

☆ Starred by 3 users

Owner:

deadbeef@chromium.org  
Last visit > 30 days ago

CC:

boi...@webRTC.org  
janag...@google.com  
huib@webRTC.org  
orphis@chromium.org  
blum@chromium.org  
metzman@chromium.org  
terelius@chromium.org  
mea...@chromium.org

Status:

Fixed (Closed)

Components:

Blink>WebRTC

Modified:

Sep 15, 2021

Backlog-Rank:

----

Editors:

----

EstimatedDays:

----

NextAction:

----

OS:

Linux, Android, Windows, Chrome, Mac, Fuchsia

Pri:

1

Type:

Bug-Security

Hotlist-Merge-Review

Security\_Impact-Stable

Deadline-Exceeded

Security\_Severity-High

reward-7500

allpublic

reward-inprocess

CVE\_description-submitted

Target-90

merge-merged-4240

M-91

LTR-Merged-86

LTS-Security-86

Target-91

external\_security\_report

merge-merged-4430

merge-merged-90

merge-merged-4472

merge-merged-91

LTS-Merged-90

Issue 1187797: Security: UAF in usrsctp on sctp\_association->str\_reset

Reported by korni...@gmail.com on Fri, Mar 12, 2021, 11:46 PM EST

Code

VULNERABILITY DETAILS

sctp\_input.c:2097

During sctp peer restart asoc->control\_send\_queue is cleared and all control chunks are freed, however str\_reset is not set to NULL. This leads to UAF in 'sctp\_strreset\_timer' (probably harmless) and 'sctp\_handle\_stream\_reset\_response' (may lead to double free)

VERSION

Chrome Version: Tested on windows x64 asan build of 91.0.4441.0

Operating System: windows 10, macos, does not matter

REPRODUCTION CASE

To trigger the bug:

1. establish sctp connection

2. close a data channel -> will allocate stream\_reset

3. do a sctp reconnect (RFC 4960 case A in Section 5.2.4 Table 2: XXMM (peer restarted))

4. make sure the 'control\_send\_queue' is not empty(poc does this by sending a packet of bundled 'heartbeat' and broken(wrong size) 'init' chunks, this populates 'control\_send\_queue' with 'heartbeat ack' and breaks out of loop cause of broken 'init' chunk)

5. next time sctp\_find\_stream\_reset is called it may return a dangling pointer.

I've attached a poc.

FOR CRASHES, PLEASE INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Type of crash: renderer

Crash State:

=====

==9672==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free on address 0x1212af9904c0 at pc 0x7ffac8087eec bp 0x004217fff710 sp 0x004217fff758

READ of size 8 at 0x1212af9904c0 thread T20

#0 0x7ffac8087eeb in sctp\_find\_stream\_reset C:\b\sw\ir\cache\builder\src\third\_party\usrsctp\usrsctplib\netinet\sctp\_input.c:3859:11

#1 0x7ffac828070c in sctp\_streset\_timer C:\b\sw\ir\cache\builder\src\third\_party\usrsctp\usrsctplib\netinet\sctp\_timer.c:1141:8

#2 0x7ffac8070dc9 in sctp\_timeout\_handler C:\b\sw\ir\cache\builder\src\third\_party\usrsctp\usrsctplib\netinet\sctputil.c:2091:7

#3 0x7ffac80aaea3 in sctp\_handle\_tick C:\b\sw\ir\cache\builder\src\third\_party\usrsctp\usrsctplib\netinet\sctp\_callout.c:172:4

#4 0x7ffac80aaf9 in user\_sctp\_timer\_iterate C:\b\sw\ir\cache\builder\src\third\_party\usrsctp\usrsctplib\netinet\sctp\_callout.c:214:3

#5 0x7ffac826801f in sctp\_create\_thread\_adapter C:\b\sw\ir\cache\builder\src\third\_party\usrsctp\usrsctplib\netinet\sctp\_userspace.c:58:9

#6 0x7ff76765e2b7 in \_\_asan::AsanThread::ThreadStart(unsigned \_\_int64) C:\b\sw\ir\cache\builder\src\third\_party\llvm\compiler-rt\lib\asan\asan\_thread.cpp:279

#7 0x7fb48967033 (C:\Windows\System32\KERNEL32.DLL+0x180017033)

#8 0x7fb4a7bd240 (C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\ntdll.dll+0x18004d240)

0x1212af9904c0 is located 64 bytes inside of 128-byte region [0x1212af990480,0x1212af990500)

freed by thread T17 here:

#0 0x7ff76765441b in free C:\b\sw\ir\cache\builder\src\third\_party\llvm\compiler-rt\lib\asan\asan\_malloc\_win.cpp:82

#1 0x7ffac80a55c1 in sctp\_process\_cookie\_existing C:\b\sw\ir\cache\builder\src\third\_party\usrsctp\usrsctplib\netinet\sctp\_input.c:2106:4

#2 0x7ffac809955f in sctp\_handle\_cookie\_echo C:\b\sw\ir\cache\builder\src\third\_party\usrsctp\usrsctplib\netinet\sctp\_input.c:2957:11

#3 0x7ffac808e127 in sctp\_process\_control C:\b\sw\ir\cache\builder\src\third\_party\usrsrc\usrsrc\plib\netinet\sctp\_input.c:5457  
#4 0x7ffac808e127 in sctp\_common\_input\_processing C:\b\sw\ir\cache\builder\src\third\_party\usrsrc\usrsrc\plib\netinet\sctp\_input.c:5991:10  
#5 0x7ffac7bdc679 in usrsrc\_conninput C:\b\sw\ir\cache\builder\src\third\_party\usrsrc\usrsrc\plib\user\_socket.c:3342:2  
#6 0x7ffac7110574 in cricket::SctpTransport::OnPacketRead(class rtc::PacketTransportInternal \*, char const \*, unsigned \_\_int64, \_\_int64 const &, int)  
C:\b\sw\ir\cache\builder\src\third\_party\webrtc\media\sctp\sctp\_transport.cc:1145:5

## CREDIT INFORMATION

Reporter credit: Tolyan Korniltsev

Found with fuzzing. I wonder if I could contribute my fuzzer as part of 'Chrome Fuzzer Program' ?

**python\_poc2.zip**  
251 KB [Download](#)

**Comment 1** by [sheriffbot](#) on Fri, Mar 12, 2021, 11:49 PM EST Project Member

**Labels:** external\_security\_report

**Comment 2** by [mea...@chromium.org](#) on Sun, Mar 14, 2021, 6:19 PM EDT Project Member

**Status:** Assigned (was: Unconfirmed)

**Owner:** deadbeef@chromium.org

**Cc:** metzman@chromium.org

**Labels:** Security\_Severity-High Security\_Impact-Head OS-Android OS-Chrome OS-Fuchsia OS-Linux OS-Mac OS-Windows Pri-1

**Components:** Blink>WebRTC

Thanks for the report. Are you able to produce this in the latest stable version? (M89)

+deadbeef: Could you PTAL?

+metzman for the Chrome Fuzzer Program question.

**Comment 3** by [korni...@gmail.com](#) on Mon, Mar 15, 2021, 4:10 AM EDT

> Are you able to produce this in the latest stable version? (M89)

Yes on 89.0.4389.90

...

(2798.4578): Access violation - code c0000005 (first chance)

First chance exceptions are reported before any exception handling.

This exception may be expected and handled.

chrome\_7fff2b6e0000\sctp\_reset\_out\_streams+0x2a:

00007fff3340800a 0fb70c6e movzx ecx,word ptr [rsi+rbp\*2] ds:00006954'00a75000=????

0:023> k

# Child-SP RetAddr Call Site

00 00000070'4edfcd20 00007fff334076d4 chrome\_7fff2b6e0000\sctp\_reset\_out\_streams+0x2a

[c:\b\sw\ir\cache\builder\src\third\_party\usrsrc\usrsrc\plib\netinet\sctp\_input.c @ 3801]

01 00000070'4edfcd90 00007fff333f7767 chrome\_7fff2b6e0000\sctp\_handle\_stream\_reset\_response+0x794

[c:\b\sw\ir\cache\builder\src\third\_party\usrsrc\usrsrc\plib\netinet\sctp\_input.c @ 3942]

02 (Inline Function) -----'----- chrome\_7fff2b6e0000\sctp\_handle\_stream\_reset+0x441

[c:\b\sw\ir\cache\builder\src\third\_party\usrsrc\usrsrc\plib\netinet\sctp\_input.c @ 4576]

03 00000070'4edfce20 00007fff33316a6e chrome\_7fff2b6e0000\sctp\_process\_control+0xc67

[c:\b\sw\ir\cache\builder\src\third\_party\usrsrc\usrsrc\plib\netinet\sctp\_input.c @ 5671]

04 00000070'4edfd570 00007fff3317b051 chrome\_7fff2b6e0000\sctp\_common\_input\_processing+0x91e

[c:\b\sw\ir\cache\builder\src\third\_party\usrsrc\usrsrc\plib\netinet\sctp\_input.c @ 5998]

05 00000070'4edfd760 00007fff3317ad70 chrome\_7fff2b6e0000\usrsrc\_conninput+0x191

[c:\b\sw\ir\cache\builder\src\third\_party\usrsrc\usrsrc\plib\user\_socket.c @ 3349]

06 00000070'4edfd830 00007fff3331df92 chrome\_7fff2b6e0000\cricket::SctpTransport::OnPacketRead+0x1d0

[c:\b\sw\ir\cache\builder\src\third\_party\webrtc\media\sctp\sctp\_transport.cc @ 1092]

...

**Comment 4** by [terelius@chromium.org](#) on Mon, Mar 15, 2021, 8:35 AM EDT Project Member

**Cc:** terelius@chromium.org blum@chromium.org huib@webrtc.org

**Comment 5** by [sheriffbot](#) on Mon, Mar 15, 2021, 12:52 PM EDT Project Member

**Labels:** M-91 Target-91

Setting milestone and target because of Security\_Impact=Head and high severity.

For more details visit <https://www.chromium.org/issue-tracking/autotriage> - Your friendly Sheriffbot

**Comment 6** by [sheriffbot](#) on Mon, Mar 15, 2021, 1:17 PM EDT Project Member

**Labels:** ReleaseBlock-Stable

This is a serious security regression. If you are not able to fix this quickly, please revert the change that introduced it.

If this doesn't affect a release branch, or has not been properly classified for severity, please update the Security\_Impact or Security\_Severity labels, and remove the ReleaseBlock label. To disable this altogether, apply ReleaseBlock-NA.

For more details visit <https://www.chromium.org/issue-tracking/autotriage> - Your friendly Sheriffbot

**Comment 7** by [deadbeef@chromium.org](#) on Mon, Mar 15, 2021, 5:42 PM EDT Project Member

orphis@: Would you be able to take ownership on this? I'm sending an email to Tuexen.

Updating tags since this is reproducible on stable. It's possible we could get a fix in for M89 security refresh 2 (Mar 30).

**Comment 8** by [terelius@chromium.org](#) on Tue, Mar 23, 2021, 5:29 AM EDT Project Member

**Cc:** orphis@chromium.org

**Comment 9** by [sheriffbot](#) on Tue, Mar 30, 2021, 12:21 PM EDT Project Member

deadbeef: Uh oh! This issue still open and hasn't been updated in the last 14 days. This is a serious vulnerability, and we want to ensure that there's progress. Could you please leave an update with the current status and any potential blockers?

If you're not the right owner for this issue, could you please remove yourself as soon as possible or help us find the right one?

If the issue is fixed or you can't reproduce it, please close the bug. If you've started working on a fix, please set the status to Started.

Thanks for your time! To disable nags, add the Disable-Nags label.

For more details visit <https://www.chromium.org/issue-tracking/autotriage> - Your friendly Sheriffbot

[Comment 10](#) by [deadbeef@chromium.org](#) on Tue, Mar 30, 2021, 4:20 PM EDT Project Member

No update from Michael yet, though he did say he would take a look two weeks ago.

orphis@, maybe you could take a look? It might be as simple as setting str\_reset to NULL in sctp\_process\_cookie\_existing.

[Comment 11](#) by [deadbeef@chromium.org](#) on Tue, Mar 30, 2021, 9:24 PM EDT Project Member

Tolyan, could you provide some brief instructions on how to run the POC? Or attach a chromium debug log with verbose WebRTC logging enabled, which will dump SCTP packets with "# SCTP\_PACKET" log lines?

[Comment 12](#) by [korni...@gmail.com](#) on Tue, Mar 30, 2021, 10:18 PM EDT

deadbeef, I run it like this:

1. pip install -r requirements.txt
2. 'cd web && python hello.py' to spawn a flask serving js
3. open [http://127.0.0.1:5000/chrome\\_poc\\_js/index.html](http://127.0.0.1:5000/chrome_poc_js/index.html) in a browser
4. in a separate terminal 'python poc.py' # to establish rtc connection with a chrome tab and trigger the bug

I've attached filtered.log with # SCTP\_PACKET dump.

**filtered.log**  
6.0 KB [View](#) [Download](#)

[Comment 13](#) by [sheriffbot](#) on Wed, Apr 14, 2021, 12:21 PM EDT Project Member

deadbeef: Uh oh! This issue still open and hasn't been updated in the last 14 days. This is a serious vulnerability, and we want to ensure that there's progress. Could you please leave an update with the current status and any potential blockers?

If you're not the right owner for this issue, could you please remove yourself as soon as possible or help us find the right one?

If the issue is fixed or you can't reproduce it, please close the bug. If you've started working on a fix, please set the status to Started.

Thanks for your time! To disable nags, add the Disable-Nags label.

For more details visit <https://www.chromium.org/issue-tracking/autotriage> - Your friendly Sheriffbot

[Comment 14](#) by [deadbeef@chromium.org](#) on Wed, Apr 14, 2021, 1:20 PM EDT Project Member

Given the information from [comment #12](#), I created a simple usrsctp repro program which I sent to Michael Tuexen. He says he's currently working on fixing it; last update was 2 days ago.

[Comment 15](#) by [sheriffbot](#) on Thu, Apr 15, 2021, 12:21 PM EDT Project Member

**Labels:** -Security\_Impact-Head Security\_Impact-Beta

[Comment 16](#) by [benmason@google.com](#) on Mon, Apr 26, 2021, 11:30 AM EDT Project Member

Any further update here?

[Comment 17](#) by [deadbeef@chromium.org](#) on Mon, Apr 26, 2021, 4:35 PM EDT Project Member

Not yet. Perhaps we should just patch this locally until the upstream fix is complete.

[Comment 18](#) by [deadbeef@chromium.org](#) on Mon, Apr 26, 2021, 4:50 PM EDT Project Member

Actually, just a few minutes ago he committed this fix: <https://github.com/sctplab/usrsctp/commit/53dd9da22a0caa77d8bcb642bcdf601b8aa6783c>

Which is related to this issue but not the root cause. So maybe the actual fix is coming soon.

[Comment 19](#) by [korni...@gmail.com](#) on Mon, May 3, 2021, 2:26 AM EDT

looks like the fix landed upstream <https://github.com/sctplab/usrsctp/commit/0f8d58300b1fdcd943b4a9dd3fbd830825390d4d>

[Comment 20](#) by [pbommana@google.com](#) on Mon, May 10, 2021, 10:52 AM EDT Project Member

[Bulk Edit] Reminder M91 is already in Beta and Stable promotion is coming soon. Please review this bug and assess if this is indeed a RBS. If not, please remove the RBS label.

If so, please make sure to land the fix and request a merge into the release branch ASAP. Thank you.

[Comment 21](#) by [deadbeef@chromium.org](#) on Mon, May 10, 2021, 3:54 PM EDT Project Member

**Status:** Fixed (was: Assigned)

The fix was included in this roll: <https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+2871465>

[Comment 22](#) by [deadbeef@chromium.org](#) on Mon, May 10, 2021, 3:58 PM EDT Project Member

**Labels:** Merge-Request-91

[Comment 23](#) by [sheriffbot](#) on Mon, May 10, 2021, 3:59 PM EDT Project Member

**Labels:** -Merge-Request-91 Hotlist-Merge-Review Merge-Review-91

This bug requires manual review: M91's targeted beta branch promotion date has already passed, so this requires manual review. Before a merge request will be considered, the following information is required to be added to this bug:

1. Does your merge fit within the Merge Decision Guidelines?  
- Chrome: [https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src.git/+master/docs/process/merge\\_request.md#when-to-request-a-merge](https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src.git/+master/docs/process/merge_request.md#when-to-request-a-merge)  
- Chrome OS: <https://goto.google.com/cros-release-branch-merge-guidelines>
2. Links to the CLs you are requesting to merge.
3. Has the change landed and been verified on ToT?
4. Does this change need to be merged into other active release branches (M-1, M+1)?
5. Why are these changes required in this milestone after branch?
6. Is this a new feature?
7. If it is a new feature, is it behind a flag using finch?

Chrome OS Only:

8. Was the change reviewed and approved by the Eng Prod Representative? See Eng Prod ownership by component: <http://go/cros-engprodcomponents>

Please contact the milestone owner if you have questions.

Owners: benmason@(Android), bindusuvama@(iOS), marinakz@(ChromeOS), pbommana@(Desktop)

For more details visit <https://www.chromium.org/issue-tracking/autotriage> - Your friendly Sheriffbot

[Comment 24](#) by [deadbeef@chromium.org](#) on Mon, May 10, 2021, 6:02 PM EDT Project Member

1. Does your merge fit within the Merge Decision Guidelines?  
Yes, given that it's a severe security vulnerability.

2. Links to the CLs you are requesting to merge.

<https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+2871465>

3. Has the change landed and been verified on ToT?

Yes.

4. Does this change need to be merged into other active release branches (M-1, M+1)?

Possibly M90.

5. Why are these changes required in this milestone after branch?

Fix was not made until after branch.

6. Is this a new feature?

No.

7. If it is a new feature, is it behind a flag using finch?

N/A

[Comment 25](#) by [adetaylor@google.com](#) on Mon, May 10, 2021, 6:05 PM EDT Project Member

Cc: mea...@chromium.org

**Labels:** -Merge-Review-91 Merge-Approved-91

deadbeef@ - this is a pretty big roll, but approving merge to M91, branch 4472, as this looks like it's already had 5+ days since landing and hopefully any problems would have shown up in Canary.

Please can you check the Security\_Impact label here? This is currently labelled as being a bug newly introduced in M91, but that doesn't seem likely to me. meacer@ was that an assumption in #c2 or did you confirm? (It's important because of release notes credits and CVEs, which only apply for stable-affecting bugs, the fact we're blocking M91 release until we have a fix for this supposed-regression, and the (slim) chance we'd want to merge to M90).

[Comment 26](#) by [deadbeef@chromium.org](#) on Mon, May 10, 2021, 6:30 PM EDT Project Member

**Labels:** -M-91 M-90

I confirmed it at least affects M90. And I suspect it goes back much further.

[Comment 27](#) by [adetaylor@chromium.org](#) on Mon, May 10, 2021, 7:38 PM EDT Project Member

**Labels:** -Security\_Impact-Beta -ReleaseBlock-Stable -Target-91 Security\_Impact-Stable Target-90

Thanks!

In that case, Sheriffbot would have added Merge-Request-90 as well, so I'll do it.

We don't have any more planned M90 refreshes so at the moment, so I'm not going to approve M90 merge any time soon, but leaving the label here as an aide-memoire just in case.

[Comment 28](#) by [deadbeef@chromium.org](#) on Mon, May 10, 2021, 8:29 PM EDT Project Member

I'm going to hold off on the merge for a bit because there may be a deadlock regression introduced in this range, as seen by an internal application for which usrsctp was updated at the same time.

If we don't figure it out in the next couple days, I'd say we should cherry pick just the relevant commit, as it appears to be completely self-contained:

<https://chromium.googlesource.com/external/github.com/sctplib/usrsctp/+0f8d58300b1fdcd943b4a9dd3fbd830825390d4d>

[Comment 29](#) by [adetaylor@chromium.org](#) on Mon, May 10, 2021, 11:31 PM EDT Project Member

SGTM!

[Comment 30](#) by [korni...@gmail.com](#) on Tue, May 11, 2021, 12:45 AM EDT

deadbeef@

My fuzzer also deadlocks here ./usrsctplib/netinet/sctputil.c:1851

If I build with -DINVARIANTS it panics with "sctp\_findassoc\_by\_vtag(): sctp\_findassoc\_by\_vtag: tcb\_mtx already locked"

I attach SCTP\_DEBUG\_ALL log, maybe it could be useful (I see it tries to lock a single mutex twice) .

**locking\_logging.txt**

52.3 KB [View](#) [Download](#)

[Comment 31](#) by [sheriffbot](#) on Tue, May 11, 2021, 12:42 PM EDT Project Member

**Labels:** reward-topanel

[Comment 32](#) by [sheriffbot](#) on Tue, May 11, 2021, 1:57 PM EDT Project Member

**Labels:** -Restrict-View-SecurityTeam Restrict-View-SecurityNotifyWebRTC

[Comment 33](#) by [Git Watcher](#) on Tue, May 11, 2021, 3:11 PM EDT Project Member

**Labels:** -merge-approved-91 merge-merged-4472 merge-merged-91

The following revision refers to this bug:

<https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+4b397994019194a5609680e6ec7a4e0bd22b691c>

commit [4b397994019194a5609680e6ec7a4e0bd22b691c](#)

Author: Taylor Brandstetter <[deadbeef@chromium.org](mailto:deadbeef@chromium.org)>

Date: Tue May 11 19:10:27 2021

[Merge M91] Roll src/third\_party/usrsctp/usrsctplib/ 70d42ae95..0bd8b8110 (13 commits)

<https://chromium.googlesource.com/external/github.com/sctplib/usrsctp/+log/70d42ae95a1d..0bd8b8110bc1>

\$ git log 70d42ae95..0bd8b8110 --date=short --no-merges --format="%ad %ae %s"

2021-05-03 yc.yang1229 Add mbedtls sha1 support (#579)

2021-05-03 tuexen Improve setup of address list for end-points

2021-05-03 tuexen Improve restart handling.

2021-05-03 tuexen Fix compilation.

2021-05-03 tuexen Improve error handling for INIT/INIT-ACK information

2021-04-30 tuexen Update vtag when scanning for INIT or INIT-ACK

2021-04-30 tuexen Handle spp\_pathmtu = 0 correctly in setsockopt SCTP\_PEER\_ADDR\_PARAMS.

2021-04-30 tuexen Use RTO.Initial of 1 sec as specified in RFC 4960bis

2021-04-30 tuexen Consistently skip chunks with incorrect length.

2021-04-28 caleb.e.allen Correct option type for UDP encapsulation port (#581)

2021-04-27 tuexen Cleanup input validation of INIT and INIT-ACK chunks

2021-04-26 tuexen Stop further processing of a packet when detecting that it contains an INIT chunk, which is too small or is not the only chunk in the packet. Still allow to

finish the processing of chunks before the INIT chunk.

2021-04-26 tuexen Small cleanup, no functional change

Created with:

roll-dep src/third\_party/usrsctp/usrsctplib

(cherry picked from commit 792a3a2c1b0ef87343d0102e77552d78d9715ad3)

[Bug-chromium-1487707](#)

Change-Id: I6e5fe109677f604bb12812014c10c5f86f190709  
Reviewed-on: <https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+2871465>  
Commit-Queue: Florent Castelli <[orphis@chromium.org](mailto:orphis@chromium.org)>  
Reviewed-by: Florent Castelli <[orphis@chromium.org](mailto:orphis@chromium.org)>  
Cr-Original-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#879130}  
Reviewed-on: <https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+2885634>  
Reviewed-by: Mirko Bonadei <[mbonadei@chromium.org](mailto:mbonadei@chromium.org)>  
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <[guidou@chromium.org](mailto:guidou@chromium.org)>  
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/branch-heads/4472@{#947}  
Cr-Branched-From: 3d60439cfb36485e76a1c5bb7f513d3721b20da1-refs/heads/master@{#870763}

[modify] <https://crrev.com/4b397994019194a5609680e6ec7a4e0bd22b691c/DEPS>

[modify] [https://crrev.com/4b397994019194a5609680e6ec7a4e0bd22b691c/third\\_party/usrsrc/README.chromium](https://crrev.com/4b397994019194a5609680e6ec7a4e0bd22b691c/third_party/usrsrc/README.chromium)

Comment 34 by Git Watcher on Tue, May 11, 2021, 5:11 PM EDT Project Member

The following revision refers to this bug:

<https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+626c0d783d8ac8a677138d60a436e2c4b64091d7>

commit 626c0d783d8ac8a677138d60a436e2c4b64091d7

Author: Taylor Brandstetter <[deadbeef@chromium.org](mailto:deadbeef@chromium.org)>

Date: Tue May 11 21:10:03 2021

Revert "[Merge M91] Roll src/third\_party/usrsrc/sctplib/ 70d42ae95..0bd8b8110 (13 commits)"

This reverts commit 4b397994019194a5609680e6ec7a4e0bd22b691c.

Reason for revert: This range may have introduced a locking issue. See comments on bug.

Original change's description:

> [Merge M91] Roll src/third\_party/usrsrc/sctplib/ 70d42ae95..0bd8b8110 (13 commits)

>  
> <https://chromium.googlesource.com/external/github.com/sctplib/usrsrcctl+/log/70d42ae95a1d..0bd8b8110bc1>  
>  
> \$ git log 70d42ae95..0bd8b8110 --date=short --no-merges --format="%ad %ae %s"  
> 2021-05-03 yc.yang1229 Add mbedtls sha1 support (#579)  
> 2021-05-03 tuexen Improve setup of address list for end-points  
> 2021-05-03 tuexen Improve restart handling.  
> 2021-05-03 tuexen Fix compilation.  
> 2021-05-03 tuexen Improve error handling for INIT/INIT-ACK information  
> 2021-04-30 tuexen Update vtag when scanning for INIT or INIT-ACK  
> 2021-04-30 tuexen Handle spp\_pathmtu = 0 correctly in setsockopt SCTP\_PEER\_ADDR\_PARAMS.  
> 2021-04-30 tuexen Use RTO.Initial of 1 sec as specified in RFC 4960bis  
> 2021-04-30 tuexen Consistently skip chunks with incorrect length.  
> 2021-04-28 caleb.e.allen Correct option type for UDP encapsulation port (#581)  
> 2021-04-27 tuexen Cleanup input validation of INIT and INIT-ACK chunks  
> 2021-04-26 tuexen Stop further processing of a packet when detecting that it contains an INIT chunk, which is too small or is not the only chunk in the packet. Still allow to finish the processing of chunks before the INIT chunk.  
> 2021-04-26 tuexen Small cleanup, no functional change  
>  
> Created with:  
> roll-dep src/third\_party/usrsrc/sctplib  
>  
> (cherry picked from commit 792a3a2c1b0ef87343d0102e77552d78d9715ad3)  
>  
> [Bug-chromium-1487707](#)  
> Change-Id: I6e5fe109677f604bb12812014c10c5f86f190709  
> Reviewed-on: <https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+2871465>  
> Commit-Queue: Florent Castelli <[orphis@chromium.org](mailto:orphis@chromium.org)>  
> Reviewed-by: Florent Castelli <[orphis@chromium.org](mailto:orphis@chromium.org)>  
> Cr-Original-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#879130}  
> Reviewed-on: <https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+2885634>  
> Reviewed-by: Mirko Bonadei <[mbonadei@chromium.org](mailto:mbonadei@chromium.org)>  
> Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <[guidou@chromium.org](mailto:guidou@chromium.org)>  
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/branch-heads/4472@{#947}  
> Cr-Branched-From: 3d60439cfb36485e76a1c5bb7f513d3721b20da1-refs/heads/master@{#870763}

[Bug-chromium-1487707](#)

Change-Id: I72ce801cd323eeea985f3e112dc7bbb18dcfb6e5  
No-Presubmit: true  
No-Tree-Checks: true  
No-Try: true  
Reviewed-on: <https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+2888216>  
Bot-Commit: Rubber Stamper <[rubber-stamper@appspot.gserviceaccount.com](mailto:rubber-stamper@appspot.gserviceaccount.com)>  
Reviewed-by: Guido Urdaneta <[guidou@chromium.org](mailto:guidou@chromium.org)>  
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <[guidou@chromium.org](mailto:guidou@chromium.org)>  
Owners-Override: Prudhvi Kumar Bommana <[pbommana@google.com](mailto:pbommana@google.com)>  
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/branch-heads/4472@{#959}  
Cr-Branched-From: 3d60439cfb36485e76a1c5bb7f513d3721b20da1-refs/heads/master@{#870763}

[modify] <https://crrev.com/626c0d783d8ac8a677138d60a436e2c4b64091d7/DEPS>

[modify] [https://crrev.com/626c0d783d8ac8a677138d60a436e2c4b64091d7/third\\_party/usrsrc/README.chromium](https://crrev.com/626c0d783d8ac8a677138d60a436e2c4b64091d7/third_party/usrsrc/README.chromium)

Comment 35 by [deadbeef@chromium.org](mailto:deadbeef@chromium.org) on Tue, May 11, 2021, 6:31 PM EDT Project Member

@ comment #30: What revision are you using specifically? sctputil.c:1851 doesn't correspond to any lock acquisition in revision 0bd8b8110 or acfce46e4.

Comment 36 by [deadbeef@chromium.org](mailto:deadbeef@chromium.org) on Tue, May 11, 2021, 6:43 PM EDT Project Member

Also, when you say you can reproduce it in the fuzzer, do you mean the program linked in this bug?

Comment 37 by [korni...@gmail.com](mailto:korni...@gmail.com) on Tue, May 11, 2021, 7:03 PM EDT

@ comment #35: sorry for confusion, it is <https://github.com/sctplib/usrsrcctl/blob/acfce46e428cc084b4bd0164e1b019261a8dbeda/usrsrcctl/netinet/sctputil.c#L1831>

But I think it does not matter much, it could be any SCTP\_TCB\_LOCK macros invocation after forgotten SCTP\_TCB\_UNLOCK.

I did little debugging and in my repro it looks like deadlock happens when sctp\_process\_cookie\_existing returns NULL and

[https://github.com/sctplib/usrsrcctl/blob/acfce46e428cc084b4bd0164e1b019261a8dbeda/usrsrcctl/netinet/sctp\\_input.c#L2933](https://github.com/sctplib/usrsrcctl/blob/acfce46e428cc084b4bd0164e1b019261a8dbeda/usrsrcctl/netinet/sctp_input.c#L2933) here prevents unlocking.

I attach my repro just in case if it could help. It is a libfuzz target. To run:

```
cmake .. -GNinja -Dasan=off -DCMAKE_BUILD_TYPE=Debug -DCMAKE_C_COMPILER=clang -DCMAKE_CXX_COMPILER=clang++ -Dscpt_invariants=on  
ninja fuzz  
./usrsrcctlib/fuzz ../deadlock
```

**usrsctp2.zip**  
2.4 MB [Download](#)

[Comment 38](#) by [mbonadei@chromium.org](#) on Wed, May 12, 2021, 2:18 AM EDT Project Member  
**Cc:** [boi...@webRTC.org](#)

[Comment 39](#) by [mbonadei@chromium.org](#) on Wed, May 12, 2021, 2:34 AM EDT Project Member  
Should we reopen this bug?

I am going to revert the last 2 rolls into Chromium.

[Comment 40](#) by [terelius@chromium.org](#) on Wed, May 12, 2021, 3:39 AM EDT Project Member  
Yes, I think we should reopen.

[Comment 41](#) by [terelius@chromium.org](#) on Wed, May 12, 2021, 3:40 AM EDT Project Member  
**Status:** Assigned (was: Fixed)

[Comment 42](#) by [korni...@gmail.com](#) on Wed, May 12, 2021, 7:39 AM EDT  
There might be same issue in process\_cookie\_new, I've got another deadlock after applying 0ed173a

[usrsctp-debug] HUH? process\_cookie\_new: could not find INIT chunk!  
[usrsctp-debug] GAK, null buffer

**usrsctp3.zip**  
2.3 MB [Download](#)

**locking\_logging\_cookie\_new.txt**  
87.6 KB [View](#) [Download](#)

[Comment 43](#) by [mbonadei@chromium.org](#) on Wed, May 12, 2021, 11:45 AM EDT Project Member  
Rolling Taylor's fix (<https://github.com/sctplab/usrsctp/commit/0ed173a023619cbd3466b3df4038f6d9a541834>) in Chromium: <https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+2892204>.

[Comment 44](#) by [sheriffbot](#) on Wed, May 12, 2021, 2:07 PM EDT Project Member  
**Labels:** Deadline-Exceeded

We commit ourselves to a 60 day deadline for fixing for high severity vulnerabilities, and have exceeded it here. If you're unable to look into this soon, could you please find another owner or remove yourself so that this gets back into the security triage queue?

For more details visit <https://www.chromium.org/issue-tracking/autotriage> - Your friendly Sheriffbot

[Comment 45](#) by [deadbeef@chromium.org](#) on Wed, May 12, 2021, 2:13 PM EDT Project Member  
FYI, the problem was introduced here: <https://github.com/sctplab/usrsctp/commit/f37c12304801511a6b4e860c212cba62a2b6d962>

Previously, sctp\_process\_cookie\_existing expected the input tcb to already be locked, and returned with it still locked. But now, it sometimes calls sctp\_abort\_association in the error paths, which always unlocks the tcb, so the semantics were changed to "if I return NULL that means I've released the lock, otherwise I haven't", which is used in several other places. Which means the existing return NULLs needed to be updated.

This reasoning doesn't apply with sctp\_process\_cookie\_new, unless it's being called by sctp\_process\_cookie\_existing here (which my PR overlooked):  
[https://source.chromium.org/chromium/chromium/src/+main:third\\_party/usrsctp/usrsctplib/usrsctplib/netinet/sctp\\_input.c;\\_id=1942;drc=1776993149abe69135b509ca24e94b6c8310206b;bpv=0;bpt=1](https://source.chromium.org/chromium/chromium/src/+main:third_party/usrsctp/usrsctplib/usrsctplib/netinet/sctp_input.c;_id=1942;drc=1776993149abe69135b509ca24e94b6c8310206b;bpv=0;bpt=1)

Can you confirm whether that's what's going on? Based on the logging it definitely appears that way. Many thanks for your continued help.

[Comment 46](#) by [deadbeef@chromium.org](#) on Wed, May 12, 2021, 2:50 PM EDT Project Member  
**Status:** Fixed (was: Assigned)  
**Labels:** -merge-merged-4472 -merge-merged-91 Merge-Request-91

As for what to do about this issue and M91: I'm requesting a merge again, this time to cherry pick just this usrsctp commit:  
<https://chromium.googlesource.com/external/github.com/sctplab/usrsctp/+0f8d58300b1fdcd943b4a9dd3fbd830825390d4d>

The alternatives would be:

- \* Cherry pick the entire roll again, as well as the deadlock fixes individually.
- \* Do a new roll that includes the deadlock fixes and cherry pick it.

But these options seem unnecessarily risky, especially when the stable cut is so soon.

[Comment 47](#) by [sheriffbot](#) on Wed, May 12, 2021, 2:53 PM EDT Project Member  
**Labels:** -Merge-Request-91 Merge-Review-91

This bug requires manual review: We are only 12 days from stable.  
Before a merge request will be considered, the following information is required to be added to this bug:

1. Does your merge fit within the Merge Decision Guidelines?  
- Chrome: [https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src.git/+master/docs/process/merge\\_request.md#when-to-request-a-merge](https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src.git/+master/docs/process/merge_request.md#when-to-request-a-merge)  
- Chrome OS: <https://goto.google.com/cros-release-branch-merge-guidelines>
2. Links to the CLs you are requesting to merge.
3. Has the change landed and been verified on ToT?
4. Does this change need to be merged into other active release branches (M-1, M+1)?
5. Why are these changes required in this milestone after branch?
6. Is this a new feature?
7. If it is a new feature, is it behind a flag using finch?

Chrome OS Only:

8. Was the change reviewed and approved by the Eng Prod Representative? See Eng Prod ownership by component: <http://go/cros-engprodcomponents>

Please contact the milestone owner if you have questions.  
Owners: [benmason@](#)(Android), [bindusuvama@](#)(iOS), [marinakz@](#)(ChromeOS), [pbommana@](#)(Desktop)

For more details visit <https://www.chromium.org/issue-tracking/autotriage> - Your friendly Sheriffbot

[Comment 48](#) by [korni...@gmail.com](#) on Wed, May 12, 2021, 3:17 PM EDT  
**@ comment #45:**

> This reasoning doesn't apply with sctp\_process\_cookie\_new, unless it's being called by sctp\_process\_cookie\_existing here (which my PR overlooked):  
[https://source.chromium.org/chromium/chromium/src/+main:third\\_party/usrsctp/usrsctplib/usrsctplib/netinet/sctp\\_input.c;\\_id=1942;drc=1776993149abe69135b509ca24e94b6c8310206b;bpv=0;bpt=1](https://source.chromium.org/chromium/chromium/src/+main:third_party/usrsctp/usrsctplib/usrsctplib/netinet/sctp_input.c;_id=1942;drc=1776993149abe69135b509ca24e94b6c8310206b;bpv=0;bpt=1) Can you confirm whether that's what's going on?

I confirm. The second deadlock happened when sctp\_process\_cookie\_new is called from sctp\_process\_cookie\_existing  
<https://github.com/sctplab/usrsctp/pull/587#issuecomment-839961754>

No more deadlocks on my fuzzer corpus IM/

[Comment 49](#) by [adetaylor@google.com](#) on Wed, May 12, 2021, 8:53 PM EDT Project Member

**Labels:** -Merge-Review-91 Merge-Approved-91

Approving merge to M91 for the cherry-pick in [#c46](#).

[Comment 50](#) by [Git Watcher](#) on Fri, May 14, 2021, 4:30 AM EDT Project Member

**Labels:** -merge-approved-91 merge-merged-4472 merge-merged-91

The following revision refers to this bug:

<https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+0ac2cfbe6954f19a92db6138b8b73a4fe514798e>

commit [0ac2cfbe6954f19a92db6138b8b73a4fe514798e](#)

Author: Taylor Brandstetter <[deadbeef@chromium.org](mailto:deadbeef@chromium.org)>

Date: Fri May 14 08:29:52 2021

Cherry picking fix for usrsctp UAF issue.

Pointing to a local usrsctp branch which has the following commit

cherry picked:

<https://github.com/sctplab/usrsctp/commit/0f8d58300b1fdc943b4a9dd3fd830825390d4d>

See log:

<https://chromium.googlesource.com/external/github.com/sctplab/usrsctp/+log/70d42ae95a1d..bf12d9242a63>

TBR=[orphis@chromium.org](mailto:orphis@chromium.org)

~~[Bug-4187707](#)~~

Change-Id: [I0f287d255a195f52ee4e88de245d48bce9b91e2a](#)

Reviewed-on: <https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+2893189>

Commit-Queue: Florent Castelli <[orphis@chromium.org](mailto:orphis@chromium.org)>

Auto-Submit: Taylor Brandstetter <[deadbeef@chromium.org](mailto:deadbeef@chromium.org)>

Reviewed-by: Florent Castelli <[orphis@chromium.org](mailto:orphis@chromium.org)>

Reviewed-by: Mirko Bonadei <[mbonadei@chromium.org](mailto:mbonadei@chromium.org)>

Cr-Commit-Position: refs/branch-heads/4472@{#1045}

Cr-Branched-From: [3d60439cfb36485e76a1c5bb7f513d3721b20da1-refs/heads/master@{#870763}](#)

[modify] <https://crrev.com/0ac2cfbe6954f19a92db6138b8b73a4fe514798e/DEPS>

[modify] [https://crrev.com/0ac2cfbe6954f19a92db6138b8b73a4fe514798e/third\\_party/usrsctp/README.chromium](https://crrev.com/0ac2cfbe6954f19a92db6138b8b73a4fe514798e/third_party/usrsctp/README.chromium)

[Comment 51](#) by [Git Watcher](#) on Mon, May 17, 2021, 9:24 AM EDT Project Member

The following revision refers to this bug:

<https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+168f33758e65f39849a121b7b3c292a4e30f6728>

commit [168f33758e65f39849a121b7b3c292a4e30f6728](#)

Author: Mirko Bonadei <[mbonadei@chromium.org](mailto:mbonadei@chromium.org)>

Date: Mon May 17 13:23:04 2021

Roll src/third\_party/usrsctp/usrsctplib/ acfce46e4..22ba62ffe (3 commits)

<https://chromium.googlesource.com/external/github.com/sctplab/usrsctp/+log/acfce46e428c..22ba62ffe79c>

\$ git log acfce46e4..22ba62ffe --date=short --no-merges --format="%ad %ae %s"

2021-05-12 tuexen Sync with FreeBSD.

2021-05-12 tuexen Improve the locking.

2021-05-12 deadbeef Unlock TCB whenever returning early from sctp\_process\_cookie\_existing. (#587)

Created with:

roll-dep src/third\_party/usrsctp/usrsctplib

~~[Bug-4187707](#)~~

Change-Id: [Ie51c9096590346c89790664bac0fad728502a1e](#)

Reviewed-on: <https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+2891660>

Commit-Queue: Mirko Bonadei <[mbonadei@chromium.org](mailto:mbonadei@chromium.org)>

Auto-Submit: Mirko Bonadei <[mbonadei@chromium.org](mailto:mbonadei@chromium.org)>

Reviewed-by: Florent Castelli <[orphis@chromium.org](mailto:orphis@chromium.org)>

Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#883450}

[modify] <https://crrev.com/168f33758e65f39849a121b7b3c292a4e30f6728/DEPS>

[Comment 52](#) by [amyressler@google.com](#) on Thu, May 20, 2021, 1:08 PM EDT Project Member

**Labels:** -reward-topanel reward-unpaid reward-7500

\*\*\* Boilerplate reminders! \*\*\*

Please do NOT publicly disclose details until a fix has been released to all our users. Early public disclosure may cancel the provisional reward. Also, please be considerate about disclosure when the bug affects a core library that may be used by other products. Please do NOT share this information with third parties who are not directly involved in fixing the bug. Doing so may cancel the provisional reward. Please be honest if you have already disclosed anything publicly or to third parties. Lastly, we understand that some of you are not interested in money. We offer the option to donate your reward to an eligible charity. If you prefer this option, let us know and we will also match your donation - subject to our discretion. Any rewards that are unclaimed after 12 months will be donated to a charity of our choosing.

Please contact [security-vrp@chromium.org](mailto:security-vrp@chromium.org) with any questions.

\*\*\*\*\*

[Comment 53](#) by [amyressler@chromium.org](#) on Thu, May 20, 2021, 5:18 PM EDT Project Member

Congratulations, Tolyan! The VRP Panel has decided to award you \$7500 for this report. Nice work!

[Comment 54](#) by [amyressler@google.com](#) on Fri, May 21, 2021, 5:37 PM EDT Project Member

**Labels:** -reward-unpaid reward-inprocess

[Comment 55](#) by [amyressler@chromium.org](#) on Mon, May 24, 2021, 11:19 AM EDT Project Member

**Labels:** Release-0-M91

[Comment 56](#) by [amyressler@google.com](#) on Mon, May 24, 2021, 2:17 PM EDT Project Member

**Labels:** CVE-2021-30523 CVE\_description-missing

[Comment 57](#) by [janag...@google.com](#) on Tue, May 25, 2021, 10:12 AM EDT Project Member

**Cc:** [janag...@google.com](mailto:janag...@google.com)

**Labels:** LTS-Security-86 LTS-Merge-Request-86

Comment 58 by [gianluca@google.com](#) on Wed, May 26, 2021, 11:48 AM EDT Project Member

**Labels:** -LTS-Merge-Request-86 LTS-Merge-Approved-86

Comment 59 by [Git Watcher](#) on Tue, Jun 1, 2021, 10:30 AM EDT Project Member

**Labels:** merge-merged-4240

The following revision refers to this bug:

<https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+eb4be47d8362e52f8c950859abacfcd61696c9b>

commit [eb4be47d8362e52f8c950859abacfcd61696c9b](#)

Author: Taylor Brandstetter <[deadbeef@chromium.org](mailto:deadbeef@chromium.org)>

Date: Tue Jun 01 14:29:34 2021

[86-LTS] Cherry picking fix for usrsctp UAF issue.

Pointing to a local usrsctp branch which has the following commit

cherry picked:

<https://github.com/sctplab/usrsctp/commit/0f8d58300b1fcd943b4a9dd3bd830825390d4d>

See log:

<https://chromium.googlesource.com/external/github.com/sctplab/usrsctp/+log/a6647318b57c...a0b4ea32a38c>

TBR=[orphis@chromium.org](mailto:orphis@chromium.org)

(cherry picked from commit [0ac2cfbe6954f19a92db6138b8b73a4fe514798e](#))

[Bug-chromium:1197707](#)

Change-Id: [I0f287d255a195f52ee4e88de245d48bce9b91e2a](#)

Reviewed-on: <https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+2893189>

Commit-Queue: Florent Castelli <[orphis@chromium.org](mailto:orphis@chromium.org)>

Auto-Submit: Taylor Brandstetter <[deadbeef@chromium.org](mailto:deadbeef@chromium.org)>

Cr-Original-Commit-Position: refs/branch-heads/4472@(#1045)

Cr-Original-Branched-From: [3d60439cfb36485e76a1c5bb7f513d3721b20da1-refs/heads/master@\(#870763\)](#)

Reviewed-on: <https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+2917015>

Commit-Queue: Jana Grill <[janagrill@google.com](mailto:janagrill@google.com)>

Owners-Override: Jana Grill <[janagrill@google.com](mailto:janagrill@google.com)>

Reviewed-by: Victor-Gabriel Savu <[vsavu@google.com](mailto:vsavu@google.com)>

Cr-Commit-Position: refs/branch-heads/4240@(#1655)

Cr-Branched-From: [f297677702651916bbf65e59c0d4bbd4ce57d1ee-refs/heads/master@\(#800218\)](#)

[modify] <https://crrev.com/eb4be47d8362e52f8c950859abacfcd61696c9b/DEPS>

[modify] [https://crrev.com/eb4be47d8362e52f8c950859abacfcd61696c9b/third\\_party/usrsctp/README.chromium](https://crrev.com/eb4be47d8362e52f8c950859abacfcd61696c9b/third_party/usrsctp/README.chromium)

Comment 60 by [janag...@google.com](#) on Tue, Jun 1, 2021, 10:55 AM EDT Project Member

**Labels:** -LTS-Merge-Approved-86 LTR-Merged-86

Comment 61 by [amyressler@google.com](#) on Mon, Jun 7, 2021, 3:26 PM EDT Project Member

**Labels:** -CVE\_description-missing CVE\_description-submitted

Comment 62 by [asumaneev@google.com](#) on Mon, Jun 7, 2021, 3:35 PM EDT Project Member

**Labels:** LTS-Security-90 LTS-Merge-Request-90

Comment 63 by [sheriffbot](#) on Tue, Jun 8, 2021, 12:21 PM EDT Project Member

**Labels:** -M-90 M-91 Target-91

Comment 64 by [gianluca@google.com](#) on Wed, Jun 9, 2021, 10:46 AM EDT Project Member

**Labels:** -LTS-Merge-Request-90 LTS-Merge-Approved-90

Comment 65 by [Git Watcher](#) on Wed, Jun 9, 2021, 1:14 PM EDT Project Member

**Labels:** merge-merged-4430 merge-merged-90

The following revision refers to this bug:

<https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+541dc23f0fd390e03d04bfddec1e1717cb3cfb9>

commit [541dc23f0fd390e03d04bfddec1e1717cb3cfb9](#)

Author: Taylor Brandstetter <[deadbeef@chromium.org](mailto:deadbeef@chromium.org)>

Date: Wed Jun 09 17:13:37 2021

[M90-LTS] Cherry picking fix for usrsctp UAF issue.

Pointing to a local usrsctp branch which has the following commit

cherry picked:

<https://github.com/sctplab/usrsctp/commit/0f8d58300b1fcd943b4a9dd3bd830825390d4d>

See log:

<https://chromium.googlesource.com/external/github.com/sctplab/usrsctp/+log/70d42ae95a1d..bf12d9242a63>

TBR=[orphis@chromium.org](mailto:orphis@chromium.org)

(cherry picked from commit [0ac2cfbe6954f19a92db6138b8b73a4fe514798e](#))

[Bug-chromium:1197707](#)

Change-Id: [I0f287d255a195f52ee4e88de245d48bce9b91e2a](#)

Reviewed-on: <https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+2893189>

Commit-Queue: Florent Castelli <[orphis@chromium.org](mailto:orphis@chromium.org)>

Auto-Submit: Taylor Brandstetter <[deadbeef@chromium.org](mailto:deadbeef@chromium.org)>

Reviewed-by: Florent Castelli <[orphis@chromium.org](mailto:orphis@chromium.org)>

Reviewed-by: Mirko Bonadei <[mbonadei@chromium.org](mailto:mbonadei@chromium.org)>

Cr-Original-Commit-Position: refs/branch-heads/4472@(#1045)

Cr-Original-Branched-From: [3d60439cfb36485e76a1c5bb7f513d3721b20da1-refs/heads/master@\(#870763\)](#)

Reviewed-on: <https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+2945772>

Commit-Queue: Artem Sumaneev <[asumaneev@google.com](mailto:asumaneev@google.com)>

Owners-Override: Artem Sumaneev <[asumaneev@google.com](mailto:asumaneev@google.com)>

Reviewed-by: Victor-Gabriel Savu <[vsavu@google.com](mailto:vsavu@google.com)>

Cr-Commit-Position: refs/branch-heads/4430@(#1510)

Cr-Branched-From: [e5ce7dc47518237b3d9bb93ccca35d25216cbe-refs/heads/master@\(#857950\)](#)

[modify] <https://crrev.com/541dc23f0fd390e03d04bfddec1e1717cb3cfb9/DEPS>

[modify] [https://crrev.com/541dc23f0fd390e03d04bfddec1e1717cb3cfb9/third\\_party/usrsctp/README.chromium](https://crrev.com/541dc23f0fd390e03d04bfddec1e1717cb3cfb9/third_party/usrsctp/README.chromium)



[Comment 66](#) by [asumaneev@google.com](mailto:asumaneev@google.com) on Wed, Jun 9, 2021, 1:17 PM EDT Project Member

**Labels:** -LTS-Merge-Approved-90 LTS-Merged-90

[Comment 67](#) by [sheriffbot](#) on Wed, Sep 15, 2021, 1:31 PM EDT Project Member

**Labels:** -Restrict-View-SecurityNotifyWebRTC allpublic

This bug has been closed for more than 14 weeks. Removing security view restrictions.

For more details visit <https://www.chromium.org/issue-tracking/autotriage> - Your friendly Sheriffbot