Documentation of Xoodyak_DOM_first_order (v0.2.0)

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1. Protection Method

   (a) Name of the applied countermeasure: **Domain-oriented Masking (DOM).**

   (b) Corresponding primary reference describing this countermeasure (when applied to an arbitrary cryptographic algorithm): **Primary reference is the paper by Gross et al. [GMK16].**

2. Results of the Preliminary Security Evaluation 1

   (a) Attack/leakage assessment type: **Fixed vs. random t-test at first order [GGR11] and second order [SM15].**

   (b) Number of traces used: **One million traces for the protected and 10,000 for the unprotected implementation.**

   (c) Experimental setup

      i. Measurement platform and device-under-evaluation: **Design-under-evaluation was instantiated on the Xilinx Spartan-6 (XC6SLX75-2CSG484C) FPGA on SAKURA-G board. The other Xilinx Spartan-6 (XC6SLX9-2CSG225C) FPGA on SAKURA-G was used for control.**

      ii. Description of measurements: **The design-under-evaluation power consumption is measured at the output of the SAKURA-G's on-board amplifier (AD8000YRDZ), that amplifies the voltage drop across the on-board 1 Ω shunt resistor.**

      iii. Usage of bandwidth limiters, filters, amplifiers, etc. and their specification: **N/A.**

      iv. Frequency of operation: **3 MHz.**

      v. Oscilloscope and its major characteristics: **Teledyne LeCroy WaveRunner 8404M with 4 GHz bandwidth was used to collect traces.**

      vi. Sampling frequency and resolution: **Sampling rate of 100 MS/s and 8-bit sample resolution were used.**

      vii. Are sampling clock and design-under-evaluation clock synchronized? **No.**

   (d) Attack/leakage assessment characteristics

      i. Data inputs and performed operations: **Tested operation is the Xoodoo permutation with 12 rounds. Input test vectors are initially shared on the control FPGA. The data input for the fixed data-set is chosen to make the state bits after the third round all zero.**

      ii. Source of random and pseudorandom inputs: **Trivium-based DRBG.**

      iii. Trigger location relative to the execution start time of the algorithm: **Scope trigger is set at the beginning of the algorithm execution.**

      iv. Time required to collect data for a given attack/leakage assessment: **About 70 minutes.**

      v. Total time of the attack/assessment: **About 80 minutes.**

      vi. Total size of all traces (if stored): **1.9 GB.**

      vii. Availability of raw measurement results: **Per request.**

   (e) Attack-specific characteristics

      i. Power model: **N/A.**

      ii. Attack point: **N/A.**

   (f) Documentation of results

  i. Graphs illustrating the obtained results: **T-test results are shown in Figure 2, Figure 3, Figure 4 and Figure 5. The raw waveform of 50 traces is provided in Figure 1 as a reference to understand the leakage in t-test.**

  ii. Attack scripts: **N/A.**

3. Results of the Preliminary Security Evaluation 2

 (a) Attack/leakage assessment type: **Fixed vs. random χ^2-test [MRSS18].**

 (b) Number of traces used: **5,000 traces for the protected and 100 for the unprotected implementation.**

 (c) Experimental setup: The same as the above t-test experiment.

 (d) Attack/leakage assessment characteristics

  i. **This χ^2-test is done over the same traces collected in the above t-test experiment.**

  ii. **The bit width of sample value used in $\chi^2 - test$: 8 bits.**

  iii. **Time required to run the $\chi^2 - test$ per 5,000 traces (900 Samples/trace): Less than one minute.**

  iv. Availability of raw measurement results: **Per request.**

 (e) Attack-specific characteristics

  i. Power model: **N/A.**

  ii. Attack point: **N/A.**

 (f) Documentation of results

  i. **The χ^2-test results are represented in terms of $-log_{10}(p)$, where p is the p-value of this test. We choose a threshold for p-value of $\alpha = 10^{-5}$, which leads to a confidence of > 0.99999 to reject the null hypothesis.**

  ii. Graphs illustrating the obtained results: **For the unprotected design, only result on 100 traces is given, as shown in Figure 6, as it already has very small p-values. For the protected design, 1k traces show no leakage and 5k traces show significant leakage, as shown in Figure 7 and Figure 8, respectively.**

 iii. Attack scripts: **N/A.**

Figure 1: Waveform of 50 traces.

Figure 2: Unprotected design first-order t-test results (10,000 traces).

Figure 3: Unprotected design second-order t-test results (10,000 traces).


Figure 4: Protected design first-order t-test results (1 million traces).

Figure 5: Protected design second-order t-test results (1 million traces).

Figure 6: Unprotected design χ^2-test results (100 traces).

Figure 7: Protected design χ^2-test results (1,000 traces).

Figure 8: Protected design χ^2-test results (5,000 traces).

References

[GGR11]   Josh Jaffe Gilbert Goodwill, Benjamin Jun and Pankaj Rohatgi. A testing methodology for side-channel resistance validation. In *NIST Non-Invasive Attack Testing Workshop*, Nara, Japan, 2011.

[GMK16]   Hannes Groß, Stefan Mangard, and Thomas Korak. Domain-oriented masking: Compact masked hardware implementations with arbitrary protection order. In Begül Bilgin, Svetla Nikova, and Vincent Rijmen, editors, *Proceedings of the ACM Workshop on Theory of Implementation Security, TIS@CCS 2016 Vienna, Austria, October, 2016*, page 3. ACM, 2016.

[MRSS18]   Amir Moradi, Bastian Richter, Tobias Schneider, and François-Xavier Standaert. Leakage detection with the χ^2-test. *IACR TCHES*, 2018(1):209–237, 2018. `https://tches.iacr.org/index.php/TCHES/article/view/838`.

[SM15]   Tobias Schneider and Amir Moradi. Leakage assessment methodology - A clear roadmap for side-channel evaluations. In Tim Güneysu and Helena Handschuh, editors, *CHES 2015*, volume 9293 of *LNCS*, pages 495–513. Springer, Heidelberg, September 2015.