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heap overflow in stbtt_find_table in stb_truetype.h #866

⊙ Closed sleicasper opened this issue on Jan 6, 2020 · 4 comments

1 stb truetype Labels

```
sleicasper commented on Jan 6, 2020
heap overflow in line 1281. stbtt_find_table doesn't check any out of bound access, so heap overflow can be triggered here.
      static stbtt_uint32 stbtt_find_table(stbtt_uint8 *data, stbtt_uint32 fontstart, const char *tag)
         stbtt_int32    num_tables = ttUSHORT(data+fontstart+4);
        stbtt uint32 tabledir = fontstart + 12:
         stbtt_int32 i;
          rr (i=0; i < num_tables; ++i) {
  stbtt_uint32 loc = tabledir + 16*i;
  if (stbtt_tag(data+loc+0, tag))</pre>
                    ttULONG(data+loc+8)
poc:
poc.zip
result:
   ==52890==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x60200000002c at pc 0x0000004c96ca bp 0x7fffffffd800 sp 0x7ffffffd7f8
  READ of size 1 at 0x60200000002c thread TO
     #0 0x4c96c9 (/home/casper/targets/struct/stb/dbg/fuzzrun/ttfuzz+0x4c96c9)
      #1 0x4df961 (/home/casper/targets/struct/stb/dbg/fuzzrun/ttfuzz+0x4df961)
     #2 0x4d71a2 (/home/casper/targets/struct/stb/dbg/fuzzrun/ttfuzz+0x4d71a2)
#3 0x4e1b28 (/home/casper/targets/struct/stb/dbg/fuzzrun/ttfuzz+0x4e1b28)
      #4 0x7ffff6e24b96 (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21b96)
     #5 0x41ad49 (/home/casper/targets/struct/stb/dbg/fuzzrun/ttfuzz+0x41ad49)
  0x60200000002c is located 12 bytes to the right of 16-byte region [0x602000000010,0x6020000000020)
  allocated by thread T0 here:
#0 0x492c4d (/home/casper/targets/struct/stb/dbg/fuzzrun/ttfuzz+0x492c4d)
     #1 0x4e1ac8 (/home/casper/targets/struct/stb/dbg/fuzzrun/ttfuzz+0x4e1ac8)
#2 0x7ffff6e24b96 (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21b96)
  SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow (/home/casper/targets/struct/stb/dbg/fuzzrun/ttfuzz+0x4c96c9)
  Shadow bytes around the buggy address:
    =>0x0c047fff8000: fa fa 00 00 fa[fa]fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
   Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00
   Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
    Heap left redzone:
   Freed heap region:
Stack left redzone:
    Stack mid redzone:
    Stack after return:
    Stack use after scope:
    Global redzone:
    Global init order:
    Poisoned by user:
    Container overflow:
    Array cookie:
    Intra object redzone:
    ASan internal:
    Left alloca redzone:
    Right alloca redzone:
  Shadow gap:
==52890==ABORTING
  Program received signal SIGABRT, Aborted.
  [-----registers-----]
  RBX: 0x73be28 --> 0x0
  RCX: 0x7ffff6e41e97 (<__GI_raise+199>: mov rcx,QWORD PTR [rsp+0x108])
  RSI: 0x7ffffffffc840 --> 0x0
  RBP: 0x7ffffffd7d0 --> 0x7fffffffd800 --> 0x7fffffffd8d0 --> 0x7fffffffe120 --> 0x7fffffffe150 --> 0x7fffffffe340 (--> ...)
  RSP: 0x7fffffffc840 --> 0x0
  RIP: 0x7ffff6e4le97 (<__GI_raise+199>: mov rcx,QWORD PTR [rsp+0x108])
  R9 : 0x7fffffffc840 --> 0x0
  R10: 0x8
 R11: 0x246
  R12: 0x7fffffffd800 --> 0x7fffffffd8d0 --> 0x7fffffffe120 --> 0x7fffffffe150 --> 0x7fffffffe340 --> 0x4f3870 (<__libc_csu_init>:
  R13: 0x7fffffffd7f8 --> 0x602000000014 --> 0x540e000000000180
```

```
R14: 0x7fffffffd7a0 --> 0x45e0010e
R15: 0x7ce288 --> 0x1
EFLAGS: 0x246 (carry PARITY adjust ZERO sign trap INTERRUPT direction overflow)
                                        -----code----
                                                       edi,0x2
    0x7fffff6e41e8b <__GI_raise+187>:
0x7fffff6e41e90 <__GI_raise+192>:
                                                          eax,0xe
0x7ffff6e41e95 <__GI_raise+197>:
=> 0x7ffff6e41e97 <__GI_raise+199>:
0x7ffff6e41e9f <__GI_raise+207>:
                                                 syscall
mov r
                                                          rcx,QWORD PTR [rsp+0x108]
                                                          rcx,QWORD PTR fs:0x28
                                                 xor
    0x7fffff6e41ea8 <__GI_raise+216>:
0x7fffff6e41eab <__GI_raise+219>:
                                               mov eax,r8d
jne 0x7ffff6e41ecc <__GI_raise+252>
    0x7ffff6e41ead <__GI_raise+221>:
                                                 add rsp,0x118
                         0000| 0x7fffffffc840 --> 0x0
0008| 0x7fffffffc848 --> 0x0
0016| 0x7fffffffc850 --> 0x0
0024 0x7fffffffc858 --> 0x0
0032 | 0x7fffffffc860 --> 0x0
0040 | 0x7fffffffc868 --> 0x0
0048| 0x7fffffffc870 --> 0x0
 0056| 0x7fffffffc878 --> 0x0
Legend: code, data, rodata, value
Stopped reason: SIGABRT
__GI_raise (sig=sig@entry=0x6) at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/raise.c:51 51 .../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/raise.c: No such file or directory. gdb-peda$ bt
    __GI_raise (sig=sig@entry=0x6) at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/raise.c:51
#1 0x00007ffff6e43801 in __GI_abort () at abort.c:79 
#2 0x00000000004b0707 in __sanitizer::Abort() ()
at /tmp/final/llvm.src/projects/compiler-rt/lib/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_posix_libcdep.cc:154
#3 0x0000000004af0e1 in _sanitizer::Die() ()
at /tmp/final/llvm.src/projects/compiler-rt/lib/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_termination.cc:58
#4 0x0000000000496c69 in ~ScopedInErrorReport ()
at /tmp/final/llvm.src/projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_report.cc:186
fontstart=0x0) at ./SRC/stb truetype.h:1344
#9 0x00000000040713a in stbtt_InitFont (info-0x7fffffffe180, data=0x602000000010 "wOF2\200\001", offset=0x0) at ./SRC/stb_truetype.h:4771
#10 0x00000000004e1b29 in main (argc=0x2, argv=0x7fffffffe428) at ../fuzzsrc/ttfuzz.c:29 #11 0x00007ffff6e24b97 in __libc_start_main (main=0x4e18f0 <main>, argc=0x2, argv=0x7fffffffe428,
    init=\mbox{coptimized out}, \ fini=\mbox{coptimized out}, \ \mbox{rtld\_fini}=\mbox{coptimized out}, \ \mbox{stack\_end=0x7ffffffe418}) \ \mbox{at ../csu/libc-start.c:310}
#12 0x0000000000041ad4a in start ()
```

carnil commented on Jan 10, 2020

CVE-2020-6618 was assigned for this issue.

NicoleG25 commented on Jan 12, 2020

@nothings is there any plans to address this vulnerability ?:)

nothings commented on Jan 12, 2020

Owner

@NicoleG25 It will be addressed eventually but it's not a priority.

The stb libraries were originally written for game developers who had control over their input files and therefore vulnerabilities like this weren't really important.

While stb_image has been improving, stb_truetype probably just needs a thorough going over since there are probably dozens or hundreds of places in the code where offsets are loaded from the file but aren't validated. So, that will happen someday. But a denial-of-service attack if you have control over the fonts being loaded by a program just isn't very high priority to me, considering the dozens of other bugs currently outstanding.

nothings added the 1stb_truetype label on Feb 1, 2020

nothings commented on Jul 4, 2021

Owner

The documentation for the library was modified in 2020 to make clear it is intentionally insecure, and fixing issues like this is out of scope.

nothings closed this as completed on Jul 4, 2021

No one assigned

1 stb_truetype

Projects

None yet

Development

No branches or pull requests

4 participants



