



Sec Bug #77423 **FILTER_VALIDATE_URL accepts URLs with invalid userinfo**
Submitted: 2019-01-07 10:16 UTC Modified: 2021-02-15 10:28 UTC
From: jifan dot jf at alibaba-inc dot com Assigned: [stas \(profile\)](#)
Status: Closed Package: *URL Functions
PHP Version: 5.6.39 OS: linux
Private report: No CVE-ID: [2020-7071](#)

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[2019-01-07 10:16 UTC] jifan dot jf at alibaba-inc dot com

Description:

From manual page: <https://php.net/datetime.formats.time>

Test script:

<?php
 \$a = "http://php.net@aliyun.com/aaa.do";
 \$b = parse_url(\$a);
 var_dump(\$b);
?>

use "str_replace("\\", "/", \$b);" to fix it

Expected result:

for security, we will filter the host before using redirect(\$url) .
we'll test if the host of the url to redirect is in our whitelist(e.g. aliyun.com).
how ever, a attacker will use "<http://php.net@aliyun.com/>" to bypass the filter.

parse_url("<http://php.net@aliyun.com/aaa.do>");
["host"]=> string(10) "aliyun.com"

parse_url("<http://php.net@aliyun.com/aaa.do>");
["host"]=> string(7) "php.net"

then we'll export the url to the webpage as "<a href=<http://php.net@aliyun.com/>>" aaa

then click the button, browser will open the "php.net".

Patches

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Pull Requests

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History

[All](#) [Comments](#) [Changes](#) [Git/SVN commits](#) [Related reports](#)

[2019-03-13 09:53 UTC] [cmb@php.net](#)

Related To: [Bug #77730](#)

[2020-02-13 14:37 UTC] [cmb@php.net](#)

-Status: Open
+Status: Duplicate

[2020-02-13 14:44 UTC] [cmb@php.net](#)

-Status: Duplicate
+Status: Open

[2020-02-13 14:50 UTC] [cmb@php.net](#)

Related To: [Bug #77730](#)

[2020-02-13 16:06 UTC] [cmb@php.net](#)

-Assigned To:
+Assigned To: stas

[2020-02-13 16:06 UTC] [cmb@php.net](#)

Given that the documentation of `parse_url()`[1] states

| This function is not meant to validate the given URL, it only
| breaks it up into the above listed parts. Partial URLs are also
| accepted, `parse_url()` tries its best to parse them correctly.

I don't think this qualifies as security issue. However, given
that `filter_var($a, FILTER_VALIDATE_URL)` returns the URL (instead
of false), I think there is a security issue in `php_url_parse_ex()`.

A possible fix would be recognize the userinfo only if it is valid

according to RFC 3986[2], which could look like
<<https://gist.github.com/cmb69/180b63eea1c5163cb29440421007ba4a>>
(this has been developed against PHP-7.4).

Stas, what do you think about this?

[1] <<https://www.php.net/parse-url>>
[2] <<https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3986#appendix-A>>

[2020-05-11 20:44 UTC] [stas@php.net](#)

-Summary: `parse_url()` will deliver a wrong host to user
+Summary: `FILTER_VALIDATE_URL` accepts URLs with invalid userinfo

[2020-05-11 20:44 UTC] [stas@php.net](#)

I think if userinfo is invalid `FILTER_VALIDATE_URL` definitely should not accept it.

[2020-05-11 20:45 UTC] [stas@php.net](#)

We'd probably need a fix for this from 7.1 up.

[2020-05-11 20:47 UTC] [stas@php.net](#)

Oops, I meant 7.2 of course not 7.1

[2020-05-13 07:46 UTC] [cmb@php.net](#)

Ah, right! Patch for PHP-7.2:
<<https://gist.github.com/cmb69/449e29fa609cf2fd6b617cf5f41638e3>>.

[2021-01-03 01:48 UTC] [stas@php.net](#)

-CVE-ID:
+CVE-ID: 2020-7071

[2021-01-04 09:14 UTC] [stas@php.net](#)

Automatic comment on behalf of cmbecker69@gmx.de
Revision: <http://git.php.net/?p=php-src.git;a=commit;h=2d3d72412a6734e19a38ed10f385227a6238e4a6>
Log: Fix #77423: `parse_url()` will deliver a wrong host to user

[2021-01-04 09:14 UTC] [stas@php.net](#)

-Status: Assigned
+Status: Closed

[2021-01-04 09:15 UTC] [stas@php.net](#)

Automatic comment on behalf of cmbecker69@gmx.de
Revision: <http://git.php.net/?p=php-src.git;a=commit;h=2d3d72412a6734e19a38ed10f385227a6238e4a6>
Log: Fix #77423: `parse_url()` will deliver a wrong host to user

[2021-01-04 09:15 UTC] [stas@php.net](#)

Automatic comment on behalf of cmbecker69@gmx.de
Revision: <http://git.php.net/?p=php-src.git;a=commit;h=2d3d72412a6734e19a38ed10f385227a6238e4a6>
Log: Fix #77423: `parse_url()` will deliver a wrong host to user

[2021-01-04 09:19 UTC] [stas@php.net](#)

Automatic comment on behalf of cmbecker69@gmx.de
Revision: <http://git.php.net/?p=php-src.git;a=commit;h=b132da7f9df39c1774997f21016c522b676a6ab0>
Log: Fix #77423: `parse_url()` will deliver a wrong host to user

[2021-01-04 09:20 UTC] [stas@php.net](#)

Automatic comment on behalf of cmbecker69@gmx.de
Revision: <http://git.php.net/?p=php-src.git;a=commit;h=5174de7cd33c3d4fa591c9c93859ff9989b07e8c>
Log: Fix #77423: `parse_url()` will deliver a wrong host to user

[2021-01-04 09:48 UTC] [stas@php.net](#)

Automatic comment on behalf of cmbecker69@gmx.de
Revision: <http://git.php.net/?p=php-src.git;a=commit;h=2d3d72412a6734e19a38ed10f385227a6238e4a6>
Log: Fix #77423: `parse_url()` will deliver a wrong host to user

[2021-01-04 09:54 UTC] [stas@php.net](#)

Automatic comment on behalf of cmbecker69@gmx.de
Revision: <http://git.php.net/?p=php-src.git;a=commit;h=b132da7f9df39c1774997f21016c522b676a6ab0>
Log: Fix #77423: `parse_url()` will deliver a wrong host to user

[2021-01-04 09:54 UTC] [stas@php.net](#)

Automatic comment on behalf of cmbecker69@gmx.de
Revision: <http://git.php.net/?p=php-src.git;a=commit;h=2d3d72412a6734e19a38ed10f385227a6238e4a6>
Log: Fix #77423: `parse_url()` will deliver a wrong host to user

[2021-01-04 10:49 UTC] [cmb@php.net](#)

Automatic comment on behalf of stas
Revision: <http://git.php.net/?p=php-src.git;a=commit;h=d4f5aed22193106271510efd643ba8f349b7d85f>
Log: Fix #77423: parse_url() will deliver a wrong host to user

[2021-01-05 13:31 UTC] carusogabriel@php.net

Automatic comment on behalf of cmbecker69@gmx.de
Revision: <http://git.php.net/?p=php-src.git;a=commit;h=b7f837381ef642d7fb369bfd0069e7525d4c22ea>
Log: Fix #77423: parse_url() will deliver a wrong host to user

[2021-01-27 07:52 UTC] [gkamathe at redhat dot com](mailto:gkamathe@redhat.com)

Hello,

Have we considered a case where the input has only "@" within the URL instead of "@.". A sample use case is below on latest version of PHP, where the hostname being returned is still incorrect (malicious).

```
$ php -v
PHP 7.4.14 (cli) (built: Jan 5 2021 10:45:06) ( NTS )
Copyright (c) The PHP Group
Zend Engine v3.4.0, Copyright (c) Zend Technologies
    with Zend OPcache v7.4.14, Copyright (c), by Zend Technologies
$
$ rpm -qa | grep -i php-7
php-7.4.14-1.fc33.x86_64
$
$ cat test.php
<?php
    #$a = "http://php.net@aliyun.com/aaa.do";
    $a = "http://php.net@aliyun.com/aaa.do";
    var_dump($a);
    $b = parse_url($a);
    var_dump($b);
?>
$
$ php -f test.php
string(32) "http://php.net@aliyun.com/aaa.do"
array(4) (
    ["scheme"]=>
    string(4) "http"
    ["host"]=>
    string(10) "aliyun.com"    <<<<<<<
    ["user"]=>
    string(7) "php.net"
    ["path"]=>
    string(7) "/aaa.do"
)
$
```

[2021-01-27 08:05 UTC] stas@php.net

The hostname returned in this case is correct. Also, please don't comment on the issues' page about different issues, it makes it very hard to track things.

[2021-02-01 17:25 UTC] [ryan at association dot drupal dot org](mailto:ryan@association.drupal.org)

Was this intended to be merged into the 7.2 branch? I thought that was out of support now?

[2021-02-15 09:29 UTC] [tomasnorre at gmail dot com](mailto:tomasnorre@gmail.com)

It looks like there is a regression regarding this fix.

<https://3v4l.org/hGk0j>

The fix is in: 7.3.26, 7.4.14 and 8.0.1 as wanted, but it's gone again in: 7.3.27, 7.4.15 and 8.0.2

[2021-02-15 10:28 UTC] stas@php.net

The change to parse_url was intentionally reversed. The change in filter_url still there.

[2021-02-15 10:31 UTC] [tomasnorre at gmail dot com](mailto:tomasnorre@gmail.com)

Thanks for the info.