

Talos Vulnerability Report

TALOS-2022-1544

Accusoft ImageGear PICT parsing pctwread_14841 out-of-bounds write vulnerability

OCTOBER 27, 2022

CVE NUMBER

CVE-2022-32588

SUMMARY

An out-of-bounds write vulnerability exists in the PICT parsing pctwread_14841 functionality of Accusoft ImageGear 20.0. A specially-crafted malformed file can lead to memory corruption. An attacker can provide a malicious file to trigger this vulnerability.

CONFIRMED VULNERABLE VERSIONS

The versions below were either tested or verified to be vulnerable by Talos or confirmed to be vulnerable by the vendor.

Accusoft ImageGear 20.0

PRODUCT URLS

ImageGear - <https://www.accusoft.com/products/imagegear-collection/>

CVSSV3 SCORE

9.8 - CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

CWE

CWE-119 - Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer

DETAILS

The ImageGear library is a document-imaging developer toolkit that offers image conversion, creation, editing, annotation and more. It supports more than 100 formats such as DICOM, PDF, Microsoft Office and others.

There is a vulnerability in the `pctwread_14841` function, due to a buffer overflow caused by a missing buffer size check.

A specially-crafted PICT file can lead to an out-of-bounds write, which can result in memory corruption.

Trying to load a malformed PICT file, we end up in the following situation:

```
(1fac.7dc): Access violation - code c0000005 (first chance)
First chance exceptions are reported before any exception handling.
This exception may be expected and handled.
eax=0d10cfff ebx=0d108f60 ecx=00000078 edx=0000402f esi=00000002 edi=00000020
eip=6d848a98 esp=0019f664 ebp=0019f670 iopl=0         nv up ei pl nz na pe cy
cs=0023  ss=002b  ds=002b  es=002b  fs=0053  gs=002b             efl=00010207
igcore20d!IG_mpi_page_set+0xdc908:
6d848a98 884801          mov     byte ptr [eax+1],cl          ds:002b:0d10d000=??
```

The issue is happening in the following code at LINE12, where we can see `dest_buffer` is written with bytes from `src_buffer`, controlled through a do-while loop at LINE10-LINE17 with the `length` passed in parameter.

```
LINE1  byte * __cdecl pict_perform_some_copy_148a60(byte *dest_buffer,byte
*src_buffer,int length)
LINE2  {
LINE3    byte *_dest_buffer;
LINE4    ushort uVar1;
LINE5    int index;
LINE6
LINE7    index = 0;
LINE8    if (0 < length) {
LINE9      _dest_buffer = dest_buffer + 1;
LINE10     do {
LINE11       uVar1 = CONCAT11(src_buffer[index * 2],src_buffer[index * 2 + 1]);
LINE12       _dest_buffer[1] = src_buffer[index * 2 + 1] << 3;
LINE13       index = index + 1;
LINE14       *_dest_buffer = (byte)(uVar1 >> 2) & 0xf8;
LINE15       _dest_buffer[-1] = (byte)(uVar1 >> 7) & 0xf8;
LINE16       _dest_buffer = _dest_buffer + 3;
LINE17     } while (index < length);
LINE18   }
LINE19   return _dest_buffer;
LINE20 }
```

When we look at the eax memory allocation corresponding to our buffer dest_buffer seen previously, we can see the buffer allocated is very small, only 1 byte:

```
0:000> !heap -p -a eax
address 0d10cfff found in
_DPH_HEAP_ROOT @ 2cb1000
in busy allocation (  DPH_HEAP_BLOCK:      UserAddr      UserSize -
VirtAddr      VirtSize)
                        d1608f0:      d10cff8      1 -
d10c000      2000
6dbca8b0 verifier!AVrfDebugPageHeapAllocate+0x000000240
77c0f10e ntdll!RtlDebugAllocateHeap+0x00000039
77b770f0 ntdll!RtlpAllocateHeap+0x000000f0
77b76e3c ntdll!RtlpAllocateHeapInternal+0x0000104c
77b75dde ntdll!RtlAllocateHeap+0x0000003e
6d50daff MSVCR110!malloc+0x00000049
6d76663e igcore20d!AF_memmm_alloc+0x0000001e
6d8484f7 igcore20d!IG_mpi_page_set+0x000dc367
6d847991 igcore20d!IG_mpi_page_set+0x000db801
6d741399 igcore20d!IG_image_savelist_get+0x00000b29
6d7809e7 igcore20d!IG_mpi_page_set+0x00014857
6d780349 igcore20d!IG_mpi_page_set+0x000141b9
6d715777 igcore20d!IG_load_file+0x00000047
00402239 Fuzzme!fuzzme+0x00000019
00402544 Fuzzme!fuzzme+0x00000324
004062a0 Fuzzme!fuzzme+0x00004080
762ffa29 KERNEL32!BaseThreadInitThunk+0x00000019
77b97a9e ntdll!_RtlUserThreadStart+0x0000002f
77b97a6e ntdll!_RtlUserThreadStart+0x0000001b
```

Investigating the callstack for the memory allocation and especially the igcore20d!IG_mpi_page_set+0x000dc367 leads us into a function named pctwread_148410 at LINE95 with the following pseudo-code:

```

LINE21  AT_ERRCOUNT
LINE22  pctwread_148410(mys_table_function *mys_table_fun,uint heap,undefined
param_3,
LINE23          pict_header *pict_header,HIGDIBINFO higdibinfo)
LINE24  {
[...]
```

```

LINE73    raster_size = IO_raster_size_get(higdibinfo);
LINE74    bloc_of_pixel? = pict_header->bloc_of_pixels?;
LINE75    buffer_from_file.size_buffer =
LINE76        (int)*(short *)((int)&bloc_of_pixel?->bounds_bottom + 2) -
LINE77        (int)*(short *)((int)&bloc_of_pixel?->bounds_top + 2);
LINE78    size_buffer_2 = buffer_from_file.size_buffer * 5;
LINE79    if ((int)size_buffer_2 < (int)raster_size) {
LINE80
AF_err_record_set("..\\..\\..\\..\\Common\\Formats\\pctwread.c",0x2f5,-0x194,0,raste
r_size,
LINE81          buffer_from_file.size_buffer,(LPCHAR)0x0);
LINE82    }
LINE83    else {
[...]
```

```

LINE95    buffer_raster = (byte *)AF_memmm_alloc(saved_heap,raster_size);
LINE96    size_to_read = saved_heap;
LINE97    src_buffer = (byte *)AF_memmm_alloc(saved_heap,size_buffer_2);
LINE98    raster_size_by_height = dup_raster_size * height;
LINE99    local_2c = (byte *)AF_memmm_alloc(size_to_read,raster_size_by_height);
LINE100    local_68 = AF_memmm_alloc(size_to_read,raster_size_by_height);
LINE101    dup_buffer_raster = buffer_raster;
LINE102    if (((buffer_raster == (byte *)0x0) || (src_buffer == (byte *)0x0)) ||
(local_2c == (byte *)0x0)
LINE103        ) {
LINE104        err_status_iolibcreate_iob_init =
LINE105
AF_err_record_set("..\\..\\..\\..\\Common\\Formats\\pctwread.c",0x308,-1000,0,0,0,
LINE106          (LPCHAR)0x0);
LINE107    }
LINE108    else if ((pixelSize#1 == 0x20) && (cmpCount == 4)) {
LINE109        local_38 = True;
LINE110    }
LINE111    dup_src_buffer = local_2c;
LINE112    OS_memset(local_2c,0,raster_size_by_height);
LINE113    err_status_iob_init=
IOb_init(mys_table_fun,saved_heap,&buffer_from_file,0x5000,1);
LINE114    ppVar3 = saved_pict_header;
LINE115    err_status_iolibcreate_iob_init = err_status_iolibcreate_iob_init +
err_status_iob_init;
LINE116    if (err_status_iolibcreate_iob_init == 0) {
LINE117        IO_attribute_set(mys_table_fun,4,
LINE118          (AT_RESOLUTION *)&saved_pict_header-
>horizontal_pixel_per_inch);
LINE119        cmpCount = 0;
LINE120        _index_bloc_data = 0;
LINE121        do {
LINE122            if ((int)ppVar3->field15_size_buffer <= (int)cmpCount) break;
LINE123            bloc_of_pixel? = ppVar3->bloc_of_pixels?;
LINE124            pbVar1 = (bits_per_channel_table *)
LINE125                (uint)*(ushort *)((int)&bloc_of_pixel?->cmpCount +
_index_bloc_data);
LINE126            if ((bits_per_channel_table *)0x2 < pbVar1) {
```

```

LINE127         pbVar1 = (bits_per_channel_table *)0x3;
LINE128     }
LINE129     iVar2 = 0;
LINE130     if (pbVar1 != (bits_per_channel_table *)0x0) {
LINE131         do {
LINE132             local_14[iVar2] = (uint)*(ushort *)((int)&bloc_of_pixel?-
>cmpSize + _index_bloc_data);
LINE133             iVar2 = iVar2 + 1;
LINE134         } while (iVar2 < (int)pbVar1);
LINE135     }
LINE136     size_to_read = (int)*(short *)((int)&(bloc_of_pixel?-
>dstRect.bottom).srcRect.right +
LINE137         _index_bloc_data) -
LINE138         (int)*(short *)((int)&(bloc_of_pixel?-
>dstRect.top).srcRect.left +
LINE139         _index_bloc_data);
LINE140     local_70 = (int)*(short *)((int)&(bloc_of_pixel?-
>dstRect.bottom).srcRect.bottom +
LINE141         _index_bloc_data) -
LINE142         (int)*(short *)((int)&(bloc_of_pixel?-
>dstRect.top).srcRect.top +
LINE143         _index_bloc_data);
LINE144     dup#2_size_to_read = size_to_read;
LINE145     IO_raster_size_calc(size_to_read,pbVar1,(int *)local_14);
LINE146     if (pixelSize#1 == 1) {
LINE147         size_to_read = DIB1bit_packed_raster_size_calc(size_to_read);
LINE148     }
LINE149     else {
LINE150         size_to_read = DIBStd_raster_size_calc_simple
LINE151             (size_to_read,pbVar1,
LINE152             (uint)*(ushort *)
LINE153             ((int)&saved_pict_header-
>bloc_of_pixels?->cmpSize +
LINE154             _index_bloc_data));
LINE155     }
LINE156     bloc_of_pixel? = saved_pict_header->bloc_of_pixels?;
LINE157     local_5c = (int)*(short *)((int)&bloc_of_pixel?->bounds_bottom +
_index_bloc_data + 2) -
LINE158         (int)*(short *)((int)&bloc_of_pixel?->bounds_top +
_index_bloc_data + 2);
LINE159     local_40 = size_to_read;
LINE160     IOb_seek(&buffer_from_file,*(int *)(&bloc_of_pixel?->field_0x3c +
_index_bloc_data),0);
LINE161     dup_buffer_raster = buffer_raster;
LINE162     OS_memset(buffer_raster,0,raster_size);
LINE163     if (pixelSize#1 != 0x18) {
LINE164         size_to_read = (uint)*(ushort *)
LINE165             ((int)&saved_pict_header->bloc_of_pixels?->
rowBytes_value_without_pixmapflag +
LINE166             _index_bloc_data);
LINE167     }
LINE168     local_64 = (uint)*(ushort *)
LINE169         ((int)&saved_pict_header->bloc_of_pixels?-
>packType + _index_bloc_data);
LINE170     local_54 = 0;
LINE171     dup_size_to_read = size_to_read;
LINE172     if (err_status_iodibcreate_iob_init == 0) {
LINE173         for (; size_to_read = dup_size_to_read, local_54 < local_70;
local_54 = local_54 + 1) {

```



```

LINE225 LAB_1014891b:
LINE226         err_status_iodibcreate_iob_init =
LINE227
AF_err_record_set("../..\\Common\\Formats\\pctwread.c",iVar2,-0x834,0,0,
LINE228                     0,(LPCHAR)0x0);
LINE229         break;
LINE230     }
[... ]
LINE270     }
LINE271     }
LINE272     cmpCount = cmpCount + 1;
LINE273     _index_bloc_data = _index_bloc_data + 0x440;
LINE274     ppVar3 = saved_pict_header;
LINE275     } while (err_status_iodibcreate_iob_init == 0);
[... ]
LINE290     }
[... ]
LINE305     }
[... ]
LINE309 }

```

The computation of the size for our buffer `buffer_raster` is identified by the variable `raster_size` at LINE73 and made through a call to `IO_raster_size_get`. In our case we can see `raster_size` set to 0, making the buffer 1 byte only.

We have to investigate through several nested functions to identify where `raster_size` is computed, starting from function `IO_raster_size_get`:

```

LINE310 uint IO_raster_size_get(HIGDIBINFO higdibinfo)
LINE311 {
[... ]
    /* indirect call to some computer_raster_size */
LINE322     _raster_size = DIBStd_raster_size_get(higdibinfo);
LINE323     return _raster_size;
LINE324 }

```

The function `IO_raster_size_get` at LINE322 is calling the function `DIBStd_raster_size_get`:

```

LINE325 AT_INT DIBStd_raster_size_get(HIGDIBINFO hdib)
LINE326 {
[... ]
LINE344     uVar1 = (*hdib->igdibstd_vftable->IGDIBStd::compute_raster_size)(hdib);
LINE345     *in_FS_OFFSET = local_10;
LINE346     return uVar1;
LINE347 }

```

This function is calling a function named `compute_raster_size` at LINE344 with the following pseudo-code :

```
LINE348 uint __thiscall IGDIBStd::compute_raster_size(IGDIBRunEnds *this)
LINE349 {
LINE350     uint _raster_size;
LINE351     ulonglong uVar1;
LINE352     longlong _computed_raster_size;
LINE353     longlong _bits_channel;
LINE354
LINE355     _bits_channel =
LINE356         (longlong)(int)this->depth_round_value *
LINE357         (longlong)(int)(this->table_color).ptr_bits_per_channel_table;
LINE358     uVar1 = __allmul((uint)_bits_channel,(uint)((ulonglong)_bits_channel >>
0x20),this->biHeight,
LINE359         (int)this->biHeight >> 0x1f);
LINE360     _computed_raster_size = (longlong)(uVar1 + 0x1f) >> 3;
LINE361     _raster_size = (uint)_computed_raster_size & 0xfffffffffc;
LINE362     if ((-1 < _computed_raster_size) &&
LINE363         ((0 < (int)((longlong)(uVar1 + 0x1f) >> 0x23) || (0x7fffffff <
_raster_size)))) {
LINE364         wrapper_throw_exception
LINE365             ((undefined *)0xffffffff6f,(char *)0x0,(undefined *)0x0,
(undefined *)0x0,
LINE366             (undefined **)0x10230a38,(undefined *)0x29);
LINE367     }
LINE368     return _raster_size;
LINE369 }
```

Finally we can observe that the returned value `_raster_size` at LINE368 is derived from `_computed_raster_size` on LINE361, which is itself computed from a multiplication between `_bits_channel` and `this->biHeight` at LINE358.

To get a null product, one of the two multipliers must be null, which in our case is `this->biHeight`. Now in order to identify where `this->biHeight` is coming from, you may put a breakpoint on access memory using a debugger with a recorded trace, for example, or put some breakpoints backward and so on.

Using one of the two methods, we'll end into a function I named `pctwread_coppalette_1482a0` with the following pseudo-code:


```

LINE370 AT_ERRCOUNT pctwread_copypalette_1482a0(pict_header *pict_header, LPHDIB
lphDib)
LINE371 {
[...]
```

LINE385 biBitCount = 0;

LINE386 if (pict_header->possible_v2_type == 0) {

LINE387 pict_header->possible_v2_type = 3;

LINE388 pict_header->field10_0x20 = 1;

LINE389 pict_header->field12_0x28 = 1;

LINE390 uVar3 = pict_header->bloc_of_pixels?->hRes;

LINE391 uVar1 = uVar3 >> 0x10;

LINE392 if (uVar1 != 0) {

LINE393 uVar3 = uVar1;

LINE394 }

LINE395 pict_header->horizontal_pixel_per_inch = uVar3;

LINE396 uVar3 = pict_header->bloc_of_pixels?->vRes;

LINE397 uVar1 = uVar3 >> 0x10;

LINE398 if (uVar1 != 0) {

LINE399 uVar3 = uVar1;

LINE400 }

LINE401 pict_header->vertical_pixel_per_inch = uVar3;

LINE402 }

LINE403 if (pict_header->v2type == 0xffffe0000) {

LINE404 lower_right_x = (pict_header->optimal_src_rectangle_72dpi).frame_lower_right_x;

LINE405 biHeigth = (int)(short)(pict_header->optimal_src_rectangle_72dpi).frame_lower_right_y -

LINE406 (int)(short)(pict_header->optimal_src_rectangle_72dpi).frame_top_left_y;

LINE407 top_left_x = (pict_header->optimal_src_rectangle_72dpi).frame_top_left_x;

LINE408 }

LINE409 else {

LINE410 lower_right_x = (pict_header->frame_info).frame_lower_right_x;

LINE411 biHeigth = (int)(short)(pict_header->frame_info).frame_lower_right_y -

LINE412 (int)(short)(pict_header->frame_info).frame_top_left_y;

LINE413 top_left_x = (pict_header->frame_info).frame_top_left_x;

LINE414 }

LINE415 _biWidth = (int)(short)lower_right_x - (int)(short)top_left_x;

LINE416 if ((int)biHeigth < 0) {

LINE417 biHeigth = -biHeigth;

LINE418 }

LINE419 [...]

LINE438 _status = DIB_info_create_cnvt_res

LINE439 (lphDib, biHeigth, _biWidth, biBitCount, 0,

LINE440 *(undefined8 *)&pict_header->horizontal_pixel_per_inch,

LINE441 *(undefined8 *)&pict_header->vertical_pixel_per_inch,

LINE442 pict_header->possible_v2_type);

LINE443 if ((_status == 0) && (_biWidth = DIB_colorspace_get(*lphDib), _biWidth ==

LINE444 3)) {

LINE445 call_IGDIB::DIB_palette_alloc(*lphDib);

LINE446 _Size = DIB_palette_size_get(*lphDib);

LINE447 _Src = &pict_header->bloc_of_pixels?->field25_0x40;

LINE448 _Dst = (void *)DIB_palette_pointer_get(*lphDib);

LINE449 memcpy(_Dst, _Src, _Size);

LINE449 }

LINE450 AVar2 = AF_error_check();

```
LINE451    return AVar2;  
LINE452 }
```

In our case, the interesting `biHeight` is computed at LINE405, which is the result of a subtraction of two variables: `frame_lower_right_y` and `frame_top_left_y`. In all cases where these two variables are equal or null, the subtraction is null, thus `biHeight`.

Earlier, we saw in `pict_perform_some_copy_148a60` at LINE17 the do-while loop is controlled by the `length` variable passed in parameter, corresponding to `dup#2_size_to_read` at LINE212 in the function `pctwread_148410`. This variable is a duplicate of `size_to_read` at LINE144, which is also read from the `pict` file.

Thus a missing check for a minimum size in the code is enabling the vulnerability to trigger. The assignments happening inside that function are out-of-bounds heap writes which lead to memory corruption and possibly code execution.

The `pict` file after research must have the following constraint: it must be a `pict v2` extended file type. The processing of opcode `DirectBitsRect` or `PackBitsRect` is prone to the vulnerability.

Crash Information

0:000> !analyze -v

```
*****
*
*                               Exception Analysis
*
*
*****
```

KEY_VALUES_STRING: 1

Key : AV.Fault
Value: Write

Key : Analysis.CPU.mSec
Value: 5562

Key : Analysis.DebugAnalysisManager
Value: Create

Key : Analysis.Elapsed.mSec
Value: 14140

Key : Analysis.Init.CPU.mSec
Value: 7530

Key : Analysis.Init.Elapsed.mSec
Value: 90474

Key : Analysis.Memory.CommitPeak.Mb
Value: 163

Key : Timeline.OS.Boot.DeltaSec
Value: 382110

Key : Timeline.Process.Start.DeltaSec
Value: 32

Key : WER.OS.Branch
Value: vb_release

Key : WER.OS.Timestamp
Value: 2019-12-06T14:06:00Z

Key : WER.OS.Version
Value: 10.0.19041.1

Key : WER.Process.Version
Value: 1.0.2.0

NTGLOBALFLAG: 2000000

PROCESS_BAM_CURRENT_THROTTLED: 0

PROCESS_BAM_PREVIOUS_THROTTLED: 0

APPLICATION_VERIFIER_FLAGS: 0

APPLICATION_VERIFIER_LOADED: 1

EXCEPTION_RECORD: (.exr -1)

ExceptionAddress: 6d848a98 (igcore20d!IG_mpi_page_set+0x000dc908)

ExceptionCode: c0000005 (Access violation)

ExceptionFlags: 00000000

NumberParameters: 2

Parameter[0]: 00000001

Parameter[1]: 0d10d000

Attempt to write to address 0d10d000

FAULTING_THREAD: 000007dc

PROCESS_NAME: Fuzzme.exe

WRITE_ADDRESS: 0d10d000

ERROR_CODE: (NTSTATUS) 0xc0000005 - The instruction at 0x%p referenced memory at 0x%p. The memory could not be %s.

EXCEPTION_CODE_STR: c0000005

EXCEPTION_PARAMETER1: 00000001

EXCEPTION_PARAMETER2: 0d10d000

STACK_TEXT:

WARNING: Stack unwind information not available. Following frames may be wrong.

0019f670 6d8487b9 0d10cff8 0d108f60 00000020 igcore20d!IG_mpi_page_set+0xdc908

0019f734 6d847991 0019fc3c 1000001e 0ab58ff8 igcore20d!IG_mpi_page_set+0xdc629

0019fbb4 6d741399 0019fc3c 0ab58ff8 00000001 igcore20d!IG_mpi_page_set+0xdb801

0019fbec 6d7809e7 00000000 0ab58ff8 0019fc3c

igcore20d!IG_image_savelist_get+0xb29

0019fe68 6d780349 00000000 052acfd0 00000001 igcore20d!IG_mpi_page_set+0x14857

0019fe88 6d715777 00000000 052acfd0 00000001 igcore20d!IG_mpi_page_set+0x141b9

0019fea8 00402239 052acfd0 0019febc 762ff550 igcore20d!IG_load_file+0x47

0019fec0 00402544 052acfd0 0019fef8 0520cf48 Fuzzme!fuzzme+0x19

0019ff28 004062a0 00000005 05206f88 0520cf48 Fuzzme!fuzzme+0x324

0019ff70 762ffa29 003f2000 762ffa10 0019ffdc Fuzzme!fuzzme+0x4080

0019ff80 77b97a9e 003f2000 8b0919bf 00000000 KERNEL32!BaseThreadInitThunk+0x19

0019ffdc 77b97a6e ffffffff 77bb8a56 00000000 ntdll!_RtlUserThreadStart+0x2f

0019ffec 00000000 00406328 003f2000 00000000 ntdll!_RtlUserThreadStart+0x1b

STACK_COMMAND: ~0s ; .cxr ; kb

SYMBOL_NAME: igcore20d!IG_mpi_page_set+dc908

MODULE_NAME: igcore20d

IMAGE_NAME: igcore20d.dll

FAILURE_BUCKET_ID:

INVALID_POINTER_WRITE_AVRF_c0000005_igcore20d.dll!IG_mpi_page_set

OS_VERSION: 10.0.19041.1

BUILDLAB_STR: vb_release

```
OSPLATFORM_TYPE:  x86
OSNAME:  Windows 10
IMAGE_VERSION:  20.0.0.0
FAILURE_ID_HASH:  {fe8f80f8-683f-d41f-7c33-712a409d5fb5}

Followup:  MachineOwner
-----
```

TIMELINE

2022-06-22 - Vendor Disclosure
2022-10-25 - Vendor Patch Release
2022-10-27 - Public Release

CREDIT

Discovered by Emmanuel Tacheau of Cisco Talos.

VULNERABILITY REPORTS

PREVIOUS REPORT

NEXT REPORT

TALOS-2022-1523

TALOS-2022-1600

