

Computer modeling of physical phenomena



05-06.03.2024

Lab II: Spatial Prisoner's Dilemma

Playing on a grid...


	NW	N	NE	
	W	C	E	
	SW	S	SE	

- Each player plays PD with all the (Moore) neighbours (including himself) using a given strategy (either always defect or always cooperate).
- The total payoffs are calculated.
- In the next round, the player adopts the strategy of its most successful neighbour (including himself).

Color coding

Use four different colors to mark:

- defectors that were cooperators in the last round (dc)
- defectors that were defectors in the last round (dd)
- cooperators that were defectors in the last round (cd)
- cooperators that were cooperators in the last round (cc)



Payoff matrix

		Player B	
		cooperate	defect
Player A	cooperate	(CC,CC) reward for mutual cooperation	(CD,DC) sucker's payoff and temptation to defect
	defect	(DC,CD) temptation to defect and sucker's payoff	(DD,DD) punishment for mutual defection

(A's payoff,
B's payoff)

- Take $CC = 1$, $CD = 0$, $DC = b$ and $DD = 0$.
- The only free parameter is then b (temptation to defect).

Task 1


- Run spatial PD on 201x201 grid with PBC.
- Start with a single defector at the center.
- Take $b = 1.9$ and $b = 2.08$.
- Make movies illustrating the evolution of such a system.
- Do not use loops over space!

Task 2

- Start with random distribution of 50% cooperators and 50% defectors.
- Run the simulation up to the steady state and calculate the final percentage of defectors (f).
- Repeat the calculation for several b values, plot $f(b)$ dependence, run additional simulations corresponding to the b values in the region of large df/db (to resolve the details of $f(b)$ dependence).
- Illustrate the change of patterns with b with a few images.

Extra task

- Include other strategies, memory-based (e.g. Tit-for-Tat & Pavlov) and random. Play M games between neighbours before they adopt the strategy of the most successful one (you can try e.g. $M = 5$).
- When plotting, use different colors for the strategies.
- How does it change the dynamics? Who wins? What happens if you include some noise in decision-making?



Points

1. Evolution of SPD for $b = 1.9$ and $b = 2.08 - 0.5 p$.
2. Plot of final percentage of defectors vs $b - 0.5 p$.
- 3*. Evolution of SPD with other strategies (memory-based and random) and noise $- 0.2 p$.