

Thesis

Leopold Ingenohl

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1 Introduction

Much attention has been recently given to the current Securities and Exchange Commission reporting requirements for Schedule 13(D), governing the disclosure of beneficial ownership interests in excess of five percent of outstanding common stock of a U.S. public company (Giglia, 2018). Amongst other causes, it is due to significant gains for the subject's stock when the partial acquisition is announced (Akhigbe et al., 2007).

However, it is still largely unanswered where this upward drift comes from (Greenwood and Schor, 2009). One approach for this issue is objective of this paper. Namely, the link between the financial condition of the corporate investor and the abnormal returns on the subject's stock around the filing date. The following findings motivate this approach.

In recent studies of what happens to the target's stock Collin-Dufresne and Fos (2015) observe a positive significant market reaction upon a more general sample of Schedule 13D filings¹. Brav et al. (2008) have shown a favorable market reaction – 7% - 8% average abnormal returns in the (-20|20) event window – particularly to Schedule 13D's filed by hedge funds. Similar results have been shown by Klein and Zur (2009) who observe 10.2% average abnormal stock returns specifically for hedge fund targets.

In addition, Brigida and Madura (2012) have shown an even higher runup if the acquirer is a private investor or a non-financial corporation. This is matching with Akhigbe et al. (2007) findings who observe greater gains for the target's stock if the partial position was initiated by a corporate bidder. Concluding, filings submitted by all investor types are followed by positive market reactions but those submitted by corporations seem to have a stronger impact.

Since filing a Schedule 13(D) allows the investing corporation to behave in an active manner² (Brigida and Madura, 2012) they can use their stakes to actively monitor the target, similar to Klein and Zur (2009) definition of an entrepreneurial activist³. These stakes tend to

¹The sample is only restricted on the subjects stock characteristics rather than on characteristics of the filers e.g. they exclude all filings which are not common stock (CRSP share code 10 or 11), whose prices are below \$1 and above \$1000 and which involve derivatives (Collin-Dufresne and Fos, 2015).

²In comparison the investor could file a Schedule 13(G) in which he would hold the shares passively hence with no intention to bring change.

³Klein and Zur (2009) define the entrepreneurial activist as an investor who buys a large stake in a publicly held corporation with the intention to bring change and thereby realize a profit on the investment.

be either made for the purpose of investment or far more importantly, as strategic investments (Damodaran, 2005), possibly resulting in business agreements, alliances or joint ventures (Allen and Phillips, 2000).

In a more direct approach however, these strategic investments can also help as a stepping stone towards full control (Huang et al., 2017). This approach is supported by Goldman and Qian (2005) who find that mergers and takeovers are often preceded by the acquisition of a minority stake in the target. Whereas hedge funds use their stakes to change characteristics of the target (e.g. the board of directors or the strategic orientation) (Klein and Zur, 2009) corporate filers are mainly focused on synergies in the form of strategic alliances or takeovers between them and the target. Akhigbe et al. (2007) observe that partial acquisitions, if carried out by corporate investors, are more likely to result in a full acquisition when compared to all other activist investors. This means that within the mass of Schedule 13D filings, institutional investors are unlikely to pursue a complete takeover whereas corporations are potential full acquirers (Brigida and Madura, 2012). The possibility of a takeover could be one explanation for the strong impact corporate filings have on the market, because the abnormal returns could be a reflection of investors' expectations of the target firms stock being acquired at a premium to the current price (Goldman and Qian, 2005) especially with strong corporate bidders being likely to overpay in the event of a full takeover (Akhigbe et al., 2007).

However, in order to be able to bring change – might it be in the form of a strategic alliance or eventually in a takeover – the filing corporation should be in a condition of sufficient financial health. A recent example on this matter is the public reception of the HNA Group. The financial condition of the HNA group, China's largest private conglomerate which over the past few years invested around \$US40 billion in businesses around the world, has currently been of great interest to financial news. Not least because they built up a 9.9% stake of of around \$US4 billion in Deutsche Bank in 2017, which is just below the 10% threshold above which stake purchases must be approved by Germany's financial watchdog but also because of their complex and nontransparent financing methods. The financing of the group has come under strain as a result of an official crackdown on risky financing at acquisitive private enterprises in China. The highly leveraged group is now facing a potential cash-shortfall and liquidity issues resulting in a S&P global rating downgrade referring to a „deteriorating liquidity profile" of

HNA. Although HNA group is a private conglomerate, the financial condition of corporations seems to be of great importance to other market participants with that said, even in the context of minority acquisitions. Therefore, linking the investor's financial condition to the underlying market reactions could be an explanation for the latter.

Based on the previous findings of corporate activism, namely their strong impact on the subjects stock in the form of abnormal returns and future possibilities involving the target, the economic significance of corporations as filers of Schedule 13(D)'s seems to be apparent.

Yet in order to make these possible developments and expectations look credible – amongst other things strategic alliances and takeovers – the investing corporation somehow has to emit signs of sufficient financial strength. Therefore, the link between the financial condition of the investor and the subsequent abnormal returns on the target's stock is an interesting issue to examine. This is in particular, is objective of the paper. What precisely are the effects of Schedule 13(D) filings by corporations on the subject's stock and can the financial condition of the corporation explain the market's reaction? In other words – how important ist the financial condition of the activist corporation?

The paper proceeds as follows. In the Section 2, the relevant literature is being reviewed. Section 3 describes the data and sample composition. In Section 4 the market's response to Schedule 13(D) filings are being examined. Section 5 represents the by are being described. In the section 4, being described

2 Literature Review

With regards to stated objective, this paper is combining literature on investor activism and fundamental analysis in determining a companies strength.

Recent research in the field of investor activism by Brav et al. (2008) shows that hedge fund activism has a positive effect on the performance of the target company, creates a favorable market reaction and activist hedge funds have a high succession rate in achieving

their main objectives ⁴. Klein and Zur (2009) not only analyse activism by hedge funds but also incorporate private investors into their analysis. In accordance with Brav et al. (2008) they observe a positive market reaction around the announcement date and highlight the success rate of activists in achieving their campaign's main objectives. Coffee Jr. and Palia (2014) are in line with a market runup in response to investor activism by hedge funds but focus on their real value creation. They find that hedge fund activism may result in a severe externalities namely at the shortening of investment horizons and the discouragement of research and development. Greenwood and Schor (2009) also document large positive abnormal returns when hedge funds announce their activist intentions and show that the ability to force the target into a takeover is attributable to the abnormal returns. In addition they find that the highest impact on the market is for those ultimately acquired. While all of these studies involve a deepened investigation of hedge-funds, especially their impact and motivation, most of them leave the remaining investor types aside. In particular, there has been no study that independently evaluates corporate activism and directly investigates the relation of the investor's strength with the subsequent market reaction.

In a study of 2010 *BCG* notes that many of the year's acquisitions would involve a financially strong acquirer. However, the attribute of being financially strong is not ambivalent in its definition. With the objective of separating strong from weak value firms, Piotroski (2000) established the F-score. The F-score represents a simple application of fundamental analysis and is the sum of nine binary signals that form a "... composite measure of firm strength" (Fama and French, 2006, p. 496). In order to legitimize the explanatory power of the F-score in separating strong from weak firms he formed portfolios. In doing so he showed that an investment strategy of shorting expected losers (weak firms) and buying expected winners (strong firms) would "generate a 23% average annual return" (Piotroski, 2000, p. 4). Hyde (2014) have matching results and observe significant return premiums for stock with a high F-score over stocks with a low F-score. Although the F-score was established to distinguish among value firms, Mohr (2012) shows that an application on growth stocks yields similar results without losing the predictive ability ⁵.

⁴They analyse the following objective of activist campaigns: (1) Maximize shareholder value (2) changes in the capital structure (3) changes in the business strategy (4) sale of the target company (5) changes in corporate governance

⁵This is in line with Piotroski (2000) and confirms earlier research conducted by him

In conducting the analysis, the F-score will be used to separate the sample of 13D filings among strong and weak corporate investors. Since it is able to separate firms in portfolios into strong and weak performing ones, an application to this analysis seems reasonable.

However, components of the f-score include changes in leverage and The score itself can be divided into the three dimensions profitability, balance sheet health and operating efficiency. In the context of this analysis As Mohr (2012) states: the f-score considers in what direction the fundamentals of a company are trending and whether financial health conditions are met. Because high F-scores imply higher returns hence stronger firms should have higher returns, investors must see a high F-score as a representation of financial strength. In the context of this paper those practices would have only been applied to the target and not the investor. An application of the F-score on the investor with the aim of distinguishing between strong and weak firms

Choi and Sias (2012) formulate it from a target perspective - "does financial strength predict subsequent institutional demand"?

On the other hand, Akhigbe et al. (2007) examine the characteristics of final acquisitions following partial bids. They find that involvements by corporate bidders are more likely to result in a full acquisition.

3 Overview

4 Data

4.1 Constructing the Sample

The sample of Schedule 13(D) filings is constructed as follows. First, using an automatic search script, 48'626 filings from the 20 year period starting in January 1996 and ending in December 2016 were identified. The script identifies all Schedule 13(D) filings that appear on EDGAR. Next, to only have filings submitted by corporations, 10-K reports were cross-

referenced with the initial sample of all filings ⁶. In order to be part of the sample, the filer had to have a 10-K report submitted 12 months prior to the filing which reduced the sample to 3'325 filings. In a third step, the subject had to have the SEC's CUSIP identifier which then had to have an active link to CRSP's PERMNO identifier. This lead to remaining 1'467 filings. On the other hand, the filer had to have a link between its CIK and COMPUSTAT's unique GVKEY identifier.

Basis of the following analysis are all Schedule 13(D) filings from the 13 year period starting in 1996 and ending blabla 2017 (available on SEC's EDGAR). Information important to the analysis and contained in the filings are (1) the filing date, (2) the filer and (3) the subject. The sample is then constructed as follows. As the analysis is focusing on corporate investors and their cross-holdings the sample is further restricted by cross-referencing the 13D filings with a corresponding sample of 10-K filings of the firms. It is done to separate corporate investors from institutional investors (e.g. hedge-funds, pension-funds, real estate investment trusts (REITs)). The daily stock returns and prices come from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). The accounting fundamentals come from the COMPUSTAT database. This is in accordance with Fama and French (2006) and Brigida and Madura (2012) resulting in (1) an exclusion of targets in the financial and utility industries, (2) firms being required to be listed CRSP and have share codes (10) or (11) (i.e. ordinary shares) and (3) firms being listed in the COMPUSTAT database and having sufficient data for the relevant periods. In a last step company web sites and newspaper articles are used to determine whether or not the reamaining activists are corporate investors or not.

This sample differs from Brav et al. (2008) who considered only filings by hedge funds, and Collin-Dufresne and Fos (2015) who involved all investor types in their sample. Table *xx* summarizes the selection process.

⁶"Managers of publicly traded firms are required to produce public documents that provide a comprehensive review of the firm's business operations and financial condition. An important financial disclosure document created by managers to communicate with investors and analysts is the annual report filed pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Form 10-K." (Loughran and Mcdonald, 2014)