

Talos Vulnerability Report

TALOS-2021-1295

Disc Soft Ltd Daemon Tools Pro ISO Parsing memory corruption vulnerability

AUGUST 17, 2021

CVE NUMBER

CVE-2021-21832

Summary

A memory corruption vulnerability exists in the ISO Parsing functionality of Disc Soft Ltd Daemon Tools Pro 8.3.0.0767. A specially crafted malformed file can lead to an out-of-bounds write. An attacker can provide a malicious file to trigger this vulnerability.

Tested Versions

Disc Soft Ltd Daemon Tools Pro 8.3.0.0767

Product URLs

<https://www.daemon-tools.cc>

CVSSv3 Score

8.1 - CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

CWE

CWE-680 - Integer Overflow to Buffer Overflow

Details

DAEMON Tools Pro is a powerful and professional emulation software to work with disc images and virtual drives. It allows mounting of ISO images on Windows systems.

When parsing a specifically crafted ISO file it is possible to cause a memory corruption. This is due to an integer overflow during a malloc operation:

```
.text:00000000000A25D7      mov     ecx, [rbp+880h+var_8F6]      ; taken from the ISO Directory record (size)
.text:00000000000A25DA      shl     ecx, 4                      ; unsigned __int64      ; integer overflow (32bit reg)
.text:00000000000A25DD      call    j_??2@YAPEAX_K@Z          ; operator new(unsigned __int64)
.text:00000000000A25E2      mov     rdi, rax                   ; possible to allocate with size=0
```

Initial ECX value is taken directly from the ISO file - ISO Directory record (size). Due to SHL operation and 32-bit register size it is possible to cause an integer overflow and for example allocate a memory region with size=0.

This leads to heap memory corruption when the allocated buffer is written to, here:

```
.text:000000000009A9B2  loc_9A9B2:                          ; CODE XREF: bad_function+300;j
.text:000000000009A9B2      movsxd  rdx, r8d
.text:000000000009A9B5      mov     eax, r13d
.text:000000000009A9B8      sub     eax, r8d
.text:000000000009A9BB      add     rdx, rcx                    ; Src
.text:000000000009A9BE      mov     rcx, [rsp+88h+AllocatedMem] ; Dst
.text:000000000009A9C6      movsxd  rbx, eax
.text:000000000009A9C9      mov     r8, rbx                    ; Size
.text:000000000009A9CC      call    memmove                    ;
.text:000000000009A9D1      mov     r9, [rsp+88h+arg_10]
.text:000000000009A9D9      xor     r8d, r8d
```

And this leads to the following crash:

```

40e8.3480): Access violation - code c0000005 (!!! second chance !!!)
Engine!FillWaveHeader-0x13207:
00007ffc8efa25b7 f3a4          rep movs byte ptr [rdi],byte ptr [rsi]
0:000> r
rax=000002626b5e7be0 rbx=0000000000000000 rcx=000000000000003e0
rdi=00000000000d31350 rsi=00000262c319350 rdi=00000262b5e8000
rip=00007ffc8efa25b7 rsp=000000d0fec2fcd8 rbp=00000262c318f20
r8=0000026262cafc08 r9=0000000000000000 r10=00000262c318f30
r11=0000000000000000 r12=0000000000000000 r13=00000000000000800
r14=0000026262c317c00 r15=00000000000000000000000000000005
ioopl=0          nv up ei pl zr na pe cy
cs=0033  ss=002b  ds=002b  es=002b  fs=0053  gs=002b             efl=00010201
Engine!FillWaveHeader-0x13207:
00007ffc8efa25b7 f3a4          rep movs byte ptr [rdi],byte ptr [rsi]
0:000> dd @rdi
000000266 2b5e8010  ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??-?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??????????????????
000000266 2b5e8010  ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??-?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??????????????????
000000266 2b5e8020  ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??-?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??????????????????
000000266 2b5e8030  ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??-?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??????????????????
000000266 2b5e8040  ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??-?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??????????????????
000000266 2b5e8050  ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??-?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??????????????????
000000266 2b5e8060  ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??-?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??????????????????
000000266 2b5e8070  ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??-?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??????????????????

```

```
0:000> !analyze -v
*****
*                                     *
*               Exception Analysis   *
*                                     *
*****

KEY_VALUES_STRING: 1

    Key : AV.Fault
    Value: Write

    Key : Analysis.CPU.mSec
    Value: 86952

    Key : Analysis.DebugAnalysisManager
    Value: Create

    Key : Analysis.Elapsed.mSec
    Value: 117195

    Key : Analysis.Init.CPU.mSec
    Value: 7015

    Key : Analysis.Init.Elapsed.mSec
    Value: 415009

    Key : Analysis.Memory.CommitPeak.Mb
    Value: 514

    Key : Timeline.OS.Boot.DeltaSec
    Value: 448861

    Key : Timeline.Process.Start.DeltaSec
    Value: 423

    Key : WER.OS.Branch
    Value: vb_release

    Key : WER.OS.Timestamp
    Value: 2019-12-06T14:06:00Z

    Key : WER.OS.Version
    Value: 10.0.19041.1

    Key : WER.Process.Version
    Value: 8.3.0.767

NTGLOBALFLAG: 0

PROCESS_BAM_CURRENT_THROTTLED: 0

PROCESS_BAM_PREVIOUS_THROTTLED: 0

APPLICATION_VERIFIER_FLAGS: 0

EXCEPTION_RECORD: (.exr -1)
ExceptionAddress: 00007ffc8efa25b7 (Engine!FillWaveHeader+0x000000000013207)
ExceptionCode: c0000005 (Access violation)
ExceptionFlags: 00000000
NumberParameters: 2
    Parameter[0]: 0000000000000001
    Parameter[1]: 000002662b5e8000
Attempt to write to address 000002662b5e8000

FAULTING_THREAD: 00003400

PROCESS_NAME: DTPPro.exe

WRITE_ADDRESS: 000002662b5e8000

ERROR_CODE: (NTSTATUS) 0xc0000005 - The instruction at 0x%p referenced memory at 0x%p. The memory could not be %s.

EXCEPTION_CODE_STR: c0000005

EXCEPTION_PARAMETER1: 0000000000000001

EXCEPTION_PARAMETER2: 000002662b5e8000

STACK_TEXT:
000000df`0e2fcad8 00007ffc`8eece9d1 : 000000df`0e2fd9c0 00000000`00000000 00000266`31ac6740
00000266`31b46e80 : Engine!FillWaveHeader+0x13207
000000df`0e2fcae0 00007ffc`8eed2634 : 00000000`00000002 00000000`00008000 00000000`00007000
00000266`2b5e7be0 : Engine!0x8a9d1
000000df`0e2fcb70 00007ffc`8eece788 : 00000000`ffffffff 000000df`0e2fd600 00000000`ffffffff
00000266`2c33d80c : Engine!0x92634
000000df`0e2fd500 00007ffc`8eece848 : 00000000`00000000 00007ffc`8eed0000 00000266`2c4f0801
00007ffc`e3093433 : Engine!0x8e788
000000df`0e2fd930 00007ffc`8ee9a0a5 : 000000df`0e2fda00 00000266`2c33c4d0 00000266`31bc92c8
00000266`2c33c4d0 : Engine!0x8e848
000000df`0e2fd9c0 00007ffc`8ee9e187 : 00000266`31b26128 00000000`00000000 00000266`31a99d28
00000266`2c4f0bd8 : Engine!0x5a0a5
000000df`0e2fda80 00007ffc`8ee6e2b3 : 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000266`31bc6940
000000df`0e2fdb98 : Engine!0x5e187
000000df`0e2fdb00 00007ffc`8ee45e0e : 00000266`2b5e6c90 00000266`2b5e6c90 ffffffff`ffffffff
00000000`00000000 : Engine!0x2e2b3
000000df`0e2fdb10 00007ffc`a4f473dc : 000000df`0e2fe270 00007ffc`a5522900 00007ffc`8f014a38
000000df`0e2fe1a8 : DTPPro!0x35e0e
000000df`0e2fe150 00007ffc`a4f44254 : 00000266`2955f738 00000266`2955f620 00000000`00000000
00000000`00000000 : DTPPro!0x373dc
000000df`0e2fecd0 00007ffc`a4f4c22b : 00000266`2955f620 00000000`00000187 00000000`00000000
00007ffc`a4fecdbd : DTPPro!0x34254
000000df`0e2fed10 00007ffc`a4f58ad6 : 00000266`2955f620 00000000`00000000 00007ffc`a560ffd8
00007ffc`a4ff0e07 : DTPPro!0x3c22b
000000df`0e2fed50 00007ffc`a4f1a07c : 00000000`00000000 00000266`2955f530 00000000`00000187
00000000`00000000 : DTPPro!0x48ad6
000000df`0e2fed90 00007ffc`a4f60492 : 00007ffc`a4f60460 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000187
00000000`00000000 : DTPPro!0xa07c
000000df`0e2fedd0 00007ffc`a4fc940c : 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000187
00000266`2c3129e0 : DTPPro!0x50492
```

000000df`0e2fee60 0000fff7`a4fe695a	: 00000266`2955f350 00000000`00000187 00000000`00000187
00000000`00000000 : DTPro+0xb940c	
000000df`0e2fee60 0000fff7`a4fca6f7	: 00007ff7`a4fe68cc 000000df`0e2ff020 00000000`00000111
00000000`00000000 : DTPro+0xd695a	
000000df`0e2fef20 0000fff7`a4fccad6	: 00007ff7`a4fca688 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000187
00000266`2955f350 : DTPro+0xba6f7	
000000df`0e2ff0b0 0000fff7`a4fc5da1	: 00000000`00000000 00007ff7`a4fcc8a8 00000000`00000187
00007ff7`a560ffb0 : DTPro+0xbcad6	
000000df`0e2ff100 0000fff7`a4fc6898	: 00000266`2948a130 00007ff7`a4fd62d8 00000000`04bc07bc
00000000`ffffff00 : DTPro+0xb5da1	
000000df`0e2ff1d0 0000ffc`e31ce858	: 00000000`00000001 00000000`00000187 00000000`00000000
00000000`00000000 : DTPro+0xb6898	
000000df`0e2ff210 0000fff7`e31ce4ee	: ffffffff`fffffffe 00007ff7`a4fc6844 00000000`04bc07bc
000000df`00000111 : USER32!UserCallWinProcCheckWow+0x2f8	
000000df`0e2ff3a0 0000fff7`a51ea323	: 00000266`29577650 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000
00007ff7`a4fc4cf4 : USER32!CallWindowProcW+0x8e	
000000df`0e2ff3f0 0000fff7`a51eb68a	: 00000266`2c3129e0 00000266`29496a78 000000df`0e2ff4f0
00000266`549fca11 : DTPro+0x2da323	
000000df`0e2ff470 0000ffc`e31ce858	: 00000266`29577650 00000000`00000001 00000000`00000187
00000000`00000000 : DTPro+0x2db68a	
000000df`0e2ffa00 0000ffc`e31ce299	: 00000266`29496a38 00007ff7`a51eb5f0 00000000`04bc07bc
00007ff7`00000111 : USER32!UserCallWinProcCheckWow+0x2f8	
000000df`0e2ff670 0000fff7`a4fd6732	: 00007ff7`a51eb5f0 00000266`29496a38 00000000`00000000
00007ff7`a561bf00 : USER32!DispatchMessageWorker+0x249	
000000df`0e2ff6f0 0000fff7`a4fd708f	: 00007ff7`a4fd7004 00000000`00000002 00000000`00000000
0000a52e`ae736e87 : DTPro+0xc6732	
000000df`0e2ff720 0000fff7`a540d88a	: 00007ff7`a4fdd0e4 00007ff7`a4f10000 00000000`00000000
00000266`294823d4 : DTPro+0xc708f	
000000df`0e2ff7f0 0000fff7`a517b923	: 00000000`00000001 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000
00000000`00000000 : DTPro+0x4fd88a	
000000df`0e2ff7b0 0000ffc`e4347034	: 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000
00000000`00000000 : DTPro+0x26b923	
000000df`0e2ff7f0 0000ffc`e5082651	: 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000
00000000`00000000 : KERNEL32!BaseThreadInitThunk+0x14	
000000df`0e2ff820 00000000`00000000	: 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000
00000000`00000000 : ntdll!RtlUserThreadStart+0x21	
STACK_COMMAND: ~0s ; .cxr ; kb	
SYMBOL_NAME: Engine!FillWaveHeader+13207	
MODULE_NAME: Engine	
IMAGE_NAME: Engine.dll	
FAILURE_BUCKET_ID: INVALID_POINTER_WRITE_STRING_DEREFERENCE_c0000005_Engine.dll!FillWaveHeader	
OS_VERSION: 10.0.19041.1	
BUILDLAB_STR: vb_release	
OSPLATFORM_TYPE: x64	
OSNAME: Windows 10	
IMAGE_VERSION: 8.3.0.767	
FAILURE_ID_HASH: {00d4a20e-1ec2-1efc-2848-4383153988d0}	
Followup: MachineOwner	

Timeline

2021-05-21 - Vendor Disclosure

2021-07-23 - Vendor Patched

2021-08-17 - Public Release

CREDIT

Discovered by Piotr Bania of Cisco Talos.

VULNERABILITY REPORTS

PREVIOUS REPORT

NEXT REPORT

TALOS-2021-1297

TALOS-2021-1346

