


1. How this is being fixed?

Firstly, look back to the original regex: $/([^)]*/)[\\n\t]/g$.

The hotspot is $([^{)}]*$. The process would be, sequentially:



- 1. Try to match the (character.
- 2. Try to match all those characters that are not), as many times as possible (greedy).
- 3. Try to match the) character.


This process will be executed for the full input string and repeated with substring (remove the start character) until match all the three steps or all characters are checked.

Consider the evil payload format: "(".repeat(x) (the worst-case). This payload will exploit the greedy mechanism of step 2 and the backtracking mechanism of the failure matching process.

For each (, step 2 will check all the rest of the substring characters (it costs X - num_of_checked_substring substeps) which certainly fails and the process has to backtrack and repeat for total X substrings. **This is a polynomial complexity problem**.

Now, look to the suggested fix: /((?:(?!/().)*/)[[n/t]/gs.

The hotspot (after remove a non-capture group (?:)) is: \(((?!\().)*\)



only costs linear steps based on the length of the input string.

2. There are a lot of regular expressions used in this project. Are there any similar issues in this project? How we can find and fix it?

The mission of moment is a third-party package that helps other projects and applications achieve their goals. I believe that eliminating all possible security vulnerabilities is crucial work for the community. Give a huge thank you and all the awesome contributors of this project. I see a lot of effort to reduce the risk of ReDos attack vector in the past (#2936, #4163, and other relative commits). After carefully looking at the codebase, this is the only ReDoS vulnerability left I could find. To prevent this kind of vulnerability in the future, we just need to carefully use efficient regexes. The recheck (see the online version) is a useful tool to check the complexity of regex, just make sure that only the safe or linear regexes should be used.

3. Is this compatible all the way back to Roman Empire JavaScript?

I am not sure what you asking about. But if you are concerned about the compatibility of the fix, I have tested the fix and confirm that it passed *160,555* test cases of unit tests. Or if I missing something, please let me know, and we will figure it out together.

References:

- Regular expression Denial of Service ReDoS (OWASP)
- Protect Against Regex Denial Of Service ReDoS
- Staicu, Cristian-Alexandru, and Michael Pradel. "Freezing the Web: A Study of {ReDoS} Vulnerabilities in {JavaScript-based} Web Servers." 27th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 18). 2018.





emer7 commented on Jun 22

Hi is there update to this fix? Thank you

vovikhangcdv commented on Jun 22

Contributor Author

Hi @ichernev, could you review the PR?

ichernev commented on Jul 5

Contributor

Hey, sorry for the delay, I'll release a build in the coming days with the fix, I was a bit worried about the lookahead (if it was supported), but the current implementation uses whitelist, which is better.

vovikhangcdv commented on Jul 5

Contributor

Author

Hey, sorry for the delay, I'll release a build in the coming days with the fix, I was a bit worried about the lookahead (if it was supported), but the current implementation uses whitelist, which is better.

Good to see you back. If you can confirm the issue, could you validate my report on Hunter?. It will help my work too. Thank you, @ichernev.

ichernev commented on Jul 5

Contributor

How about we change $(/([^)]*/)[_n\t]/g$ to $(/([^()]*/)[_n\t]/g$? As far as I get it you should avoid matching more open brackets, so we can just prevent that.

icherney commented on Jul 5

Contributor

@vovikhangcdv

I can merge the fix with [^()], I can give further attribution to you if necessary (i.e make a security advisory in github), for reporting it. I'll use your excellent description from a few comments above.



update regex by avoid matching more open brackets

✓ 4bbb9f3

vovikhangcdv commented on Jul 5

Contributor

Author

Hey @ichernev,

I can confirm your solution solves the security issue and work well. I have added a commit change from your suggestion.

vovikhangcdv commented on Jul 5 • edited •

Contributor

Author

advisory in github), for reporting it. I'll use your excellent description from a few comments above.

As a researcher, being credited on moment security advisory or assigned CVE is my pleasure. I would appreciate that. Thank you @ichernev.

icherney commented on Jul 6

Contributor

Reading through the specification of the date format, it looks like formally a comment (stuff in brackets) can have a nested comment inside:


```
FWS
                       ([*WSP CRLF] 1*WSP) / ; Folding white space
                       obs-FWS
ctext
                       NO-WS-CTL / ; Non white space controls
                       %d33-39 /
                                      ; The rest of the US-ASCII
                       %d42-91 /
                                       ; characters not including "(",
                                      ; ")", or "\"
                       %d93-126
ccontent
                       ctext / quoted-pair / comment
                       "(" *([FWS] ccontent) [FWS] ")"
comment
CFWS
                       *([FWS] comment) (([FWS] comment) / FWS)
```

note how comment includes ccontent which might include comment. Also note that CFWS is part of the obs-tokens, short for *obsolete*, so if this was obsolete in 2001 it might be safe to move on:)

To be fair, the Ruby standard library fails to parse dates with comments, so I'm not 100% sure we should deal with this crap. But if we do, there should be code to track open/closed parenthesis, if there is anything unbalanced the parsing should fail (because there are no brackets allowed in the actual string). This code is linear, so won't introduce bottlenecks.

If we keep the current comment approach (disallow open and close paren inside comment), it will "capture" (and remove) only the inner most comment, and the parsing will fail if there are nested comments (which, given the legacy-ness of all of this might be fine :)).





⊙ Open eexit mentioned this pull request on Jul 12 **Upgrade moment to 2.29.3** TryGhost/Ghost-Storage-Base#66 រ៉េ Open adleong mentioned this pull request on Jul 12 web: Update moment for CVE-2022-31129 linkerd/linkerd2#8856 **№** Merged **a** unlikelyzero mentioned this pull request on Jul 14 Update moment nasa/openmct#5509 **№** Merged 15 tasks debricked (bot) mentioned this pull request on Jul 18 Fix CVE-2022-31129 suculent/thinx-device-api#400 Merged jhuckaby added a commit to jhuckaby/Cronicle that referenced this pull request on Jul 29 Bumped moment to v2.29.4 for vuln ... b939bf4 github-actions (bot) mentioned this pull request on Aug 1 **CVE-2022-31129 - high detected in moment['2.19.3']** rhicksiii91/goof#279 ⊙ Open stondino00 mentioned this pull request on Aug 7 Security Dependency Update Moment.js to 2.29.4 in Nextcloud 24.0.4 nextcloud/server#33478

⊙ Open

ÇŽ	debricked (bot) mentioned this pull request on Aug 8
	Fix CVE-2022-31129 OS2iot/OS2IoT-frontend#113
	I Closed
ÇŽ	icoloboschi mentioned this pull request on Aug 30
	[security] Upgrade moment.js to 2.29.4 datastax/pulsar-admin-console#81
Ç	michaeljmarshall pushed a commit to datastax/pulsar-admin-console that referenced this pull request on Aug 30
	<pre> ② [security] Upgrade moment.js to 2.29.4 (#81) ✓ 4e6b3f4</pre>
Ç₹	craigfay mentioned this pull request on Sep 6
	[CF] (Security) Upgrade "rollup-plugin-license" to resolve vulnerability in MomentJS Econify/moonshine-css#29
	\$→ Merged
以	S jorritfolmer mentioned this pull request on Oct 21
	Splunkbase blocking issues for cloud vetting v4.1.0 jorritfolmer/TA-dmarc#45
	⊙ Open
Reviev	vers
No rev	riews
Assign	nees
No on	e assigned
Labels	
None	yet

Projects

Milestone

No milestone

Development

Successfully merging this pull request may close these issues.

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

4 participants







