One-Time Verifiably Encrypted Signatures A.K.A. Adaptor Signatures

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Abstract

On Bitcoin-like ledgers, smart contract functionality can be realised without using the ledger's native smart contract language through the "adaptor signature" technique[1]. An adaptor signature is a kind of partial signature that, if completed, will reveal valuable information to the signer. In this work, we conduct the first formal analysis of the adaptor signature as an isolated primitive. We find that it offers similar functionality to the already well established concept of *verifiably encrypted signatures* (VES) with one notable difference: the decryption key can be recovered from the ciphertext and the decrypted signature. To capture this property, we formally introduce the notion of *one-time verifiably encrypted signatures*. To properly define their security in the Bitcoin layer-2 setting we revisit the original VES definitions and modify them to remove the ingrained assumption of a trusted third party.

After the extending our VES definitions to the one-time VES, we attempt to prove that the existing Schnorr and ECDSA adaptor signature schemes satisfy them. In the case of Schnorr, we succeed unconditionally but our definitions expose a (non-fatal) flaw in the ECDSA scheme. Nevertheless, we show how to use the ECDSA scheme to realise functionality in Bitcoin that was previously thought to be out of reach without Schnorr signatures or complex two-party ECDSA protocols.

1 Introduction

In 2017, Andrew Poelstra posted a message to the Mimblewimble mailing list[2] demonstrating an interesting feature of the Schnorr signature scheme. He showed that through a small tweak to the signing algorithm the core lock construction of the lightning payment channel network[3] could be realised without using Bitcoin's *smart contract* language called *script*. This was a remarkable discovery as the existing proposal relied heavily on enforcing the lock logic using script based hash locks. His explanation ended with "I'm very excited about this" and in retrospect his excitement seems justified. This breakthrough has been used to create "scriptless" variants of most Bitcoin layer-2[1] protocols (we give a fairly comprehensive list in Section 1.1).

Scriptless scripts. Achieving smart contract logic without script has been termed *scriptless scripts* within the Bitcoin research community. It is a significant challenge to the usual conception of smart contracts. Instead of being expressed in a programming language, a smart contract becomes a kind of multi-party computation that outputs transaction signatures according to the desired contract logic. In other words, if according to a contract Alice is meant to receive funds when event X occurs, instead of expressing event X in some way using the smart contract language, the contract is set up such that Alice is only able to compute a signature on a transaction that claims the funds due to her when event X occurs. This is clearly beneficial to Alice because no passive observer of the blockchain can tell that the transaction depended on event X, rather it (optimistically) looks just like a normal payment transaction.

Verifiably Encrypted Signatures. In this work we frame the adaptor signature, the key building block of scriptless protocols, as a kind of signature encryption. In particular, we find it almost fits the definition of *verifiably encrypted signatures*[4] (VES) introduced for the BLS signature scheme[5]. A VES scheme enables a signer to produce an encrypted signature whose validity can be verified non-interactively. The adaptor signature is a VES where the encryption is *one-time* in a similar sense to a one-time pad: the decryption key can easily be recovered from the ciphertext and its plaintext (the signature).

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[1] In this work we will use layer-2 to refer to any protocol that requires a direct communication channel between participants not just "off-chain" payment channel type protocols

Fair Exchange of Signatures Without a Trusted Party. This "one-time" property may seem like a bug, but in many settings it is actually a powerful feature. Consider the motivating example for the original VES scheme[4]: two parties, Alice and Bob, wish to fairly exchange signatures with the assistance of a trusted third party named the *adjudicator*. First, Alice sends to Bob her signature encrypted under the adjudicator's public key. Bob verifies the validity of the signature encryption and then sends his signature to Alice. If Alice refuses to reciprocate, Bob may ask the adjudicator to intervene by decrypting the encryption of Alice's signature he already has. If we assume the adjudicator is able to correctly assess the situation (i.e. will not be tricked by a malicious Bob) then this a secure optimistic fair signature exchange protocol.

With a one-time VES we can achieve the fair exchange of signatures *without* a trusted party under the assumption that the signatures need to be published publicly to be useful. The one-time property gives the Bitcoin layer-2 protocol designer leverage over malicious parties by forcing them to leak a secret key when they publish a decrypted signature. This leaked key can then be used by honest parties to carry on the protocol and claim the funds due to them. A simple one-time VES fair signature exchange protocol can be described as follows: Alice generates her signature encryption under a public encryption key she herself generates and sends the key and the ciphertext to Bob. Bob responds by generating a signature encrypted under the same key. Alice decrypts this signature and publishes it. Due to the one-time property of the VES, Bob is able to recover the Alice's decryption key and decrypt the signature from the ciphertext given to him by Alice.

1.1 Survey of Scriptless Protocols

In order to motivate our formalisation, we first review how one-time VES schemes (i.e. adaptor signatures) are used in existing scriptless layer-2 protocol proposals. We give a simplified explanation of each protocol below focusing on the role the VES plays in the construction. Interestingly not every proposal requires the VES to have the one-time property; the "Discreet Log Contracts" and lottery protocols only need an ordinary VES. In practice, each protocol requires a VES scheme with a two-party encrypted signing algorithm but we leave this out to simplify the description (Section 7 focuses on this point). In general, each scriptless protocol is more efficient in terms of transaction footprint and more confidential than its script based counterpart.

Atomic swaps. In an atomic swap, two parties, Alice and Bob, exchange the ownership of two assets, A and B, on two different ledgers, α and β. As initially conceived[6], Alice generates a random secret y and shares the hash of it $Y \leftarrow H(y)$ with Bob. Alice then locks A in a smart contract on α that will only release A if Bob activates it with y' such that $Y = H(y')$. Bob locks B into a similar contract on β. Alice then claims B by activating the contract on β with y. Bob then learns y and claims A with it on α.

The scriptless atomic swap protocol[7] is the classic example of how to apply adaptor signatures to create a practically identical structure without requiring smart contract based hash operations. Rather than a hash pre-image, Alice generates an encryption key-pair (y, Y). On α Alice gives Bob a one-time VES under Y on a transaction giving Bob A should he be able to decrypt it. Bob then sends Alice a one-time VES under Y on a transaction giving Alice B. Alice decrypts he signature with y and broadcasts to claim B. Bob then sees the decrypted signature and due to the one-time property of the VES he is able to extract y from it and decrypts his own signature to claim A. Note that, unlike the hash based protocol, the secret y is never placed into any transaction on either ledger making it much harder to link the transactions on α and β with each other.

Payment channels. Poelstra's original mailing list post applies the same transformation used in the scriptless atomic swap to the Lightning Network[3]. Payment channels gain an additional benefit from having a group element (the encryption key) as the lock, rather than a hash. Using the homomorphic properties of the group, the lock can be randomised at each hop making it difficult to link a payments traveling through the network just based on them having the same lock. This was formalised in [8]. Informal discussions on the lightning network development mailing list also suggest other benefits of using group elements, rather than hashes as the lock[9].

Discreet Log Contracts. In layer-2 protocols, "oracles" are parties who are trusted to cryptographically attest to the outcome of real world events. In his work "Discreet Log Contracts"[10] Dryja proposes a model where rather than interacting with smart contracts directly, oracles publicly reveal secret information (usually a signature) depending on the outcome of the real world event. Two parties who wish to engage in a bet

can construct a set of jointly signed transactions where only one of them becomes valid determined by the signature the oracle reveals. Importantly, the oracle remains oblivious to the existence of the bet.

The protocol in the original work required three on-chain transactions to settle a bet. We observe that by using a one-time VES we can construct a more efficient two transaction protocol. The oracle announces it will reveal the decryption key corresponding to public encryption key A or B depending on the outcome of some event. Alice and Bob wish to bet 1 BTC on outcomes A and B respectively with even odds. To securely set up this contract, they both pay their 1 BTC into a single joint 2 BTC output and Alice gives a VES on a transaction paying Bob the 2 BTC encrypted by B and Bob gives a VES on a transaction paying Alice the 2 BTC encrypted by A. When the oracle releases the decryption key for one of A or B, the winner can decrypt their transaction signature and claim the 2 BTC with 1 BTC profit. Note that this protocol does not require the VES to be one-time.

Tumblers. Inspired by Chaumian eCash[11], the first tumbler protocol, TumbleBit[12] enabled Bitcoin payments through an untrusted intermediary called the *tumbler* to be mixed so it is hard (even for the tumbler) to link the incoming and outgoing payments. TumbleBit requires script in the un-cooperative case to verify that the tumbler correctly releases blinded RSA decryptions.

Tairi et al. recently proposed a more efficient scriptless tumbler called A^{2}L[13]. The tumbler first locks coins up and gives a VES on a transaction releasing the coins to the *receiver* encrypted under $A = g^{\alpha_i}$. The tumbler also gives the sender a homomorphic encryption of the decryption key α_i. The *sender* then attempts to pay the tumbler for α_i without letting the tumbler know which α she paid for (the tumbler is presumed to be executing many such protocols at once each with a different α). The sender purchases α_i by giving the tumbler a one-time VES on a payment transaction encrypted under a blinded version of the encryption key e.g. $g^{\alpha_i+\beta}$ where the sender knows β. When the tumbler takes the payment $\alpha_i + \beta$ is revealed to the sender allowing them to decrypt receiver's signature.

In addition, a scriptless tumbler protocol based on blind Schnorr signatures is proposed in [14].

Lotteries. The possibility of Bitcoin lotteries without a trusted party[15] was one of the first ideas academic Bitcoin researchers formally explored[16][17]. In its simplest form two parties both bet 1 Bitcoin and at the end of the protocol, the randomly chosen winner has 2 Bitcoin and the loser has 0. Most proposals, including more recent ones[18][19] are based on hash commitment coin tossing to produce the random outcome. The protocols use script to check the commitment openings on-chain.

A scriptless lottery was recently proposed[20] which uses the *oblivious signatures* from [21] rather than hash commitment coin tossing. The oblivious signature scheme is essentially built on a VES: The receiver first sends a Pedersen commitment $T = g^x h^c$ where $c \in \{0, 1\}$, to the signer. The singer then sends a VES for each of m_0 and m_1 encrypted under T and Th^{-1} respectively. Due to the binding property of the commitment, the receiver only knows the decryption key x for the signature on m_c but the sender never learns c. The proposed protocol uses the adaptor signature style one-time VES but in principle the idea works with any VES as long as there is an algorithm that allows the receiver to verifiably produce a set of public keys for which it only knows one of the private keys (without anyone else knowing which one).

Pay for commitment opening. A script based smart contract to pay for an opening hash commitment is straightforward to construct. A scriptless alternative for paying for the opening of a Pedersen commitment has been proposed in [22].

1.2 Our Contribution

In Section 3, we contribute to theory of verifiably encrypted signatures in general. The original security definitions[4] only required the scheme to be secure if the encryption key-pair was chosen by the trusted adjudicator. VES schemes secure by these definitions are generally inappropriate for use in layer-2 protocols where a trusted party is rarely assumed. We propose new security definitions without reference to trusted parties and show that all existing schemes satisfy our new definitions.

In Section 4 we formally introduce one-time verifiably encrypted signatures. We then frame the existing Schnorr and ECDSA "adaptor signature" schemes as one-time VES schemes. We prove the Schnorr scheme secure but find that the ECDSA one-time VES unintentionally leaks a Diffie-Hellman tuple for the signing key and the encryption key. We incorporate this weakness and prove that this is at least the only problem with the scheme.

Finally in Section 7 we introduce the practical "semi-scriptless" paradigm where protocols can only have scripts with a single `OP_CHECKMULTISIG` script opcode. We show how to generically transform any scriptless protocol into a semi-scriptless protocol using the ECDSA one-time VES. This allows any scriptless protocol to be practically realised on Bitcoin as it is today without a complex two-party ECDSA multi-signature scheme.

1.3 Previous Work with Adaptor Signatures In Security Proofs

As far as we are aware, this work is the first attempt to formalise the adaptor signature as a primitive on its own. However, the works of [8] and [13] use the idea of the adaptor signature and formally argue their security in the *Universal Composability* (UC) model[23]. Their UC simulation ensures that corrupted parties may learn nothing but the signature itself from any adaptor signatures they receive. In general, the UC simulation is achieved through efficient *non-interactive zero knowledge proofs of knowledge* for discrete logarithms. This allows the simulator in the ideal world to extract the secret keys of the corrupted party and use them to synthetically create adaptor signatures to simulate the view of the adversary in the real world.

In our work, we use a weaker game-based model of security. This ensure that the corrupted party learns nothing *useful*, rather than nothing at all, from a signature encryption other than the signature itself. In particular, we will define security for VES and one-time VES schemes such that an adversary cannot learn anything from a signature encryption that will help them forge a signature on another message. We believe this is a viable approach in general, but it is especially reasonable in the context of Bitcoin style ledgers. In layer-2 Bitcoin protocols, the keys that own coins are not re-used between protocol executions so it is easy to ensure that a key is only used in the particular ways our game-based definitions can ensure is secure.

1.4 Future Work

Multi-party VES. All proposed scriptless protocols require signature encryptions generated through a two-party encrypted signing protocol. The security of Schnorr two-party one-time VES protocols deserves attention since it is being put forward as the main primitive for the protocols listed in Section 1.1 above in the long-term. We limit ourselves to focusing on defining formal security for single singer VES schemes and leave this analysis for future work.

Schnorr vs BLS. This work suggests a significant trade-off between the choice of Schnorr and BLS as the main signature scheme for Bitcoin-like systems. BLS admits an efficient VES scheme[4] and extremely attractive non-interactive signature aggregation [24]. On the other hand, Schnorr admits a less elegant interactive multi-signature scheme[25] but a very efficient one-time VES scheme. Additionally, it should be possible to create a Schnorr (not one-time) VES scheme with general zero-knowledge proof techniques where as a one-time VES for BLS looks much less likely. This trade off deserves further exploration including the possibility of a signature scheme that admits both an efficient VES and one-time VES scheme.

2 Preliminaries

2.1 Bitcoin

We assume a fair amount of familiarity with the Bitcoin transaction structure in Section 7. A Bitcoin transaction has the following elements:

- A set of inputs, each of which refer to a previous output.
- For each input, a witness that satisfies the spending constraints specified in the output it references.
- For each input, a *relative* time-lock which prevents the transaction from being included in the ledger until enough time has passed since the output it references was included in the ledger.
- A set of new outputs, each with a value and spending constraint.
- An *absolute* time-lock, which prevents the transaction from being included in the ledger until a specific time.

Whenever a transaction is included in the ledger, its outputs are considered "spent" and their value is transferred to the new outputs created by the transaction (and a small fee to the miner who included them).

When we refer to a "layer-2" protocol we mean any protocol that is composed of messages sent between the participants and transactions sent to the ledger. A scriptless protocol means any protocol where the transactions only use a basic public key spending constraint which can only be satisfied by a signature on the spending transaction under that public key. It's important to note that a scriptless protocol can still use the time-lock constraints (and most do).

2.2 Notation

We analyse security asymptotically with our security parameter as k. We assume that the algorithms for each scheme have been generated by some $\mathsf{Setup}(1^k)$ algorithm which generates the a concrete instance of the scheme according to k. By $\mathsf{negl}(k)$ we denote any negligible function of k i.e. $\mathsf{negl}(k) < 1/p(k)$ for all positive polynomials $p(k)$ and all sufficiently large values of k. We say a probability is "negligible" if it can be expressed as $\mathsf{negl}(k)$ or overwhelming if it can be expressed as $1 - \mathsf{negl}(k)$. A polynomial time adversary runs in time that can be upper bounded by some polynomial of k. A *probabilistic* algorithm is also implicitly given a long string of random bits in addition to its other arguments. We denote invoking a probabilistic algorithm with $\leftarrow_{\$}$. If an algorithm is probabilistic and polynomial time we say it is a PPT algorithm.

2.3 The Discrete Logarithm Problem

The concrete signature schemes we deal with (Schnorr and ECDSA) are based on the discrete logarithm problem (DL). Written multiplicatively, the DL problem is to find $x \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ given (X, g) such that $g^x = X$, in a group $\mathbb{G}$ of prime order by q. We denote the fixed generator of a DL based scheme by g. In reality $(\mathbb{G}, q, g)$ are fixed by the ledger i.e. the Secp256k1 elliptic curve group for Bitcoin, but we reason about them as if the they were generated by the $\mathsf{Setup}(1^k)$ algorithm relative to k. Note that when we describe schemes based on the DL problem, all scalar operations are implicitly done modulo q.

2.4 Signature Schemes

2.5 Cryptographic Reductions

In a security game a challenger $\mathcal{C}$ and adversary $\mathcal{A}$ send game defined messages to each other sequentially. If at the end of the game the *transcript* of the messages satisfy a game specific predicate then the adversary is said to have won the succeeded, otherwise they have failed. A simple and relevant example is the *unforgeability* games where $\mathcal{C}$ sends $\mathcal{A}$ a public key X and then $\mathcal{A}$ sends back a signature σ.

The security game may allow $\mathcal{A}$ to query $\mathcal{C}$ about something it could

Definition 2.1 (Security Reduction). Let $\mathcal{H}$ and $\mathcal{G}$ describe two security games. Let $\mathcal{C}$ be the challenger for $\mathcal{G}$, let $\mathcal{A}$ be an adversary against $\mathcal{H}$ and let $\mathcal{R}$ be an ITM that interacts with $\mathcal{C}$ and $\mathcal{R}$ concurrently by playing the challenger in $\mathcal{H}$ and the adversary in $\mathcal{G}$. We say $\mathcal{R}$ is a reduction from $\mathcal{G}$ to $\mathcal{H}$ if its probability of success and execution time in the $\mathcal{G}$ security game is a function of the probability success and execution time of $\mathcal{A}$ in the $\mathcal{H}$ security game. The existence of $\mathcal{R}$ allows us to bound the success of any adversary against $\mathcal{H}$ by the difficulty of $\mathcal{G}$. Specifically, we say $\mathcal{R}$ is a reduction from $\mathcal{G}$ to $\mathcal{H}$ if given any $\mathcal{A}$ that $(\tau, \epsilon, Q_1, ..., Q_n)$-solves $\mathcal{H}$ $\mathcal{R}$ $(\tau', \epsilon', Q'_1, \ldots, Q'_m)$-solves $\mathcal{G}$ where $\varepsilon \leq \mathcal{B}_\varepsilon(\varepsilon', Q_1, \ldots, Q_n)$ and $\tau \geq \mathcal{B}_\tau(\tau, Q_1, \ldots, Q_n)$ and $Q_1, \ldots, Q_n$ (resp. $\{Q'_1, \ldots, Q'_m\}$) are the number of queries made by $\mathcal{A}$ (resp. $\mathcal{R}$) to each of the n (resp. m) oracles available while solving $\mathcal{H}$ (resp. $\mathcal{G}$).

reduction structure. The $\mathcal{R}$ machine must be structured as follows. $\mathcal{R}$ is activated with an instance of a problem $\mathcal{G}$ by the *challenger* ITM. After it is activated it may query the oracles $\mathcal{O}'_1, \ldots, \mathcal{O}'_m$ at any time by activating the challenger. Eventually $\mathcal{R}$ activates $\mathcal{A}$ with an instance of $\mathcal{H}$ and may supplies its random tape. From there $\mathcal{R}$ may be activated again by $\mathcal{A}$ making an oracle query or by $\mathcal{A}$ returning output. If $\mathcal{H}$ is an interactive problem it must activate $\mathcal{A}$ again after it first returns output in accordance with description of $\mathcal{H}$ (and the same is true between the challenger and $\mathcal{R}$ with respect to $\mathcal{G}$).

oracle queries. When $\mathcal{A}$ makes any query to an oracle $\mathcal{O}_i$ it has access to in $\mathcal{H}$ $\mathcal{R}$ is activated (as it is the notional challenger). In particular, $\mathcal{R}$ is activated with $(oracle, i, \mathbf{q})$ where q is the query $\mathcal{A}$ is making to $\mathcal{O}_i$. $\mathcal{R}$ must then *blindly* forward q to a simulator subroutine along with its own *advice* a. When activated with (α, q) the simulator returns (a', q') to $\mathcal{R}$ where a' is the simulator's advice to $\mathcal{R}$ and q' is the query

response. $\mathcal{R}$ then inspects a' and decides whether to abort but cannot inspect q'. If it does not abort, it outputs the query response q' to $\mathcal{A}$. Note that restricting $\mathcal{R}$ so that it cannot read (q, q') for each query is without loss of generality since, if need be, $\mathcal{R}$ can be defined with a simulator that returns (q, q') in a'.

oracle simulator requirements. $\mathcal{R}$ may be defined with any set of simulators $\mathcal{S}_1, \ldots, \mathcal{S}_n$ for each oracle in $\mathcal{H}$ as long as they preserve the view $\mathcal{A}$ with respect to $\mathcal{H}$. $\mathcal{R}$ cannot choose the random tape of its simulators, instead they are provided directly by the environment. If $\mathcal{G}$ allows oracle queries ($m > 0$) then the simualtors may (and very often will) query $\mathcal{G}$ directly (they may do this without activating $\mathcal{R}$). The execution time of the simulator contributes to the execution time of $\mathcal{R}$ (but the execution of oracles from $\mathcal{G}$ do not). Each simulator may abort the execution which in-turn aborts the execution of $\mathcal{R}$ as well.

rewinding. $\mathcal{R}$ may "rewind" $\mathcal{A}$, which in our definition simply means activating a new instance of $\mathcal{A}$ with the same random tape. Despite $\mathcal{R}$ not being able to read query response from the oracle simulators, it may store them and repeat the response for each corresponding query. Note it need not inspect the query to do this since after rewinding, the adversary will make the same queries in the same order.

To profit from our isolation of the oracle simulators from the reduction itself we now define how to replace an oracle with another oracle,and by implication change the set of adversaries the reduction works against. Since we are only changing oracles, the transcript between the reduction and the adversary remains in the same form and so the reduction should be able to extract solutions to the exterior problem from it. To ensure this is true our switch of oracles must not affect the reduction. Therefore, the new oracle simulator, in addition to simulating the view of the adversary, must simulate the view of the reduction with respect to the simulator that is being replaced.

Lemma 2.1 (Simulator Substitution). *Let $\mathcal{H}^A$ (resp. $\mathcal{H}^B$) be a variation of some hard problem $\mathcal{H}$ where the adversary has access to an additional oracle A (resp. B) with a valid set of queries $\mathbb{Q}_A$ (resp. $\mathbb{Q}_B$). Let $\mathcal{R}$ be a security reduction from $\mathcal{G}$ to $\mathcal{H}^A$ which uses $\mathcal{S}_A$ with minimum execution time $\tau^A_{\min}$, to simulate A. Let $\mathcal{S}_B$ be a simulator with maximum execution time $\tau^B_{\max}$ for B that requires access to additional oracles and $\mathcal{G}^C$ be a variant of $\mathcal{G}$ that provides those oracles. If for all advice a and all $q_B \in \mathbb{Q}_B$) there exists $q_A \in \mathbb{Q}_A$ such that the distributions of a'_A and a'_B are identical where $(a'_A, \cdot) \leftarrow\!\!\$\, \mathcal{S}_A(a, q_A)$ and $(a'_B, \cdot) \leftarrow\!\!\$\, \mathcal{S}_B(a, q_B)$, then $\mathcal{R}$ is also a reduction from $\mathcal{G}^C$ to $\mathcal{H}^B$. In particular the reduction has bounding functions $\mathcal{B}_\varepsilon, \mathcal{B}^B_\tau$ where $\mathcal{B}^B_\tau(\tau) = \mathcal{B}_\tau(\tau) - Q^*(\tau^B_{\max} - \tau^A_{\min})$ where Q^* is the number of times $\mathcal{R}$ executes $\mathcal{S}_A$.*

Proof. For the advantage of $\mathcal{R}$ against $\mathcal{G}$ (or $\mathcal{G}^C$) to be different when running against a adversary solving $\mathcal{H}^B$ than to an adversary solving $\mathcal{H}^A$, the view of $\mathcal{R}$ must be distributed differently when the two adversaries finally output their respective solutions. If they were not distributed differently then $\mathcal{R}$ could be used to distinguish two identically distributed variables which is a contradiction.

The view of $\mathcal{R}$ consists of three parts (i) its transcript with the $\mathcal{G}$ challenger, (ii) its transcript with the adversary solving $\mathcal{H}$ and (iii) its transcripts with its oracles. Clearly, changing $\mathcal{G}$ to $\mathcal{G}^C$ does not change the distribution of (i) since $\mathcal{R}$ does not query the extra oracles in $\mathcal{G}^C$. For every adversary against $\mathcal{H}^B$ there must exist an adversary against $\mathcal{H}^A$ with that sends non-oracle messages to $\mathcal{R}$ from the same distribution (this adversary does not necessarily run in the same time but has the same advantage). This means that (ii) cannot be the source of disparity. Finally, as our premise we have stated that $\mathcal{S}_A$ and $\mathcal{S}_B$ return identically distributed a' given some a so the transcripts in (iii) are also identically distributed.

The running time of $\mathcal{R}$ against $\mathcal{A}^B$ will be the difference between the running time of $\mathcal{S}_B$ and $\mathcal{S}_A$ multiplied by the number of executions and similarly the number of oracle queries made to $\mathcal{G}$. □

3 Verifiably Encrypted Signatures Without a Trusted Third Party

Verifiably encrypted signatures (VES) were introduced by Boneh, Gentry, Lynn and Shacham (BGLS) [4] in 2003 for the BLS signature scheme[5]. A VES scheme lets a signer create a signature encryption that can be non-interactively verified. Just by knowing the message and public signing key, a verifier can tell that a ciphertext contains a valid signature encrypted by a particular encryption key. This separates it from the earlier notion of *signcryption*[26] where the message is also encrypted and the verification is often interactive.

This idea is somewhat unintuitive. If I can verify that the signer has indeed signed the message then what's the point of decrypting the ciphertext? A VES is only useful in settings where the signature itself is what has value rather than the fact that someone has signed it. In layer-2 protocols we have exactly this situation. Having a verifiably encrypted transaction signature is not enough to make the transaction valid — it must first be decrypted and attached to the transaction. Skipping ahead a bit, with our new definitions

we do not even require that a valid encrypted signature was created by the signer for it to be a secure VES scheme.

The original definitions of BGLS were made relative to a trusted third party, the *adjudicator*. The original idea was that two parties could optimistically exchange signatures, by first exchanging verifiably encrypted signatures, then should one of them fail to provide their signature, the other could go to the adjudicator to have it decrypted. This is not appropriate for our setting. In most of the protocols described in Section 1.1, one of the possibly malicious parties generates the encryption key-pair. We take our first step towards a trusted party free definition by removing references to the "adjudicator" from the definition of VES:

Definition 3.1 (Verifiably Encrypted Signature Scheme). A verifiably encrypted signature scheme (VES) $\hat{\Sigma}$ is defined with an ordinary *underlying* signature scheme $\Sigma := (\mathsf{Gen}, \mathsf{Sign}, \mathsf{Vrfy})$ and four additional algorithms:

- $\mathsf{EncGen} \xrightarrow{\$} (sk_E, pk_E)$: A probabilistic encryption key generation algorithm which outputs an encryption key pk_E and a decryption key sk_E. There should also exist an efficient predicate $\mathsf{valid}(sk_E, pk_E)$ that returns 1 when (sk_E, pk_E) is a valid key-pair.
- $\mathsf{EncSign}(sk_S, pk_E, m) \xrightarrow{\$} \hat{\sigma}$: A possibly probabilistic encrypted signing algorithm, which on input of a secret signing key sk_S, a public encryption key pk_E and a message m outputs a ciphertext $\hat{\sigma}$.
- $\mathsf{EncVrfy}(pk_S, pk_E, m, \hat{\sigma}) \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$: A deterministic encrypted signature verification algorithm which on input of a public signing key pk_S, a public encryption key pk_E, a message m and a ciphertext $\hat{\sigma}$ outputs 1 only if $\hat{\sigma}$ is a valid encryption of a signature on m for pk_S under pk_E.
- $\mathsf{DecSig}(sk_E, \hat{\sigma}) \rightarrow \sigma$: A (usually) deterministic signature decryption algorithm which on input of a decryption key sk_E and a valid ciphertext $\hat{\sigma}$ under that encryption key outputs a valid signature σ.

Any coherent VES should satisfy a basic notion of completeness such that for all messages m, valid encryption and signing key pairs (sk_E, pk_E) and (sk_S, pk_S) and for all coin tosses of $\mathsf{EncSign}$ the following always holds:

$$\hat{\sigma} = \mathsf{EncSign}(sk_S, pk_E, m) \implies \mathsf{EncVrfy}(pk_S, pk_E, m, \hat{\sigma}) = 1 \wedge \mathsf{Vrfy}(pk_S, m, \mathsf{DecSig}(sk_E, \hat{\sigma})) = 1$$

The original work BGLS proposed three security properties: *validity*, *unforgeability*, and *opacity*. To meet the requirements of our setting, we will restate validity without reference to a trusted party and replace unforgeability with a new *existential unforgeability under chosen message attack* ($\mathsf{EUF\text{-}CMA}[\mathsf{VES}]$) property. We keep the original definition of opacity. Therefore our VES requirements are informally as follows:

- **Validity:** It is infeasible to generate a valid looking ciphertext that does not yield a valid signature upon decryption.
- $\mathsf{EUF\text{-}CMA}[\mathsf{VES}]$: A VES ciphertext does not help an adversary forge signatures. In other words, an adversary cannot learn anything useful from a VES ciphertext other than the signature that is encrypted.
- **Opacity:** The encrypted signature cannot be extracted from the ciphertext without the decryption key.

We formally present our new definitions for validity and introduce $\mathsf{EUF\text{-}CMA}[\mathsf{VES}]$ after summarizing previous work on improving VES definitions. We do not formally describe opacity as the original definitions are not applicable the one-time VES (see Section 4).

3.1 Previous Revisions of the VES Security Definitions

Rückert et al. [27] noticed that *key independent* schemes (which we call Sign then Encrypt (StE)) whose underlying signature schemes are $\mathsf{EUF\text{-}CMA}$ secure can be proved unforgeable generically. This is remarkable as the original BGLS scheme, which is StE, had an involved proof for unforgeability that spanned several pages. We use a similar idea to prove any StE scheme satisfies $\mathsf{EUF\text{-}CMA}[\mathsf{VES}]$. Hanser et al. [28] also identified the importance of the $\mathsf{EUF\text{-}CMA}$ security of the underlying signature scheme. They proved that the underlying signature scheme is unforgeable if the VES scheme is unforgeable based on a different property.

Calderon et al. [29] discuss the original definitions in detail. They show a pathological VES scheme which is secure according to the original definitions but can be constructed only using a signature scheme i.e. without any encryption. For simplicity, our definitions exclude the pathological constructions but could be easily modified to account for them.

Shao [30] addresses the assumption of trust in the adjudicator by providing a stronger definition of unforgeability which prevents forging a VES even if the adjudicator is corrupted. Unfortunately, the original and highly practical VES scheme of BGLS does not meet this stronger requirement. Our approach to removing trust in a third party is to simply replace the concept of unforgeability with EUF-CMA[VES] . The ability of malicious parties to forge signature encryptions is not a concern in our setting as long as they cannot forge signatures (which is already ensured by the EUF-CMA security of the signature scheme).

3.2 Validity

Validity protects against an adversary who attempts to create a valid looking ciphertext that when decrypted will not yield a valid signature. The original BGLS definition of validity was inadequate as they only guaranteed a valid signature upon decryption if the ciphertext was generated by the EncSign algorithm. Rückert et al. [27] noticed this problem and introduced the additional property of *extractability* which ensured the adversary could not find a malicious ciphertext against the trusted adjudicator's encryption key.

This definition of extractability is not appropriate for our setting as we have no trusted party. In layer-2 protocols, the encryption key and the signing key may be generated by the same malicious party. For example, imagine an adversary who maliciously generates a VES ciphertext on some transaction signature and attempts to sell the decryption key to someone who wishes to know the signature. If they are successful they can get paid for the decryption key but even after obtaining the decryption key the buyer will be unable to get their desired signature. Therefore, in our setting, the adversary must be free to choose the signing and encryption keys. We choose to use the original name of validity to capture this idea as it ensures that the validity of a ciphertext carries through to the validity of the decrypted signature.

Definition 3.2 (Validity). A VES scheme $\hat{\Sigma}$ is (τ, ϵ)-valid if $\Pr\left[\mathsf{VES\text{-}Validity}^{\mathcal{A}}_{\hat{\Sigma}} = 1\right] \leq \epsilon$, for all algorithms $\mathcal{A}$ running it at most time τ.

$\mathsf{VES\text{-}Validity}^{\mathcal{A}}_{\hat{\Sigma}}$

$(pk_S, (sk_E, pk_E), m, \hat{\sigma}) \leftarrow_{\$} \mathcal{A}$

$\sigma \leftarrow \mathsf{DecSig}(sk_E, \hat{\sigma})$

return $\mathsf{valid}(sk_E, pk_E) \implies \mathsf{EncVrfy}(pk_S, pk_E, m, \hat{\sigma}) = \mathsf{Vrfy}(pk_S, m, \sigma)$

3.3 EUF-CMA[VES]

Our goal in this section is to formally capture the requirement that nothing can be learned from a VES ciphertext except the signature encrypted within. We start with the typical EUF-CMA security definition for signature schemes which ensures that from a signature, nothing can be learned about a signature on any other message under the same signing key. The experiment tests this by giving the forger a signature oracle S from which it can query signatures under the signing key on messages of its choosing. For a secure scheme, no algorithm should exist that is able to forge signatures even with access to S. By implication, the forger learns nothing useful from the signatures other than the signatures themselves.

To show that a VES ciphertext equally offers no extra information to the forger, we modify the experiment so the forger instead has access to a signature encryption oracle E. The forger may query this oracle under any encryption key and message it wants and receives back a valid signature on the message encrypted under that key. This allows, for example, the forger to request a ciphertext where the encryption key is a functions of the signing key they are trying to forge against in the hope that this will leak something about the signing key. This is crucial because as we will see later, due to a problem in our ECDSA one-time VES scheme, the forger can do exactly this to speed up an attempt to recover the secret signing key. Note that we provide the encryption oracle E instead of S, rather than in addition to, because we assume S can be simulated with E by simply requesting an encryption for which the forger knows the decryption key. This assumption holds as long as decrypted signatures are indistinguishable from ordinary signatures, which is true except for some pathological constructions[29]. We call denote this modified experiment EUF-CMA[VES] and define it as follows.

Definition 3.3 (EUF-CMA[VES]). A VES scheme $\hat{\Sigma}$ is (ϵ, τ, Q_E)-EUF-CMA[VES] secure if $\Pr\left[\mathsf{EUF\text{-}CMA[VES]}^{\mathcal{F}}_{\hat{\Sigma}} = 1\right] \leq \epsilon$ for all forgers $\mathcal{F}$ making at most Q_E signature encryption queries and running in at most time τ.

$\mathsf{EUF\text{-}CMA[VES]}^{\mathcal{F}}_{\hat{\Sigma}}$	Oracle $E(pk_E, m)$
$Q := \emptyset$	$Q := Q \cup \{m\}$
$(sk_S, pk_S) \leftarrow_\$ \mathsf{Gen}$	**return** $\mathsf{EncSign}(sk_S, pk_E, m)$
$(m^*, \sigma) \leftarrow_\$ \mathcal{F}^E(pk_S)$	
return $\mathsf{Vrfy}(pk_S, m^*, \sigma) \wedge m^* \notin Q$	

EUF-CMA[VES] effectively replaces the original definition of *unforgeability* so we now discuss and prove the relationship between the two. The original unforgeability property referred to signature encryptions being unforgeable under the trusted adjudicator's encryption key and is therefore inadequate for our setting. EUF-CMA[VES] says nothing about the unforgeability of signature encryptions. In fact, an adversary who can produce valid VES ciphertexts without the secret signing key is perfectly compatible. Of course, they will never be able to forge a VES ciphertext under a particular encryption key. If they could do that, then they could trivially forge an encrypted signature under a key for which they know the decryption key and decrypt it. The original definitions seem to have missed this intuition: it is not the security of the VES scheme that prevents there being a successful forger of signature encryptions under a particular key, the EUF-CMA security of the underlying signature scheme already ensures that no such algorithm can exist. After recalling the original BGLS definition of unforgeability, we use this intuition to prove that any EUF-CMA[VES] scheme is also unforgeable.

Definition 3.4 (BGLS VES Unforgeability [4]). We say a VES scheme $\hat{\Sigma}$ is $(\tau, \epsilon, Q_E, Q_D)$-BGLS unforgeable if $\Pr[\mathsf{BGLS\text{-}Unforgeability} = 1] < \epsilon$ for all algorithms $\mathcal{F}$ running in time τ making Q_E and Q_D signature encryption and decryption oracle queries respectively. Note that unlike in the EUF-CMA[VES] experiment the oracles in BGLS-Unforgeability only provide signature encryptions and decryption under a static encryption key chosen by the experiment (this represents the trusted adjudicator's key).

$\mathsf{BGLS\text{-}Unforgeability}^{\mathcal{F}}_{\hat{\Sigma}}$	Oracle $\tilde{E}(m)$	Oracle $\tilde{D}(\hat{\sigma})$
$Q \leftarrow \emptyset$	$Q := Q \cup \{m\}$	$\mathsf{EncVrfy}(pk_S, pk_E, \hat{\sigma}) \stackrel{?}{=} 1$
$(sk_S, pk_S) \leftarrow_\$ \mathsf{Gen}$	$\hat{\sigma} \leftarrow_\$ \mathsf{EncSign}(sk_S, pk_E, m)$	**return** $\mathsf{DecSig}(sk_E, \hat{\sigma})$
$(sk_E, pk_E) \leftarrow_\$ \mathsf{EncGen}$	**return** $\hat{\sigma}$	
$(m^*, \hat{\sigma}^*) \leftarrow_\$ \mathcal{F}^{\tilde{E}, \tilde{D}}(pk_S, pk_E)$		
return $\mathsf{EncVrfy}(pk_S, pk_E, m^*, \hat{\sigma}^*) \wedge m^* \notin Q$		

Theorem 3.1 (EUF-CMA[VES] + Validity $\implies$ BGLS Unforgeability). *Let $\hat{\Sigma}$ be a VES scheme and let $\mathcal{F}$ be a forger that $(\tau, \epsilon, Q_E, Q_D)$-breaks the BGLS unforgeability of it. Then, there exists a forger $\mathcal{F}_0$ that $(\tau_0, \epsilon_0, Q_E)$-breaks the EUF-CMA[VES] security of $\hat{\Sigma}$ and an adversary $\mathcal{A}_v$ that (τ_v, ϵ_v)-breaks the validity of $\hat{\Sigma}$, where $\epsilon \leq \epsilon_0 + \epsilon_v$ and $\tau_v \approx \tau_0 \approx \tau$.*

Proof. We construct $\mathcal{F}_0$ as follows:

$\mathcal{F}_0^E(pk_S)$	Simulate $\tilde{E}(m)$	Simulate $\tilde{D}(\hat{\sigma})$
$(sk_E, pk_E) \leftarrow_\$ \mathsf{EncGen}$	**return** $E(pk_E, m)$	$\mathsf{EncVrfy}(pk_S, pk_E, \hat{\sigma}) \stackrel{?}{=} 1$
$(m^*, \hat{\sigma}^*) \leftarrow_\$ \mathcal{F}^{\tilde{E}, \tilde{D}}(pk_S, pk_E)$		**return** $\mathsf{DecSig}(sk_E, \hat{\sigma})$
$\sigma^* \leftarrow \mathsf{DecSig}(sk_E, \hat{\sigma}^*)$		
return (m^*, σ^*)		

Clearly $\mathcal{F}_0$ can perfectly simulate the view of $\mathcal{F}$ in the real BGLS-Unforgeability experiment by generating the encryption key-pair itself and using its access to E from the EUF-CMA[VES] experiment. If $\mathcal{F}$

outputs a valid ciphertext that yields a valid signature upon decryption, $\mathcal{F}_0$ successfully forges a signature in the EUF-CMA[VES] experiment. Otherwise if the ciphertext does not yield a valid signature, the tuple $(pk_S, (sk_E, pk_E), m, \hat{\sigma})$ can be used to break validity and so we can construct an aglorithm $\mathcal{A}_v$ that simulates the view similarly to $\mathcal{F}_0$ but returns those tuples. Therefore,

$$\Pr[\mathcal{F}\text{-}breaks] = \Pr[\mathcal{F}_0\text{-}breaks] + \Pr[\mathcal{A}_v\text{-}breaks]$$

and $\epsilon \leq \epsilon_0 + \epsilon_v$. Regardless of which VES property $\mathcal{F}$ breaks, for the other two algorithms to output a solution to their problem they will take whatever time $\mathcal{F}$ takes plus extra time to simulate the oracle queries so we say $\tau_v \approx \tau_0 \approx \tau$. □

3.4 Sign Then Encrypt VES

We now make the case for using EUF-CMA[VES] as the standard VES security definition even in the trusted party setting since it implies BGLS unforgeability and it is much easier to prove for the schemes that have been developed so far. We can prove all existing schemes we are aware of [4, 27, 31, 30, 28] EUF-CMA[VES] secure just by the *Sign then Encrypt* (StE) structure they all share. That is, internally the EncSign algorithm first generates a normal signature using Sign and then encrypts the result. Formally:

Definition 3.5 (Sign then Encrypt VES). A *Sign then Encrypt* (StE) VES scheme is defined with an ordinary *underlying* signature scheme $\Sigma := (\mathsf{Gen}, \mathsf{Sign}, \mathsf{Vrfy})$ an *associated* public key encryption scheme $\Pi = (\mathsf{EncGen}, \mathsf{Enc}, \mathsf{Dec})$ and a VES verification algorithm EncVrfy such that if we define DecSig := Dec and $\mathsf{EncSign}(sk_S, pk_E, m) := \mathsf{Enc}(pk_E, \mathsf{Sign}(pk_S, m))$ then $\hat{\Sigma} := (\mathsf{EncGen}, \mathsf{EncSign}, \mathsf{EncVrfy}, \mathsf{DecSig})$ is a VES scheme according to Definition 3.1.

It is easy to see that any valid StE scheme must be EUF-CMA[VES] secure. The encryption oracle E the forger has access to in the EUF-CMA[VES] experiment can be simulated just by encrypting the result of a query to the signature oracle S that the EUF-CMA experiment provides.

Theorem 3.2 (StE + EUF-CMA $\implies$ EUF-CMA[VES]). *Let $\hat{\Sigma}$ be a StE VES scheme, Σ be its underlying signature scheme and $\Pi = (\mathsf{EncGen}, \mathsf{Enc}, \mathsf{Dec})$ be its associated public key encryption scheme and let $\mathcal{R}$ be a reduction to the EUF-CMA security of Σ with signature simulator $\mathcal{S}_S$. If $\mathcal{R}$ shows that Σ is at least (τ, ε, Q_S)-EUF-CMA secure then $\hat{\Sigma}$ is at least $(\tau', \varepsilon, Q_E)$-EUF-CMA[VES] secure where*

$$Q_E = Q_S, \tau = \tau' + Q_S^* \tau_{\mathsf{Enc}}$$

and Q_S^* is number of times $\mathcal{R}$ executes $\mathcal{S}_S$ and τ_{Enc} is the time Enc takes to run.

Proof. We can construct a substitutable simulator for $\mathcal{S}_E$ with $\mathcal{S}_S$ trivially. When E is asked to respond to a query by $\mathcal{R}$ with $(a, (pk_E, m))$, $\mathcal{S}_E$ forwards the query to $\mathcal{S}_S$ like so $(a', \sigma) \leftarrow_\$ \mathcal{S}_S(a, m)$ and then encrypts the result $\hat{\sigma} \leftarrow_\$ \mathsf{Enc}(pk_E, m)$ and returns $(a', \hat{\sigma})$ to $\mathcal{R}$. Clearly $\mathcal{S}_E$ and $\mathcal{S}_S$ are simulation substitutable as per Lemma 2.1 since each $q_E := (pk_E, m)$ and a has a corresponding query $q_S := m$ whose a' must be distributed identically because it is produced by $\mathcal{S}_S$ and forwarded by $\mathcal{S}_E$ unmodified. □

4 One-Time Verifiably Encrypted Signatures

We introduce the *one-time verifiably encrypted signature scheme* to abstract the functionality of the "adaptor signature"[1]. A one-time VES is a VES with an additional property: given the ciphertext and the decrypted signature, the decryption key is easily recoverable. Obviously, this property makes it useless for the optimistic fair exchange of signatures with a trusted party envisioned for ordinary VES schemes, as the trusted adjudicator would leak their decryption key after its first use. Despite this, the property turns out to be incredibly useful to layer-2 protocol designers as it allows them to force the release of a secret key whenever a party broadcasts a decrypted transaction signature. We define by extending the original VES definition:

Definition 4.1 (One-Time Verifiably Encrypted Signatures). A One-Time Verifiably Encrypted Signature scheme (one-time VES) is a Verifiably Encrypted Signature scheme (Gen, Sign, Vrfy, EncGen, EncSign, EncVrfy, DecSig) with the following additional algorithms:

- $\mathsf{RecKey}(pk_E, \hat{\sigma}) \to \delta$: A deterministic recovery key extraction algorithm which extracts a recovery key δ from the ciphertext $\hat{\sigma}$ and the public encryption key pk_E.
- $\mathsf{Rec}(\sigma, \delta) \to sk_E$: A deterministic decryption key recovery algorithm which when given a decrypted signature σ and the recovery key δ associated with the original ciphertext, returns the secret decryption key sk_E.

Technically, Rec takes a "recovery key" δ rather than the ciphertext $\hat{\sigma}$ but they should usually be thought of as equivalent. The distinction only really becomes necessary in Section 7 when we construct a simple two party encrypted signing protocol where one party is not able to output the whole ciphertext but is able to output the recovery key.

To be considered secure, we require a one-time VES scheme to have the *completeness*, *validity* and EUF-CMA[VES] properties of an ordinary VES along with *recoverability* which we define as follows.

Definition 4.2 (Recoverability). A one-time VES scheme is recoverable if for all PPT algorithms $\mathcal{A}$ the VES-Recover experiment outputs 1 except with negligible probability over the coin tosses of $\mathcal{A}$ and Setup:

$\mathsf{VES\text{-}Recover}^{\mathcal{A}}_{\mathsf{Setup}}$

$\hat{\Sigma} \leftarrow\!\!\$\ \mathsf{Setup}(1^k)$

$(pk_S, (sk_E, pk_E), m, \hat{\sigma}) \leftarrow\!\!\$\ \mathcal{A}(\hat{\Sigma})$

$\delta \leftarrow \hat{\Sigma}.\mathsf{RecKey}(pk_E, \hat{\sigma}); \sigma \leftarrow \hat{\Sigma}.\mathsf{DecSig}(sk_E, \hat{\sigma})$

return $(\hat{\Sigma}.\mathsf{valid}(sk_E, pk_E) \wedge \hat{\Sigma}.\mathsf{EncVrfy}(pk_S, pk_E, m, \hat{\sigma}) \wedge \hat{\Sigma}.\mathsf{Vrfy}(pk_S, m, \sigma)) \implies \hat{\Sigma}.\mathsf{Rec}(\sigma, \delta) = sk_E$

Note that we no longer have need of the *opacity* property as defined for an ordinary VES scheme. Recall that the informal purpose of opacity is to ensure that an encrypted signature cannot be accessed without the decryption key. Recoverability makes this is trivial because if you are able to access the signature you can recover the decryption key anyway. In other words, obtaining a signature from a ciphertext without the decryption key is no easier than obtaining the decryption key just given the public encryption key (which is hopefully hard). Crucially, this also means that even the signer themselves cannot produce the signature from the ciphertext without the decryption key. This necessarily implies that one-time VES schemes only exist for probabilistic signature schemes where there is an exponential number of possible signatures under a public key for any message.

5 Schnorr One-Time VES Scheme

What we call the Schnorr one-time VES was introduced by Poelstra [32] which he termed an "adaptor signature"[1] with the encryption key being termed an "auxiliary point"[14] or sometimes just "T". A major benefit of our one-time VES concept is to be able to explain this useful idea with intuitive encryption/decryption semantics. It is typically described with a two-party signing protocol as this is where it is most useful. We describe the single singer scheme in Figure 1 including its underlying Schnorr signature scheme. The Schnorr signature scheme was introduced by its namesake in [33] and our description resembles the key-prefixed scheme described in the Schnorr Bitcoin Improvement Proposal[34] currently under consideration.

Since the EncSign algorithm is a simple tweak of the sign algorithm it is easy to get an intuition for the security of the scheme. Unsurprisingly, we find that the scheme is unconditionally valid and recoverable and is EUF-CMA[VES] secure. We now formally prove these properties.

Lemma 5.1. *The Schnorr one-time VES is unconditionally valid and recoverable.*

Proof. Since $\mathsf{EncVrfy}(X, Y, m, (\hat{R}, \hat{s})) = 1$ implies $\hat{R} = g^{\hat{s}} X^{-c}$ where $c := H(\hat{R}Y||X||m)$, by the one-way homomorphism between $\mathbb{Z}_q$ and $\mathbb{G}$ we know that $\hat{\sigma}$ encrypts some valid signature $(R, s) := (\hat{R}Y, \hat{s} + y)$ where $g^y = Y$ and is therefore valid because:

$$\hat{R}Y = Y g^{\hat{s}} X^{-c} = g^{\hat{s}+y} X^{-c}$$

By the same token, the scheme is recoverable because $\mathsf{Rec}((\hat{R}Y, \hat{s} + y)), \hat{s})$ always returns the decryption key $y = s - \hat{s}$. □



Fig. 1. The algorithms of the Schnorr one-time VES scheme with a hash algorithm H

To prove EUF-CMA[VES] security we start with an existing EUF-CMA reduction and apply the simulator substitution lemma to preserve the reduction against adversaries with access an encrypted signature oracle instead. Pointcheval and Stern[35] provided the original "forking lemma" EUF-CMA security proof for Schnorr signatures that reduced from DL to its EUF-KO security which they then reduced to its EUF-CMA security. The simulator for S used in the proof below is the black-box version of the simulation in the original reduction.

Theorem 5.1. *Let $\mathcal{R}$ be a reduction to the EUF-CMA security of the Schnorr signature scheme in the random oracle model which uses the signature simulator $\mathcal{S}_S$ as below. If $\mathcal{R}$ shows that the Schnorr signature scheme is at least $(\tau, \varepsilon, Q_S, Q_H)$-EUF-CMA secure then the Schnorr one-time VES is at least $(\tau', \varepsilon, Q_E, Q_H)$-EUF-CMA[VES] secure where*

$$Q_E = Q_S, \tau' = \tau - Q_S^* \tau_{\mathbb{G}}$$

and $\tau_{\mathbb{G}}$ is the time for a group operation and Q_S^* is the number of times $\mathcal{R}$ executes $\mathcal{S}_S$.

Proof. In the random oracle model, the Schnorr signature oracle S (for EUF-CMA) and encrypted signature oracle E (for EUF-CMA[VES]) can be black box simulated by the algorithms $(\mathcal{S}_S, \mathcal{S}_E)$ below. $\mathcal{S}_S$ is an adapted version of the original simulator which does not program the random oracle or abort itself but rather returns how the random oracle should be programmed in its returned advice $a' := ((R, X, m), c)$ and lets the reduction decide whether to abort. Clearly $\mathcal{S}_E$ perfectly simulates the view of the EUF-CMA[VES] forger.

$\mathcal{S}_S(pk_S := a, (m) := q_S)$	$\mathcal{S}_E(pk_S := a, (pk_E, m) := q_E)$
$X := pk_S$	$X := pk_S; Y := pk_E$
$s, c \leftarrow_\$ \mathbb{Z}_q^2$	$\hat{s}, c \leftarrow_\$ \mathbb{Z}_q^2$
$R \leftarrow g^s X^{-c}$	$\hat{R} \leftarrow g^{\hat{s}} X^{-c}$
$a' := ((R, X, m), c)$	$R \leftarrow \hat{R}Y$
$q' := (R, s)$	$a' := ((R, X, m), c)\}$
return (a', q')	$q' := (\hat{R}, \hat{s})$
	return (a', q')

These two oracle simulators are substitutable as per Lemma 2.1 which requires that for all possible (a, q_E) there must a q_S such that a' is distributed identically between them. This is clearly the case here since for any value of q_S will produce $a' := ((R, X, m), c)$ will the same distribution as any q_E for any a. Clearly $\mathcal{S}_E$ runs in the same time as $\mathcal{S}_S$ except for one extra group operation so the substitution means the reduction loses $Q_S^* \tau_{\mathbb{G}}$ time. Note that for the typical reduction[35] from the EUF-KO security of Schnorr $Q_S^* = Q_S$. □

6 ECDSA One-Time VES Scheme

Moreno-Sanchez et al. developed an ECDSA adaptor signature scheme compatible with Bitcoin signatures today[37]. It has been applied to achieve a payment channel construction with better privacy in [8] and an efficient tumbler in [13]. The original proposal is built upon the two-party ECDSA protocol from [38]. In Figure 2 we distill it into a single signer scheme which avoids all the complexities that come with two-party ECDSA protocols.

The construction works in a similar way to the Schnorr scheme: the public randomness R is mutated independently of its private counterpart r to include the encryption key Y. This offsets the resulting signature by the same factor. Unfortunately, due to the non-linear structure of ECDSA it needs a non-interactive zero knowledge proof of discrete logarithm equality so the verifier can confirm that s is offset by the correct amount. we denote the proof generation and verification algorithms as follows $(\mathsf{P}_{\mathsf{DLEQ}}, \mathsf{V}_{\mathsf{DLEQ}})$. Formally, When invoked as $\mathsf{P}_{\mathsf{DLEQ}}((g, A), (h, B), w)$, it generates a proof of membership of the language:

$$L_{\mathsf{DLEQ}} = \{(g, h, A, B) \in \mathbb{G}^4 \mid \exists w \in \mathbb{Z}_q : A = g^w \wedge B = h^w\}$$

Practically this proof can be instantiated with the Fiat-Shamir transform applied to the standard Sigma protocol for the relation.

Gen/EncGen

$x \leftarrow\!\!\$\ \mathbb{Z}_q; X \leftarrow g^x$
$sk := (x, X); pk := X$
return (sk, pk)

Sign(sk_S, m)

$(x, X) := sk_S;$
$r \leftarrow\!\!\$\ \mathbb{Z}_q; R \leftarrow g^r$
$R_{\mathsf{x}} \leftarrow f(R)$
$s \leftarrow r^{-1}(H(m) + R_{\mathsf{x}} x)$
return $\sigma := (R_{\mathsf{x}}, s)$

Vrfy(pk_S, m, σ)

$X := pk_S; (R_{\mathsf{x}}, s) := \sigma$
$R' \leftarrow (g^{H(m)} X^{R_{\mathsf{x}}})^{s^{-1}}$
return $f(R') = R_{\mathsf{x}}$

EncSign(sk_S, pk_E, m)

$(x, X) := sk_S; Y := pk_E$
$r \leftarrow\!\!\$\ \mathbb{Z}_q; \hat{R} \leftarrow g^r; R \leftarrow Y^r$
$\pi \leftarrow\!\!\$\ \mathsf{P}_{\mathsf{DLEQ}}((g, \hat{R}), (Y, R), r)$
$R_{\mathsf{x}} \leftarrow f(R)$
$\hat{s} \leftarrow r^{-1}(H(m) + R_{\mathsf{x}} x)$
return $\hat{\sigma} := (R, \hat{R}, \hat{s}, \pi)$

EncVrfy$(pk_S, pk_E, m, \hat{\sigma})$

$X := pk_S; Y := pk_E$
$(R, \hat{R}, \hat{s}, \pi) := \hat{\sigma}$
$\mathsf{V}_{\mathsf{DLEQ}}((g, \hat{R}), (Y, R)), \pi) \stackrel{?}{=} 1$
$R_{\mathsf{x}} \leftarrow f(R)$
return $\hat{R} = (g^{H(m)} X^{R_{\mathsf{x}}})^{\hat{s}^{-1}}$

DecSig$(sk_E, \hat{\sigma})$

$(R, \hat{R}, \hat{s}, \pi) := \hat{\sigma}$
$(y, Y) := sk_E$
$s \leftarrow \hat{s} y^{-1}$
return $\sigma := (f(R), s)$

RecKey$(pk_E, \hat{\sigma})$

$(R, \hat{R}, \hat{s}, \pi) := \hat{\sigma}$
$Y := pk_E$
return $\delta := (Y, \hat{s})$

Rec(σ, δ)

$(R_{\mathsf{x}}, s) := \sigma; (Y, \hat{s}) := \delta$
$\tilde{y} \leftarrow s^{-1} \hat{s}$
$y := \begin{cases} \tilde{y} & \textbf{if } g^{\tilde{y}} = Y \\ -\tilde{y} & \textbf{if } g^{\tilde{y}} = Y^{-1} \\ \perp & \textbf{otherwise} \end{cases}$
return y

Fig. 2. The algorithms of the ECDSA one-time VES scheme. $f : \mathbb{G} \to \mathbb{Z}_q$ converts a an elliptic curve point to its x-coordinate mod q. H is a hash function.

We now prove the scheme is a secure one-time VES by showing it meets our requirements of validity, recoverability and EUF-CMA[VES]. In the latter case, the proof is not straightforward because we must account for a weakness in the scheme. First we prove validity and recoverability.

Lemma 6.1. *The ECDSA one-time VES is valid and unconditionally recoverable.*

Proof. If $\mathsf{EncVrfy}(X, Y, m, (R, \hat{R}, \hat{s}, \pi)) = 1$ then $\hat{R} = (g^{H(m)} X^{R_\mathbf{x}})^{\hat{s}^{-1}}$ and $\hat{R}^y = R$ if π is sound. Which means $\hat{R}^y = R = (g^{H(m)} X^{R_\mathbf{x}})^{\hat{s}^{-1} y}$. Therefore DecSig produces a valid signature $\sigma := (R, \hat{s}y^{-1})$ whenever $\hat{\sigma}$ is valid except with the negligible probability that π is unsound. If σ is valid then Rec will always recover $\tilde{y} \leftarrow s^{-1}\hat{s} = (\hat{s}y^{-1})^{-1}\hat{s}$, which is either equal to y or $-y$ (due to Vrfy only checking the x-coordinate of R). □

6.1 ECDSA EUF-CMA[VES] security

The ECDSA one-time VES is flawed with respect to its $\mathsf{EUF\text{-}CMA}[\mathsf{VES}]$ security. Each valid ciphertext surreptitiously leaks the Diffie-Hellman key between the public signing key and the encryption key i.e. allows the receiver to compute $X^y = Y^x$. At a high level, the problem arises because the value s in the signature is computed through the product of r^{-1} and x and then π reveals the product of Y and r and R. The adversary can then cancel out r from the picture and is left with Y^x.

Lemma 6.2. *Let $(R, \hat{R}, \hat{s}, \pi)$ be a ECDSA one-time VES ciphertext encrypted by Y and assume that π is a sound proof that $\mathsf{CDH}(\hat{R}, Y) = R$. If $\mathsf{EncVrfy}(X, Y, m, (R, \hat{R}, \hat{s}, \pi)) = 1$, for some message m and encryption key Y, then $\mathsf{CDH}(X, Y) = (R^{\hat{s}} Y^{-H(m)})^{R_\mathbf{x}^{-1}}$.*

Proof. Since $\hat{s} = r^{-1}(H(m) + R_\mathbf{x} x)$ and $R = Y^r$ we can compute Y^x as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} R^{\hat{s}} &= Y^{H(m)+R_\mathbf{x}x} \\ R^{\hat{s}} Y^{-H(m)} &= Y^{R_\mathbf{x}x} \\ (R^{\hat{s}} Y^{-H(m)})^{R_\mathbf{x}^{-1}} &= Y^x \end{aligned}$$

□

This clearly violates the spirit of $\mathsf{EUF\text{-}CMA}[\mathsf{VES}]$ which is that nothing useful should be learned from the ciphertext other than the signature (if it can be decrypted). To demonstrate our formal definitions do stay faithful to this idea we show there is no $\mathsf{EUF\text{-}CMA}[\mathsf{VES}]$ reduction for it

Lemma 6.3. *There is no key-preserving reduction from DL to the $\mathsf{EUF\text{-}CMA}[\mathsf{VES}]$ security of the ECDSA one-time VES if the CDH problem is hard.*

Proof Sketch. Observe that any key preserving DL reduction must simulate the encryption oracle E without the secret key x. It is not enough for this simulator to just return two random group elements $(\hat{R}, R)$ and simulate the proof π to make them appear valid with respect to a query for an encryption under Y. We can easily catch this behaviour by querying the simulator on key Y' such that we know the secret key y' and checking that $\hat{R}^{y'} = R$. Since the simulator must return valid ciphertexts and from valid ciphertexts we can extract a Diffie-Hellman key (as shown in Lemma 6.2) the simulator must not exist if CDH problem is hard. If no simulator exists then no key-preserving reduction can exist. □

We now attempt to salvage the ECDSA one-time VES by isolating the security impact of the flaw. Our approach is to show that the Diffie-Hellman key is the only extra thing that can be learned from the ciphertext. Existing protocols that use ECDSA adaptor signatures sidestep this issue in their simulation based proofs by making any receiver of the ciphertext prove knowledge of the decryption key. Obviously, if they already know the decryption key y then they can compute $X^y = Y^x$ without help from the signer. We seek to capture security without proofs of knowledge since it may not always be practical to provide such a proofs and it complicates the application of the scheme. Instead, we suggest that in security proofs whenever adversary learns a ECDSA encrypted signature for a signing key X and encryption key Y the proof environment should leak Y^x to them.

To make our case that Diffie-Hellman key is the only thing that can be learned from a ciphertext we will artificially prove $\mathsf{EUF\text{-}CMA}[\mathsf{VES}]$ security in a model where the reduction is able to request Diffie-Hellman keys for the signing key. Since the reduction is able to perfectly simulate ECDSA encrypted signatures with access to this oracle this must be the only thing that can be learned from them. Formally, instead of showing a reduction from DL we reduce from the $u\text{-}\mathsf{DL}_{\mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{SDH}}}$ which we define as follows:

Definition 6.1 (Discrete logarithm with static Diffie-Hellman oracle problem). An algorithm $\mathcal{A}$ solves the $u\text{-}\mathsf{DL}_{\mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{SDH}}}$ problem in a group $\mathbb{G}$ if the following experiment outputs 1 and $\mathcal{A}$ makes u or less queries to $\mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{SDH}}$.

$\mathsf{DL}_{\mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{SDH}}}$	$\mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{SDH}}(Y)$
$x \leftarrow\!\!\$\, \mathbb{Z}_q; X \leftarrow g^x$	**return** Y^x
$x^* \leftarrow\!\!\$\, \mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{SDH}}}(X)$	
return $x^* \stackrel{?}{=} x$	

Changing the problem we reduce from comes with a cost.

u-$\mathsf{DL}_{\mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{SDH}}}$ is not as hard as ordinary DL for some very subtle and surprising reasons. Brown et al.[40] show it is possible to use $\mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{SDH}}$ to assist in computing the discrete logarithm of the static key (in our case the public signing key). The attack works by querying $\mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{SDH}}$ with the static key itself and thereby learning non-linear functions of the static secret key *in the exponent* e.g. a query for the static key $X = g^x$ returns g^{x^2} and then querying with that result returns g^{x^3} and so on. Of course, in our setting the adversary will never be able to decrypt a signature encrypted with $Y = X$ but they would nevertheless be able to extract g^{x^2} from it. Since the likely only application of this scheme will be to Bitcoin we provide concrete computational estimates on the difficulty of u-$\mathsf{DL}_{\mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{SDH}}}$ in Bitcoin's secp256k1 group in Appendix B. In practice it appears that u-$\mathsf{DL}_{\mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{SDH}}}$ is still sufficiently hard even for very large values of u (which is in our case, the number of encrypted signatures requested and received).

We now proceed to prove $\mathsf{EUF\text{-}CMA}[\mathsf{VES}]$ security from the hardness of u-$\mathsf{DL}_{\mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{SDH}}}$. As in the case of our Schnorr proof we use an existing $\mathsf{EUF\text{-}CMA}$ reduction as our starting point and apply simulator substitution to arrive at $\mathsf{EUF\text{-}CMA}[\mathsf{VES}]$ reduction. The work of Fersch et al.[41] meticulously captures the $\mathsf{EUF\text{-}CMA}$ security of ECDSA in a *bijective random oracle model* by showing a reduction from the DL to the $\mathsf{EUF\text{-}KO}$ security of ECDSA which is then in-turn reduced to $\mathsf{EUF\text{-}CMA}$ security. Their reduction also shows the security of ECDSA relies on particular properties of the message hash function H. We focus on the discrete logarithm breaking reduction but the bounds in terms of the hash function properties are implicitly included in $\mathcal{B}_e$.

In the ECDSA bijective random oracle model, the conversation function f which converts an elliptic curve point R to its modulo q reduced x-coordinate R_{x} is modelled as a bijective random oracle and signatures are simulated by programming it. We provide more details of the original proof of Fersh et al. and prove the following theorem in Appendix A.

Theorem 6.1. *Let the DL problem be (τ, ε)-hard and the u-$\mathsf{DL}_{\mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{SDH}}}$ problem be $(\tau_{\mathsf{sdh}}, \varepsilon_{\mathsf{sdh}})$-hard. Let $\mathcal{R}$ be the reduction from DL to the $\mathsf{EUF\text{-}CMA}$ security of the ECDSA signature scheme in the bijective random oracle model with signature simualtor $\mathcal{S}_S$ (as in Appendix A). If $\mathcal{R}$ shows that the ECDSA signature scheme is at least $(\tau', \varepsilon', Q_S, Q_\Pi)$-$\mathsf{EUF\text{-}CMA}$ secure then the ECDSA one-time VES is at least $(\tau'', \varepsilon'', Q_E, Q_\Pi)$-$\mathsf{EUF\text{-}CMA}[\mathsf{VES}]$ secure where*

$$
\begin{aligned}
Q_E &= Q_S = u \\
\varepsilon' &= \mathcal{B}_\varepsilon(\varepsilon, Q_S, Q_\Pi) & \varepsilon'' &= \mathcal{B}_\varepsilon(\varepsilon_{\mathsf{sdh}}, Q_E, Q_\Pi) \\
\tau' &= \mathcal{B}_\tau(\tau, Q_S, Q_\Pi) & \tau'' &= \mathcal{B}_\tau(\tau_{\mathsf{sdh}}, Q_E, Q_\Pi) - 2et_{\mathbb{G}^*}
\end{aligned}
$$

and $t_{\mathbb{G}^*}$ is the time for a scalar multiplication in $\mathbb{G}$ and e is the number of times $\mathcal{R}$ executes $\mathcal{S}_S$.

The reduction only needs to query $\mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{SDH}}$ once for each query the forger makes to E (i.e. $u = Q_E$) which demonstrates what we set out to prove: from each ciphertext the Diffie-Hellman key can be learned and nothing else.

We conclude with two remarks that should provide more confidence in the application of the scheme. Firstly, the only practical way to use the ECDSA one-time VES is with *pay-to-script-hash* type outputs which commit to script based spending rules with a 160-bit hash and thus only provide 80 bits of collision resistance. It is possible to avoid relying on the collision resistance of the hash by executing a commitment round first before revealing the values that go into the script but this is rarely done in practice. Secondly, The work of Boneh and Boyen [42] shows no generic algorithm can improve upon the complexity of the algorithm described in Appendix B. Specifically, they prove a lower time bound of $\Omega(\sqrt{q/u})$ where $u < \sqrt[3]{q}$ and q is the order of the group for any generic group model adversary against the *Strong Diffie-Hellan* problem which implies the same lower bound for u-$\mathsf{DL}_{\mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{SDH}}}$.

7 Semi-Scriptless Protocols

The essential function of a smart contract on a Bitcoin-like ledger is to lock coins in an output such that they can only be spent to certain parties under certain conditions. With a smart contract language like Bitcoin script, the conditions can be expressed in the language and enforced by the ledger's transaction validation rules. In the scriptless model, we can only constrain spending through time-locks and by setting a public key, for which the spender must provide a signature. Clearly in order to stop one party from arbitrarily spending the coins the corresponding private key cannot be exclusively known to one party. Thus we require the parties have a joint ownership of the public key and cooperatively use a multi-signature protocol to sign transactions spending from the joint output. Multi-signature protocols exist for ECDSA[38, 43], Schnorr[25], BLS[24] and most prominent signature schemes.

To realise most of the scriptless protocols from Section 1.1, the multi-signature scheme also needs to admit a two-party one-time VES encrypted signing protocol to emulate $\mathsf{EncSign}$ on a joint signing key. It is relatively simple to build this on top of a Schnorr multi-signature scheme, but since Schnorr signatures have not been included in the Bitcoin protocol yet, this tool is out of reach for now. Both the two-party ECDSA schemes in [38, 43] admit a two-party $\mathsf{EncSign}$ protocol as described in [37]. Unfortunately, these schemes are complex and rely additional exotic computational hardness assumptions. As a result, the consensus that came out of the 2018 Lightning Developer Summit was to postpone updating the lightning specification to include "payment points" until Schnorr becomes viable.[44]

We present a workaround that allows protocol designers to realise many of the benefits of scriptless protocols in Bitcoin as it is today. To do so, we relax the scriptless model slightly to what we call the "semi-scriptless" model where protocols are allowed to use a single `OP_CHECKMULTISIG` script opcode but no others. `OP_CHECKMULTISIG` acts as a naive ECDSA multi-signature scheme, where the public key for the scheme is the concatenation of each party's public keys and a valid signature is the concatenation of valid signatures under each public key. When locking coins with `OP_CHECKMULTISIG`, a set of public keys is specified along with how many of those keys must authorize any transaction spending from it. We will only use "2-of-2" outputs which require two signatures on two out of two of the specified public keys.



Fig. 3. The two-party signing and encrypted signing algorithms for an 2-of-2 `OP_CHECKMULTISIG` output.

We can transform any existing scriptless protocol into a semi-scriptless protocol by locking funds to an `OP_CHECKMULTISIG` 2-of-2 on two distinct public keys and using the single signer ECDSA one-time VES from Section 6. The simple two-party signing and encrypted signing protocols are presented in Figure 3.

The downsides of semi-scriptless protocols are readily apparent. First, the transactions are larger because they require two public keys and two signatures to spend them (in addition the overhead that comes from using script). Secondly, it is easy to distinguish `OP_CHECKMULTISIG` outputs from a regular payment transactions (but not from other uses of `OP_CHECKMULTISIG` 2-of-2).

Having said this, semi-scriptless protocols are a practical alternative to two-party ECDSA to developers who wish to attempt to realise many of the benefits of scriptless protocols prior to the Schnorr upgrade. In general, semi-scriptless enjoy better confidentiality than their script based counterparts. Although script is used, `OP_CHECKMULTISIG` is not particular to any protocol making it at more confidential than protocols with

a unique script structure. For the following protocols we note the following particular benefits:

- **Payment Channels [3]:** The typical hash lock can be replaced with a discrete logarithm based lock which enables the privacy benefits from [8] other conjectured improvements[9].
- **Atomic swaps [7]:** The secret that releases funds from the escrow transactions never appears on the ledger, unlike the existing hash constructions which make it easy to associate assets changing hands as the contracts on the ledgers share the same hash.
- **Discreet Log Contracts [10]:** The protocol can be completed in two transactions rather than three.

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A Proof for Theorem ??

First, we give more thorough description of the original EUF-CMA reduction by Fersh et al.[41]. Fersh et al. decompose and idealize the conversion function $f : \mathbb{G} \to \mathbb{Z}_q$ that maps a group element to its x-coordinate mod q as a random oracle. The forger queries the bijective random oracle Π and the signature oracle S and eventually outputs an ECDSA forgery with some probability. The reduction programs the oracle and rewinds the successful forger in an attempt to get it to produce two signatures with different values for $R_{\mathbf{x}} = f(R)$ but the same value for R in the typical "forking lemma" style[35]. In more detail, f is decomposed as $f = \psi \circ \Pi \circ \varphi$ where:

1. $\varphi : \mathbb{G} \to \mathbb{A}$ is an invertible 2-to-1 function mapping curve points to the domain of Π reflecting the fact that every x-coordinate belongs to two possible group elements.
2. $\Pi : \mathbb{A} \to \mathbb{B}$ is the bijective random oracle that the reduction is able to program.
3. $\psi : \mathbb{B} \to \mathbb{Z}_q$ is a "semi-injective" invertible function that maps the range of Π to $\mathbb{Z}_q$.

Fersh et al. split up their security proof by first doing a reduction from the ECDSA's EUF-KO security to EUF-CMA and then from DL to EUF-KO. To make our security claim we imagine that these two reductions have been combined into one so that DL is reduced directly to EUF-CMA and then tranform that reduction by replacing S with E.

Proof. In the bijective random oracle model, the ECDSA signature oracle S (for $\mathsf{EUF\text{-}CMA}$) and encrypted signature oracle E (for $\mathsf{EUF\text{-}CMA[VES]}$) can be simulated by the algorithms $(\mathcal{S}_S, \mathcal{S}_E)$ below. $\mathcal{S}_S$ is adapted from the original simulator from Fersh et al.[41] (Figure 5). Unlike the original, $\mathcal{S}_S$ does not program the oracle responses directly but returns them as advice $a' := ((\alpha, \beta), m)$ along with the message. It returns the message because the reduction needs extract a hash collision from an adversary that forges a signature by querying m to $\mathcal{S}_S$ and finding $H(m') = H(m)$.

To simulate E, for a query (Y, m) $\mathcal{S}_E$ must return a valid tuple $(R, \hat{R}, \hat{s}, \pi)$ with respect to a programmed entry $(\alpha, \beta) \in \Pi$. We sample β and $\hat{s}$ randomly as in the $\mathcal{S}_S$. The difficult part is to return $(\hat{R}, R)$ such that $\hat{R}^y = R$ where $Y = g^y$ since the simulator does not know y. The trick is achieve this shown in lines 7-11 of Figure 4. First we query $\mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{SDH}}$ with Y to learn $Z = Y^x = X^y$ and then use the fact that $(Y, Z) = (g, X)^y$ to compute $R = \hat{R}^y$. Once we have a well formed $(\hat{R}, R)$ we run the zero-knowledge simulator for $\mathsf{P}_{\mathsf{DLEQ}}$ which we denote $\mathcal{S}_{\mathsf{DLEQ}}$ to create π. To complete the simulation we program our return advice a' with β and $\alpha \leftarrow \varphi(R)$. $(R, \hat{R}, \hat{s}, \pi)$ is a valid and uniformly distributed ECDSA encrypted signature with Π programmed with (α, β), and therefore $\mathcal{S}_E$ simulates E.

$\mathcal{S}_S(pk_S := a, (m) := q_S)$		$\mathcal{S}_E(pk_S := a, (pk_E, m) := q_E)$
$X := pk_S$	1 :	$X := pk_S; Y := pk_E$
$\beta \leftarrow\!\!\$\ \mathbb{B}$	2 :	$\beta \leftarrow\!\!\$\ \mathbb{B}$
$R_{\mathsf{x}} \leftarrow \psi(\beta)$	3 :	$R_{\mathsf{x}} \leftarrow \psi(\beta)$
if $R_{\mathsf{x}} = 0$ **then return** $\perp$	4 :	**if** $R_{\mathsf{x}} = 0$ **then return** $\perp$
$s \leftarrow\!\!\$\ \mathbb{Z}_q$	5 :	$\hat{s} \leftarrow\!\!\$\ \mathbb{Z}_q$
if $s = 0$ **then return** $\perp$	6 :	**if** $\hat{s} = 0$ **then return** $\perp$
$u_1 \leftarrow H(m)s^{-1}$	7 :	$Z \leftarrow \mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{SDH}}(Y)$
$u_2 \leftarrow R_{\mathsf{x}}s^{-1}$	8 :	$u_1 \leftarrow H(m)\hat{s}^{-1}$
$R \leftarrow g^{u_1}X^{u_2}$	9 :	$u_2 \leftarrow R_{\mathsf{x}}\hat{s}^{-1}$
if $R = 1$ **then return** $\perp$	10 :	$\hat{R} \leftarrow X^{u_1}g^{u_2}$
$\alpha \leftarrow \varphi(R)$	11 :	$R \leftarrow Z^{u_1}Y^{u_2}$
$q'_S := (R_{\mathsf{x}}, s)$	12 :	**if** $R = 1$ **then return** $\perp$
$a'_S := ((\alpha, \beta), m)$	13 :	$\pi \leftarrow \mathcal{S}_{\mathsf{DLEQ}}((g, \hat{R}), (Y, R))$
return (a'_S, q')	14 :	$\alpha \leftarrow \varphi(R)$
	15 :	$q'_E := (R, \hat{R}, \hat{s}, \pi)$
	16 :	$a'_E := ((\alpha, \beta), m)$
	17 :	**return** (a'_E, q')

Fig. 4. The original simulator for the signing oracle S with our simulator for E.

Now we argue that these two simulators are substitutable as per Lemma 2.1 which requires that for all a and all q_E there must exists a q_S such that a'_E and a'_S are distributed identically. For every $q_E := (Y, m)$ there is obviously the query $q_S := (m)$ which means the m in a'_S and a'_E will be the same. So we require that for all X, and all values of (Y, m) the distributions of (α_E, β_E) and (α_S, β_S) are identical where

$$(((\alpha_E, \beta_E), m), \cdot) \leftarrow\!\!\$\ \mathcal{S}_E(X, (Y, m))$$
$$(((\alpha_S, \beta_S), m), \cdot) \leftarrow\!\!\$\ \mathcal{S}_S(X, (m))$$

β_E and β_S are sampled uniformly in both cases. Although R is computed differently it is distributed identically and so $\alpha_S \leftarrow \varphi(R)$ and $\alpha_E \leftarrow \varphi(R)$ are also distributed the same. Thus the oracle simulators S_S and S_E are substitutable.

As proved in Lemma 2.1, since we provide $\mathcal{S}_E$ with an additional oracle $\mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{SDH}}$ the reduction bounds adversaries against $\mathsf{EUF\text{-}CMA[VES]}$ against the hardness of $u\text{-}\mathsf{DL}_{\mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{SDH}}}$ rather than ordinary DL (but with the same advantage bound $\mathcal{B}_\varepsilon$). $\mathcal{S}_E$ queries $\mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{SDH}}$ once per query so $u = Q_E$. Since $\mathcal{S}_E$ does a extra double scalar multiplication over $\mathcal{S}_S$ we write $\tau'' = \mathcal{B}_\tau(\tau_{\mathsf{sdh}}, Q_E, Q_\Pi) - 2et_{\mathbb{G}^*}$.

□

B Hardness of u-$\mathsf{DL}_{\mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{SDH}}}$ in secp256k1

We base our estimates on the work of Brown et al.[40] who show approximately the best known algorithm for solving u-$\mathsf{DL}_{\mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{SDH}}}$[2] which works in $O(\sqrt{q/u})$ time where q is the order of the group. The intuition for the algorithms is this: if we suppose the order of Z_q^* is divisible by u and so $uv = q - 1$ for some v, then there are subgroups of Z_q^* of order u and v since they both divide the order. Simplifying a bit, the attack splits the problem of finding the discrete logarithm x into finding the discrete logarithm of two smaller components of x in the subgroups of order u and v. To this end the attacker queries the oracle u times to compute g^{x^u} which allows it to work in the subgroup of order v where it solves the smaller DL problem using a modified baby-step-giant-step algorithm. With that result, they are able to do the same for the subgroup of order u and combine the two results to finally output the discrete logarithm.

In addition to u oracle queries the algorithm requires $n = 2(\sqrt{u} + \sqrt{v})$ scalar multiplications in $\mathbb{G}$ to finally output the discrete logarithm with certainty. Treating the oracle queries and scalar multiplications as equal, the algorithm has an optima running time of approximately $3\sqrt[3]{q}$ whenever $u = \sqrt[3]{q}$. We provide concrete estimates for the amount of computation needed to run this algorithm on secp256k1 in Figure 5. As expected, the table shows the optimal value for u (treating scalar multiplications between the attacker and the oracle as equal) is $2^{84} \approx \sqrt[3]{q}$ which gives $n \approx 2^{86}$. Smaller and more plausible values for u, e.g. $u \approx 2^{24} \approx 16$ million give $n \approx 2^{116}$ which means receiving 16 million encrypted signatures of your choosing will only improve your ability to solve the discrete logarithms over the generic algorithms which take $O(\sqrt{q}) \approx 2^{128}$ group operations.

$$q = 2^6 \times 3 \times 149 \times 631 \times 107361793816595537 \times 17472360753441437144 9 \times 341948486974166000522343609283189$$

$\geq \log_2 u$	$\lfloor \log_2 u \rfloor$	$\lfloor \log_2 n \rfloor$	Factorization of u
*	84	86	$2 \times 149 \times 631 \times 174723607534414371449$
80	80	88	$2^2 \times 3 \times 631 \times 174723607534414371449$
70	70	93	$2^3 \times 174723607534414371449$
60	60	98	$2^2 \times 3 \times 107361793816595537$
50	24	116	$2^6 \times 3 \times 149 \times 631$

Fig. 5. The optimal number of scalar multiplications n required in secp256k1 for each upper bound on the bit length of u static Diffie-Hellman oracle queries to solve the u-$\mathsf{DL}_{\mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{SDH}}}$ problem

[2] In our description of u-$\mathsf{DL}_{\mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{SDH}}}$ the adversary is given a challenge group element up front (to make it easy to apply the simulator substitution lemma) and in Brown et al. work they only provide the oracle but this difference is immaterial.