

Coherent One Way (COW) QKD Protocol

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


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Quantum Key Distribution

Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is a secure way of sharing a unique random key (composed of 0 and 1) between two parties spatially distant. They later use this symmetric key to encrypt and decrypt messages between them.

To share/create the random key, they use two channels, one quantum channel and one Authenticated classic channel (can be eavesdropped but can't be modified).








Quantum Key Distribution Time Bin -


The two main types of QKD are Polarization protocols and Time Bin protocols.

The Coherent One Way (COW) protocol was elaborated by Nicolas Gisin et al in 2004 [1]. Uses time bin properties.

It is also characterized by having a very simple experimental setup since Bob's apparatus is passive.



[1] Gisin, Nicolas, et al. "Towards practical and fast quantum cryptography." arXiv preprint quant-ph/0411022 (2004).





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
Step 1 Alice creates a random key using:

$$egin{aligned} |0
angle = |lpha
angle |\emptyset
angle \\ |1
angle = |\emptyset
angle |lpha
angle \\ |d
angle = |lpha
angle |lpha
angle \end{aligned}$$

Where $|\emptyset\rangle$ is the vacuum state and $|\alpha\rangle$ is a coherent state of light with intensity $\mu = |\alpha|^2$ and spreads a few random decoy states $(|d\rangle)$ in random locations during the creation of the key.








W < < 1

Step 2 Bob's detection is completely passive. An asymmetric coupler sends a fraction t_B of the photons into the data line. That consist of a single photon counter D_B , where the bits are discriminated by the time of arrival.




In the other line half of each pulse interacts with the half of the previous pulse (delayed by $0.5 t_{bit}$).

The D_{M2} (constructive photon counter) should only click when:

- A logical bit 1 followed by a logical bit 0 where the coherence is across the bit separation (s=1:0);
- Decoy state where the coherence is within the bit sequence (s=d);

All the other photons should click the D_{M1} .







Step 3 Alice tell Bob the times of the decoy sequences $(2k_d \& 2k_d - 1)$. Bob also checks if the D_{M2} has ever fired during a $2k_d$ time. Thus they estimate the break of coherence of decoy pulses.

Step 4 Bob reveals the times that he had a detection in D_{M2} , Alice verifies if they belong to a $|1\rangle : |0\rangle$, thus, Alice and Bob estimate the break of coherence across the bit separation.

Step 5 Finally, Bob reveals the items that he has detected in the data line. Alice and Bob run error correction and privacy amplification on these bits and end up with a secret key.



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- Branciard, Cyril, et al. "Zero-error attacks and detection statistics in the coherent one-way protocol for quantum cryptography." arXiv preprint quant-ph/0609090 (2006).
- Kronberg, Dmitry Anatol'evich, et al. "Analysis of coherent quantum cryptography protocol vulnerability to an active beam-splitting attack." Quantum Electronics 47.2 (2017): 163.
- Roberts, George L., et al. "Modulator-Free Coherent-One-Way Quantum Key Distribution." Laser & Photonics Reviews 11.4 (2017): 1700067.

