

How does partisan type influence affective polarization?*

A comparative study of 25 European democracies

Tristan Muno

Thomas König

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Space for an abstract.

1 Roadmap

Explore variation across three main dimensions:

1. Operationalization: Ingroup via explicit attachment (identity) vs vote intention/choice
2. Measurement: Behavior vs Attitude
3. External validity: Cross-national variability

*Space for acknowledgements. Wordcount: .

2 Exploratory figures




Figure 1: Distribution of partisan types, by country. Stacked horizontal bars show the within-country share (%) of three partisan types: explicit partisans (respondents who reported a subjective attachment to a party, $T_i = 1$), implicit partisans (respondents who reported no attachment but did report a vote preference or intention, $T_i = 0$), and respondents who reported neither (none, $T_i = \emptyset$). Percentages sum to 100% within each country, with country samples containing about 1,100 respondents each (detailed numbers are reported in appendix section X).

Source: [CSAP Code Notebook 01](#)




Figure 2: Exploratory token allocation behavior by country and pid type in the dictator game: ingroup favoritism, outgroup derogation and affective polarization. The figure shows mean differences in token allocation with 95% confidence intervals. IF = $\text{mean}(\text{token2co}) - \text{mean}(\text{token2control})$, OD = $\text{mean}(\text{token2control}) - \text{mean}(\text{token2out})$, AP = $\text{mean}(\text{token2co}) - \text{mean}(\text{token2out})$

Source: [CSAP Code Notebook 01](#)




Figure 3: Exploratory token allocation behavior by country and pid type in the trust game: ingroup favoritism, outgroup derogation and affective polarization. The figure shows mean differences in token allocation with 95% confidence intervals. IF = $\text{mean}(\text{token2co}) - \text{mean}(\text{token2control})$, OD = $\text{mean}(\text{token2control}) - \text{mean}(\text{token2out})$, AP = $\text{mean}(\text{token2co}) - \text{mean}(\text{token2out})$

Source: [CSAP Code Notebook 01](#)

3 Data

We use data from Hahm, Hilpert, and König (2024).

4 References

Hahm, Hyeonho, David Hilpert, and Thomas König. 2024. “Divided We Unite: The Nature of Partyism and the Role of Coalition Partnership in Europe.” *American Political Science Review* 118 (1): 69–87. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055423000266>.

5 Appendix

5.1 Sample descriptives

Table 1: Sample composition by country. Numbers denote respondents.

Country	N	Percent
Austria	1277	0.04
Belgium	1305	0.04
Bulgaria	982	0.03
Croatia	1240	0.04
Czech Republic	1135	0.04
Denmark	1200	0.04
Estonia	944	0.03
Finland	1160	0.04
France	1156	0.04
Germany	1188	0.04
Greece	1161	0.04
Hungary	986	0.03
Ireland	1061	0.04
Italy	1172	0.04
Latvia	1148	0.04
Lithuania	1265	0.04
Netherlands	1221	0.04
Poland	1198	0.04
Portugal	1187	0.04
Romania	1480	0.05
Slovakia	1297	0.04
Slovenia	1135	0.04
Spain	1396	0.05
Sweden	1254	0.04
United Kingdom	1279	0.04
Total	29827	0.99

Source: [CSAP Code Notebook 02](#)

Table 2: Sample composition by country and gender. Numbers denote respondents.

Country	Male	Female	Other
Austria	645	630	2
Belgium	729	574	2
Bulgaria	463	518	1
Croatia	545	694	1
Czech Republic	515	618	2
Denmark	690	508	2
Estonia	331	611	2
Finland	586	567	7
France	562	594	0
Germany	587	597	4
Greece	588	572	1
Hungary	493	492	1
Ireland	481	577	3
Italy	603	569	0
Latvia	415	733	0
Lithuania	462	803	0
Netherlands	642	577	2
Poland	540	658	0
Portugal	593	593	1
Romania	837	641	2
Slovakia	550	746	1
Slovenia	569	566	0
Spain	677	718	1
Sweden	648	602	4
United Kingdom	635	641	3
Total	14386	15399	42

Source: [CSAP Code Notebook 02](#)

Table 3: Sample composition by country and age group. Numbers denote respondents.

Country	18 to 25	26 to 35	36 to 45	46 to 55	56 to 65	66 to 75	> 75
Austria	144	177	249	263	286	142	0
Belgium	197	132	160	235	333	239	3
Bulgaria	57	195	231	250	212	33	0
Croatia	119	251	272	331	205	47	0
Czech Republic	88	187	227	219	281	126	0
Denmark	132	134	139	208	321	249	4
Estonia	56	168	164	283	265	7	0
Finland	125	178	210	242	259	137	1
France	123	176	242	267	279	51	0
Germany	125	184	200	240	313	117	0
Greece	77	202	376	318	136	34	0
Hungary	51	175	196	166	273	117	1
Ireland	128	216	223	187	169	120	0

Table 3: Sample composition by country and age group. Numbers denote respondents.

Country	18 to 25	26 to 35	36 to 45	46 to 55	56 to 65	66 to 75	> 75
Italy	104	196	264	195	294	98	2
Latvia	78	251	231	338	239	6	0
Lithuania	223	311	257	250	212	2	0
Netherlands	149	126	161	234	340	194	3
Poland	200	342	222	187	196	42	0
Portugal	112	260	289	231	218	67	1
Romania	128	339	373	347	202	65	0
Slovakia	139	223	282	290	250	108	1
Slovenia	97	186	246	284	234	72	0
Spain	125	293	355	305	228	66	1
Sweden	124	165	156	234	297	261	3
United Kingdom	121	184	196	234	268	250	1
Total	3022	5251	5921	6338	6310	2650	21

Source: [CSAP Code Notebook 02](#)

5.2 Experimental setup

Before the behavioral games, Hahm, Hilpert, and König (2024) presented respondents a short background information overview and instructions. For the dictator game, these were: *This game is played by pairs of individuals. Each pair is made up of a Player 1 and a Player 2. Each player will have some information about the other player, but you will not be told who the other players are during or after the experiment. The game is conducted as follows: A sum of 10 tokens will be provisionally allocated to Player 1 at the start of each round. Player 1 will then decide how much of the 10 tokens to offer to Player 2. Player 1 could give some, all, or none of the 10 tokens. Player 1 keeps all tokens not given to Player 2. Player 2 gets to keep all the tokens Player 1 offers. You will play this game three times with three different people.* In the trust game, the provided information and instruction were: *This game is played by pairs of individuals. Each pair is made up of a Player 1 and a Player 2. Each player will have some information about the other player, but you will not be told who the other players are during or after the experiment. Each player will receive 10 tokens. Player 1 then has the opportunity to give a portion of his or her 10 tokens to Player 2. Player 1 could give some, all, or none of the 10 tokens. Whatever amount Player 1 decides to give to Player 2 will be tripled before it is passed on to Player 2. Player 2 then has the option of returning any portion of this tripled amount to Player 1. Then, the game is over. Player 1 receives whatever he or she keeps from the original 10 tokens, plus anything returned to him or her by Player 2. Player 2 receives their original 10 tokens, plus whatever he or she keeps after returning any portion of the tripled amount to Player 1. You will play this game three times, with three different people. The more tokens you obtain, the more successful you will be.*

In both games respondents were shown a tabular overview of Player 2 after the instructions. Figure 4 shows an example of such a profile along with the interface respondents were provided to assign the 10 tokens. Each round, a new profile was displayed to respondents.

	Player 2
Nationality	United Kingdom
Age	18
Party Affiliation	Labour Party (Labour)
Gender	Female
Religion	Muslim
Social Class	Middle Class

So put the number of tokens you wish to keep in the box labeled "Player 1." Put the tokens you wish to go to Player 2 in the box labeled "Player 2."

Player 1 (You)

Token(s)

Player 2

Token(s)

Total

Token(s)

Figure 4: Example of potential co-player profile.

5.3 Distribution of Y




Figure 5: Distribution of token allocation (Y) by game. Dictator game: *Mean* = 3.41, *median* = 4, *SD* = 2.35. Trust game: *Mean* = 3.48, *median* = 4, *SD* = 2.49

Source: [CSAP Code Notebook 02](#)

5.4 Distribution of T and R

Table 4

der_partisan_type	None	Co	Out
0	5123	1948	18465
1	14898	30820	29366

Source: [CSAP Code Notebook 02](#)

5.5 Distribution of Covariates by T

Table 5

Variable	0 N = 25,536 ¹	1 N = 75,084 ¹
q_lrpos2_z	-0.08 (-0.45, 0.29)	-0.08 (-0.82, 0.66)
q_eupos2_z	0.08 (-0.68, 0.46)	0.08 (-0.68, 0.84)
q_econ_nativism_z	0.15 (-1.03, 0.74)	0.15 (-1.03, 0.74)
q_cult_nativism_z	0.07 (-1.03, 0.62)	0.07 (-1.03, 0.62)
q_satis_demo_country_z	0.30 (-0.81, 1.40)	0.30 (-0.81, 0.30)
q_understand_nat_pol_z	0.12 (-0.65, 0.12)	0.12 (-0.65, 0.90)
q_understand_eu_pol_z	0.22 (-0.50, 0.22)	0.22 (-0.50, 0.94)
q_parties_harm_z	0.25 (-0.38, 0.88)	0.25 (-0.38, 0.88)
qOfficials_talk_action_z	0.41 (-0.33, 1.15)	0.41 (-0.33, 1.15)
q_politics_good_evil_z	-0.14 (-0.76, 0.48)	-0.14 (-0.76, 0.48)
q_people_unaware_z	0.40 (-0.81, 1.00)	-0.20 (-0.81, 1.00)
q_leaders_educated_z	0.39 (-0.32, 1.10)	0.39 (-1.03, 1.10)
q_expert_decisions_z	0.16 (-0.49, 0.80)	0.16 (-0.49, 0.80)
q_listen_other_groups_z	0.18 (-0.74, 1.10)	0.18 (-0.74, 1.10)
q_democracy_compromise_z	-0.29 (-0.29, 0.57)	-0.29 (-0.29, 0.57)
q_interest_pol_country_z	0.06 (-0.60, 0.72)	0.06 (-0.60, 0.72)
q_interest_pol_eu_z	-0.28 (-0.96, 0.39)	0.39 (-0.28, 1.06)
q_eval_finance_household_z	0.01 (-0.99, 1.00)	0.01 (-0.99, 1.00)
q_eval_job_z	0.11 (-0.80, 1.03)	0.11 (-0.80, 0.11)
q_eval_econ_country_z	-0.14 (-1.03, 0.76)	-0.14 (-1.03, 0.76)
q_eval_econ_eur_z	0.07 (-0.94, 1.09)	0.07 (-0.94, 1.09)
q_risk_taking_z	0.11 (-0.56, 0.78)	0.11 (-0.56, 0.78)
q_future_discount_z	-0.17 (-0.84, 0.50)	-0.17 (-0.84, 0.50)
q_edu_z	-0.08 (-0.73, 0.57)	-0.08 (-0.73, 0.57)
q_age_z	-0.11 (-0.92, 0.64)	0.09 (-0.79, 0.91)
q_religion_en		
catholic	8,606 (34%)	27,379 (36%)
no religion	9,462 (37%)	25,678 (34%)
protstnt	1,881 (7.4%)	7,570 (10%)
other religion	5,470 (21%)	13,791 (18%)
muslim	114 (0.4%)	664 (0.9%)
q_perc_class		
Working class	5,307 (22%)	15,198 (21%)
Lower middle class	4,866 (20%)	13,924 (19%)
Middle class	12,060 (49%)	35,019 (48%)
Upper middle class	2,055 (8.4%)	7,622 (10%)
Upper class	191 (0.8%)	1,310 (1.8%)
q_rural_urban		
Rural area or village	5,819 (23%)	17,093 (23%)
Small or middle sized town	9,069 (36%)	28,418 (38%)
Large town	10,573 (42%)	29,298 (39%)

Table 5

Variable	0 N = 25,536 ¹	1 N = 75,084 ¹
<u>q_gender</u>		
Male	10,939 (43%)	39,456 (53%)
Female	14,565 (57%)	35,514 (47%)
Other	32 (0.1%)	114 (0.2%)

¹ Median (Q1, Q3); n (%)

Source: [CSAP Code Notebook 02](#)

5.6 Robustness

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