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Unsupervised Outlier Detection in Time Series Data

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Abstract

Fraud detection is of great importance to financial institutions. This paper is concerned with the problem of finding outliers in time series financial data using Peer Group Analysis (PGA), which is an unsupervised technique for fraud detection. The objective of PGA is to characterize the expected pattern of behavior around the target sequence in terms of the behavior of similar objects, and then to detect any difference in evolution between the expected pattern and the target. The tool has been applied to the stock market data, which has been collected from Bangladesh Stock Exchange to assess its performance in stock fraud detection. We observed PGA can detect those brokers who suddenly start selling the stock in a different way to other brokers to whom they were previously similar. We also applied t-statistics to find the deviations effectively.

Keywords: Outlier Detection, Fraud Detection, Time Series Data, Data Mining, Peer Group Analysis.

1. Introduction

Detecting the frauds means identifying suspicious fraudulent transfers, orders and other illegal activities against the company. Outlier detection is a fundamental issue in data mining, specifically in fraud detection. Outliers have been informally defined as observations in a data set which appear to be inconsistent with the remainder of that set of data [1, 2], or which deviate so

much from other observations so as to arouse suspicions that they were generated by a different mechanism [3]. The identification of outliers can lead to the discovery of useful knowledge and has a number of practical applications in areas such as credit card fraud detection, athlete performance analysis, voting irregularity analysis, severe weather prediction etc. [4, 5, 6]. Peer Group Analysis (PGA) is an unsupervised method for monitoring behavior over time in data mining [7].

2. Stock Market Analysis

2.1 Stock Fraud & The Manipulators

Stock fraud usually takes place when brokers try to manipulate their customers into trading stocks without regard for the customers' own real interests. Stock fraud can be at a company level, or can be committed by a single stockbroker. Corporate insiders, brokers, underwriters, large shareholders and market makers are likely to be manipulators.

2.2 Why Stock Fraud Detection is Necessary

Several fraud detection methods are available for the fields like credit card, telecommunications, network intrusion detections etc. But stock market fraud detection area is still behind. Since stock market enhances the economic development of a country greatly, this field has a vital need for efficient security system. Also the amount of money involved in stock market is huge. So,

appropriate fraud detection system is essential. For example, in Australia, 63 per cent of people's superannuation, namely their retirement savings, is invested in securities. Investment in stock market is high in almost all the countries. If we don't protect against the ability of people to manipulate those securities, then implicitly, we're open to attack, or we're allowing open to attack a country's very wealth. Stock fraud may not be very frequent but when it occurs the amount of loss is abundant.

3. Our Contribution

First we analyzed how the fraud cases occur in stock market by the thorough technical reviews and from the practical experiences with stock markets. The following two cases are the most important which have to mine first to detect stock fraud:

- Identify seller IDs whose sell quantity rise up suddenly.
- Identify seller IDs whose sell quantity fall suddenly.

We simulate the PGA tool in various situations and illustrate its use on a set of stock market transaction data. We evaluated the performance of PGA over Stock fraud detection. We found that this tool is quite efficient for the above cases. PGA was initially proposed for credit card fraud detection by Bolton & Hand in 2001[7]. We applied the tool in our research by changing some parameters. Our intention is to modify PGA to fit for stock market fraud detection and also to increase its effectiveness.

4. Related Work

The neural network and Bayesian network comparison study (Maes *et al*, 2002) uses the STAGE algorithm for Bayesian networks and back propagation algorithm for neural networks in credit transactional fraud detection. [8].

The Securities Observation, News Analysis, and Regulation (SONAR) (Goldberg *et al*, 2003) uses text mining, statistical regression, rule-based inference, uncertainty, and fuzzy matching. It mines for explicit and

implicit relationships among the entities and events, all of which form episodes or scenarios with specific identifiers [9].

Yamanish *et al*. [10] reduce the problem of change point detection in time series into that of outlier detection from time series of moving-averaged scores. Ge *et al*. [11] extend hidden semi markov model for change detection. Both these solutions are applicable to different data distributions using different regression functions; however, they are not scalable to large size datasets due to their time complexity.

5. Peer Group Analysis

5.1 Overview

The Following processes are involved in PGA.




Figure 1: Process Flow of PGA

Peer group analysis (PGA) is a term that have been coined to describe the analysis of the time evolution of a given object (the *target*) relative to other objects that have been identified as initially similar to the target in some sense (the *peer group*).

- Since PGA finds anomalous trends in the data, it is reasonable to characterize such data in balanced form by collating data under fixed time periods. For example, the total sell quantity can

be aggregated per week or the number of phone calls can be counted per day.

- After the proper data modeling some statistical analysis are required. Mean or variance can be appropriate. In our research we used weekly mean of stock transactions.
- Then the most important task of PGA method is to identify peer groups for all the target observations (objects). Member of peer groups are the most similar objects to the target object. In order to make the definition of peer group precise, we must decide how many objects, *npeer*, it contains from the complete set of objects. The parameter *npeer* effectively controls the sensitivity of the peer group analysis. Of course, if *npeer* is chosen to be too small then the behavior of the peer group may be too sensitive to random errors and thus inaccurate. The length of time window for calculating the peer group has been chosen arbitrarily here. We used 5 weeks for our experiments.
- Peer groups are summarized at each subsequent time point and the target object is then compared with its peer group's summary.
- Those accounts deviate from their peer groups more substantially are flagged as outliers for further investigation.
- These processes repeat from the peer group identification to the account flagging as long as proper result received.

5.2 Significance of PGA

The approach of PGA is different in that a profile is formed based on the behavior of several similar users where current outlier detection techniques over time include profiling for single user. The most distinguishing feature of PGA lies in its focus on local patterns rather than global models; a sequence may not evolve unusually when compared with the whole population of sequences but may display unusual properties when compared with its peer group. That is, it may begin to deviate in behavior from objects to which it has previously been similar.

5.3 Definition of Peer Groups

Based on [7], Let us suppose that we have observations on N objects, where each observation is a sequence of d values, represented by a vector, \mathbf{x}_i , of length d . The j th value of the i th observation, x_{ij} , occurs at a fixed time point t_j .

Let $PG_i(t_j) = \{\text{Some subset of observations } (\neq \mathbf{x}_i) \text{ which show behavior similar to that of } \mathbf{x}_i \text{ at time } t_j\}$.

Then $PG_i(t_j)$ is the peer group of object i , at time j .

The parameter *npeer* describes the number of objects in the peer group and effectively controls the sensitivity of the peer group analysis. The problem of finding a good number of peers is akin to finding the correct number of neighbors in a nearest-neighbor analysis.

5.4 Peer Group Statistics

Let S_{ij} be a statistic summarizing the behavior of the i th observations at time j . Once we have found the peer group for the target observation \mathbf{x}_i we can calculate peer group statistics, P_{ij} . These will generally be summaries of the values of S_{ij} for the members of the peer group. The principle here is that the peer group initially provides a local model, P_{i1} , for S_{i1} , thus characterizing the local behavior of \mathbf{x}_i at time t_1 , and will subsequently provide models, P_{ij} , for S_{ij} , at time t_j , $j > 1$. If our target observation, S_{ik} , deviates 'significantly' from its peer group model P_{ik} at time t_k , then we conclude that our target is no longer behaving like its peers at time t_k . If the departure is large enough, then the target observation will be flagged as worthy of investigation.

To measure the departure of the target observation from its peer group we calculate its standardized distance from the peer group model; the example we use here is a standardized distance from the centroid of the peer group based on a t -statistic. The centroid value of the peer group is given by the equation:

$$P_{ij} = \frac{1}{npeer} \left(\sum_{p \in P_i(t_1)} S_{pj} \right); \quad j \geq 1, p \neq i.$$

where $P_i(t_1)$ is the peer group calculated at time t_1 . The variance of the peer group is then

$$V_{ij} = \frac{1}{(npeer - 1)} \sum_{p \in P_i(t_1)} (S_{pj} - P_{ij})(S_{pj} - P_{ij})'$$

Where $j \geq 1, p \neq i$.

The square root of this can be used to standardize the difference between the target S_{ij} and the peer group summary P_{ij} , yielding

$$T_{ij} = (S_{ij} - P_{ij}) / \sqrt{V_{ij}}$$

6. Experiments

Table 1: Parameters Used in Experimental Setup

Symbol	Meaning
d	Total number of weeks
N	Number of target objects
npeer	Number of peer group member
w	Length of time window

6.1 Experimental Data

Our data set consists of 3 months real data from 06/01/2005 to 08/31/2005 for the daily stock amount sold for each of 143 brokers, which has been collected from Bangladesh Stock Exchange (Dhaka). The total number of transaction is 340,234.

Here we set, $d = 14$ weeks, $N = 143$. The length of time window, $w = 5$, but varied $npeer$ to take values $npeer = 13$ and $npeer = 26$. A sample of stock market data is shown below:

Table 2: Stock Market Transaction

ID	Date	Stock	Seller	Buyer	Quantity
002205	6/1/05	11102	30	184	10
002206	6/1/05	11102	30	194	5
002207	6/1/05	11102	30	178	5
002208	6/1/05	11102	134	178	5

6.2 Experimental Results

For comparison purpose, we simulated PGA over stock transactions many times by changing the number of peers. The following plots illustrate the power of PGA to detect local anomalies in the data. The vertical axis shows cumulative stock sold as weeks pass on the horizontal axis. The sold quantity of the target observation is represented by a red line and the sold quantity of the peer group by green lines; sold quantity from a sample of the remaining accounts is represented by blue lines.




Figure 2: PGA Over Stock Transactions, account # 132 when $npeer = 13$




Figure 3: PGA Over Stock Transactions, account # 132 when $npeer = 26$




Figure 4: PGA Over Stock Transactions, account # 68 when $n_{peer} = 13$




Figure 5: PGA Over Stock Transactions, account # 68 when $n_{peer} = 26$

We also measured the departure of the target observation from its peer group. If the departure is large enough then the target observation will be flagged as worthy of investigation. The following results shown here are the standardized distances from the centroid of the peer group based on a t-statistic [12].

Table 3: Departure of Some Broker Accounts

Account No.	T-Score
132	5.65768366
68	2.1516554
99	1.74654872
129	1.61005567
164	1.20917806

7. Discussions

Figure 2 shows an account (132) flagged since it has the highest suspicious score in 8th week. Figure 3 also shows account (132) but here n_{peer} is increased to 26. The behavior of this account varied largely from its peers almost in every week even though number of peers was increased. According to the suspicious score calculated by t-statistics (Table 3), this account (132) is the most suspicious one. This is an outlier but it may not be a fraud case. Since the behavior of this account is different to its peer groups from the beginning, so may be it is the general nature of this particular broker. But this information is also necessary for proper knowledge discovery of such stock transactions.

Figure 4 shows an account (68) flagged as having the highest suspicious score at 12th week whereas most peers have very little spending in this week. This could be a possible fraud case since the behavior of this account was quite similar to its peer groups for all the weeks except the sudden rise on 12th week. Figure 5 shows account (68) where n_{peer} is 26. Here we got very interesting findings. The behavior of this account has not been affected by the increase of n_{peer} , which makes this account more suspicious.

In our experiment, we determined the proper value of n_{peer} by comparing with the total number of objects. We have about 143 objects. So, taking n_{peer} as 26 is quite perfect for the method.

In practical application, the flagged accounts will simply be noted as meriting more detailed examination, which has to be done definitely by human.

The process of calculating the peer groups and t-scores can be run every minute in a real-time manner. Using over 340,234 transactions gives an indicator of the performance of PGA on large data sets.

8. Conclusions and Future Work

In this paper, we tried to mention the necessity of stock market fraud detection since the area has lack of proper researches. We have demonstrated the experimental results of PGA tool in an unsupervised problem over real

stock market data sets with continuous values over regular time intervals. The visual evidences have been shown through graphical plots that peer group analysis can be useful in detecting observations that deviate from their peers. We also applied t-statistics to find the deviations effectively.

The following cases of possible outliers have to be investigated:

- Identify buyer IDs whose buy quantity rise up suddenly.
- Identify seller/buyer IDs who suddenly starts a large volume of trade.
- Identify stock IDs if trade volume or trade quantity or price increases suspiciously.

We have intention to integrate some other effective methods with PGA. We will also apply our strategy on other more applications, such as banking fraud detection.

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