A close-up photograph of a sandcastle shaped like the Android robot, standing on a sandy beach. The robot's head, body, arms, and legs are all constructed from sand. It has two small sticks for antennae and two circular holes for eyes. The background is a blurred beach scene with a blue sky and ocean. A semi-transparent dark box with rounded corners is overlaid on the right side of the image, containing the title text.

# Beyond Java: Obfuscating Android Apps with Purely Native Code

Laurie Kirk

# whoami

- ▶ Laurie Kirk
- ▶ Reverse Engineer at Microsoft
- ▶ Specialize in cross-platform malware with a focus on mobile malware
- ▶ Run YouTube channel @lauriewired
- ▶ Representing myself as an individual security researcher today (not representing Microsoft)



@lauriewired

# Analysis Materials



LaurieWired TROOPERS23  
Github Repo

[https://github.com/LaurieWired/AndroidPurelyNative\\_Troopers23](https://github.com/LaurieWired/AndroidPurelyNative_Troopers23)

# The only difference between this app...

6aaa73a0c642d4ec945e8af438d5a2eaf93ddb5162edda0ad675ba459cf93a83



Community Score

5 security vendors and no sandboxes flagged this file as malicious



6aaa73a0c642d4ec945e8af438d5a2eaf93ddb5162edda0ad675ba459cf93a83  
utils5.apk

5.11 MB  
Size

2023-04-23 22:36:06 UTC  
1 minute ago



android apk

DETECTION

DETAILS

RELATIONS

BEHAVIOR

COMMUNITY

[Join the VT Community](#) and enjoy additional community insights and crowdsourced detections, plus an API key to [automate checks](#).

Popular threat label trojan.smsspy/anubis

Threat categories trojan banker

Family labels smsspy anubis

Security vendors' analysis

Do you want to automate checks?

Avira (no cloud)	ANDROID/Spy.SmsSpy.GAG.Gen	Cynet	Malicious (score: 99)
F-Secure	Malware.ANDROID/Spy.SmsSpy.GAG.Gen	Kaspersky	HEUR:Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Anubis.n
ZoneAlarm by Check Point	HEUR:Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Anubis.n	Acronis (Static ML)	Undetected



# ... and this app

c679fa2522276e1101e7062cfaea21ac35a08d38026878244dc715b8079a9f06

0  
/ 65

Community Score

✔ No security vendors and no sandboxes flagged this file as malicious

c679fa2522276e1101e7062cfaea21ac35a08d38026878244dc715b8079a9f06  
stringsinnative.apk

5.89 MB  
Size

2023-04-23 23:27:41 UTC  
a moment ago

APK

DETECTION

DETAILS

RELATIONS

BEHAVIOR

COMMUNITY

Join the VT Community and enjoy additional community insights and crowdsourced detections, plus an API key to automate checks.

Security vendors' analysis ⓘ

Do you want to automate checks?

Acronis (Static ML)	✔ Undetected	AhnLab-V3	✔ Undetected
Alibaba	✔ Undetected	ALYac	✔ Undetected
Antiy-AVL	✔ Undetected	Arcabit	✔ Undetected
Avast	✔ Undetected	Avast-Mobile	✔ Undetected
AVG	✔ Undetected	Avira (no cloud)	✔ Undetected

is that part of the code is written in C++.

# Agenda

- ▶ Obfuscate an Android app
- ▶ Use purely native code
- ▶ Mask our API calls



# Java is the main language in Android



## **Managed code**

Java / Kotlin



## **Native code**

C / C++



C++ == obfuscation?

# Same file except I added a blank C++ stub

3927b4868b18203de6e5b2eb208096999ee72c35d0f7d5f7f8cbb7eafc4385d0



Community Score

2 security vendors and no sandboxes flagged this file as malicious



3927b4868b18203de6e5b2eb208096999ee72c35d0f7d5f7f8cbb7eafc4385d0

5.87 MB  
Size

2023-04-23 23:08:11 UTC  
a moment ago



utilsnative1.apk

android apk contains-elf

DETECTION

DETAILS

RELATIONS

BEHAVIOR

COMMUNITY

[Join the VT Community](#) and enjoy additional community insights and crowdsourced detections, plus an API key to [automate checks](#).

Popular threat label trojan.anubis

Threat categories trojan banker

Family labels anubis

Security vendors' analysis

Do you want to automate checks?

Kaspersky

! HEUR:Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Anubis.n

ZoneAlarm by Check Point

! HEUR:Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Anubis.n

Acronis (Static ML)

✓ Undetected

AhnLab-V3

✓ Undetected

Alihaha

✓ Undetected

AI Yar

✓ Undetected

**ADD C++ CODE**

**3 ANTIVIRUSES STOP DETECTING**

# Further Native Obfuscation Advantages

- ▶ More challenging to reverse engineer
  - ▶ Read assembly instead of Java
  - ▶ Understand JNI invocations
- ▶ Remove x86 support to thwart emulators



How far can we go?

# Purely Native Code Methodology

Remove Java entrypoint

A light blue downward-pointing arrow indicating the flow from the first step to the second.

Translate methods to C++


A light green downward-pointing arrow indicating the flow from the second step to the third.

Conceal Android API calls



# Removing the Java Entrypoint

# The Manifest defines entrypoints in Java



The background features abstract, overlapping geometric shapes in various shades of blue, ranging from light sky blue to deep navy blue. These shapes are primarily located on the right side of the frame, creating a modern, layered effect.


# Hands On: Finding the Standard Entrypoint

Is this possible to bypass?

# Android Provides NativeActivity

- ▶ Helper class provided in Android framework
- ▶ Used for gaming apps
- ▶ Calls the native library specified in metadata


# Android Purely NativeActivity





# Native Application Glue

- ▶ Part of the Android NDK platform code
- ▶ Handles application context
- ▶ Calls user main
- ▶ Defines loopers listening for events



# Native App Glue Stores Context

```
void ANativeActivity_onCreate(ANativeActivity* activity, void* savedState, size_t savedStateSize) {  
    LOGV("Creating: %p", activity);  
  
    activity->callbacks->onConfigurationChanged = onConfigurationChanged;  
    activity->callbacks->onContentRectChanged = onContentRectChanged;  
    activity->callbacks->onDestroy = onDestroy;  
    activity->callbacks->onInputQueueCreated = onInputQueueCreated;  
    activity->callbacks->onInputQueueDestroyed = onInputQueueDestroyed;  
    activity->callbacks->onLowMemory = onLowMemory;  
    activity->callbacks->onNativeWindowCreated = onNativeWindowCreated;  
    activity->callbacks->onNativeWindowDestroyed = onNativeWindowDestroyed;  
    activity->callbacks->onNativeWindowRedrawNeeded = onNativeWindowRedrawNeeded;  
    activity->callbacks->onNativeWindowResized = onNativeWindowResized;  
}
```

User code goes in `android_main()`

# Hands On: Masking the Entrypoint

# Removing Resource Files

- ▶ Optionally remove resources files
  - ▶ Android libraries
  - ▶ Assets
- ▶ Further reduces analysis surfaces




Can we remove the `AndroidManifest`?





# Example Purely Native App

App: rawdrawandroid



Excellent, now we can draw malicious shapes!

# Translating Java Methods to C++

# Standard differences between Java and C++

## Java

```
private void printFibonacci(int N) {  
    int num1 = 0;  
    int num2 = 1;  
    int counter = 0;  
  
    while (counter < N) {  
        Log.d("Number", String.valueOf(num1));  
  
        // Calculate next  
        int num3 = num2 + num1;  
        num1 = num2;  
        num2 = num3;  
        counter++;  
    }  
}
```



## C++

```
void printFibonacci(int N) {  
    int num1 = 0;  
    int num2 = 1;  
    int counter = 0;  
  
    while (counter < N) {  
        __android_log_print(ANDROID_LOG_DEBUG, "Number", "%d", num1);  
  
        // Calculate next  
        int num3 = num2 + num1;  
        num1 = num2;  
        num2 = num3;  
        counter++;  
    }  
}
```

We want to manipulate the device.



# Android API Framework

- ▶ Library of APIs used by developers
- ▶ Callable classes, methods, and variables
- ▶ Interface to Android services and hardware

# Using the JNI to Invoke Android APIs

- ▶ The Android framework is exposed in Java
- ▶ JNI is the bridge between Java and C++



The background features abstract, overlapping geometric shapes in various shades of blue, ranging from light sky blue to deep navy blue. These shapes are primarily located on the right side of the frame, creating a modern, layered effect.

# Hands On: Translating Java to Native C++

JNI calls are easy to read / hook.

# Further JNI Drawbacks

- ▶ Methods are commonly hooked with Frida
- ▶ Class names are plaintext strings
- ▶ Easy to reverse engineer



What if we want to be stealthier?

# Hiding API Calls Via Binder

# Case Study: Dialing a Phone

- ▶ Intents send the dial request
- ▶ Binder sends this to the TelephonyManager service
- ▶ TelephonyManager service handles event






The background features abstract, overlapping geometric shapes in various shades of blue, ranging from light sky blue to deep navy blue. These shapes are primarily located on the right side of the frame, creating a modern, layered effect. The left side of the image is a solid, very light blue, providing a clean backdrop for the text.


# Knowledge time: Exploring the Binder

# Enables IPC and RPC in Android



# Wrapped by many popular classes


- ▶ Intents
- ▶ Messengers
- ▶ ContentProviders
- ▶ Android Interface Definition Language (AIDL)



Can we bypass these common targets?

Let's dive even deeper


# Implemented as a kernel driver



The screenshot displays the Android Code Search interface. At the top, there's a search bar with the text "Search for code or files". Below it, the breadcrumb navigation shows the path: `kernel/superproject` > `common-android-mainline` > `common/drivers/android/binder.c`. The left sidebar contains a file explorer with a tree view. The `binder.c` file is selected and highlighted. The main area shows the source code of `binder.c`, with line numbers 112 through 131 visible. The code defines several constants for binder debug flags and initializes a debug mask.

```
112  BINDER_DEBUG_INTERNAL_REFS          = 1U << 12,  
113  BINDER_DEBUG_PRIORITY_CAP           = 1U << 13,  
114  BINDER_DEBUG_SPINLOCKS              = 1U << 14,  
115  };  
116  static uint32_t binder_debug_mask = BINDER_DEBUG_USER_ERROR |  
117      BINDER_DEBUG_FAILED_TRANSACTION | BINDER_DEBUG_DEAD_TRANSACTION;  
118  module_param_named(debug_mask, binder_debug_mask, uint, 0644);  
119  
120  char *binder_devices_param = CONFIG_ANDROID_BINDER_DEVICES;  
121  module_param_named(devices, binder_devices_param, charp, 0444);  
122  
123  static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(binder_user_error_wait);  
124  static int binder_stop_on_user_error;  
125  
126  static int binder_set_stop_on_user_error(const char *val,  
127      const struct kernel_param *kp)  
128  {  
129      int ret;  
130  
131      ret = param_set_int(val, kp);
```

# More Detailed Binder Architecture



# Binder Invocation Backend

Binder allocates memory in target process


Process handles with onTransact()

Writes response back

Binder retrieves and returns response



Not required for non-  
IOCTL commands



We want to transact with existing services.

ServiceManager handles system services.

# But we can't use ServiceManager 😞

Cannot resolve symbol

```
import android.os.IBinder;
import android.os.Parcel;
import android.os.ServiceManager;
2 usages
public class MainActivity extends AppCompatActivity {

    1 usage
    private void transactTelephonyService() {
        try {
            IBinder binder = ServiceManager.getService
```

# It's hidden and limited to system use

```
▼ > frameworks/base/core/java/android/os/ServiceManager.java

ServiceManager.java

34  * declared statically on an Android device (SELinux access_v
35  * names in service_contexts files), and they do not follow t
36  * building applications, android.app.Service should be pref
37  *
38  * @hide
39  **/
40  @SystemApi(client = SystemApi.Client.MODULE_LIBRARIES)
41  public final class ServiceManager {
42      private static final String TAG = "ServiceManager";
43      private static final Object sLock = new Object();
44
45      @UnsupportedAppUsage
46      private static IServiceManager sServiceManager;
47
```



Or is it?

Reflection doesn't respect hidden APIs lol

# No more errors!

```
public class MainActivity extends AppCompatActivity {  
  
    1 usage  
    private String transactTelephonyService() {  
        String result = "";  
        Method getService = null;  
        IBinder binder = null;  
        Parcel data = null;  
        Parcel reply = null;  
  
        try {  
            getService = Class.forName(className: "android.os.ServiceManager").getMethod(name: "getService", String.class);
```

Reflection



The background features abstract, overlapping geometric shapes in various shades of blue, ranging from light sky blue to deep navy blue. These shapes are primarily located on the right side of the frame, creating a modern, layered effect. The left side of the image is a solid, very light blue, providing a clean backdrop for the text.

# Hands On: Finding Callable Services

# Bound Invokable services

ActivityManagerService

LocationManager

PackageManagerService

TelephonyManager

SensorService

WifiManagerNotificationManager

AudioManager

PowerManagerWindowManager

ClipboardServiceInputMethodManager

AlarmManagerBatteryManager

StorageManagerConnectivityManager


BluetoothManagerVibratorService

UserManager

AccessibilityManager

# Use Parcel objects to transmit data

- ▶ Container for messages
- ▶ Requires target interface
- ▶ Must write method arguments



# Call `transact()` to communicate

- ▶ Transmits the message
- ▶ Receives the response via another Parcel
- ▶ Requires method code instead of name



# Hands On: Invoking dial via Binder

We need to do this in C++.

I won't make you  
translate it all.



Phew!

# We already know native translation

```
// Binder calling
jclass serviceManagerClass = env->FindClass("android/os/ServiceManager");
jmethodID getServiceMethodID = env->GetStaticMethodID(serviceManagerClass, "getService",
    "(Ljava/lang/String;)Landroid/os/IBinder;");

jstring serviceName = env->NewStringUTF("phone");
jobject binder = env->CallStaticObjectMethod(serviceManagerClass, getServiceMethodID, serviceName);

// Make the transaction
jclass iBinderClass = env->FindClass("android/os/IBinder");
jmethodID transactMethodID = env->GetMethodID(iBinderClass, "transact", "(ILandroid/os/Parcel;Landroid/os/Parcel;I)Z");
env->CallBooleanMethod(binder, transactMethodID, 1, dataParcel, replyParcel, 0);
}
```



Test time!

# Encrypt class strings for further protection

- ▶ Encrypt string targets of reflective calls
- ▶ Avoid plaintext
  - ▶ Target services
  - ▶ Target class names



# Summarizing Our Obfuscation


# Purely Native Code

- ▶ Masks the entrypoint
- ▶ No pretty Java code
- ▶ Challenges automated and human analysts




# Direct Binder Invocation

- ▶ Use for system service calls
- ▶ Entirely avoids method names
- ▶ Bypasses hooks



Will we see this more?

It's hard to write lol





Thank you!



# Bonus Section



# References



LaurieWired TROOPERS23  
Github Repo

[https://github.com/LaurieWired/Android  
PurelyNative\\_Troopers23](https://github.com/LaurieWired/AndroidPurelyNative_Troopers23)

# Android Native Code Resources

- ▶ Sample: native-activity
  - ▶ [https://developer.android.com/ndk/samples/sample\\_na](https://developer.android.com/ndk/samples/sample_na)
- ▶ Android framework NativeActivity class
  - ▶ <https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/base.git/+master/core/java/android/app/NativeActivity.java>
- ▶ Rawdrawandroid
  - ▶ <https://github.com/cnlohr/rawdrawandroid>

# Java Native Interface (JNI)

- ▶ JNI Functions
- ▶ JNI Types and Signatures

# Binder

- ▶ Documentation

- ▶ <https://developer.android.com/reference/android/os/Binder>

- ▶ Source code


- ▶ <https://cs.android.com/android/kernel/superproject/+common-android-mainline:common/drivers/android/binder.c>

# ServiceManager

- ▶ Source code

- ▶ <https://cs.android.com/android/platform/superproject/+/master:frameworks/base/core/java/android/os/ServiceManager.java>

# Native App Structure





# We can use NativeActivity as main

Entrypoint

User code library

```
<activity android:name="android.app.NativeActivity" android:label="@string/app_name"
    android:configChanges="orientation|keyboardHidden">

    <meta-data android:name="android.app.lib_name" android:value="native-activity" />

    <intent-filter>
        <action android:name="android.intent.action.MAIN" />
        <category android:name="android.intent.category.LAUNCHER" />
    </intent-filter>
</activity>
```

# Define Obfuscation

- ▶ Obfuscation obscures app data and functionality
- ▶ Essential for Android
- ▶ Decompiled into pretty Java code



# Native Code in Android

- ▶ Implemented as Linux ELF binaries
- ▶ Shared object (.so) files
- ▶ Compiled to run on particular instruction set architectures



The screenshot displays the file explorer of an Android Studio project, specifically focusing on the 'rawtest.apk' file. The file is expanded, revealing its internal structure. The 'Source code' folder is collapsed. The 'Resources' folder is expanded, showing subfolders for 'assets' and 'lib'. The 'lib' folder is further expanded, showing architecture-specific folders: 'arm64-v8a', 'armeabi-v7a', 'x86', and 'x86\_64'. The 'arm64-v8a' folder is expanded, showing the file 'librawtest.so'. Other files visible in the 'Resources' folder include 'META-INF', 'res' (which is further expanded to show 'mipmap' and 'AndroidManifest.xml'), 'resources.arsc', 'APK signature', and 'Summary'.

```
rawtest.apk
├── Source code
├── Resources
│   ├── assets
│   └── lib
│       ├── arm64-v8a
│       │   └── librawtest.so
│       ├── armeabi-v7a
│       ├── x86
│       └── x86_64
│   ├── META-INF
│   └── res
│       ├── mipmap
│       ├── AndroidManifest.xml
│       └── resources.arsc
├── APK signature
└── Summary
```

# Standard Entrypoint Recognition

Java entrypoint

The screenshot shows an IDE window with the following components:

- Project Explorer (Left):** A tree view showing the project structure. The 'main' directory is selected and highlighted.
- AndroidManifest.xml (Main Editor):** The manifest file is open, showing XML code. Line 70 is highlighted in yellow, corresponding to the `<activity>` tag. A search bar at the top of the editor shows 'Find: main'.
- Annotations:** Two arrows point from external text to the IDE. One arrow points from the 'main' directory in the Project Explorer to the `main` tab in the editor. Another arrow points from the text 'Java entrypoint' to the `<activity>` tag on line 70.

```
68         </intent-filter>
69     </service>
70     <activity android:label="GameHub" android:name="app.retrofit.android.main"
71         <intent-filter>
72             <action android:name="android.intent.action.MAIN"/>
73             <category android:name="android.intent.category.LAUNCHER"/>
74         </intent-filter>
75     </activity>
76     <service android:name="app.retrofit.android.receiver"/>
77     <receiver android:name="app.retrofit.android.receiver.receiver_BR"
78         <intent-filter>
79             <action android:name="android.intent.action.BOOT_COMPLETED"/>
80         </intent-filter>
81         <intent-filter>
82             <action android:name="android.provider.Telephony.SMS_RECEIVED"/>
```

Java implementation

# Android NDK

- ▶ NDK stands for Native Development Kit
- ▶ Contains tools for writing C/C++ code in Android

# NativeActivity

- ▶ Runs in the main app thread
- ▶ Managed code entryptpoint
- ▶ Sets up and loads user native library

# Minimal Native APK

The screenshot shows an IDE window titled "rawtest - jadx-gui". The left sidebar displays the project structure for "rawtest.apk", including "Source code", "com.app.rawtest", "Resources", "assets", "lib/x86/librawtest.so", "META-INF", "res", "AndroidManifest.xml", "resources.arsc", "APK signature", and "Summary". The main editor displays the "AndroidManifest.xml" file with the following content:

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
2 <manifest xmlns:android="http://schemas.android.com/apk/res/android" package="com.app.rawtest"
  platformBuildVersionName="7">
3   <uses-sdk android:minSdkVersion="30" android:targetSdkVersion="30"/>
5   <uses-permission android:name="android.permission.SET_RELEASE_APP"/>
6   <application android:label="rawtest" android:icon="@mipmap/icon" android:hasCode="false" an
7   <activity android:label="rawtest" android:name="android.app.NativeActivity" android:con
8       <meta-data android:name="android.app.lib_name" android:value="rawtest"/>
9       <intent-filter>
10          <action android:name="android.intent.action.MAIN"/>
11          <category android:name="android.intent.category.LAUNCHER"/>
12      </intent-filter>
13  </activity>
14 </application>
```

Annotations on the image:

- A line points from the text "Defined entrypoint" to the `<activity>` tag on line 7.
- A line points from the text "No such class!" to the `android.app.NativeActivity` class name on line 7.

# Java Method

```
private String getPhoneNumber() {  
    TelephonyManager telephonyManager =  
        (TelephonyManager) this.getSystemService(Context.TELEPHONY_SERVICE);  
    if (ActivityCompat.checkSelfPermission(this,  
        Manifest.permission.READ_PHONE_STATE) == PackageManager.PERMISSION_GRANTED &&  
        ActivityCompat.checkSelfPermission(this,  
            Manifest.permission.READ_SMS) == PackageManager.PERMISSION_GRANTED &&  
        ActivityCompat.checkSelfPermission(this,  
            Manifest.permission.READ_PHONE_NUMBERS) == PackageManager.PERMISSION_GRANTED) {  
  
        String phoneNumber = telephonyManager.getLine1Number();  
        Log.d("LAURIE", "Printing number");  
        Log.d("LAURIE", phoneNumber);  
    }  
}
```



# Equivalent C++ Method (fix picture)

```
JNIEXPORT jstring JNICALL
Java_com_example_calltelephony_MainActivity_getPhoneNumber(JNIEnv *env, jobject MainActivity obj) {
    jclass contextClass = env->FindClass( name: "android/content/Context");

    // Get getSystemService method
    jmethodID getSystemService = env->GetMethodID( clazz: contextClass, name: "getSystemService", sig: "(Ljava/lang/String;)Ljava/lang/Object;");

    // Get TELEPHONY_SERVICE
    jfieldID telephonyServiceField = env->GetStaticFieldID( clazz: contextClass, name: "TELEPHONY_SERVICE", sig: "Ljava/lang/String;");
    jstring telephonyService = (jstring) env->GetStaticObjectField( clazz: contextClass, fieldID: telephonyServiceField);

    jobject telephonyManager = env->CallObjectMethod(obj, methodID: getSystemService, telephonyService);

    // Get TelephonyManager class
    jclass telephonyManagerClass = env->FindClass( name: "android/telephony/TelephonyManager");

    // Get getLine1Number method
    jmethodID getLine1Number = env->GetMethodID( clazz: telephonyManagerClass, name: "getLine1Number", sig: "()Ljava/lang/String;");
```

Let's make the first line look more like the second.

```
jmethodID dialNumberID = env->GetMethodID(clazz, "dialNumber", "(Ljava/lang/String;)V");  
env->CallVoidMethod(instance, dialNumberID, "12345678");
```



```
jmethodID transactMethodID = env->GetMethodID(iBinderClass, "transact", "(ILandroid/os/Parcel;Landroid/os/Parcel;I)Z");  
env->CallBooleanMethod(binder, transactMethodID, 1, dataParcel, replyParcel, 0);
```

# Binding to System Services with ServiceManager

- ▶ Returns Binder object for target service
- ▶ Manages system services
- ▶ Limited to system usage

# Simple Java Transaction Example

System interface

```
getService = Class.forName("android.os.ServiceManager").getMethod("getService", String.class);  
binder = (IBinder) getService.invoke(null, "phone");  
  
data = Parcel.obtain();  
reply = Parcel.obtain();  
  
data.writeInterfaceToken("com.android.internal.telephony.ITelephony");  
data.writeString("12345678"); // add the phone number argument  
  
binder.transact(1, data, reply, 0);  
reply.readException();
```

Method code

# Service Constant Mappings

TELEPHONY\_SERVICE = "phone";

TELECOM\_SERVICE = "telecom";

CARRIER\_CONFIG\_SERVICE = "carrier\_config";

EUICC\_SERVICE = "euicc";

EUICC\_CARD\_SERVICE = "euicc\_card";

MMS\_SERVICE = "mms";

CLIPBOARD\_SERVICE = "clipboard";

TEXT\_CLASSIFICATION\_SERVICE = "textclassification";

SELECTION\_TOOLBAR\_SERVICE = "selection\_toolbar";

FONT\_SERVICE = "font";

ATTENTION\_SERVICE = "attention";

ROTATION\_RESOLVER\_SERVICE = "resolver";

# Resulting Code in Ghidra

```
uVar4 = _JNIEnv::GetStaticMethodID
        (param_1,p_Var1,"getService","(Ljava/lang/String;)Landroid/os/IBinder;");
uVar5 = _JNIEnv::NewStringUTF(param_1,"phone");
p_Var6 = (_jmethodID *)
        _JNIEnv::CallStaticObjectMethod((_jclass *)param_1,(_jmethodID *)p_Var1,uVar4,uVar5);
p_Var1 = (_jclass *)_JNIEnv::FindClass(param_1,"android/os/IBinder");
uVar4 = _JNIEnv::GetMethodID
        (param_1,p_Var1,"transact","(ILandroid/os/Parcel;Landroid/os/Parcel;I)Z");
_JNIEnv::CallBooleanMethod((_jobject *)param_1,p_Var6,uVar4,1,p_Var3,uVar2,0);
pcVar7 = (char *)FUN_000219fe(abStack_20);
uVar2 = _JNIEnv::NewStringUTF(param_1,pcVar7);
```

???