

# A Fairness-Driven Method for Learning Human-Compatible Negotiation Strategies

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# 01


## Introduction

# Introduction

- Negotiation is a complex skill requiring strategic reasoning and understanding of human behavior.
- Despite advances in AI and NLP, building negotiation agents that align with human expectations remains challenging.



# Challenges with Current Methods



- Game-Theoretic Methods:
  - Strong in two-player zero-sum games (e.g., chess, poker).
  - Struggle with human-compatible strategies in negotiation settings requiring cooperation.
- Data-Driven Methods:
  - Reliance on human data leads to domain-specific solutions.
  - High cost and effort for collecting diverse datasets.
  - Lack of theoretical guarantees like convergence to optimal solutions.

# Nash Equilibrium

- A Nash equilibrium is a stable game state where no player can improve their outcome by unilaterally changing their strategy.
- **Key property:** Each player's strategy is **optimal** given the strategies of the others.
- Ensures that agreements are stable and mutually acceptable.
- Guarantees that neither party has an incentive to deviate from the agreed terms.

# Example Scenario

**Scenario:** Two parties negotiating over a car price.

Buyer's maximum price: \$13,000.

Seller's minimum price: \$12,500.

Nash equilibrium: A deal at a price where neither party benefits by changing their offer alone, e.g., \$12,750.



# Goals of FDHC

- Fairness Driven Human-Compatible bargaining
- FDHC ensures convergence to Nash equilibrium outcomes as a baseline.
- Enhances the equilibrium concept by incorporating fairness (Egalitarian Bargaining Solution).




# How Does FDHC Work?

- Fairness-Driven Human-Compatible (FDHC) Framework.
- LLM-Guided Monte Carlo Tree Search (LGM-Zero).

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Methodology

# FDHC Negotiation Framework



# Estimate Surplus And Compute EBS Split

- **Context:** Operates within the Nash bargaining game framework.
- **Mechanism:**
  1. **Decomposes** the game into a series of depth-limited subgames.
  2. Makes initial guesses about the **resource pool size** and **opponent's utility**, updating these as the game progresses.
  3. Targets the Egalitarian Bargaining Solution (**EBS**), maximizing minimum individual payoffs within the bargaining set.

$$E(S, d) = \arg \max_{x \in I(S, d)} (\min_{i \in N} (x_i - d_i))$$

# LGM-Zero

- Given the history of the negotiation the algorithm searches for the best solution by repeatedly performing:
  - **Selection**
  - **Expansion**
  - **Backpropagation**
- Finally we will talk about the **training** of the system.

# LGM-Zero - Selection

- In a give state game we choose the action that **maximize** the upper bound for its Q-value, computed as:

$$U(s, a) = Q(s, a) + c_p * \frac{\sqrt{\sum_b N(s, b)}}{1 + N(s, a)}$$

# LGM-Zero - Expansion

- We feed an LLM a **prompt** to suggest the best 5 action to take given the current game state
- The prompt used must be **specific** for the negotiation setting
- All the actions have an initial **equal probability** to be taken
- If one of the action results in a **terminal state** its value is set to the reward obtained by the state, otherwise it is set to the output of our **value model**.
- Those information are **propagated back** up the tree thanks to the next step.

# LGM-Zero - Backpropagation

- Update the  $N(s, a)$  by one for each action taken at the given state during the search.
- Update the Q-value function at the current state and chosen action:

$$Q(s, a) \leftarrow Q(s, a) + \frac{v(s)}{N(s, a)}$$

- We repeat this search **n times**, then make a move based on which child of the current state has the maximum Q-value.



# LGM-Zero - Training

- **Idea:** Approximate Nash equilibrium through iterative self-play.
- **Mechanism:**
  - Mixed strategy: Combines **best response** to the opponent's strategy and the **average strategy**.
  - Best response learned via:
    - Traditional: **Deep Q-Network (DQN)** (Mnih et al., 2013).
    - Augmented: **Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS)** (Zhang et al., 2019).
  - Average strategy:
    - Leverages **LLM** to suggest moves, bypassing value network ranking.

# LGM-Zero - Training

- The **training data** consist of game states and outcomes of depth-limited subgames, as described before.
- **Reward function**

$$v(s) = \begin{cases} \min_{i \in N} (x_i - d_i) & \text{if } x_1 \geq E(S, d) \\ -\min_{i \in N} (x_i - d_i) & \text{if } x_1 < E(S, d) \end{cases}$$

- This reward says that if the payoff for player one is **greater than or equal** to the EBS of the subgame.
- The **goal** is to train a model to target EBS as the optimal solution while considering outcomes that favor its own utility.

# 03

## Experiments and results

# Model evaluation.Experiment

## **Models against our model**


- Supervised Learning
- Offline RL
- GPT 3.5 and GPT 4
- GPT4 Self-play.
- Vicuna-13b

**Number of Simulations:** The evaluation involves conducting 100 simulated negotiations between baseline models and an aGPT-4 buyer.

**Optimal Outcome Definition:** The optimal outcomes of these negotiations are identified as those achieving the highest fairness values.

**Fairness Criterion:** Fairness is defined as the difference in payoff between the buyer and the seller, with smaller differences representing higher fairness.

# Results from different models



# Results from different models

Model (Seller)	Average Deal Price	Average Fairness $\uparrow$	Median Fairness $\uparrow$
GPT-3.5	\$12,644 (357)	-0.88 (0.49)	-1.0
Offline RL	\$13,224 (308)	-0.68 (0.34)	-0.8
SL	\$12,978 (368)	-0.59 (0.44)	-0.6
GPT-4	\$12,968 (346)	-0.57 (0.39)	-0.5
GPT-4 Self-Play	\$13,242 (240)	-0.54 (0.41)	-0.5
Vicuna-13b	\$13,156 (293)	-0.53 (0.40)	-0.5
FDHC (No LGM-Zero)	\$13,042 (211)	-0.36 (0.23)	-0.4
FDHC	\$13,062 (128)	<b>-0.12 (0.26)*</b>	<b>0.0</b>

# Human evaluation.Experiment

**Participant Recruitment:** 30 individuals were recruited in person to participate in the evaluation, with each conducting one negotiation per bot, resulting in 30 dialogues per model.

**Evaluation Process:** Participants were instructed to negotiate with the bot until reaching a deal and then complete a post-chat survey rating:


- "How good of a negotiator is the bot?" (scale of 1-5).
- "How human-like is the bot's negotiation?" (scale of 1-5).
- Optionally, participants could provide suggestions for improvement in a text box.

**Filtering Low-Quality Data:** Low-quality dialogues were removed, including instances where the price detection or realization modules failed in the FDHC method.

**Reservation Price Consistency:** Conversations were excluded if the model (or GPT-4) agreed to a price below its reservation point to ensure fair comparison and prevent skewing the data.

**Filtering Human-Terminated Dialogues:** Dialogues were also removed where human participants chose to end negotiations without reaching a deal that provided a positive payoff for them.

# Human evaluation.Results





# Human evaluation.Results

Model	Average Deal Price	Average Fairness↑	Quality↑	Human-like↑
GPT-4	\$12,702 (203)	-0.61 (0.38)	3.97 (0.96)	<b>3.97 (0.96)</b>
FDHC	\$13,032 (238)	<b>-0.30 (0.38)*</b>	<b>4.10 (0.76)</b>	3.93 (0.78)

- **Fairness Scores:** The FDHC framework achieved significantly higher fairness scores compared to other methods in human evaluations.
- **Consistency with Automatic Evaluation:** FDHC maintained a similar average deal price to the results from automatic evaluation, indicating that the framework performs consistently across various negotiation strategies.
- **Improved Negotiation Quality:** The FDHC model demonstrated improved negotiation quality compared to the GPT-4 baseline, even though it uses GPT-3.5 as its base model.
- **Human-Likeness Retention:** Despite its improvements in fairness and negotiation quality, FDHC maintained a similar level of human-like behavior to the GPT-4 baseline.

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Limitations

# Dependence on strong theoretical assumptions

**The quality of the results depends on accurate information about resources and adverse preferences.**

- All agents, must have access to accurate and unbiased estimates of total surplus
- Assumes that negotiating parties follow negotiation axioms (symmetry, strong monotonicity)
- Limitation of the model in complex or unpredictable environments
- Example: in property negotiation with hidden cost and preferences

# Response time and operational slowness

- FDHC depends on large number models such as GPT3.5 or GPT4
- Each action in the search process (Monte Carlo Tree) -> demanding in resources and time
- Limits the search to just 10 iterations
- Suitable for simulated scenarios or planned negotiations
- Not suitable for fast environments such as auctions

# Lack of consideration for social aspects

**The emotional and cultural dimensions of negotiations are poorly integrated.**

- Not sufficiently integrate the social and emotional dimensions which play a crucial role
- Trust, persuasion and even implicit communication -> difficult to model
- Risk of adopting 'mechanical' strategies that could seem disconnected or impersonal
- Example: commercial negotiation without enthusiasm or fear of losing the deal

# Vulnerability to non-cooperative adversarial strategies

## **The model can be exploited by non cooperative strategies**

- FDHC provide fair solution and expects opposing parties to do the same
- Example: systematically refuse to make concessions or deliberately overestimate
- FDHC might be forced to give more -> unbalanced outcomes
- Framework less robust to unconventional behaviour

# Complexity of adaptation to multiple domains

- New negotiation contexts often requires significant customisation (adjusting parameters, designing new prompts for linguistic models).
- Limits rapid deployment
- Requires technical expertise
- Reducing its potential for universal use

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Conclusion



# Conclusion

- Possible to combine fairness and humanity in autonomous negotiations
- Outperforms various conventional approaches
- Scalable platform for future research
- Need improvements in speed, robustness and consideration of social aspects to its generalisation
- Highlights ethical importance of favouring cooperation over exploitation strategies for good result and to preserve the integrity

THANK YOU!