

## Oracle Database Weak NNE Integrity Key Derivation

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NNE's integrity protection mechanism deliberately weakens the key used for computing per-packet message authentication codes (MACs). Oracle Database versions 19c, 12.2.0.1, and 12.1.0.2 are affected.

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SHA-256 | 819ba67d5e27ccd91c65c8f0781b76862e43a929fdc227c9dab9c9d20d7aa8d2

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Advisory ID: SYSS-2021-062  
Product: Database  
Manufacturer: Oracle  
Affected Version(s): 12.1.0.2, 12.2.0.1, 19c  
Tested Version(s): 19c  
Vulnerability Type: Inadequate Encryption Strength (CWE-326)  
Risk Level: Medium  
Solution Status: Fixed  
Manufacturer Notification: 2021-03-17  
Solution Date: 2021-08-07  
Public Disclosure: 2021-12-10  
CVE Reference: CVE-2021-2351  
Author of Advisory: Moritz Bechler, SysSS GmbH

Overview:

Oracle Database is a general purpose relational database management system (RDBMS).

The manufacturer describes the product as follows (see [1]):

"Oracle database products offer customers cost-optimized and high-performance versions of Oracle Database, the world's leading converged, multi-model database management system, as well as in-memory, NoSQL and MySQL databases. Oracle Autonomous Database, available on premises via Oracle Cloud@Customer or in the Oracle Cloud Infrastructure, enables customers to simplify relational database environments and reduce management workloads."

To protect the client/server communication, a proprietary security protocol "Native Network Encryption" (NNE) is used.  
A TLS-based alternative can optionally be configured.

NNE's integrity protection mechanism deliberately weakens the key used for computing per-packet message authentication codes (MACs).

Vulnerability Details:

When analyzing the protocol details, SysSS found out that depending on the selected hash algorithms, one of two key generation schemes is used. Both are seeded with material from the established session key. However, even for the AES-based key generator, which is used when modern cryptographic primitives are selected, the session key is truncated to 40 bits.

For more details on the protocol and MAC computation, refer to our paper [4].

Brute-force cracking of that key, for example if only integrity but no encryption is enabled, is likely possible and allows malicious manipulation of transmitted database commands or data.

Proof of Concept (PoC):

The initialization of the key generator, as originally implemented, can be described with the following Python code, where SK is the established session key, and the initialization vector (IV) was exchanged in clear text during NNE negotiation.

```
mk = SK[0:5] + b'\xFF' + b'\x00' * 10
self.m = AES.new(mk, AES.MODE_CBC, iv=IV[0:16])
self.ms = b'\x00' * 32
self.ms = self.m.encrypt(self.ms)
self.m = AES.new(self.m, AES.MODE_CBC, iv=self.ms[16:32])

k1 = s[0:5] + b'\xB4' + s[6:16]
self.s2c = AES.new(k1, AES.MODE_CBC, iv=s[16:32])
self.s2cs = b'\x00' * 32

k2 = s[0:5] + b'\x5A' + s[6:16]
self.c2s = AES.new(k2, AES.MODE_CBC, iv=s[16:32])
self.c2ss = b'\x00' * 32
```

A per-packet key "k" is then generated like

```
self.c2ss = k = self.c2s.encrypt(self.c2ss)
```

and appended to the packet data as well as hashed using the selected hash algorithm.

Solution:

Update the Oracle Database servers and clients to the patched versions.  
Enforce usage of a secured protocol version by setting the following options:

```
SQLNET.ALLOW_WEAK_CRYPTO_CLIENTS=FALSE (server-side)
SQLNET.ALLOW_WEAK_CRYPTO=FALSE (client-side)
```

Or use TLS-based transport security instead of Native Network Encryption.

More information:  
<https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/cpujul2021.html>  
<https://support.oracle.com/rs?type=doc&id=2791571.1> (customer account required)

Disclosure Timeline:

2013-03-02: Vulnerability discovered  
2021-03-17: Vulnerability reported to manufacturer  
2021-07-20: Initial patch release by manufacturer  
2021-08-07: Final patches released by manufacturer  
2021-12-10: Public disclosure of vulnerability

References:

[1] Product website for Oracle Database  
<https://www.oracle.com/database/>  
[2] SysSS Security Advisory SYSS-2021-062  
<https://www.sysss.de/filesadmin/dokumente/Publikationen/Advisories/SYSS-2021-062.txt>  
[3] SysSS Responsible Disclosure Policy

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https://www.syss.de/en/responsible-disclosure-policy
[4] Paper "Oracle Native Network Encryption"
https://www.syss.de/fileadmin/dokumente/Publikationen/2021/2021_Oracle_NNE.pdf
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Credits:

This security vulnerability was found by Moritz Bechler of SySS GmbH.

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Public Key: https://www.syss.de/fileadmin/dokumente/PGPKeys/Moritz_Bechler.asc
Key ID: 0x7688FE28B3E3DDA
Key Fingerprint: 2C8F F1D1 9D77 BDE6 465E CCC2 768E FE2B B3E5 3DDA
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