Efficient Adversarial Training in LLMs with Continuous Attacks

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Main Contribution:

1) Propose continuous adversarial training methods C-AdvUL and C-AdvIPO;
2) Substantially enhance LLM robustness against discrete attacks;
3) Present a path toward scalable adversarial training algorithms.

Efficient Adversarial Training in LLMs with Continuous Attacks

Background

1. Standard Adversarial Training in vision

$$\min_{\theta} \mathbb{E}_{(x,y)\in\mathcal{D}} \left[\max_{\delta\in T(x)} \mathcal{L}(f_\theta(x+\delta), y) \right]$$

2. Adversarial Perturbation in LLM

$$\delta^{t+1} = \delta^t + \alpha \cdot \text{sign}(\nabla \log f(y|f(x+\delta^t)))$$

3. Adversarial Training in LLM (R2D2)

$$\min_{\theta} -\mathbb{E}_{(x,y,\hat{y})\in\mathcal{D}} \Big[\underbrace{\log f_\theta(y|x+\delta(x,\hat{y}))}_{\text{toward loss}} - \underbrace{\log f_\theta(\hat{y}|x+\delta(x,\hat{y}))}_{\text{away loss}} \Big] - \mathbb{E}_{(x,y)\in\mathcal{D}_u} \Big[\underbrace{\log f_\theta(y|x)}_{\text{utility loss}} \Big]$$



Table 11. Our R2D2 adversarial training method retains high performance on benign tasks, outperforming Koala 13B on MT-Bench and approaching Mistral 7B Instruct-v0.2. This demonstrates that adversarial training against automated red teaming methods does not necessarily harm performance. While Zephyr 7B obtains a substantially higher MT-Bench score, this is not exactly comparable to Zephyr 7B + R2D2. The Zephyr 7B model in our main tables is Zephyr 7B Beta, which includes SFT and DPO training. For our initial investigation of using automated red teaming methods for adversarial training, we incorporate R2D2 into the Zephyr 7B Beta SFT training code and do not include DPO training.

	Zephyr 7B	Mistral 7B	Koala 13B	Zephyr 7B + R2D2 (Ours)
MT-Bench	7.34	6.5	5.4	6.0
GCG ASR	69.4	69.1	62.2	5.5
Average ASR	62.7	55.7	48.5	19.1

Limitation: **high computational costs** are required to perform discrete adversarial attacks at each training iteration.

Overview



In R2D2: $T_{\text{suffix}}(x) = \{\delta \mid x + \delta \in \mathcal{V}^{n+m}\}$

In this method: $E(x) = E(v_1); E(v_2); \ldots; E(v_n)$ $\quad E(x+\delta) = E(v_1) + \delta_1; \ldots; E(v_n) + \delta_n$

$$T_{\text{cont.}}(x) = \{\delta \mid \forall i. \epsilon \geq \|\delta_i\|_p, x + \delta \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times k}\}$$

Method

C-AdvUL

$$\min_{\theta} -\mathbb{E}_{(x,y,\hat{y})\in\mathcal{D}}\Big[\underbrace{\log f_\theta(y|x+\delta(x,\hat{y}))}_{\text{toward loss}} - \underbrace{\log f_\theta(\hat{y}|x+\delta(x,\hat{y}))}_{\text{away loss}}\Big] - \mathbb{E}_{(x,y)\in\mathcal{D}_u}\Big[\underbrace{\log f_\theta(y|x)}_{\text{utility loss}}\Big]$$

$L = \mathbb{1}[L' > c]0.999c + (\mathbb{1}[L' > c]0.001 + \mathbb{1}[L' \leq c])L'$, c is the cutoff value chosen

C-AdvIPO

$$\min_{\theta} -\mathbb{E}_{(x,y,\hat{y})\in\mathcal{D}}\left[\ell\left(\log\frac{f_\theta(y|x+\delta(x,\hat{y}))}{f_{\theta_0}(y|x)} - \log\frac{f_\theta(\hat{y}|x+\delta(x,\hat{y}))}{f_{\theta_0}(\hat{y}|x)}\right)\right] \quad \ell_\beta(h) = \left(h - \frac{1}{2\beta}\right)^2$$

DPO: $$\mathcal{L}_{\text{DPO}}(\pi_\theta;\pi_{\text{ref}}) = -\mathbb{E}_{(x,y_w,y_l)\sim\mathcal{D}}\left[\log\sigma\left(\beta\log\frac{\pi_\theta(y_w\mid x)}{\pi_{\text{ref}}(y_w\mid x)} - \beta\log\frac{\pi_\theta(y_l\mid x)}{\pi_{\text{ref}}(y_l\mid x)}\right)\right]$$

IPO: $$h_\pi(y,y',x) = \log\left(\frac{\pi(y|x)\pi_{\text{ref}}(y'|x)}{\pi(y'|x)\pi_{\text{ref}}(y|x)}\right) \qquad \mathbb{E}_{(y_w,y_l,x)\sim D}\left(h_\pi(y_w,y_l,x) - \frac{\tau^{-1}}{2}\right)^2$$

Experiment -- Setup

Models	GEMMA, PHI-3-MINI, MISTRAL-7B, and ZEPHYR-7B with increasing parameter counts—2B, 3.8B, 7B, 7B
Data(Train)	Harmbench, UltraChat200k
Data(Eval)	40 samples in Harmbench test, MMLU, ARC-E and ARC-C, and MT-BENCH, HARMLESS
Baselines	ZEPHYR + R2D2
Attack	GCG, AutoDAN, PAIR

Experiment -- Results

Why do we need continuous adversarial training?

Algorithm	R2D2	C-AdvUL	C-AdvIPO
F/B	2565/5	10/10	10/10
Iterations	2000	780	360
Batch size	256	64	64
F/B (total)	165,632,000	234,000	552,960
Type	Discrete	Continuous	Continuous

Experiment -- Results



(a) GEMMA (b) PHI-3-MINI

(c) MISTRAL-7B (d) ZEPHYR-7B

- C-AdvUL considerably increases the average robustness against discrete adversarial attacks.
- Similar degradations for all C-AdvUL trained models.
- C-AdvUL has not overfitted the safety objective or the patterns in the Harmbench behaviors.

- C-AdvIPO does not introduce larger utility decreases than C-AavUL.
- C-AdvIPO achieves considerably higher robustness on PAIR.

The results indicate that adversarial variations of common alignment methods, such as IPO, can be used to adversarially align LLMs.

Experiment -- Ablations

Robust fine tuning without attack

Table 6: No adversarial training ablation. Difference to the base model is shown.

Model	MMLU↑	ARC-E↑	ARC-C↑	GCG↓
GEMMA-2B-NOAT	-0.1	+9.4	+10.7	-2.5

- No robustness gains when fine-tuning without attacks.

One-step adversarial training in LLMs

Table 5: One-step training ablation. Difference to the base model is shown.

Model	MMLU↑	ARC-E↑	ARC-C↑	GCG↓
GEMMA-2B-IPO-1-STEP	-2.5	-4.6	-5.0	-62.5

- Achieves robustness improvements comparable to the multi-step variant and slightly worse utility trade-offs.

Correlation between continuous attack loss and GCG loss/ Robustness-utility trade-offs



(a) Robustness correlation



(b) Robustness-utility trade-off

- Models robust to continuous attacks during training are also robust to discrete attacks at inference.

Thanks !

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