DSB-D122.844/0006-DSB/2018 from 21.6.2018
[Note editor: Names and companies, legal forms and product names,□
Addresses (incl. URLs, IP and e-mail addresses), file numbers (and the like), etc.,□
as well as their initials and abbreviations can be used for pseudonymization reasons□
be abbreviated and/or modified. Obvious spelling, grammar and□
Punctuation errors have been corrected.□
Ruling reworded according to the decision of the Federal Administrative Court of May 24, 2019,□
GZ: W258 2205602-1/8E.]□
NOTICE
SPRUCH□
The data protection authority decides on Mr. Alfred's data protection complaint□
A*** (complainant) of January 22, 2018 against N*** Bank AG□
(Respondent) for violation of the right to information as follows:□
1. It is established that the Respondent is the Appellant□
thereby violated his right to information by telling him about his□
Request from 11/28/2017, information about his data, namely□
Transfers to the property management "XXXX" and the property management □
"XXXX" of the past 5 years has not provided any information. □
2. The Respondent is ordered within a period of two□
to provide information in accordance with Art. 15 GDPR in the event of other execution. □
Legal basis: §§ 32 ff of the Payment Services Act 2018 - ZaDiG 2018, Federal Law Gazette I□
No. 17; Sections 24 and 69 of the Data Protection Act (DSG), Federal Law Gazette I No. 165/1999 as amended; Article 5□
Paragraph 1 letter e, Article 15, Article 12 Paragraph 5 letter a, Article 55 Paragraph 1, Article 56 paragraph 1, Article 57 Paragraph
Article 58(2)(c) and Article 77 of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (data protection□
Basic Regulation - GDPR), OJ No. L 119 p. 1.□
A. Submissions of the parties and course of the proceedings□


1) With a submission dated January 22, 2018, the complainant complained that he □
Respondent needs proof of transfer of the last five years and □
only proof of transfer, which does not date back more than a year, $\!$
could see. The complainant then asked the respondent to $\!\!\!\square$
Transmission of evidence for the other years. However, the Respondent would have □
the provision of proof of transfer is charged at EUR 30 per year. □
The complainant would then have a data protection request for information □
and received no information by the end of the period. □
2) With a request for a statement dated January 29, 2018, GZ: DSB-D122.844/0001-□
DSB/2018, the data protection authority asked the respondent to□
Eliminate the infringement and provide information directly to the complainant□
to issue or, if necessary, to comment. The Respondent took part□
Entry dated February 10, 2018 that duplicate account statements not using □
e**Banking could be queried electronically, according to the notice with EUR $30.00\square$
would be charged. □
3) The data protection authority cleared the respondent with the completion of $\!\!\!\!\square$
February 23, 2018, GZ: DSB-D122.844/0002-DSB/2018, right to be heard. the □
Complainant commented on March 14, 2018 and led □
summarized from the fact that data protection information is fundamentally free of charge
would be granted and according to the case law of the data protection authority only $\!$
actually incurred costs for replacement could be prescribed. in the □
In the present case, it is not clear how the prescribed costs came about□
and he requested that the costs be assessed accordingly and that $\!\!\!\!\!\square$
instruct the Respondent to comply with the request for information. □
4) With a further request for comment dated April 18, 2018, □

GZ: DSB-D122.844/0003-DSB/2018, the data protection authority informed that□
Compensation for costs can only be prescribed for costs actually incurred and □
that the Respondent may explain how the costs demanded□
would put together.□
5) In a submission dated April 30, 2018, the Respondent stated that she already□
the obligation of the ZaDiG to provide the complainant with information free of charge□
would have granted and on the basis of this special statutory provision to the complainant□
no further free information is entitled. In this regard, the□
Data Protection Authority in its case law the existence of harassment in the event that□
where the data could still be viewed electronically using e**banking. Further□
did the OGH in 6 Ob 25/90 harassment with regard to those data that were already before the □
requests for information would have been communicated in bank statements, affirmed. Furthermore□
see the ZaDiG, in the implementation of the Payment Services Directive as equal to the Data Protection Directive,□
provides that fees are linked to the repeated provision of information□
could become. In any case, the fee is reasonable. The Respondent□
also referred to the provisions of Article 12(5) in force after May 25, 2018 □
lit. a and b GDPR, according to which a fee can be demanded. Also could dem□
Union legislators are not assumed that the provisions of Art. 40 ff□
RL 2015/2366 would have to remain without scope and this would be the case if it□
the Respondent would not be granted a reasonable fee□
charge. Also, not all payment transaction data are without further effort□
accessible. It would bind the information essential human resources and be the□
Information where the Respondent is dependent on third-party service providers□
monetary expenses associated. In the present case would be □
Respondent incurred costs of EUR 9.92 for 2013. □
6) The data protection authority granted the complainant on May 3rd □

2018, GZ: DSB-D122.844/0005-DSB/2018, legal hearing again. A substantive □
The complainant's comments were not received. □
B. Subject of Complaint□
The subject of the complaint is the question of whether the Respondent□
thereby violated the right to information by responding to the request for information from□
November 28, 2018 has not ruled, as well as the question of whether the right of access □
Duplicate extracts can also be requested. □
C. Findings of Facts□
The complainant sent a request for information on November 28, 2017 to the □
Respondent and requested information about own data, especially about□
Transfers from the years back to 2013. The Respondent has none □
provides information under data protection law and ties information to costs of EUR 30.00 □
per year. For the year 2013, the Respondent incurs costs amounting to□
EUR 9.92.□
Evidence Evidence: Evidence was through the submissions of the parties□
recorded. The preservation of the matter is undisputed insofar as the parties□
consistently described the facts and clarified the relevant facts□
The question lies solely in the legal assessment. □
D. In legal terms it follows that: □
1. General: □
According to the legal situation applicable from May 25, 2018, this was previously according to § 31□
DSG 2000, Federal Law Gazette I No. 165/1999 as amended by Federal Law Gazette I No. 83/2013, procedures as
Complaints procedure according to § 24 DSG, Federal Law Gazette I No. 165/1999 as amended (cf□
Section 69 (4) DSG).□
The applicability of the DSG in the current version and the GDPR must be stated, $ \Box$
that according to § 69 DSG there is no statutory transition period and therefore□

the legal situation at the time of the official decision is decisive. it's coming□
namely, in the present case it does not depend on what happened on a specific date or in a $\square$
specific period was legal, since both the DSG 2000 and the DSG it a□
Respondents concede, until the end of the official procedure, the information $ \Box$
to catch up (cf. from the stRsp of the VwGH the decision of February 28, 2018,□
ZI. Fe 2016/06/0001 with further references). Thus, the complainant's request at the time, $\Box$
which was based on the then applicable legal situation of § 26 DSG 2000, after which□
to assess the now applicable right to information under Art. 15 GDPR and the □
compared to ZaDiG 2018.□
2. To justify the complaint: □
The complaint is justified because the respondent is undisputed □
to the data protection request for information not in accordance with the DSG or the □
GDPR has reacted in the manner provided for. Already the non-reaction to a□
A request for information constitutes a violation of the right to information (cf□
Decision of the Data Protection Commission of April 10, 2013, GZ K121.924/0006-□
DSK/2013), which is why the complaint had to be upheld. □
The complainant also claims that the respondent had him in□
Right to information violated by (incomprehensible) costs to the □
Information about certain account statements and led to the case law of □
Data Protection Commission on GZ: K121.394, according to which the right to information □
is to be granted free of charge and only costs actually incurred are prescribed □
could become. □
The quoted case law of the data protection commission refers to the legal situation□
before the GDPR came into force and relates to the content of the rules that are in the current
Can't find legal position. □
Applied to the current case, the following must therefore be carried out:□

2.1. Regarding the request for information in relation to information obligations: □
As data protection information, the complainant requests the (free)□
Provision of information held by the Respondent. the □
Respondent charges for the objective answer to the information,□
does not dispute the existence of a data protection request for information. □
The Respondent believes its obligations under the ZaDiG 2018□
to have complied, and therefore assumes that the requirements of Art. 12 $\!\square$
Paragraph 5 lit. a and b GDPR are present and the complainant abused his right□
practice□
It should be pointed out that Art. 15 GDPR does not correspond to Section 26 (6) DSG 2000□
identical regulation, according to which the data protection request for information□
can only be exercised as a subsidiary to other rights of inspection. Rather, there is□
fundamental right to information according to Art. 15 DSGVO, insofar as no permissible one□
Restriction according to Art. 23 DSGVO exists. □
Restriction according to Art. 23 DSGVO exists. ☐  If, on the other hand, a more specific substantive regulation applies under Union law, then this applies ☐
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Respondent legitimately makes use of its right under Article 12(5)(a). □
GDPR by prescribing costs in the event of excessive requests for information,□
cannot be followed.□
In its statement, the Respondent refers to a general point□
Ban on harassment and explains that the OGH had approved such a thing and that with□
Art. 12 (5) lit. a and b GDPR also counteracted vexatious exercise of rights□
shall be.□
First of all, it must be stated that the Austrian case law requires the existence of a□
"General ban on harassment" denied and only an exercise of rights, which□
violates good morals in Section 1295 (2) ABGB, is frowned upon (cf□
2 Ob 576/55, 3 Ob 520/51 and others, see also OGH in the decision of July 10th $\!\!\!\!\!\!\square$
1986, 6 Ob 12/85 = SZ 59/123 = RdW 1986, 306 = JBI 1986, 643).□
But what a special claim of the□
Respondent (of the person responsible) in accordance with Article 12 (5) lit. a and b GDPR
concerned, it is granted that in the event of manifestly unfounded or□
excessive exercise of rights, a right to have costs imposed or a□
"Right of Refusal" would apply.□
The legislature is bad at it. "particularly in the case of frequent repetition" thereof□
that there must be a certain intensity that the person responsible must be able to $\!\!\!\!\!\Box$
would make unreasonable against the fundamentally unfounded subjective right of control
to have to accept (heads in Gantschacher/Jelinek/Schmidl/Spanberger,□
Commentary on the General Data Protection Regulation1 2017, on Art. 12; see also the □
Decision of the DSK from September 14th, 2012, GZ K121.830/0008-DSK/2012).□
The complainant exercises the right to information for the first time against the □
Respondent and asks for very specific data. Here will too□
takes into account that the complainant only requests information about data that he□

himself can no longer see the e**banking and therefore the participation of □
Respondent is required. □
The complainant therefore has no behavior when exercising his right to information $\square$
set, which would make it unreasonable for the Respondent to do without□
to take action to prescribe costs, or to refuse to provide information. $\hfill\Box$
It was therefore to be decided accordingly. □