Introduction to Bayesian statistics

Part 1 — Concepts

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• https://github.com/jorgetendeiro/GSMS-2020

Bayes rule

- $\triangleright \mathcal{D} = data$
- $ightharpoonup \theta = \text{unknown parameter}$

$$p(\theta|\mathcal{D}) = \frac{p(\theta)p(\mathcal{D}|\theta)}{p(\mathcal{D})}$$

In words,

$$posterior = \frac{prior \times likelihood}{evidence}$$

The *evidence* does not depend on θ ; let's hide it:

$$posterior \propto prior \times likelihood$$

The symbol \propto means "proportional to".

Bayes rule

$posterior \propto prior \times likelihood$

- ▶ *Prior*: Belief about the 'true' value of θ , before looking at the data.
- ▶ *Likelihood*: The statistical model, linking θ to data.
- ▶ *Posterior*: Updated knowledge about θ , in light of the observed data.


Let's look at the Bayes rule from various angles.

Bayes rule – ABC

One useful way to think about the Bayes rule is by considering *Approximate Bayesian Computation* (ABC; see Wiki).

- ▶ ABC is actually computationally *very* inefficient.
- ▶ But, it is *conceptually* very clear!

Bayes rule – ABC



Bayes rule – ABC

The Bayes rule from the ABC perspective:

Find the values of θ that allow the model to predict data pretty much like our observed data.

Humm...

Maximum likelihood estimation, anyone?

Bayesian inference can be thought of as an extension of MLE!

Bayes rule – Inverse probability

Bayes rule allows reversing conditional probabilities.

$$p(A|B) = \frac{p(A)p(B|A)}{p(B)}$$

Consider the canonical example:

- \triangleright \mathcal{A} : Have disease.
- \triangleright \mathcal{B} : Test positive.

Then:

▶ p(B|A): Probability of testing positive given that one has the disease.

Test's sensitivity.

▶ p(A|B): Probability of having the disease given that (s)he tests positive.

What patients really want to know.

Bayes rule – Updating beliefs

Definition of probability:

- ► *Frequentist:* Long-run relative frequency. (Problem: *p*(Trump winning 2020 election)?...)
- ► *Bayesian*: Degree of subjective belief.

 $posterior \propto prior \times likelihood$

- ▶ Bayes rule is a rational means of updating our current belief (*prior*) by means of observed data (*likelihood*).
- ► "Today's posterior is tomorrow's prior" Lindley (1970)

Bayes rule – Summary

 $posterior \propto prior \times likelihood$

Bayesian modelling requires three ingredients:

- ▶ Data.
- ▶ Priors, reflecting our subjective belief about the parameters.
- ► A statistical model, relating parameters to data.


Bayes rule is a mathematically rigorous means to combine prior information on *parameters* with the *data*, using the *statistical model* as the bridge between both.

Data here:

https://dasl.datadescription.com/datafile/bodyfat/.

- ▶ Various measurements of 250 men.
- ▶ To keep it simple: I dichotomize the percentage of body fat (PBF).
- ightharpoonup 0 = PBF lower than 25%;
 - 1 = PBF larger than 25%.
- ▶ *Goal*: Infer the proportion of obese men in the population.

Let's denote the population proportion by θ .




Let's use the Bayesian machinery.

Recall that we need three ingredients:

- ▶ Data.
- ▶ Prior.
- ► Model.

Data. For now, let's only use the first 10 scores.

- ► Sample size: 10
- ▶ Number of men with PBF > 25%: 2
- ► Sample proportion: $\hat{\theta} = \frac{2}{10} = .20$





Model. We'll use the binomial model. Assumptions:

- ► Independence between measurements.
- ▶ One population with underlying rate θ .
- ▶ Random sample.


Prior. We'll try several.

What happens if the prior is 'uninformative'?







What happens if the prior is 'very informative'?



What happens if neither the prior nor the likelihood dominates?








Let's now use all the data.


- ▶ Sample size: 250
- ▶ Number of men with PBF > 25%: 64
- ► Sample proportion: $\hat{\theta} = \frac{64}{250} = .256$

How does Bayes updating look like now, when the data dominate?









Bayes rule – Some conclusions

- ▶ Bayes rule highlights the parameter values that make the observed data look more plausible.
- ► The posterior distribution is a compromise between the information in the prior and the information in the data.

Bayes rule – Some conclusions

How do priors typically affect posterior distributions?

- ▶ For 'uninformative' priors, posterior \approx likelihood.
- ▶ For 'very informative' priors, posterior \approx prior.

Bayes rule – Some conclusions

How do data typically affect posterior distributions?

- ▶ For small sample sizes, posterior \approx prior.
- ▶ For large sample sizes, posterior \approx likelihood.

Bayesian inference – Some criticism

I think I can hear some of you thinking right now...


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"Hey, but there are sooo many posterior distributions!"
"This seems all sooo subjective!"
"I sooo don't like it!"
:-(
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Fair points.

Let me offer several counter-arguments.

1. Posterior distributions are fairly stable across a wide range of reasonable priors, *for large data sets*.

More data \Rightarrow more information \Rightarrow more certainty.



2. *Illusion of certainty:* Pretending that results tell us more than is actually possible.


There is subjectivity in each step of the scientific way:

- ► Selection of participants.
- ▶ Number of assessments.
- ► Variables to measure.
- ▶ Variables to control.
- ▶ Variability across researchers / labs.
- ▶ Statistical model to use.
- ▶ Variables to (not) include in the model.
- **...**

Then, try topping it up with few and noisy data...


It is fair, logical, necessary, that statistical inference reflects uncertainty.

Do embrace uncertainty!



- 3. Priors allow incorporating useful information.
- ▶ What is known about the parameter?

Let's not pretend we do not know anything.




About PBF:

- ▶ It is actually known that the proportion of obese men in (some...) population is about 40%.
- ▶ We can (we *should*!) take this into account.
- ▶ And *that* is what the prior is for.

(Do you know how much variability to expect? Then include this in the prior too!!)


One of Bayes' advantages: Accummulation of evidence. Use it!



Of course, strange things can occur.

"A Bayesian is one who, vaguely expecting a horse, and catching a glimpse of a donkey, strongly believes he has seen a mule." (Stephen Senn)

(Inspired by Aki Vehtari and John Kruschke.)





The posterior distribution is the *Holy Grail* in Bayesian statistics.

It reflects our current knowledge of the world, conditional on:

- ▶ The chosen model.
- ► The chosen prior(s).
- ▶ The observed data.

How can we summarize the information in the posterior distribution?





Point estimates.


Commonly used:

- posterior mean
- ▶ posterior mode
- ▶ posterior median.

For the PBF data based on 250 scores:

post. mean \approx post. mode \approx post. median \approx .26.

(Recall: $\widehat{\theta} = .256$.)




Interval estimates.


I will focus on the 95% credible interval throughout.

There are some variants (do not overly worry about these nuances):

- ► *Central 95% credible interval.* With 2.5% probability out on each tail.
- ▶ 95% HDI (highest density interval). The shortest interval covering area .95.

For the PBF data they practically coincide.







The posterior distribution allows computing probabilities for any events involving parameters.

For instance:

- ▶ What is the (posterior) probability that the population proportion of obese men is larger than 30%?
- ▶ What is the (posterior) probability that the population proportion of obese men is between 20% and 30%?





Next

Specific examples will be dealt with in Part 2. More concepts will be introduced as we proceed.

Now where's that cup of coffee?

