

Decision

Diarienr

2020-06-22

DI-2020-2278

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A026.530 / 2020

The police authority

Supervision of the Police Authority

load register according to the law on

load register

The Data Inspectorate's decision

The Data Inspectorate states that the Police Authority has rectified this

technical errors which have meant that mailing of register extracts from

the load register during the period 19 November 2019 up to and including the 13th

January 2020 has become incorrect. The Data Inspectorate therefore does not take any

further action.

The case is closed.

Report on the supervisory matter

The purpose and delimitation of the review

On 20 January 2020, the Data Inspectorate received a report from

The police authority on personal data incident, ref A026.530 / 2020. Incidents

referred to extracts from the debit register to individuals as below

the period November 19, 2019 through January 13, 2020 has included for

little or too much information. In the light of the information in the notification has

The Data Inspectorate decided to examine the Police Authority's

personal data processing in the debit register. The purpose of the supervisory matter

has been limited to control of the authority's handling of

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personal data in the register extracts during the period of notification

the personal data incident refers to.

Implementation and method

During the review, the following has mainly emerged.

On 25 February 2020, the Data Inspectorate asked a number of questions

The police authority for written answers.

The Police Authority's response states that the indictment register in November

2019 was migrated to a new technical platform, which required changes in

the communication with the system extract register (RUT). The current one

the function underwent both unit tests, system tests and acceptance tests before

it was commissioned. The system is complex and a couple of shortcomings were discovered

caused errors in certain types of extracts from the debit register. In total

are 448 individuals who have requested information about themselves affected by

it occurred. The register extracts that have been sent to the persons concerned have

contained too little or too much information. Of the incorrect extracts referred to

407 paragraph such complete extracts that individuals may request to exercise

their right of access to the debit register and the remaining 41 incorrect extracts

referred to such limited extracts that individuals may request to show

or leave to employers. When the extent of the problem became known

the registry extraction service was paused pending the error.

The police authority has subsequently supplemented coding and thinning logic in

the system with what was missing after the migration to the new platform.

The police authority has stated that when a modernization or update of

the technical platform becomes relevant again, the tests will be organized

and designed so that similar errors do not recur. The police authority

further intends to investigate the possibilities of automatic tests to avoid

errors in the future caused by the human factor.

Due to the incorrect extract from the register, the Police Authority has

taken a number of measures. The authority has, among other things, published one

press release with general information about what happened and

notified all individuals who received an incorrect extract. Further has

correct extracts have been sent out to the persons concerned and the incorrect extracts

have been requested to prevent their use. The police authority has

further stated that they followed up which extracts were submitted and made one

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careful investigation and risk assessment of the 41 incorrect extracts that can

be used to search for certain types of jobs.

Justification of decision

The Data Inspectorate's assessment

Section 1 of the Load Register Act (1998: 620) states that the Police Authority

with the help of automated processing shall keep a load register.

The authority is responsible for personal data for the processing of personal data

in the register. The law contains provisions regarding the registration of persons who have been convicted or have not been charged with a crime and apply in addition Criminal Data Act (2018: 1877).

Section 2 of the Load Register Act states that the load register must be kept to provide information on such load data as is needed in activities of law enforcement agencies. The register may also be used to provide an individual with information that is of particular importance in his or her business. It can e.g. be alarm installation companies or individual employers in the healthcare sector who need information about persons to be employed in the business.

The investigation shows that the Police Authority has taken a number of measures in direct connection with the authority becoming aware of the current situation technical problem which meant that a number of incorrect registry extracts from the debit register was sent during the period 19 November 2019 up to and including on 13 January 2020. Among other things, the register extraction service was temporarily stopped in waiting for the problem to be fixed, correct extracts and information was sent to the persons concerned and the Police Authority reported without delay the incident to the Data Inspectorate. It happened the personal data incident has not affected what data is available about persons in the debit register or how long the data is stored.

In summary, the Data Inspectorate states that the Police Authority has rectified the technical error that involved sending out extract from the register the load register during the period 19 November 2019 up to and including the 13th January 2020 has become incorrect. The Data Inspectorate therefore does not take any further action.

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This decision was made by unit manager Charlotte Waller Dahlberg after presentation by lawyer Linda Olander. At the final processing has also the data council Agneta Runmarker and the IT security specialists Johan Ma and Ulrika Sundling participated.

Charlotte Waller Dahlberg, 2020-06-22 (This is an electronic signature)

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