SMART CONTRACT SECURITY AUDIT OF (LRG) LARGE CHAIN

Audit Introduction

Auditing Firm LARGE CHAIN PROTOCOL

Audit Architecture LARGE CHAIN Echelon Auditing Standard

Language Solidity

Client Firm LARGE CHAIN

Website https://largechain.net/

Telegram https://t.me/largechainn

Twitter https://twitter.com/lrgtokenn

Facebook https://www.facebook.com/Largechain

Whitepaper https://largechain.net

Report Date Dec 26. 2022

About LRG CHAIN

LARGE CHAIN WEB 3.0 PROTOCOL

LargeChain, (BinanceSmart Chain ile yaygınlaşan) blockchain tabanlı akıllı sözleşmelerle gerçek dünya uygulamaları arasında köprü vazifesi görmeyi hedefleyen bir platformdur. Blockchain'ler ağ dışındaki veriye erişim sağlayamadığı için, akıllı sözleşmelerde veri sağlayıcı olarak (WEB 3.0) ihtiyaç duyuluyor. LargeChain durumunda BinanceSmartChain ağına bağlı bulunuyor. ağın sağladığı (sıcaklık, hava durumu gibi) harici veri, önceden belirlenmiş koşullar gerçekleştiğinde akıllı sözleşmeleri tetikliyor sağlıyor.

Audit Summary

large chain team has performed a line-by-line manual analysis and automated review of smart contracts. Smart contracts were analyzed mainly for common contract vulnerabilities, exploits, and manipulation hacks. According to the audit:

- LRG LARGE CHAIN solidity source code has LOW RISK SEVERITY
- LRG LARGE CHAIN smart contract has an **ACTIVE OWNERSHIP**
- LRG LARGE CHAIN centralization risk correlated to the active owner is
 MEDIUM
- Important owner privileges BURN, PAUSE, SET FEES, WITHDRAW

Be aware that smart contracts deployed on the blockchain aren't resistant to internal exploit, external vulnerability, or hack. For a detailed understanding of risk severity, source code vulnerability, exploitability, and audit disclaimer, kindly refer to the audit.

- Contract address: 0x76b7e29212a53166d358daf2b227c3810fe7ff70
- Blockchain: Binance Smart Chain
- ✓ Verify the authenticity of this report on InterFi's GitHub: https://github.com/LargeChain

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Audit Information

Audit Scope

InterFi was consulted by LARGE CHAIN to conduct the smart contract security audit of their solidity source codes. The audit scope of work is strictly limited to the mentioned solidity file(s) only:

Irg.sol

Solidity Source Code On GitHub

https://github.com/LargeCHAIN/LargeChainn

SHA-1 Hash

Solidity source code is audited at hash #

0x3ef348e846bdac325d0c836c4692f7f188fccddaf8596f7db05978beba2e6729

Audit Methodology

The scope of this report is to audit the smart contract source code of LARGE CHAIN has scanned contracts and reviewed codes for common vulnerabilities, exploits, hacks, and backdoors. Due to being out of scope, LARGE CHAIN has not tested contracts on testnet to assess any functional flaws. Below is the list of commonly known smart contract vulnerabilities, exploits, and hacks:

Category

Smart Contract Vulnerabilities

- Re-entrancy
- Unhandled Exceptions
- Transaction Order Dependency
- Integer Overflow
- Unrestricted Action
- Incorrect Inheritance Order
- Typographical Errors
- Requirement Violation

Source Code Review

- Gas Limit and Loops
- Deployment Consistency
- Repository Consistency
- Data Consistency
- Token Supply Manipulation
- Access Control and Authorization
- Operations Trail and Event Generation
- Assets Manipulation
- Ownership Control
- Liquidity Access

Large Chain Echelon Audit Standard

• The aim of Large Chain "Echelon" standard is to analyze smart contracts and identify the vulnerabilities and the hacks. Kindly note, large chain does not test smart contracts on testnet. It is recommended that smart contracts are thoroughly tested prior to the audit submission. Mentioned are the steps used by large chain to audit smart contracts:

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- · Solidity smart contract source code reviewal:
- Review of the specifications, sources, and instructions provided to Large chain to make sure we understand the size, and scope of the smart contract audit.

- Manual review of code, which is the process of reading source code lineby-line to identify potential vulnerabilities.
- · Static, Manual, and Software analysis:
- Test coverage analysis is the process of determining whether the test cases are covering the code and how much code is exercised when we run those test cases.
- Symbolic execution is analyzing a program to determine what inputs cause each part of a program to execute.
- Best practices review, which is a review of the smart contracts to improve efficiency, effectiveness, clarify, maintainability, security, and control based on the established industry and academic practices, recommendations, and research.
- Specific, itemized, actionable recommendations to help you take steps to secure your smart contracts
- Automated 3P frameworks used to assess the smart contract vulnerabilities Consensys Tools
- SWC Registry
- Solidity Coverage
- Open Zeppelin Code Analyzer
- Solidity Code Complier

Risk Classification

Smart contracts are generally designed to manipulate and hold funds denominated in ETH/BNB. This makes them very tempting attack targets, as a successful attack may allow the attacker to directly steal funds from the contract. Below are the typical risk levels of a smart contract:

Vulnerable: A contract is vulnerable if it has been flagged by a static analysis tool as such. As we will see later, this means that some contracts may be vulnerable because of a false positive.

Exploitable: A contract is exploitable if it is vulnerable and the vulnerability could be exploited by an external attacker. For example, if the "vulnerability" flagged by a tool is in a function that requires owning the contract, it would be vulnerable but not exploitable.

Exploited: A contract is exploited if it received a transaction on the main network which triggered one of its vulnerabilities. Therefore, a contract can be vulnerable or even exploitable without having been exploited.

Risk severity Meaning

This level vulnerabilities could be exploited easily and can lead to asset loss,

! Low

! Medium

! Low

! Informational

data loss, asset, or data manipulation. They should be fixed right away.

This level vulnerabilities are hard to exploit but very important to fix, they carry an elevated risk of smart contract manipulation, which can lead to high-risk severity

This level vulnerabilities should be fixed, as they carry an inherent risk of future exploits, and hacks which may or may not impact the smart contract execution.

This level vulnerabilities can be ignored. They are code style violations and informational statements in the code. They may not affect the smart contract execution

Centralization Risk

Centralization risk is the most common cause of decentralized finance hacks. When a smart contract has an active contract ownership, the risk related to centralization is elevated. There are some well-intended reasons to be an active contract owner, such as:

- Contract owner can be granted the power to pause() or lock()
 the contract in case of an external attack.
- Contract owner can use functions like, include(), and exclude() to add or remove wallets from fees, swap checks, and transaction limits. This is useful to run a presale, and to list on an exchange.

Authorizing a full centralized power to a single body can be dangerous.

Unfortunately, centralization related risks are higher than common smart

contract vulnerabilities. Centralization of ownership creates a risk of rug pull scams, where owners cash out tokens in such quantities that they become valueless. **Most important question to ask here is, how to mitigate centralization risk?** Here's InterFi's recommendation to lower the risks related to centralization hacks:

- Smart contract owner's private key must be carefully secured to avoid any potential hack.
- Smart contract ownership should be shared by multi-signature (multi-sig) wallets.
- Smart contract ownership can be locked in a contract, user voting,
 or community DAO can be introduced to unlock the ownership.


LRG LARGE CHAIN Centralization Status

- LARGE CHAIN smart contract has an active ownership.
- Smart contract is **not deployed** on blockchain at the time of the audit.

Static Analysis

Symbol	Meaning	
	Function can modify state	
	Function is payable	
	Function is locked	
	Function can be accessed	
	Important functionality	

```
| **Ownable ** | Implementation | Context |||
| L | <Constructor> | Public | NO |
| L | owner | Public | | NO |
| L | checkOwner | Internal | | |
| L | renounceOwnership | Public | | onlyOwner |
| L | transferOwnership | Public |
                                     | onlyOwner |
| L | transferOwnership | Internal | | |
| **<mark>SafeMath</mark>** | Library | |||
| L | tryAdd | Internal
| L | trySub | Internal
| L | tryMul | Internal
 L | tryDiv | Internal
        tryMod | Internal
         add | Internal
        sub | Internal
        mul | Internal
         div | Internal
         mod | Internal
         sub | Internal
         div | Internal
   L
         mod | Internal
| **ReentrancyGuard** | Implementation | |||
| L | <Constructor> | Public | NO |
| **IBEP2E** | Interface | |||
!!| L | totalSupply | External | | NO |
!| L | decimals | External | | NO! |
!| L | symbol | External | |NO! |
‼| └ | name | External | |NO |
!| L | getOwner | External | | NO! |
!!| L | balanceOf | External | |NO
!| L | transfer | External
                         | NO ! |
‼| └ | allowance | External |
                               | NO
!!| L | approve | External | ● |NO |
!!| L | transferFrom | External | | NO |
| **IPancakeswapV2Factory** | Interface | |||
| L | feeTo | External | NO |
| L | feeToSetter | External | NO
| L | getPair | External | | NO |
| L | allPairs | External | | NO |
| L | allPairsLength | External | | NO |
| L | createPair | External |
                                | NO |
| L | setFeeTo | External | NO |
| L | setFeeToSetter | External
```



```
| L | getAmountOut | External
                            | NO
| L | getAmountIn | External
                            NO |
| L | getAmountsOut | External
                            | | NO |
| L | getAmountsIn | External
                                 l NO
| **IPancakeRouter02** | Interface | IPancakeRouter01 |||
L | removeLiquidityETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens | External
| L | removeLiquidityETHWithPermitSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens | External
                                                                           | NO
| L | swapExactTokensForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens | External
                                                                   | NO
                                                                   | L | swapExactETHForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens | External
                                                                     | NO
| L | swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens | External
                                                                     | NO
| **BrnMetaverse** | Implementation | Ownable, IBEP2E, ReentrancyGuard |||
| L | <Constructor> | Public | NO
| L | paused | Public | | NO |
| L | name | Public | NO |
| L | symbol | Public | NO |
| L | decimals | Public | NO |
L | totalSupply | Public | NO
| L | getOwner | Public | | NO |
| L | balanceOf | Public | NO |
| L | transfer | Public | | whenNotPaused |
| L | transferFrom | Public | whenNotPaused |
| L | allowance | Public | NO |
| L | approve | Public | | whenNotPaused |
| L | increaseAllowance | Public | | whenNotPaused |
| L | decreaseAllowance | Public |
                                    | whenNotPaused |
| L | burn | Public | | onlyOwner whenNotPaused |
| L | pause | Public | | onlyOwner whenNotPaused |
| L | unpause | Public | onlyOwner whenPaused |
| L | createLiquidityPoolPair | Public | | liquidityPairNotCreated
onlyOwner |
| L | setRouterAddress | External | | liquidityPairCreated onlyOwner |
| L | setLiquidityFee | External
                               1
                                    | onlyOwner |
! | L | setLiquidityPoolBuyFee | External | ● | onlyOwner |
!| \mathsf{L} | setSwapAndLiquifyEnabled | Public | lacktriangle | onlyOwner swapIsNotEnabled |
🄐 | L | calculateLiquidityFee | Private 🔐 | | |
| L | calculateTaxFee | Private | | |
| L | removeAllFee | Private 🔐 | 🛑 | |
| └ | restoreAllFee | Private 🔐 | 🛑 | |
‼| L | <Receive Ether> | External | № |NO
| L | swapAndLiquify | Private 🔐 | 🛑 | lockTheSwap |
| L | swapTokensForBnb | Private 🔐 | 🛑 | |
| L | addLiquidity | Private | | |
```

```
\mid L \mid removeLiquidity \mid Public \mid onlyOwner \mid
| ^{\mathsf{L}} | excludeFromReward | Public | | onlyOwner |
| L | includeInReward | External | | onlyOwner |
| L | withdraw | Public | | onlyOwner nonReentrant |
| L | getChainID | Private | | |
| L | transfer | Internal | | |
| L | _takeLiquidity | Private | | |
| L | takeFee | Private | | |
| L | _transferTokens | Private
                               1 1
| L | takeTaxes | Internal | | |
 L | _getFeeAmountValues | Private
                                    1 1 1
                                    burn | Internal |
                                    approve | Internal
                                    burnFrom | Internal
                                   beforeTokenTransfer | Internal
                                   afterTokenTransfer | Internal
```

Software Analysis

Function Signatures

39509351	=>	increaseAllowance(address,uint256)
75128141	=>	calculateTaxFee(uint256)
8da5cb5b	=>	owner()
53a72975	=>	checkOwner()
715018a6	=>	renounceOwnership()
f2fde38b	=>	transferOwnership(address)
d29d44ee	=>	transferOwnership(address)
884557bf	=>	tryAdd(uint256,uint256)
a29962b1	=>	trySub (uint256, uint256)
6281efa4	=>	tryMul(uint256,uint256)
736ecb18	=>	tryDiv(uint256,uint256)
38dc0867	=>	tryMod(uint256,uint256)
771602f7	=>	add(uint256,uint256)
b67d77c5	=>	sub (uint256, uint256)
c8a4ac9c	=>	mul(uint256,uint256)
a391c15b	=>	div(uint256,uint256)
f43f523a	=>	mod(uint256, uint256)
e31bdc0a	=>	sub(uint256,uint256,string)
b745d336	=>	div(uint256,uint256,string)
71af23e8	=>	mod(uint256,uint256,string)
18160ddd	=>	totalSupply()
313ce567	=>	decimals()
95d89b41	=>	symbol()
06fdde03	=>	name()
893d20e8	=>	getOwner()
70a08231	=>	balanceOf(address)

a9059cbb	=>	transfer(address,uint256)
dd62ed3e	=>	allowance(address,address)
095ea7b3	=>	approve(address,uint256)
23b872dd	=>	transferFrom(address,address,uint256)
017e7e58	=>	feeTo()
094b7415	=>	feeToSetter()
e6a43905	=>	getPair(address,address)
1e3dd18b	=>	allPairs(uint256)
574f2ba3	=>	allPairsLength()
c9c65396	=>	createPair(address,address)
f46901ed	=>	setFeeTo(address)
a2e74af6	=>	setFeeToSetter(address)
3644e515	=>	DOMAIN_SEPARATOR()
30adf81f	=>	PERMIT_TYPEHASH()
7ecebe00	=>	nonces (address)
d505accf	=>	permit(address,address,uint256,uint256,uint8,bytes32,bytes32)
ba9a7a56	=>	MINIMUM_LIQUIDITY()
c45a0155	=>	factory()
0dfe1681	=>	token0()

421220-	_	tokan1()
d21220a 7	= >	token1()
0902f1a c	= >	getReserves()
5909c0d 5	= >	priceOCumulativeLast()
5a3d549 3	= >	pricelCumulativeLast()
7464fc3 d	= >	kLast()
6a62784 2	= ^	mint(address)
89afcb4 4	= >	burn(address)
022c0d9 f	= >	swap(uint256,uint256,address,bytes)
bc25cf7 7	= ^	skim(address)
fff6cae 9	= ^	sync()
485cc95 5	= ^	initialize(address,address)
ad5c464 8	= >	WETH()
e8e3370 0	= ^	addLiquidity(address,address,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,address,uint256)
f305d71 9	= >	addLiquidityETH(address,uint256,uint256,uint256,address,uint256)
baa2abd e	= >	removeLiquidity(address,address,uint256,uint256,uint256,address,uint256)
02751ce c	= >	removeLiquidityETH(address,uint256,uint256,uint256,address,uint256)
2195995 c	= >	

```
removeLiquidityWithPermit(address,address,uint256,uint256,uint256,address,uint256
,bool,uint8,bytes3 2,bytes32)
ded9382a =>
removeLiquidityETHWithPermit(address,uint256,uint256,uint256,address,uint25
6,bool,uint8,bytes32,byt es32)
38ed1739 =>
swapExactTokensForTokens(uint256,uint256,address[],add
ress,uint256) 8803dbee =>
swapTokensForExactTokens(uint256,uint256,address[],add
ress,uint256) 7ff36ab5 =>
swapExactETHForTokens(uint256,address[],address,uint256)
```

054d50d4	=>	getAmountOut(uint256,uint256,uint256)
85f8c259	=>	getAmountIn(uint256,uint256,uint256)
d06ca61f	=>	<pre>getAmountsOut(uint256,address[])</pre>
1f00ca74	=>	<pre>getAmountsIn(uint256,address[])</pre>
af2979eb	=>	

```
4a25d94a =>
swapTokensForExactETH(uint256, uint256, address[], ad
dress, uint256) 18cbafe5 =>
swapExactTokensForETH(uint256, uint256, address[], ad
dress, uint256) fb3bdb41 =>
swapETHForExactTokens(uint256, address[], address, ui
nt256) ad615dec => quote(uint256, uint256, uint256)
```

removeLiquidityETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens(address, uint256, uint256, uint
t256, address, uint256) 5b0d5984 =>
removeLiquidityETHWithPermitSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens(address, uint256, uint256
, uint256, address, u int256, bool, uint8, bytes32, bytes32)
5c11d795 =>
swapExactTokensForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens(uint256, uint256, address[], address, uint256) b6f9de95 =>
swapExactETHForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens(uint256, address[], address, uint256) 791ac947 =>

a457c2d7	=>	decreaseAllowance(address,uint256)
9dc29fac	=>	burn(address,uint256)
8456cb59	=>	pause()
3f4ba83a	=>	unpause()
4dc2fe46	=>	createLiquidityPoolPair()
41cb87fc	=>	setRouterAddress(address)

swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens(uint256,uint256,addres
s[],address,uint256) 5c975abb => paused()

357bf15c	=>	setLiquidityFee(uint256)
6ea23a34	=>	setLiquidityPoolBuyFee(uint256)
3dd2e789	=>	setLiquidityPoolSellFee(uint256)
dc38a03f	=>	setSwapAndLiquifyEnabled()
cc126a23	=>	calculateLiquidityFee(uint256)
301370af	=>	removeAllFee()
e7e3e3a7	=>	restoreAllFee()
173865ad	=>	swapAndLiquify(uint256)
528689ea	=>	swapTokensForBnb(uint256)
9cd441da	=>	addLiquidity(uint256,uint256)
9c8f9f23	=>	removeLiquidity(uint256)
52390c02	=>	excludeFromReward(address)
3685d419	=>	includeInReward(address)
2e1a7d4d	=>	withdraw(uint256)
660a00ed	=>	_getChainID()
30e0789e	=>	_transfer(address,address,uint256)
c432df5e	=>	_takeLiquidity(uint256)
49026a97	=>	_takeFee(uint256)
20d6115d	=>	_transferTokens(address,address,uint256,bool)
aa0ffca5	=>	takeTaxes(address,address,uint256)
d4b80039	=>	_getFeeAmountValues(uint256)
6161eb18	=>	_burn(address,uint256)
104e81ff	=>	_approve(address,address,uint256)
a22b35ce	=>	_burnFrom(address,uint256)
cad3be83	=>	_beforeTokenTransfer(address,address,uint256)
8f811a1c	=>	afterTokenTransfer(address,address,uint256)

Inheritance Graph

Manual Analysis

Function Description

Available Status

provides information about the total token

Total Supply

Balance Of

Transfer

Approve

Allowance

Burn

Dividend

Lock / Pause

Contract Fees

supply

provides account balance of the owner's account
executes transfers of a specified number of tokens to a specified address
allow a spender to withdraw a set number of tokens from a specified account
returns a set number of tokens from a spender to the owner
executes transfers of a specified number of tokens to a burn address
executes transfers of a specified dividend token to a specified address
locks or pauses all or some function modules of the smart contract
executes fee collection from swap events and/or transfer events

Yes	Passed
-----	---------------

Yes ! Low

Yes !Low

Transfer Ownership

Renounce

executes transfer of contract ownership to a specified wallet executes transfer of contract ownership to a

Ownership

dead address

Yes

Passed

Notable Information

 Smart contract owner can pause or lock the smart contract function modules.

```
function pause() public onlyOwner whenNotPaused {
    _paused = true;
function unpause() public onlyOwner whenPaused {
    paused = false;
```

 Smart contract owner can **burn** user assets. Token allowance requirements must be met to perform this transaction.

```
function burn(address _account, uint _amount) public onlyOwner whenNotPaused
returns(bool){
    _burn(_account, _amount);
```

 Smart contract utilizes safemath function to avoid common smart contract vulnerabilities.

```
string private _name = "BRNMETAVERSE";
library SafeMath {
function add(uint256 a, uint256 b) internal pure returns (uint256) {
    uint256 c = a + b;
    require(c >= a, "SafeMath: addition overflow");
function sub(uint256 a, uint256 b) internal pure returns (uint256) {
    return sub(a, b, "SafeMath:
    subtraction overflow");
    uint256 c = a * b;
```

```
require(c / a == b, "SafeMath:
   multiplication overflow");
   return c;
function div(uint256 a, uint256 b) internal pure returns (uint256) {
   return div(a, b, "SafeMath: division by zero");
function mod(uint256 a, uint256 b) internal pure returns (uint256) {
   return mod(a, b, "SafeMath: modulo by zero");
```

- Smart contract utilizes **re-entrancy guard** to prevent re-entrant calls to withdraw().
- Smart contract utilizes redundant code for

transferOwnership(). Ideal transfer ownership code should look be written like:

```
function transferOwnership(address newOwner) public
  virtual onlyOwner { require(newOwner != address(0),
   "Ownable: new owner is the zero address"); emit
  OwnershipTransferred(_owner, newOwner);
  owner = newOwner;
```

Smart contract owner can change transaction fees. This
function module can be used to impose extraordinary fees. No
arbitrary limit set.

```
function setLiquidityFee (uint256
    _liquidityFee) external onlyOwner() {
    require(_liquidityFee != 0,"BEP2E: Fee
    cannot be zero"); liquidityFee =
    _liquidityFee;
function setLiquidityPoolBuyFee(uint256 _fee)
    external onlyOwner{    require(_fee != 0,"BEP2E:
    Fee cannot be zero");
    _buyFee = _fee;
function setLiquidityPoolSellFee(uint256 _fee)
    external onlyOwner{    require(_fee != 0,"BEP2E:
    Fee cannot be zero");
```

 Smart contract has a low severity issue which may or may not create any functional vulnerability.

"severity": 8, (! Low Severity)

"Expected pragma, import directive or contract/interface/library definition"

SWC Attacks

SWC ID	Description	Status
SWC-101	Integer Overflow and Underflow	Passed
SWC-102	Outdated Compiler Version	! Informational
SWC-103	Floating Pragma	Passed
SWC-104	Unchecked Call Return Value	Passed
SWC-105	Unprotected Ether Withdrawal	Passed
SWC-106	Unprotected SELF-DESTRUCT Instruction	Passed
SWC-107	Re-entrancy	Passed
SWC-108	State Variable Default Visibility	Passed
SWC-109	Uninitialized Storage Pointer	Passed
SWC-110	Assert Violation	Passed
SWC-111	Use of Deprecated Solidity Functions	Passed
SWC-112	Delegate Call to Untrusted Callee	Passed
SWC-113	DoS with Failed Call	Passed
SWC-114	Transaction Order Dependence	Passed
SWC-115	Authorization through tx.origin	Passed
SWC-116	Block values as a proxy for time	Passed

SWC-117	Signature Malleability	Passed
SWC-118	Incorrect Constructor Name	Passed

SWC-119	Shadowing State Variables	Passed
SWC-120	Weak Sources of Randomness from Chain Attributes	Passed
SWC-121	Missing Protection against Signature Replay Attacks	Passed
SWC-122	Lack of Proper Signature Verification	Passed
SWC-123	Requirement Violation	Passed
SWC-124	Write to Arbitrary Storage Location	Passed
SWC-125	Incorrect Inheritance Order	Passed
SWC-126	Insufficient Gas Griefing	Passed
SWC-127	Arbitrary Jump with Function Type Variable	Passed
SWC-128	DoS With Block Gas Limit	Passed
SWC-129	Typographical Error	Passed
SWC-130	Right-To-Left-Override control character (U+202E)	Passed
SWC-131	Presence of unused variables	Passed
SWC-132	Unexpected Ether balance	Passed
SWC-133	Hash Collisions With Multiple Variable Length Arguments	Passed
SWC-134	Message call with the hardcoded gas amount	Passed
SWC-135	Code With No Effects (Irrelevant/Dead Code)	! Informational
SWC-136	Unencrypted Private Data On-Chain	Passed

Risk Status & Radar Chart

Risk Severity	Status
Passed	No high severity issues identified
Medium	No medium severity issues identified
Low	2 low severity

issues identified **Informational** 2

informational severity issues identified

Centralization Risk Active

contract ownership identified

LARGE CHAIN Safety

Score out of 100

Compiler Check

100

95

90

85

80

75

Static Analysis

Manual Analysis

Software Analysis

Auditor's Verdict

InterFi team has performed a line-by-line manual analysis and automated review of smart contracts. Smart contracts were analyzed mainly for common contract vulnerabilities, exploits, and manipulation hacks. According to the audit:

- LARGE CHAIN solidity source code has LOW RISK SEVERITY
- LARGE CHAIN smart contract has an **ACTIVE OWNERSHIP**
- LARGE CHAIN centralization risk correlated to the active owner is MEDIUM

Note for stakeholders

- Be aware that active smart contract owner privileges constitute an elevated impact on smart contract safety and security.
- If the smart contract is not deployed on any blockchain at the time of the audit, the contract can be modified or altered before blockchain development. Verify contract's deployment status in the audit report.
- Make sure that the project team's KYC/identity is verified by an independent firm.
- Always check if the contract's liquidity is locked. A longer liquidity lock plays an important role in the project's longevity. It is recommended to have multiple liquidity providers.
- Examine the unlocked token supply in the owner, developer, or team's private wallets. Understand the project's tokenomics, and make sure the tokens outside of the LP Pair are vested or locked for a longer period.

Important Disclaimer

LARGE CHAIN provides contract development, testing, auditing and project evaluation services for blockchain projects. The purpose of the audit is to analyze the on-chain smart contract source code and to provide a basic overview of the project. This report should not be transmitted, disclosed, referred to, or relied upon by any person for any purpose without InterFi's prior written consent.

LARGE CHAIN provides the easy-to-understand assessment of the project, and the smart contract (otherwise known as the source code).

The audit makes no statements or warranties on the security of the code. It also cannot be considered as enough assessment regarding the utility and safety of the code, bug-free status, or any other statements of the contract. While we have used all the data at our disposal to provide the transparent analysis, it is important to note that you should not rely on this report only — we recommend proceeding with several independent audits and a public bug bounty program to ensure the security of smart contracts. Be aware that smart contracts deployed on a blockchain aren't resistant to external vulnerability, or a hack. Be aware that active smart contract owner privileges constitute an elevated impact on smart contract safety and security. Therefore, InterFi does not guarantee the explicit security of the audited smart contract.

The analysis of the security is purely based on the smart contracts alone. No applications or operations were reviewed for security. No product code has been reviewed.

This report should not be considered as an endorsement or disapproval of any project or team. The information provided in this report does not constitute investment advice, financial advice, trading advice, or any other sort of advice and you should not treat any of the report's content as such. Do conduct your due diligence and consult your financial advisor before making any investment decisions.

About LARGE CHAIN PROTOCOL

LARGE CHAIN provides intelligent blockchain solutions. LARGE CHAIN is developing an ecosystem that is seamless and responsive. Some of our services: Blockchain Security, Token Launchpad, NFT Marketplace, etc. LARGE CHAIN mission is to interconnect multiple services like Blockchain Security, DeFi, Gaming, and Marketplace under one ecosystem that is seamless, multi-chain compatible, scalable, secure, fast, responsive, and easy to use.

InterFi is built by a decentralized team of UI experts, contributors, engineers, and enthusiasts from all over the world. Our team currently consists of 6+ core team members, and 10+ casual contributors. LARGE CHAIN provides manual, static, and automatic smart contract analysis, to ensure that project is checked against known attacks and potential vulnerabilities.

To learn more, visit https://largechain.net/

To view our audit portfolio, visit https://github.com/LargeChain

To book an audit, message https://t.me/largechainn

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