughts on my proposal?




Sarah Waldner

@sarahwaldner · 2 years ago

[@ClemMakesApps](#) Proposal sounds great. I'll add to [%13.1](#).

Please [register](#) or [sign in](#) to reply

- ✓ **Jeremy Matos** added [group](#) [respond](#) [@ehorai](#) [monitor](#) scoped labels [2 years ago](#)
- ✓ **GitLab SecurityBot** removed [security-recuse-missing](#) [security-misuse-appeal](#) labels [2 years ago](#)
- ✗ **Olena Horal-Koretska** assigned to [@ehorai](#) [2 years ago](#)
- ✗ **Sarah Waldiner** changed milestone to [%131](#) [2 years ago](#)
- ✓ **Clement Ho** added [fix](#) label [2 years ago](#)
- ✓ **Olena Horal-Koretska** added [worklog](#) [in dev](#) scoped label [2 years ago](#)



Olena Horak-Koretska @ohorak · 2 years ago

Maintainer

1. Please provide a quick summary of the current status (one sentence)

MR targeting security repo master branch was sent for initial review today

1. When do you predict this feature to be ready for maintainer review

Early next week


2. Are there any opportunities to further break the issue or merge request into smaller pieces (if applicable)? Backport MRs are coming after MR targeting master is approved

/cc @ClemMakesApps

- Olena Horal-Koretska removed `workflow` `in dev` label 2 years ago

 Costel Maxim @cmaxim · 2 years ago Developer

- Costel Maxim closed 2 years ago




GitLab SecurityBot @gitlab-security-bot · 2 years ago

Author

Reporter


This [closed issue](#) was closed 30 days ago and may become public.

Please ensure the following items are true and add a  reaction:

- Issue description and comments do not contain sensitive data belonging to GitLab.
- Issue does not reveal private information of the reporter (i.e. session IDs, passwords).

If the issue needs to stay confidential, please add the [confidential](#) label.


If you removed confidential data from the issue description before making it public, make sure that the description history entry is deleted.


 **Jeremy Matos** @jeremymatos · 2 years ago

Contributor

Making issue public after redacting IP address and auth token

Please [register](#) or [sign in](#) to reply

 **Jeremy Matos** changed the description 2 years ago ·

 **Jeremy Matos** made the issue visible to everyone 2 years ago

Please [register](#) or [sign in](#) to reply