GZ: DSB-D130.033/0003-DSB/2019 from 7.3.2019
[Note editor: Names and companies, legal forms and product names,□
Addresses (incl. URLs, IP and email addresses), file numbers (and the like), etc., as well as □
their initials and abbreviations may be abbreviated for reasons of pseudonymization□
and/or changed. Obvious spelling, grammar and punctuation errors□
have been corrected.]
NOTICE
SPRUCH□
The data protection authority decides on the data protection complaint of Dr. Ulrich A***□
(Appellant) of July 23, 2018 against N***, Inc (Respondent),□
established in CA 9*3*2 T***, USA, represented in the Union by N*** Nederland B.V.,□
established in **** Amsterdam, Netherlands, for violating fundamental rights□
Privacy as follows:□
- The complaint is upheld and it is established that the□
Respondent thereby grants the complainant the fundamental right to data protection□
infringed by sending them a promotional email on July 19, 2018□
has sent, although no consent was given. □
Legal basis: Article 5 paragraph 1 letters a, c and e, Article 27, Article 57 paragraph 1 letter f and Article 77 □
Paragraph 1 of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), OJ No. L 119 of 4 May 2016, p. 1; §§ 1□
Para. 1, 24 Para. 1 and 5 of the Data Protection Act (DSG), Federal Law Gazette I No. 165/1999 as amended; Article 8□
Paragraph 1 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (EU-GRC), OJ C 326 dated □
October 26, 2012, p. 391. □
REASON□
A. Submissions of the parties and course of the proceedings□
1. With a submission dated July 23, 2018, the complainant alleged a violation of the □
Right to information and the illegality of the processing of his data. □

In summary, on May 26, 2018, he submitted to the data protection declaration of the □
Respondent submitted a request for information to the e-mail address provided. the □
However, the Respondent did not respond to this request. reason for the application□
is an e-mail from the Respondent dated May 18, 2018. In the context of this e-mail□
the Respondent informed the Complainant that his consent was required □
to keep in touch with him. However, the complainant□
also received a promotional email on July 19, 2018, although he did not□
have given consent. The Respondent therefore processes his data □
unlawful. The input is the request for information from May 26, 2018 as well as a $\!$
Attached screenshot of email of May 18, 2018 and July 19, 2018.□
2. In a letter dated November 28, 2018, the Respondent summarized □
from that on November 6, 2018, they sent subsequent information to the complainant□
have granted. A copy of the email dated November 6, 2018 is attached to the letter. □
3. The Data Protection Authority granted the complainant by letter dated □
December 3, 2018 Hearing of parties in accordance with Section 24 (6) DSG. The Complainant□
no longer objected to the information subsequently provided on November 6, 2018, which is why
the data protection authority the procedure with regard to the alleged violation in $\!\square$
Informally discontinued the right to information in a letter dated January 24, 2019. Simultaneously
the data protection authority asked the complainant to submit his complaint in □
with regard to the alleged illegality of the processing of his data□
and to assert a data subject right. □
4. In his statement of January 27, 2019, the complainant brought□
summarized before, the Respondent in the processing of his□
personal data violate the fundamental right to secrecy by□
the principles for processing in accordance with Art. 5 GDPR and against legality□
of processing pursuant to Art. 6 GDPR.□

5. With a statement dated February 13, 2019, the Respondent brought □
summarized, that the complainant at the end of 2014 $\!\!\!\!\!\!\!\square$
Respondent registered to attend a marketing event and his□
submitted contact information. Before the GDPR came into force, the complainant had an e-
Received an e-mail asking you to confirm if you receive further e-mails□
Mails on the part of the Respondent were still desired. The complainant has□
not agreed to further communication, but still emails from□
Respondent received, which should not have happened. In view of□
of which it is confirmed that the complainant "in all future marketing□
Communications from N*** is completely removed". □
B. Subject of Complaint□
Based on the submissions of the appellant, it follows that□
The subject of the complaint is whether the respondent is the complainant□
thereby violated the fundamental right to data protection by contacting them on July 19, 2018 $\!$
sent an e-mail for advertising purposes, although no corresponding consent□
was caught. □
C. Findings of Facts□
1. The Respondent has its place of business in CA 9*3*2 T***, USA and is located in the□
Union by N*** Nederland B.V., established in **** Amsterdam, The Netherlands,□
represent.□
2. The Respondent requested the Appellant, who resided in Austria□
is, by email dated May 18, 2018, about giving consent to continue with $\!$
to be able to keep in touch with him. □
3. Although the complainant has not given appropriate consent to further□
contact, the Respondent sent an email on July 19, 2018□
for advertising purposes (offer to participate in an event in Germany). □

sent the complainant (ulrich@a***.at). □
4. In a statement dated February 13, 2019, the Respondent submitted that the □
Email address of the complainant "in all future marketing communications from
N*** is completely removed".□
Evidence assessment: The findings made are based on the undisputed
Submission of the complainant of July 23, 2018, on the opinion of the □
Respondent of February 13, 2019 and on an official search by the□
Respondent's privacy policy (https://www.n***.com/privacy-
statement.html, retrieved on March 6, 2019), which the factual findings□
is taken as a basis. □
D. In legal terms it follows that:□
1. Respondent and its representative in the Union□
First of all, it should be pointed out that the "One-Stop-Shop" mechanism according to Art. 60 □
DSGVO does not apply in the present case, since the Respondent as□
The person responsible within the meaning of Art. 4 Z 7 DSGVO decides on the purposes and means of processing□
and is based only in the United States. □
In its data protection declaration, the Respondent mentions N*** Nederland B.V. as□
their representative in the Union area in accordance with Art. 3 Para. 3 in conjunction with Art. 27 Para. 1 GDPR, which
according to the Respondent's privacy policy, however, none □
Decision-making authority with regard to the processing activities of the respondent□
due.□
Against this background, the complaint in question was pursuant to Art. 27 (4) GDPR□
to N*** Nederland B.V. to transmit. Since the appointment of a representative after the□
express regulation text according to Art. 27 Para. 5 DSGVO no transfer of the □
entails responsibility, the present decision is directed at the□
Data Protection Authority against the Respondent. □

In the present case, the Respondent sent an e-mail for advertising purposes to□
the complainant, although no appropriate consent was obtained for this. □
It should be noted that the sending of electronic mail for advertising purposes without□
Prior Consent of Subscriber ("Unsolicited Messages") under the Provision□
of § 107 Para. 1 TKG 2003 (Article 13 Para. 1 of Directive 2002/58/EC, the "e-□
Data Protection Directive", is to be assessed. In this regard, the legal situation has also changed □
Validity of the GDPR has not changed since May 25, 2018 (cf. Art. 95 GDPR, according to which the □
Regulation natural or legal persons in relation to processing in□
connection with the provision of publicly available electronic□
Communications services on public communications networks in the Union none □
additional obligations imposed, insofar as they are specified in the e-Privacy Directive□
subject to obligations that pursue the same goal).□
However, this does not mean that the complainant does not have a privacy complaint □
pursuant to Art. 77 Para. 1 GDPR. Although the admissibility of a□
Contact for advertising purposes - as explained - according to the provisions of the □
TKG 2003 or the e-Privacy Directive and not according to Art. 6 DSGVO. However, through□
a breach of the TKG 2003 or the e-Privacy Directive is also a violation □
of the right to secrecy according to § 1 Para. 1 DSG and also a violation of those □
There are provisions of the GDPR that do not impose any additional obligations on the person responsible □
iSv Art. 95 DSGVO (cf. the decision of the DSB of October 31, 2018,□
GZ DSB-D123.076/0003-DSB/2018).□
3. On the right deemed to have been infringed □
First of all, it should be noted that the complainant's submissions refer to □
a violation of Art. 5 and Art. 6 GDPR (therefore a lack of consent), which□
However, data subject rights are listed exhaustively in Chapter III GDPR (Articles 12 to 23). □

2. To Directive 2002/58/EG as lex specialis□

According to the case law of the data protection authority, a data subject can object to □
Basically, nevertheless, rely on any provision outside of Chapter III of the GDPR,□
if this results in a possible violation of the right to secrecy□
according to § 1 para. 1 DSG (cf. the decision of the DSB of September 13, 2018,□
DSB-D123.070/0005-DSB/2018, according to which the person responsible violated Art. 32□
DSGVO can lead to a violation of § 1 Para. 1 DSG).□
Accordingly, a violation of the right to secrecy had to be checked, which - $\Box$
as explained – is not covered by Art. 95 GDPR□
4. On the right to secrecy in international matters□
a) On the geographical scope of the GDPR□
The e-mail address that is the subject of the proceedings consists of the first and last name of the
Complainant, which is why there is a personal reference. □
Furthermore, although the Respondent is not established in the Union,□
the processing of the data of the complainant, who is resident in Austria,□
in connection with the offering of goods or services (specifically:□
Offer to participate in an event in Germany), which is why the GDPR□
according to Art. 3 Para. 2 lit. a GDPR applies in spatial terms (cf. recital 23□
GDPR, according to which the use of the language of a data subject in connection with□
the possibility of ordering goods and services in this language□
indicates that the person responsible intends to send goods or goods to persons in the Union□
provide services).□
b) On the fundamental right to data protection and the horizontal effect of Art. 8 (1) EU-GRC□
According to the data protection authority, the GDPR is generally a fundamental right□
Data protection is inherent and stands for the GDPR – as the most important European□
Source of secondary law for handling personal data – in a narrow□
Relationship to Art. 8 Para. 1 of the EU-GRC and serves to develop it in more detail. this□

is already clear from Recital 1 GDPR, according to which "The protection of natural persons in the□
Processing of personal data […] [is] a fundamental right. Pursuant to Article 8(1). □
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union […] everyone has the right to □
Protection of personal data concerning them."
Against this background, the data protection authority assumes that□
Right of appeal according to Art. 77 Para. 1 GDPR - in addition to asserting the infringement□
of data subject rights according to Chapter III of the regulation - also for international ones□
A complaint option based on § 1 Para. 1 DSG in conjunction with Art. 8 Para. 1□
EU GRC opened.□
Based on these considerations and due to the fact that the GDPR also□
Those responsible for the private (i.e. the non-sovereign) area are directly obliged to represent□
the data protection authority is of the opinion that the fundamental right to data protection according to Art. $8\Box$
Paragraph 1 of the EU-GRC as well as § 1 DSG has a horizontal effect. □
In other words: Because the GDPR inherently includes a general fundamental right to data protection □
is, which is expressly anchored in Art. 8 Para. 1 EU-GRC, a data subject can□
as a result also against legal entities that are set up in forms of private law, $\!\Box$
lodge a complaint pursuant to Art. 77 Para. 1 GDPR and this complaint to a □
Violation of Art. 8 Para. 1 EU-GRC (cf. the judgment of the ECJ of November 29th□
2017, C-214/16, paragraph 31 et seq., according to which the ECJ recognizes such a horizontal effect of rights□
not expressly denied under the EU-GRC; this becomes clearer in the Opinion□
of the Advocate General in this case, which a□
Horizontal effect of provisions of the EU-GRC expressly affirmed). □
An alleged violation of the principles according to Art. 5 and 6 DSGVO can therefore be considered □
alleged violation of Art. 8 EU-GRC.□
5. The lawfulness of the processing □
As already stated above, the lawfulness of the processing is exclusively determined □

according to the e-Privacy Directive as a lex specialis. □
According to Art. 13 Para. 1 of the e-Privacy Directive, before sending electronic mail, a□
obtain consent from the data subject. It should be noted, however, that the e-□
Data Protection Directive no further conditions or definition for consent□
provides. □
However, with regard to the term "consent", the e-Privacy Directive refers to the □
Consent within the meaning of Directive 95/46/EC (Data Protection Directive; cf. Art. 2 lit. f□
e-Privacy Directive). The concept of consent according to the e-Privacy Directive therefore corresponds□
in systematic interpretation the concept of consent according to Art. 4 Z 11 or Art. 7□
GDPR, as follows from Art. 94 Para. 2 GDPR.□
The processing can therefore not be based on an alternative basis for permission under Art. 6□
DSGVO (e.g. legitimate interests according to paragraph 1 lit. f leg. cit.) are supported, which the □
Respondent has not claimed either.□
However, since, as stated, no consent to receive e-mails for advertising purposes□
was available, the complainant's personal data (his e-mail□
address with clear name) processed unlawfully (i.e. without permission), which is why□
there is a violation of § 1 Para. 1 DSG in conjunction with Art. 8 Para. 1 EU-GRC.□
Since the complainant - despite the request of the respondent by e-mail dated May 18□
2018 - has no longer given such consent, that would be □
Respondent was obliged to provide the complainant's e-mail address□
to delete; however, it should be noted that this obligation is not limited to□
of the GDPR, but already according to the old legal situation according to the data protection directive□
has passed. □
Since the Respondent already stated in its statement of February 13, 2019 that□
the email address of the complainant from "any future marketing communications□
was completely removed from N***" was not a performance mandate in accordance with Section 24 (5) DSG□

or Article 58 (2) (c) GDPR.  $\square$ 

It was therefore to be decided accordingly.  $\hfill\Box$