Models and Domains

Jodi Schneider (based on slides from Dave Dubin)

January 26, 2017

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- or modeling for purposes of keeping track of information.

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- Today I'll introduce you to a diagrammatic notation that we'll come back to in later presentations.

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- Consider three categories of things we might believe are real: physical things, abstract things, and social things (Ferraris, 2011; Jubien, 1997).

Physical things exist in space and time: if they exist, then there is some place and time where we can find them. Examples include:

• The particular chair you're sitting in right now.

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- Particular sound waves reaching your ears at this moment.
- The electric current circulating through wires in this room.
- The seat back that is part of your chair.
- Any specific atomic particle from which the chair is composed.

Social things exist in time, but not in space. Examples include:

• My marriage.

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- The mortgage on my house.
- The promise I made to my partner to remember to pay the mortgage on time.
- The University of Illinois School of Information Sciences.

Abstract things are not found in the physical universe. They don't come into existence, nor are they destroyed or modified. Examples include:

The number eleven.

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- The relationship "employed by the University of Illinois."
- The state of affairs "Jodi's being employed by the University of Illinois."
- The state of affairs "Dave's being employed by the University of Illinois."

Michael Jubien (1997) offers an accessible introduction to the Platonistic conception of abstract things like properties. A property, he says, is "a way something can be." His examples include:

green

- green
- hot

- green
- hot
- slimy

- green
- hot
- slimy
- hungry

- green
- hot
- slimy
- hungry
- four-legged

- green
- hot
- slimy
- hungry
- four-legged
- dead

- green
- hot
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- married
- flat
- soluble
- "having been a female US President before 1997"

Relationships

Jubien uses the term "relation" for a part of abstract reality that I'll call "relationship," so as to keep it distinct from a mathematical object that might or might not be the same thing. Jubien's examples of relation(ships) include:

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- the "betweenness" relationship that can obtain among physical objects in space;
- the instantiation relationship that can link a property to a particular thing that exemplifies the property;

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- In models such as RDF, these relational properties can only obtain between exactly two individuals (binary relationships only).

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- Propositions are language-independent entities. You can think of them as the information content of simple declarative sentences.
- The Platonistic conception of propositions has them outside of time and space.
- So a proposition is not in your mind: it's the kind of thing with respect to which you can stand in a relationship such as belief or desire.

Propositions are language-independent

• It's Thursday.

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- Also called "situations"

State of affairs diagram




Figure 1: Dave's being employed by the University of Illinois

 Maria E. Reicher (2009) characterizes the "standard conception" of states of affairs as: "complex entities, consisting of particulars, (universal) properties and relations, such that an atomic state of affairs is a particular's exemplifying a property (or one or more particulars' exemplifying a relation)."

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- Physical thing: Something that's bounded in both time and space.
- Abstract thing: Something that's bounded in neither time nor space, but may have a physical expression or instantiation.
- **Social thing**: Something bounded in time, but not space, and is essentially connected to the context of its creation.

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- Relationship: A way two or more things could be with respect to each other.
- Relational property: A way something could be in virtue of its participation in a relationship.
- Proposition: A language-independent bearer of truth values and object of propositional attitudes like belief.
- **State of affairs**: A particular's exemplifying a property, or one or more particulars' exemplifying a relation.

Further Reading

Ferraris, M. (2011). Social Ontology and Documentality. In G. Sartor, P. Casanovas, M. Biasiotti, & M. Fernández-Barrera (Eds.), *Approaches to Legal Ontologies: Theories, Domains, Methodologies* (pp. 83–97). Dordrecht: Springer. Jubien, M. (1997). Platonism. In *Contemporary Metaphysics: An Introduction* (pp. 36–62). Cambridge MA: Blackwell.

Reicher, M. (2009). Introduction. In *States of Affairs* (pp. 7–37).

Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.