



Diplomacy and Economic Cooperation in Sino-American Relations

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Introduction

For many years now, diplomatic relations between the United States and China seem to be deteriorating. Events such as the Trade war initiated in 2018, the global coronavirus pandemic which debuted in China, Beijing's forced internment of Uyghurs in "reeducation camps" in Xinjiang, the implementation of a new national security law in Hong Kong, which reduced the autonomy of the special administrative region, America's ban on the Chinese telecommunication giant Huawei, Nancy Pelosi's visit to Taiwan coupled with Biden's assurance that his government would defend Taiwan against China if needed, and the allegations by the United-States that China is now sending spy balloons across the continent, all put a lot of strain on their relationship.(BBC News 2020; Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs 2020; Collinson 2023; Lanteigne 2020, 1; U.S. Department of the Treasury 2020)

In 2020, the United States National Security Council released a document that stated: "Given the strategic choices China's leadership is making, the United States now acknowledges and accepts the relationship with the PRC as the CCP always framed it internally: one of great power competition."(National Security Council 2020) later that year, the FBI director declared during a speech that: "[...][the] greatest long-term threat to [America's] information and intellectual property, and to [its] economic vitality, is the counter-intelligence and economic espionage threat from China."(Wray 2020) While many hoped that the transition from Trump to Biden in 2020 could usher in an era of stability, the Democrat president's way of dealing with China does not contrast much with that of his predecessor.(Mishra 2022, 6) The war in Ukraine and Beijing's continued relationship with Moscow made it all the more difficult for Biden to find a way to reshape Sino-American relations.(Korolev 2023)

Additionally, every time something bad happens, reputable media outlets rush to publish dramatic and alarming headlines such as "Officials Push U.S.-China Relations Toward Point of No Return"(Wong et Myers 2020), "How the U.S. Could Lose a War with China"(@ Gilsinan 2019), and "The risk of China-US military conflict is worryingly high"(Bo 2020) It's now common for journalists to write about a potential new cold war between the two superpowers. "The Cold War With China Is Changing Everything"(Brooks 2023), and "The USChina Cold War Has Already Started" (@ Dupont 2020).

With such a negative representation of the conflict in the media, it would be normal to believe that the relationship between both states could potentially lead to a disastrous outcome. However, looking at a simple graph of their economic relation, it's possible to notice that trade between the two countries does not seem to be affected very much by these tensions. In fact, despite a noticeable dip in 2021 due to the pandemic, trade between the two giants

has reached it's highest point in history in 2022.(US Census Bureau 2023)




Figure 1: Sino-American Trade Between 1995 and 2021Source: Census.gov (2023)

Research Question

As trade is a core characteristic of bilateral economic cooperation between states, it would therefore be interesting, in order to obtain a clearer portrait of the situation, to investigate how shifts in the political relations between the United States and China influenced their trade relations and their economic cooperation more broadly. In this period of political degradation, can economic cooperation alone be enough to prevent a conflict between both states? How likely is it that both superpowers will clash in the future? This leads up to the research question. *How can the stability of the economic relationship between the United States be explained in the context of their apparent political disagreements?* Are trade relations directly related to political relations or are they independent? As Shambaugh wrote, “[their] relationship has been fundamentally troubled for many years and has failed to find extensive common ground to forge a real and enduring partnership.”(Shambaugh 2016, 299) However, as Luckhurst argues and as it is possible to observe, “The governments of China and the USA have enhanced their economic cooperation since the GFC, reducing the likelihood of strategic competition leading to conflict.”(Luckhurst 2016, 239)

Literature Review

While no one argues that it is going exceptionally well between China and the United States, scholars are divided on the issue. This section will review how some of the main approaches of international relations view this situation.

Realism, a mainstream theory of international relations, offers many possible interpretations, all of which are worrisome and pessimistic. For structural realist John J. Mearsheimer, who in his 2001 book, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, popularized the concept of Offensive Realism, a conflict is likely to happen between the United States and China. According to him, the Anarchical structure of the international system forces states to seek hegemony since it is the optimal way to maximize their security and guarantee their survival, the primary objective of every state.(Mearsheimer 2014, 34)

In Mearsheimer's opinion, the United States should contain China's rise at all costs because as he wrote:

If China becomes an economic powerhouse, it will almost certainly translate its economic might into military might and make a run at dominating Northeast Asia. [...] The result would be an intense security competition between China and its rivals, with the ever-present danger of great-power war hanging over them.(Mearsheimer 2014, 37:38)

In a different fashion, Classical realism, sometimes called human nature realism, posits that it is possible to understand the behaviour of states by analyzing it through the prism of human nature. For them, it is not the structure of the international system that causes states to collide with each other but the imperfect nature of the human race which created the international system in the first place. If humans are self-centered, greedy, and hypocrites, so will the states, which they created. Human nature realists criticize Mearsheimer's structural theory for being "suspect (at best) in its logic handcuffed by the limits of its structuralism, and, ironically, rooted in utopianism — an attempt to reshape the world as one would like to see it, rather than respecting the realities of power."(Kirshner 2012, 70) They believe that following Mearsheimer's tenets would inevitably lead to disaster. Kirshner describes Offensive realism as a "self-fulfilling prophecy".(Kirshner 2012, 70) One in which there is no issue. For Hans Morgenthau, a famous theoretician of human nature realism, it is possible for states to escape conflict through wit and well-crafted diplomacy. He wrote: "This being inherently a world of opposing interests and of conflict among them, moral principles can never be fully realized, but must at best be approximated through the ever temporary balancing of interests and the ever precarious settlement of conflicts."(Morgenthau et Thompson

1993, 13)

For classical realists, the behaviour of states, rational actors, can be understood through the lens of their self-interest. In the case of the rise of China, Kirshner wrote:

Rising powers in particular, then, are potential sources of instability because the self-definition of their interests will expand along with their increasing capabilities (and expectations of still greater power to come); classical realists also expect them to seek not just security, but also status, prestige, and even deference from others.(Kirshner 2012, 58)

He believes that the best way to prevent a military conflict between China and the United States is for America to engage the rising giant, acknowledge its threat, and place a greater emphasis on politics, diplomacy as well as domestic politics.(Kirshner 2012, 66, 68) Morgenthau also believed diplomacy was the main tool in achieving world peace. He wrote:

If the world state is unattainable in our world, yet indispensable for the survival of that world, it is necessary to create the conditions under which it will not be impossible from the outset to establish a world state. As the prime requisite for the creation of such conditions, we suggested the mitigation and minimization of those political conflicts which in our time pit the two superpowers against each other and evoke the specter of a cataclysmic war. This method of establishing the preconditions for permanent peace we call peace through accommodation. Its instrument is diplomacy.(Morgenthau et Thompson 1993, 175)

For classical realists, the deterioration of Sino-American diplomacy does not bode well for the future. It could be a sign that a great power competition is about to happen.

This intense security competition is known as the security dilemma, a concept introduced by John Herz in 1950. He wrote: “Groups [...] living in [anarchy] must be [...] concerned about their security from being attacked [...] by other groups [...]”(Herz 1950, 157) According to him, the dilemma is then that: “Striving to attain security from such attack, [states] are driven to acquire more and more power in order to escape the impact of the power of others. This, in turn, renders the others more insecure and compels them to prepare for the worst.”(Herz 1950, 157) Even though one state might arm itself strictly for defensive reasons, it would be rational for its neighbours to want to arm themselves in return just in case, considering that states cannot know each other’s true intentions in an anarchical system where self-help is the norm.(@ Viotti et Kauppi 2012, 56)

In a 2015 article name The Thucydides Trap: Are the U.S. and China headed for War? and in

his subsequent 2017 book name *Destined for War*, Graham Allison used the security dilemma in his power transition theory called the Thucydides Trap. He gave the theory its name, referencing the ancient Greek historian Thucydides and his work on the Peloponnesian War, a conflict where “the rise of Athens and the fear that this instilled in Sparta”(Allison 2017, 21) triggered a bloody war that eventually brought all of Greece to its knee. He observed that in the past 500 years, 12 of the 16 cases of power transition, where the second world power overtook the first world power, resulted in a bloody conflict.(Allison 2015) Graham Allison uses his theory to demonstrate that “war between the US and China in the decades ahead is not just possible, but much more likely than currently recognized.”(Allison 2017, 27)

Despite its impressive mainstream success, Allison’s work has been criticized for its flawed methodology. Richard Hanania denotes three notable methodological flaws in his research. The first is failing to provide proper definitions for important terms he uses such as “rising power”. He also fails to explain how economic and military strength is measured in his study, and he fails to provide a justified explanation about why he chose certain cases while ignoring others.(Hanania 2021, 17:18) The Second is omitting important variables, which according to Hanania, quoting Paul A. Jargowsky, might be “the most serious and pervasive threat to the validity of social science research.”(Hanania 2021, 19) He shows that “[...] if we control for other variables that could determine whether rival powers end up in war, the results look much less impressive.”(Hanania 2021, 19) For example, time might be a contributing factor in his 500 years analysis but its possible effects are not discussed in his work. States might not react the same to threats now as they did hundreds of years ago. The third methodological flaw is selection bias. “[...] One cannot conclude states are ‘destined for war’ based on a material shift in power from a data set that selects for countries based on whether they are rivals, which is a state of affairs determined by the intentions of the actors in question.”(Hanania 2021, 20)

The Security Dilemma is not exclusive to realists. According to Bruce Russett, liberals, who tend to be more optimistic than realists, also believe in its existence but the difference is that they “[...] [see] democratic government, economic interdependence, and international law and organizations as means to overcome the security dilemma of the international system.”(Dunne, Kurki, et Smith 2013, 95) In the case of Sino-American relations, economic interdependence can be a likely way out of an intense security competition. Liberals acknowledge the benefits of maintaining good diplomatic relations but emphasize the significance that economic cooperation (but also other types of cooperation) has on maintaining a cordial relationship. This cooperation is enhanced by both countries’ participation in a wide range

of institutions such as the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, and the Financial Action Task Force. Keohane and Martin take a direct jab at Mearsheimer when they write: “[his] characterization of conflict in world politics makes institutions appear essential if states are to have any hope of sustained cooperation, and of reaping its benefits”(Keohane et Martin 1995, 50) Indeed, for liberals, institutions are a key vessel for cooperation, they allow states with divergent interests to gather and cooperate despite their differences. They write:

[In] a world politics constrained by state power and divergent interests, and unlikely to experience effective hierarchical governance, international institutions operating on the basis of reciprocity will be components of any lasting peace.(Keohane et Martin 1995, 50)

According to institutionalists, the reason why institutions can facilitate cooperation is that they can enable a form of cheat monitoring system rendering possible credible commitments. For liberals, the fear that the other might cheat is the greatest impediment to international cooperation.(Stein 1982 , p. 313)

Another liberal concept is that of Interdependence. Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye defined it in terms of “reciprocal costly effects”(Keohane et Nye 2012, 232) where costly means “[...] effects that are consequential. [That] may reduce costs, or provide benefits, as well as imposing costs.”(Keohane et Nye 2012, 232) The authors add that “These costs need not be economic but may instead involve significant effects on other values, including moral standards, aesthetic tastes, personal security, or ecological integrity.”(Keohane et Nye 2012, 232) In this way, power, viewed in absolute terms, is defined by asymmetries, where the state which is the least sensitive to cross-border flows and the least vulnerable to external events and policy alternation, has power over the other.(Keohane et Nye 2012, 232:233)

Joseph Nye then wrote in his 2020 article Perspective for a China Strategy that “there are too many symmetries in U.S.-China interdependence at this point [for one to have power over the other], though that might change if there is a much more radical decoupling.”(Nye 2020, 125) The author also believes that in the globalized 21st century, both countries face mutual risk from issues such as global warming, drug trafficking, cyber-terrorism, and COVID-19, which cannot be solved unilaterally.(Nye 2020, 127:128) Nye wrote: “On many transnational issues, empowering others can help us to accomplish our own goals.”(Nye 2020, 129) He describes the Sino-American relationship as a “cooperative rivalry” but wonders if both countries “can develop attitudes that allow them to cooperate in producing global public goods while competing in the traditional areas of great power competition.”(Nye 2020, 130)

He warns that “Exaggerated fears and worst-case analyses may make such a balanced policy impossible.”(Nye 2020, 130)

This opinion is shared by Constructivist China scholar Alastair Iain Johnston who in his article *How New and Assertive is China’s New Assertiveness?* Analyzed how the media, played an important role in creating a mischaracterization of Chinese foreign policy, which he believes, “reduce[s] the range of interpretations of Chinese foreign policy, potentially narrowing policy options available to decisionmaker [...]and[...] could contribute to an emerging security dilemma in the U.S.-China relationship.” (Johnston 2013, 7:8) He accuses the media of creating faulty conventional wisdom. He dismisses allegations that suggested a change in China’s assertiveness in 2010 by reviewing the six events the media used to support their claims and by demonstrating how the “discourse about a newly assertive China has suffered from a dearth of definitions and valid indicators”(Johnston 2013, 9) He also mentions how the media only reporting on the negative events can influence and strengthen the belief that China and the U.S. are competitors and not cooperators, thus fueling the security dilemma. (Johnston 2013, 46) Johnston wrote that the problematic analysis of China’s assertiveness “suggest[s] that the nature of the media-blogsosphere[sic] interaction may become an important factor in explaining the speed and intensity of future security dilemma dynamics between [...] the United States and China.”(Johnston 2013, 48)

David Shambaugh, another constructivist China Scholar, also gives importance to the role of perception in shaping the public discourse about the relationship between the two giants. He wrote that “China has a very, very long way to go before it catches up with the United States [...]”(Shambaugh 2016, 293) and that he “[...] remain[s] mystified why there is an”illusion of Chinese power” held by many around the world.”(Shambaugh 2014) According to the author, perception matters greatly in international relations, and the fact that people perceive that China will overtake, or has overtaken, the United States as the first world power can influence policymakers in their decisions about how to act vis-à-vis China. (Shambaugh 2016, 294) Furthermore, Shambaugh wrote in 2013 in his book *China Goes Global* that “longtime observers of Sino-Americans know that there is constant ebb-and-flow, frequent frictions, and a kind of love-hate repetitive cycle in mutual images.(Shambaugh 2013a, 139) In this way, he adds, the relationship is”never as bad as it seems, or as good as it seems.”(Shambaugh 2013a, 139) In his book 2013 *Tangled Titans: The United States and China*, Shambaugh argue that cooperation and competition happen simultaneously on a spectrum. He wrote: “What changes is the balance between these two features.”(Shambaugh 2013b, 21) However, in his 2016 book *China’s Future*, the author observed that “The Sino-American relationship is finding it increasingly difficult to find a [...] positive narrative and trajectory into the

future.”(Shambaugh 2016, 299) Interdependence, or, according to Shambaugh, “the fear of it falling apart”, is the “[...] ‘glue’ that seems to keep them together.”(Shambaugh 2016, 299)

Jonathan Luckhurst has a similar point of view. He wrote in his 2016 book chapter China–US Economic Cooperation as Antidote to Strategic Conflict: “There is too much at stake — economically, politically, and strategically — to let relations deteriorate significantly under the pressure of political rhetoric or security tensions.”(Luckhurst 2016, 229) He believes that “[bilateral] economic interdependence decreases prospects for hostility by increasing perceived gains and risks from economic relations, giving incentives to reduce tensions and limit damage from political differences.” (Luckhurst 2016, 217) This could be the “glue” that Shambaugh referred to. He demonstrates ways in which officials from both states make efforts to diverge from these negative narratives by way of discursive adjustment. He gives two examples: How China went from ‘peaceful rise’ to ‘peaceful development’ and how the United States went from ‘pivot to Asia’ to ‘rebalancing to Asia’.(Luckhurst 2016, 229) Luckhurst concludes his chapter by writing that “[so] long as political discourse and domestic politics in each country does not damage their relations, China–US economic cooperation should continue to be an antidote to strategic conflict.”(Luckhurst 2016, 240) # Theory

Social Constructivism can prove useful to answer such questions. It emphasizes the role of a multitude of actors in international relations and the intersubjectivity between them. Fierke wrote: “Constructivists embrace an intersubjective ontology, emphasizing norms, social agents, and structures, and the mutual constitution of identity.”(Dunne, Kurki, et Smith 2013, 193) Each state is composed of individuals with their agency, acting according to what they believe is in their interest. This can be shaped by what they perceive as their identity, which is built in intersubjectivity with every other member of their social surroundings. Their behaviour is bound by the norms and the social structure they are subjected to or have been influenced by, coming from their family, employer, religious group, society, or other forms of social groups. In the words of Jonathan Luckhurst: “Agency is context-dependent and social, existing in complex flows of interactions and processes; individuals are reflexive, but not isolated from the constitutive effects of practices and shifts in background knowledge.”(Luckhurst 2019, 3) Individuals, who in the pursuit of their self-interest, wish to alter the economic, political, or social norms and structure, can then form groups with other individuals with similar interests. These groups can get bigger and gain more importance or can be influenced by bigger groups. Through what Johnston calls micro-processes — “[...] the susceptibility of structures to minor perturbations, contingencies, nonlinearity, and path dependence set in motion by the conscious reflection and action of agents of change”(Johnston 2008, p. xiv:xv) — these groups can influence actions of states.

According to Johnston, this socialization process should matter a lot when studying the behaviour of states.(Johnston 2008, xv)

Therefore, to understand bilateral relations between states, it is important to analyze and understand the socialization process happening between them and within each of them. Every head of state of every country will be different from the others and will have a different vision for its country, different personal interests, different methods of governance, a different education, a different history, will evolve in a different political context, will have different social surroundings, different reasons for why they are in power, different people whom they owe favours to, a different understanding of what is right or wrong, different perceptions of other states, etc. Additionally, heads of state are not the only ones making decisions within a state. Elected or unelected officials, each with different aspirations, maybe working for a specific lobby, maybe with the desire to improve the social condition of his electors; CEOs of Multinational companies courting the government; NGOs and civil society actors working to rally the population under certain causes; Ambassadors, tasked with improving the standings of his state with another. Each of these actors, their specificities, the role they play within their state, and the influence they have in the bilateral relations of their country adds a level of complexity to the analysis, but reviewing them makes it more accurate, nuanced, and reliable.

This is why realism can also be important to analyze the Sino-American relation, as most Chinese IR scholars and a sizable portion of its political class tend to agree with it.(Zhang 2020, 241; Shambaugh 2013a, 49, 66) It is, therefore, possible to assume that certain Chinese policymakers are likely to act according to the dictates of the theory in response to actions made by the United States, and that the United States policymakers, knowing this, might act in a preventive way, anticipating “realist” actions from China. The fact that Allison’s book was so popular among statesmen is a good indicator of what kind of ideology circulates among American decision-makers. Hanania lists some known personalities who praised Allison’s work: “former CIA director David Petraeus, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, former Senator Sam Nunn, and former Secretaries of Defense Ash Carter and William Cohen.”(Hanania 2021, 13) Allison himself was assistant secretary of defense under Bill Clinton, and “[despite] his affiliation with a Democratic administration, [his] ideas were adopted by many Trump administration officials.(Hanania 2021, 15) This kind of ideational propagation could increase tensions and fuel their security dilemma.

Additionally, as most scholars agree, the United States and China are interdependent, which means that altering their relationship can generate costly effects which need to be taken into account in the analysis.(Luckhurst 2016, 219; Nye 2020, 125; Zhang 2020, 242; Kirshner

2012, 59) Keohane and Nye define costly effects as “effects that people care about. [Effects that] generate concern—and politics.”(Keohane et Nye 2012, 232) The way these effects are perceived by the people in power, either positively or negatively, will vary greatly. This again underlines the impact of human agency and contingency in the decision-making process. Different leaders might evaluate the cost of these effects in different ways, leading to different policy orientations.

As Wendt wrote: “Social theories do not determine the content of our international theorizing, but they do structure the questions we ask about world politics and our approaches to answering those questions.”(Wendt 1992, 422) If realism is seeing the world as it is and liberalism is seeing the world as we want it to be, then constructivism is understanding how others see the world. In this manner, it can act as a bridge between important and useful elements of each theory of international relations. It can acknowledge the role self-interested human nature plays in international politics while retaining room for structural analysis and the effects it can have on the behavior of states. It also recognizes the role of institutions and does not see power as inherently absolute or relative. Constructivism offers malleability and a deep level of analysis which can help understand a specific set of events, and their context, in a situation where there are so many contradicting theories and speculations.

Modifications

Expliquer les lacunes de chaque théories:

Réalisme: Le réalisme expliquer mal pourquoi les pays continuent de commercer et pourquoi malgré les animosités les liens économiques entre les deux pays continuent de se resserrer. Le réalisme classique offre une percée dans l'explication mais ne pousse pas assez loin.

Les limites du structuralisme: Pourquoi la chine continue de s'autocratiser et continue de refuser à participer aux insitutions internationales. Elle y participe mais refuse d'adhérer aux normes établies

Le constructivisme peut expliquer ce que les deux autres théories peinent à expliquer en contextualisant les décisions prises et en apportant plus de nuance aux concepts sans toutefois invalider les deux théorie. Au final, il s'agit d'un réseaux de connection entre plusieurs humains ayant chacun des intérêts convergents et divergents.

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