# Project Veraison

**Attestation Verification Components** 

Veraison: VERificAtIon of atteStatiON




## Setting the scene:

- "Confidential Computing protects data in use by performing computation in a hardware-based Trusted Execution Environment"
  - Confidential Computing: Hardware-Based Trusted Execution for Applications and Data
- CC service users \*must\* be able to establish that a TEE is trustworthy
  - Hardware & Software aspects are "correct"
- The means to establish trustworthiness is Attestation
- Being able to produce an Attestation report alone is not sufficient
- The report must be Verified to prove the constituent claims






## Supply Chain & Lifecycle (somewhat idealised)







#### Information Flow for Verification





#### Process of Verification

- Verification operations must:
  - Deserialise & syntax check attestation report data models
  - Check Cryptographic Signing
    - which requires knowledge of relevant trust anchor(s)
  - Confirm measurements within claims match Reference Values
    - Ref values need to be drawn from supply chain
    - and be up to date
    - Multiple actors, business and trust relationships
  - Apply any semantic relationships between claims
    - e.g., certain hardware & firmware combinations
- Perform all operations while being trustworthy itself



## Verification software components

- If every deployment prepares custom logic for the verification process
  - Quality, and hence trustworthiness, may vary
  - Building a verifier is a barrier to entry
- Project Veraison (**VER**ific**AtI**on of atte**S**tati**ON**) will build software components that can be used for attestation verification services
- Open-source project, operating with fully Open Governance
- Arm is making contributions to the core team, but the intent is to have an industry wide scope





#### Status

- Project is active on github (<a href="https://github.com/veraison">https://github.com/veraison</a>)
- Open Governance / weekly public meetings
- Active collaboration with standards bodies (IETF RATS, TCG)
- Initial Design work complete
- Core functionality demostones (PSA-EAT, DICE)
  - Demo integration for Enterprise TPM use case with EnactTrust
- Long list of potential features / capabilities
- Contributions most welcome



## CCC 'fit'





## Out of Scope

- It is not intended to look at other aspects of verification e.g.
  - Unification of Attestation Token formats
  - Normalising the means by which a Relying Party requests Attestation
  - Common Attestation protocol

