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Date: Wed, 19 Feb 2020 09:03:04 +0100
From: Hanno Böck <hanno@hboeck.de>
To: oss-security@lists.openwall.com
Subject: Wordpress themegrill-demo-importer: database reset/auth bypass, incomplete fix due to CSRF

A severe vulnerability in a wordpress plugin called ThemeGrill Demo Importer was discovered by the company WebARX:
<https://www.webarxsecurity.com/critical-issue-in-themegrill-demo-importer/>

The vulnerability is as follows:
The plugin adds a hook to wordpress that can be reached with the ajax-interface (admin-ajax.php) and that has a functionality to reset the wordpress database which will be triggered if the GET variable do_reset_wordpress is set.

The problem: This had no authentication whatsoever.

PoC:
curl https://example.org/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php?do_reset_wordpress01 --data 'action=heartbeat' -i

This can obviously delete all existing posts and other data. If there exists a user called "admin" (i.e. the name of the user is admin, not just a user with an admin role) then after triggering that function the attacking user will be logged in as the admin, so in that case he can use that to e.g. install a plugin and gain code execution. For further details read the WebARX post.

This is already being actively exploited, I observed several vulnerable installations that were empty yesterday (i.e. only showing the standard "Hello World" post of a new wordpress installation).

Incomplete Fix / CSRF
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As a fix for this the developers of the plugin added a check if one is logged in as a user with sufficient permission in version 1.6.2. This is not a full fix, because there is no protection from Cross Site Request Forgery. This means the functionality can no longer be triggered by an unauthenticated user, but one can lure the admin of an affected site to a site triggering a POST request executing that function.

PoC code:
<form id="f1"
action="https://example.org/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php?do_reset_wordpress=1"
method="POST"> <input type="hidden" name="action" value="heartbeat">
</form>
<script>
document.getElementById("f1").submit();
</script>

I had reported this to the developers of the plugin on Monday, but given that this is almost entirely obvious looking at the fix I was likely not the only one who has noticed. WebARX also told me they noticed this and had already told Themegrill about it.

There's now an update 1.6.3 that adds a nonce check. I have not reviewed that change in detail. Patches:
<https://github.com/themegrill/themegrill-demo-importer/commit/b350a29628fb40522468a576e98e45abbc4de0c7>
<https://github.com/themegrill/themegrill-demo-importer/commit/564d8496d1f0d10f6aab4798ecec7ddefc81bdd2>

From the functionality this plugin provides I believe it's only useful during development and testing of themes. Therefore even if the vulnerability is now hopefully fixed it is probably a good idea to remove it from production installations when it's no longer needed.

Summary on affected versions:
1.3.4 to 1.6.1: vulnerable to original/severe variant
1.6.2: Insufficient fix, attack with CSRF possible
1.6.3: hopefully fixed

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