Litigation Chamber ☐
Decision on the merits 21/2022 of February 2, 2022□
Unofficial translation from Dutch□
File number: DOS-2019-01377□
Concerns: Complaint regarding Transparency & Consent Framework□
The Litigation Chamber of the Data Protection Authority, composed of Mr. Hielke□
Hijmans, chairman, and MM. Yves Poullet and Frank DeSmet;□
Having regard to Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the□
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and □
to the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (general regulation on the□
data protection), hereinafter GDPR;□
Having regard to the law of 3 December 2017 establishing the Data Protection Authority (hereinafter□
ACL);□
Having regard to the internal regulations as approved by the House of Representatives on 20 □
December 2018 and published in the Belgian Official Gazette on January 15, 2019;□
Considering the documents in the file;□
made the following decision:□
Complainants: Mr. Johnny Ryan, Mr. Pierre Dewitte and Mr. Jef Ausloos, Ms. Katarzyna□
Szymielewic having mandated the NGO Panoptykon to act on his behalf, as well as□
the NGOs Bits of Freedom and the League of Human Rights, all represented □
by Masters Frédéric Debusseré and Ruben Roex, as well as Mr. Bruno Bidon, below□
after "the complainants";□

The defendant: IAB Europe, whose registered office is located at [] 1040 Brussels,□	
with company number [], represented by Masters Frank Judo and □	
Kristof Van Quathem, hereinafter "the defendant".□	
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C. Penalty
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A. Facts and procedure □
A.1 Complaints against Interactive Advertising Bureau Europe□
1.□
During 2019, a series of complaints were filed against Interactive□
Advertising Bureau Europe (hereinafter IAB Europe), for breaching various provisions□
of the GDPR with regard to the large-scale processing of personal data. The□
complaints related in particular to the principles of legality, adequacy, transparency,□
purpose limitation, storage restriction and security, as well as on the □
responsibility. □
2.□
Nine identical or very similar complaints were filed, four of which directly□
with the Data Protection Authority (hereinafter referred to as "DPA") and five via the□
IMI system with supervisory authorities in other EU countries.□
3.□
The Inspection Service has also carried out investigations on its own initiative,□
in accordance with article 63, paragraph 6, of the LCA. Complaints relating to the same subject□
and being directed against the same party (IAB Europe), based on the principles of□
proportionality and necessity in the conduct of investigations (Article 64 of the LCA), the□
Inspection Service has merged the aforementioned files into a single case under the□
file number DOS-2019-01377.□
4.□
The plaintiffs accepted this merger, as well as the request of the Litigation Chamber□

to merge their conclusions and present them jointly, in the interest of□
the economy and efficiency of the procedure.□
5.□
In this international case, four plaintiffs, including the NGO League for Human Rights,□
are domiciled in Belgium, one in Ireland, four in different EU states, represented□
by the Poland-based NGO Panoptykon, and one complainant is represented by the NGO Bits of□
Freedom based in the Netherlands. □
$6.\Box$
Pursuant to Article 4(1) of the LCA, the Data Protection Authority is responsible □
to monitor the data protection principles contained in the GDPR and in□
other laws containing provisions on the protection of the processing of personal data□
personal character.□
7.□
In accordance with Article 32 of the LCA, the Litigation Chamber is the administrative body□
ODA Dispute Resolution1.□
$8.\Box$
In accordance with Articles 51 et seq. of the GDPR and Article 4(1) of the LCA, it is□
to the Litigation Chamber, as an administrative body for settling disputes in□
the DPA, to exercise effective control over the application of the GDPR and to protect the freedoms and □
1 The administrative nature of the disputes before the Litigation Chamber has been confirmed by the Court of Markets. See□
in particular the judgment of 12 June 2019, published on the DPA website, as well as the decision 17/2020 of the Chamber
Litigation. □
5□
fundamental rights of natural persons with regard to the processing of their personal data□
personal character and to facilitate the free movement of personal data within□
the European Union. These tasks are further explained in the strategic plan and □

ODA management plans, drawn up in accordance with Article 17(2) of the ACL.□
$9.\square$
In addition, with regard to IMI, Article 56 of the GDPR provides: "Without prejudice to Article□
55, the supervisory authority of the main establishment or the sole establishment of the □
controller or processor is competent to act as an authority□
supervisory authority concerning□
the cross-border processing carried out by this□
controller or this processor, in accordance with the procedure provided for in□
section 60."□
10.□
Article 4.23 of the GDPR clarifies the notion of cross-border processing in the terms□
following: "a processing of personal data which takes place in the Union in the□
framework of the activities of establishments in several Member States of a person responsible for the
processing or a processor when the controller or processor is□
established in several Member States; or (b) processing of personal data□
which takes place in the Union as part of the activities of a single establishment of a $\Box$
controller or processor, but which materially affects or is□
likely to significantly affect data subjects in more than one State□
members; »□
11.□
The defendant has its only head office in Belgium, but its activities have an impact□
significant on stakeholders in several Member States, including the□
plaintiffs in Ireland, Poland and the Netherlands, as well as in Belgium. Bedroom□
Litigation derives its jurisdiction from a combined reading of Articles 56 and 4(23)(b) of the□
GDPR. The DPA was entered by the Polish data protection authorities,□
Dutch and Irish following a complaint addressed to them by the complainants□

in accordance with Article 77.1 of the GDPR. She declares that she is the control authority□
principal (Article 60 of the GDPR).□
12.□
The following supervisory authorities have indicated their willingness to act as□
concerned ("Concerned Supervisory Authority" - "CSA" below): Netherlands,□
Latvia, Italy, Sweden, Slovenia, Norway, Hungary, Poland, Portugal, Denmark, France,□
Finland, Greece, Spain, Luxembourg, Czech Republic, Austria, Croatia, Cyprus and □
Germany (Berlin, Rhineland-Palatinate, North Rhine-Westphalia, Saarland, Lower Saxony,□
Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, Bavaria), Ireland.□
13.□
During the procedure, other complaints, the object of which is very similar to that of the □
this case, were sent to the Belgian DPA by the Maltese, Romanian, Croatian, $\!$
Greek, Portuguese, Swedish, Cypriot and Italian. These complaints are not part of the□
this procedure. □
6 🗆
A.2 The language of the proceedings: Interlocutory decision 01/2021 modified by the decision □
interlocutory 26/2021 of February 23, 2021.□
14.□
On October 13, 2020,□
the Litigation Chamber sent a□
letter to the parties,□
in accordance with article 98 of the DPA law, informing them of the language of the procedure (the
French), and inviting them to present their written conclusions. □
15. In response to the Complainants' request of November 27, 2020, and taking into account the □
international nature of this case, the Litigation Chamber rendered on January 8, 2021□
interlocutory decision 01/2021 regarding the language of the proceedings. Following an appeal□


plaintiffs before the Court of Markets, this interlocutory decision was amended on □
February 23, 2021 (interlocutory decision 26/2021). □
16. Under this last interlocutory decision, based on an agreement with the parties, the□
correspondence of the DPA with the parties is done in Dutch and the decisions□
interlocutory and final of the Litigation Chamber are in Dutch. Nevertheless, the□
Chambre Litigation provides the parties with a French translation and a translation □
English of the final decision.□
17. However, the parties are free to use the language of their choice (Dutch, French or □
English) in the proceedings before the Litigation Chamber, whether in writing or□
orally. In the case of IAB Europe, it is French or English. ODA is not□
responsible for translations of procedural documents submitted by a party for the□
account of the other.□
18. Finally, the Litigation Division points out that it sometimes uses English terminology in□
this decision, in cases where the translation into Dutch would reduce the comprehensibility of□
decision. □
A.3 RTB and TCF□
19. In essence, this case concerns, on the one hand, the compliance of the TCF system with the $\!$
GDPR and, on the other hand, the responsibility of IAB Europe, the defendant in this□
procedure, and the other different actors involved. Furthermore, it is also□
procedure, and the other different actors involved. Furthermore, it is also □ the impact of the TCF on what is known as the real-time auction system (Real-Time □
the impact of the TCF on what is known as the real-time auction system (Real-Time□
the impact of the TCF on what is known as the real-time auction system (Real-Time□  Bidding (RTB)). Considering the complexity of the RTB, it is shown below.□
the impact of the TCF on what is known as the real-time auction system (Real-Time Bidding (RTB)). Considering the complexity of the RTB, it is shown below.
the impact of the TCF on what is known as the real-time auction system (Real-Time Bidding (RTB)). Considering the complexity of the RTB, it is shown below.  A.3.1 Definitions and operation of the real-time auction system (Real-Time Bidding -RTB-)

through "programmatic advertising" methods, including real-time bidding (RTB) $\!\Box$
is the main system2.□
21.□
The real-time auction is defined in the legal literature as "a network of □
partners that enables big data applications in the organizational domain of the□
marketing to improve sales of pre-determined advertising space through a $\!\!\!\!\square$
real-time marketing based on □
data and personalized advertising□
(behavioural)".3. □
22. Real-time bidding means the use of an automated online auction and □
instant for the sale and purchase of online advertising space. More specifically, this $\hfill\Box$
means that when an individual accesses a website or application that contains a $\square$
advertising space, behind the scenes, through an automated online auction system and $\Box$
algorithms, technology companies representing thousands of advertisers can□
instantly (in real time) make an offer for this advertising space in order to display□
targeted advertisements specifically tailored to that individual's profile.□
23. Real-time bidding works behind the scenes on most websites□
commercial and mobile applications. Thousands of companies are involved and $\hfill\Box$
receive information about the person visiting the website. In this way, $\hfill\Box$
billions of advertisements are auctioned every day. □
24. In a real-time auction system, several parties are involved4:□
A. The companies or organizations that created and operate the Time Auction System
concerned, in particular by defining its policies/governance and protocols□
techniques. The main ones are:□
has. □

7□

the "OpenRTB" system and the "Advertising Common Object Model" (AdCOM) which□
associated with it, created by IAB Technology Laboratory, Inc. (abbreviated as "IAB Tech□
Lab") and Interactive Advertising Bureau, Inc. (abbreviated "IAB"), both based in□
New York ;□
b.□
the "Authorized Buyers" system created by Google.□
OpenRTB is a standard protocol that aims to simplify the interconnection between□
adtech providers of advertising space, publishers (ad exchanges, □
sell-side platforms or networks working with publishers) and buyers□
advertising space competitors (bidders, demand-side platforms or □
2 M. VEALE, FR. ZUIDERVEEN BORGESIUS, "Adtech and Real-Time Bidding under European Data Protection Law", German
Journal, July 31, 2021, p. 8-10.□
R. VAN EIJK, "Web Privacy Measurement in Real-Time Bidding Systems - A Graph-Based Approach to RTB system
classification", 2019, p. 140: "a network of partners enabling big data applications in the field□
marketing organization to improve sales through real-time, data-driven marketing and □
personalized (behavioral) advertising", available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3319284; 3 M. VEALE, FR.□
ZUIDERVEEN BORGESIUS, IBIDEM, P. 3.□
4 Ibid.□
8 🗆
networks working with advertisers). The overall goal of OpenRTB is to establish a□
common language for communication between buyers and ad tech vendors□
advertising space5. □
B. On the "supply side", we find:□
has. Businesses that have a website or app with Spaces□
advertisers. In RTB jargon, these companies are called "publishers".□
b. Companies operating an automated online platform through which□

publishers can optimize the value and volume of their media sales□
advertisers by indicating the availability of their advertising space to be displayed on a $\!\!\!\square$
data subject and requesting that one or more bid requests□
be made for this advertising space. In RTB jargon, these companies are□
called "Sell-Side Platforms" ("SSPs"). SSPs provide□
$inventory \square$
available from□
their publishers to the various ad exchanges on the market and $\hfill\Box$
possibly to advertising networks and other "Demand-Side Platforms" □
("DSPs" -see below-). The most advanced SSPs work in real time. $\hfill\Box$
As soon as an advertising space is called up when a page is viewed on the site□
of a publisher, the SSP searches for the best offer on this type of advertising space by $\!$
based on the profile of the detected visitor, and automatically broadcasts the $\mbox{ad}\square$
corresponding6.□
C. On the "demand side" we find:□
has. Companies wishing to display advertisements for their products or□
services in a targeted manner to website visitors and users□
applications (advertisers). □
b. Companies operating an online platform that allows advertisers and $\hfill\Box$
media agencies to make and optimize their purchases of advertising space,□
and on which advertisers' ads are offered7. In RTB jargon,□
these companies are called "Demand-Side Platforms" ("DSPs"). □
D. Companies, called "Ad Exchanges", play the role of intermediaries between them.
They bring together organizations from the supply and demand side and allow them
automatically communicate with each other so that the DSPs can respond to □
requests for offers from SSPs.□



9 M. VEALE, FR. ZUIDERVEEN BORGESIUS, "Adtech and Real-Time Bidding under European Data Protection Law", German
Journal, July 31, 2021, p. 9.□
10 Technical analysis report from the inspection service, June 4, 2019 (Exhibit 24), p. 6.□
10□
29. The content of a bid request, which contains data about online users, their□
device and websites visited, is captured by the OpenRTB protocol or the system□
Authorized Buyers. Generally, the following categories of□
personal data may be communicated to advertisers in the context of□
from bid request 11:□
■ URL of the site visited□
■ Category or subject of the site□
■ Device operating system□
Software and browser version□
Device manufacturer and model□
■ Mobile phone operator□
■ Screen size □
Unique user identification defined by supplier and/or buyer.□
Unique identifier of the person from the Ad Exchange, often derived from the Ad cookie□
Exchange. □
A DSP's user identification, often derived from the Ad Exchange cookie that□
is synchronized with a DSP domain cookie.□

• Teal of Diffill
- Gender□
•□
Interests□
■ Metadata reflecting the consent given □
■ Geography□
•□
Longitude and latitude□
■ Zip code□
30. Consequently, the Litigation Division considers that the GDPR applies ratione □
materiae to the RTB system, including the OpenRTB protocol and, to some extent, the □
11 Ibid., p. 10.□
11 🗆
Transparency & Consent Framework (TCF) discussed below are components□
essential, since RTB trading through RFPs involves□
intrinsically the processing of personal data.□
31.□
The different steps and interactions between SSPs, DSPs and DMPs that take place in the $\!$
RTB system can be summarized as follows12:□
i.□
ii.□
iii.□
iv.□
An end user requests a web page;□
The publisher's ad server on the web page selects an SSP;□
The SSP then selects an Ad Exchange;□

The Ad Exchange sends requests for offers to hundreds of partners in the □
network and offers them the possibility of generating an offer in response;□
<b>v</b> . 🗆
The Ad Exchange allows privileged DMPs and/or DSPs to synchronize □
http-cookies;□
vi.□
vii.□
The "Ad Exchange" places the winning bid;□
The DSP serves the advertiser's advertising;□
viii.□
The advertisement is loaded from a CDN (Content Delivery Network, or □
network provider);□
ix.□
The advertiser's server loads a JavaScript for verification;□
R.12 VAN EIJK, "Web Privacy Measurement in Real-Time Bidding Systems- A Graph-Based Approach to RTB system."
classification", 2019, p. 150-151, available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3319284. □
12□
32. Real-time auctions present a number of risks that arise from the□
nature of the ecosystem and how personal data is□
processed within it. These risks include13:□
• profiling and automated decision making □
large-scale processing (including special categories of data to□
personal character);□
• innovative use or application of new technological solutions or□
organizational; □

■ matching or merging datasets;□
analysis or prediction of behavior, location or movements□
natural persons;□
invisible processing of personal data.□
33. In addition, a large number of organizations — such as data controllers,□
joint controllers, processors or other data subjects□
— are part of the ecosystem. This has a potentially significant impact on the protection $\square$
Datas. In addition, most of those affected have a limited understanding □
how the ecosystem processes their personal data. □
34. Accordingly, the GDPR applies to processing carried out under the RTB, which□
are of such a nature that they may create a significant risk to the rights and freedoms□
some people.□
A.3.2 IAB Europe Transparency and Consent Framework□
Framework-TCF-)
35.□
IAB Tech Lab designed the OpenRTB protocol, which together with Google's AdBuyers protocol,
is the most widely used RTB protocol in the world. IAB Tech Lab, based in New York USA $\!$
United, acts as a provider of the OpenRTB standard and should be distinguished from IAB Europe,□
who designed the Transparency and Consent Framework□
Framework-TCF-).
36.□
IAB Europe is a federation that represents the advertising and marketing sector □
digital at European level. It includes member companies as well as□
national associations, with □

their own member companies. □
Indirectly, □
IAB Europe represents approximately 5,000 companies, including large corporations and □
national members14. □
13 Information Commissioner's Office, "Update report into adtech and real time bidding", 20 June 2019, p. 9 -□
https://ico.org.uk/media/about-the-ico/documents/2615156/adtech-real-time-bidding-report-201906-dl191220.pdf
14 As indicated by the CEO of the defendant during the hearing before the Litigation Chamber, June 11, 2021. □
13□
37. According to IAB Europe, the defendant in these proceedings, the TCF ensures the □
accountability and transparency of OpenRTB. The TCF is a separate set of□
policies (TCF Policies), technical specifications, terms and conditions, created, managed□
and administered by IAB Europe, and, according to the defendant, should be able to inform□
users of the legitimate interests pursued by advertisers, as well as to obtain the□
valid consent of these users with regard to the processing of their data□
personal data in a real-time auction system (such as OpenRTB).□
38. Although OpenRTB should be distinguished from TCF, the two systems are related. After all,□
IAB Europe claims that the TCF provides an operational framework within which the operations of□
data processing that takes place on the basis of the OpenRTB protocol can be put□
in compliance with the GDPR (and the ePrivacy Directive).□
39. Regarding the TCF IAB Europe declares the following:□
"In its current form, the TCF is a cross-industry best practice standard that□
facilitates the compliance of the digital advertising sector with certain rules of□
privacy and data protection policy and which aims to provide individuals with□
greater transparency and control over their personal data. More□
specifically, it is a "framework" within which companies operate in a□
independent and helps them meet the requirement to have a GDPR legal basis□

for any processing of personal data and the obligation to obtain the □
user consent for storing and accessing information on a device□
the user under the Privacy and Electronic Communications Directive"15□
40. Moreover, the main actors within the TCF correspond to a large extent to the□
Parties participating in OpenRTB (excluding CMPs):□
i.□
Publishers—Parties that make advertising space available on their site□
web or in their application and who are in direct contact with the users whose□
personal data is collected and processed. A publisher can□
provide a CMP (see below) on their website or in their app for them□
allow to seek and manage the consent of visitors/users to the□
processing of their personal data and to facilitate the operation□
of TCF16. Publishers decide which adtech providers can collect□
data on their website and process the personal data of their□
users (and/or access their devices) and for what purposes17.□
ii.□
Adtech providers — Companies that receive personal data □
staff of publishers in order to fill advertising space on websites □
15 Free translation, submissions in response of the defendant dated March 25, 2021, para. 32. □
16 Information Commissioner's Office, "Update report into adtech and real time bidding", 20 June 2019, p. 11-□
12https://ico.org.uk/media/about-the-ico/documents/2615156/adtech-real-time-bidding-report-201906-dl191220.pdf.
17 Conclusions of Respondent's Response dated March 25, 2021, para. 32.□
14□
publishers or in publisher applications, such as advertisers,□
SSPs, DSPs, Ad Exchanges, and DMPs.□

Consent Management Platforms—For the TCF, there are also □
companies that offer "consent management platforms" (hereafter□
after "Consent Management Platforms" CMP). Concretely, a CMP takes the □
form of a pop-up that appears the first time you connect to a website to□
collect the user's consent to the placement of cookies and other□
credentials18.□
41. An essential part of a CMP intervention is the generation of a chain of □
characters consisting of a combination of letters, numbers and other characters. $\hfill\Box$
This string is called "TC String" by IAB Europe, for "Transparency and Consent□
String". The TC String is intended to capture in a structured and automated way the□
preferences of a user when visiting a website or application from a publisher that has□
integrated into the CMP. This concerns in particular the collection of consent (or not) to the
processing of personal data for marketing and other purposes, sharing $\!\!\!\!\square$
whether or not personal data with third parties (adtech providers) and the exercise□
or not of the right of opposition. □
42. Adtech vendors decipher the TC String to determine if they have the base□
necessary legal basis to process a user's personal data for the purposes□
specified. Thanks to its concise data format, the CMP can store and retrieve at any□
moment the preferences of a user and transmit this information to the suppliers□
adtech who need it19.□
43. This can be represented schematically as follows20:□
18 Technical analysis report from the inspection service, January 6, 2020 (Exhibit 53), p. 59.□
19 Technical analysis report from the inspection service, January 6, 2020 (Exhibit 53), p. 75.□
20 Defendant's submissions dated February 18, 2021, para. 18.□
15□
i.□

An Internet user browses a publisher's site, for example an information site. □
The publisher ensures that a CMP is activated on its website or in its application□
when the user starts using it. □
iii.□
The CMP checks whether a TC String already exists for this user or not. If a CT□
String "stored globally"21 is chosen, the CMP will contact the Internet domain□
consensus.org run by IAB Europe to check from there if there is already a $\!\!\!\square$
so-called "consensus" cookie on the user's device. This particularly concerns the $\!\Box$
cookie euconsent-v2. □
iv.□
If the third step shows that the TC String does not yet exist or is not up to date,□
in a fourth step, the CMP will show the user a user interface□
where he can consent to the collection and sharing of his personal data.
<b>v</b> .□
The Internet user makes a choice in the user interface. □
vi.□
The CMP generates the TC String and installs a euconsent-v2 cookie on the □
user's device or updates the existing cookie.□
A.4 Inspection Service reports□
A.4.1 IAB Europe acts as data controller with respect to□
relates to the Transparency and Consent Framework□
Framework -TCF) and the personal data processing operations involved therein□
relate□
44. As part of this procedure, the Inspection Service concentrated its investigation□
exclusively on IAB Europe, which the Inspection Service has identified as the responsible□

ii.□

data processing for the Transparency and Consent Framework (hereinafter,□
"TCF"). The Inspection Service bases this first observation on the fact that IAB $\Box$
Europe has developed the TCF, with which IAB Europe imposes binding rules on□
participating organizations. According to the Inspection Service, these binding rules□
relate in particular to the processing of personal data in the context of□
the collection and processing of consent, as well as the preferences of users in□
online, with regard to the purposes of the processing and the authorized adtech providers. $\Box$
45. The Inspection Service bases its report on two technical analyzes relating to the□
IAB Europe Open Realtime Bidding API specification, as well as the different mechanisms□
of the IAB Tech Lab's OpenMedia Specification, including the Transparency and □
consent22. □
21 Also referred to as "broad consent"□
22 Technical analysis reports from the inspection service, June 4, 2019 (Exhibit 24) and January 6, 2020 (Exhibit 53).
16□
46. With respect to the OpenRTB protocol, the Inspection Service finds that IAB Tech Lab,□
who developed this open technical standard and is based in New York (USA), simply acts□
as the system supplier vis-à-vis the participating organizations and cannot□
therefore not be considered a data controller. Unlike TCF,□
the OpenRTB allows the processing of personal data according to means and □
purposes entirely determined by participating organizations, but not by IAB Tech□
Lab.□
47. Finally, the Inspection Service indicates that the DPA is not competent for the protocol□
Authorized Buyers, which was developed by Google as an alternative to the standard $\square$
OpenRTB. □
A.4.2 Identified breaches of the GDPR□
48. The Inspection Service finds that IAB Europe violates the legal provisions and the□

■ Articles 5.1.a and 5.2 (principles of fairness, transparency and accountability)□
■ Article 6.1 (lawfulness of processing);□
<ul> <li>Article 9.1 and 9.2 (processing relating to special categories of data to be □</li> </ul>
personal character);□
■ Article 12.1 (transparency of information, communication and procedures for exercising □
rights of data subjects)□
■ Article 13 (information to be provided when personal data has been□
collected from the data subject)□
■ Article 14 (information to be provided when personal data has not been □
not been collected from the data subject)□
■ Article 24.1 (responsibility of the controller);□
■ Articles 32.1 and 32.2 (security of processing). □
49. Apart from complaints, the Inspection Service also finds breaches□
additional to the following provisions of the GDPR:□
■ Article 30 (record of processing activities);□
■ Article 31 (cooperation with the supervisory authority)□
■ Article 24.1 (responsibility of the controller);□
■ Article 37 (appointment of a data protection officer). □
17□
Finding 1 - IAB Europe wrongly uses legitimate interest as a legal basis for the□
processing of personal data under the TCF, according to which categories□
special types of personal data may also be processed in certain□
case.□
50. Based on the two versions of the IAB Europe Policies on Transparency and □
consent of IAB Europe23 (hereinafter TCF Policies), the Inspection Service notes that IAB

following principles of the GDPR with its TCF:  $\hfill\Box$ 

Europe places the responsibility for respecting the principles of transparency and fairness on $\Box$
CMPs and/or publishers. Furthermore, IAB Europe considers that the legitimate interest of □
participating organizations constitutes an appropriate basis for data processing □
of a personal nature within the framework of the TCF, in order to create an advertising profile of □
data subjects and to send them personalized advertisements. However, according to $\!\!\!\square$
the Inspection Service, IAB Europe does not provide evidence that the interests, in particular□
the fundamental rights and freedoms of the persons concerned have been duly taken into□
consideration in the process. □
51. Furthermore, the Inspection Service notes that in certain circumstances, categories □
particular types of personal data may also be collected and □
processed by the participating organizations. For example, participating organizations $\!\!\!\!\square$
could know the websites previously visited by a data subject, which□
which would make it possible to deduce or reveal political opinions, religious beliefs□
or philosophical, sexual orientation, data relating to health or even□
the trade union membership of the persons concerned. □
52. The Inspection Service considers that IAB Europe has therefore not complied □
adequately the principles of transparency and fairness with regard to the persons concerned.
Finding 2 - The information provided does not comply with Articles 12.1, 13 and 14 of the □
GDPR.□
53. The Inspection Service also notes that the privacy policy that IAB□
Europe makes available to data subjects is not always transparent or □
comprehensible, which constitutes a breach of the obligations arising from articles□
12.1, 13 and 14 GDPR.□
54. The IAB Europe24 privacy policy is only available in English. In□
Additionally, the Privacy Policy contains several terms which, without explanation□
additional, are not clear to those involved. For example, the□

Inspection service mentions "services" and "other means". □
23 IAB Europe Transparency & Consent Framework Policies v2019-08-21.3 (Exhibit 32); IAB Europe Transparency & Consent
Framework Policies v2019-04-02.2c (Exhibit 38)□
24 Room 41.□
18□
55. Furthermore, according to the Inspection Service, the information provided is incomplete and □
inadequate. Firstly, data subjects are not informed of the interests□
exact legitimate persons pursued by IAB Europe. Second, it is not easy for□
data subjects to distinguish between the different recipients or categories□
recipients of their personal data □
; the terms "third party" and □
"partner" are not understandable without further explanation.□
Thirdly, the persons concerned are not informed, on the one hand, of the □
reference to appropriate or sufficient guarantees for the international transfer of their□
personal data outside the EEA or, on the other hand, how to□
obtain a copy or where it is made available. Fourth, based on□
of the IAB Europe Privacy Policy, it is not clear to individuals□
concerned that their personal data can be obtained by IAB□
Europe via its TCF25. Fifth, the conditions under which people□
concerned must provide their personal data, in particular if this□
collection is organized on the basis of a legal, pre-contractual or contractual obligation,□
are not clearly stated. The persons concerned are also not□
informed of the possible consequences of a refusal to provide their data. □
56. Consequently, the Privacy Policy does not comply with the obligations enshrined □
by articles 13 and 14 of the GDPR.□
Finding 3 - IAB Europe does not provide any compliance checks under the rules of the □

TCF policy□
57. Based on the two versions of the TCF Policies26, the inspection service considers that IAB□
Europe does not sufficiently monitor compliance with the rules it has drawn up with regard to □
participating organizations. In particular, it would be possible for a CMP to continue to □
exchange personal data with a publisher of which it reasonably believes□
that it does not comply with the rules imposed by the TCF or the law27.□
58. Given the role that IAB Europe assigns itself, namely that of Managing Organization, this□
disregard for the risks to the rights and freedoms of data subjects would indicate a□
violation of Article 24.1 GDPR as well as the obligation to provide appropriate security□
for the processing of personal data, in accordance with articles 32.1 and □
32.2 GDPR. □
25 IAB Europe Transparency and Consent Framework Terms and Conditions ("Terms and Conditions") (Exhibit 33),□
p.7.□
26 IAB Europe TCF Policies v2019-08-21.3 (Exhibit 32); IAB Europe TCF Policies v2019-04-02.2c (Exhibit 38). □
27 IAB Europe TCF Policies v2019-08-21.3 (Exhibit 32), p11; IAB Europe TCF Policies v2019-04-02.2c (Exhibit 38), p6.
19□
Finding 4 - IAB Europe did not maintain a processing register.□
59. The Inspection Service also notes that IAB Europe does not consider itself bound to□
keep a record of processing activities, based on the exception provided for in Article□
30.5 GDPR for organizations with fewer than 250 people28. The service□
inspection also points out that IAB Europe did not initially provide the Service□
inspection a copy of its record of processing activities. □
60. It was only in a second response29 that IAB Europe decided, for the sake of completeness,□
to provide a record of processing activities, although the organization does not consider itself□
still not subject to the obligation provided for in Article 30.5 GDPR.□
Finding 5 - IAB Europe did not sufficiently cooperate with the Inspection Service's investigation □

61. Based on conclusion 4, and with reference to the delay with which IAB Europe responded □
requests for additional information from the Inspection Service,□
the service□
of inspection concludes that the behavior of IAB Europe within the framework of its investigation is□
in violation of the obligation to cooperate under Article 31 of the GDPR.□
Finding 6 - IAB Europe has not appointed a data protection officer, although□
that as Managing Organization, it reserves the right to access the data (to□
personal character) that the organizations participating in the TCF collect and process.□
62.□
IAB Europe claims30 that it does not meet the conditions referred to in Article 37.1.b of the GDPR,□
because "IAB Europe is a professional association whose main activities□
consists of providing information and tools to stakeholders (in particular, $\!\Box$
companies) operating in the digital advertising sector, as well as to provide□
information to the general public in order to improve their knowledge and inform them of the □
value that digital advertising brings to the market". For these reasons, IAB Europe has not□
designated data protection officer. □
63. According to the Inspection Service, the approach of IAB Europe set out above is not substantiated □
by the facts. IAB Europe designed and manages the TCF in its capacity as Managing Organization and,□
as such, as well as under the terms and conditions of the TCF of IAB Europe31, has the right to access□
to all information provided by the participating organizations, to store it and to □
treat them. □
28 IAB Europe - Response to Belgian DPA, 26 June 2019 (Exhibit 22), p. 2-3.□
29IAB Europe Response to Inspection Report, February 10, 2020 (Exhibit 57).□
30 In its response to the inspection service dated 26/06/2019 and 20/08/2019, exhibits 22 and 29. $\hfill\Box$
31 IAB Europe Transparency and Consent Framework Terms and Conditions ("Terms and Conditions") (Exhibit 33).
20 🗆

the inspection department□
deems relevant to□
assessment of the seriousness of the facts.□
64. The Inspection Service refers to the judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union (here□
after the "Court of Justice" in case C-25/17 (Jehovah's Witnesses)32, in which the Court□
clarified that the definition of controller must be interpreted in a manner□
broad in order to ensure effective and comprehensive protection of data subjects. In this□
regard, the Inspection Service argues that IAB Europe is trying to evade its□
liability under the GDPR.□
65. The Inspection Service mentions the clauses included in title 10 "Liability"□
of the TCF Terms and Conditions33, by which IAB Europe imposes the responsibility of the□
processing of personal data collected by the parties of the sector of the□
digital advertising entirely on CMPs, publishers and other providers□
adtech34. Indeed, these clauses expressly provide that IAB Europe does not guarantee in□
no way that:□
the consent given by the CMPs or publishers, approved partners□
(global adtech providers) has been collected and processed in accordance with, among other things,□
GDPR;□
any data processing carried out within the framework or on behalf of the TCF will be□
compliant with all relevant laws and regulations, including GDPR.□
AT 5 Summary of the respondent's response of February 11, 2021□
A.5.1 IAB Europe is not a data controller with respect to the processing□
personal data under the TCF.□

A.4.3. - Other considerations than □

IAB Europe essentially refutes the Inspection Service's position that the □
defendant, in its capacity as Managing Organization, acts as responsible for the □
processing of personal data processed by TCF participants. □
67. According to the defendant, the TCF in no way obliges the participating organizations to □
pursue certain objectives, but merely aims to provide the information, which must□
be provided to data subjects in accordance with Articles 12 and 13 of the GDPR,□
streamlined and standardized way through CMPs. On the other hand, the real purposes □
32 Judgment of the CJEU of 10 July 2018, C-25/17, Jehovah's Witnesses, ECLI:EU:C:2018:551.□
33 IAB Europe Transparency and Consent Framework Terms and Conditions ("Terms and Conditions") (Exhibit 33). □
34 In particular, supply-side platforms, demand-side platforms, Ad Exchanges, advertisers and □
data management platforms. □
21
processing are determined by the participating organisations, without the intervention of□
the defendant. □
68. In the first place, the defendant alleges the absence of legal jurisdiction (ratione □
personae) on the part of the DPA, and more particularly of the Inspection Service, to carry out□
an investigation and challenge the TCF. The defendant also refers to the capacity of □
the DPA to hold the true controllers of the data processing, i.e. the□
TCF participants, responsible for possible violations of the GDPR, if applicable. □
69. According to the defendant, the TCF as such does not involve any processing of data at □
personal character and the inspection report does not show for which activities of□
processing IAB Europe must be considered as the controller of the processing of □
data. □
70. Secondly, it argues that a broad definition of the concept of responsible party□
treatment, as proposed by the Inspection Service, is not justified in the□

context of the TCF, given that there are already controllers clearly□
identified, on the one hand, and taking into account the fact that the TCF has no influence on the□
processing of personal data that takes place in the context of the protocol□
OpenRTB, on the other hand. More specifically, the defendant mentions the absence of any□
influence on the means and purposes of processing within the RTB system.□
71.□
The defendant also considers that the aforementioned Jehovah's Witnesses judgment does not apply□
not to the situation of IAB Europe, for the following reasons:□
■ Unlike the Community of Jehovah's Witnesses, IAB Europe does not organize,□
does not coordinate or promote in any way the processing of data to□
personal character by TCF participants.□
■ The processing of personal data by TCF participants for purposes□
purposes of RTB is not in the interest of IAB Europe.□
■ TCF participants do not have a common goal in dealing with□
personal data and only participate in the TCF for the purpose of achieving□
their individual purposes in a GDPR-compliant manner.□
72. The defendant considers that the judgment in Wirtschaftsakademie35 does not apply to IAB either□
Europe, because the defendant never disseminates information (i.e. advertising) for□
account or at the request of advertisers, does not choose an advertising platform or□
other communication channel and does not set parameters or processing purposes,□
unlike the TCF participants who decide these matters. According□
the□
defendant, IAB Europe does not actively participate in RTB processing and is not□
the origin of this treatment, in any way whatsoever. Data processing□
35 Judgment of the CJEU of 5 June 2018, C-210/16, Wirtschaftsakademie Schleswig-Holstein, ECLI:EU:C:2018:388.□

22□

associated with the OpenRTB protocol is performed exclusively by TCF participants and has□
therefore takes place independently of IAB Europe or the TCF.□
73. Thirdly, it disputes the definition of controller as it is□
explained in the guidelines published by the European Council for the protection of□
data (EDPB).36 The defendant claims that IAB Europe does not exercise any power□
discretionary as to the purposes or means of the processing of personal data $\!$
staff under the TCF. In addition, IAB does not process personal data□
personal in a way that could be considered "inseparable" or□
"inextricably linked" to the processing of personal data by the□
TCF participants. Similarly, the fact that participating organizations pay a□
financial fee to IAB Europe does not constitute, according to the defendant, an "advantage□
mutual" which would lead to joint processing responsibility.
74. Furthermore, the defendant emphasizes the absence of decisions or guidelines from other
supervisory authorities who could support the opinion of the Inspection Service. In particular, the
Belgian, German, French and British supervisory authorities have not identified IAB□
Europe as (joint) controller. More specifically, the Conference□
independent data protection authorities of the German Federation and the□
Länder noted in September 2019 that IAB Europe only acts as□
representative organization in the programmatic advertising sector. Furthermore, the $\!\!\!\!\!\!\square$
German supervisory authorities confirmed their position in November 2019,□
when they announced that any enforcement proceedings related to complaints against the□
online advertising should be brought against TCF participants, but not against IAB□
Europe. According to the defendant, the French supervisory authority (CNIL) also accepted □
indirectly the idea that IAB Europe was not responsible for the processing carried out by□
TCF participants. Also, the UK ICO would never have identified IAB Europe□
as a potential controller within the RTB ecosystem, regardless of□

any time.□
75. Finally, the defendant refers to the possible consequences for other organizations □
subject to the GDPR if the Litigation Chamber were to judge that IAB Europe is indeed (co-□
)responsible for the processing of personal data within the framework of the TCF. In□
particular, according to the defendant, such a decision would mean that any organization□
umbrella body that draws up and adopts a code of conduct would, by the mere fact of its role as □
monitoring, considered jointly responsible with regard to the processing carried out□
by other organizations in accordance with this code of conduct. □
36 EDPB - Guidelines 07/2020 on the concepts of data controller and processor in the GDPR, v2.0, 2021.□
23 🗆
A.5.2 The TCF is GDPR compliant.□
has. Legality and legal basis□
76. First of all, the defendant claims that IAB Europe, unlike the organizations□
participants, is under absolutely no obligation to explain to the Inspection Service the existence□
a legitimate interest, including balancing the interests of organizations□
participants and the rights and freedoms of data subjects, since IAB Europe does not□
does not participate in the TCF and does not act as a data controller.□
77. Furthermore, the defendant asserts that the DPA is not authorized to prohibit participants□
the TCF to process the personal data of data subjects on the basis □
of a legitimate interest. On the contrary, the assessment of the merits of the legitimate interests $\!$
invoked by the participants must be done on a case-by-case basis, and cannot therefore be prohibited from□
in advance and absolutely by the ODA. □
78. With regard to the claims that IAB Europe deals with categories□
particulars of personal data in□
under the TCF, or would be□
jointly responsible for the processing of this personal data by the organizations□

participants, the defendant points out that these categories of personal data□
personnel may, where applicable, only be processed within the framework of the OpenRTB, by□
opposition to the TCF. The defendant refers in this respect to the TCF Policies, which prohibit□
expressly the use of the TCF to process special categories of data to □
personal character.□
b. Transparency□
79. Considering the fact that IAB Europe does not act as data controller□
personal data processed for the purposes of RTB, the defendant argues that one□
also can't expect her to□
informed□
the people concerned□
in accordance with Articles 12 and 13 of the GDPR.□
80. Furthermore, the defendant argues that the privacy policy that the Service□
of inspection invokes as evidence of possible breaches of the principle of transparency□
is applicable exclusively to the processing of personal data collected□
on the various Internet sites operated by the defendant, as well as to the data to be $\Box$
personal character collected within the framework of the participating organizations (in particular, □
contact details of representatives of these organizations). In other words, the policy□
of confidentiality to which the Inspection Service refers has, according to the defendant, $\!\Box$
unrelated to processing activities under the OpenRTB Protocol.□
81.□
The defendant also disputes any allegation that IAB Europe, in its□
as Managing Organization, reserves the right to access personal data□
staff collected and exchanged by participating organizations under the TCF□
24□
and the OpenRTB protocol. IAB Europe asserts that this assumption is not based on any□

evidence and is due to an erroneous interpretation of the possibility offered to the defendant to□
treat□
personal data of representatives of organizations□
participants. □
82. Furthermore, the defendant considers that it is entitled to propose the policy of□
confidentiality exclusively in English, given that the target audience is mainly□
made up of professional and B2B players. The defendant stresses that Belgian law does not□
provides for no obligation to make available a privacy policy in□
French or Dutch and that, moreover, Belgium has not made use of the possibility□
to adopt additional requirements concerning the use of language within the framework□
of the EU consumer rights directive.□
vs. Security□
83. The Respondent submits that the accusations concerning the lack of measures □
technical and organizational measures to protect personal data in the□
framework of the TCF are unfounded.□
84. First of all, the defendant considers that IAB Europe is not subject to Articles 24 and 32□
of the GDPR with regard to the processing of data carried out within the TCF, because□
the organization is not a controller.□
85. Second, the IAB Europe TCF Policies provide that TCF participants must□
report breaches of TCF rules to IAB Europe. Once again, the defendant□
claims that the Inspection Service is misinterpreting the TCF Policies, in particular by□
granting the CMPs the right to end the cooperation if they consider that a publisher□
does not comply with the rules, without suffering any contractual disadvantage. Furthermore, the□
defendant notes that infringements of the rules provided for by the TCF can always be □
reported to the supervisory authorities, who will then take action if they deem it□
necessary.

d. International transfer of personal data□
86.□
IAB Europe refutes the plaintiffs' allegations regarding the international transfer of□
personal data under the TCF. The defendant notes in this respect□
that these claims are only relevant in the context of the OpenRTB protocol, which□
is not at issue in this case. Furthermore, IAB Europe cannot be held□
responsible for the transfer under the OpenRTB protocol.□
37 Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on consumer rights,□
amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC and Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing
Council Directive 85/577/EEC and Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, OJ L 304/64.□
25□
A.5.3 IAB Europe is not subject to the obligation to keep a register of processing operations. □
87. Respondent emphasizes that it may invoke the exception provided for in Article 30.5,□
in particular the fact that the organization is not required to keep a register of the activities of□
processing, as IAB Europe is not a data controller with respect to□
concerns the processing activities carried out within the TCFF and, in addition, the organization□
has less than 250 employees. Nevertheless, the defendant emphasizes its own initiative □
to draw up a register and submit it to the Inspection Service, as well as the fact that this□
register does not relate to processing activities relating to the TCF.□
A.5.4 IAB Europe is not required to appoint a Data Protection Officer.□
88. Given the nature and scope of the processing activities carried out by□
organization, the defendant indicates that IAB Europe is not required to appoint a□
data protection officer, the criteria set out in Article 37 of the GDPR not being□
full. □
A.5.5 IAB Europe cooperated with the Inspection Service.□
89. The respondent refutes the allegations of insufficient cooperation with the investigation, noting□

that the deadlines imposed by the Inspection Service on the parties to an investigation are not□
no cases determined by law, but must be the result of a reasonable evaluation and $\hfill\Box$
must take into account the specific circumstances of the case. In this case, the defendant $\!\!\!\!\!\square$
believes that IAB Europe has always cooperated in good faith and provided information and $\!\Box$
responses with the aim of clarifying its status with respect to the TCF and demonstrating its□
GDPR compliance, as it applies to IAB Europe.□
90. In addition, the defendant observes that the duty of cooperation provided for in Article 31 of the GDPR $\Box$
can in no way be interpreted as an obligation to provide documentation□
in accordance with the provisions of the GDPR which the defendant does not consider as $\!\Box$
necessary. □
A.5.6 There are no aggravating circumstances to the detriment of IAB Europe. □
91. Finally, IAB Europe disputes the conclusion of the Inspection Service that the refusal to□
the defendant to recognize that IAB Europe acts as data controller,□
as well as the large volume of personal data processed and organizations□
participants, can be considered as aggravating circumstances. □
92. The defendant refers to the absence of clear evidence in the investigation report that these□
circumstances are aggravating and concludes that□
the allegations are due to a□
insufficient knowledge of how the TCF works. Therefore, the defendant□
26 🗆
asks the Litigation Chamber not to take into account the opinion of the Service□
inspection. □
A.6 Summary of the plaintiffs' conclusions of February 18, 2021□
A.6.1 IAB Europe is the data controller for the TCF.□
has. Processing of personal data in the TCF□
93. Complainants argue that a unique identification number, such as the generated TC String□

and stored in a cookie, is personal data within the meaning of Article 4,□
paragraph 1, of the GDPR, a position which has also been expressly confirmed by the□
pre-GDPR case law.□
94. However, according to the Complainants, the TC String is more than just a unique identifier, because IAB□
Europe would also use it to collect information regarding applications□
that a data subject uses and the websites that he or she visits. It could also□
reveal sensitive data about data subjects within the meaning of Article 9 of the GDPR.□
95. Furthermore, the generation of the TC String constitutes in itself, without any doubt, a processing of □
personal data. The problem in question is the automated creation, for□
a CMP member of the TCF, a unique and linked set of characters intended to capture the□
preferences of a specific user regarding authorized exchanges of data with $\square$
advertisers. □
96. The sharing of the TC String with the CMPs is done, according to the complainants, in two ways:□
has. by storing the TC String in a global consent cookie shared on the□
Internet domain IAB Europe consensus.org; Where□
b. by storing the TC String in a storage system chosen by the CMP if it is□
a service-specific authorization. □
97. According to the complainants, in both cases, IAB Europe is the data controller of these□
processing operations. The intervention of IAB Europe is all the more drastic□
assuming the global shared consent cookie. Indeed, this cookie of□
shared global consent that stores□
the TC String points to□
the domain□
"consensu.org", operated by IAB Europe, from which CMPs can access and update□
update the shared TC String. □
b. IAB acts as data controller for processing operations within the□

ICF.
98. First of all, the Complainants submit that IAB Europe, in its "Frequently Asked Questions" □
questions" on the TCF, explicitly indicates that it is responsible for the TCF Policies.□
27□
99. According to the Complainants, it goes without saying that the organization which manages and operates the TCF is also□
the controller of this system, including any processing of data to □
personal character imposed and organized by the TCF. Indeed, IAB Europe imposes these□
personal data processing operations to other participants of□
binding manner.□
100. In addition, IAB Europe requires CMPs to implement the TCF in accordance with□
strictly its Technical specifications. In the Technical specifications of the TCF, IAB□
Europe explains in detail which personal data must be processed by□
the participants, for what purposes and by what means□
101.□
IAB Europe also requires CMPs, in the case of global consent, to store the□
character string in a global consent cookie shared on the domain□
"consensus.org". As this Internet domain is registered and managed by IAB Europe, the□
defendant also has access to the personal data processed in the TCF.□
102. Furthermore, according to the Complainants, IAB Europe determines the "essential means" for the □
processing of personal data within the TCF. On the one hand, IAB Europe□
specifies in detail the elements that must be included in the TC String. And, on the other hand, IAB□
Europe determines the categories of recipients of this personal data, □
since the defendant is responsible, according to its own terms, for the management of the □
Global Vendor List and the management of CMPs participating in the TCF.□
103. Complainants also submit that the TCF does not provide an effective mechanism for□
enforce certain elements of the TCF Policies 38, whereas a code of conduct is supposed to□

be an effective system for compelling its members to comply, as provided □
GDPR Article 41.□
A.6.2 The processing operations carried out in the TCF violate the GDPR at different□
levels□
has. Violation of the principles of purpose, proportionality and necessity□
104. According to the Complainants, IAB Europe collects the preferences of TCF users via the TC□
String for a vague, inaccessible and abusive purpose, while character data□
personal data processed are insufficient and irrelevant for this purpose.□
105. Furthermore, the processing itself would be anything but proportionate, which means that IAB□
Europe violates Articles 5(1)(b) and 5(1)(c) GDPR, as well as its duty□
liability as controller, provided for in Article 5, paragraph 2 of the□
GDPR. Furthermore, the plaintiffs consider that with the design of the TCF, IAB Europe does not□
does not provide the guarantees necessary to comply with the requirements of the GDPR and to protect□
38 See para. 133 et seq. of this decision. □
28□
the rights of data subjects; therefore, the defendant violates Article 25□
GDPR.□
The purpose of the processing of the TC String is neither specified nor explicitly defined □
for those affected, nor is it justified.□
106. According to the complainants, IAB Europe does not provide information to data subjects□
regarding the processing of their personal data in the TCF.□
107. The purpose of the TC String within the overall objective of the TCF is to capture the□
information provided to users and their processing preferences. In others□
terms, IAB Europe does process personal data (in particular the TC□
String) as part of the TCF because it claims it could make processing□
underlying GDPR-compliant marketing. According to the complainants, it is therefore this□

purpose which must be assessed with regard to its legality, and in the light of this purpose, it□
should assess the proportionality and necessity of the processing carried out by the TC $\!$
String as part of the TCF.□
The TC String is inadequate and irrelevant for the intended purpose□
108. Complainants further claim that the processing operations of the TC String within□
of the TCF are insufficient and irrelevant to ensure compliance with the GDPR when□
personal data is processed by the OpenRTB protocol.□
109. The OpenRTB protocol contains an inherent security issue that makes it impossible for□
a system such as the TCF to ensure, among other things, transparency and accountability $\!$
necessary with regard to personal data, including the categories□
special types of personal data, processed in a bid request after this□
this has been sent. □
110. The central idea of the TCF is that participants collect user preferences□
and pass them as the TC String, so that other participants take□
rate the content (i.e. read the TCF signal) and thus be able to respect the preferences□
users. However, according to the plaintiffs, there is nothing in the TCF, or in any $\!$
system or related mechanism, which effectively ensures that participants in the□
OpenRTB protocol are bound by the TCF signal. The TCF signal is therefore nothing more than a $\Box$
simple notification. □
111. Given the inherently unlawful nature of the processing of personal data□
personal in the OpenRTB protocol, on the one hand, and of the nature intrinsically□
imperfect of a purely signal-based system such as TCF without control□
effective, on the other hand, the use of the eTCF, including the processing of the TC String, cannot □
never give participants the assurance of being in compliance with the GDPR. Indeed, the $\!\square$
TCF makes no warranty that TCF participants will comply with their obligations□

liability (article 5.2 of the GDPR). Nor can it provide protection. □
adequate personal data shared by the OpenRTB protocol (article□
5.1fGDPR).□
IAB Europe has set up the TCF in such a way that data protection□
is not guaranteed from the design stage. □
112. Complainants argue that the design of the TCF, due to its character□
disproportionate, cannot guarantee the level of data protection required by Article 25□
GDPR, in particular with regard to the obligation to implement technical measures and □
appropriate organizational arrangements to ensure that, in principle, only the data to be $\!$
personal character which are necessary for each specific purpose of the processing are □
processed. □
113. The processing of personal data within the TCF, in particular the TC String, $\!\Box$
is therefore not necessary for the specific purpose because, according to the complainants, this purpose □
cannot and will not be achieved in any event.□
114. Further, the complainants argue that the TC String, as personal data □
independent that uniquely identifies users, is shared with many□
participants through various mechanisms, including IAB's own mechanism□
Europe of the global consent cookie shared on its domain□
Internet□
"consensus.org".□
b. Violation of the principles of fair, lawful and transparent treatment (Articles 5, 6, 12,□
13 and 14 GDPR).□
115. The complainants allege that the persons concerned are in no way informed□
because□
their personal data (including□
the TC String) are□

systematically and widely handled by IAB Europe within the TCF.□
116. According to the complainants, the processing of the personal data of the complainants and □
Other IAB Affected Persons in the TCF is ultimately:□
anything but legal since there is no legal basis;□
• neither appropriate nor transparent, since it takes place entirely "behind the back" of□
data subjects, without any form of notification.□
The processing carried out by IAB Europe has no legal basis and is therefore□
illegal.□
117.□
IAB Europe cannot rely on the consent of the persons concerned (article□
6.1.a GDPR), according to □
the complainants, because she did not□
never asked for or obtained such a□
consent. Similarly, TCF Policies, Technical specifications and TCF Terms□
30□
and Conditions nowhere mention a mechanism by□
which IAB Europe□
would ask data subjects for permission to generate a string□
unique identifier that would share their privacy preferences with□
a mass of recipients, even in cases where these people indicate in a CMP $\square$
that they do not wish to share their personal data with anyone□
that is.□
118. According to the complainants, IAB Europe also cannot invoke the necessity of the processing □
of the TC String within the TCF for the performance of a contract with Complainants and others
persons concerned (article 6.1.b), because there is no contract between the persons□

concerned and IAB Europe. □
119. Furthermore, the Complainants argue that the Respondent cannot invoke the □
necessity of the processing of the TC String within the TCF to serve its legitimate interests, or□
those of a third party (article 6.1.f GDPR). The required balance between interests would always be □
favor of the persons concerned. □
120. First of all, the processing of the TC String does not benefit the data subjects, because □
the TCF is not in a position to guarantee security, accountability or transparency. In□
Besides, there is no legitimate interest, because this interest is nowhere sufficiently clearly□
formulated and it is not possible to weigh it against the interests and rights□
fundamentals of the people concerned. □
121. Next, in balancing the interests, the controller must in principle□
take into account several factors: the effects of the processing on the data subject, the □
nature of the personal data processed, the way in which this personal data □
personal are processed, the reasonable expectations of the data subject and the status of the□
controller and data subject. □
122. According to the complainants, the consequences of the processing of the TC String are particularly
burdensome for those involved. IAB Europe processing operations□
would lead TCF participants to assume that they are correctly informing□
data subjects of the processing of personal data by the protocol□
OpenRTB, when such is not the case. This would then lead to the sharing and distribution □
illicit use of personal data, even sensitive ones, on a considerable scale via□
the OpenRTB protocol. □
123. The processing of the TC String by IAB Europe would result in the sharing of an online identifier □
single with an incalculable number of parts, following the example of what happens with the□
unique identifiers in advertising cookies from major advertising companies. He□
would therefore allow easy tracking of users on the web and on different devices□

("web and cross-device tracking"). Further, the plaintiffs argue that the TC String may□
be combined with data distributed via the OpenRTB protocol, because the TC String is□
embedded in a bid request.□
31□
124. Given the lack of information of the persons concerned on the operations of □
processing within the TCF and unrestricted sharing of the TC String with a group□
almost unlimited number of recipients, it is clear to the plaintiffs that these operations of □
processing exceed the reasonable expectations of data subjects. In□
Furthermore, those affected, such as complainants, do not expect the □
processing of personal data under the TCF entails the sharing of□
their personal data, sometimes sensitive, and their detailed profiles with□
many companies through the OpenRTB protocol, without any control□
real and effective about what these companies will do with personal data□
obtained. □
125. The plaintiffs in this case are individuals and interest groups□
representing the data protection interests of natural persons.□
They have no control over the processing of personal data within the framework□
of the TCF (which takes place regardless of whether consent is given or denied in a CMP).□
They also have no control over what happens to their personal data.□
shared by the OpenRTB protocol. According to the complainants, the persons concerned do not□
cannot verify whether OpenRTB participants are indeed following the rules of the□
TCF.□
IAB Europe processes personal data under the TCF of□
surreptitiously, without any form of notification, and the processing is not□
therefore neither appropriate nor transparent.□
126. Despite the extensive documentation that IAB Europe makes available to TCF participants □

on its website, it does not state anywhere that the TCF itself also involves the□
processing of personal data, according to □
the complainants. In addition,□
the□
documentation expressly disclaims, with respect to TCF participants, that the TCF□
itself involves the processing of personal data. □
127. The TCF implementation guidelines seem to suggest that there are □
assumptions in which participation in the TCF does not involve the processing of data□
of a personal nature. Ultimately, advertisers and DSPs, who are already participating in the□
TCF are informed that they must register as adtech providers if they deal □
personal data. According to the complainants, this implies that they would not have□
to do so if they were not processing personal data. However, this last situation□
is entirely impossible, according to the plaintiffs, because the TCF inherently requires the processing of □
personal data. □
128. According to the complainants, the statements contained in the IAB Europe guidelines are □
misleading for the hundreds of adtech vendors that use the TCF. Given $\square$
that IAB Europe does not inform TCF participants of the processing of personal data□
32□
staff that necessarily involves the implementation of a TCF, none of these□
participants is informed or does not realize that it has an obligation of transparency. Of this□
manner, data subjects - such as complainants - are not informed by any□
participant in the processing of personal data within the TCF.□
129.□
IAB Europe is also not respecting its own obligation of transparency. Neither on its own□
website or in other sources, the defendant does not communicate the information□
required by Articles 13 and 14 to data subjects, such as complainants. That□

would include the following information: that IAB Europe is the data controller
TCF data and contact details; the contact details of its protection officer□
Datas ; what are the purposes of its processing and the legal basis for the processing; $\!\!\!\!\Box$
what are the categories of personal data processed (in particular the TC $\!$
String); who receives the personal data (at least all TCF participants □
receive the TC String); that IAB Europe intends to transfer the personal data□
personnel to recipients in third countries; how long the data to □
personal character are retained; what are its legitimate interests for the processing;
what are the rights of data subjects; that the persons concerned can□
lodge a complaint with the data protection authority; that people $\!$
concerned can withdraw the consent they have given; and finally, what is the $\!$
source of personal data. □
130. At the same time, IAB Europe cannot invoke any of the exceptions provided for in□
Article 14.5 of the GDPR for not having to provide this information, since:□
has. □
the persons concerned are not yet in possession of the information, $\hfill\Box$
since the processing concerning them has so far been carried out in secret□
(Article 14.5.a GDPR);□
$b.\Box$
it is not impossible to bring this information to the attention of the people $\hfill\Box$
concerned and does not require a disproportionate effort, taking into account□
the influence that IAB Europe exerts on the functioning of the TCF (article 14.5.b□
GDPR);□
vs.□
the acquisition of this data is not prescribed by law (Article 14.5.c of the GDPR); $\hfill\Box$
and $\square$

personal data should not be kept confidential for□
reasons of professional secrecy (article 14.5.d GDPR).□
IAB Europe's reference to the Vectaury case in France is irrelevant. □
131. According to the Complainants, IAB Europe mistakenly believes that it can rely on the decision of □
the French supervisory authority CNIL in the Vectaury case. Indeed, IAB Europe affirms to□
wrong that it would be strange for the Inspection Service to find offenses relating to the treatment□
personal data in the TCF, while the CNIL would not, according to the□
33 🗆
defendant, raised no problem with regard to the legitimacy of these treatments. The $\!\!\!\!\!\!\square$
plaintiffs claim that IAB Europe makes assumptions and draws conclusions that do not□
absolutely cannot be inferred from the Vectaury case:□
$\bullet$ First of all, the Vectaury case concerned the specific implementation of a CMP $\!\!\!\square$
by Vectaury which would have made it possible to implement the TCF. The role of IAB Europe□
was not the subject of this procedure and the CNIL therefore did not rule, nor investigate, on □
IAB Europe's role in providing the TCF.□
$\bullet$ Second, this case specifically concerned the question of whether the $\!$
implementation of the TCF by Vectaury could put the underlying treatment of □
GDPR-compliant real-time bidding systems. The verdict of the □
CNIL was clearly negative, as evidenced by the fact that Vectaury itself□
indicates on its website that it has created a completely new method in dialogue with $\!\!\!\!\!\square$
the CNIL. According to the complainants, it is therefore misleading for IAB Europe to □
claim that the CNIL would have legitimized the TCF in itself as sufficient to allow□
GDPR compliance of real-time bidding systems.
• Third, the plaintiffs argue that the CNIL investigation did not relate to □
the legitimacy of the processing of personal data within the TCF. The □

CNIL did not consider the generation and distribution of the TC String as a□
autonomous treatment and therefore made no statement about it.□
132. According to the complainants, the decisions of the CNIL in the Vectaury case are therefore not□
relevant, as it was a clearly different case, directed against a different party,□
involving different treatments and under legislation which has since been superseded. The□
Litigation Chamber follows the point of view of the plaintiffs and does not discuss the case□
Vectaury, which concerns a different case from the present. □
vs. Violation of the principles of integrity and confidentiality (articles 5.1.f and 32 of the GDPR). □
133. According to the Complainants, IAB Europe violates the integrity and confidentiality obligations of the
GDPR as it facilitates the exchange of personal data in the TCF, in particular□
exchanging the TC String, with many parties, without checking if all recipients□
of this personal data comply with the rules of the GDPR.□
134.□
It is certain that the TC String is shared with thousands of companies. The TC String must□
therefore be protected by appropriate measures in accordance with Articles 5.1.f and 32□
GDPR. However, IAB Europe has not integrated an appropriate protection mechanism:□
As with any other processing in the OpenRTB protocol, there is no way to□
verify that recipients are indeed processing the TC String in accordance with the GDPR.□
Indeed, the plaintiffs claim that none of the mechanisms presented by IAB Europe is□
based on a real and proactive monitoring of compliance with the TCF.□
34□
135. Complainants contest IAB Europe's argument that it is not required to□
comply with the TCF, and in particular the agreements entered into under the TCF. Complainants□
claim that it is indeed his duty, as data controller,□
to implement the agreements concluded within the framework of the TCF and, at least in this way, to□
provide certain guarantees for the secure processing of the TC String.□

136. Second, the Complainants point to IAB Europe's assertions that, in□
As a management organization, it makes "substantial efforts" to enforce the□
agreements concluded within the framework of the TCF. According to the complainants, there is no evidence of these
so-called "substantial efforts". The plaintiffs further claim that IAB Europe should□
verify compliance with all agreements by each registered TCF participant, which,□
given the scale of the data processing, would involve a very large survey□
magnitude. Furthermore, the complainants refer to the answer given by IAB Europe itself□
to the Inspection Service: "The reporting obligation itself is not currently□
controlled. Also, it is difficult to control it as it would be difficult for IAB Europe□
to establish if and when a PPC has (or should have had) a "reasonable belief" that another□
party did not comply with the regulations"39.□
137. Third, the Complainants submit that IAB Europe is wrong to try to hide□
behind the contractual arrangements. According to the plaintiffs, the defendant claims that it□
sufficient that participants are contractually obligated to report any non-compliance□
at IAB Europe.□
138. The complainants also argue that IAB Europe, as data controller□
data from the TCF, is bound by articles 5.1.f and 32 of the GDPR, although it is practically□
cannot guarantee the security of the processed TC String when shared with thousands□
recipient companies. According to the plaintiffs, this last point would mean that IAB Europe□
actively checks that all recipients of the TC String still respect the□
GDPR obligations, so the processing of the received TC String would not be unlawful. □
139. Moreover, according to the complainants, practice proves that almost all TCF participants□
are illegally processing the TC String, because not a single CMP, not a single publisher, and not a single □
seller only provides information on the processing of the TC String, its purpose, its basis□
legal or the categories of recipients. This would imply, according to the complainants, that the□
transfer of the TC String to these parties is in itself a data breach□

personnel which, given its considerable size, gives rise to an obligation to□
notification to supervisory authorities. □
140. The practical impossibility of providing the guarantees necessary for the protection of personal data ☐
personal character (in particular the TC String) of the persons concerned, when they□
are shared with thousands of recipients within the OpenRTB protocol, demonstrates, $\!$
39 Letter from IAB Europe to the inspection service of February 10, 2020, p. 8.□
35□
according to the plaintiffs, that IAB Europe is in breach of its obligations under the□
articles 5.1.f and 32 of the GDPR.□
d. The systematic transfer of the TC String to third countries without adequate protection □
(violation of Article 44 of the GDPR). □
141. Complainants claim that IAB Europe set up the TCF in such a way that□
personal data - including the TC String, as it is embedded in requests□
offers - are structurally transferred as part of OpenRTB to many□
companies located outside the European Economic Area (EEA), without protection□
adequate is ensured for these transfers.□
142. The complainants refer to the Ad Exchange Xandr (based in the United States), which is affiliated with the □
TCF from IAB Europe and therefore receives at least the TC String from EEA users including□
the complainants. As responsible for the processing of personal data□
in the TCF, IAB Europe must provide a mechanism for transferring personal data□
personnel so that Ad Exchanges established outside the EEA can receive the TC□
String. □
143. Trading the TC String via real-time auction systems such as OpenRTB□
are structural in nature and repeat themselves continuously in fractions of seconds. In□
indeed, the TC String is sent with the requests for offers. It would therefore be impossible for□
IAB Europe, according to the plaintiffs, to invoke one of the exceptions provided for in Article 49 of the □

144. Appropriate guarantees would be the only way for IAB Europe to organize the □
transfers of personal data under the TCF. However, at the time□
Currently, IAB Europe does not provide any form of appropriate safeguards for the transfer of □
the TC String through real-time auction systems such as OpenRTB.□
145. In accordance with the Schrems II judgment, IAB Europe40 should have, in addition to choosing a form of
adequate safeguards, take additional measures to prevent the□
personal data are not processed in a non-compliant manner in countries□
third. However, these additional measures are just as insufficient as the □
appropriate safeguards. The TC String is blind shared with an indefinite number of □
participants in the OpenRTB protocol, wherever they are in the world. □
40 CJEU judgment of 16 July 2020, C-311/18, Facebook Ireland and Schrems, ECLI:EU:C:2020:559.□
36□
A.7 Summary of the defendant's rejoinder of March 25, 2021 □
A.7.1 Organizations that process personal data in the context of the□
RTB system are required to comply with the GDPR and the "Privacy and □
electronic communication".
146. The defendant first claims that any party participating in the RTB and using the□
OpenRTB protocol can intervene in the technical operations of storage and/or□
access on a user's device (e.g. placing website cookies) by□
under the "Privacy and Electronic Communications" Directive, and/or act as□
controller or processor of personal data (for example, □
for digital advertising purposes) under the GDPR. Where applicable, all such parties are □
responsible for complying with their obligations under the GDPR and the Privacy Directive□
and Electronic Communications" when engaging in the RTB.□
147. Furthermore, according to the defendant, there are thousands of companies engaged in the RTB and □


GDPR.□

using the OpenRTB protocol, which however do not participate in the TCF. Likewise, the □
parties may use the TCF for purposes other than the RTB. IAB Europe also highlights□
that publishers can use the TCF for a range of online advertising scenarios□
other than the OpenRTB protocol - including other types of RTB protocols, but also□
online advertising that does not involve RTB at all, such as direct inventory selling□
advertising.□
148. The Respondent also refutes the Plaintiffs' allegations that the RTB□
is inherently illegal by reference to the report of the UK supervisory authority□
(ICO) which simply stated that the RTB "requires organizations to assume the□
responsibility for their own data processing, and for the industry to reform□
collectively the RTB". The ICO would also have highlighted the efforts made in good faith□
by stakeholders such as IAB UK to contribute to this reform process in□
a more recent publication. □
149. In addition, the defendant indicates that several supervisory authorities have requested □
ways to increase□
transparency for□
the persons concerned in □
identifier□
clearly the data controllers with whom the personal data□
will be shared, specifying the purposes of the processing and allowing individuals $\!\!\!\!\!\square$
concerned to exercise control over their personal data. This is□
precisely this type of transparency measure that IAB Europe and the TCF intend□
sustain. □
41 Information Commissioner's Office - Adtech - real-time auction reform has begun and will continue, 17
January□
https://ico.org.uk/about-the-ico/news-and-events/blog-adtech-the-reform-of-real-time-bidding-has-

started/.□	
2020,□	
37□	
150. Under the TCF, data subjects have t	he possibility to give their consent□
prior to a certain number of identified third	d parties (adtech providers) and purposes of $\square$
treatment. According to IAB Europe, this	transparency and due diligence constitute a□
appropriate substitute, from a legal compl	iance point of view, for consent in time□
real, on-the-fly and one-by-one for data a	ccess, storage and processing by□
data controllers.□	
A.7.2 IAB Europe cannot be held respo	nsible for the alleged illegal practices of□
participants in the RTB, as the TCF is cor	npletely separate from the RTB.□
151. Respondent points out that the TCF	is only one of many optional approaches□
which data controllers may choose to help	o ensure compliance with□
transparency and consent requirements v	vhen processing personal data□
personal character for RTB or other adve	rtising purposes. Therefore,□
responsibility for compliance and effective	e decisions on objectives and means
of these personal data processing operati	ons is entirely the responsibility of□
to parties engaged in the RTB, not to IAB	Europe.
152. The defendant also states that IAB E	urope had contacts with several□
supervisory authorities after the deployment	ent of the first version of the TCF, as well as with□
several publishers. As a result of these di	scussions, the second version of the TCF was□
elaborate, in which several processing pu	rposes have been grouped under a single□
title in "stacks", and legitimate interest wa	s introduced as a possible legal basis. In□
Additionally, the TCF v2 introduces additionally	onal goals and "editor controls" that□
allow publishers to restrict access to a pa	rticular objective to a sub-□
set of adtech vendors.□	

153. Finally, the defendant specifies that IAB Europe always intended to have the □
TCF as a transnational code of conduct. □
154. In his conclusion□
initial, □
the defendant advances procedural arguments□
regarding the jurisdiction of the DPA and the manner in which the complaints and investigation were
processed. These defenses are set out below in Section A.9.□
155. In its summary submissions, the defendant also asserts that the manner in which□
the DPA conducted the procedure does not comply with Article 57 of the GDPR. However, the $\!\square$
complainants were unable to respond, the proceedings were reopened at the request□
of the Litigation Chamber.□
38□
AT 8 hearing and reopening of proceedings□
156. In accordance with article 51 of the rules of procedure of the Authority for the protection of □
given, a hearing was held, to which all parties were invited.□
The hearing took place on June 11, 2021.□
157. A written record of the hearing is drawn up in order to give the details and information □
additional information that was provided during the hearing, without repeating the elements□
set out in the conclusions. The parties also had the opportunity to submit their $\hfill\Box$
written comments on the file. A number of items mentioned below□
are relevant to this decision. □
158. During the hearing, the Inspection Service first confirms its position according to □
which IAB Europe acts as data controller□
staff under the Transparency and Consent Framework, but not for□
OpenRTB.□
159. The Inspection Service also specifies that personal data are □

collected as provided for in the TCF Policies, in the general conditions42 and in the□
privacy policy, as well as in the context of the TC String values stored in□
a euconsent-v2 cookie, the latter as an expression of the preferences of a□
user should also be considered as personal data.□
The Inspection Service also points out that the TC String as such does not contain□
any information relating directly or indirectly to the taxonomy of the website□
to which the TC String refers. This last aspect concerns an essential distinction□
between user preferences that are collected in the context of the TCF, and $\Box$
personal data of this same user which is collected and distributed to the□
within the OpenRTB protocol. In conclusion, the Inspection Service declares that the values□
TC String and the euconsent-v2 cookie do not in themselves identify a user□
individual. Although both elements contain personal data,□
in the sense that the information relates to a natural person, the Inspection Service□
also confirms that it is not possible to identify the specific data subject□
based on this information alone.□
160. During the hearing, counsel for the defendant raised a point of procedure, namely□
that the Litigation Chamber is not authorized to rule on the elements□
presented by the complainants before an analysis was carried out on the consistency of□
their conclusions with all the complaints. The defendant also asks the□
Litigation Chamber to rule on the need to request an investigation □
complementary to the Inspection Service, as required by Article 57.1.f GDPR. The□
42 IAB Europe Transparency and Consent Framework Terms and Conditions ("Terms and Conditions") (Exhibit 33),
p.7.□
39□
Litigation Chamber will rule on this point of procedure in this□
decision43. □



euconsent-v2. Complainants also point out that DNS delegation can be □
considered an essential means of processing, since DNS delegation is□
used to distribute the TC String further in the TCF ecosystem. □
166. Regarding the existence of interfaces between the TCF and OpenRTB, the Complainants point out□
that the two systems are intrinsically intertwined due to the link between, on the one hand, $\Box$
the TC String that the CMPs generate according to the instructions of the TCF and, on the other hand, the□
43 See para. 174 et seq. of this decision. □
44 According to the defendant, the number of global consent cookies was a maximum of 0.5% of all □
consents and preferences collected around the world.□
45 Article 4.11 GDPR: "consent" of the person concerned, any expression of will, free, specific, informed □
and unequivocal by which the person concerned accepts, by a declaration or by a clear positive act, that data to be□
personal character concerning him are the subject of processing;□
40□
RFPs, which are regulated by OpenRTB. In other words, these are □
used as vehicles to spread the TC String across the OpenRTB ecosystem. □
167. Respondent asserts that the two systems can operate independently and □
that the TCF was developed with OpenRTB as a starting point and could be used□
in this context, with OpenRTB being the most widely used standard in the industry. According□
the defendant, this does not mean that the TCF is an essential means of using□
the OpenRTB.□
168. Respondent claims that Respondent's development of a future code of conduct□
in relation to the TCF cannot be considered as proof of its responsibility□
(shared) regarding the processing of personal data in the context of the □
TCF. The complainants add that it is impossible to verify compliance with the GDPR by the□
participating organisations, even if the rules are clearly defined in a policy□
of application. □

109. In this respect, the defendant refers to the elaboration and progressive implementation
automated compliance programs to monitor the extent to which CMPs and □
advertisers (as well as other adtech providers) comply with the TCF Policies, including □
including future internal audits of the above parties' processes. The defendant $\!\!\!\!\!\square$
also points out that the TCF already provides for sanction measures against□
adtech providers who do not adhere to the framework, such as the temporary suspension of their
participating in the TCF.□
170. As regards the link between the TC String and the individual user, the defendant considers□
that the TCF does not determine how this is done, nor how the TC String is then□
communicated to adtech suppliers, these elements being entirely subject to the□
OpenRTB protocol. □
171. The defendant specifies that □
use of the consensus.org domain is purely□
optional, and further that this domain has not been developed for the purpose of addressing or□
store logs related to TC Strings.□
172. Finally, the defendant emphasizes its position that the TC String does not constitute a□
personal data only after having been linked within the framework of the OpenRTB to a bid $\!\square$
request which already contains personal data.□
173. On August 9, 2021, after deliberation, the Litigation Chamber decided to reopen the proceedings□
on the specific procedural arguments of IAB Europe.□
174. On August 23, 2021, the Litigation Chamber received the first conclusions of the □
defendant. The defendant asserts that the Belgian supervisory authority (DPA) violated □
GDPR Article 57.1.a and 57.1.f and LCA Article 94(3). ODA would also not have □
respected the principle of good administration and the defendant's rights of defence.
41□
175. With regard to Article 57.1.f GDPR, the defendant first argues that the □

plaintiffs presented new allegations in their pleadings, which are therefore more □
extensive than the initial complaints. Moreover, according to the defendant, the DPA did not investigate $\Box$
proactively on these new allegations by instructing the Inspection Service to □
new or additional investigation. Consequently, the defendant considers that□
the DPA has breached its obligations under Article 57.1.f GDPR.□
176. Furthermore, defendant submits that, by requesting an initial investigation from the Service□
of inspection, the Litigation Chamber is bound de facto to a procedure in which□
each allegation or defense must be examined by the Inspection Service. According to □
defendant, the decision of the Litigation Division not to request additional□
of investigation after an initial investigation and the presentation of the means of defense $led\Box$
to a violation of Article 94(3) of the ACL. □
177. The defendant also indicates that in the absence of an investigation by the Inspection Service□
on supposed new allegations in the defenses of the plaintiffs and $a\square$
legal qualification of these allegations, it was unable to defend itself against□
adequately against complaints filed against IAB Europe. Thus, the procedure□
before the Litigation Chamber could be considered as having evolved from a□
procedure
inquisitorial to an adversarial procedure in□
which□
bedroom□
Contentious would no longer have acted as an administrative dispute resolution body,□
mainly taking into account the claims and documents of the plaintiffs, $\!$
so that the rights of defense of IAB Europe would have been violated, according to the defendant.□
178. On September 6, 2021, the Litigation Chamber received the complainants' submissions. The □
plaintiffs consider, first of all, that the defendant's new pleas exceeded $\hfill\Box$
the limited framework of reopened debates.

179. Second, the Complainants claim that the nature of the proceedings has not changed in any way,□
since the procedure was initiated due to complaints lodged with the DPA, in□
other words, as an adversarial procedure, and that it remained so throughout□
the procedure.□
180. Third, the Complainants refer to Articles 63(2) and 94 of the LCA, $\Box$
as a counter-argument to the assertion that the Litigation Chamber should have□
have the Inspection Service examine each of the grounds raised by the complainants.□
Indeed, these provisions confer on the Litigation Chamber a discretionary power□
to decide whether an (additional) investigation by the Inspection Service is necessary or□
nope.□
181. In addition, the complainants argue that it is impossible for the Litigation Chamber to□
have an investigation or an additional investigation carried out by the Inspection Service□
after the conclusions and documents of the parties, taking into account the limited deadlines of 30 days after□
<b>42</b> □
42□ that the Litigation Chamber was seized by the Frontline Service after the filing of□
that the Litigation Chamber was seized by the Frontline Service after the filing of□
that the Litigation Chamber was seized by the Frontline Service after the filing of □ the complaint, or by the Inspection Service after receipt of the initial investigation report. □
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the Litigation Division to request an investigation by the Service□
of Inspection on the complaints, but with the capacity of the authorities of control to close the business.□
184. In addition, the Complainants claim that the decision of the Litigation Chamber to request□
an investigation by the Inspection Service in no way prevents it from relying on the□
conclusions and exhibits submitted by the parties, contrary to the position of the □
defendant. □
185. With respect to the defendant's alleged breach of the principle of diligence,□
the plaintiffs maintain that the Litigation Chamber is required, by virtue of this principle,□
to properly study all the documents in the file so that its decision is based on a $\!\Box$
correct and complete presentation of the facts. However, this principle in no way implies□
that the Litigation Division should have a (complementary) investigation carried out by the□
Inspection service for each exhibit.□
186. With regard to the defendant's rights of defence, the plaintiffs submit□
that, on the basis of the various investigation reports of the Inspection Service and the memoranda□
and exhibits presented by the plaintiffs, the defendant was sufficiently informed of the□
facts and alleged violations of law. Moreover, according to the plaintiffs, the defendant had□
sufficient opportunity to defend themselves in writing against the legal claims and□
facts made by the plaintiffs, given that the defendant can submit two□
conclusion games. □
187. Finally, the complainants refer to the absence of concrete examples, in recent□
conclusions of the defendant, alleged new allegations on which the□
defendant was unable to conclude or which were not investigated□
by the Inspection Service.□
188. On September 13, 2021, the Litigation Chamber received the respondent's response. □
189. According to the defendant, only the inspection report determines the extent of the allegations,□
provided that the inspection report is meaningful and based on a full review of the□

facts. In addition, the defendant argues that the decision of the Litigation Chamber of □
requesting an investigation from the Inspection Service had the effect of transforming the whole□
of the procedure into an "inquisitorial" procedure, regardless of whether the procedure□
finds its origin in the complaints lodged with the DPA. According to the defendant, the□
decision of the Litigation Chamber not to subsequently request additional□
of investigation and to base the rest of the procedure solely on the conclusions and documents $\Box$
of the parties constitutes a violation of his rights of defence.□
190. Furthermore, the defendant is of the opinion that the thirty-day period provided for in Article 96, paragraph 1,□
of the LCA does not apply to the request of the Litigation Chamber to proceed with□
further investigation by the Inspection Service. □
191. The defendant bases this reasoning on the distinction made in administrative law□
general between expiry periods and order periods. In particular, the defendant□
considers that, in the absence of formal provisions in the LCA according to which the □
exceeding the 30-day period entails a loss of jurisdiction of the Chamber□
Litigation, the deadlines provided for in Article 96 must be respected, but not□
nullity of the decision rendered too late. According to the defendant, the Litigation Chamber□
therefore remains competent to take an additional investigation decision even□
after the expiry of the 30-day order period. This interpretation, according to the defendant, □
is in fact the result of the greater importance of the right to defense compared to the right□
to a rapid procedure before the Litigation Chamber.□
192. As regards the direct effect of Article 57.1.f GDPR, the defendant asserts that□
the existence of a margin of discretion for the Member States does not exclude the direct effect□
of a provision, but involves examining whether this provision is intended to offer a guarantee to □
parts. The defendant considers that Article 57.1. f GDPR meets this requirement and □
clarifies that its argument for requesting further investigation is further limited to □

an assessment in fact and in law of the supporting elements of the procedure.
193. In conclusion, the Respondent states that it did not receive a clear statement of the nature and □
the scope of the charges, with the exception of the allegations made in the factums in $\Box$
defense of plaintiffs. In this regard, the defendant asserts that the control reports□
technical only contain technical descriptions, in which, in addition, the TC□
String is not mentioned anywhere. In section A.9 Procedural objections□
raised by the defendant, the Litigation Chamber indicates the reasons why□
procedural safeguards, including regarding the nature and scope of the charges, have□
peen respected.□
44□
A.9 Procedural objections raised by the defendant□
A.9.1 Breaches of the rules of procedure applicable to the inspection report and to the rights□
and fundamental freedoms of IAB Europe□
nas. Inadmissibility of complaints□
194. The defendant first argues that some of the complaints were filed in□
English and therefore do not meet the formal conditions of admissibility laid down□
n Article 60 of the LCA.□
195. Furthermore, the defendant considers that some of the persons who lodged complaints $\square$
cannot be considered either as "complainants" nor as "parties" within the meaning□
of Articles 93, 95, 98 and 99 ODA, so that their conclusions must be excluded from the□
debates and cannot be taken into account.□
196. Finally, the defendant asserts that the measures which the DPA may impose under Article□
100 of the ACL provide no benefit to these plaintiffs.□
197.□
AB Europe therefore considers that the case was unlawfully brought - in particular on the basis□
of several inadmissible complaints - so that the grievances formulated against him must□

be rejected and cannot lead to the imposition of a sanction or measure□
corrective valid at IAB Europe.□
Position of the Litigation Chamber□
198. The Litigation Chamber refers to Article 77.1 of the GDPR, according to which persons □
concerned have the right to lodge a complaint in the Member State where they reside□
usually have their place of work or in which the alleged offense was committed. □
The four complaints in English mentioned by the defendant were not filed □
directly with the DPA, but with the supervisory authorities competent to □
each of the complainants, in accordance with the locally applicable language legislation. In□
casu, the four complaints were lodged respectively with the supervisory authority□
Polish SA, the Slovenian SA, the Italian SA as well as the Spanish SA, which then□
forwarded these complaints to □
the Belgian DPA as lead supervisory authority,□
in accordance with the cooperation procedure provided for in Article 56 of the GDPR.□
199. The formal conditions of admissibility provided for in Article 58 of the LCA, and more □
particularly the obligation to write the complaint in one of the national languages, $\!$
apply only to complaints lodged directly with the DPA. Any other point of view□
would undermine the proper functioning of the right to lodge a complaint, one of the fundamental elements
of the GDPR. Indeed, one cannot expect a complainant who submits his complaint to an authority□
of a Member State that it submits it in the language of the Member State of the principal authority,□
if this is different from the authority to which he submits his complaint. It follows that the four□
complaints in question have been validly lodged with the DPA.□
45□
200. With regard to the lack of interest of Fundacja Panoptykon, as well as other□
complainants, for complaints lodged through the European "one-stop shop" mechanism□
unique", raised by the defendant, the Litigation Chamber notes that Fundacja□


Panoptykon filed the complaint with the Polish Supervisory Authority on behalf of Ms. □
Katarzyna Szymielewicz, in accordance with Article 80.1 GDPR. Based on this□
provision, the complainant has the right to instruct Fundacja Panoptykon to file the complaint□
in his name. □
201. The Litigation Chamber notes that IAB Europe absolutely does not explain why□
Fundacja Panoptykon should not be considered a plaintiff and a party□
in this procedure. Moreover, in the absence of doubts about the admissibility of the other□
complaints, the defendant's argument would make no difference as to the outcome of this□
decision. □
202. This argument must therefore be rejected. □
b. The inspection report is not properly reasoned $\hfill\Box$
203. The defendant then attacks the insufficient reasoning of the inspection report. In□
due to the absence of a clearly formulated reason in the inspection report -□
in particular the absence of a clearly identified data controller in□
relationship to a clearly defined data processing activity - the defendant□
argues that the inspection report not only violates APD's obligation to give reasons□
expressly and sufficiently its decisions, but also constitutes a violation□
manifesto of the rights of defense of IAB Europe. Therefore, the inspection report□
infringes the rights of defense of IAB Europe as set out in Article 6 of □
ECHR and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. □
Position of the Litigation Chamber□
204. IAB Europe's assertion that the Inspection Service report of 13 July□
2020 is not motivated enough is incorrect. As also shown in the reflection□
of that inspection report in this decision, the inspection report contains $\textbf{a} \square$
detailed reasoning.□
205. Furthermore, IAB Europe ignores the fact that, in addition to the report of July 13, 2020, the Service□

inspection produced other very complete and detailed technical reports (exhibits 24 and □
53). Finally, the Litigation Chamber underlines the many written exchanges of views and □
between the parties before her. IAB Europe's mere assertion of non-compliance with□
its rights of defense is therefore unfounded, as set out in the□
following paragraphs.□
46□
vs. Incompleteness and partiality of the inspection report□
206. The defendant refers to Article 58.4 GDPR, which provides that the procedure before the DPA
must be carried out in compliance with "appropriate safeguards, including […] respect for the □
legality". According to the defendant, this principle applies both to the investigation carried out by the □
Inspection service only to the findings in the inspection report. □
207. Referring to the similarities with the role and duties of a prosecutor in a procedure□
ordinary criminal law, the defendant asserts that the fundamental principles of loyalty, $\!$
impartiality and independence also apply to the Inspection Service. The□
defendant refers to section IV of its pleadings and considers that elements to be□
relevant discharge, of which the Inspection Service had or should have had knowledge, are□
missing from the inspection report. □
208. The defendant, emphasizing that the DPA is required to maintain the presumption of innocence□
of a defendant at any time, including during the investigation phase of a proceeding□
which may lead to criminal sanctions within the meaning of Article 6 of the ECHR, considers□
that his presumption of innocence has been violated and that the claims against IAB Europe□
must therefore be rejected.□
Position of the Litigation Chamber□
With regard to the autonomy of the Litigation Chamber in relation to the□
other DPA bodies, including the Inspection Service□
209. The Litigation Chamber notes first of all that the defendant seems to confuse the□


role and prerogatives of the Litigation Chamber with those of the other DPA bodies. □
210. As indicated above, the Litigation Chamber is the administrative body for resolution□
DPA disputes, in accordance with Article 33(1) of the LCA. The provisions governing the□
proceedings before the Litigation Chamber (see Articles 92 to 100 of the LCA)□
not show that it is bound in any way by the conclusions of another□
ODA body. Consequently, the Litigation Chamber is not bound by the□
conclusions of the Inspection Service.□
211.□
It is also recalled that the Inspection Service presented not one but several □
detailed and technical reports clearly exposing the deficiencies attributable to the □
defendant and supporting its position with the help of legislative, jurisprudential and $\Box$
factual, as the Complainants point out. The defendant had access to these reports.□
Moreover, the defendant replied in detail to the reports of the Inspection Service.□
212. Respondent further submits that the Inspection Service's report of July 13, 2020□
would not be exonerating, but simply incriminating, because this report would not contain□
"certain exculpatory material" from IAB Europe. The defendant also refers, without□
further clarification, in section IV of its pleadings, in which it sets out its arguments□
47□
on the background. In the absence of more detailed information on the exculpatory evidence which□
been omitted from the aforementioned report of the Inspection Service, this complaint must be dismissed. □
213. The Litigation Chamber notes that even if we were to follow the argument of the□
respondent, quod non, one could nevertheless conclude, as the Court has already indicated□
des Marchés, that the procedure before the Litigation Chamber was not illegal in the□
to the extent that both parties have had the opportunity to present their arguments in their□
conclusions46. Given the complexity of the system, the Litigation Chamber did not□
was able to specify every technical aspect of the system against which□

charges were brought against the defendant at the start of the proceedings□
before the Litigation Chamber, on October 13, 2020, that is to say when the parties□
were invited to submit their conclusions (art. 98 LCA). However, in order to guarantee the□
procedural rights of the parties, the Litigation Chamber ensured, on the one hand, that the□
defendant has sufficient opportunities to present its arguments before it and,□
on the other hand, that it remains within the framework of the initial complaints and reports of the Service
inspection, communicated to both parties before their written conclusions.□
Regarding the legal framework for investigations by the Inspection Service□
214.□
It should also be remembered that the Inspection Service can carry out any investigation,□
conduct any hearing and collect any information it deems useful in the context of its□
missions in order to ensure compliance with the fundamental principles of the protection of□
personal data47.□
215. The Litigation Division also recalls that the intervention of the Inspection Service□
in the procedure is to record findings and that he does not have the power□
to impose penalties.□
216. Contrary to what the defendant maintains, the Inspection Service is not a□
administrative authority under criminal law within the meaning of Article 6 of the European Convention on
Human Rights (hereinafter: "ECHR"), because it has no power to sanction and its task is□
limited to making findings and transmitting them to the Litigation Chamber within□
his report. As indicated above48, the findings of the Inspection Service are not□
only elements on which the Litigation Chamber bases its decision at a certain stage□
later in the procedure. Nevertheless, the Litigation Chamber stresses that the investigation of the□
Inspection service in this case was conducted impartially,□
in accordance with the requirements of Article 6 of the ECHR and Article 47 of the Charter. She□
46 Market Court, 2019/AR/741, June 12, 2019, p. 12, available on the APD website. □

47 See Art. 64 of the APD law: "The Inspector General and the inspectors exercise the powers referred to in this□
chapter with a view to the control as provided for in Article 4, § 1, of this law. » See also art. 72(1) of the DPA law: "Without□
prejudice to the provisions of this chapter, the Inspector General and the inspectors may carry out any investigation,□
any control and any hearing, as well as collecting any information they deem useful in order to ensure that the principles□
fundamentals of the protection of personal data, within the framework of this law and the laws containing $\Box$
provisions relating to the protection of the processing of personal data, are effectively complied with. »□
(emphasis added).□
48 See para. 209-210 of this decision.□
<b>48</b> □
opposes the defendant's suggestions insofar as they call into question□
the impartiality of the Inspection Service.□
Regarding respect for the right to a fair trial, including the right to□
defense before the Litigation Chamber□
217. The Litigation Division shares the defendant's opinion on the importance of applying the□
procedural guarantees relating to the respect of legality in the disputes referred to it.□
It is also established that these principles are actually applied before the Chamber.□
Litigation. □
218. As explained above49, the defendant's complaint concerning the alleged□
lack of motivation and impartiality of the report of the Inspection Service, on which the□
defendant relies on finding a violation of its right to a fair trial, must□
be rejected.□
219. For the sake of completeness, the Litigation Division also recalls that the Court of □
Marchés has already ruled that — in the event that the procedural safeguards in the phase□
prior to the proceedings were not assured, quod non — the parties have a□
adequate recourse against the decisions of the administrative bodies, in particular by the□
possibility of an appeal before the Court of Markets50.□



guarantee of Article 6.1 of the ECHR and, more particularly, the remedy provided for in Article 47 of □
CDFUE [Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union]".52□
223. Therefore, in the absence of impartiality on the part of the Litigation Division, quod non en□
case, and insofar as the Court of Markets exercises judicial control□
completeness of the decisions of the Litigation Chamber, it could not be concluded, ipso facto, to□
a violation of the right to a fair trial in the proceedings.□
224. For the sake of clarity and information, the Litigation Division notes that if the rights□
of defense are part of the fundamental rights which constitute the legal order of□
the Union and are enshrined in the Charter53, the fact remains that, as judged by the□
CJEU, the different components of the right to a fair trial, including the rights of the □
defence, are not absolute and that any restriction may be possible for a□
grounds of general interest. This assessment must be made in concrete terms:□
"However, the Court has already considered that fundamental rights, such as respect for□
rights of defence, do not appear as absolute prerogatives, but can□
include restrictions, provided that these effectively meet objectives□
of general interest pursued by the measure in question and do not constitute, with regard to the aim□
continued, a disproportionate and intolerable intervention which would harm the substance□
even of the rights thus guaranteed () []. □
34. Furthermore, the question of whether the rights of the defense have been violated must be assessed□
in the light of the specific circumstances of each case []"54.□
A.9.2 Violations of the fundamental rights and freedoms of IAB Europe with regard to the □
general nature of the DPA procedure□
has. Administrative sanctions and Articles 6 and 7 of the ECHR and Article 47 of the Bill of Rights□
fundamentals of the European Union□
225. The Respondent argues that the measures and fines that DPA is authorized to□
tax under sections 100 and 101 of the LCA, read in conjunction with section 83□



Position of the Litigation Chamber□
228. First of all, the power to impose an administrative fine and the terms of its□
application are provided for by Article 83 of the GDPR, with direct effect. In accordance with the□
case law of the Court of Markets, the Litigation Chamber considers that the □
administrative fines, as well as the other corrective measures provided for in Article $58\square$
GDPR, constitute a powerful part of the enforcement tools available to the APD55.□
229. If the DPA notices one or more infringements of the rules, it must determine the □
most appropriate corrective action to address this violation. Measures□
available for this purpose are listed in Article 58.2.b to 58.2.j of the GDPR. Especially, $\!\Box$
Article 58.2.i GDPR provides that the supervisory authority has the power, depending on the circumstances
in each case, to impose, in addition to or instead of the measures referred to in this paragraph, a $\Box$
administrative fine in accordance with Article 83 GDPR. This means a fine□
administrative can be both a stand-alone (corrective) action and an action taken□
together with other corrective measures (and therefore constitutes a kind of measure □
additoinal). The criminal provisions of Articles 83.4 to 83.6 of the GDPR allow□
the imposition of an administrative fine for most offences. However, $\hfill\Box$
the supervisory authority is responsible for always choosing the most appropriate measure or measures $\square$
appropriate56. □
55 Brussels Court of Appeal, market court section, 2021/AR/320, 7 July 2021, p. 38. □
56 Ibid.□
51□
230. In addition to the relevant provisions of the GDPR and the LCA on the level of fines□
administrative measures that the Litigation Chamber may impose, the Litigation Chamber□
is also based on the case law of the Court of Markets57, which formulates□
requirements on the foreseeability and motivation of the administrative fines imposed by the □
Litigation Chamber. This case law has, for example, led to a form□

notification of the intention to impose a sanction is submitted to the party concerned, who may $\!$
react and send their comments to the Litigation Chamber before it takes a□
decision. Accordingly, in these proceedings, this form has been sent and the□
defendant submitted a reaction58.□
231. The Litigation Division also refers to the case law of the Court of Markets,□
which found that the GDPR does not provide for a specific fine range for□
specific offences, but only an upper limit or maximum amount. In□
practice, this means that the DPA can decide not only not to impose a fine□
to the offender, but also that, if it decides to impose a fine, it will be $\!$
between the minimum, from 1 EUR, and the maximum provided. The fine is $decided \square$
by the DPA taking into account the criteria listed in Article 83(2) of the GDPR.59. □
232. In addition, the Litigation Chamber also follows the guidelines of the Group of □
work Article 29 on data protection concerning the application and fixing of□
administrative fines under the GDPR, approved by the EDPB60, which detail the□
criteria of Article 83(2) GDPR that a supervisory authority must apply when assessing □
whether to impose a fine and the amount of the fine. $\!\Box$
233. In addition, these guidelines also contain an explanation of Article 58 of the □
GDPR relating to the measures that a supervisory authority may choose to take, being $\!\!\!\!\square$
given that the remedies are by nature different and essentially have different purposes $\!$
different. Finally, it specifies that certain measures under Article 58 GDPR may be □
cumulative and thus constitute a regulatory action based on several remedies. $\!$
234. The Court of Markets, ruling in full jurisdiction, carries out a review of the legality and
proportionality of the sanction and will reduce or cancel (only) the fine in case of □
serious and proven circumstances that the Litigation Division would not or would not take□
enough into account.□
235. In summary, this system sufficiently guarantees compliance with the legal principles □

fundamentals stemming from Article 6 of the ECHR and Article 47 of the Charter. □
57 Among others, the judgments of February 19, 2020 (2019/AR/1600), January 24, 2021 (2020/AR/1333) and July 7, 2021 □
(2021/AR/320).□
58 See para. 272-273.□
59 Brussels Court of Appeal, Market Court section, 2021/AR/320, 7 July 2021, p. 38.□
60 EDPB - Guidelines on the application and setting of administrative fines for the purposes of Regulation (EU)□
2016/679, WP253, published at http://www.edpb.europa.eu.□
52□
Legal framework for administrative fines □
Relevant provisions of the ACL□
236. Under Article 100(1)(13) of the LCA, the Litigation Chamber has the power to impose □
administrative fines. The Litigation Chamber may decide to impose a□
administrative fine to the parties prosecuted according to the general procedures provided for in□
Article 83 GDPR.□
237. Pursuant to section 103 of the ACL, if an offender has committed more than one offense□
by the same act, only the heaviest administrative fine of the offenses concerned□
applies. In the event of overlapping offences, the rates of the administrative fines□
add up without the total amount being able to exceed twice the highest amount□
amount of the fine applicable to the offenses committed.□
Relevant provisions of the GDPR□
238. Once an infringement of the Regulation has been established, on the basis of the assessment of the facts□
of the case, the competent supervisory authority should determine the corrective measures —
most appropriate to remedy the breach. The provisions of Article 58(2)(b)-(j)61□
define the tools that supervisory authorities can use to remedy the non-compliance□
compliance with the rules by a controller or processor. □
has. notify a data controller or processor of the fact that the operations□

envisaged treatment are likely to violate the provisions of this□
regulation;□
b. call a controller or processor to order when the□
processing operations have resulted in a breach of the provisions of this□
regulation;□
vs. order the controller or processor to comply with the□
requests made by the data subject to exercise their rights in□
application of this regulation;□
d. order the controller or processor to put the□
processing operations in accordance with□
the provisions of this□
settlement, where applicable, in a specific manner and within a specified period; $\!\Box$
e. order the controller to communicate to the data subject□
a personal data breach;□
<b>f</b> .□
impose a temporary or permanent limitation, including a ban, on the□
treatment ;□
61 Article 58(2)(a) provides that a warning may be issued. In other words, in the event that the□
provision relates, a remedial sanction shall not be imposed.□
53□
g. order the rectification or erasure of personal data or the□
restriction of processing pursuant to Articles 16, 17 and 18 GDPR and the□
notification of these measures to the recipients to whom the personal data□
personnel have been disclosed pursuant to Article 17(2) and □
Article 19 GDPR;□
h. revoke a certification or order the certification body to revoke□

a certification issued pursuant to Articles 42 and 43 GDPR, or order□
the certification body not to issue certification if the requirements□
applicable to the certification are not or no longer satisfied;□
i.□
depending on the specific characteristics of each case, impose a fine □
administrative pursuant to Article 83 GDPR, in addition to or instead of the □
measures referred to in this paragraph; and □
d. order the suspension of data flows addressed to a recipient located in $\!\!\!\!\!\square$
a third country or an international organisation. □
239. The power to impose an administrative fine is governed by Article 83 of the GDPR, which
has:□
General conditions for imposing administrative fines □
1. Each supervisory authority shall ensure that administrative fines imposed pursuant to □
of this article for breaches of this Regulation referred to in paragraphs 4, 5 and $6\square$
are, in each case, effective, proportionate and dissuasive. □
2. Depending on the specific characteristics of each case, the administrative fines are □
imposed in addition to or instead of the measures referred to in point (2) of Article $58\square$
a) to h), and j). To decide whether to impose an administrative fine and to decide on the $\!\!\!\!\!\square$
amount of the administrative fine, due account shall be taken, in each case, of $\!\!\!\!\square$
of the following elements:□
has)□
the nature, gravity and duration of the breach, taking into account the nature, scope or□
the purpose of the processing concerned, as well as the number of data subjects $\!$
affected and the level of damage they suffered;□
has)□
<b>b</b> )□

vs)□
d)□
e)□
f)□
g) 🗆
h)□
whether the breach was committed willfully or negligently;□
any action taken by the controller or processor to mitigate the□
damage suffered by the persons concerned;□
the degree of responsibility of the controller or processor, account□
given the technical and organizational measures they have implemented pursuant to□
sections 25 and 32;□
any relevant breach previously committed by the controller or $\!$
the subcontractor ;□
the degree of cooperation established with the supervisory authority with a view to remedying the $\!\!\!\!\!\square$
violation and to mitigate any adverse effects;□
the categories of personal data affected by the breach;□
the manner in which the supervisory authority became aware of the breach, in particular whether, $\!$
the manner in which the supervisory authority became aware of the breach, in particular whether, $\Box$ and the extent to which the controller or processor notified the $\Box$
and the extent to which the controller or processor notified the □
and the extent to which the controller or processor notified the $\Box$ breach ; $\Box$
and the extent to which the controller or processor notified the □ breach ;□ where measures referred to in Article 58(2) have previously been □
and the extent to which the controller or processor notified the □ breach;□ where measures referred to in Article 58(2) have previously been □ ordered against the controller or processor concerned □
and the extent to which the controller or processor notified the □ breach;□ where measures referred to in Article 58(2) have previously been □ ordered against the controller or processor concerned □ for the same purpose, compliance with these measures;□

the application of codes of conduct approved pursuant to Article 40 or □
certification mechanisms approved under Article 42; and □
any other aggravating or mitigating circumstance applicable to the circumstances of $\!\!\!\!\square$
the species, such as the financial advantages obtained or the losses avoided, directly $\!$
or indirectly, as a result of the breach. □
3. If a controller or processor willfully or negligently violates□
several provisions of these rules, within the framework of the same operation of $\!\!\!\!\!\square$
processing or related processing operations, the total amount of the administrative fine□
cannot exceed the amount set for the most serious violation. □
4. Violations of the following provisions are subject, in accordance with paragraph $2,\Box$
administrative fines of up to EUR 10,000,000 or, in the case of $\!\Box$
company, up to 2% of the total worldwide annual turnover of the preceding financial year, the□
the highest amount being retained: □
b)□
b)□
b)□ the obligations incumbent on the controller and the processor under□
b)□ the obligations incumbent on the controller and the processor under□ articles 8, 11, 25 to 39, 42 and 43;□
b)□ the obligations incumbent on the controller and the processor under□ articles 8, 11, 25 to 39, 42 and 43;□ the obligations of the certification body under Articles 42 and 43;□
b)□  the obligations incumbent on the controller and the processor under□  articles 8, 11, 25 to 39, 42 and 43;□  the obligations of the certification body under Articles 42 and 43;□  the obligations incumbent on the body responsible for monitoring codes of conduct under□
the obligations incumbent on the controller and the processor under articles 8, 11, 25 to 39, 42 and 43; the obligations of the certification body under Articles 42 and 43; the obligations incumbent on the body responsible for monitoring codes of conduct under of Article 41, paragraph 4.
the obligations incumbent on the controller and the processor under articles 8, 11, 25 to 39, 42 and 43; the obligations of the certification body under Articles 42 and 43; the obligations incumbent on the body responsible for monitoring codes of conduct under of Article 41, paragraph 4.
the obligations incumbent on the controller and the processor under articles 8, 11, 25 to 39, 42 and 43; the obligations of the certification body under Articles 42 and 43; the obligations incumbent on the body responsible for monitoring codes of conduct under of Article 41, paragraph 4.
the obligations incumbent on the controller and the processor under articles 8, 11, 25 to 39, 42 and 43; the obligations of the certification body under Articles 42 and 43; the obligations incumbent on the body responsible for monitoring codes of conduct under of Article 41, paragraph 4. Vs) d
the obligations incumbent on the controller and the processor under articles 8, 11, 25 to 39, 42 and 43; the obligations of the certification body under Articles 42 and 43; the obligations incumbent on the body responsible for monitoring codes of conduct under of Article 41, paragraph 4.   vs) d  5. Violations of the following provisions are subject, in accordance with paragraph 2, administrative fines of up to EUR 20,000,000 or, in the case of

the basic principles of processing, including the conditions applicable to the $\!$
consent under Articles 5, 6, 7 and 9;□
the rights enjoyed by data subjects under Articles 12 to 22;□
transfers of personal data to a recipient located in a country□
third party or an international organization under Articles 44 to 49;□
all obligations deriving from the law of the Member States adopted pursuant to the □
chapter IX;□
non-compliance with an injunction, a temporary or permanent restriction of processing $\!\!\!\!\square$
or the suspension of data flows ordered by the supervisory authority pursuant to $\!\!\!\!\!\square$
article 58, paragraph 2, or the fact of not granting the foreseen access, in violation of □
Article 58, paragraph 1.□
b)□
vs)□
d)□
e)□
6. Non-compliance with an injunction issued by the supervisory authority under Article 58, $\!\Box$
paragraph 2, shall be subject, in accordance with paragraph 2 of this article, to fines□
administrative costs of up to EUR 20,000,000 or, in the case of a company, $\!$
up to 4% of the total worldwide annual turnover of the preceding financial year, the amount □
higher being retained.□
7. Without prejudice to the powers of the supervisory authorities with regard to adoption □
corrective measures pursuant to Article 58(2), each Member State may□
establish the rules determining whether and to what extent administrative fines may
be imposed on public authorities and public bodies established in its territory. $\hfill\Box$
8. The exercise by the supervisory authority of the powers conferred on it by this article is
subject to appropriate procedural safeguards in accordance with Union law and □

law of the Member States, including an effective judicial remedy and a procedure□
regular.□
9. […]"□
240. The reading of Article 83, paragraph 2, GDPR, points (a) to (k), as well as explanations□
additional information contained in paragraphs 3 to 6 of the same provision, is sufficient to refute□
55□
the defendant's argument that the various offenses listed in article□
83 GDPR are placed on an equal footing.□
241. The various criteria for assessing the severity of sanctions are clearly□
set out in Article 83 itself and in recitals 148 to 150 of the GDPR. Section 83.2□
also specifies that an analysis must be made "according to the circumstances of□
the species".□
242. The Litigation Division has already referred to the Guidelines on the application and □
setting of administrative fines under the GDPR, approved by the EDPB. These lines□
guidelines provide advice on the interpretation of the individual facts of the case at the□
light of the criteria set out in Article 83.2 of the GDPR. The guidelines are binding on the House□
Litigation as a body of the DPA, member of the EDPB.□
243. In order to reinforce the application of the rules of the GDPR, recital 148 of the GDPR specifies that □
Sanctions including administrative fines should be imposed for any□
violation of the regulations, in addition to or instead of the appropriate measures imposed by $\Box$
supervisory authorities under this Regulation. In the event of a minor violation or if□
the fine that may be imposed constitutes a disproportionate burden on a $\square$
natural person, a call to order may be sent rather than a fine. It suits□
however, to take due account of the nature, gravity and duration of the violation, the□
intentional nature of the violation and of the measures taken to mitigate the damage suffered, $\Box$
the degree of responsibility or any relevant breach previously committed, the□

how the supervisory authority became aware of the breach, compliance with $\!\!\!\!\!\square$
measures ordered against the controller or processor, $\hfill\Box$
application of a code of conduct, and any other aggravating or□
mitigating. The application of sanctions, including administrative fines, should $\hfill\Box$
subject to appropriate procedural safeguards in accordance with the general principles of□
Union and Charter law, including the right to effective judicial protection □
and due process. □
244. Contrary to what the defendant maintains, the GDPR therefore does not impose an amount
minimum fine, but only maximum amounts which, depending on the infringements□
committed, may amount to 2% or 4% of the turnover of a manager of□
salary, i.e. 10,000,000 or 20,000,000 euros respectively. These amounts have a $\!\Box$
dissuasive nature and it is up to the Litigation Chamber to modulate the amount of□
the fine depending on the circumstances of the case, taking into account the requirement of
proportionality and with a view to ensuring the effectiveness of the provisions of the GDPR.□
245. Since the various offenses listed in Article 83 GDPR are not dealt with □
in the same way and that the various criteria for assessing the severity of $\!\!\!\!\!\square$
sanctions are clearly set out, the defendant's argument must be rejected □
that the combined reading of Article 83 GDPR and Articles 100 and 101 of the LCA
56□
violates the principles of legality and proportionality, and therefore Articles 6 and 7 ECHR and $47\ \Box$
of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, because of its vagueness. □
246. Article 83 GDPR is a provision with direct effect of an EU regulation and it is for□
the Litigation Chamber to ensure the proper functioning of this regulation. It does not belong $\hfill\Box$
not in the Litigation Chamber, as a body of a national administrative authority, $\!$
to rule on the possible illegality of this provision. □
247. Furthermore, the Constitutional Court ruled in its judgment no. 25/2016 of 18 February 2016□

(p24-28) that a single and wide margin for an administrative fine, allowing □
the administrative authority to adapt the administrative fine to the seriousness of the offence, $\Box$
does not violate the principle of legality:□
"B.18.2.□
"B.18.2. Furthermore, the principle of legality in criminal matters which derives from the provisions□
above-mentioned constitutional and conventional rules stem from the idea that criminal law must be
formulated in terms that allow everyone to know, when adopting a□
behavior, whether or not it is punishable and, if so, to know the penalty□
incurred. (…)□
However, the principle of legality in criminal matters does not prevent the law from attributing a□
discretion of the judge. It is indeed necessary to take into account the character of generality of the
laws, the diversity of the situations to which they apply and the evolution of□
behaviors they suppress. □
Similarly, in order to determine whether the ranges of sentences adopted by the legislator□
schedule are so broad that they would disregard the principle of predictability of the□
penalty, it is necessary to take into account the specificities of the offenses to which these penalties
relate. (…)□
B.20.1. The assessment of the seriousness of an offense and the severity with which□
the offense can be punished is within the discretion of the competent legislator. he can□
impose particularly heavy penalties in matters where the offenses are of□
likely to seriously undermine the fundamental rights of individuals and the interests of□
the community. It is therefore up to the competent legislator to set the limits and $\square$
the amounts to□
judge and that of□
the discretion of the□
inside which□

administration must be exercised. The Court could only censure such a system if it were □
patently unreasonable.□
B.20.2. The ordinance legislator cannot be criticized for having wanted to rationalize□
and simplify the environmental criminal law in force in the Region. In order to achieve this□
objective, he was able to provide for a single and sufficiently wide range of sentences, both in terms of□
with regard to criminal sanctions than alternative administrative fines, in order to□
allow the judge or the administrative authority to adapt the penalty or the administrative fine□
alternative to the seriousness of the offence.□
57□
B.20.3. With specific regard to the offense of exceeding the standards of□
noise set by the Government, the contested provisions are aimed at litigants□
professionals who can assess with sufficient precision the seriousness of the offense□
they commit and the correlative importance of the sanction to which they expose themselves. By□
elsewhere, the choice of the sanction must be justified, either by the judge, or by the authority□
administration. In the latter case, a judicial appeal is open against the decision. □
B.20.4. It follows from the foregoing that the contested provisions do not attribute to the judge or □
to the administrative authority a power of appreciation which would exceed the limits of what is admitted —
the principle of foreseeability of the sentence. »□
248. The defendant's argument that Articles 100 and 101□
of the LCA, read together with Article 83 of the GDPR, which form the basis of the □
power of the Litigation Chamber to impose administrative sanctions and □
fines, violate the principles of legality and proportionality and, therefore, the right to a $\square$
fair trial.□
b. The rules of procedure of the DPA would not respect the fundamental principle of legality□
formal criminal penalties, enshrined in Articles 12 and 14 of the Belgian Constitution.□
249. The principle of formal legality, enshrined in Articles 12 and 14 of the Belgian Constitution,□

requires that the essential elements of the rules relating to the offenses punished, the nature□
and at the level of the sanction, as well as the procedure guaranteeing the safeguard of the rights of □
defence, be fixed by the House of Representatives according to the legislative procedure□
provided for by the Belgian Constitution.□
250. Since this principle applies not only to penal sanctions stricto sensu, but also to□
administrative sanctions of a criminal nature, it would be fully applicable to the procedure of□
ODA penalty.□
251. In this respect, the defendant claims that several aspects of the sanction procedure of □
ODA are not fixed in a legislative text - in particular, not in the LCA, but□
in the internal rules of January 15, 2019 (ROI).□
252. Accordingly, the Respondent considers that these proceedings were conducted on the basis of □
basis of rules of procedure contrary to Articles 12 and 14 of the Belgian Constitution and □
that it is therefore devoid of a valid legal basis, so that the complaints against IAB□
Europe should be rejected.□
Position of the Litigation Chamber□
253. The principle of legality means that the essential elements of an offence, such as its□
nature, the level of the sanction and the related procedural guarantees, must be□
determined by the legislator.□
58□
254. The Litigation Chamber notes that the only elements relating to the imposition of a□
sanction which does not appear in the GDPR, nor in the LCA, nor in the law of July 30, 2018, but□
in the Rules of Procedure (ROI) of the APD to which the defendant refers, are not□
in no way essential elements for the imposition of fines. In fact, it is not the□
nature of the fine, nor the penalty, which are in question, but elements of a $\!\Box$
secondary or organizational, for example as to the procedure to be followed in the absence of the□
president of the Litigation Chamber (article 44 ROI), or the number of members sitting□

per case (article 43 ROI). □
255. The Litigation Chamber also emphasizes that the independence of a supervisory authority□
control pursuant to Article 51 et seq. of the GDPR means that the organization of its□
process, including for example the assignment of members to a procedure, is at the $\!\!\!\!\!\!\square$
discretion of the Data Protection Authority, of course within the limits of the □
general principles of good administration and relevant national legislation. □
256. The defendant's argument that the proceedings before the Litigation Chamber□
would violate the principle of legality is therefore rejected.□
vs. Appointment of DPA members would violate GDPR Article 53□
257. The defendant claims that Article 39 of the LCA, which regulates the appointment of members of □
the Litigation Chamber, in no way specifies the terms of the procedure for□
nomination. In particular, it does not specify anywhere how the interviewing of candidates should be□
take place, and data protection law does not require a written record of □
the hearing. Furthermore, the appointment takes place on the basis of a secret ballot and there is no $\square$
guarantee as to the adequacy of the information on the candidates provided to the members of $\!\!\!\!\square$
representatives room. □
258. According to the Respondent, the appointment of members of the APD, including members of the
Litigation Chamber, would therefore not meet the requirements of Article 53 GDPR, which□
provides that the appointment must be made "through a transparent procedure".□
259. In view of the foregoing, the Respondent considers that the members of the Chamber□
Litigation would not be able to make a legally valid decision to□
towards IAB Europe in this matter. For these reasons too, the claims against □
IAB Europe should be rejected.□
Position of the Litigation Chamber□
260. First of all, the Litigation Chamber recalls that any imperfections in the □
procedure for appointing DPA members cannot be part of this procedure □

and that the parties cannot invoke a procedural interest to challenge the□
designation procedure. □
59□
261. The Litigation Chamber recalls that the members of the Litigation Chamber are □
appointed by the House of Representatives and cannot be removed from office□
only by this one. Thus, neither the Litigation Division nor the Market Court are□
competent to decide on their appointment. Furthermore, the parties have no interest in□
request such a decision.□
262. Consequently, the Litigation Chamber finds that this allegation is unfounded. □
d. The DPA's handling of this procedure would not be in accordance with its obligations and $\hfill\Box$
its powers under Article 57 of the GDPR.□
263. In conclusion, the defendant indicates, both in its initial conclusion and in the context of □
the reopening of the proceedings, that the way in which the DPA, in addition to the initial complaint, examines $\Box$
also the additional complaints and grievances formulated by the complainants, without the □
relevance of these additional allegations has been examined by the Inspection Service,□
makes defending IAB Europe considerably more difficult.□
264. IAB Europe considers that this approach is not only fundamentally□
incompatible with the duties and responsibilities of a supervisory authority such as□
defined in Article 57 of the GDPR, but also has the effect that IAB Europe is not required to □
defend only against the allegations contained in the inspection report, and not against □
subsequent allegations made by□
the complainants in □
their presentations ☐
subsequent arguments. □
Position of the Litigation Chamber□
265. The Litigation Division firstly emphasizes that at no time did the defendant□

explained what new allegations are the subject of his defenses and □
would thus violate his rights of defence. For this reason alone, the Litigation Chamber□
considers itself justified in declaring the defendant's argument unfounded.□
266. Secondly, the Litigation Chamber notes that the LCA in no way prescribes that the □
Litigation Chamber would be bound by an investigation report following a requested investigation □
to the Inspection Service. Indeed, it does not follow from any provision of the LCA that the Chamber□
Litigation would be deprived of□
the possibility of taking into account elements□
additional or complementary to the report of the Inspection Service, provided that□
investigation and consideration of these additional elements are sufficiently $\!$
justified in the decision and that the rights of the defense are sufficiently guaranteed. $\hfill\Box$
267. The Inspection Service may in any case decide not to investigate certain□
disputed points, in accordance with the prerogative conferred on it by article 64 (2) of the LCA. In□
such a case, it would however be contrary to Article 57 GDPR as well as to the autonomy and □
the independence of the Litigation Chamber, as implemented by articles $92\square$
to 100 of the LCA, to purely and simply bind the Litigation Chamber by the□
60□
conclusions of the Inspection Service, without taking into account the elements put forward in the □
debates by the parties during the proceedings and in accordance with the right to be heard. $\hfill\Box$
268. Thirdly, the Litigation Chamber decides that the alleged obligation to found the□
debates on the sole inspection report following an investigation by the Inspection Service is not□
not applicable. The LCA does not provide anywhere that the Litigation Chamber should base its□
decision solely on the inspection report or on the conclusions of the parties. He $\!$
agrees that a supervisory authority also consults other bodies and sources in order to□
to be able to support its decisions if necessary. □
269. As for□

the assessment of the Inspection Service with a view to an investigation □
complementary, and in particular the nature of the time limits provided for in Article 96 of the LCA, the□
Chambre Litigation is not convinced by□
the arguments put forward by□
the□
defendant. In this case, the parties have had ample opportunity to make known their□
point of view to the Litigation Chamber and to the opposing party concerning the allegations and □
the charges, including the operation of the TCF, the processing of preferences and $\hfill\Box$
user permissions in the TC String, as well as the interrelation between the TCF and □
the OpenRTB. □
270. Furthermore, the Litigation Chamber considers that there is no doubt about the crucial importance□
of the TC String for the operation of the TCF. Therefore, the defendant could□
expect, from the beginning of the procedure, that the debates focus on the $\!\!\!\!\!\square$
data processing within the framework of the TC String. Thus, there can be no question □
new allegations - insofar as they exist, given the absence of examples□
with which the defendant supported its argument - in the conclusions of the□
plaintiffs, since they constitute an explanation of the operation of the TCF, of which it is not□
not disputed that it is at the heart of the complaints against IAB Europe.□
271. In view of the foregoing, the Litigation Division finds that this means is insufficient □
both in fact and in law.□
A.10. – Sanction form, European cooperation procedure, and publication of the□
decision□
272. The procedure before the Litigation Chamber includes an exchange of written submissions□
as well as an oral hearing of the parties concerned, as usual steps within the framework□
of a decision. If the Litigation Chamber proposes, after deliberation, to impose a□
(punitive) sanction, the Court of Markets requires that the Litigation Chamber give the□

defendant the advisability of responding to the envisaged sanctions, by means of a $\square$
standard form also covering the offenses retained and the criteria for□
determination of the amount of the fine. This possibility of contradictory, or right to be□
of course, concerns only the sanctions proposed and is therefore only communicated to the□
respondent. □
61□
273. A sanction form was sent on October 11, 2021 to the Respondent, informing this□
last of its breaches of the GDPR as well as the intention of the Litigation Chamber□
to impose corrective measures and an administrative fine. IAB Europe submitted its□
answer□
on November 1, 2021. The defendant contests□
the calculation of□
the fine□
administrative, asserting that the Litigation Chamber did not take into account all the□
elements relevant to determining the amount of the administrative fine pursuant to□
article 83.2 GDPR. Furthermore, the defendant contests the Chamber's taking into account□
Interactive Advertising Bureau Inc. Total Worldwide Annual Revenue Litigation□
(IAB Inc.) for the calculation of the administrative fine, since the latter has no□
participation in the defendant nor any right of inspection on the deployment of the activities□
from IAB Europe. The defendant specifies that IAB Europe obtains the license of the brand name□
"IAB" with the IAB Inc. and that the various IAB organizations in Europe are□
separate and distinct organizations.□
274. On November 8, 2021, the plaintiffs submitted a request to the Litigation Chamber,□
requesting to receive a copy of the sanction form as well as the reaction of the□
defendant, based on the erroneous assumption that the defendant also received $\square$
additional information on the Litigation Chamber's draft decision. The□


Chambre Litigation responds on November 9, 2021 that it will not disclose the form□
sanction to complainants. Notification of the penalty form to the defendant takes place□
within the framework of an objective control of legality and with the specific aim of respecting the rights□
of the defendant's defence, in accordance with the case law of the Court of Markets. the□
defendant is thus informed in advance of the nature and severity of the sanction that he risks□
and has the opportunity to submit its final conclusions on this point to the Chamber□
Litigation. Notification of the sanction form to complainants could not□
contribute to the same objective, since the envisaged sanction would only be imposed on the□
defendant, and not to the plaintiffs, and would therefore not directly affect the interests of those□
last. Neither the rights of defense nor any other rule of law require that□
complainants can present additional conclusions in relation to the sanction□
which the defendant is likely to be inflicted.□
275. On 23 November 2021, the Litigation Chamber submitted its draft decision to the other□
supervisory authorities concerned (hereinafter, "CSAs"), as provided for in Article 60.3 of the □
GDPR.□
276. On December 18, 2021, the Litigation Chamber received a letter from the complainants in response
the decision of the Litigation Division not to disclose the content of the application form□
sanction to complainants. Specifically, the Complainants argued that they should be $\square$
informed if the defendant has brought new elements to the proceedings. Bedroom□
Litigation notes that the debates were already closed at that time, and that the reaction□
of the defendant in the penalty form only related to elements concerning the□
sanction. □
62□
277. On December 20, 2021, the Litigation Chamber is informed by the information system□
on the Internal Market (IMI) of a relevant and reasoned objection (RRO) submitted by□
the Dutch Authority (Autoriteit Persoonsgegevens, "AP"). The objection relates to □


the absence of reasoning from the Litigation Chamber concerning the assertion of the NGO
Dutch Bits of Freedom that the TCF makes it impossible to exercise their rights□
by the persons concerned. The Litigation Division addressed this objection in its□
revised draft decision62.□
278. On December 21, 2021, the defendant submits a letter to the Litigation Chamber,□
requesting the suspension of the provisional execution of the decision, that the DPA does not return the□
public decision until all remedies have been exhausted, and the DPA abstains□
any public communication about the decision prior to such final decision. Once□
again, the Litigation Chamber notes that the debates were already closed at that time.□
279. On December 21, 2021, the Litigation Chamber is notified of a relevant and □
reasoned submitted by the Portuguese Authority (Comissão Nacional de Proteção de Dados,□
"CNPD"). The objection relates to the absence of a sanction taken by the Litigation Chamber $\Box$
with regard to the processing of TC Strings in the absence of a legal basis provided for in Article 6 GDPR.
The CNPD considers that the draft decision should require the defendant to erase□
immediately of all personal data unlawfully collected to date. The□
The Litigation Chamber addressed this objection in its revised draft decision63.□
280. In addition to the two relevant and reasoned objections, the Litigation Division received □
comments from other CSAs regarding co-responsibility established by the Chamber□
Litigation, the use of legitimate interest for certain processing operations, the scope of □
corrective measures, as well as the envisaged administrative fine and the relationship between IAB□
Inc. and IAB Europe.□
281. On January 13, 2022, the Litigation Chamber submitted its revised draft decision to the □
other relevant supervisory authorities, as provided for in Article 60.5 of the GDPR.□
282. On January 17, 2022, the Litigation Chamber notified the parties of the filing of the draft□
revised decision and the deadline of January 27, 2022 for CSAs. She also clarified □
that the written exchanges with counsel for the defendant, concerning the form of□

sanction, did not include new arguments that would require reopening the □
discussions with both parties. Consequently, and given that both these exchanges and the form of $\!\Box$
penalty will be part of the administrative file, the Litigation Chamber rejected the□
asks the complainants to have access to the sanction form and to the written exchanges which $\!$
followed with the defendant. □
62 See para. 504-506□
63 See para. 535.□
63□
283. On January 20, 2022, the Litigation Chamber received a letter from the complainants, in which□
they reaffirm that they have the right to obtain a copy of the sanction form and exchanges□
with the defendant, in order to verify for themselves that no new element□
was raised by the latter. The complainants also argue that if the form of $\!\!\!\!\!\!\square$
sanction and subsequent exchanges will be part of the administrative file, and will therefore be □
accessible in the event of an appeal, there is no reason not to grant them access during $\!\!\!\!\square$
the current procedure. The plaintiffs further claim, on the basis of a press release from□
defendant's press dated November 5, 2021, which the Litigation Chamber has□
agreed to approve a Code of Conduct submitted by the defendant 6 months after its□
decision. The plaintiffs argue that this was not discussed during the□
procedure, and therefore request access to all written exchanges with the defendant following □
to the sanction sheet, as well as the reopening of the debates on the jurisdiction of the Chamber□
Litigation to approve a code of conduct or validate an action plan. □
284. On January 27, 2022, the Litigation Chamber acknowledged receipt of the letter from counsel for □
complainants, and responded that their arguments will be considered in its□
deliberation. □
Position of the Litigation Chamber□
285. The Litigation Division finds above all that it is not responsible and cannot be □

held responsible for public statements made outside the proceedings by □
either party concerned during deliberation on the merits by the Chamber□
Litigation. □
286. Second, the Court of Markets stated that plaintiffs have no say□
in the determination of the sanctions imposed by the Litigation Chamber64. In this regard,□
Article 58.2.d of the GDPR grants supervisory authorities the power to order a□
controller or a subcontractor to put the processing operations into □
compliance with the provisions of the GDPR, where applicable, in a manner and within a time□
determined. This provision, read in conjunction with Article 100, § 1, 9° of the LCA, must□
be interpreted in the sense that an action plan and the intrinsic monitoring of this action plan $\square$
by the DPA, should be considered as one of the sanctions that can be imposed on $\Box$
a data controller or a processor. The action plan must therefore be □
considered a remedy, in respect of which the Complainants have no□
interest in asserting their case.□
287. With regard to the Respondent's request not to publish the decision, the Chamber□
Litigation recalls the significant impact of the case, given the large number of □
64 Market Court, 1 December 2021, FOD Financiën c. GBA, no. 2021/AR/1044, para. 7.3.4: "It does (certainly) belong□
not for a Complainant to interfere in any way with the appropriateness, much less with□
the extent of a sanction. The complaint only relates (and can only relate) to an alleged infringement such that the □
decision taken by the Litigation Chamber of the APD concerning the complaint - and possibly imposing a sanction on the□
person concerned - can never be considered an ultra petita judgment from the point of view of the complaint. "□
64□
people concerned and organizations involved. In addition, the Litigation Chamber□
notes that the defendants' request was submitted after the closing of the hearings, and that the □
defendant itself has already published on the case on November 5, 2021. In view of these□
elements, the Litigation Chamber decides not to respond to the request of the □

defendant dd. December 21, 2021 regarding the non-publication of the decision and □
the absence of public communications on the decision before exhaustion of all
remedies. □
B. Reasoning □
B.1 Processing of personal data in the context of Transparency and □
Consent Framework□
288. In this section, the Litigation Chamber examines the concept of personal data□
personal as well as the question whether personal data exist in□
the context of the Transparency and Consent Framework, designed and managed by IAB Europe65, and if
they are processed. □
289. For a good understanding of this decision, the Litigation Chamber emphasizes that□
the complainants indicated in their written submissions that they wished to limit themselves to□
alleged violations of the GDPR in the processing of personal data "in□
the TCF itself"67. The Litigation Chamber will therefore not rule on this□
section on liability for processing operations that take place in the context of□
of the OpenRTB protocol. □
B.1.1. – Presence of personal data in the TCF□
290. European data protection legislation, including the GDPR, has always been □
adopted a broad view of personal data with the aim of ensuring a level□
high level of data protection and to safeguard the fundamental rights and freedoms of □
persons concerned. The broad interpretation of the concept of personal data□
and the concept of processing, among others, is a key element of the Court's case-law□
of justice68. The principle that personal data does not concern□
only a natural person□
identified, but also a natural person□
identifiable, was already established in 1981 by the Council of Europe Convention for the□






which the data subject can be identified are wholly owned by□
the same data controller or in part by another entity, this information□
should be considered as personal data.□
297. Complainants argue in their reply submissions that the TC String is a string□
of unique characters which is also written in a cookie as a unique identifier□
and which is then stored on a user's device77. Furthermore, the plaintiffs consider□
that IAB Europe collects additional information about users using the□
TC String, including sensitive personal data within the meaning of Article 9 of the□
GDPR78.□
298. The defendant, on the other hand, refutes the allegations and asserts that the TC String does not contain□
no personal data79 nor any⊡
information directly or□
indirectly linked to the "content taxonomy80", which IAB Europe uses as a "language□
common" to describe the content of a website81. Furthermore, the defendant considers that the□
TC String does not constitute a unique identifier and is not designed for this purpose82.□
299. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the defendant indicates that it must necessarily be possible□
to link the TC String to a user, but provided that this link between the preferences□
designed in the TC String and the user is not established until later, namely in the□
framework of the OpenRTB, and is therefore not covered by the Transparency and Consent□
Framework83. □
300. Based on technical documentation from IAB Europe and the IAB Tech Lab on the□
TCF protocol, the Inspection Service concludes that the TC String in itself does not identify□
users or devices directly, because the elements that compose it only do□
reflect technical information, whether or not an unidentified user has consented□
74 Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston of 12 December 2013 in joined cases C-141/12 and C-372/12 Y.S., para.
45.□

75 CJEU judgment C-434/16 of 20 December 2017, Nowak t. Data Protection Commissioner, ECLI:EU:C:2017:994,□
para. 35.□
76 See also CJEU judgment C-582/14 of 19 October 2016, Patrick Breyer t. Bundesrepublik Deutschland,□
ECLI:EU:C:2016:779, para. 43; judgment of the CJEU C-434/16 of December 20, 2017, Nowak t. Privacy Commissioner□
data, ECLI:EU:C:2017:994, para. 31: see also FR. ZUIDERVEEN BORGESIUS, "Singling out people without knowing their□
names - Behavioral targeting, pseudonymous data, and the new Data Protection regulation", Computer Law & Security□
Review, vol. 32-2, 2016, p. 256-271; and FR. ZUIDERVEEN BORGESIUS, "The Breyer Case of the CJEU - IP Addresses and to
Personal Data Definition", EDPL, 1/2017, p. 130-137.□
77 Complainants' submissions of February 18, 2021, para. 25. □
78 Submissions of the Complainants of February 18, 2021, para. 26. □
79 Respondent's submissions of March 25, 2021, para. 48. □
80 Respondent's submissions of March 25, 2021, para. 51.□
81 https://iabtechlab.com/standards/content-taxonomy/□
82 Respondent's submissions of March 25, 2021, para. 53. □
83 Respondent's submissions of March 25, 2021, para. 54. □
67□
for purposes Y or Z, and whether adtech providers A and B may process the data to□
personal character for the accepted purposes. □
301. More specifically, a TC String consists of the following fields: □
i.□
ii.□
iii. 🗆
iv.□
v. 🗆
vi.□
Vii.□

viii. □
ix.□
general metadata;□
a binary value for each of the processing purposes for which the □
consent can be given;□
a binary value for each of the processing purposes permitted by an interest□
legit ;□
a binary value for each of the adtech providers that can collect and □
process the personal data of the user on the basis of his□
consent ;□
a binary value for each of the adtech providers that can collect and □
process the user's personal data on the basis of an interest□
legit ;□
any restriction of processing; □
special opt-in features in relation to the processing purposes;□
a field dedicated to processing purposes that do not fall under the TCF but which are □
vendor-specific;□
consent to processing on legal bases that are not covered by the□
TCF.□
Position of the Litigation Chamber□
302. Although the Litigation Chamber understands that it has not been conclusively established $\!\!\!\!\square$
than the TC String, due to the limited metadata and values it contains,□
itself allows direct identification of the user, the Litigation Chamber□
note that when the consent pop-up is accessed, via a script, from a server $\!$
managed by the CMP84, this inevitably also processes the IP address of the user, which is□
explicitly classified as personal data within the meaning of the GDPR.□



or indirectly the user behind a TC String.□
307. The Litigation Division also understands that the TCF is intended for recording□
each user's combination of preferences as a single string□
in the TC String, in order to communicate these preferences to a large number of suppliers□
adtech, and therefore inherently involves the recording of such data. □
308. The Litigation Chamber has in fact noted, on the basis of the investigation reports of the □
Inspection Service, that adtech providers as well as other participants within□
the wider OpenRTB ecosystem read the signal contained in a TC String in order to□
determine whether they have the required legal basis to process the personal data□
personal data of a user, for the purposes to which the latter has consented88. □
309. In this regard, the Litigation Division emphasizes that it is sufficient for certain information to be □
used to individualize a natural person, to be able to talk about data to□
personal character. Additionally, the purpose of the TC String, i.e. entering preferences□
of a specific user, leads de facto to consider the TC String as data to□
personal character. □
85 See the examples in the technical analysis report of the Inspection Service, January 6, 2020 (exhibit 53), p. 99 and □
following.
86 C. SANTOS, M. NOUWENS, M. TOTH, N. BIELOVA, V. ROCA, "Consent Management Platforms Under the GDPR: Process
and/or Controllers? », in Privacy Technologies and Policy, APF 2021, LNCS, vol 12703, Springer, 2021, pp. 50-51. Bedroom□
Contentious notes in this respect that, until this summer, if a "globally stored" TC String was chosen, the CMPs could□
access the internet domain consensu.org managed by IAB Europe to check whether a consent with a global scope had been
given by the user, which involved disclosing the values of the TC String coupled with the users' IP addresses□
to the CMPs, by IAB Europe. The defendant announced during the hearing that the functionality of the consents within□
overall would be depreciated. □
87 See paras. 358 and following of this decision. □
88 Technical analysis report from the Inspection Service, January 6, 2020 (Exhibit 53), p. 75.□

89 WP136 - Opinion 4/2007 on the concept of personal data, p. 14.□
69□
310. In other words, if the purpose of the processing is to isolate people, it can be assumed $\!$
that the controller or another party has or will have at its disposal the means□
by which it can reasonably be expected that the data subject will be identified. □
Claiming that people are not identifiable, when the purpose of the processing is $\!\!\!\!\square$
precisely to identify them would be a contradictio in terminis90. $\hfill\Box$
311. In addition, the Litigation Division is of the opinion that the use of these preferences has□
undoubted consequences on the rights and interests of the data subjects, since $\!$
these choices determine, among other things, which third parties will receive and process the data to $\!\!\!\!\!\Box$
personal character of users within the framework of the OpenRTB91 protocol.□
312. In view of the above findings and of the broad interpretation of the concept□
of personal data, as confirmed by the case law of the Court of□
justice92, the Litigation Chamber concludes that the user preferences contained□
in a TC String do indeed constitute personal data, since these□
preferences relate to an individualized and identifiable natural person. □
B.1.2 Processing of personal data in the TCF.□
313. The Inspection Service explains in its technical investigation reports that the TCF is based □
necessarily on three fundamental elements:□
i.□
a fully customizable user interface that allows Consent□
Management Platforms (CMP) registered with the TCF to obtain the consent of □
the user, his possible objections to processing based on an interest□
legitimate, and their preferences regarding the purposes of the processing as well as the $\!\!\!\square$
authorized adtech providers;□
ii.□

list of global adtech providers which includes□
the partners□
approved by IAB Europe and specific information regarding their□
processing purposes and their respective legal bases; and □
iii.□
a standardized mechanism for requesting, recording and possibly sharing □
authorized adtech providers, consents, objections and □
preferences through a dedicated API, a standard format for storing□
partners/consents, and a standardized data structure for□
transfer the status of partners/consents94. □
90 WP136 - Opinion 4/2007 on the concept of personal data, p. 14. □
91 CJEU judgment C-434/16 of 20 December 2017, Nowak t. Data Protection Commissioner, para. 39.□
92 See para. 296 and following of this decision. □
93Judgment of the CJEU C-434/16 of December 20, 2017, Nowak t. Data Protection Commissioner, para. 34.
94 API Consent Management Platform v2.0, August 2019 (Exhibit 34), p. 4; Service technical analysis report
d'Inspection, January 6, 2020 (Exhibit 53), p. 58-59.□
70□
314. Complainants argue that the creation of the TC String corresponds to the generation□
automated a unique string of characters associated with a specific user, for□
which their data exchange preferences are entered following □
the intervention of a CMP registered with the TCF95.□
315. In addition, Complainants refer to the sharing of the TC String with CMPs and other□
TCF participants. Specifically, they argue that storing a TC String in□
a specific euconsent-v2 cookie, on a storage system chosen by the CMP or□
associated with the internet domain consensus.org managed by IAB Europe, also constitutes a□

а□

handling user preferences.□
316. The defendant, on the other hand, argues that there is no data processing at $\!\Box$
personal character within the meaning of Article 4(2) of the GDPR in the context of the TCF, given its□
view that the TC String as such cannot be considered as a□
personal data.□
Assessment by the Litigation Chamber□
317. Firstly, the Litigation Division refers to the definition of data processing□
of a personal nature as being any transaction or set of transactions□
whether or not carried out using automated processes and applied to data or□
sets of personal data, such as the collection, recording,□
organization, structuring, storage, adaptation or modification, extraction, □
the consultation, use, communication by transmission, dissemination or any other $\Box$
form of provision,□
reconciliation or□
interconnection, □
the□
limitation, □
erasure or destruction96.□
318. The TCF provides a standardized approach for the collection and exchange of data across□
personal character — i.e. consent, possible objections and □
preferences — of well-defined users, already identified or at least identifiable, of a□
purportedly GDPR-compliant manner. The fact that participating organizations can□
directly identify data subjects with the help of additional data,□
such as an IP address, from the TC String that captures these consents, objections and □
preferences, not only means that the TC String can be considered a□
personal data97, but also leads to participating organizations (suppliers□

adtech), inevitably process personal data.□
319. Given the link between the TCF and the OpenRTB protocol, the Litigation Chamber□
refers to the guidelines of the former Article 29 Working Party on advertising in□
online, in which the Task Force noted that online advertising methods□
95 Submissions of the Complainants of February 18, 2021, para. 27.□
96 Art. 4.2) GDPR.□
97 See previous section B.1.1. – Presence of personal data in the TCF.□
71□
browsing behavior inherently involve the processing of data to □
personal nature, as such advertising involves the collection of IP addresses and the□
processing of unique identifiers, so that data subjects can be□
followed online even if their real name is not known98.□
320. The Litigation Chamber understands that the Transparency and Consent Framework□
inherently involves the collection, processing, storage and further sharing of□
user preferences with other parties, whether or not in combination with□
additional personal data in the context of OpenRTB.□
321. Consequently, the Litigation Division finds that there is indeed data processing□
of a personal nature within the meaning of Article 4.2 of the GDPR. This conclusion is also □
confirmed by taking into account the possibility that the TC String may at any time□
be linked to immediately identifiable information, whether or not provided by the person□
concerned. □
B.2 Responsibility of IAB Europe for processing operations in the Transparency and $\!\Box$
Consent Framework □
322. IAB Europe declares that it is not a data controller or co-responsible for□
processing of personal data collected by□
organizations□

participants in the framework of the TCF.□
323. The Litigation Chamber considers, however, that this reasoning cannot be followed, and this,□
for several reasons. First of all, it is appropriate to apply the broad interpretation by the Court□
of justice of the notion of controller (B.2.1 Broad interpretation of the notion□
controller by the Court of Justice and the EDPB). The fact that IAB Europe has a□
decisive influence on the objective (B.2.2 Determination of the purposes of the processing of □
personal data within the TCF) and the means (B.2.3 Determination of the□
means of processing personal data within the TCF) of the processing in□
imposing mandatory TCF parameters must also be taken into account.□
B.2.1 Broad interpretation of the notion of controller by the Court of Justice□
and the EDPB□
324. The GDPR defines the "controller" as the entity which, alone or jointly□
with others, determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal data□
staff99. This definition must be understood in light of the legislative objective of□
placing primary responsibility for the protection of personal data on□
98 WP171 - Opinion 2/2010 on online behavioral advertising, 22 June 2010, p. 10, https://ec.europa.eu/justice/article-
29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2010/wp171_nl.pdf.□
99 Art. 4.7) GDPR.□
72□
the entity that actually exercises control over the processing of the data. That means□
that account must be taken not only of the legal qualification, but also of the reality□
effective100. □
325. The EDPB clarified that the notion of controller refers to the influence of the□
responsible for the treatment on the treatment, based on a decision-making power or□
control over processing activities. This control can be based on□
legal provisions, on an implied power or on the exercise of a de facto influence101. In□

$substance, \square$
the determination of ends and means corresponds to deciding □
respectively of the "why" and the "how" of the processing: for a given processing, □
the controller is the actor who exercises such influence on the processing of $\!\!\!\!\!\!\square$
personal data, thus determining the reason for which the processing takes place□
(i.e. "to what end"; or "for what purpose") and how this will be achieved□
(i.e. what means will be used to pursue the objective)102.□
326. The power to determine the means and purposes of processing activities may first□
be linked to the functional role of an organization103. Liability can also be □
allocated on the basis of contractual arrangements between the parties concerned, although□
these are not always decisive104, or on the basis of an assessment of the control□
size of a party. The determination of means and ends can for example □
result from a decisive influence on the processing, in particular on the reason for □
which the processing is carried out in a certain way105. □
327. In its "Jehovah's Witnesses" judgment106, the Court of Justice gave a broad interpretation □
to the notion of controller. This decision is relevant and applicable in the present case, $\!\Box$
because it specifies that the definition of controller must be interpreted in a manner□
wide, in order to ensure "effective and complete protection of the persons concerned"107,□
and that it is not necessary to have access to the personal data concerned□
to qualify as controller. The Litigation Chamber cites below□
below the relevant recitals of the aforementioned judgment: □
100 L.A. BYGRAVE & L. TOSONI, "Article 4(7). Controller" in The EU General Data Protection Regulation. A Commentary, Oxfo
University Press, 2020, p. 148.□
101 EDPB - Guidelines 07/2020 on the concepts of data controller and processor in the GDPR, v2.0, 2021, para. 20 et seq. □
102 Ibid., para. 35.□
103 D. DE BOT, De toepassing van de Algemene Verordening Gegevensbescherming in de Belgische context, Wolters Kluwer,

2020, para. 362.□
104 D. DE BOT, De toepassing van de Algemene Verordening Gegevensbescherming in de Belgische context, Wolters Kluwer,
2020, par. 362-365. □
105 EDPB - Guidelines 07/2020 on the concepts of data controller and processor in the GDPR, v2.0, 2021, para. 20 et seq. □
106CJEU judgment of 10 July 2018, Tietosuojavaltuutettu and Jehovan todistajat - uskonnollinen yhdyskunta, C-25/17,□
ECLI:EU:C:2018:551.□
107 CJEU judgment of 13 May 2014, Google Spain SL c. Agencia Española de protección de Datos (AEPD) and others, C-131/
ECLI: EU:C:2014:317, paragraph 34; see also the discussion on the scope of the concept in C. DOCKSEY and H.□
HIJMANS, "The Court of Justice as a Key Player in Privacy and Data Protection", European Data Protection Law Review,□
2019, Issue 3, (300)304. □
108CJEU judgment of 10 July 2018, Tietosuojavaltuutettu and Jehovan todistajat - uskonnollinen yhdyskunta, C-25/17,□
ECLI:EU:C:2018:551. EDPB - Guidelines 07/2020 on the concepts of data controller and processor in the GDPR, v2.0, 2021,□
para. 45. □
73 🗆
73□ "65. As expressly provided for in Article 2(d) of Directive 95/46, the concept of '□
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"65. As expressly provided for in Article 2(d) of Directive 95/46, the concept of '□  controller" refers to the natural or legal person who, "alone or□  jointly with others", determines the purposes and means of the processing of□  personal data. This notion therefore does not necessarily refer to a□  single natural or legal person and may concern several actors participating in this□
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"65. As expressly provided for in Article 2(d) of Directive 95/46, the concept of ' controller" refers to the natural or legal person who, "alone or jointly with others", determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal data. This notion therefore does not necessarily refer to a single natural or legal person and may concern several actors participating in this treatment, each of them must then be subject to the provisions applicable in data protection
"65. As expressly provided for in Article 2(d) of Directive 95/46, the concept of ' controller" refers to the natural or legal person who, "alone or jointly with others", determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal data. This notion therefore does not necessarily refer to a single natural or legal person and may concern several actors participating in this treatment, each of them must then be subject to the provisions applicable in data protection june 2018,  june 2018,
"65. As expressly provided for in Article 2(d) of Directive 95/46, the concept of ' controller" refers to the natural or legal person who, "alone or jointly with others", determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal data. This notion therefore does not necessarily refer to a single natural or legal person and may concern several actors participating in this treatment, each of them must then be subject to the provisions applicable in data protection june 2018, (see, to this effect, judgment of 5

of joint liability does not necessarily translate into joint liability.□
equivalent, for the same processing of personal data, of the different□
actors. On the contrary, these actors can be involved at different stages of this□
treatment and according to different degrees, so that the level of responsibility of each□
of them must be assessed taking into account all the relevant circumstances of the case□
case (see, to this effect, judgment of 5 June 2018, Wirtschaftsakademie Schleswig-Holstein,□
C□210/16, EU:C:2018:388, points 28, 43 and 44).□
67. In that regard, neither the wording of Article 2(d) of Directive 95/46 nor any other□
provision of this directive only allow to consider the determination of the purposes□
and means of the processing must be carried out by means of written guidelines or□
instructions from the controller.□
68. On the other hand, a natural or legal person who influences, for his own purposes,□
on the processing of personal data and thereby participates in the determination□
of the purposes and means of this processing, can be considered to be responsible $\!\!\!\!\!\!\square$
processing, within the meaning of Article 2(d) of Directive 95/46. □
69. In addition, the joint responsibility of several actors for the same processing, in□
under this provision, does not presuppose that each of them has access to the data to be□
personal character concerned (see, to this effect, judgment of 5 June 2018, Wirtschaftsakademie□
Schleswig-Holstein, C□210/16, EU:C:2018:388, paragraph 38). »□
328. It therefore clearly appears to the Litigation Division that the defendant should not□
necessarily process the personal data concerned itself, nor be□
able to grant itself any access to this data, so that IAB Europe can□
be considered a data controller109 with respect to a system□
for which the defendant also invoices an annual fee of 1,200 euros to the □
participating organizations110.□
the CJEU of 5□

109 Stop □
June 2018, Unabhängiges Landeszentrum für Datenschutz Schleswig-Holstein c/□
Wirtschaftsakademie Schleswig-Holstein GmbH, C-210/16, ECLI: EU:C:2017:796, para. 35; judgment of the CJEU of July 10□
2018, Tietosuojavaltuutettu and Jehovan todistajat - uskonnollinen yhdyskunta, C-25/17, ECLI:EU:C:2018:551, para. 69.□
110 https://iabeurope.eu/join-the-tcf/□
<b>74</b> □
329. In addition, the impact or consequences of certain activities on the rights and freedoms of □
data subjects may also be taken into account in determining the□
responsibility of an organization. If it appears that an organization plays a decisive role in□
the dissemination of personal data111 or that the processing operations□
performed under the influence of this organization may substantially affect□
fundamental rights to privacy and data protection□
personnel112, this organization must be considered a data controller□
Datas. □
Datas. ☐  330. In this case, the Litigation Chamber concludes that the participating organisations, i.e. ☐
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
responsibility of an organization. Incidentally, a□
erroneous designation by a controller, such as a designation as□
subcontractor contradicted by the factual situation, does not bind the jurisdiction or authority of□
control115. □
332. The Inspection Service specifies that the Transparency and Consent Framework in itself does not□
does not constitute processing of personal data, but that it is a□
set of Policies and technical specifications developed by IAB Europe and IAB Tech□
Lab116. The Litigation Chamber agrees with the Inspection Service on this point. □
111 Judgment of the CJEU of 13 May 2014, Google Spain SL c. Agencia Española de protección de Datos (AEPD) and others,
ECLI: EU:C:2014:317, para. 36.□
112 Judgment of the CJEU of 13 May 2014, Google Spain SL c. Agencia Española de protección de Datos (AEPD) and others,
ECLI: EU:C:2014:317, para. 38.□
113 Art. 4.7) GDPR; A. DELFORGE Title 8. The general obligations of the controller and the place of the subcontractor"□
in The General Data Protection Regulation (RGPD/GDPR). In-depth analysis, Larcier, Brussels, 2018, para.□
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9-12. ☐  114 EDPB - Guidelines 7/2020 on the concepts of controller and processor in the GDPR, v2.0, 2021, para. 20; L.A. BYGRAVE & L. TOSONI, "Article 4(7). Controller" in The EU General Data Protection Regulation. A Commentary, Oxford University Press, □
9-12. □  114 EDPB - Guidelines 7/2020 on the concepts of controller and processor in the GDPR, v2.0, 2021, para. 20; L.A. BYGRAVE & L. TOSONI, "Article 4(7). Controller" in The EU General Data Protection Regulation. A Commentary, Oxford University Press, □  2020, p. 150; B. VAN ALSENOY, Data Protection Law in the EU: Roles, Responsibilities and Liability, Intersentia, 2019, para □
9-12.   114 EDPB - Guidelines 7/2020 on the concepts of controller and processor in the GDPR, v2.0, 2021, para. 20; L.A. BYGRAVE & L. TOSONI, "Article 4(7). Controller" in The EU General Data Protection Regulation. A Commentary, Oxford University Press,   2020, p. 150; B. VAN ALSENOY, Data Protection Law in the EU: Roles, Responsibilities and Liability, Intersentia, 2019, para   109-110; A. DELFORGE Title 8. The general obligations of the data controller and the place of the subcontractor" in Le
9-12.   114 EDPB - Guidelines 7/2020 on the concepts of controller and processor in the GDPR, v2.0, 2021, para. 20; L.A. BYGRAVE & L. TOSONI, "Article 4(7). Controller" in The EU General Data Protection Regulation. A Commentary, Oxford University Press, 2020, p. 150; B. VAN ALSENOY, Data Protection Law in the EU: Roles, Responsibilities and Liability, Intersentia, 2019, para 109-110; A. DELFORGE Title 8. The general obligations of the data controller and the place of the subcontractor" in Le General Data Protection Regulation (RGPD/GDPR). In-depth analysis, Larcier, Brussels, 2018, para. 12.
9-12. □  114 EDPB - Guidelines 7/2020 on the concepts of controller and processor in the GDPR, v2.0, 2021, para. 20; L.A. BYGRAVE & L. TOSONI, "Article 4(7). Controller" in The EU General Data Protection Regulation. A Commentary, Oxford University Press, □  2020, p. 150; B. VAN ALSENOY, Data Protection Law in the EU: Roles, Responsibilities and Liability, Intersentia, 2019, para □  109-110; A. DELFORGE Title 8. The general obligations of the data controller and the place of the subcontractor" in Le□  General Data Protection Regulation (RGPD/GDPR). In-depth analysis, Larcier, Brussels, 2018, para. 12. □  115 C. de TERWANGNE, "Title 2. Key definitions and scope of the GDPR" in The General Protection Regulation □
9-12.   114 EDPB - Guidelines 7/2020 on the concepts of controller and processor in the GDPR, v2.0, 2021, para. 20; L.A. BYGRAVE & L. TOSONI, "Article 4(7). Controller" in The EU General Data Protection Regulation. A Commentary, Oxford University Press, 2020, p. 150; B. VAN ALSENOY, Data Protection Law in the EU: Roles, Responsibilities and Liability, Intersentia, 2019, para 109-110; A. DELFORGE Title 8. The general obligations of the data controller and the place of the subcontractor" in Le General Data Protection Regulation (RGPD/GDPR). In-depth analysis, Larcier, Brussels, 2018, para. 12.   115 C. de TERWANGNE, "Title 2. Key definitions and scope of the GDPR" in The General Protection Regulation data (RGPD/GDPR). In-depth analysis, Larcier, Brussels, 2018, para. 9-12.
9-12. □  114 EDPB - Guidelines 7/2020 on the concepts of controller and processor in the GDPR, v2.0, 2021, para. 20; L.A. BYGRAVE & L. TOSONI, "Article 4(7). Controller" in The EU General Data Protection Regulation. A Commentary, Oxford University Press, □  2020, p. 150; B. VAN ALSENOY, Data Protection Law in the EU: Roles, Responsibilities and Liability, Intersentia, 2019, para □  109-110; A. DELFORGE Title 8. The general obligations of the data controller and the place of the subcontractor" in Le □  General Data Protection Regulation (RGPD/GDPR). In-depth analysis, Larcier, Brussels, 2018, para. 12. □  115 C. de TERWANGNE, "Title 2. Key definitions and scope of the GDPR" in The General Protection Regulation □  data (RGPD/GDPR). In-depth analysis, Larcier, Brussels, 2018, para. 9-12. □  116 Technical analysis report from the Inspection Service, January 6, 2020 (Exhibit 53), p. 9. □

users, which CMPs register through a user interface and store using the □
TC String. In order to allow a standardized approach within the TCF, IAB Europe makes
use of both policy documents and technical specifications:□
■ The TCF Policies consist of rules of participation that apply to the □
publishers, consent management platforms (CMP) and other providers $\!$
adtech.□
$\ ^{\bullet}$ The TCF technical specifications, which provide a technical protocol with $\square$
which participating organizations can immediately exchange status□
information provided to users and the choices of the persons concerned. $\hfill\Box$
These technical specifications are closely linked to the TCF policy (policies) in order to □
provide the technical functionality required to make the standard operational □
TCF.□
334. The defendant states in its pleadings that the treatment of these preferences, $\!$
in accordance with the rules imposed by the TCF on participating organisations, continues
the objective of allowing both publishers of websites and applications (publishers) and $\hfill\Box$
ad tech partners who support ad targeting, delivery and measurement□
and content (adtech providers) to obtain consent from users, to disclose□
in a transparent manner the purposes of their processing and to establish a legal basis□
valid for the processing of personal data for the purpose of providing between $\!$
other digital advertising117. This objective is also reflected in the TCF□
Policies118:□
"ii. The objective of the framework is to help players in the online ecosystem meet certain □
requirements of the "privacy and electronic communications" directive (and, by extension, $\!$
of its successor, the future "privacy and electronic communications" regulation) and of the $\!\!\!\!\!\square$
General Data Protection Regulation, by providing a means of informing□
users, among other things, of the storage and/or access to information on their devices,□

the fact that their personal data are processed, the purposes for which they are □
are processed, companies seeking to process their personal data to□
these purposes, giving users choice about it, and notifying third parties, among other things,□
what information has been disclosed to users and what their choices are. » $\square$
335. It is also clear from the documentation compiled by the defendant that the objectives of the $\square$
TC String are determined by IAB Europe:□
117 Defendant's Response, para. 33.□
118 IAB Europe Transparency & Consent Framework Policies v2019-08-21.3 (Exhibit 32); IAB Europe Transparency &□
Consent Framework Policies v2019-04-02.2c (Exhibit 38).□
76□
"The main purpose of a TC String is to encapsulate and encode all the information□
disclosed to a user and the expression of his preferences for the treatment of his□
personal data under the GDPR. Using a management platform□
consents (CMP), the information is captured in a coded and compact string□
transferable by HTTP. This chain is used to communicate information about□
transparency and consent to the entities, or "vendors", which process the data to be□
personal character of a user. Vendors decode a TC String to determine□
whether they have the necessary legal bases to process the personal data of a□
user for their purposes. » 119□
336. Although the Litigation Chamber emphasizes that the purpose of the processing of the TC String□
must be distinguished from the purposes of the processing that takes place outside the TCF, such as the□
processing and exchange of personal data contained in a bid request□
as part of the OpenRTB, she finds that the TCF is being offered for the purpose of promoting□
indirectly the use of OpenRTB. With this in mind, IAB Europe, in its capacity as□
Managing Organization, serves as a real hinge between the TCF and the OpenRTB, which, by□
elsewhere, was developed by IAB Tech Lab.□


which they are used. □
77□
■ Purpose 8 — Measure content performance □
■ Purpose 9 — Apply market research to generate information about  □
the audience □
■ Purpose 10 — Develop and improve products □
■ Special Purpose 1 — Provide security, prevent fraud and debug□
■ Special Purpose 2 — Technically deliver advertisements or content.  □
■ Feature 1 — Match and combine offline data sources□
line□
<ul> <li>Feature 2 — Link different devices□</li> </ul>
■ Feature 3 — Receive and use device characteristics sent□
automatically for identification□
■ Special Feature 1 — Use precise geolocation data□
<ul> <li>Special Feature 2 — Active analysis of device characteristics for□</li> </ul>
identification. □
338. The Litigation Chamber concludes that the purpose of the TC String, and in the broader sense of the □
treatment of the TC String within the TCF as described in the TCF Policies, has been established□
by IAB Europe.□
B.2.3 Determination of the means of processing personal data within □
of the TCF□
339. Determining the means of processing is the second cornerstone of accountability $\!\!\!\!\!\!\square$
treatment. With regard to the means of processing, the EDPB makes a distinction $\!\!\!\!\!\square$
between "essential" means and "non-essential" means. The choice of means not□
essentials can, in principle, be left to a subcontractor without the liability of□
the entity that determined the purposes is reduced124. □


340. The "essential means" are closely linked to the purpose and scope of the processing and □
are by nature reserved for the controller. Examples of essential means□
relate to the type of personal data processed ("what data is□
treated? ), the duration of the processing ("how long are they processed?"), the $\square$
categories of recipients ("who has access to it?") and categories of data subjects□
("Which personal data is processed?"). The "non-essential means", $\hfill\Box$
on the other hand, mainly concern the practical aspects of the implementation, such as□
the choice of a particular type of hardware or software or the detailed security measures
which can be left to the discretion of the subcontractor125.□
124 EDPB - Guidelines 07/2020 on the concepts of data controller and processor in the GDPR, v2.0, 2021, para. 39-41.
125 EDPB - Guidelines 07/2020 on the concepts of data controller and processor in the GDPR, v2.0, 2021, para. 40.□
<b>78</b> □
341.□
It is established by the Litigation Chamber, and also confirmed by the defendant126, that□
the Transparency and Consent Framework provides a framework of binding rules for□
participating organizations in handling user preferences. The□
TCF participants are expected to agree to the Transparency and □
IAB Europe Consent Framework (hereafter referred to as "Terms and Conditions") 127 for□
register. In doing so, the Litigation Chamber finds that IAB Europe does not only□
monitor compliance with specifications and TCF Policies, as Managing □
Organization. The defendant also defines the rules applicable to the □
treatment of TC Strings under the TCF, and it imposes these rules on organizations□
participants. □
342. In the following paragraphs, the Litigation Division will examine the extent to which□
Essential ways of processing the TC String are actually determined by□
IAB Europe.□



advertisers.
133 Consent Management Platform API v2.0, August 2019 (Exhibit 34), p. 4.□
134 Consent Management Platform API v2.0, August 2019 (Exhibit 34), p. 6.□
79□
345. With regard to the content of the TC String, the TCF Technical Specifications specify□
what information is included, including metadata such as the exact time at□
which the TC String was generated or modified. □
346. In this regard, the Litigation Division refers to the "Wirtschaftsakademie" judgment, in which□
the Court of Justice ruled that the entity responsible for defining, and a fortiori for imposing, the □
parameters of data processing, thus participates in the determination of the purposes and $\!\Box$
of the means of this treatment and must therefore be considered as the person responsible for the
treatment135. □
347. Storage location — In their written evidence, the plaintiffs argue□
that IAB Europe is responsible for the management of the Internet domain "consensu.org", to which□
return so-called "globally scoped" consent cookies136 and □
which as such allows CMPs to view and modify shared TC Strings□
between several websites or applications. □
348. On the other hand, IAB Europe indicates in its conclusions that, although it recorded the □
consensus.org domain, there is no storage of the TC String on the IAB Europe servers□
to which this consensus.org domain links. Indeed, IAB Europe delegates a sub-domain of $\!\!\!\!\square$
consensus.org to each registered CMP137, which stores the TC String on the user's device at□
using a euconsent-v2 cookie and □
associates it with the consensus.org domain. According□
the□
defendant, it is therefore only the CMP which generates and stores the TC String and the□
own CMP servers that have access to the TC String.□


349. In order to establish the responsibility of IAB Europe in the processing of TC Strings, it is □
necessary to determine to what extent delegating a subdomain to a CMP□
by IAB Europe implies that the defendant establishes at the very least the means (and the□
possible purposes) of this processing. □
350. The TCF technical specifications provide that sharing the TC String with the CMPs□
must be done in two ways: either by storing the TC String in a storage system□
chosen by the CMP, if it is a consent specific to a service138, either by storing□
the TC String in a shared consent cookie with global scope, associated with the domain□
Internet consensus.org of IAB Europe139.□
the CJEU of 5□
135 Stop□
June 2018, Unabhängiges Landeszentrum für Datenschutz Schleswig-Holstein v.□
Wirtschaftsakademie Schleswig-Holstein GmbH, C-210/16, ECLI: EU:C:2017:796, para. 39: "Under these conditions, there is re
to judge that the administrator of a fan page on Facebook, such as Wirtschaftsakademie, by defining parameters□
depending, in particular, on its target audience and the objectives of managing or promoting its activities, participates in the□
determination of the purposes and means of the processing of personal data of visitors to its fan page". □
136 Which contain the TC Strings.□
137It concerns more particularly the subdomain <name cmp="" of="" the="">.mgr.consensu.org. For example, for Onetrust, it□</name>
this is https://cookies.onetrust.mgr.consensu.org/.□
138 Concretely, this means that the user's consent is only valid for the website visited, and for the purposes□
accepted and approved suppliers. □
139 Chain of Transparency and Consent with Global Supplier and CMP List Formats v2.0, August□
2019 (Exhibit 35). □
80 🗆
351. On the basis of the technical reports and the statements of the parties at the hearing, the Chamber□
Litigation concludes that the specific consent to the service is established by means of a□





146 IAB Europe Transparency & Consent Framework Policies v2019-04-02.2c (Annex 32); IAB Europe Transparency & 🗆
Consent Framework Policies v2019-08-21.3 (Annex 32). Articles 8 and 15. □
82 🗆
1. A CMP will maintain records of consent, as required under the Policies and/or the □
Specifications, and will provide the MO access to such records upon request without undue □
delay.□
2. A CMP will retain a record of the UI that has been deployed on any given Publisher at any□
given time and make this record available to its Publisher client, Vendors, and/or the MO upon□
request.□
[]  □
15.Record Keeping□
1. A Vendor must maintain records of consent, as required under the Policies and the□
Specifications, and will provide the MO access to such records upon request without undue □
delay. □
2. A Vendor must maintain records of user identification, timestamps, and received Signals ☐
for the full duration of the relevant processing. A Vendor may maintain such records of user□
identification, timestamps, and Signals beyond the duration of the processing as required to□
comply with legal obligations or to reasonably defend or pursue legal claims, and/or for other□
processing allowed by law, under a valid legal basis, and consistent with the purposes for□
which the data was collected. »□
359. The Litigation Chamber therefore considers that IAB Europe is responsible for defining the □
criteria for determining retention periods for TC Strings.□
360. It follows from the above that, in addition to the purposes, it is IAB Europe which actually determines□
the means to generate, store and share the TC String by which the preferences,□
user objections and consent are handled. The following items are □

i.□
IAB Europe defines how CMPs can collect consent or □
user objections, generate a unique TC String and store the value of the □
TCString;□
ii.□
IAB Europe, in collaboration with IAB Tech Lab147 has developed the technical□
specifications of the API with which adtech providers, among others, can□
access in a standardized way to user preferences, managed by the□
CMP;□
iii.□
IAB Europe determines the location and method of storing cookies from□
consent, whether service-specific or global in scope;□
iv.□
IAB Europe maintains lists of registered CMPs and adtech providers and □
therefore determines to which recipients the data relating to the TC String is □
potentially communicated;□
147 IAB Europe worked with the IAB Tech Lab to determine the framework rules policies. IAB Europe has also□
entrusted Tech Lab with the development and hosting of technical implementations and specifications of the TCF,□
because of their technological expertise. □
83□
<b>v.</b>
IAB Europe determines the criteria according to which the retention periods of TCs□
Strings can be established, as well as how organizations□
participating in the TCF must make these TC Strings available to the Managing□
Organization, that is to say the defendant. □
361 Based on the above explanations, the Litigation Chamber considers that the □



148 CJEU Judgment of 10 July 2018, Tietosuojavaltuutettu and Jehovan todistajat - uskonnollinen yhdyskunta, C-25/17,□
ECLI:EU:C:2018:551, para. 66 and CJEU Judgment of July 29, 2019, Fashion ID GmbH & Co. KG, C-40/17, ECLI:EU:C:2019:6
para. 70.□
149 EDPB - Guidelines 07/2020 on the concepts of data controller and processor in the GDPR, v2.0, 2021, para. 52. □
150 Opinion of Advocate General Bobek in Fashion ID, C-40/17, ECLI: EU:C:2018:1039, para. 105: "Notwithstanding□
the fact that the precise uses of the data for commercial purposes are not necessarily the same, both the □
84□
also that joint participation in the definition of means and ends can□
take the form of a common decision, but also result from different decisions but□
convergence of two or more entities concerning the purposes and the essential means□
of data processing.□
366. Decisions can be considered convergent if they are □
complementary and necessary to processing in a way that confers influence□
tangible on the determination of the purposes and means of the processing. The question to□
to ask is whether the intended processing of personal data would be□
impossible without the participation of all parties, or more precisely, if the activities of□
processing carried out by each party are inseparable and indivisible.□
367. Both in its submissions and during the hearing, IAB Europe pointed out that the TCF and the□
OpenRTB protocol are completely independent of each other, in the sense that even □
without participation in the TCF, adtech providers can freely process data to □
personal character in the context of OpenRTB. On the other hand, the plaintiffs have□
always refers to the inherent interconnection between OpenRTB and TCF, that the□
defendant itself confirms — according to □
the plaintiffs — in□
TCFs□
Implementation Guidelines152. □

368. The Litigation Chamber finds that the defendant's argument cannot be followed,□
given that the defendant indicates on several occasions in its pleadings that the□
raison d'être of the TCF is precisely to put the processing of data in character□
staff based on the OpenRTB protocol, among others, in compliance with the□
applicable regulations, including the GDPR and the ePrivacy Directive. Although the□
The Litigation Chamber understands that the TCF can also be used by□
publishers for other applications153, in collaboration or not with the CMPs, it is□
also certain that the TCF was never intended to be a stand-alone ecosystem and □
independent. □
369. On the contrary, the Litigation Chamber notes that the Transparency and Consent Framework□
includes TCF Policies and technical specifications which should enable□
publishers of websites and applications (publishers) as well as adtech partners who□
support targeting, delivery and measurement of advertising and content□
(adtech providers), to transparently disclose their processing purposes,□
to establish a legal basis for the processing of personal data for the □
defendant in the main proceedings that Facebook Ireland appear overall to pursue the same purpose in a manner which□
seems mutually quite complementary. In the absence of identity, there is therefore a unity of finality: there is a finality□
commercial and advertising. »□
151 EDPB - Guidelines 07/2020 on the concepts of data controller and processor in the GDPR, v2.0, 2021, para. 54. □
152 https://github.com/InteractiveAdvertisingBureau/GDPR-Transparency-and-Consent-□
Framework/blob/master/TCFv2/TCF-Implementation-Guidelines.md#how-does-the-tc-string-apply-to-non-openrtb-□
situations. □
153 The TCF can thus also be used for non-marketing purposes, for example to measure audience,□
performance, etc□
85□
provision of digital advertising, and to obtain consent or identify□

user objections. □
370. Accordingly, the Litigation Division finds that the decisions translated by IAB Europe□
in the provisions of the TCF Policies and the technical specifications of the TCF, on the one hand,
and the means and ends determined by the participating organizations regarding $\!\!\!\!\!\square$
the processing — whether or not within the framework of OpenRTB — of character data $\hfill\Box$
personal users, on the other hand, should be seen as decisions□
convergent155. IAB Europe provides an ecosystem where consent,□
objections and preferences of users are collected and exchanged not to□
own or self-preservation purposes, but to facilitate further processing by□
third parties (namely: publishers and adtech providers). □
371. Consequently, the Litigation Chamber judges that IAB Europe and the organizations□
respective participants must be considered as data controllers□
spouses with respect to the collection and subsequent dissemination of consent, $\!$
objections and preferences of users, as well as for the related processing of their□
personal data, without the responsibility of the CMPs and the suppliers□
adtech participants does not reduce that of IAB Europe.□
has. Consent Management Platforms (CMP)□
372. CMPs ensure the technical implementation of consent banners by□
which data subjects indicate their choices regarding the processing of□
their personal data. □
373. More specifically, CMPs have the function of storing consent, objections and □
user preferences in the TC String, then store that value as□
a euconsent-v2 cookie in the browsers used to visit the website, and finally□
provide an API to adtech vendors so they can access the values of □
consent, objection and preference for each individual user156.□
374. CMPs wishing to register for the IAB Europe TCF v2.0 are required to put in place□

standardized processing purposes and functionalities in their user interface,□
in order to collect and store the data subject's preferences in this regard157. They□
must also respect the applicable legal principles, as defined in the□
TCF v2.0 from IAB Europe.□
375. The Litigation Chamber has already established that the TC String in itself does not allow□
directly identify people or devices. However, once the TC□
154 Respondent's submissions of March 25, 2021, para. 33. □
155 See para. 365-366.□
156 C. SANTOS, M. NOUWENS, M. TOTH, N. BIELOVA, V. ROCA, "Consent Management Platforms Under the GDPR: Proces
and/or Controllers? », in Privacy Technologies and Policy, APF 2021, LNCS, vol 12703, Springer, 2021, pp. 50-51.□
157 IAB Europe Transparency & Consent Framework Policies v2019-08-21.3 (Exhibit 32), p. 9 and following. □
86□
String is placed on the user's device, a CMP can assign a unique identifier □
to this TC String, i.e. the IP address of the device on which it is placed under the□
form of a euconsent-v2.158 cookie.□
376. To provide a CMP interface to users, publishers must implement code □
JavaScript CMP on their website. This code is then loaded directly from the server□
CMP or through the delegated subdomain. Following this HTTP(S) request, the publisher's server□
and the CMP server have access to the IP address of the user who visits the website and sees□
the CMP159 interface. □
377. Access to this IP address allows the CMPs to enrich the consent, objection and □
preferences contained in the TC String with other information already in their possession□
or in the possession of the publisher and linked to this same IP address. On this basis, the Chamber□
Litigation concludes that CMPs are able to process a large amount of data □
of a personal nature. □
378. The Litigation Chamber assesses the extent to which the CMPs act as□

processors or as (joint) controllers in paragraphs□
following.
379. According to the defendant, and as provided for in its TCF Policies, CMPs are in principle □
considered as subcontractors. The Litigation Chamber does not share this□
point of view for the following reasons. The main task of CMPs is to develop and □
to provide interfaces that can have a direct impact on the choice of people□
concerned. CMPs therefore play a key role, not only in the context of the TCF, but□
also with regard to the processing of personal data in the context of□
the OpenRTB. They are therefore required to comply with the principles of data protection □
set out in Article 5.1 of the GDPR (lawfulness, fairness and transparency of data processing □
personal).□
380. Although the TCF Policies prohibit CMPs from giving preference to certain □
adtech vendors on the Global Vendors List, and that they are therefore in principle required to □
introduce users to all TCF-registered vendors, unless instructed otherwise□
publishers161, some authors note that a certain number of CMPs do not respect□
this requirement. Either because CMPs require publishers to supply□
pre-selected, or because they refuse them the possibility of derogating from the complete list□
adtech providers, proposed by default162.□
158 See paras. 302 and following of this decision. See also C. SANTOS, M. NOUWENS, M. TOTH, N. BIELOVA, V.□
ROCA, "Consent Management Platforms Under the GDPR: Processors and/or Controllers? », in Privacy Technologies and □
Policy, APF 2021, LNCS, vol 12703, Springer, 2021, p. 50. □
159 Ibid., p. 5.□
160 IAB Europe Transparency & Consent Framework Policies v2019-08-21.3 (Exhibit 32), p. 9 and following. □
161 IAB Europe Transparency & Consent Framework Policies v2019-08-21.3 (Exhibit 32), p. 9, § 8 and p. 10, § 11.□
162 C. SANTOS, M. NOUWENS, M. TOTH, N. BIELOVA, V. ROCA, "Consent Management Platforms Under the GDPR: Proces
and/or Controllers? », in Privacy Technologies and Policy, APF 2021, LNCS, vol 12703, Springer, 2021, pp. 50-51.□

381. It should also be noted that the CMPs have a wide margin of appreciation with regard to $\!$
relates to the interface they offer to users. Indeed, the TCF Policies do not impose □
only minimum interface requirements to participating CMPs163, with the consequence□
that in practice, the interfaces and compliance with the principles of fairness and transparency
can vary greatly depending on the CMP with which website publishers and □
applications collaborate164.□
382. The above findings lead the Litigation Division to conclude that the CMPs□
play an important role and therefore bear a (joint) responsibility165 with regard to□
the purposes and means of processing users' personal data□
as part of the TCF and the OpenRTB protocol.□
383. The Litigation Division observes, however, that this conclusion does not mean for $\!$
as much as all CMPs must systematically be considered as □
controllers jointly with IAB Europe and the publishers, or that the □
scope of this joint responsibility is limitless. As explained□
earlier in this decision166, the list of CMPs implementing the TCF is exhaustive167□
due to mandatory registration and approval process with IAB□
Europe, as Managing Organization. The Litigation Chamber finds that the□
joint responsibility for control is established with respect to, respectively:□
has.□
the publisher of the site or application,□
$b.\Box$
the specific CMP set up by the publisher and providing the TCF interface to □
users,□
vs.□
IAB Europe, as Managing Organization. □


In this respect, the Litigation Chamber emphasizes that appropriate agreements must be □
put in place between the various joint controllers, in accordance with the□
requirements under Article 26 of the GDPR.□
384. CMPs are in principle required by TCF Policies — developed and administered□
by the defendant — to present by default in their interface all of the□
TCF-registered adtech providers. To the extent CMPs implement TCFs□
Policies, the Litigation Chamber finds that the defendant is responsible for the □
essential means of processing, since IAB Europe determines the recipients of the□
personal data collected, and is therefore jointly responsible for the□
163 IAB Europe Transparency & Consent Framework Policies v2019-08-21.3 (Exhibit 32), p. 61 and following. □
164 Technical analysis report from the Inspection Service, January 6, 2020 (Exhibit 53), p. 99-103. □
165See para. 360 of this decision on the processing responsibility of IAB Europe for the determination of □
recipients.□
166 See para. 102; 341; 344; 356-360; and 374 of this decision. □
167 As of November 2021, the list of registered CMPs includes 76 entries: https://iabeurope.eu/cmp-list/. □
88□
transmission of personal data, including certain data□
contained in the bid request. □
385. If, on the other hand, the CMPs deviate from the TCF Policies, the Litigation Chamber considers□
that, this time, the CMPs themselves act as data controllers□
data with regard to the recipients of the personal data. Insofar as□
the CMPs do not respect the instructions imposed on them, they are themselves□
themselves fully responsible168, in accordance with article 28.10 GDPR.□
386. Finally,□
when□
CMPs determine □


the□
list of recipients in accordance with□
instructions from the publishers, the Litigation Chamber finds that the publishers bear□
primary responsibility for the transfer of personal data to □
suppliers, without prejudice to the responsibility of IAB Europe, without which the global list□
of participating adtech providers would not exist in the first place. $\Box$
b. Publishers □
387. Publishers generally act as data controllers in the context of□
context of the TCF, as they are expected to decide whether or not to cooperate with a registered CMP,□
and are also able to determine which suppliers are authorized to provide□
advertising on their website or in their application. Additionally, publishers can□
exercise control over the legal basis for a specific processing purpose, and they□
may exclude certain processing purposes. □
388. Bid requests are sent by supply-side platforms, or □
SSP), in their capacity as representatives of publishers, to demand-side platforms□
(demand-side platforms, or DSPs), which represent adtech providers. The format and the $\!\square$
content (or "attributes") of these bid requests are determined in accordance with the technical□
specifications of the OpenRTB protocol, independent of the TCF.□
389. As confirmed by the reports of the Inspection Service, IAB Europe does not participate in the $\!\square$
determining the attributes of a specific bid request. These are mainly the□
website and app publishers who decide which attributes to include in a bid $\!\Box$
request and forward to adtech vendors.□
390. A bid request contains at least one unique identifier for each bid request (Bid ID) and □
a unique identifier for the auctioned advertising space (Item ID). Additionally, a bid $\!\!\!\!\square$
request usually contains information about the user's device, details of□
the user, the website or the application, and technical details about the advertising space□

(Print)170.□
168 EDPB - Guidelines 07/2020 on the concepts of data controller and processor in the GDPR, v2.0, 2021, para. 150.□
169 IAB Europe Transparency & Consent Framework Policies v2019-08-21.3 (Exhibit 32), p. 21-22.□
170 Technical analysis report from the Inspection Service, June 4, 2019 (Exhibit 24), p. 12-13. □
89□
391. Based on the foregoing, the Litigation Division finds that the bid request contains□
the most personal data, and that this data is not processed by the□
defendant, but mainly by□
publishers,□
CMPs and □
the different□
adtech providers who are in principle all bound to respect the values of the TC String,□
in accordance with the TCF Policies.□
392. To the extent that a publisher relies on a CMP that has implemented the TCF, the bid request□
will also contain a TC String indicating the preferences of the website visitor or□
the app user. The Litigation Chamber is of the opinion that this can be□
considered not only as additional proof that the TC String is indeed a □
personal data, since it is information relating to a person□
physically identifiable171, but also as proof that the preferences stored in□
the TC String have a direct and significant impact on subsequent processing activities. □
393. Therefore, when a user knowingly or unknowingly gives consent through the □
through an "accept all" button in a CMP interface, and that the website editor and the□
CMP have not deviated from the full list of participating adtech vendors, that means□
that the personal data of the data subject will be shared with□
hundreds of third parties. □
394. Consistent with its previous findings regarding CMPs,172 the Chamber□

Litigation believes that publishers also act as responsible for the□
processing of user preferences in a TC String as well as their data□
of a personal nature addressed in a bid request.□
395. In addition, the Litigation Division refers to Article 23.5 of the TCF Policies, which prohibits□
publishers to modify the purposes of the processing, or to give the CMPs any instructions to □
this effect.□
396. Therefore, to the extent that publishers decide not to deviate from the list of□
adtech providers offered by default and accept all processing purposes□
proposed, the Litigation Chamber also considers that IAB Europe acts as□
joint data controller with the publishers with respect to the□
recipients of the TC String as well as the processing purposes for which the data□
personal data of users will be processed.□
vs. adtech suppliers□
397. The Litigation Chamber has already found that IAB Europe is responsible for the $\!\Box$
definition of the different processing purposes within the framework of the TCF174.□
171 See paras. 291 and following of this decision. □
172 See para. 382 et seq. of this decision. □
173 IAB Europe Transparency & Consent Framework Policies v2019-08-21.3 (Exhibit 32), p. 22-23. □
174 See para. 331 et seq. of this decision. □
90□
398. When registering for TCF v2.0, adtech providers must also choose the □
intended processing purposes and possible legal bases, starting from a list□
fixed and predetermined goals.□
399. In this sense, the Litigation Chamber finds that adtech suppliers as well as the $\!\Box$
defendant are jointly responsible for the processing that takes place in the□
context of OpenRTB, for processing purposes and in accordance with preferences,□


the actual capture of the signal of□
175 WP171 - Opinion 2.2010 on online behavioral advertising, p. 10-11.□
176 https://iabeurope.eu/vendor-list-tcf-v2-0/.□
91 🗆
consent, objections and preferences of users in the TC String by the □
CMP (a), and, on the other hand, the collection and dissemination of personal data of $\!\!\!\!\square$
users by participating organizations (b). □
has. Registration of the signal of consent, objections and preferences of the $\!\square$
users by means of the TC String.□
404. The Litigation Chamber notes that users are nowhere informed of the □
legal basis for CMPs to process their personal and individual preferences□
regarding the purposes and authorized adtech providers. □
405. The defendant's underlying reasoning in this respect is that the TC String is not□
personal data and that, therefore, no legal basis is□
required for its processing. □
406. As already established,□
the Litigation Chamber does not share□
the position of□
the□
defendant177. The Litigation Chamber has established that the generation and dissemination of□
TC String do involve the processing of personal data.178 By□
Consequently, this processing must in any case be based on one of the bases□
legal treatment limits listed in Article 6 of the GDPR. For this reason,□
the Litigation Chamber will examine the question of whether one of the legal bases of □
Article 6 GDPR can be applied.□
407. First of all, the Litigation Chamber finds that neither the TCF Policies nor the TCF□





180 CJEU judgment of 11 December 2019, TK v. Asociația de Proprietari block M5A-ScaraA, C-708/18, ECLI:EU:C:2019:1064,
para. 44.□
181CJEU judgment of 4 May 2017, Valsts policijas Rīgas reģiona pārvaldes Kārtības policijas pārvalde t. Rīgas pašvaldības□
SIA "Rīgas satiksme", C-13/16; ECLI: EU:C:2017:336, para. 28-31. See also Judgment of the CJEU of December 11, 2019,□
TK v. Asociația de Proprietari block M5A-ScaraA, C-708/18, ECLI:EU:C:2019:1064, para. 40.□
93 🗆
2)□
the envisaged processing is necessary for the realization of these interests (criterion of□
" need ") ; and □
3)□
the balancing of these interests with the fundamental interests, freedoms and rights□
of the data subjects leans in favor of the controller or a□
third party ("balancing" criterion).□
413. With regard to the first condition, the Litigation Chamber considers that□
recording users' consent and preferences in order to ensure and □
to be able to demonstrate that they validly consented or did not oppose the□
processing of their personal data for advertising purposes, may be□
considered to be carried out in a legitimate interest.□
414. The interest pursued by the defendant as data controller□
can, in accordance with recital 47 of the GDPR, be considered legitimate in itself.□
In particular, the ability to store user preferences182 is a□
essential element of the TCF and the Litigation Chamber notes that this is done in the interest□
legitimate of the defendant as well as of the third parties concerned, such as adtech suppliers□
attendees. □
415. Therefore, the first condition set out in Article 6.1.f of the GDPR is met. □
416. To fulfill the second condition, it must then be demonstrated that the processing is □

necessary for the achievement of the purposes pursued. This means in particular that it is necessary to □
ask if the same result can be obtained by other means, without treatment of□
personal data or without processing that is unnecessarily burdensome for the □
persons concerned. □
417. Given the objective of enabling both publishers of websites or□
applications and participating adtech providers to communicate the purposes of their□
processing in a transparent manner, to establish a valid legal basis for the processing□
personal data in order to provide digital advertising, and to collect□
consent — or to identify whether an objection has, if any, been made to the □
processing of data based on their legitimate interest183 —, the Litigation Chamber□
must check whether the personal data included in the TC String are □
limited to what is strictly necessary to register the consent, the□
specific user's objections and preferences. □
418. This second condition can also be fulfilled by respecting the principle of □
data minimization (article 5.1.c of the GDPR). The Litigation Chamber notes that the□
182 Including obtaining valid consent before processing personal data, or allowing data subjects to □
users to object to processing based on Article 6.1.f GDPR at the time of collection of personal data□
personal.
183 IAB Europe Transparency & Consent Framework - Policies, Version 2020-11-18.3.2a, p. 5, https://iabeurope.eu/iab-□
europe-transparency-consent-framework-policies/
94□
information processed in a TC String184 is limited to data strictly□
necessary to achieve the desired objective. Furthermore, on the basis of the documents in the file and the □
defenses of the parties, the Litigation Division was not able to establish□
that the TC String is kept indefinitely.□
419. In order to verify whether the third condition of Article 6.1.f of the GDPR — the criterion of "implementation □




possibly sensitive of this data, as well as the nature and concrete methods□
the data processing in question, in particular the number of people who have access□
184 See para. 300 and 301 of this decision.□
185 Recital 47 GDPR.□
186 CJEU judgment of 11 December 2019, TK v. Asociația de Proprietari block M5A-ScaraA, C-708/18, ECLI:EU:C:2019:1064,
58.□
187 Ibid., para. 56.□
95□
to this data and the methods of access to the latter"188. In this context, the House□
Litigation highlights the large number of participating organizations that have access to the □
TC String, as well as the reduced control of data subjects over the nature and scope□
the processing of their personal data by these organisations.□
424. In the absence of a valid legal basis, the Litigation Division judges that the processing□
data under the TCF in its current format, whereby CMPs□
store user preferences in a TC String, does not conform to □
GDPR Article 6.□
425. It is therefore undeniable for the Litigation Chamber that IAB Europe, as□
Managing Organization of the TCF, did not provide a legal basis for the treatment of□
user preferences in the form of a TC String and therefore violated Article 6 of the□
GDPR.□
b. Collection and dissemination of personal data under the RTB□
426. It is undisputed by any of the parties that the TCF aims to capture, by means of the interfaces□
presented by the CMPs, the users' consent or their lack of objection to the □
legitimate interests of participating adtech providers.□
427. For the record, the Litigation Division emphasizes that these two bases concern the□
processing activities that take place within the framework of the RTB, in accordance with the protocol□

OpenR1B.
428. However, the Litigation Chamber judges that none of the bases proposed and implemented □
implemented by the TCF cannot be legally invoked by the participants of the TCF. All □
first, the Litigation Chamber considers that the consent of the persons concerned□
obtained through the CMP is not valid (i) and that the (pre)contractual necessity is not□
not applicable (ii). In addition, the Litigation Chamber considers that the legitimate interest does not □
does not meet the CJEU's triple test (iii). Article 6 of the GDPR is therefore infringed.□
(i) - Consent is not a valid basis for processing operations□
in the OpenRTB as facilitated by the TCF□
429. In order to ensure that publishers and adtech providers comply with the requirements□
more stringent transparency and consent requirements under the GDPR with respect to□
regarding the processing of personal data in the context of□
OpenRTB (or RTB in general), CMPs provide a relatively□
standardized allowing users to consent or oppose the transfer of their□
personal data to hundreds of third parties at once, for□
specific purposes. □
188 CJEU judgment of 11 December 2019, TK v. Asociația de Proprietari block M5A-ScaraA, C-708/18, ECLI:EU:C:2019:1064,
57.□
96□
430. Based on the documents in this case, the Litigation Chamber understands that the □
participants can pursue one or more purposes among□
the 12 purposes □
standards that the TCF makes available to participating adtech providers, and which□
are offered to users through the CMP189.□
431. However, the CMP system poses problems at several levels, with□
consequence that the consent obtained by these CMPs (through the TCF), for□

the processing carried out within the framework of the OpenRTB, is not legally valid $\hfill\Box$
with regard to article 7 GDPR.□
432. In order to be able to be used as a legitimate legal basis, consent under □
Article 7 of the GDPR must meet strict conditions. However, for the reasons□
set out below, the Litigation Chamber considers that the consent obtained by $\!$
CMPs and publishers in the current version of the TCF is insufficiently free, $\!$
specific, informed and unambiguous. □
433. First of all, the Litigation Division finds that the processing purposes proposed □
are not described clearly enough, and in some cases are even□
misleading190. By way of example, the Litigation Division finds that the purposes $8\square$
("Measure content performance") and 9 ("Apply market research to generate audience $\!$
insights")191 provide little or no guidance on the scope of the processing, the nature of the $\!\!\!\!\!\square$
personal data processed, or the retention period of the data to be ☐
personal character collected as long as the user does not withdraw his consent. □
434. In addition, based on the documents in the file, the Litigation Division understands that□
the CMP user interface does not provide an overview of data categories to□
personal character collected, which makes it impossible for users to give their□
informed consent. □
435. The Litigation Division also notes that the TCF makes it particularly difficult for□
users to obtain more information about the identity of all those responsible for the□
data processing to which they give their consent to process their data□
for certain purposes before obtaining their consent. In particular, recipients for□
which consent is collected are so numerous that users would need □
disproportionately long for□
read these□
information, which means□

their□
consent can rarely be sufficiently informed.□
436. In addition, the information CMPs provide to users remains too□
general to reflect the specific processing operations of each supplier□
adtech, which prevents the necessary granularity of consent.
189 For an overview of these TCF objectives, see paragraph 337 of this decision.□
190 See para. 465 et seq. of this decision.□
191 IAB Europe Transparency & Consent Framework Policies v2019-08-21.3 (Exhibit 32), p. 34-36.□
97□
437. In addition, the Litigation Chamber considers that the enrichment of the data contained □
in a bid request, using personal data already in the possession of the□
adtech providers and relevant CMPs, implies that users cannot□
be adequately informed, since the TCF does not provide in its current format that□
participating organizations□
indicate which personal data they□
hold or what processing operations they already carry out with this data. □
438. Finally, the Litigation Chamber finds that the consent, once obtained by the $\!\Box$
CMP, cannot be removed by users as easily as given, as required□
yet Article 7 of the GDPR. First of all, the Litigation Chamber observes that under□
of the TCF Policies, adtech providers are required to comply with the signals of□
consent of a user in real time192, while no measures are put in place□
to ensure that adtech providers cannot continue processing on the□
based on a previously received consent signal. Moreover, the TCF does not provide□
no proactive transmission of updated consent signals to providers□
adtech. In addition, adtech providers can in principle no longer access the data□
of a personal nature□




as audience measurement and performance measurement.
442. As indicated above194, the assessment of legitimate interests must be carried out□
based on the three-step approach established by the Court of Justice. This appreciation□
must be performed by data controllers prior to implementation□
processing based on Article 6.1.f GDPR, as they determine the means and $\!$
the purposes of the personal data processing activities envisaged and $\!\Box$
are therefore the only ones in a position to put in place appropriate safeguards to avoid a $\!\!\!\!\!\square$
disproportionate impact on□
the people concerned. In □
the case where several □
controllers are jointly responsible, □
the principles of □
accountability and transparency require that□
balancing is done □
jointly by all data controllers involved in the□
treatment. □
443. As stated by the Article 29 Working Party, the consequences, both positive and □
negative effects must be taken into account to assess the impact of the treatment, which must□
be necessary and proportionate to the achievement of the legitimate interests pursued by the
data controllers or by a third party. These consequences may include □
"decisions or possible measures that will be taken subsequently by third parties and □
situations where the processing may lead to the exclusion of certain persons, to a $\!\!\!\!\square$
discrimination against them, defamation or, more generally, situations which $\!\!\!\!\!\square$
entail a risk of harm to reputation, bargaining power or autonomy□
of the data subject."195□
444. With regard to the purpose test, in particular the question of whether the interests □

pursued by publishers and adtech providers through data processing□
of a personal nature can be recognized as legitimate, the Litigation Chamber□
understands that participating organizations have an interest in collecting and processing□
personal data of users in order to be able to offer them advertisements□
tailored.□
445. Based on the case law of the Court of Justice and the guidelines of the EDPB, the□
Litigation Chamber considers that the notion of legitimate interest can have a broad scope,□
Being heard that□
interest□
invoked by a data controller must be □
sufficiently specific, existing, current and not hypothetical196.□
194 See para. 411 et seq.□
195 Article 29 Working Party - Opinion 06.2014 on the notion of legitimate interests of the data controller□
under article 7 of directive 95-46-CE (WP217), p. 37.□
196 CJEU judgment of 11 December 2019, TK c. Asociația de Proprietari block M5A-ScaraA, C-708/18, ECLI:EU:C:2019:1064,
para. 44. □
99 🗆
446. In this respect, the Litigation Division can only note that, firstly, the □
proposed processing purposes are described in general terms, so that it is not□
easy for users to assess the extent to which the collection, dissemination and □
processing of their personal data is necessary for the purposes□
envisaged, insofar as these are understandable for the users.□
447. To be relevant, a legitimate interest must comply with European and national law□
applicable, be sufficiently specific and formulated clearly so that an implementation □
balance is permitted, and represent a real and current interest. Therefore, the mere fact□
to invoke a legitimate interest in the processing of personal data is not□

not enough ; the outcome of the balancing test will determine whether Article 6.1.f GDPR can□
to be invoked.□
448. The TCF Policies do not provide for an obligation for CMPs to explain in clear terms□
users the legitimate interests at stake. Instead, the specific requirements for□
the Framework UIs in relation to the legitimate interests contained in the TCF Policies198□
only require CMPs to provide an information layer□
secondary, allowing users:□
has. to obtain information on the fact that personal data is□
processed, as well as the nature of the personal data processed (for $\!$
example, unique identifiers, browsing data);□
b. to obtain information on the scope of processing based on legitimate interest and $\hfill\Box$
the scope of any objection to such processing;□
vs. to access the parameters in the CMP interface in order to oppose the processing of $\!\!\!\!\square$
their personal data based on a legitimate interest;□
d. examine the list of processing purposes, including their standard name and their□
full standard description, as defined in Appendix A of the TCF Policies, and of□
provide users with a mechanism to see which adtech providers are dealing with□
their data for each of the purposes on the basis of a legitimate interest;□
e. to exercise their right of opposition, either with respect to each adtech supplier whose □
the processing is based on the legitimate interest, either, separately, for each $\!$
purpose pursued by adtech providers on the basis of a legitimate interest;□
f. consult the list of names of adtech suppliers, as well as their objectives and $\hfill\Box$
their legal bases, and to access a link to the privacy policy. □
confidentiality of each adtech supplier. □
449. By way of example, the Litigation Division refers to the definitions of the purpose of□
processing 5 (Create a personalized content profile), in appendix A of TCF Policies 199:□


197 Ibid., p. 25.□
198 IAB Europe Transparency & Consent Framework Policies v2020-11-18.3.2.a, pp.67-68.□
199 IAB Europe Transparency & Consent Framework Policies v2020-11-18.3.2.a, p. 32.□
100□
450. Notwithstanding that the TCF Policies state that they establish requirements □
language, design and other elements in the interface□
user framework (Framework UI), which are intended to align with legal requirements□
European regulations on privacy and data protection, the□
The Litigation Chamber also notes that the general rules and conditions for□
Framework UI also specify that□
"b. When providing transparency about Purposes and Features, the Framework UI must do□
so only on the basis of the standard Purpose, Special Purpose, Feature, and Special Feature
names and definitions of Appendix A as they are published on the Global Vendor List or using
Stacks200 in accordance with the Policies and Specifications. UIs must make available the
standard legal text of Purposes, Special Purposes, Features, and Special Features of □
Appendix A but may substitute or supplement the standard legal definitions with the □
standard user friendly text of Appendix A so long as the legal text remains available to the□
user and it is explained that these legal texts are definitive. $\mbox{\ensuremath{\square}}$
451. The Litigation Chamber interprets these general rules as prohibiting CMPs and □
publishers participating in the TCF to explain more to the persons concerned, to□
clear and user-friendly manner, both the legitimate interests pursued as well as the reasons
200 Stacks are, in essence, a combination of different treatment goals. □
101□
for which they believe that their interests are not superseded by the interests or $\!\!\!\!\!\!\square$
fundamental rights and freedoms of data subjects. □
452. Although, in the context of this case, the Litigation Division does not rule □




under article 7 of directive 95-46-CE (WP217), p. 47.□
202 Contrary to the interest pursued by capturing user choices in a TC String, as analyzed in□
para. 404 and following.□
203 CJEU judgment of 4 May 2017, Valsts policijas Rīgas reģiona pārvaldes Kārtības policijas pārvalde t. Rīgas pašvaldības□
SIA "Rīgas satiksme", C-13/16; ECLI: EU:C:2017:336, para. 47.□
204 Ibid., para. 48.□
205 In this regard, some authors claim that there are alternatives to the RTB, in which only information □
minimums on the user are communicated. See M. VEALE, FR. ZUIDERVEEN BORGESIUS, "Adtech and Real-Time Bidding
under European Data Protection Law", German Law Journal, 31 July 2021, p. 19 and following. The authors mention in□
particular the Adnostic browser plug-in, developed ten years ago, which builds a profile based on the behavior of□
user navigation in order to target advertisements, the information leaving the user's device is minimal and the□
behavioral targeting taking place exclusively in the user's browser. In addition, the authors refer to the□
Google's system called Federated Learning of Cohorts (FLoC) for micro-targeting in Chrome.□
102□
concerned should also be taken into account, in accordance with recital 47
of the GDPR, in addition to the circumstances specific to the particular case206.□
458. The criterion of the seriousness of the violation of the rights and freedoms of the data subject□
constitutes an essential element of the case-by-case assessment required by Article 6.1.f of the □
GDPR207. In this context, according to the Court of Justice, account should be taken in particular□
of "the nature of the personal data in question, in particular the nature□
possibly sensitive of this data, as well as the nature and concrete methods□
the data processing in question, in particular the number of people who have access□
to this data and the methods of access to the latter208". □
459. Once again, the Litigation Chamber notes, firstly, that due to the large□
number of TCF partners likely to receive their personal data,□

resulting from this transfer. Added to this is the huge amount of data that, □
in accordance with the preferences entered as part of the TCF, are collected through□
of a bid request and transmitted to adtech suppliers as part of the protocol□
OpenRTB209.□
460. Furthermore, the EDPB indicates that the legitimate interest does not constitute a sufficient legal basis□
in the context of direct marketing implementing behavioral advertising210.□
Similarly, the ICO concluded in a recent report that legitimate interest is not a basis for□
legality in the context of the RTB (despite this many publishers base their□
processing on this legal basis)211. In summary, in view of the foregoing, the Chamber□
Litigation judges that the third condition imposed by article 6.1.f GDPR and the □
case law of the Court is not satisfied in this case.□
461. In light of the above considerations, the Litigation Chamber considers that□
the legitimate interest of the participating organizations cannot be considered as a□
adequate legal basis for the processing activities carried out under the protocol□
OpenRTB, in accordance with user preferences and choices entered into the□
TCF framework. □
206 CJEU judgment of 11 December 2019, TK v. Asociația de Proprietari block M5A-ScaraA, C-708/18, ECLI:EU:C:2019:1064,
para. 58.□
207 Ibid., para. 56.□
208 CJEU judgment of 11 December 2019, TK v. Asociația de Proprietari block M5A-ScaraA, C-708/18, ECLI:EU:C:2019:1064,
para. 57.□
209 Norsk Forbrukerrådet - "Out of Control. How consumers are exploited by the advertising industry in□
line", 14 January 2020, https://www.forbrukerradet.no/undersokelse/no-undersokelsekategori/report-out-of-control/, p.□
36-37; see also Recommendation CM/Rec(2021)8 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe to the States□
members on the protection of individuals with regard to the automatic processing of personal data in the□
frame□


https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=0900001680a46147.
210 Article 29 Working Party - Opinion 03/2013 on purpose limitation (WP 203), 2 April 2013, p. 46: "consent□
should be required, for example, for tracking and profiling for the purposes of direct marketing, behavioral advertising,
brokerage of data, location-based advertising or tracking-based digital market research". □
211 Information Commissioner's Office - "Update report□
https://ico.org.uk/media/about-the-ico/documents/2615156/adtech-real-time-bidding-report-201906-dl191220.pdf
into adtech and real time bidding", 20 □
june 2019,□
november□
profiling, $\Box$
from□
$3\square$
103□
(iii) - Contractual necessity is not a valid basis for the processing of□
personal data in the context of TCF and OpenRTB□
462. In accordance with the guidelines of the EDPB, the Litigation Chamber notes that,□
generally, the (pre)contractual necessity of the processing is not a legal basis□
applicable to behavioral advertising.□
463. In addition, the Litigation Division notes that the current version of the TCF does not mention □
nowhere Article 6.1.b GDPR as a possible legal basis for the processing of □
personal data within the TCF and OpenRTB.□
464. On the basis of the foregoing, the Litigation Chamber therefore concludes that the □
processing of personal data within the framework of the OpenRTB, on the basis of□
preferences captured in accordance with the current version of the TCF, is incompatible□
with the GDPR due to an inherent violation of the principle of lawfulness and fairness. □




provided to data subjects, which has been established by IAB Europe, does not comply with□
the requirement of a "transparent, comprehensible and easily accessible form"216. □
The former Article 29 Working Party sets out in its guidelines on the □
transparency that "The requirement that the provision of information to data subjects□
and that communications addressed to them are carried out in a "concise" manner.
and transparent" means that data controllers should present the□
information/communications effectively and succinctly to avoid drowning□
of information to the persons concerned"217. In addition, data subjects must□
be able to determine the scope and consequences of the processing in advance and not be $\!\!\!\!\square$
later surprised by other ways of using □
their personal data □
personal218. □
470. The Litigation Chamber considers that the approach adopted so far does not meet□
the conditions of transparency and fairness required by the GDPR. Some of the purposes of □
treatment announced are in fact expressed in a way that is too generic for the□
data subjects are properly informed of the exact scope and nature□
processing of their personal data. This is particularly□
problematic for purposes that rely on the consent of individuals□
concerned, because the consent must be specific and sufficiently informed to be□
valid as a legal basis. □
471. The Litigation Division also refers to the examples of CMP specified in the□
technical report of the Inspection Service, and notes that the interface offered to□
users does not allow, among other things, to identify in a simple and clear manner the purposes□
processing associated with the authorization of a particular adtech provider or to identify $\!$
adtech providers who will process their data for a specific purpose221.□
472. In this regard, the Litigation Division underlines that the large number of third parties, namely□



These measures should also be reviewed and updated if necessary. This article □
reflects the principle of "responsibility"" set out in Article 5.2 of the GDPR, according to which "the □
controller is responsible for compliance with paragraph 1 (liability) and $\hfill\Box$
can prove it". Article 24.2 of the GDPR provides that, when □
are proportionate to the processing activities, the measures referred to in Article□
24.1 of the GDPR below include the implementation of data protection policies□
appropriate data by the controller.□
475. Recital 74 of the GDPR adds that "there is a need to establish the liability of the controller□
processing for any processing of personal data that it carries out itself□
itself or which is carried out on its behalf. In particular, it is important that the head of the □
processing is required to implement appropriate and effective measures and either□
even to demonstrate the compliance of processing activities with this Regulation, including
including the effectiveness of the measures. These measures should take into account the nature, $\!$
scope, context and purposes of the processing as well as the risk it presents□
for the rights and freedoms of natural persons. $\mbox{\ensuremath{\triangleright}}\square$
476. It is also the responsibility of the data controller, in accordance with Articles 24□
(liability) and 25 GDPR (data protection by design and by default),□
integrate the necessary compliance with the rules of the GDPR into its processing and procedures $\!$
(for example, ensuring the existence and effectiveness of procedures for handling $\!\!\!\!\square$
requests from data subjects, and relating to the verification of the integrity and $\hfill\Box$
conformity of the TC String).□
b. The contours of the safety obligation □
477. In accordance with Article 32 GDPR, the controller is responsible for □
guarantee the security of the processing, "taking into account the state of knowledge, the costs of
guarantee the security of the processing, "taking into account the state of knowledge, the costs of □ 106 □



traceable. □
481. The Litigation Chamber also recalls the requirement of Article 25 GDPR (protection□
data by design and by default), which imposes on the controller□
to integrate the necessary compliance with the rules of the GDPR upstream of its actions. $\hfill\Box$
482. It should also be noted that the security principle, with its various□
components of data integrity, confidentiality and availability, is set out in□
articles 5.1.f and 32 of the GDPR and is now regulated in the GDPR in the same way as $\!\!\!\!\square$
the fundamental principles of lawfulness, transparency and fairness. $\hfill\Box$
222 See para. 448 and following of this decision. □
107□
483. IAB Europe offers the TCF to make the OpenRTB protocol GDPR compliant. In□
in other words, the objective of the TCF is to guarantee that the processing of data to $\!$
personal character under the OpenRTB protocol take place in accordance with the□
GDPR as well as the ePrivacy Directive. Therefore, IAB Europe, as Managing□
Organization of the TCF and joint controller of the processing operations carried out□
in this context223, must take organizational and technical measures to guarantee□
that participants comply with at least the TCF Policies. □
484. Although in the current TCF system of IAB Europe, adtech providers receive the□
consent signals as part of an HTTP(S) request or via the APIs of □
sailors, some authors believe that the measures in place under the TCF are □
insufficient to guarantee the integrity of consent signals (in particular their□
validity) and to ensure that an adtech provider actually received them (rather than□
generated itself)224. □
485. However, in the absence of validation by IAB Europe, it becomes theoretically possible for□
CMPs to tamper with or modify the signal to generate a euconsent-v2 cookie and so□
reproduce a "false consent" of users for all purposes and for all □




this introduction of the TCF Vendor Compliance Program is insufficient to put the □
defendant in compliance with the security obligation. □
488. In particular, the Litigation Chamber relies on the fact that the sanctions regime of this□
new program, provided by the defendant in the event of non-compliance with the rules of the TCF, $\!$
is permissive and not dissuasive. Indeed, an adtech supplier can claim responsibility $\!\!\!\!\!\!\!\square$
of a violation up to three times, without any sanction, before benefiting from a $\!\!\!\!\!\square$
28 days to comply. Only in the event of non-compliance after□
the expiration of 28 days the adtech vendor will be suspended from the Global Vendors List. □
He can also be reintroduced in the list if he complies with the rules afterwards. the $\!\!\!\!\!\!\square$
program also provides that an adtech provider may commit an offense□
up to four times, before proceeding with his immediate suspension for a brief□
14 day period, until the supplier comes into compliance. The "TCF Vendor□
Compliance Programme" is therefore not a sufficient measure to ensure the□
security of the processing of personal data carried out within the framework of the TCF. $\Box$
489. The Litigation Chamber also observes that no measure other than the "TCF Vendor□
Compliance Programme" is intended by the defendant to monitor or prevent the□
tampering with or modifying the TC String. □
490. With regard to the Complainants' allegation that IAB Europe is also in breach□
Articles 44 to 49 of the GDPR, the Litigation Chamber recognizes, in view of the scope of the TCF $\Box$
— which involves a large number of participating organizations — that it is clear that the
personal data included in the TC Strings will be transferred at some point□
given outside the EEA by the CMPs, and that the defendant acts as responsible □
processing in this respect (see paras. 356-357). However, the Litigation Chamber notes□
that the Inspection Service did not include in its report an assessment of a transfer□
concrete international data. For this reason, the Litigation Chamber concludes that it□
there is a violation of the GDPR, but given the absence of proof of an international transfer□

systematic, as well as the scope and nature thereof, the Litigation Chamber□
considers that it is not in a position to sanction the defendant for a violation of the □
articles 44 to 49 of the GDPR. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Litigation Division judges□
also that these international transfers of personal data, the case□
applicable, should be evaluated first by publishers and CMPs implementing□
works the TCF. The Litigation Chamber finds that publishers are responsible and $\hfill\Box$
liable to take the necessary measures to prevent the personal data□
personal data collected through their website and/or application are not transferred □
outside the EEA without adequate international transfer mechanisms. □
491. However, the Litigation Division is also of the opinion that the defendant should □
facilitate the due diligence incumbent on publishers and CMPs, by $\!\!\!\square$
109□
e.g. requiring adtech providers to clearly indicate whether they are localized $\!\!\!\!\!\!\!\square$
outside the EEA or if they plan to transfer personal data at a later date □
personnel outside the EEA through their subcontractors. Furthermore, the □
Litigation Chamber notes that, contrary to its obligation under the□
principles of liability and data protection by design and by default,□
IAB Europe has no mechanism in place to ensure that publishers and □
Participating CMPs have adequate mechanisms in place for transfers□
potential international partners of the TC String, as provided for in Articles 44 to 49 of the GDPR, $\!\Box$
both at the time of its creation and during the transmission of the TC String to the suppliers $\Box$
adtech participants. The preamble to the TCF Policies simply states that the TCF "is not□
intended nor has it been designed to facilitate [] more strictly regulated processing
activities, such as transferring personal data outside of the EU". The Litigation Chamber□
considers that this does not meet the requirements of Articles 24 and 25 of the GDPR.□
492. The Litigation Division notes, for the record, that it is not certain that, given the □

its current architecture and support for the OpenRTB protocol, the TCF can be □
reconciled with the GDPR. □
493. In this sense, the responsibility of IAB Europe is engaged from the moment when the organization $\square$
designs and makes available a consent or objection management system for□
users, but does not take the necessary steps to ensure compliance, $\!$
the integrity and validity of such consent or objection. □
494. The Litigation Chamber therefore notes that, within the framework of its security obligations□
and integrity,□
he□
responsibility of IAB Europe to take effective measures, both□
organizational and technical, to guarantee and be able to demonstrate the integrity of the signal □
preference transmitted by CMPs to adtech suppliers. □
B.4.4 - Other alleged violations of the GDPR□
has. Purpose limitation and data minimization (Art. 5.1.b and 5.1.c GDPR)□
495. Although in this decision, the Litigation Chamber has already concluded that the transactions □
processing methods based on the OpenRTB protocol do not comply with the principles $\!$
fundamentals of purpose limitation and data minimization227 (therefore □
that no guarantee is provided to ensure that the personal data□
collected and disseminated within the framework of the OpenRTB are limited to information strictly□
necessary for the purposes pursued), the Litigation Chamber emphasizes that the plaintiffs $\!$
have explicitly stated in their conclusions that they limit the scope of their claims
processing operations within the TCF. The Inspection Service also clarified □
in its report that IAB Europe does not act as a data controller□
227 See para. 455-456 of this decision□
110□
data for processing operations that take place entirely within the framework of □

the OpenRTB. □
496. Given these details, the Litigation Chamber concludes that, given the limited quantity□
data relating to a user which is stored in a TC String before being□
saved using a euconsent-v2 cookie, there is no violation of the principles of□
Purpose limitation and data minimization in the context of the TCF. □
497. Although larger amounts of personal data are processed □
at a later stage, including special categories of personal data□
personal, this is not the case in the context of the TCF. Within the framework of the TCF, there is therefore no□
no violation of the principles of purpose limitation and data minimization. □
b. Limitation of storage (Art. 5.1.e GDPR)□
498. With regard to the principle of limitation of storage and on the basis of the report of the □
Inspection Service, the Litigation Chamber considers that there is not sufficient evidence□
as the TC String and associated storage of users' personal data□
are stored for an unauthorized period, in violation of Article 5.1.e of the GDPR.□
499. Consequently, the Litigation Chamber concludes that no violation of Article 5.1.e of the □
GDPR could not be established.□
vs. Integrity and confidentiality (Art. 5.1.f GDPR)□
500. As already explained above228, the Litigation Chamber considers that the current version□
of the TCF offers insufficient safeguards to prevent the values included in a $\!\!\!\!\!\square$
TC String are modified in an unauthorized manner, with the consequence that the □
personal data of a data subject aggregated in a bid request□
may be processed for improper purposes, in violation of the principle of integrity, and/or may□
end up with bad adtech suppliers or adtech suppliers refused by□
the user, in violation of the principle of confidentiality. The Litigation Chamber therefore judges□
that the current version of the TCF violates Article 5.1.f of the GDPR.□
d. Processing of special categories of personal data (Art. 9 GDPR)□



persons concerned.□
505. Secondly, the Litigation Chamber takes into consideration the scope of the conclusions□
written submissions from the complainants, in which they specifically limited their grievances to the $\!\!\!\square$
processing of the personal data of the complainants by the defendant in the□
particular framework of the TCF230. Consequently, the Litigation Chamber will not assess the □
circumstances in which data subjects can exercise their rights□
regarding the processing of personal data contained in requests□
of offers, with respect to adtech providers, given that this processing takes place $\!$
entirely under the OpenRTB protocol. □
506. With regard to the current version of the TCF, the Litigation Chamber notes however□
that the TCF does not appear to facilitate the exercise of the rights of data subjects, in the□
as the CMP interface cannot be easily recalled at any time by□
users, so as to allow them to modify their preferences and find $\!\square$
the identity of the adtech providers with whom their personal data has□
been shared by means of a bid request, in accordance with the OpenRTB protocol. In this□
regard, the Litigation Chamber emphasizes the importance of implementing and $\hfill\Box$
correct application of interface requirements as defined in the TCF□
Policies, so as to allow data subjects to effectively exercise their□
rights vis-à-vis each of the joint controllers, and notes that the□
Shared responsibility in this regard lies primarily with CMPs and publishers. □
230 Plaintiffs' submissions of February 18, 2021, p. 2.□
112□
In these circumstances, however, the Litigation Chamber is not in a position to □
find a breach of Articles 15 - 22 GDPR.□
f. Register of processing activities (Art. 30 GDPR)□
507. The Inspection Service notes in its report that IAB Europe does not keep a record of its□

processing activities. The defendant considers, first of all, that it can rely on □
the exception provided for in Article 30.5 of the GDPR and that it is therefore not subject to the obligation □
to maintain such records. During the investigation, the defendant nevertheless□
added to the documents in the file a summary of its processing activities231.□
508. The Litigation Chamber notes first of all that the register submitted by the defendant□
so provided does not contain any activity relating to the TCF, with the exception of the management of□
members, including□
administration of the TCF. Unlike□
the assertion of□
the□
defendant, namely that the records do not need to include the activities of□
processing in the context of the TCF, the Litigation Chamber is of the opinion that the registers□
must at a minimum include access to signals of consent, objections and□
user preferences. □
509. Indeed, in accordance with Article 8 of the TCF Policies (v1.1)232 and Article 15 of the TCF Policies
(v2.0)233, the defendant reserves the right, as Managing Organization, to access□
to "records of consent". The Litigation Chamber also emphasizes that the character□
incidental to this access to user preferences has not been demonstrated or raised $\Box$
by the defendant. The stable relationship between IAB Europe, in its capacity as Managing $\Box$
Organization, and all organizations participating in the TCF ecosystem, must also□
be taken into account. Given the large number of participating organizations and $\square$
the defendant's intention to monitor the compliance of the various CMPs and other□
adtech234 vendors in more depth in the future, IAB Europe should□
also include this processing in its processing activity logs.□
510. Consequently, the Litigation Division considers that the non-accessory nature of the□
processing and the violation of Article 30.1 of the GDPR noted by the Inspection Service□

are sufficiently proven.
g. Data protection impact assessment (Art. 35 GDPR)□
511. The Litigation Chamber notes first of all that the defendant does not dispute that the □
TCF can also be used for RTB purposes.□
512. The defendant's argument that the TCF can be used for other purposes, unrelated □
to direct marketing, and that the OpenRTB can also operate separately from the TCF□
231 Response from IAB Europe to the investigation of February 10, 2020 (Exhibit 57), p. 23.□
232 IAB Europe Transparency & Consent Framework Policies v2019-08-21.3 (Exhibit 38), p. 6.□
233 IAB Europe Transparency & Consent Framework Policies v2019-08-21.3 (Exhibit 32), p. 14.□
234 See Hearing of June 11, 2021.□
113□
is therefore not relevant for the examination of the necessity or not of an impact assessment on the □
Data protection. □
513. Moreover, the correlation between the TCF and the RTB implies that the preferences that□
users enter using the CMP interface will necessarily have an impact on □
how their personal data will subsequently be processed by the□
adtech providers under the RTB, in accordance with the OpenRTB protocol.□
514. The Litigation Division also refers to decision No. 01/2019 of the General Secretariat□
Belgian ODA235, in which the General Secretariat has drawn up a list of treatments for□
which a data protection impact assessment is required.□
515. It is indisputable for the Litigation Division that the TCF was developed, among other things,□
for the RTB system, in which the online behavior of users is observed, $\!$
collected, recorded or influenced in a systematic and automated way, including to □
advertising purposes. Nor is it disputed that under the RTB the data□
are widely collected from third parties (Data Management Platforms, or DMPs) in order to□
analyze or predict the economic situation, health, preferences or interests□

personal data, the reliability or the behavior, location or movements of□
natural persons237.□
516. Given the large number of data subjects who come into contact with the□
websites and applications implementing the TCF, as well as the growing number□
of organizations participating in the TCF, on the one hand, and the impact of the TCF on the treatment□
large scale of personal data under the RTB, on the other hand, the□
Litigation Chamber finds that, in accordance with□
Decision No 01/2019,□
the□
defendant is indeed subject to the obligation to carry out an impact analysis on the□
data protection, pursuant to Article 35 of the GDPR. Therefore, there is□
violation of Article 35 GDPR.□
h. Appointment of the Data Protection Officer (Art. 37 GDPR)□
517. Article 37 of the GDPR provides for the obligation to appoint a data protection officer□
(DPD) in cases where:□
i.□
ii.□
the processing is carried out by a public authority or a public body; Where□
a controller or processor is primarily responsible for the□
processing operations which, due to their nature, scope and/or□
purposes, require regular and systematic monitoring on a large scale of□
persons concerned; Where
235 Decision of the General Secretariat n° 01/2019 of 16□
ODAhttps://www.gegevensbeschermingsautoriteit.be/publications/beslissing-nr01-2019-van-16-januari-2019.pdf.
236 General Secretariat Decision No. 01/2019 of 16 January 2019, para. 6.8).□
237 General Secretariat Decision No. 01/2019 of 16 January 2019, para. 6.3).□

January 2019, available at□
the site □
internet of□
114□
iii. 🗆
the core activities of the controller or processor consist of $\!\!\!\!\!\square$
into large-scale processing of special categories of data to□
personal character referred to in Article 9 of the GDPR and personal data□
personnel relating to criminal convictions and offenses referred to in Article□
10 GDPR.□
518. The Litigation Division has already concluded that the defendant processes personal data□
personnel due to the fact that IAB Europe, in its capacity as Managing Organization, may□
have access to TC Strings and records of consent238. □
519. The former Article 29 Working Party indicates that processing activities which are □
necessary to achieve the objectives of the controller or processor
can be considered basic activities within the meaning of Article 37 of the GDPR. The□
Litigation Chamber considers that, given the importance of the TCF for the □
defendant, of the declared objectives of the TCF as well as the associated processing of data to $\!$
personal character in its capacity as Managing Organization, the processing within the framework of the
TCF is part of the core business of IAB Europe. □
520. With regard to the notion of "large-scale processing", the Working Party "Article□
29" specifies that the following elements must be taken into account in particular:□
i.o
the number of people involved - either as a specific number or □
as a proportion of the relevant population;□
the amount of data and/or range of different data processed;□

the duration or permanence of the data processing;□
the geographic scope of the processing activity. $\hfill\Box$
ii.□
iii. 🗆
iv.□
In this case, the Litigation Chamber finds that the TCF is offered in different□
Member States ; that the TCF inherently requires that personal data $\hfill\Box$
users are treated as a TC String as long as it is□
necessary to be able to demonstrate that the consent was obtained in accordance with the
TCF Policies; and that the personal data processed is further shared □
with many adtech vendors. The Litigation Chamber concludes that the TCF $\hfill\Box$
involves large-scale processing of personal data. □
521. With regard to the criterion of regular and systematic observation, WP29 interprets the $\!$
term "regular" in one or more of the following ways:□
term "regular" in one or more of the following ways: $\hfill\Box$
i.□
i.□ something that happens continuously or at specific times during□
i.□ something that happens continuously or at specific times during□ a certain period of time;□
i.□ something that happens continuously or at specific times during□ a certain period of time;□ ii.□
i.□  something that happens continuously or at specific times during□  a certain period of time;□  ii.□  something that happens on a recurring or repetitive basis at times□
i. something that happens continuously or at specific times during a certain period of time;  ii. something that happens on a recurring or repetitive basis at times fixed; Where
i. something that happens continuously or at specific times during a certain period of time; si. something that happens on a recurring or repetitive basis at times fixed; Where 238 See para. 358 and 468 of this decision.
i. something that happens continuously or at specific times during a certain period of time; something that happens on a recurring or repetitive basis at times fixed; Where 238 See para. 358 and 468 of this decision.
i. something that happens continuously or at specific times during a certain period of time; something that happens on a recurring or repetitive basis at times fixed; Where 238 See para. 358 and 468 of this decision.


its capacity as Managing Organization, at the simple request of IAB Europe, falls under point (i). $\Box$
There is therefore a regular observation of data relating to identifiable users. □
522. The term "systematic" must be understood in one or more of the meanings□
following: □
i.□
ii.□
iii. 🗆
something that happens according to a system;□
predisposed, organized or methodical;□
something that happens as part of a general fundraising program□
data ; Where□
iv.□
an action carried out within the framework of a strategy. $\hfill\Box$
523. Once again, the Litigation Division considers that the processing of TC Strings or □
records of consent by the defendant in the current version of the TCF meets at least□
to the first three criteria. Consequently, the Litigation Chamber judges that the TCF must□
be considered regular and systematic user observation□
identifiable.□
524. Based on the foregoing, the Litigation Chamber concludes that IAB Europe □
should have appointed a DPO, in accordance with Article 37 of the GDPR. Therefore, there is □
violation of Article 37 GDPR.□
116□
C. Penalty□
525. On a preliminary basis, and as developed below, the Litigation Chamber notes that the □
this decision on the TCF does not directly address deficiencies in the broader framework $\!$
of the OpenRTB. However, the Litigation Chamber draws attention to the risks□

importance that OpenRTB poses to the fundamental rights and freedoms of people $\hfill\square$
concerned, in particular due to the large amount of personal data□
concerned, profiling activities, prediction of behavior and □
resulting monitoring (see A.3.1). Insofar as the TCF is the tool on which $\!$
OpenRTB relies to justify its GDPR compliance, the TC String plays a central role □
in the current OpenRTB protocol architecture□
526. Under article 100 LCA, the Litigation Chamber has the power to:□
1° dismiss the complaint without follow-up;□
2° order the dismissal;□
3° order a suspension of the pronouncement;□
4° to propose a transaction;□
5° issue warnings or reprimands;□
6° order to comply with the data subject's requests to exercise □
his rights;□
$7^{\circ}$ order that the person concerned be informed of the security problem; $\square$
8° order the freezing, limitation or temporary or permanent prohibition of the □
treatment ;□
9° order compliance of the processing;□
9° order compliance of the processing;□ 10° order the rectification, restriction or erasure of the data and the□
10° order the rectification, restriction or erasure of the data and the □
10° order the rectification, restriction or erasure of the data and the □ notification of these to the recipients of the data; □
10° order the rectification, restriction or erasure of the data and the □ notification of these to the recipients of the data; □  11° order the withdrawal of accreditation from certification bodies; □
10° order the rectification, restriction or erasure of the data and the □ notification of these to the recipients of the data; □  11° order the withdrawal of accreditation from certification bodies; □  12° impose periodic penalty payments; □
10° order the rectification, restriction or erasure of the data and the □ notification of these to the recipients of the data; □  11° order the withdrawal of accreditation from certification bodies; □  12° impose periodic penalty payments; □  13° to impose administrative fines; □

informs him of the follow-up given to the file;□
16° decide, on a case-by-case basis, to publish its decisions on the Authority's website□
data protection.□
527. As to the administrative fine that may be imposed under Article 83 of the GDPR and
of articles 100, 13° and 101 LCA, article 83 of the GDPR provides:□
"1. Each supervisory authority shall ensure that the administrative fines imposed in $\square$
under this article for breaches of this Regulation referred to in paragraphs 4,□
5 and 6 are, in each case, effective, proportionate and dissuasive. $\!\Box$
117□
Depending on the specific characteristics of each case, administrative fines are imposed
in addition to or instead of the measures referred to in points (a) to (h) of Article 58(2), and □
j). To decide whether to impose an administrative fine and to decide the amount□
of the administrative fine, due account shall be taken, in each case, of the□
following elements:□
has)□
the nature, gravity and duration of the breach, taking into account the nature, $scope\square$
or the purpose of the processing concerned, as well as the number of persons□
concerned affected and the level of damage they have suffered;□
b)□
whether the breach was committed willfully or negligently;□
vs)□
d)□
e)□
<b>f</b> )□
any action taken by the controller or processor to□
mitigate the damage suffered by the persons concerned;□


the degree of responsibility of the controller or processor, account□
given the technical and organizational measures they have implemented in□
under sections 25 and 32;□
any relevant breach previously committed by□
processor or processor;□
the person in charge of□
the degree of cooperation established with the supervisory authority with a view to remedying the □
violation and to mitigate any adverse effects;□
g)□
the categories of personal data affected by the breach;□
h)□
the manner in which the supervisory authority became aware of the breach, in particular□
whether, and to what extent, the controller or processor has notified the□
breach ;□
i)□
i)□
where measures referred to in Article 58(2) have previously been□
ordered against the controller or processor concerned□
for the same purpose, compliance with these measures;□
the application of codes of conduct approved pursuant to Article 40 or□
certification mechanisms approved under Article 42; and □
k) any other aggravating or mitigating circumstance applicable to the circumstances of□
the species, such as the financial advantages obtained or the losses avoided, $\!$
directly or indirectly, as a result of the breach".□
528. Recital 150 of the GDPR239 makes an additional distinction depending on whether the□
offender is a business or not. In the first hypothesis, the criterion (amount□

fixed or percentage) to reach the highest fine should be applied. When,□
on the other hand, the author of the infringement is not a company, it is necessary to take into account□
the economic situation of the author and the general level of income in the Member State□
concerned. This is to avoid the imposition of fines which could be disproportionate. □
239 Recital 150 of the GDPR: "[] When administrative fines are imposed on a company, this term must, at□
For this purpose, be understood as a business in accordance with Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Operation of □
the European Union. When administrative fines are imposed on persons who are not a company,□
the supervisory authority should take into account, when considering what the appropriate amount of the fine would be, the leve
general income in the Member State as well as the economic situation of the person concerned]".□
118□
529. It is important to contextualize the Respondent's breaches in order to identify the □
most appropriate corrective actions. In this context, the Litigation Chamber□
take into account all the circumstances of the case, including — to the extent that it□
detailed below — of the reaction presented by the defendant to the sanctions□
considered and communicated through the sanction form240. In this regard, the□
Litigation Chamber specifies that□
the form she sent mentions□
expressly that this does not imply a reopening of the debates. Its only purpose is to □
obtain the defendant's reaction to the penalties provided for. □
530. While measures such as a compliance order or a ban on□
further processing may end a□
offense□
identified, fines□
administrative procedures, as defined in recital 148 of the GDPR, are imposed in the event of□
serious breaches, in addition to or instead of the appropriate measures that are necessary□
to remedy the violation.□



<b>b.</b> □
prohibit IAB Europe from processing in the TCF any personal data□
personnel associated with the processing of the TC String, such as IP addresses, websites $\!$
visited and the applications used;□
vs. order IAB Europe to permanently remove its website and other communication channels□
public communication of all documents, files and records which, from□
in any way induce or oblige a third party to carry out such processing;□
2) Pursuant to Article 100, §1, 10° of the LCA, order IAB Europe to erase□
definitively all TC Strings and other personal data already processed in□
as part of the TCF of all its computer systems, files and data carriers, as well as $\!\!\!\!\square$
computer systems, files and data carriers of the subcontractors contracted by $\!$
IAB Europe;□
3) Pursuant to Article 100, §1, 10° of the LCA, order IAB Europe to inform all □
recipients of the personal data processed in the TCF of the imposed order□
by the Litigation Division, including:□
has.□
<b>b.</b> □
the prohibition of the processing of the TC String in the TCF;□
the prohibition of the processing in the TCF of all personal data□
associated with TC String processing, such as IP addresses, websites visited and □
applications used;□
the order for the permanent deletion of all TC Strings and other data to □
VS.□
personal character already processed under the TCF of all systems□
computers, files and data carriers;□
and this, in a clearly visible and legible way in a box in bold at the top of the home page□

from the IAB Europe website www.iabeurope.eu in the usual font and size up to 6□
months after a judgment of the Markets Court has become final, if applicable □
in accordance with Article 108 LCA, or by e-mail, in both cases with a□
hyperlink to the English version of the decision of the Litigation Chamber on the website□
ODA;□
4) Pursuant to Article 100, §1, 12° LCA on behalf of IAB Europe order the confiscation□
a penalty payment of 25,000 euros per calendar day started for delay in the execution of any measure□
imposed in the interlocutory decision of the Litigation Chamber from the expiry□
seven calendar days after the interlocutory decision of the Litigation Chamber. » $\square$
534. A sanction form was sent to the defendant on October 11, 2021. IAB Europe□
submitted its response on 1 November 2021243. This response was taken into account in the□
following paragraphs. □
243 See heading A.10. – Sanction form, European cooperation procedure, and publication of the decision, supra.
120□
C.1 Violations□
535. The Litigation Division found that the defendant had violated the following articles:□
<ul> <li>Articles 5.1.a and 6 of the GDPR — The current TCF does not provide a legal basis for the□</li> </ul>
handling user preferences in the form of a TC String. Furthermore, the□
Litigation Chamber notes that the TCF proposes two legal bases for the □
processing of personal data by participating adtech providers,□
but finds that none of them can be used. First of all,□
the□
consent of data subjects is currently not given in a manner□
sufficiently specific, informed and granular. Second, the interests of □
sufficiently specific, informed and granular. Second, the interests of □ data subjects outweigh the legitimate interest of the participating organizations□



245 In accordance with the Mandatory Policies and the technical specifications established and imposed on TCF participants
by IAB Europe.□
246 In addition, the Litigation Chamber emphasizes the fact that none of the CMPs and suppliers took part in this□
procedure.
121□
collected about them, and are not able to determine in advance the scope and □
the consequences of the treatment. The information given to users is too□
general to reflect the specific treatment of each adtech provider, which□
also prevents the granularity — and therefore the validity — of the consent received for□
the processing carried out within the framework of the OpenRTB protocol. The people concerned□
are unable to determine in advance the scope and consequences of the□
processing, and therefore do not have sufficient control over the processing of their□
data to avoid being surprised later by further processing of their□
personal data.□
- Articles 24, 25, 5.1.f and 32 GDPR — As explained above247, based on the □
articles 5.1.f and 32 GDPR, the controller is required to ensure the security of the □
processing and the integrity of the personal data processed. Bedroom□
Litigation recalls that the combined reading of Articles 5.1.f and 32, as well as 5.2 and □
24 GDPR (principle of accountability) requires the controller to□
demonstrate its compliance with article 32, by implementing technical measures and □
organizational arrangements, in a transparent and traceable manner. As part of the□
current TCF system, adtech providers receive a consent signal without□
that no technical or organizational measure can guarantee that this signal□
of consent is valid or that an adtech provider actually received it (rather□
of consent is valid or that an adtech provider actually received it (rather□ than generated). In the absence of systematic and automated control systems for□

String is not sufficiently secure, since it is possible for CMPs to falsify the □
signal in order to generate a euconsent-v2 cookie and thus reproduce a "false□
consent" of users for all purposes and for all types of partners. As□
indicated above248, this hypothesis is moreover specifically covered by the □
TCF terms of use. The Litigation Chamber therefore finds that IAB□
Europe, in its capacity as Managing Organization, has designed and provides a system of □
management of consent, but does not take the necessary measures to ensure the□
validity,□
integrity and □
the conformity of the preferences and the consent of the □
users.□
The Litigation Chamber also notes that the current version of the TCF does not facilitate □
not the exercise of the rights of the data subject, in particular taking into account the □
relationship of joint responsibility for processing between the publisher, the CMP set up□
and the defendant. The Litigation Chamber also points out that the GDPR requires□
that the rights of data subjects can be exercised vis-à-vis each of the □
joint controllers of the TCF so as to comply with Articles 24 and 25 of the GDPR.□
247 See heading B.4.3 Responsibility (art. 24 GDPR), data protection by design and by default (art. 25 GDPR),
integrity and confidentiality (art. 5.1.f GDPR), and processing security (art. 32 GDPR)□
248 See para. 485 of this decision. □
122□
In view of the foregoing, the Litigation Division finds that the defendant has □
breached its obligations of security of processing, integrity of personal data□
personal and data protection by design and by default (Articles 24, 25,□
5.1.f and 32 GDPR).□
■ Article 30 GDPR — As developed above249, the Litigation Chamber cannot  □

follow the defendant's argument that it believes it can benefit from the □
exceptions to the obligation to keep records of its processing activities, such as
provided for in article 30.5 GDPR. Since the record of processing activities□
of the defendant does not contain any treatment relating to the TCF, apart from the management of
members and administration of the TCF, while IAB Europe is able to access□
to the records of consent as Managing Organization, the Litigation Chamber□
finds the breach of Article 30 of the GDPR on the part of the defendant. $\hfill\Box$
■ Article 35 GDPR — Given the large number of data subjects who□
come into contact with websites and applications implementing the TCF, as well as $\!\!\!\!\Box$
that the organizations participating in the TCF, on the one hand, and the impact of the TCF on the □
large-scale processing of personal data through the protocol□
OpenRTB, on the other hand, the Litigation Chamber finds that IAB Europe has not□
carried out a full data protection impact assessment (DPIA)□
to the processing of personal data within the TCF, and therefore violated Article $\hfill\Box$
35 GDPR. The Litigation Chamber notes that the TCF was developed, among other things,□
for the RTB system, in which the online behavior of users is observed, $\!$
collected, recorded or influenced in a systematic and automated manner, including □
advertising purposes. It is also undisputed that within the RTB, data is□
widely collected from third parties (DMP) in order to analyze or predict the situation□
economic, health, personal preferences or interests, reliability or□
behaviour, location or movements of natural persons. □
■ Article 37 GDPR— Due to □
large-scale, regular and □
system of identifiable users involved in the TCF, and given the role of □
the defendant, more specifically in its capacity as Managing Organization, the Chambre
Litigation judges that IAB Europe should have appointed a delegate for the protection of□

data (DPD). By not doing so, the defendant violates Article 37 of the GDPR. □
C.2 Penalties□
536. Consequently, the Litigation Division condemns the defendant:□
<b>I.</b> □
To make the TCF compliant with the obligations of legality, fairness and transparency□
(articles 5.1.a and 6 GDPR), establishing a legal basis for the processing as well□
249 See para. 507 et seq. of this decision.□
123□
that the sharing of user preferences within the framework of the TCF, in the form□
a TC String and a euconsent-v2 cookie placed on users' devices□
to this end. These obligations also imply that any data of a□
personnel collected so far by means of a TC String within the framework of the□
global consents, which are no longer supported by IAB□
Europe, must be deleted by the defendant without undue delay. Furthermore, the□
Litigation Chamber orders the defendant to prohibit the use of□
legitimate interest as a legal basis for processing by organizations□
participating in the TCF in its current format, through the conditions□
of using the TCF.□
II. 🗆
To make the TCF compliant with the obligations of transparency and information (Articles□
12, 13 and 14 of the GDPR), requiring that CMPs registered with the TCF□
adopt a harmonized and GDPR-compliant approach to□
with regard to□
information to be provided to users via their interface. This information, which $\!$
relate to the categories of data collected, the purposes of their collection and the□
legal bases applicable to the processing, must be precise, concise and □

understandable in order to prevent users from being surprised by the processing□
subsequent processing of their personal data by parties other than the □
publishers or IAB Europe.□
III. 🗆
To ensure compliance of the TCF with integrity and security obligations, as well as □
that data protection by design and by default (dedicated to $\!\Box$
articles 5.1.f and 32 GDPR, and 25 GDPR). In this regard, the Litigation Chamber $\!$
orders to include technical and organizational control measures□
effective in facilitating the exercise of the rights of data subjects and in $\!\!\!\square$
guarantee the integrity of the TC String, given the possibility, in the current state $\!$
of the system, to falsify the signal. An example of measures to be put in place under□
of Article 32 of the GDPR is a strict verification process for organizations □
participating in the TCF. The Litigation Chamber reminds the defendant, as well $\hfill\square$
than to other joint controllers, their obligation to take the□
necessary arrangements to ensure, inter alia, that□
the people □
concerned can effectively exercise their rights. Finally, as part of □
Article 25 of the GDPR, the defendant is obliged, via its terms of use, $\!$
prohibit organizations participating in the current version of the TCF from activating a $\!\square$
consent by default, as well as to base the lawfulness of the processing activities $\!$
envisaged on the legitimate interest. □
IV.□
To ensure the compliance of the register of processing activities carried out in the□
framework of the TCF, and in particular concerning the processing of preferences and $\!\!\!\!\!\square$
124□
user consent in the form of a TC String and the placement of a $\!\square$

euconsent-v2 cookie on their devices. □
<b>V</b> .□
To carry out a data protection impact assessment (DPIA),□
covering both personal data processing activities in the□
title of the TCF, and the impact of these activities on the further processing on the basis of the □
OpenRTB protocol.□
VI.□
To appoint a Data Protection Officer (DPO), responsible, among other things, for□
ensure the compliance of personal data processing activities in the□
framework of the TCF, in accordance with articles 37 to 39 of the GDPR.□
537. These compliance measures must be carried out within a maximum period of six□
months after the validation of an action plan by the Belgian Data Protection Authority,□
which will be submitted to the Litigation Chamber within two months of this decision. □
On the basis of article 100 § 1, 12° of the LCA, a penalty payment of 5,000 EUR per day will be due
in the event of non-compliance with the aforementioned deadlines.□
538. In addition to this compliance injunction, the Litigation Chamber considers that a $\square$
administrative fine is justified in this case for the following reasons, analyzed on the□
basis of Article 83.2 GDPR.□
539. The principles of legality, fairness, transparency and security are part of the essence of the □
GDPR, and violations of these rights are subject to the highest fines,□
in accordance with□
Article 83.5 GDPR. In this regard,□
failure to respect the principles□
fundamentals of data protection must be sanctioned by fines at the□
proportionate amount, depending on the circumstances of the case. In this sense, one can refer□
the guidelines on the application and setting of administrative fines, according to $\!\Box$

which:□
"Fines are an important tool that supervisors should use□
in the appropriate circumstances. Supervisors are encouraged to adopt□
a well-considered and balanced approach when applying measures□
remedies in order to react to the violation in a manner that is both effective and dissuasive □
proportionate. This is not to see fines as a last resort or to □
fear of imposing them, but, on the other hand, they should not be used in such a way either.□
way that their effectiveness would be reduced. »250 □
540. In point (a), Article 83.2 mentions "the nature, gravity and duration of the violation,□
taking into account the nature, scope or purpose of the processing concerned, as well as the□
number of data subjects affected and the level of harm they suffered". □
250 Article 29 Working Party - Guidelines on the application and setting of administrative fines for the purposes of
regulation 2016/679 (WP 253), p. 7.□
125□
541. With regard to the nature and seriousness of the breaches, the Litigation Division notes □
541. With regard to the nature and seriousness of the breaches, the Litigation Division notes ☐ that the principles of lawfulness (articles 5.1.a and 6 GDPR), transparency (articles 12 to 14 GDPR) ☐
that the principles of lawfulness (articles 5.1.a and 6 GDPR), transparency (articles 12 to 14 GDPR)□
that the principles of lawfulness (articles 5.1.a and 6 GDPR), transparency (articles 12 to 14 GDPR)□ as well as security (articles 5.1.f and 32 GDPR) are fundamental principles of the regime□
that the principles of lawfulness (articles 5.1.a and 6 GDPR), transparency (articles 12 to 14 GDPR) as well as security (articles 5.1.f and 32 GDPR) are fundamental principles of the regime protection put in place by the GDPR. The principle of accountability set out in
that the principles of lawfulness (articles 5.1.a and 6 GDPR), transparency (articles 12 to 14 GDPR) as well as security (articles 5.1.f and 32 GDPR) are fundamental principles of the regime protection put in place by the GDPR. The principle of accountability set out in article 5.2 of the GDPR and developed in article 24 is also at the heart of the GDPR and reflects
that the principles of lawfulness (articles 5.1.a and 6 GDPR), transparency (articles 12 to 14 GDPR) as well as security (articles 5.1.f and 32 GDPR) are fundamental principles of the regime protection put in place by the GDPR. The principle of accountability set out in article 5.2 of the GDPR and developed in article 24 is also at the heart of the GDPR and reflects the paradigm shift brought about by the GDPR, namely the transition from a regime based on
that the principles of lawfulness (articles 5.1.a and 6 GDPR), transparency (articles 12 to 14 GDPR) as well as security (articles 5.1.f and 32 GDPR) are fundamental principles of the regime protection put in place by the GDPR. The principle of accountability set out in article 5.2 of the GDPR and developed in article 24 is also at the heart of the GDPR and reflects the paradigm shift brought about by the GDPR, namely the transition from a regime based on prior declarations and authorizations by the supervisory authority to a greater
that the principles of lawfulness (articles 5.1.a and 6 GDPR), transparency (articles 12 to 14 GDPR)  as well as security (articles 5.1.f and 32 GDPR) are fundamental principles of the regime  protection put in place by the GDPR. The principle of accountability set out in  article 5.2 of the GDPR and developed in article 24 is also at the heart of the GDPR and reflects  the paradigm shift brought about by the GDPR, namely the transition from a regime based on  prior declarations and authorizations by the supervisory authority to a greater  accountability and responsibility of the controller. Compliance with its obligations
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concerned on their personal data as well as the exercise of other rights□
granted to data subjects by the GDPR, such as the right to object and the right□
erasure. Violations of these principles constitute serious breaches, which□
may be subject to the highest administrative fines under the GDPR□
543. Violation of Article 25, relating to the obligation of data protection from the design stage□
and by default, as well as Article 30, relating to the keeping of a register of the activities of□
processing, also constitute significant offences, particularly in view of□
the extent of processing operations and the impact on the privacy of complainants as well as □
than other users confronted with websites or applications highlighting□
works the TCF.□
544. With regard to the nature and purpose of the processing, and more particularly the nature of the □
data, the Litigation Chamber notes that the TC String, as an expression of the□
user preferences regarding processing purposes and providers□
adtech potential highlighted by the CMP interface, constitutes the cornerstone of the□
TCF. Although the scope of this decision is the TCF and the TC String, well□
that the sanction imposed on the defendant concerns only this framework, the compliance□
of the OpenRTB protocol with the GDPR is evaluated as part of a holistic analysis of the □
TCF and its interaction with the first. Since the current version of the TCF is□
the tool on which the OpenRTB relies to justify its compliance with the GDPR, and since the □
defendant facilitates membership in and use of OpenRTB by a significant number□
of participating organizations, the Litigation Chamber observes that IAB Europe plays a $\square$
pivotal role with respect to OpenRTB, without being a data controller□
data in this context.□
545. With regard to the scope of the contested processing and the number of persons□
concerned, the Litigation Division finds that the TCF (in its current format), as it□
was developed by the defendant (representing major players in the□


online behavioral advertising 251), offers a unique service on the market. The scope of $\hfill\Box$
TCF is therefore essential, given the growing number of partners who have joined. $ \Box$
With regard to the level of harm suffered by the persons concerned, the Chamber□
Litigation stresses once again that the TC String plays a central role in□
the current architecture of the OpenRTB protocol. Therefore, the TC String supports a system□
presenting significant risks that OpenRTB poses to the rights and freedoms□
fundamentals of the persons concerned, in particular because of the large amount of□
personal data concerned, profiling activities, prediction of the □
behavior and subsequent monitoring (see A.3.1).□
546. With regard to the duration of the offence, the Litigation Chamber notes that the TCF□
has been proposed by the defendant since April 25, 2018 as a mechanism allowing □
to get□
user consent to □
with regard to processing purposes□
predetermined, and to transfer their personal data to participants in the□
TCF, including adtech providers. Notwithstanding the different iterations of the framework, which □
was upgraded to the second version of the TCF on August 21, 2019, and considering the □
systemic deficiencies of the TCF with regard to the GDPR, the Litigation Chamber finds□
that the shortcomings have existed at least since May 2018, with regard to the validity of the □
collected consent and placement of a String TC without a valid legal basis, and □
since August 2019 for the use of legitimate interest as a legal basis in order to process□
the personal data of the persons concerned. □
547. Article 83.2.b GDPR requires DPA to take into account the intentional or□
negligent of the offence. Noting that the defendant, in its capacity as Managing □
Organization, was aware252 of the risks associated with non-compliance with the TCF, in particular

which concerns the integrity of the TC String and the encapsulated choices and preferences of
users, and given the impact of the TC String on subsequent processing in□
within the framework of OpenRTB, the Litigation Chamber considers that IAB Europe has demonstrated □
negligence in establishing measures governing the implementation of the version□
current TCF.□
548. In point (c), Article 83.2 GDPR refers to potential actions taken by the controller□
processing to mitigate the damage suffered by data subjects. The□
Litigation Chamber notes the absence of concrete measures taken or introduced by□
the defendant in order to mitigate the damage suffered by the persons concerned (namely the□
processing of their personal data independently of their choices, or in□
lack of a valid legal basis). □
251 See para. 36.□
252 See para. 485□
127□
549. Article 83.2d of the GDPR concerns the degree of responsibility of the controller□
or of the subcontractor, taking into account the technical and organizational measures that they have
implemented under Articles 25 and 32.□
550. Even if the Litigation Division does not take into account in this decision the□
developments after the closure of the procedure in June 2021, it notes that□
the defendant announced during the hearing253 its intention to introduce a "TCF Vendor□
Compliance Programme" in September 2021, through which audits of organizations□
participating in the TCF (appearing on the Global Vendors List) will be set up.□
551. The Litigation Chamber encourages all measures aimed at ensuring compliance□
with the GDPR. However, as explained in paras. 487-488, given the absence□
systematic control by the defendant of compliance with the rules of the TCF by the□
participating organizations at the time of lodging the complaints, and taking into account□

the significant impact of such violations (for example in the event of tampering or□
modification of the TC String), the Litigation Chamber considers that the announcement of this□
initiative to increase compliance with one of his obligations as responsible for the□
processing of the TCF and consisting of audits of adtech suppliers listed on the Global□
Vendors List demonstrates that the TCF did not comply with the security obligations of the□
defendant, including the obligation to minimize the damage suffered by the persons□
concerned. No other action was communicated by the defendant to the Chamber.□
Litigation in this regard.□
552. Moreover, the Litigation Division is no longer in a position to examine the nature of this□
program and, in any case, this new program does not change the nature of the□
GDPR breaches that occurred up to the close of proceedings in June 2021.□
553. In light of Article 83.2.e of the GDPR, the Litigation Chamber notes the absence, at□
time of this decision, any final decisions of other supervisory authorities□
jurisdictions, concerning previous relevant infringements by the defendant in□
relationship with the TCF.□
554. Article 83.2.f of the GDPR concerns the degree of cooperation established with the authority, with a view to□
554. Article 83.2.f of the GDPR concerns the degree of cooperation established with the authority, with a view to □ to remedy the violation and to mitigate any adverse effects thereof. In this regard, the □
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the defendant by a public announcement on its website,□
August 26, 2021 □
128□
adequacy with the principle of minimization of data, taking into account their nature.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Litigation Division reiterates its position that the □
TCF plays a central role in supporting processing operations as part of the □
OpenRTB protocol. Consequently, the Litigation Chamber concludes that it cannot be □
excludes that both special categories and regular categories of data to be□
personal — processed through a bid request with the TC String attached □
— may be affected by offenses committed under the TCF. $\!\Box$
556. With regard to Article 83.2.h of the GDPR, the Litigation Chamber notes that this criterion □
is not relevant here.□
557. Article 83.2.i of the GDPR is not applicable in the absence of any previous final decision □
in this regard, taken against the defendant. □
558. Article 83.2.j of the GDPR concerns adherence to approved codes of conduct or□
approved certification mechanisms. In this context, the Litigation Chamber notes□
that IAB Europe has already been in contact with the Belgian Data Protection Authority□
concerning the drafting and adoption of a code of conduct (when the procedure□
was already underway). The Litigation Chamber also underlines the lack of monitoring of the □
defendant in this regard since June 2020, without further explanation on its part. □
559. Finally, Article 83.2.k of the GDPR covers any other aggravating or mitigating circumstance ☐
applicable to the circumstances of the case, such as the financial advantages obtained or the $\!\Box$
losses avoided, directly or indirectly, as a result of the breach. Bedroom□
Litigation did not retain specific elements likely to modify the amount□
of the fine. □





given the ever-increasing number of TCF participants.□
130□
568. As regards, inter alia, violations of a fundamental right enshrined in Article 8 of the□
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, the assessment of their gravity on the□
basis of Article 83.2.a GDPR will be done independently.□
569. On the basis of the elements developed above, of the defendant's reaction to the $\!\Box$
proposed sanction form, as well as the criteria listed in Article 83.2 GDPR, the□
Litigation Chamber considers that the aforementioned offenses justify imposing□
to the defendant a compliance order accompanied by a fine□
administrative charge of 250,000 EUR (article 100, $\S$ 1, 13 $^{\circ}$ and 101 of the LCA), as a penalty $\Box$
effective, proportionate and dissuasive under Article 83 GDPR. To determine what□
amount, the Litigation Chamber took into account the total annual turnover of the□
defendant, which amounted to EUR 2,471,467 in 2020259.□
570. The amount of EUR 250,000 remains, in view of the above, proportionate to the□
offenses that have been established by the Litigation Chamber. This amount is also□
significantly lower than the maximum amount of EUR 20,000,000 provided for in Article 83.5 of the□
GDPR.□
571. The Litigation Division is of the opinion that a lower fine would not respond, in□
the species, to the criteria required by□
section 83.1. of the GDPR, according to□
which□
the fine□
administrative action must not only be proportionate, but also effective and dissuasive.□
These elements derive from the principle of sincere cooperation described in recital 13 of the □
GDPR (in accordance with Article 4.3 of the Treaty on European Union).□
572. Given the importance of transparency regarding the decision-making process of the □

d. to take technical and organizational measures to prevent the □
consent is checked by default in the interfaces of the CMPs as well as to prevent□
the automatic authorization of participating adtech providers basing their operations $\!$
of processing on the legitimate interest, in accordance with articles 24 and 25 of the GDPR;
e. compel CMPs to adopt a uniform and GDPR-compliant approach to □
information they submit to users, in accordance with Articles 12 to 14 and □
24 GDPR;□
f. update the current register of processing activities, including the processing of $\!\!\!\square$
personal data in the context of the TCF by IAB Europe, in accordance with article 30□
GDPR;□
132□
g. to carry out a data protection impact assessment (DPIA) with regard to□
regarding the processing activities carried out within the framework of the TCF and their□
impact on the processing activities carried out under the protocol□
OpenRTB, as well as adapting this AIPD to future versions or modifications of the □
current version of the TCF, in accordance with Article 35 of the GDPR;□
h. to appoint a data protection officer (DPO) in accordance with the $\!$
articles 37 to 39 of the GDPR.□
These compliance measures must be implemented within a maximum period □
six months after the validation of an action plan by the Belgian Data Protection Authority $\!$
data, which will be submitted to the Litigation Chamber within two months of this□
decision. In accordance with article 100 § 1, 12° of the LCA, a penalty payment of 5,000 EUR
per day will be due in the event of non-compliance with the aforementioned deadlines.□
- to impose an administrative fine of EUR 250,000 on the defendant pursuant to□
section 101 of the ACL.□
This decision may be appealed to the Court of Markets, in accordance with □

Article 108, § 1 of the LCA, within thirty days of its notification, with
the Data Protection Authority as defendant. □
(Sr.) Hielke HIJMANS□
President of the Litigation Chamber□
133□