

Computer and Network Security: Hashes

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Outline

- **Modern Cryptography**

- Overview

- Confidentiality

- Background: Definition, Crypto-analysis, One Time Pads
 - Symmetric key encryption, Block modes
 - Asymmetric key encryption

- **Integrity (includes Authentication)**

- **Hashes**, MAC, Digital signature

Integrity and Authentication

- Focus: Communication framework


Definition:

- Integrity (data): Has the data been modified in transit?
- Authentication: Am I talking with the right person?

- Hashes/Message Digests: Integrity
- Message Authentication Codes (MACs): Integrity and Authentication
 - Based on Shared key
- Digital Signatures: Integrity and Authentication
 - Based on Asymmetric key

Hashes/Message Digest

- **One way** function used to verify message integrity
- Maps arbitrary length message (*) \rightarrow fixed length string (d)
 - $h(M)$ hash of message M ; similar to fingerprint
 - No key; public algorithm
 - Typical values of d : 128, 160, 256, 512 bits




$$h : \{0, 1\}^* \longrightarrow \{0, 1\}^d$$

Collisions Possible

- Brute Force Attack
 - 1000 bit message and 160 bit output
 - On average 2^{840} messages map to the same output
 - Have to try approx 2^{160} possible messages to find a match
- Usage:
 - Hash of Software (e.g. Ubuntu versions); file integrity checks
 - Password verification (hash of passwords stored);
 - Commitment: Alice submits $h(v|r)$ as sealed bid (r is random no)
 - After bidding close, to open bid Alice reveals (r, v)

- Hash operation needs to be
 - Efficient (polynomial time)
 - Deterministic but should look like random string
 - For each message choose a different and independent string
- Hash functions like SHA1 (160), SHA2/3 (224, 256, 384 512), MD4(128), MD5(128) take the role of RO
 - “pseudo random” though

Random Oracle (RO)



If M not in book

- flip coin d times to generate $h(M)$
- record $(M, h(M))$ in book

Else return $h(M)$ from book

(book ensures process deterministic)

Desirable Properties

- Pre-image resistant:
 - Given y , infeasible to find any m where $h(m) = y$
 - m is a pre-image of y
- 2nd pre-image resistance (weak collision resistance)
 - Given m_1 , infeasible to find different m_2 such that $h(m_1) = h(m_2)$
 - Adversary knows m_1 and wishes to change it to m_2 to produce same hash

- Collision Resistance (strong):
 - Infeasible to find **ANY** two different messages m_1 and m_2 such that $h(m_1) = h(m_2)$
- If $h()$ is collision resistant, $h()$ is also weak collision resistant
 - Converse not true
- If $h()$ is weak collision resistant, $h()$ is also pre-image resistant
 - Converse not true

Birthday Problem

23 or more people in a room, >50% chance two have same birthday

Proof: Calculate probability no two people have the same birthday

$$= 365/365 * 364/365 * 363/365 * \dots * 343/365$$

$$= (1/365)^{23} * (365 * 364 * \dots * 343) \approx 0.49$$

→ 0.51 prob two have same birthday

Intuition: 23 people, 253 possible pairs

Each pair has to have different birthdays for no two people to have same birthday

Relevance to Collision Resistance

- b-bit hash, $n=2^b$ possible hash values
- Prob i^{th} generated message does not collide with previous $i-1$ messages $= (n-(i-1))/n = 1 - ((i-1)/n)$
- Failure after generating k messages (attacker has still not found a collision) This is product, not addition

$$P_k = (1 - 1/n) + (1 - 2/n) + \cdots + (1 - (k - 1)/n)$$

$$P_k = (1 - 1/n) + (1 - 2/n) + \dots + (1 - (k - 1)/n)$$

This is product, not addition

- For $P_k = 0.5$, $k \approx 1.17\sqrt{n}$
- 64-bit hash would only take searching 2^{32} random messages to find two with same value
 - 32 bits of security for a 64 bit output
 - Hashes ≥ 128 bits

Importance of Collision Resistance

- Players: Alice(Boss); Mallory (Malicious Secretary)
- Mallory: two versions of contract
 - C1: favorable to Alice; C2: favorable to self
 - Make many unnoticeable changes to C1 and C2
 - Extra space at end of line; double space between words; synonyms of words etc
 - E.g. 32 lines; change/no-change to each line $\rightarrow 2^{32}$ variations

- 2^{32} messages of type C1 and 2^{32} messages of type C2
- By birthday paradox
 - Testing $\sim 2^{32}$ messages can find messages C1 and C2 where $h(C1) = h(C2)$
 - As against 2^{64} if original message of type C1 was fixed

Hashes vs Encryption

Hashes

- One-way
 - No un-hashing
 - Collisions
- Deterministic
 - Hash same input, get same output

Encryption


- One-way with trapdoor
 - Plaintext can be recovered from Ciphertext
 - No collisions
- Random
 - Ideally encrypt same plaintext, get different ciphertext

Common Hash Functions

- MD4, MD5 (128 bits): Developed by Ronald Rivest
 - Completely broken
- SHA-1 (160 bits): Developed by NSA
 - No longer secure against powerful attackers
- SHA-2: Developed by NSA
 - Supports 224, 256, 384 and 512 output lengths
 - No significant attack still (but good to have alternatives)
- SHA-3: Public competition, winner Keccak (2012)
 - Supports 224, 256, 384 and 512 output lengths
 - Internal structure very different from rest of SHA family

Construction


- No math; bunch of steps that increasingly mangle the message (output has to pass randomness tests)
- Common Structure (Merkle Damgard Construction)



Construction

Message M divided into blocks M_1, M_2 etc

- Message block size b (e.g. 512 bits)
- Pad message to make it multiple of b



Output size: d

Chaining variable c

- c_0 is fixed and public
- $c \geq d$

C : Compression function

SHA-1: $m = 512$ bits and final hash (and c 's) 160 bits

Compression function collision resistant \rightarrow Above construction collision resistant

Example: SHA-1


Processing one message block of size 512 bits

- Each message block split into 16 words of 32 bits ($W_1, W_2 \dots W_{16}$), further


$$W_i = W_{i-3} \oplus W_{i-8} \oplus W_{i-14} \oplus W_{i-16} \quad 16 < i \leq 80$$

(for a total of 80 words)

- Shift Register: A, B, C, D and E (32 bit words)
 - Initialized to h_1, h_2, h_3, h_4 and h_5
 - At the very beginning (first message chunk)
 - $h_1 = 0x67452301$, $h_2 = 0xEFCDAB89$, $h_3 = 0x98BADCFE$, $h_4 = 0x10325476$, $h_5 = 0xC3D2E1F0$



<<< : rotation to left

 : modulo addition 2^{32}

Example: SHA-1

$$W_i = W_{i-3} \oplus W_{i-8} \oplus W_{i-14} \oplus W_{i-16} \quad 16 < i \leq 80$$

Procedure:

For $i = 1$ to 80 {

Temp $\leftarrow E + (A \ll 5) + F_i(B, C, D) + K_i + W_i$

$E \leftarrow D$

$D \leftarrow C$

$C \leftarrow B \gg 2$


$B \leftarrow A$

$A \leftarrow \text{temp}$


}

K_i : known constant

F_i : Function



<<< : rotation to left

 : modulo addition 2^{32}

- Function F:

$$F_i(B,C,D) = (B \text{ AND } C) \text{ OR } ((\text{NOT } B) \text{ AND } D) \quad (1 \leq i \leq 20)$$

$$F_i(B,C,D) = B \text{ XOR } C \text{ XOR } D \quad (21 \leq i \leq 40)$$

$$F_i(B,C,D) = (B \text{ AND } C) \text{ OR } (B \text{ AND } D) \text{ OR } (C \text{ AND } D) \quad (41 \leq i \leq 60)$$

$$F_i(B,C,D) = B \text{ XOR } C \text{ XOR } D \quad (61 \leq i \leq 80)$$

- *Add this message chunk's hash to result so far:* $h1 = h1 + A$; $h2 = h2 + B$; $h3 = h3 + C$; $h4 = h4 + D$; $h5 = h5 + E$
- After all message blocks processed, content of shift register is the $h1|h2|h3|h4|h5$
- `SHA1("The quick brown fox jumps over the lazy dog")` gives hexadecimal:
`2fd4e1c67a2d28fced849ee1bb76e7391b93eb12`

Summary

- Integrity/Authentication: A very important aspect of security
- Hashes provide integrity (not authentication)
 - Desirable properties
 - Construction
 - Example: SHA-1