

New issue

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# Python : Flask Path Traversal Vulnerability #669

 Closed

 1 of 2 tasks

porcupineyhairs opened this issue on Apr 28 · 54 comments

Assignees



Labels

invalid The Bug Slayer

porcupineyhairs commented on Apr 28

## CVE(s) ID list

This is a placeholder issue. I plan on sending bulk PR's to approx 100 projects. I will add the CVE once the fixes are merged and identifiers are assigned.

## All For One submission

[#407](#)

## Details

TBA

Are you planning to discuss this vulnerability submission publicly? (Blog Post, social networks, etc).

☒ Yes

☐ No

## Blog post link

No response



 This was referenced on Apr 28

**Security Vulnerability Found** noamezekiel/sphere#16

 Closed

**Security Vulnerability Found** noamezekiel/sphere#17


 Closed

**Security Vulnerability Found** pleomax00/flask-mongo-skel#1

 Closed

jorgectf commented on Apr 28 • edited ▼

Contributor

 Just a detail. There's a typo in This bug was found using [CodeQL by Github](here) pointing to affected repo's /issues/codeql.github.com :)

 1

 porcupineyhairs pushed a commit to porcupineyhairs/flask-mongo-skel that referenced this issue on Apr 28

# Absolute Path Traversal due to incorrect use of send\_file call ... 0b1f1c2

 porcupineyhairs pushed a commit to porcupineyhairs/sphere that referenced this issue on Apr 28

# Absolute Path Traversal due to incorrect use of send\_file call ... 184e0ee

  porcupineyhairs mentioned this issue on Apr 28

**Security Vulnerability Found** nlpweb/glance#2

 Closed

 porcupineyhairs pushed a commit to porcupineyhairs/glance that referenced this issue on Apr 28

# Absolute Path Traversal due to incorrect use of send\_file call ... 25af4e7

 This was referenced on Apr 28

**Security Vulnerability Found** nlpweb/glance#4

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🔒 Closed

**Security Vulnerability Found** olmax99/pyathenastack#7

🔒 Closed

🔗 porcupineyhairs pushed a commit to porcupineyhairs/pyathenastack that referenced this issue on Apr 28

# Absolute Path Traversal due to incorrect use of send\_file call ...

45a0dbc

🔗 This was referenced on Apr 28

**Security Vulnerability Found** nlpweb/glance#6

🔒 Closed

**Security Vulnerability Found** olmax99/pyathenastack#9

🔒 Closed

**Security Vulnerability Found** olmax99/helm-flask-celery#1

🔒 Closed

**Security Vulnerability Found** operatorequals/wormnest#7

🔒 Closed

**Security Vulnerability Found** orchest/orchest#906

🔒 Closed

**Security Vulnerability Found** onlaj/Piano-LED-Visualizer#350

🔒 Closed

**Security Vulnerability Found** nrlakin/homepage#1

🔓 Open

🔗 porcupineyhairs pushed a commit to porcupineyhairs/homepage that referenced this issue on Apr 28

# Absolute Path Traversal due to incorrect use of send\_file call ...

c28c561

🔗 This was referenced on Apr 28

**Security Vulnerability Found** piaoyunsoft/bt\_Inmp#7

---

Open

Security Vulnerability Found pleomax00/flask-mongo-skel#3

Open

Security Vulnerability Found olmax99/pyathenastack#10

Open

Security Vulnerability Found nlpweb/glance#7

Open

Fix Path Traversal Vulnerability nlpweb/glance#8

Open

Fix Path Traversal Vulnerability olmax99/pyathenastack#11

Open

Security Vulnerability Found AFDudley/equanimity#2

Open

porcupineyhairs pushed a commit to porcupineyhairs/equanimity that referenced this issue on Apr 28

# Absolute Path Traversal due to incorrect use of send\_file call ...

62ccc57

127 hidden items

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porcupineyhairs commented on May 4 • edited

Author

Hi,

So, all in all, I have been able to send in close to 92 reports. These are independent from the four CVE's referenced in [#480](#).

Here are the details :

Sr. No.	Project	Current State	CVE ID	
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1	ChaoticOnyx/OnyxForum	PR Merged.	GHSA-95jq-7f5x-v9x7	ChaoticOnyx/OnyxForu
2	clinical-genomics/scout	PR Merged.	CVE-2022-1554	<a href="https://www.huntr.dev/99e2-e4e17a81e600/">https://www.huntr.dev/99e2-e4e17a81e600/</a>
3	onlaj/Piano-LED-Visualizer	PR Merged.	GHSA-g78x-q3x8-r6m4	onlaj/Piano-LED-Visua
4	operatorequals/wormnest	PR Merged.	GHSA-v339-rw28-w5fr	operatorequals/wormr
5	orchest/orchest	PR Merged.	GHSA-j2rj-x939-977h	orchest/orchest#906
6	ChangeWeDer/BaiduWenkuSpider_flaskWeb	PR Merged.	CVE-2022-31504	
7	Microsoft/OLive	PR Merged.		<a href="https://www.huntr.dev/96cf-f7f81da10fff/">https://www.huntr.dev/96cf-f7f81da10fff/</a>
8	cheo0/MercadoEnLineaBack	PR Merged.	CVE-2022-31505	<a href="https://github.com/cheo0/MercadoEnLineaBack">https://github.com/cheo0/MercadoEnLineaBack</a>
9	cmusatyalab/opendiamond	PR Merged.	CVE-2022-31506	cmusatyalab/opendiar
10	ganga-devs/ganga	PR Merged.	CVE-2022-31507	ganga-devs/ganga#20
11	idayrus/evoting	PR Merged.	CVE-2022-31508	idayrus/evoting#1

12	<a href="#">iedadata/usap-dc-website</a>	PR Merged.	CVE-2022-31509	<a href="https://www.huntr.dev/8883-d9ccf1f64024/">https://www.huntr.dev/8883-d9ccf1f64024/</a>
13	<a href="#">sergeKashkin/Simple-RAT</a>	PR Merged.	CVE-2022-31510	<a href="#">sergeKashkin/Simple-F</a>
14	<a href="#">AFDudley/equanimity</a>	Fix Pending Merge.	CVE-2022-31511	<a href="#">AFDudley/equanimity#</a>
15	<a href="#">Atom02/flask-mvc</a>	Fix Pending Merge.	CVE-2022-31512	<a href="#">Atom02/flask-mvc#1</a>
16	<a href="#">BolunHan/Krypton</a>	Fix Pending Merge.	CVE-2022-31513	<a href="#">BolunHan/Krypton#1</a>
17	<a href="#">Caoyongqi912/Fan_Platform</a>	Fix Pending Merge.	CVE-2022-31514	<a href="https://github.com/Ca">https://github.com/Ca</a>
18	<a href="#">Delor4/CarceresBE</a>	Fix Pending Merge.	CVE-2022-31515	<a href="#">Delor4/CarceresBE#3</a>
19	<a href="#">Harveyzyh/Python</a>	Fix Pending Merge.	CVE-2022-31516	<a href="https://github.com/Ha">https://github.com/Ha</a>
20	<a href="#">HolgerGraef/MSM</a>	Fix Pending Merge.	CVE-2022-31517	<a href="#">HolgerGraef/MSM#12</a>
21	<a href="#">JustAnotherSoftwareDeveloper/Python-Recipe-Database</a>	Fix Pending Merge.	CVE-2022-31518	<a href="#">JustAnotherSoftwareD Database#9</a>
22	<a href="#">Lukasavicus/WindMill</a>	Fix Pending Merge.	CVE-2022-31519	<a href="#">Lukasavicus/WindMill#</a>
23	<a href="#">Luxas98/logstash-management-api</a>	Fix Pending Merge.	CVE-2022-31520	<a href="#">Luxas98/logstash-man</a>

24	Niyaz-Mohamed/mosaic	Fix Pending Merge.	CVE-2022-31521	
25	NotVinay/karaokey	Fix Pending Merge.	CVE-2022-31522	NotVinay/karaokey#5
26	PaddlePaddle/Anakin	Fix Pending Merge.	CVE-2022-31523	PaddlePaddle/Anakin#
27	PureStorage-OpenConnect/swagger	Fix Pending Merge.	CVE-2022-31524	PureStorage-OpenCon
28	SummaLabs/DLS	Fix Pending Merge.	CVE-2022-31525	SummaLabs/DLS#4
29	ThundeRatz/ThunderDocs	Fix Pending Merge.	CVE-2022-31526	ThundeRatz/ThunderD
30	Wildog/flask-file-server	Fix Pending Merge.	CVE-2022-31527	Wildog/flask-file-serve
31	adobe/OSAS	Fix Pending Merge.		adobe/OSAS#16
32	bonn-activity-maps/bam_annotation_tool	Fix Pending Merge.	CVE-2022-31528	bonn-activity-maps/ba
33	cinemaproject/monorepo	Fix Pending Merge.	CVE-2022-31529	cinemaproject/monore
34	csm-aut/csm	Fix Pending Merge.	CVE-2022-31530	csm-aut/csm#104
35	dainst/cilantro	Fix Pending Merge.	CVE-2022-31531	dainst/cilantro#260

36	<a href="#">dankolbman/travel_blahg</a>	Fix Pending Merge.	<a href="#">CVE-2022-31532</a>	<a href="#">dankolbman/travel_bla</a>
37	<a href="#">decentraminds/umbral</a>	Fix Pending Merge.	<a href="#">CVE-2022-31533</a>	<a href="#">decentraminds/umbra</a>
38	<a href="#">echoleegroup/PythonWeb</a>	Fix Pending Merge.	<a href="#">CVE-2022-31534</a>	<a href="#">echoleegroup/Python\</a>
39	<a href="#">freefood89/Fishtank</a>	Fix Pending Merge.	<a href="#">CVE-2022-31535</a>	<a href="#">freefood89/Fishtank#4</a>
40	<a href="#">jaygarza1982/ytdl-sync</a>	Fix Pending Merge.	<a href="#">CVE-2022-31536</a>	<a href="#">jaygarza1982/ytdl-sync</a>
41	<a href="#">jmcginty15/Solar-system-simulator</a>	Fix Pending Merge.	<a href="#">CVE-2022-31537</a>	<a href="#">jmcginty15/Solar-syste</a>
42	<a href="#">joaopedro-fg/mp-m08-interface</a>	Fix Pending Merge.	<a href="#">CVE-2022-31538</a>	<a href="#">joaopedro-fg/mp-m08</a>
43	<a href="#">kotekan/kotekan</a>	Fix Pending Merge.	<a href="#">CVE-2022-31539</a>	<a href="#">kotekan/kotekan#1024</a>
44	<a href="#">kumardeepak/hin-eng-preprocessing</a>	Fix Pending Merge.	<a href="#">CVE-2022-31540</a>	<a href="#">kumardeepak/hin-eng</a>
45	<a href="#">lyubolp/Barry-Voice-Assistant</a>	Fix Pending Merge.	<a href="#">CVE-2022-31541</a>	<a href="#">lyubolp/Barry-Voice-A</a>
46	<a href="#">mandoku/mdweb</a>	Fix Pending Merge.	<a href="#">CVE-2022-31542</a>	<a href="#">mandoku/mdweb#1</a>
47	<a href="#">maxtortime/SetupBox</a>	Fix Pending Merge.	<a href="#">CVE-2022-31543</a>	<a href="#">maxtortime/SetupBox#</a>



48	<a href="#">meerstein/rbtm</a>	Fix Pending Merge.	<a href="#">CVE-2022-31544</a>	<a href="#">meerstein/rbtm#47</a>
49	<a href="#">ml-inory/ModelConverter</a>	Fix Pending Merge.	<a href="#">CVE-2022-31545</a>	<a href="#">ml-inory/ModelConver</a>
50	<a href="#">nlpweb/glance</a>	Fix Pending Merge.	<a href="#">CVE-2022-31546</a>	<a href="#">nlpweb/glance#7</a>
51	<a href="#">noamezekiel/sphere</a>	Fix Pending Merge.	<a href="#">CVE-2022-31547</a>	<a href="#">noamezekiel/sphere#1</a>
52	<a href="#">nrlakin/homepage</a>	Fix Pending Merge.	<a href="#">CVE-2022-31548</a>	<a href="#">nrlakin/homepage#1</a>
53	<a href="#">olmax99/helm-flask-celery</a>	Fix Pending Merge.	<a href="#">CVE-2022-31549</a>	<a href="#">olmax99/helm-flask-ce</a>
54	<a href="#">olmax99/pyathenastack</a>	Fix Pending Merge.	<a href="#">CVE-2022-31550</a>	<a href="#">olmax99/pyathenastac</a>
55	<a href="#">pleomax00/flask-mongo-skel</a>	Fix Pending Merge.	<a href="#">CVE-2022-31551</a>	<a href="#">pleomax00/flask-mong</a>
56	<a href="#">project-anuvaad/anuvaad-corpus</a>	Fix Pending Merge.	<a href="#">CVE-2022-31552</a>	<a href="#">project-anuvaad/anuv</a>
57	<a href="#">rainsoupah/sleep-learner</a>	Fix Pending Merge.	<a href="#">CVE-2022-31553</a>	<a href="#">rainsoupah/sleep-learn</a>
58	<a href="#">rohitnayak/movie-review-sentiment-analysis</a>	Fix Pending Merge.	<a href="#">CVE-2022-31554</a>	<a href="#">rohitnayak/movie-revi</a>
59	<a href="#">romain20100/nursequest</a>	Fix Pending Merge.	<a href="#">CVE-2022-31555</a>	<a href="#">sylann/nursequest#6</a>

60	<a href="#">rusyasoft/TrainEnergyServer</a>	Fix Pending Merge.	<a href="#">CVE-2022-31556</a>	<a href="#">rusyasoft/TrainEnergyS</a>
61	<a href="#">seveas/golem</a>	Fix Pending Merge.	<a href="#">CVE-2022-31557</a>	<a href="#">seveas/golem#11</a>
62	<a href="#">tooxie/shiva-server</a>	Fix Pending Merge.	<a href="#">CVE-2022-31558</a>	<a href="#">tooxie/shiva-server#18</a>
63	<a href="#">tsileo/flask-yeoman</a>	Fix Pending Merge.	<a href="#">CVE-2022-31559</a>	<a href="#">tsileo/flask-yeoman#2</a>
64	<a href="#">uncleYiba/photo_tag</a>	Fix Pending Merge.	<a href="#">CVE-2022-31560</a>	<a href="#">uncleYiba/photo_tag#</a>
65	<a href="#">varijkapil13/Sphere_ImageBackend</a>	Fix Pending Merge.	<a href="#">CVE-2022-31561</a>	<a href="#">varijkapil13/Sphere_Im</a>
66	<a href="#">waveyan/internshipsystem</a>	Fix Pending Merge.	<a href="#">CVE-2022-31562</a>	<a href="#">waveyan/internshipsys</a>
67	<a href="#">whmacmac/vprj</a>	Fix Pending Merge.	<a href="#">CVE-2022-31563</a>	<a href="#">whmacmac/vprj#2</a>
68	<a href="#">woduq1414/munhak-moa</a>	Fix Pending Merge.	<a href="#">CVE-2022-31564</a>	<a href="#">woduq1414/munhak-r</a>
69	<a href="#">yogson/syrabond</a>	Fix Pending Merge.	<a href="#">CVE-2022-31565</a>	<a href="https://github.com/yogson/syrabond">https://github.com/yogson/syrabond</a>
70	<a href="#">DSAB-local/DSAB</a>	Vulnerability reported.	<a href="#">CVE-2022-31566</a>	<a href="#">DSAB-local/DSAB#2</a>
71	<a href="#">DSABenchmark/DSAB</a>	Vulnerability reported.	<a href="#">CVE-2022-31567</a>	<a href="#">DSABenchmark/DSAB#</a>

72	<a href="#">Rexians/rex-web</a>	Vulnerability reported.	<a href="#">CVE-2022-31568</a>	<a href="#">Rexians/rex-web#5</a>
73	<a href="#">RipudamanKaushikDal/projects</a>	Vulnerability reported.	<a href="#">CVE-2022-31569</a>	<a href="#">RipudamanKaushikDal</a>
74	<a href="#">adriankoczuruek/ceneo-web-scrapper</a>	Vulnerability reported.	<a href="#">CVE-2022-31570</a>	<a href="https://www.huntr.dev/ab25-e02ec2b1a2ae/">https://www.huntr.dev/ab25-e02ec2b1a2ae/</a>
75	<a href="#">akashtalole/python-flask-restful-api</a>	Vulnerability reported.	<a href="#">CVE-2022-31571</a>	<a href="#">akashtalole/python-fla</a>
76	<a href="#">ceee-vip/cockybook</a>	Vulnerability reported.	<a href="#">CVE-2022-31572</a>	<a href="#">ceee-vip/cockybook#1</a>
77	<a href="#">chainer/chainerml-visualizer</a>	Vulnerability reported.	<a href="#">CVE-2022-31573</a>	<a href="#">chainer/chainerml-visua</a>
78	<a href="#">deepaliupadhyay/RealEstate</a>	Vulnerability reported.	<a href="#">CVE-2022-31574</a>	<a href="#">deepaliupadhyay/Reall</a>
79	<a href="#">duducosmos/livro_python</a>	Vulnerability reported.	<a href="#">CVE-2022-31575</a>	<a href="#">duducosmos/livro_pytl</a>
80	<a href="#">heidi-luong1109/shackerpanel</a>	Vulnerability reported.	<a href="#">CVE-2022-31576</a>	<a href="#">heidi-luong1109/shack</a>
81	<a href="#">longmaoteamtf/audio_aligner_app</a>	Vulnerability reported.	<a href="#">CVE-2022-31577</a>	<a href="https://www.huntr.dev/85c7-f5f56f3676fc/">https://www.huntr.dev/85c7-f5f56f3676fc/</a>
82	<a href="#">piaoyunsoft/bt_Inmp</a>	Vulnerability reported.	<a href="#">CVE-2022-31578</a>	<a href="#">piaoyunsoft/bt_Inmp#</a>
83	<a href="#">ralphjzhang/iasset</a>	Vulnerability reported.	<a href="#">CVE-2022-31579</a>	<a href="https://github.com/ralp">https://github.com/ralp</a>

84	<a href="#">sanojtharindu/caretakerr-api</a>	Vulnerability reported.	<a href="#">CVE-2022-31580</a>	<a href="#">sanojtharindu/caretake</a>
85	<a href="#">scorelab/OpenMF</a>	Vulnerability reported.	<a href="#">CVE-2022-31581</a>	<a href="#">scorelab/OpenMF#263</a>
86	<a href="#">shaolo1/VideoServer</a>	Vulnerability reported.	<a href="#">CVE-2022-31582</a>	<a href="#">shaolo1/VideoServer#</a>
87	<a href="#">sravaniboinepelli/AutomatedQuizEval</a>	Vulnerability reported.	<a href="#">CVE-2022-31583</a>	<a href="#">sravaniboinepelli/Auto</a>
88	<a href="#">stonethree/s3label</a>	Vulnerability reported.	<a href="#">CVE-2022-31584</a>	<a href="#">stonethree/s3label#10</a>
89	<a href="#">umeshpatil-dev/Home_internet</a>	Vulnerability reported.	<a href="#">CVE-2022-31585</a>	<a href="#">umeshpatil-dev/Home</a>
90	<a href="#">unizar-30226-2019-06/ChangePop-Back</a>	Vulnerability reported.	<a href="#">CVE-2022-31586</a>	<a href="#">unizar-30226-2019-06,</a>
91	<a href="#">yuriyouzhou/KG-fashion-chatbot</a>	Vulnerability reported.	<a href="#">CVE-2022-31587</a>	<a href="#">yuriyouzhou/KG-fashic</a>
92	<a href="#">zippies/testplatform</a>	Vulnerability reported.	<a href="#">CVE-2022-31588</a>	<a href="https://www.huntr.dev/8e13-6249be5ec005/">https://www.huntr.dev/8e13-6249be5ec005/</a>



39 hidden items

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dependency checks going on, and dependency check failures require us to investigate and resolve such issues before we can merge code and produce releases. So we have multiple projects in need of suppressions now, which adds further maintenance burdens down the line.

I understand you may have little/no control over the CPE/mask that is assigned, and that there may be cases where tooling like DependencyCheck causes further issues, but I absolutely believe flagging a bunch of random people's side projects/test code with security vulnerabilities is at best an immense waste of time and resources of everyone involved, and at worst amounts to abuse of these reporting systems.

Where does it stop? Some random person's bash script which has a `rm -rf /` in it because he thought it would be fun to do some testing and happened to commit it to GitHub?



ascope commented on Jul 19

Matching nothing is an improvement over matching everything (but still not much use). IMO - issuing CVEs for things that aren't consumable by anyone or anything else is not much use and just wasted noise. We will have to agree to disagree (or see what happens)

As much as I appreciate the fact that anyone can open a CVE, I totally agree with this. When creating a CVE, one of the things to consider is the impact of the vulnerability. If this is effectively a personal project that is not being used elsewhere, the impact is minimal. Letting the entire world know via a blanket CVE does not provide reasonable benefit to the development community.

I understand you may have little/no control over the CPE/mask that is assigned, and that there may be cases where tooling like DependencyCheck causes further issues, but I absolutely believe flagging a bunch of random people's side projects/test code with security vulnerabilities is at best an immense waste of time and resources of everyone involved, and at worst amounts to abuse of these reporting systems.

It appears the CVE has been marked as rejected (<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-31569>) which is a flag that this CVE was potentially inappropriate. The given reason was:

```
** REJECT ** DO NOT USE THIS CANDIDATE NUMBER. ConsultIDs: none. Reason: This candidate was withdrawn by its CNA. Further investigation showed that no specific affected product had been identified. Notes: none.
```



which is a flag that this CVE was potentially inappropriate

Outside of the one that caused the issue, most all of the CVEs here on [#669 \(comment\)](#) are inappropriate for the same reason. I'll be submitting those for re-evaluation as well. What a mess!



**marcelstoer** commented on Jul 19 • edited ▼

~~Instead of bulk-submitting CVEs IMO you should have bulk-submitted GitHub issue for the affected projects.~~  
Ok, I see you did.

@skavanagh I also reached out to NIST asking to reject [CVE-2022-31514](#).



**porcupineyhairs** commented on Jul 19

Author

This thread has been blowing up quite a bit. This is most probably going to be my last and final comment for the issue at hand.

The GHSL team along with independent security researchers like me use tools like CodeQL to find security vulnerabilities in open source code. We try and recognise commonly occurring vulnerable patterns in codebases to prevent them from reoccurring. In this case, by performing variant analysis, I found path traversal vulnerabilities in multiple projects. These were reported to their respective maintainers. Those who chose to fix them fixed them, those who didn't didn't. The entire reporting process was semi-automated and maintainers were given enough time before a disclosure was made. With each report, a CVE request was made so as to uniquely identify the issue. Now, CVE identifiers are by a variety of stakeholders for a variety of purposes; be it developers, their users, or security researchers. Sometimes, CVE records are used by devs to inform their users of a vulnerability, sometimes the records are used by authors of tools such as `dependency-check` to scan dependencies for known vulnerabilities and other times, they are used by folks like me to further our research. The CVE record list is not a text book you read page by page or record by record. The CVE project aims to catalog every cybersecurity vulnerability there is. They try to be as broad as possible when accepting a new record. Given that the bug at hand, is a security vulnerability a CVE can be issued for it. There is no scarcity of record numbers and there's no real harm in registering one. In this case, I found a valid vulnerability and responsibly disclosed it. That's it. Fullstop. There's nothing more to it. All I did was share a link to [this](#) comment and requested a CVE. They did the rest. All those CPE identifiers, that not so helpful, probably script generated description for each individual CVE is all their doing. I don't have any role to play in it.

failing builds is a bug in the `OWASP dependency-check` project. Please file a bug report with that project. To repeat, The builds are not failing because I am requesting CVE ids, they fail because the tooling you use is buggy. If your tool can't figure out the difference between libs like `jakarta-annotation-api`, `JUnit 5` and `Fan_Platform`, I can't do much about it. Please check [the issue tracker](#) for that tool, there are multiple CVEs causing dependency checks to fail, not all of them are mine. Now coming to the second issue, as to whether MITRE and other CNA's should or shouldn't try and catalog every vulnerability there exists, all I can say is this issue is not the place for having philosophical discussions and hence, this conversation be taken somewhere else.



**marcelstoer** commented on Jul 19

The GHSL team along with independent security researchers like me use tools like CodeQL to find security vulnerabilities in open source code.



We try and recognise commonly occurring vulnerable patterns in codebases to prevent them from reoccurring.



In this case, by performing variant analysis, I found path traversal vulnerabilities in multiple projects. These were reported to their respective maintainers. Those who chose to fix them fixed them, those who didn't didn't.



The entire reporting process was semi-automated and maintainers were given enough time before a disclosure was made.



With each report, a CVE request was made so as to uniquely identify the issue.



Projects that have no license, no vendor, no version, no release, no package, or no build do not deserve to have CVEs IMO. I feel responsible security researchers should understand the - well, responsibility - they have.

There is no scarcity of record numbers and there's no real harm in registering one.



I disagree, it's just keeping systems and people busy needlessly. In some cases the amount of waste is significant.

Yes and no. By reporting CVEs that shouldn't exist in the first place you triggered it. Of course you are not responsible for potential bugs in the ODC project ([jeremylong/DependencyCheck!4671](#)). I feel that most people engaged in this discussion here do understand that perfectly well.



**skavanagh** commented on Jul 19 • edited ▾

First, the issue of failing builds, folks who are here blaming me for their failing builds should understand that I am not the reason for their failed builds. The reason behind their failing builds is a bug in the OWASP dependency-check project. Please file a bug report with that project. To repeat, The builds are not failing because I am requesting CVE ids, they fail because the tooling you use is buggy.

OWASP dependency-check project is a best effort tool and only as good as the data it utilizes. It breaks up keywords from the vendor, project, and all the fields in the CPE to find matches. The more accurate the data is for the CVE, the more accurate the tool is (other tools too). We all deal with when these tools fail b/c it flags things it shouldn't, but usually the false-positives are against valid CVEs. I'm going to have NIST review all your CVEs. You filed junk data to the in NIST database - PERIOD! It would be nice if you realized the mistake and help clean it up, but I guess not 🙄



**jorgectf** commented on Jul 19

Contributor

Hi all,

Thank you all for bringing this information to our attention. It seems like there was an error assigning the CPEs for some of the CVEs associated with this Bug Slayer submission. We have already conveyed the issue to NIST.

As for the applicability of these CVEs, we do not encourage participants to ask maintainers to request CVEs for small, academic, or personal projects as stated in [our bug bounty rules](#):

Please note that projects which purposely include a vulnerability pattern for testing purposes, projects that are inactive in the last year, and student or academic projects, are considered out of scope.

And therefore, we will not take into account the CVEs assigned to projects matching those conditions.

We are and will be listening to your concerns and suggestions to improve the program and avoid future similar situations.

Thank you.



ascopes commented on Jul 19 • edited ▼

Not wanting to argue with anyone or cause any problems, but I think it is worth adding a couple of points to what has already been said here, a little further up the thread. I appreciate both sides have valid arguments here, but there are a couple of things I disagree with.

The CVE record list is not a text book you read page by page or record by record. The CVE project aims to catalog every cybersecurity vulnerability there is.

The main problem with this mindset is that if you want to document every single security vulnerability there is, you are going to end up with hundreds of thousands of vaguely labelled CVEs from projects made by students who have use-after-free vulnerabilities in their coursework for University. You are going to have vulnerabilities in random proofs of concept for tests. You are going to have CVEs for dummy hello world applications where people hardcode a fake password or don't sanitise a SQL input, or don't encode a URL path safely. All things that in a deployed system would be critical, but in a proof of concept or test, do not actually have any significance.

From this, a situation will arise where we are going to have so much noise and so many CVEs with vague CPEs that it will make the database completely unusable in enterprise and open source scenarios. This limits the use of any of these reports where this database is used for continuous integration and vulnerability detection to prevent human error.

This will just discourage the use of the NVE database entirely. The end result will be a far less secure cyberspace.

The purpose of a CVE is to evaluate the impact of a vulnerability (hence the 10 point rating system). A vulnerability that impacts, say, React Native, is going to naturally have a wider impact than a hello world application that exists for purely symbolic purposes. With additional noise and misclassifications, it becomes increasingly difficult to accurately determine that impact. In the same way that it is far harder to hear someone talk if everyone in the room is shouting.

If your tool can't figure out the difference between libs like jakarta-annotation-api, JUnit 5 and Fan\_Platform

I think you have misunderstood the issue here a little. The issue is that it is somewhat difficult to determine what the library is when the CPE marks the name as \*. Even for myself, it is not clear what that CVE is actually for. I still don't fully understand what library it is targeting. Even with the word project in it, it does not provide any meaningful information. Those CPEs are meant to be machine readable, which is why many sites print them as monospace.

I appreciate it is not your fault this was misconfigured, but it is worth taking into appreciation when considering how the thread has blown up.

Also worth noting some of the listed projects have had zero activity since 2015, so raising a CVE is going to have little effect on amending that code base. At least one of those I clicked on does not even exist.

skavanagh commented on Jul 19

I will be asking NIST to re-evaluate the following CVEs based on the justification below. There were some CVEs that were legit and should have been requested, but most weren't. These CVEs should absolutely not have been requested (or even approved) as there are no impacted products. We trip up on enough false-positives on valid CVEs. PRs are fine, but not CVEs.

CVE	JUSTIFICATION
CVE-2022-31504	<a href="https://github.com/ChangeWeDer/BaiduWenkuSpider_flaskWeb">https://github.com/ChangeWeDer/BaiduWenkuSpider_flaskWeb</a> has no license, no vendor, no version, no release, no package, no build, and is thus not consumable by another party.
CVE-2022-31505	<a href="https://github.com/cheo0/MercadoEnLineaBack">https://github.com/cheo0/MercadoEnLineaBack</a> This was a personal repository, but no longer exists. Regardless it has no license, no vendor, no version, no release, no package, no build, and is thus not consumable by another party.
CVE-2022-31509	<a href="https://github.com/iedadata/usap-dc-website">https://github.com/iedadata/usap-dc-website</a> This is the website for USAP-DC and specific to that use case. It has no license or package that is consumable by another party.
CVE-2022-31510	<a href="https://github.com/sergeKashkin/Simple-RAT">https://github.com/sergeKashkin/Simple-RAT</a> has no license, no vendor, no version, no release, no package, no build, and is thus not consumable by another party.
CVE-2022-31511	<a href="https://github.com/AFDudley/equanimity">https://github.com/AFDudley/equanimity</a> has no usable license, no vendor, no version, no release, no package, no build, and is thus not consumable by another party.
CVE-2022-31512	<a href="https://github.com/Atom02/flask-mvc">https://github.com/Atom02/flask-mvc</a> has no license, no vendor, no version, no release, no package, no build, and is thus not consumable by another party.
CVE-2022-31513	<a href="https://github.com/BolunHan/Krypton">https://github.com/BolunHan/Krypton</a> has a MIT license, but still no vendor, no version, no release, no package, no build, and is thus not consumable by another party (it's someone's personal repository).
CVE-2022-31514	<a href="https://github.com/Caoyongqi912/Fan_Platform">https://github.com/Caoyongqi912/Fan_Platform</a> has no license, no vendor, no version, no release, no package, no build, and is thus not consumable by another party.
CVE-2022-31515	<a href="https://github.com/Delor4/CarceresBE">https://github.com/Delor4/CarceresBE</a> has no license, no vendor, no version, no release, no package, no build, and is thus not consumable by another party.

2022-31516	Regardless it has no license, no vendor, no version, no release, no package, no build, and is thus not consumable by another party.
CVE-2022-31518	<a href="https://github.com/JustAnotherSoftwareDeveloper/Python-Recipe-Database">https://github.com/JustAnotherSoftwareDeveloper/Python-Recipe-Database</a> has no license, no vendor, no version, no release, no package, no build, and is thus not consumable by another party.
CVE-2022-31520	<a href="https://github.com/Luxas98/logstash-management-api">https://github.com/Luxas98/logstash-management-api</a> has no license, no vendor, no version, no release, no package, no build, and is thus not consumable by another party.
CVE-2022-31521	<a href="https://github.com/Niyaz-Mohamed/Mosaic">https://github.com/Niyaz-Mohamed/Mosaic</a> has no license, no vendor, no version, no release, no package, no build, and is thus not consumable by another party.
CVE-2022-31526	<a href="https://github.com/ThundeRatz/ThunderDocs">https://github.com/ThundeRatz/ThunderDocs</a> has no license, no vendor, no version, no release, no package, no build, and is thus not consumable by another party.
CVE-2022-31527	<a href="https://github.com/Wildog/flask-file-server">https://github.com/Wildog/flask-file-server</a> has no license, no vendor, no version, no release, no package, no build, and is thus not consumable by another party.
CVE-2022-31528	<a href="https://github.com/bonn-activity-maps/bam_annotation_tool">https://github.com/bonn-activity-maps/bam_annotation_tool</a> has no license, no vendor, no version, no release, no package, no build, and is thus not consumable by another party.
CVE-2022-31532	<a href="https://github.com/dankolbman/travel_blahg">https://github.com/dankolbman/travel_blahg</a> has a MIT license, but still no vendor, no version, no release, no package, no build, and is thus not consumable by another party (it's someone's personal repository).
CVE-2022-31533	<a href="https://github.com/decentraminds/umbral">https://github.com/decentraminds/umbral</a> has no license, no vendor, no version, no release, no package, no build, and is thus not consumable by another party.
CVE-2022-31534	<a href="https://github.com/echoleegroup/PythonWeb">https://github.com/echoleegroup/PythonWeb</a> has no license, no vendor, no version, no release, no package, no build, and is thus not consumable by another party.
CVE-2022-31535	<a href="https://github.com/freefood89/Fishtank">https://github.com/freefood89/Fishtank</a> has no license, no vendor, no version, no release, no package, no build, and is thus not consumable by another party.
CVE-2022-31536	<a href="https://github.com/jaygarza1982/ytdl-sync">https://github.com/jaygarza1982/ytdl-sync</a> has no license, no vendor, no version, no release, no package, no build, and is thus not consumable by another party.

2022-31537	<a href="https://github.com/jmcginty15/Solar-system-simulator">https://github.com/jmcginty15/Solar-system-simulator</a> has no license, no vendor, no version, no release, no package, no build, and is thus not consumable by another party.
CVE-2022-31538	<a href="https://github.com/joaopedro-fg/mp-m08-interface">https://github.com/joaopedro-fg/mp-m08-interface</a> has no license, no vendor, no version, no release, no package, no build, and is thus not consumable by another party.
CVE-2022-31540	<a href="https://github.com/kumardeepak/hin-eng-preprocessing">https://github.com/kumardeepak/hin-eng-preprocessing</a> has no license, no vendor, no version, no release, no package, no build, and is thus not consumable by another party.
CVE-2022-31544	<a href="https://github.com/meerstein/rbtm">https://github.com/meerstein/rbtm</a> has no license, no vendor, no version, no release, no package, no build, and is thus not consumable by another party.
CVE-2022-31545	<a href="https://github.com/ml-inory/ModelConverter">https://github.com/ml-inory/ModelConverter</a> has no license, no vendor, no version, no release, no package, no build, and is thus not consumable by another party.
CVE-2022-31546	<a href="https://github.com/nlpweb/glance">https://github.com/nlpweb/glance</a> has no license, no vendor, no version, no release, no package, no build, and is thus not consumable by another party.
CVE-2022-31547	<a href="https://github.com/noamezekiel/sphere">https://github.com/noamezekiel/sphere</a> has no license, no vendor, no version, no release, no package, no build, and is thus not consumable by another party.
CVE-2022-31548	<a href="https://github.com/nrlakin/homepage">https://github.com/nrlakin/homepage</a> has no license, no vendor, no version, no release, no package, no build, and is thus not consumable by another party.
CVE-2022-31551	<a href="https://github.com/pleomax00/flask-mongo-skel">https://github.com/pleomax00/flask-mongo-skel</a> has no license, no vendor, no version, no release, no package, no build, and is thus not consumable by another party.
CVE-2022-31552	<a href="https://github.com/project-anuvaad/anuvaad-corpus">https://github.com/project-anuvaad/anuvaad-corpus</a> has no license, no vendor, no version, no release, no package, no build, and is thus not consumable by another party.
CVE-2022-31553	<a href="https://github.com/rainsoupah/sleep-learner">https://github.com/rainsoupah/sleep-learner</a> has no license, no vendor, no version, no release, no package, no build, and is thus not consumable by another party.
CVE-2022-31554	<a href="https://github.com/rohitnayak/movie-review-sentiment-analysis">https://github.com/rohitnayak/movie-review-sentiment-analysis</a> has a MIT license, but still no vendor, no version, no release, no package, no build, and is thus not consumable by another party (it's someone's personal repository).

2022-31555	no release, no package, no build, and is thus not consumable by another party (it's someone's personal repository).
CVE-2022-31556	<a href="https://github.com/rusyasoft/TrainEnergyServer">https://github.com/rusyasoft/TrainEnergyServer</a> has no license, no vendor, no version, no release, no package, no build, and is thus not consumable by another party.
CVE-2022-31557	<a href="https://github.com/seveas/golem">https://github.com/seveas/golem</a> has no license, no vendor, no version, no release, no package, no build, and is thus not consumable by another party.
CVE-2022-31559	<a href="https://github.com/tsileo/flask-yeoman">https://github.com/tsileo/flask-yeoman</a> has a MIT license, but still no vendor, no version, no release, no package, no build, and is thus not consumable by another party (it's someone's personal repository).
CVE-2022-31560	<a href="https://github.com/uncleYiba/photo_tag">https://github.com/uncleYiba/photo_tag</a> has no license, no vendor, no version, no release, no package, no build, and is thus not consumable by another party.
CVE-2022-31561	<a href="https://github.com/varijkapil13/Sphere_ImageBackend">https://github.com/varijkapil13/Sphere_ImageBackend</a> has a BSD license, but still no vendor, no version, no release, no package, no build, and is thus not consumable by another party (it's someone's personal repository).
CVE-2022-31562	<a href="https://github.com/waveyan/internshipsystem">https://github.com/waveyan/internshipsystem</a> has a MIT license, but still no vendor, no version, no release, no package, no build, and is thus not consumable by another party (it's someone's personal repository for a student internship).
CVE-2022-31563	<a href="https://github.com/whmacmac/vprj">https://github.com/whmacmac/vprj</a> has no license, no vendor, no version, no release, no package, no build, and is thus not consumable by another party.
CVE-2022-31564	<a href="https://github.com/woduq1414/munhak-moa">https://github.com/woduq1414/munhak-moa</a> has no license, no vendor, no version, no release, no package, no build, and is thus not consumable by another party.
CVE-2022-31565	<a href="https://github.com/yogson/syrabond">https://github.com/yogson/syrabond</a> has no license, no vendor, no version, no release, no package, no build, and is thus not consumable by another party.
CVE-2022-31566	<a href="https://github.com/DSAB-local/DSAB">https://github.com/DSAB-local/DSAB</a> has no license, no vendor, no version, no release, no package, no build, and is thus not consumable by another party.
CVE-2022-31567	<a href="https://github.com/DSABenchmark/DSAB">https://github.com/DSABenchmark/DSAB</a> has no license, no vendor, no version, no release, no package, no build, and is thus not consumable by another party.

2022-31568	<a href="https://github.com/Rexians/rex-web">https://github.com/Rexians/rex-web</a> This is the website for Rexians Community and specific to that usecase. It has no license or package that is consumable by another party.
CVE-2022-31570	<a href="https://github.com/adriankoczuruek/ceneo-web-scrapper">https://github.com/adriankoczuruek/ceneo-web-scrapper</a> has no license, no vendor, no version, no release, no package, no build, and is thus not consumable by another party.
CVE-2022-31571	<a href="https://github.com/akashtalole/python-flask-restful-api">https://github.com/akashtalole/python-flask-restful-api</a> has a MIT license, but still no vendor, no version, no release, no package, no build, and is thus not consumable by another party (it's someone's personal repository).
CVE-2022-31572	<a href="https://github.com/ceee-vip/cockybook">https://github.com/ceee-vip/cockybook</a> has no license, no vendor, no version, no release, no package, no build, and is thus not consumable by another party.
CVE-2022-31574	<a href="https://github.com/deepaliupadhyay/RealEstate">https://github.com/deepaliupadhyay/RealEstate</a> has no license, no vendor, no version, no release, no package, no build, and is thus not consumable by another party.
CVE-2022-31575	<a href="https://github.com/duducosmos/livro_python">https://github.com/duducosmos/livro_python</a> has no license, no vendor, no version, no release, no package, no build, and is thus not consumable by another party.
CVE-2022-31576	<a href="https://github.com/heidi-luong1109/shackerpanel">https://github.com/heidi-luong1109/shackerpanel</a> has no license, no vendor, no version, no release, no package, no build, and is thus not consumable by another party.
CVE-2022-31577	<a href="https://github.com/longmaoteamtf/audio_aligner_app">https://github.com/longmaoteamtf/audio_aligner_app</a> has a MIT license, but still no vendor, no version, no release, no package, no build, and is thus not consumable by another party.
CVE-2022-31578	<a href="https://github.com/piaoyunsoft/bt_Inmp">https://github.com/piaoyunsoft/bt_Inmp</a> has no license, no vendor, no version, no release, no package, no build, and is thus not consumable by another party.
CVE-2022-31579	<a href="https://github.com/ralphjzhang/iasset">https://github.com/ralphjzhang/iasset</a> This was a personal repository, but no longer exists. Regardless it has no license, no vendor, no version, no release, no package, no build, and is thus not consumable by another party.
CVE-2022-31582	<a href="https://github.com/shaolo1/VideoServer">https://github.com/shaolo1/VideoServer</a> , has a GPL license, but still no vendor, no version, no release, no package, no build, and is thus not consumable by another party (it's someone's personal repository).
CVE-2022-31583	<a href="https://github.com/sravaniboinepelli/AutomatedQuizEval">https://github.com/sravaniboinepelli/AutomatedQuizEval</a> has no license, no vendor, no version, no release, no package, no build, and is thus not consumable by another party.

2022-31585	<a href="https://github.com/umesnpatii-dev/Home__internet">https://github.com/umesnpatii-dev/Home__internet</a> has no license, no vendor, no version, no release, no package, no build, and is thus not consumable by another party.
CVE-2022-31587	<a href="https://github.com/yuriyouzhou/KG-fashion-chatbot">https://github.com/yuriyouzhou/KG-fashion-chatbot</a> has no license, no vendor, no version, no release, no package, no build, and is thus not consumable by another party.
CVE-2022-31588	<a href="https://github.com/zippies/testplatform">https://github.com/zippies/testplatform</a> has no license, no vendor, no version, no release, no package, no build, and is thus not consumable by another party.

porcupineyhairs commented on Jul 19

Author

Here's what MITRE has to say about all of this

Thank you for contacting us. We are primarily concerned with the amount of time required to debate CVE Records for products that are not widely used. Regardless of whether something is a "valid vulnerability in a valid Github repo" it is possible that nobody will ever use the affected code. We cannot devote a lot of time to the optimal resolution of debates about software that has very few users and/or would be difficult to incorporate into other projects.

CVE Records need to be about software products, not solely about Github repos. By far, the most common case is that one repo is used for one software product. However, as you can see,

<https://github.com/RipudamanKaushikDal/projects>

is about many unrelated software-development efforts by the same person. The information in your original CVE ID request pointed only to <https://github.com/github/securitylab/issues/669> and did not point to the <https://github.com/RipudamanKaushikDal/projects/issues/21> issue that said the vulnerability was in something called `image_search_gallery`. This makes the CVE ID request and the CVE Record completely invalid, and it is removed from the main CVE List. We do keep it in our GitHub repo forever:

<https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelist/blob/c791c48acd4ec8c16b331cc745e98f3118d21568/2022/31xxx/CVE-2022-31569.json>

in case someone needs it. However, <https://github.com/RipudamanKaushikDal/projects> seems to be about copying code to GitHub for personal learning without any intention to make the code usable by other people.

If you need a CVE ID for `image_search_gallery`, we can provide one, but

Fan\_Platform is a completely different case. Indeed, earlier today someone wanted it removed, but we did not remove it, Instead we told them that their objections were not sufficient. We looked at it and decided:

1. There might be a bug in <https://github.com/jeremylong/DependencyCheck> that causes Fan\_platform to match `^pkg:maven/org\.junit\.platform/junit\.-platform` - in other words, the presence of the "platform" substring might be enough for DependencyCheck to guess that there is a dependency
2. There has been an assertion of "no license" in a situation where multiple GitHub users have been contributing to the codebase. Even if you do not know what the license is, the continuing activity by multiple persons makes it reasonable to expect that they have arranged among themselves to allow use of the software.

Again, because of time constraints, we will not necessarily send any responses or notifications about additional CVE Records that people want rejected. Your work is still a valid application of the CodeQL tool even if the GitHub repos aren't for widely used software, and your work can potentially improve the process by which other persons use CodeQL in the future. Thank you for your contribution.



porcupineyhairs commented on Jul 19

Author

I can see [CVE-2022-31569](#) has been removed. MITRE says I can seek a new CVE with the correct sub-project name but they don't encourage this. So I am not going to apply for a CVE that particular project again. As for the disputes to all other CVE's are considered. I think they are effectively addressed by the message above. Everyone visiting this thread for addressing their failed builds can take up the issue of the false positive with their respective tool maintainers.

With that said, [@jorgectf](#), the bounty application still remains in place. So far I have 13 projects and 2 independent forks which have addressed the vulnerability. Of these, [Microsoft/Olive](#) has merged the fix but is yet to issue a CVE. I received a message from them late last week that they are still working on this and would get back soon. [cheo0/MercadoEnLineaBack](#) had merged the fix but now the repo has been deleted. I do have a clone [porcupineyhairs/MercadoEnLineaBack](#) which has been included in the [LGTM run](#) I shared earlier. As for the forks, [scaraude/Piano-LED-Visualizer](#) and [Nbobito/Piano-LED-Visualizer](#), these are forks of [onlaj/Piano-LED-Visualizer](#) but have diverged from the original repo. They should be treated as separate projects but I haven't sought a CVE for them and I haven't included them in the LGTM run.

The impact metrics for of these vulnerabilities remains the exactly as we discussed [here](#)





I'll appeal to NIST directly on the CVEs in question, but to address the points made

There has been an assertion of "no license" in a situation where multiple GitHub users have been contributing to the codebase. Even if you do not know what the license is, the continuing activity by multiple persons makes it reasonable to expect that they have arranged among themselves to allow use of the software.

A lack of licensing would mean a library or project is less likely to be used elsewhere. A lack of a release is even less likely, A build even more. And on top of all, if it hasn't even been published or versioned - I think it's safe to question if anything is really impacted. Do any of these CVEs have any sort of product or service behind them that is vulnerable?

There might be a bug in <https://github.com/jeremylong/DependencyCheck> that causes Fan\_platform to match ^pkg:maven/org.junit.platform/junit-platform - in other words, the presence of the "platform" substring might be enough for DependencyCheck to guess that there is a dependency'

Dependency check (and other tools) have to do this on purpose. They break up the keywords in the CPE to identify possible vulnerable dependencies. If the NIST data could be used to perfectly identify a vulnerable dependency then there wouldn't be the need to do this and all would be well. This "bug" sometimes accounts for the very problem caused by the negligent submission CVEs. Bad data in = Bad data out. You can't build good tools around bad data. Not saying the NIST data is bad, it's very good! We find legit vulnerabilities all the time, but we need to keep it that way. Submitting CVEs for random github projects does not serve that purpose. The world does not need to know about a vulnerability in [Uncle Yiba's photo\\_tag project - CVE-2022-31560](#). It takes manpower and computing power to ensure things are identified properly. It's not cheap!



5

**marcelstoer** mentioned this issue on Jul 21

**Fix #4671** [jeremylong/DependencyCheck#4688](#)

Merged

**skavanagh** mentioned this issue on Jul 23

**Reject Python pet projects CVEs** [CVEProject/cvelist#6623](#)

Closed

**xcorail** commented on Jul 28

Contributor

assessing the findings we have determined this submission is not eligible for a reward under the Bug Bounty program, because the security vulnerabilities have been disclosed publicly, in public Issues and Pull Requests.

The Bug Slayer program requires that you disclose the vulnerabilities following a **coordinated disclosure** process. Here are the extracts of our rules that mention this:

To be eligible for a bounty, you must first coordinate disclosure and fix of the vulnerabilities with the maintainers of the projects

The CVEs must correspond to vulnerabilities that have been disclosed and fixed via coordinated disclosure with the maintainers.

We know that private collaboration between security researchers and maintainers is sometimes difficult, but that is precisely the point of this program. As stated in our rules:

The goal of this program is to incentivize the collaboration with maintainers to fix vulnerabilities.

Even though this submission was assessed as being ineligible for the bounty program, we appreciate your efforts finding and fixing security vulnerabilities at scale in open source projects, and would like to offer you a thank you reward.

Best regards and happy hacking!

 **xcorail** closed this as completed on Jul 28

**ghsecuritylab** commented on Jul 28

Collaborator

Your submission is now in status **Closed**.

*For information, the evaluation workflow is the following:*

*Initial triage > Test run > Results analysis > Query review > Final decision > Pay > Closed*

**porcupineyhairs** commented on Aug 4

Author

Okay, so @xcorail and I discussed this on Slack the other day. I am posting a brief below to keep track of the conversation. Here's what I understand so far.

GHSL wants to promote responsible behaviour and hence requests that a researcher only make a Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure(CVD). In this case, GHSL deems that by making a public issue and a public PR with a fix, I have violated CVD norms. Instead of filing public issues and public PR's, I should have contacted each maintainer individually and requested them to either fix the vulnerability, provide them a private patch or at least seek prior permission before submitting the PR.

Reporting, Validation and Triage, Remediation, Public Awareness and Deployment. It explicitly says that a stakeholder may be responsible for more than one phase. In this case, since everything till the Remediation phase was handled by me. I discovered the underlying issue, validated the vulnerability, drafted a report and even created a patch; I claim that there is no real adversary advantage resulting from my acts. None of the projects were, even for a few minutes, left without a patch.

I claim, since the vendor for open source projects is typically the owner of the repo and the repository's contributors, by the virtue of me submitting a tested patch, I, for the purposes of CVD, can act as a vendor. @xcorail does not agree with this. They say, the vendor should only be the owner or a previous contributor. I can't deem myself as a vendor and publish a patch.

I would also like to point out that my CodeQL patch was merged directly into an already existing stable query. So the vulnerabilities were already publicly visible on LGTM. In fact, walking through the LGTM alerts for the particular rule is what led me to those projects in the first place. While I claim above that I carried out the reporting phase, it was in fact LGTM which did it. The vulnerability was publicly shown on LGTM well before I attempted to patch them. My public Github issues/PRs don't make any new additions on that front. My PRs on the contrary aid in fixing them. I might have made the public disclosure which prompted the maintainers to act but I am not the first one to discuss the vulnerability publicly. LGTM did that before me by making alerts publicly visible.

By this decision, I believe GHSL is implying that no new alert on LGTM, resulting from a CodeQL stable query, or any additional patch on it, would ever be eligible for Bug Slayer. Is this intended?



xcorail commented on Aug 4

Contributor

I claim, since the vendor for open source projects is typically the owner of the repo and the repository's contributors, by the virtue of me submitting a tested patch, I, for the purposes of CVD, can act as a vendor. @xcorail does not agree with this. They say, the vendor should only be the owner or a previous contributor. I can't deem myself as a vendor and publish a patch.

Indeed I do not agree with you. The reporter cannot be a vendor. If you look at page 17 of the CERT guide that you mention, the vendor is clearly defined, and when they talk about open source they say Many open source libraries are maintained by a single person or a small independent team; we still refer to these individuals and groups as vendors which implies that in the open source case, the vendor is a maintainer or a group of maintainers of the projects (and not all contributors). You can totally publish a patch if you want, but you cannot consider yourself as a vendor in the documented CVD. The CVD is a **collaboration** between the reporter and the vendor, so the reporter cannot be the vendor.

By this decision, I believe GHSL is implying that no new alert on LGTM, resulting from a CodeQL stable query, or any additional patch on it, would ever be eligible for Bug Slayer.

**skavanagh** commented on Aug 4

I'll just chime in here too.. b/c you are doing things so wrong.

I discovered the underlying issue, validated the vulnerability, drafted a report and even created a patch

I don't see how you could have done this. Most of those "projects" don't have a viable application that you could have gotten up and running. Have you done a reproduction or exploited any of these "applications" that you have alerted the public about? Just b/c something shows in a SAST scan doesn't mean it's vulnerable. It's got to be exploitable in the context of a running application.

I claim, since the vendor for open source projects is typically the owner of the repo and the repository's contributors, by the virtue of me submitting a tested patch.

Yeah.. that's BS! You couldn't have "tested" the patch on a running "application" there are no applications to run on those CVEs you've opened. Maybe you've tested the remediation by itself, but you have not in the context of those projects. It's just scraps of code in various repositories.

IMO - Mitre has handled this wrong too. Lots of wrong everywhere.



**porcupineyhairs** commented on Aug 4

Author

@xcorail

The LGTM alerts are indeed visible to the public, but they are not yet verified and triaged. If you use one of these alerts, verify it, create a PoC for it, propose a patch or not,

CVD says verification and triage is done by the vendor. Provided that the vendor can reproduce the issue by reading the report, PoC, patch etc are not required by CVD. In this case, qhelp would typically suffice.

disclose it privately following the CVD, and get the consent of the maintainer to create a public PR, then that would be eligible to our program.

The disclosure is already done. A report's a report regardless of who does it. A report even from a less trusted source is still processed the same way. Yes, during verification/triage the vendor may still decline it but I don't see any special exclusions for anyone there. I am trying to understand how a report from LGTM differs from a report by me on this front.

In this case, GHSL deems that by making a public issue and a public PR with a fix, I have violated CVD norms. Instead of filing public issues and public PR's, I should have contacted each maintainer individually and requested them to either fix the vulnerability, provide them a private patch or at least seek prior permission before submitting the PR.

Isn't this the whole definition of responsible disclosure? You don't make dangerous information known to the world until actions have been taken to prevent it being exploited by falling into the wrong hands. By making an issue the center of attention by raising public paperwork for it, you are just holding up a big flashing sign saying "hey, I found an exploit for your application that is dangerous, come see".

If the exploit isn't dangerous or has very limited or no scope, it then questions the appropriateness of a CVE.

The vulnerability was publicly shown on LGTM well before I attempted to patch them.

LGTM just shows the potential for a vulnerability to be present. It does not understand every edge case that exists to prove something is exploitable. LGTM is an advisory assistive tool, not a single source of truth.

LGTM is also an automated tool, it lacks the ability to exercise situational discretion in the same way you do as a human. This is important to distinguish.

I have seen applications that LGTM would raise as being vulnerable to CVEs that are just totally incorrect (one being Log4Shell), purely because a dependency has an optional binding to that library. The noise by false positives is always a deterrent for people looking for quick ways to exploit deployed software. LGTM can also be left misconfigured for some projects, which can add additional noise that an attacker would have to spend time and resources working around.

By raising issues and PRs before a fix has been evaluated and ideally implemented, you are effectively reducing the legwork needed by people scraping for exploits. Unlike LGTM, you are saying "I have proven that this is vulnerable", not just "this has the potential to be vulnerable based on other cases I know of".

For most Flask apps that are just hobby/pet projects, the impact is somewhat limited, but imagine if you did this for heartbleed, or spectre-like attacks. It would throw everyone into an immediate panic.



porcupineyairs commented on Aug 4 • edited ▼

Author

@ascope

By making an issue the center of attention by raising public paperwork for it, you are just holding up a big flashing sign saying "hey, I found an exploit for your application that is dangerous, come see".

LGTM just shows the potential for a vulnerability to be present. It does not understand every edge case that exists to prove something is exploitable. LGTM is an advisory assistive tool, not a single source of truth.

In the coordinated vulnerability disclosure process, each report is to be assessed independently. The sources may be less trusted but that does not mean you disregard the report.

I have seen applications that LGTM would raise as being vulnerable to CVEs that are just totally incorrect (one being Log4Shell), purely because a dependency has an optional binding to that library. The noise by false positives is always a deterrent for people looking for quick ways to exploit deployed software.

Agreed.

By raising issues and PRs before a fix has been evaluated and ideally implemented, you are effectively reducing the legwork needed by people scraping for exploits. Unlike LGTM, you are saying "I have proven that this is vulnerable", not just "this has the potential to be vulnerable based on other cases I know of".

The fix are comparatively minor and all assessed manually by me. A report for "has the potential to be vulnerable" is still a report worth taking a look at according to CERT's CVD guidelines. Yes, one could have looked at my profile and found a very useful set of results but I don't know if there would be a meaningful impact in this case.

Basically, I am seeking a few clarifications on GHSL's bounty program. GHSL is rejecting my report saying I am making a public disclosure instead of a CVD. But the thing is if you strictly go by the CVD guidelines, then even LGTM alerts are treated as valid reports. If GHSL is disqualifying my report due to non-conformance with CVD guidelines, I would like to know if GHSL plans on disqualifying all cases where a public LGTM alert was shown as ineligible on similar grounds.



**ascopes** commented on Aug 4 • edited ▼

In the coordinated vulnerability disclosure process

This is kind of missing my point. My point is not that it follows some defined process. My point is that it is a difference between speculation and confirmation.

I sent in a public patch to fix bugs which were valid after manual testing.

That's the point, you explicitly declared and confirmed the vulnerability. Without doing that, it is not clear that the issue was actually a problem in the first place.

seeing the dependency list most of the time. LGTM is just linking that and the patterns for it. Neither are disclosing a confirmed issue.

It is a case of providing additional information that was not there before, either via clarity, reproductions, confirmation, or additional attack vectors.

Not speaking on behalf of the project, but that is my assumption as to why this is the case.



**xcorail** commented on Aug 4

Contributor

Basically, I am seeking a few clarifications on GHSL's bounty program. GHSL is rejecting my report saying I am making a public disclosure instead of a CVD. But the thing is if you strictly go by the CVD guidelines, then even LGTM alerts are treated as valid reports.

I don't agree. LGTM alerts are not valid reports. They are just results of a SAST tool, without any human additional analysis of whether the alert is exploitable or not.

If GHSL is disqualifying my report due to non-conformance with CVD guidelines, I would like to know if GHSL plans on disqualifying all cases where a public LGTM alert was shown as ineligible on similar grounds.

I already answered this question above. If you transform one of these alerts into an actionable report, by adding your added value as a security researcher (examples from what @ascopes said: either via clarity, reproductions, confirmation), and disclose it privately to the maintainer, then it would be eligible.



**skavanagh** commented on Aug 4

I use CodeQL on my projects, BTW! Love it!



**porcupineyhairs** mentioned this issue on Aug 7

**Go : PAM Authorization Bypass #686**

Closed

2 tasks

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 **NickHastings** pushed a commit to NickHastings/ganga that referenced this issue on Sep 12

 # Absolute Path Traversal due to incorrect use of send\_file call ([g...](#) ...

8157aae

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#### Assignees

 jorgectf

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#### Labels

**invalid**   The Bug Slayer

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#### Projects

None yet

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#### Milestone

No milestone

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#### Development

No branches or pull requests

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#### 15 participants

