

Shift Left – An Approach Note

APPLICATION SECURITY

SUNIL VARKEY

Shift-Left

Enterprise IT environment overall fabrics changed over the last few years with business and every CIO driving Application Modernization, mobility, and Cloud Adoption - critical levers of Digital Transformation.

Agility, continuous improvement, mobility, reusable components, microservices, redesigning and migration of legacy applications, API level integration federation to 3rd parties, and hybrid services with the objective of data available in 'any device' 'from anywhere' 'at any time' becoming the new norm in the application development lifecycle. Covid is also pushing the digital transformation agenda much further in a disruptive way over the last year.

Exposure of enterprise applications, services, and data without adequate consideration triggered Web and applications attacks exponentially - the most significant cause of security breaches in recent years.

Few of the **potential reasons for this state:**

- Weak coding practices followed by developers
- Inadequate testing and assessments
- Errors, Omissions, and Oversights by stakeholders
- Remediation, not a priority due to various constraints
- Lack of ownership and accountability across technologies and platform
- Lack of mandate process around secured coding and weak production release practice
- The urgency for production release
- Changes in architectures, business models mandating applications including legacy exposed to the internet
- Increased exposure attack surface area
- An easy target to identify and exploit vulnerabilities
- Reusable components – 3rd party, vulnerable codes

Role and responsibility related to the developer, from a security perspective, changed a lot in the new agile digital transformation era – developers are the new security frontiers. But many of the developers are failing to understand their role in the security program, mainly due to

- Tight timelines, changing requirements, too many dependencies
- Security perceived as headwind and showstoppers from past experiences
- Repeated nonvalue-added activities due to false positives
- New technologies, platforms, and environment – non-standardized approach
- Usage of reusable components
- Lack of context, overall picture on the criticality of the application service and its potential impact of a compromise
- False-positive mindset
- Federated service development approach, dispersed (lack) accountability
- The mindset that security is someone else's responsibility
- Security not part of role definition, not rewarded

Traditional Security testing practices followed by many enterprises are of

- Linear sequential process approach – Waterfall model
- Standard tool-based assessment with limited manual security testing
- Security experts with no or little application development expertise engaged in application assessments
- Assessment engagements timelines are over many weeks
- Primary security focus on the production environment
- Standard testing approach, limited use cases based on the application service context

- Most of the application in consideration are hosted and governed internally consumed by internal stakeholders from the network
- The security team rarely collaborated with application developers nor provided easily consumable best practices for remediation.

While most of the organization has the intent to do proper security assessments, multiple changes in application development lifecycle made traditional approach inadequate, since

- Web applications are the core of digitalization, undergo continuous changes (average, an application goes at least three to four-time through the development CI/CD pipeline in a year which could be for bug fixes, feature releases, enhancement, etc.)
- Applications moved away from being inside layered security cover to directly exposed to the internet.
- Agile sprint models not tolerant to multi-week security assessment models
- Vulnerable and defects codes are getting committed to production continuously, increasing exposure and risks
- Too many development technology variants and lack of standardization – API's, microservices, containers, workloads, different languages, web components, federated integrations, mobile applications accessed from different devices and OS.
- Microservice-based changes may not go through security change reviews
- All application components need to be assessed on every change, considering the exposure and threats. Too many applications to assess based on change.
- Cost of remediation much lower in the early phases of SDLC
- Skillset, resource constraints for application security assessments
- Aligned to dynamic business changes ensuring security from all perspectives
- Repeated defects and vulnerability patterns – OWASP Top 10, limited intervention to change the pattern at the root.
- Developer who coded with context may not be available for fixing if the time to assess and notify is huge
- Days and months to identify and remediate issues

Application development lifecycle must have security considerations that are

- Functional requirement
- Systems design
- Development
- Integration and testing
- Acceptance, installation, deployment
- Maintenance

Security considerations during these phases are

- Business needs, regulatory requirements & Commitments related to security
- Security Standards and Principles
- Security control Requirements
- Secure Design solution Security Architecture
- Contextual Threat modeling
- Secure Deployment Standard
- Inventory – software bill of material
- R&R
- Remediation strategy
- Secured Lifecycle management
- Secure Dev Standards
- Logging standards

- Secure Coding Practice
- Static Code Analysis
- FOSS security
- 3rd party component security
- Vulnerability Visibility
- Secure software maintenance
- Triage of Vulnerabilities
- Criticality categorization and classification
- Threshold enforcements
- Change management – security considerations for release
- Static Code Review
- Binary Code Assessments
- Infra and Config Assessment
- Container security Assessment
- Dynamic code Analysis
- IAST

These activities are time-consuming, traditionally taken up through a toll gate approach before the production release. Findings of the assessments ideally go back to the development team for review and rework. This approach worked when releases were less, time for testing and rework was budgeted, and no pressure on release timelines.

Last stage assessment and rework is highly time-consuming, even impacting production release timeline commitments. A common practice followed by many is taking exceptions of these vulnerability risks and move code to production – meeting compliance of security assessment, no action to fix resulting in vulnerable code in production.

Cost of testing, detection, and remediation of vulnerabilities in the early stage of pre-production could be in \$xx with less time, while at last stages or in production environment could be in \$x, xxx range and huge timeline, along with associated risk.

So, application security, to be effective, practical, and sustainable security needs to integrate with the development process CI/CD pipeline or as DevSecOps, by having a set of security practices incorporated into your SDLC to build, test, and deploy secure software faster and easier.

Considerations and Candidates for Shift Left

- Applications undergoing minor changes, bug fixes without altering security or architecture (60% of the enterprise application for testing assessment is in this category)
- Applications with low criticality
- Threat modeling by Solution architect for plotting the environment and controls in place

It is not easy to establish DevSecOps overnight, considering it a significant change involving various stakeholder groups.

- **Avoid friction between various groups and individuals, participative approach**

Developers are exceptionally in high demand with a high sense of accomplishment and pride in each of the codes they develop; traditionally, they hated security groups as it was dictating terms, time consumed for testing, delayed the project, reported issues with the ambiguous comments, non-friendly (rudeness comes when security guys don't understand software development and its intricacy)

Introducing security testing (on specific scenarios) as a developer's activity is not easy to get participation unless they understand the bigger picture, the impact they could create, and how it could transform their work with less rework and better release timing.

- **Adequate Technical toolset and process availability**

For the selected set of shift-left activities, relevant easily consumable toolsets made available in the development pipeline along with a defined actionable process to leverage at each stage is the right way

- **Automate as much as possible – self-service approach**

Security is not the developer's primary role, so all activities and processes should be simple. Expected activities should integrate with developers' standard routine pipeline through automation to avoid multiple routines, time-consuming manual activities. Security lifecycle in the development pre-deployment phase should be delivered and consumed as a self-service approach.

- **Avoid bureaucracy and multiple toll gates**

By shifting left and participating actively in the security program, developers should have substantial benefit in removing bureaucracy processes and improving timelines for production release.

With the new process, they should submit the code for production release change management without getting further approvals from the security or governance team if they executed required tastings as per the defined process. They should be in control of the activities and their outcome.

- **Easy to adopt, consume, leverage, and mitigate**

The primary objective of shift left is to ensure required security testing for the selected criteria by developers while codes are in the development stage. To achieve the entire objective solution, technology, the process should be easy to adopt, consume and leverage across the defined lifecycle with a clearly defined process

Abstraction layer

One of the critical challenges with shift left adoption is educating developers on each of the testing tools (at least 5) features, configurations, and usage and frequent changes in the tool's capabilities (new and each change)

The best option to avoid this challenge is to build an abstraction layer with minimum fields (most of the standard fields auto-populated) as GUI, for developers to input application identification number, language used, testing stage (dev phase / interim testing/production release). It helps to avoid the need for the developer to understand which all testing and tools are required, tool configurations, and human errors for each of the applications.

Based on this input, the abstraction application platform will be able to pull in relevant application details for the required context and define the tools and type of testing required (DAST if web component, container assessment if container used, binary testing if no codes available, etc.)

Could expect some morons from business security and 2nd line, resisting the abstraction layers. The argument just for the sake of argument (they stay relevant in their role by creating the complexity and confusion) will be that developers will not get to know the tools used and they cannot leverage tools full capability since configuration setting is pre-defined to the defined testing policy level behind the abstraction layer.

If there are developers in the team with security expertise and are enthusiasts with extra time in hand for advanced security testing (typically very few or nil), give them direct access to tools to do advanced testing's.

Complete tool native access to developers is not recommended since

The problem of not having an abstraction layer

- Each developer must master the features and configuration of each of the tools used for testing (DAST, SAST, MAST....). Very difficult to get all developers to learn every security tool.
- Can lower the level of testing configuration, ensuring mandate testing compliance done but not effectively or comprehensively.
- Changes or introduction of (new) tools required complete re-education
- Can avoid (bypass) completing total levels of testing, ex. The only test on DAST while open-source, container codes are also in scope
- Test applications for vulnerabilities beyond their scope and control
- Service disruptions by intrusive scanning and assessments across the enterprise or on other critical applications.

Penetration testing, red team, and other specific internal security teams will be using the tools with full potential, ensuring the ROI of the investment is fully leveraged.

Abstraction layer governed by the security team should be the only application security testing toll gate consider accepted for the change management production release. This helps to ensure all applications are assessed the same way and comprehensively as defined by security team.

Transparent

The need for each of the testing modules, approximate time for completion, pre-requisite for initiating the testing, roles, and responsibilities across the process should be well defined and transparent to all the stakeholders. If the pipeline breaks based on vulnerability threshold (at specific points), it has to be communicated in advance, so developers will be careful to avoid mistakes.

Actionable output

Output reports from the testing should be easy to consume, relevant with minimal false positives, in-scope, and out of scope of testing, and assumptions should be mentioned clearly to avoid a false sense of assurance. Required actions from the output should be mentioned with roles of specific teams to move the process to the next phase.

Inline

The shift-left solution, tools, abstraction layer should be in the same path as of development CI/CD pipeline, which can be called for execution easily. Any additional path or approval can consider a hindrance to adoption.

Automated decisions

The decision to evoke various testing requirements based on the application type, criticality, mandates, etc should be automated to avoid the developer's manual intervention. The system should have the capability to understand if the changes are incremental or significant, so the level of testing and time to complete testing can be improved. All relevant records, testing status, change management required pre-requisite, exception approval process all should be automated to get the full benefit of the initiative.

If change is only incremental without changing existing security or architecture, testing should be only on the changed code.

Limited overhead

Shift-Left process once in production should work with limited overhead, reduced time to complete the process, and finding record updates without human invention or manual errors.

Easy to Understand, Relate, Act, Fix

Security is not the primary domain of Software developers; their understanding of the security domain is limited.

Testing reports should be presented to them in an easy-to-understand and relatable mode. Reported issues should be communicated in the way developers understand, with the context and risk, mentioning specific lines where the gap is identified.

The report should also provide guidelines with examples or recommended changes, for the developer to fix them quickly.

Also, suggest providing a link to the internal or external training module where developers could refer to secured coding practice related to this gap.

This input could help developers avoid commonly repeated mistakes over time and improve secured coding practices.

Extreme Shift-Left

There are situations to consider where extreme Shift-Left approach to be taken, else too many vulnerabilities will be found in a later stage, leading to the same situation of time-consuming reworks, frustrating developers.

Ideally, SAST tool with limited and specific feature capability to be integrated with their development environment, which checks codes for best practices and common errors deviations (defects) while it is coded and suggest required change options helping coder to improve coding practices while coding – helping to avoid such mistakes in future. Like spell check in Word.

At each stage of testing, the error threshold (tolerance to critical, medium, low vulnerabilities) to be set, which breaks the pipe forcing the developer to review and fix the issue before proceeding further with bad vulnerable codes. If this can be enforced before the integration of smaller modules, fixing will be much easier.

Centralized Vulnerability Dashboard

At an enterprise level, a centralized vulnerability posture storage and dashboard is required where all vulnerability ingestion, aggregation, normalization & triage happens.

Findings from various tools are aggregated and normalized against a unique value (asset name or an identifier from the software, application asset register) for standard reference and search.

This dashboard act as the authoritative source for all enterprise known vulnerabilities in the production environment (if build and test environment is not segregated from production environment, then findings from those systems and environment should also be part of the consolidated dashboard), reported based on its criticality and priority.

Remediation prioritization is generally based on the criticality of the vulnerability (impact, ease of exploits), asset's criticality, service it is running, exposure of the application – internet-facing or internal, regulatory applications, hosting, or serving sensitive information, etc. This way of categorization will help the stakeholders to prioritize remediation activities.

Defects and Vulnerabilities are different; we should approach how each of these is to be treated and reported.

In the shift-left scenario, only findings from the last assessment before production movement commit to be updated in the centralized vulnerability dashboard.

Pipeline Assessment vs. Release Assessment

Developers require the option to assess the code at various stages of development and not only at the time of production movement stage. Initial scans may find so many common gaps which developer fixes on the move. These findings should not be reported to the enterprise vulnerability dashboard since those are not real production level vulnerabilities, but these findings could pollute the overall vulnerability posture reports.

Considering the requirement, options for different modes of assessment to be provisioned in the shift-left abstraction level

- Pipeline level assessment – all testing features, can choose the testing category required (SAST/DAST/MAST..), reports accessible to the developer but central repository or dashboard not updated with the findings
- Release assessment – All testing features available, abstraction layer logic decides testing category based on the application context, reports accessible to the developer, and updated in a central repository, all dashboards updated with finding details.

Change Management and Exception Approvals

With the Shift-Left approach, developers should be able to initiate change management process (with all other pre-requisite completed) for moving the code to production release, directly without the intervention of the security team or other process for security clearance, if they completed the defined security testing through the abstraction layer, findings are within threshold and security assessment completion report with 'Pass'.

In the production movement assessment mode, the abstraction layer platform should be able to provide a consolidated report of all findings, validate open findings against the defined threshold, and provide a 'Pass' or 'Fail' report based on the defined threshold, risk appetite, which will be the pre-requisite document for the change management team to consider security findings complete and approved for production release.

If the report mentions 'Fail', application owners should prioritize fixing reported vulnerabilities to ensure open findings are within the defined threshold.

The change management process should use this report with 'Pass' as completion of required security clearance. The abstraction layer can also automatically upload this report to the change management program.

There could be situations where the business requires this application change release in the production environment immediately. Stakeholder ready to accept the risk of open vulnerabilities or compensating controls exist in the production environment due to which this open vulnerability is not a significant risk, or stakeholders need more time to mitigate the risk, willing to take the risk during that period.

The abstraction layer platform should have the feature to accept and record exceptions approval from designated stakeholders and provide a 'Pass' report based on the exception given for production release.

Authority to provide exceptions and acceptance of risk should be only for named individuals/roles based on the criticality of the vulnerabilities and its impact at application, service, enterprise-level, including reputational, availability, confidentiality, and integrity.

All exception approval should be time-based.

Visibility, Software bill of material

Visibility across enterprise applications and its software bill of material is critical to the security program's success.

An accurate application asset register is required to ensure all applications are assessed and mitigated at any point in time for compliance and avoid blind spots.

Tools and Assessments which could be leveraged for Shift-Left

- Threat modeling (Solution architect)
- Static Application Security Testing - SAST
- Dynamic Application Security Testing – DAST
- Interactive Application Security Testing – IAST
- Mobile Application Security Testing - MAST

- Free and open-source software – FOSS
- Software Composition Analysis - SCA
- Infrastructure Security Assessments
- Container Security Assessments
- Binary Code Assessments

Challenges for Shift Left

- Maturity of the enterprise – technology, process, people
- Mindset and resistance from the team – developers, security, management
- Management support for Enforcement

Desired outcome

- Avoidance of Vulnerable defect codes moving from pre-production to production IT estate
- Sustainable Application security assessments
- The reduced vulnerable attack surface
- Effective security program reduced budget need
- Effective oversight around Pre and Post IT production environment

Empower developers as security champions

- Process governance for production movement by developers without the involvement of security team involvement
- Participative role in the security program
- Risk acceptance process with business stakeholders, on the defined guidelines
- Trained and comfortable with adoption, assessment, report review, and remediation – Investment
- Culture with security mindset and security as a collaborative group with common business objectives
- Policies for responsible adoption and actions

Shift-Left is the participative way to ensure application security assessments are done effectively in a timely manner with the involvement of the right stakeholders and to avoid huge rework of the applications just before production release. It is no way delegation or transfer of accountability from the security team to developers. The security team is accountable and responsible to ensure testing configurations, effectiveness and process is adequate and comprehensive for the scope of Shift-Left