

# Coherent One Way (COW) QKD Protocol

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# COW - Protocol

**Step 1** Alice produces:

$$|0\rangle = |\alpha\rangle|0\rangle$$

$$|1\rangle = |0\rangle|\alpha\rangle$$

$$|d\rangle = |\alpha\rangle|\alpha\rangle$$

where  $|0\rangle$  is the vacuum state and  $|\alpha\rangle$  is a coherent state of light with intensity  $\mu = |\alpha|^2$ .


Alice produces  $|d\rangle$  with probability  $f$  and the quantum signal cannot be divided bitwise (coherence of the laser).

$$|...0d10...\rangle = |\dots : 0\alpha : \alpha\alpha : \alpha 0 : 0\alpha \dots\rangle$$

# COW - Protocol

**Step 2** Alice uses an attenuator to around 0.1 photons per pulse and then transmits through a quantum channel.

**Step 3** Bob uses a 90:10 beamsplitter making 90% of the photons into the SPD<sub>1</sub> to arrival time measurements, the remaining 10% are used to measure phase coherence.



# COW - Protocol

In the UMZI (Unbalanced Mach-Zehnder Interferometer) the delayed half of each pulse is recombined in the non-delayed half the next pulse.




Image based on the article 2017 - Roberts - Modulator-free coherent-one-way quantum key distribution

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# COW - Protocol

**Step 4** Alice informs Bob when she sent a decoy pulse.

**Step 5** They calculate the visibility ( $V$ ) and the QBER ( $Q$ ) of the key.

$$V = \frac{I_{max} - I_{min}}{I_{max} + I_{min}}$$


where the  $I_{max}$  and  $I_{min}$  are the average pulse intensities for constructive and destructive interference respectively.

They also share a small part of the key in a public channel, to see if there are errors in the message.

A loss of coherence and therefore a reduction of the visibility reveal the presence of an eavesdropper, in which case the key is simply discarded

# COW - Protocol - Attacks


- Beam-splitting attack - Eve removes a small part from the intensity of the original message and send the rest to Bob in a no-losses channel (symbolized by a red line). Eve introduces additional errors in order to make her information equal to the Bob information.
- Active beam-splitting attack - Eve removes smaller intensities of the message and can make individual measurements and block some of it.



# COW - Protocol - Attacks

- Unambiguous state discrimination (USD) - Alice and Bob only check for coherence in two successive pulses. d So if Eve attacks while they don't check the coherence, she can do an unnoticed attack. But if systematically, they notice that no decoy is detected.

Name	Discriminating
USD3	$ 0\rangle \alpha\rangle 0\rangle$
USD4a	$ 0\rangle \alpha\rangle :  \alpha\rangle 0\rangle$
USD4b	$ 0\rangle :  \alpha\rangle \alpha\rangle :  0\rangle$



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