CAN Network Anomaly Detection

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
Agenda

- Our Research
- CAN Network Attack Framework
- Attacks on CAN
- Anomaly Detection Methods
- Visualization
- Conclusion and Future Work

Our Research

- CoWork! by using github
- There are three researchers in our team
- The things that we developed is the following
 - CAN anomaly detection for DoS/Fuzzy/Replay Attack
 - Data sequence modeling based on RNN(LSTM) algorithm
 - Realtime visualization by using PyQt

Our Research



Attack Framework

- Frequency effects
 - Insertions: extra packets
 - Erasures: missing packets
- Data: Altering packet data contents
 - Data replay
 - Data field modifications


Frequency effects

- Each ID has a fixed frequency of occurrence on the bus
- The frequencies of normal packets are very consistent
- Anomalies in terms of frequencies will involve additional packets, or missing packets that were expected
- The majority of attacks involve inserted packets with specific IDs and data
- Some attacks can manifest as the absence of packets that should arrive at regular intervals

Altering packet data contents


- Many bits in each data sequence are constant
- The second main signature of attacks is a change in the data sequence of some ID
- The only indication of replay attack is that the data sequence of the ID being replayed has changed from one context to another
- The replaced data is a legitimate subsequence, but incongruous with preceding data sequence

Attacks on CAN




DoS Attack

Attacks on CAN



Fuzzy Attack

Attacks on CAN




Impersonation Attack


Anomaly Detection Methods

- Frequency anomaly detection
 - Average/Deviation of Time Interval
- Data sequence anomaly detection
 - RNN(Recurrent Neural Network) LSTM(Long Short Term Memory)
 - Data field mask by ANDing all data sequence of each ID

Anomaly Detection Methods





Recurrent Neural Network



- Save previous input data in network
- Predict next sequence from previous data
- In our case, predict next data bytes in real can packets

Recurrent Neural Network





Fully Connected Network

Recurrent Neural Network

RNN modeling by using Keras

```
model = Sequential()
model.add(SimpleRNN(64, input_shape = (steps, 64)))
model.add(Dense(64))

model.compile(loss='mse', optimizer='rmsprop', metrics=["accuracy"])

x_train = feature[:,:-1,:]
y_train = feature[:,-1,:]

history = model.fit(x_train, y_train, epochs=epochs, verbose=1)

model.save("./models/rnn_model_" + key + ".h5")
```

Weakness


- Too slow for real time detecting
 - Use only in warning state
- Vehicle model is changed
 - Train new model with new datasets... but not enough time :(

Actually...

There are some tricky issues to detect anomalies like

- Too many resources are needed to adjust deep learning to CAN network packet
- There are some ambiguous concepts on CAN attack types
- Very hard to speed up the rate of next data predictions based on RNN (LSTM) and very hard to understand the algorithm:
- Maybe there is no perfect algorithm which detects all the attack vectors at a time


Anomaly Detection Methods




Visualization

- Environment
 - Python 3
 - Numpy
 - PyQt5, PyQtGraph
- Focusing on real time plotting
- Cross checking whether the detection is correct

Visualization



Visualization



Demo

Conclusion and Future Work

- There are many types of attack vector on CAN network
- Realtime and precision are the most important elements in anomaly detection
- More faster data sequence predictions
- User friendly visualization tool
- Improve the speed of detection
- Make it more easy to adopt in new vehicles

Reference

- Adrian Taylor, "Anomaly-based detection of malicious activity in invehicle networks", 2017
- Mohammad Raashid Ansari, "Low-Cost Approaches to Detect Masquerade and Replay Attacks on Automotive Controller Area Network", 2016
- Hyunsung Lee, Seong Hoon Jeong, Huy Kang Kim, "OTIDS: A Novel Intrusion Detection System for In-vehicle Network by using Remote Frame", 2016

Thank you!