


Smart contract security audit report





Audit Number: 202103111628

Smart Contract Info:

Smart Contract Name	Smart Contract Address	Smart Contract Address Link
GeneLavaRewards	0xf7e4B85903e8DC9047262 cB419eF249e07ec139D	https://hecoinfo.com/address/0xf7e4B85903e 8DC9047262cB419eF249e07ec139D#code
FOMPTPTRewards	0xe9503aa48f3Cb0e540c64c dd00848c29A2720BE5	https://hecoinfo.com/address/0xe9503aa48f3 Cb0e540c64cdd00848c29A2720BE5#code
FOMPUSDTRewards	0x9428b5ACe2B3a427Ba44 A1183eCc779df6631a29	https://hecoinfo.com/address/0x9428b5ACe2 B3a427Ba44A1183eCc779df6631a29#code
FOMAUSDTRewards	0xEe90Be0Fa394f3C18e14e D4096A3F99f3Ddac11F	https://hecoinfo.com/address/0xEe90Be0Fa3 94f3C18e14eD4096A3F99f3Ddac11F#code

Start Date: 2021.03.11

Completion Date: 2021.03.11

Overall Result: Pass

Audit Team: Beosin (Chengdu LianAn) Technology Co. Ltd.

Audit Categories and Results:

No.	Categories	Subitems	Results
1 Coding Cor		Compiler Version Security	Pass
	Coding Conventions	Deprecated Items	Pass
		Redundant Code	Pass



	SafeMath Features	Pass
	require/assert Usage	Pass
	Gas Consumption	Pass
	Visibility Specifiers	Pass
	Fallback Usage	Pass
2 General Vulnerability	Integer Overflow/Underflow	Pass
	Reentrancy	Pass
	Pseudo-random Number Generator (PRNG)	Pass
	Transaction-Ordering Dependence	Pass
	DoS (Denial of Service)	Pass
	Access Control of Owner	Pass
	Low-level Function (call/delegatecall) Security	Pass
	Returned Value Security	Pass
	tx.origin Usage	Pass
	Replay Attack	Pass
	Overriding Variables	Pass
Desires Consider	Business Logics	Pass
Business Security	Business Implementations	Pass
	General Vulnerability Business Security	require/assert Usage Gas Consumption Visibility Specifiers Fallback Usage Integer Overflow/Underflow Reentrancy Pseudo-random Number Generator (PRNG) Transaction-Ordering Dependence DoS (Denial of Service) Access Control of Owner Low-level Function (call/delegatecall) Security Returned Value Security tx.origin Usage Replay Attack Overriding Variables Business Logics

Disclaimer: This audit is only applied to the type of auditing specified in this report and the scope of given in the results table. Other unknown security vulnerabilities are beyond auditing responsibility. Beosin (Chengdu LianAn) Technology only issues this report based on the attacks or vulnerabilities that already existed or occurred before the issuance of this report. For the emergence of new attacks or vulnerabilities that exist or occur in the future, Beosin (Chengdu LianAn) Technology lacks the capability to judge its possible impact on the security status of smart contracts, thus taking no responsibility for them. The security audit analysis and other contents of this report are based solely on the documents and materials that the contract provider has provided to Beosin (Chengdu LianAn) Technology before the issuance of this report, and the contract provider warrants that there are no missing, tampered, deleted; if the documents and materials provided by the contract provider are missing, tampered, deleted, concealed or reflected in a situation that is inconsistent with the actual situation, or if the documents and materials provided are changed after the issuance of this report, Beosin (Chengdu LianAn) Technology assumes no responsibility for the resulting loss or adverse effects. The audit report issued by Beosin (Chengdu LianAn) Technology is based on the documents and materials provided by the contract provider, and relies on the technology currently possessed by Beosin (Chengdu LianAn). Due to the technical limitations of any organization, this report conducted by Beosin (Chengdu LianAn) still has the possibility that the entire risk cannot be completely detected. Beosin (Chengdu LianAn) disclaims any liability for the resulting losses.



The final interpretation of this statement belongs to Beosin (Chengdu LianAn).

Audit Results Explained:

Beosin (Chengdu LianAn) Technology has used several methods including Formal Verification, Static Analysis, Typical Case Testing and Manual Review to audit three major aspects of smart contracts GeneLavaRewards, FOMPTPTRewards, FOMPUSDTRewards and FOMAUSDTRewards, including Coding Standards, Security, and Business Logic. The GeneLavaRewards, FOMPTPTRewards, FOMPUSDTRewards and FOMAUSDTRewards contracts passed all audit items. The overall result is Pass. The smart contract is able to function properly.

1. Coding Conventions

Check the code style that does not conform to Solidity code style.

1.1 Compiler Version Security

- Description: Check whether the code implementation of current contract contains the exposed solidity compiler bug.
- Result: Pass

1.2 Deprecated Items

- Description: Check whether the current contract has the deprecated items.
- Result: Pass

1.3 Redundant Code

- Description: Check whether the contract code has redundant codes.
- Result: Pass

1.4 SafeMath Features

- Description: Check whether the SafeMath has been used. Or prevents the integer overflow/underflow in mathematical operation.
- Result: Pass

1.5 require/assert Usage

- Description: Check the use reasonability of 'require' and 'assert' in the contract.
- Result: Pass

1.6 Gas Consumption

- Description: Check whether the gas consumption exceeds the block gas limitation.
- Result: Pass

1.7 Visibility Specifiers

- Description: Check whether the visibility conforms to design requirement.
- Result: Pass



1.8 Fallback Usage

• Description: Check whether the Fallback function has been used correctly in the current contract.

• Result: Pass

2. General Vulnerability

Check whether the general vulnerabilities exist in the contract.

2.1 Integer Overflow/Underflow

• Description: Check whether there is an integer overflow/underflow in the contract and the calculation result is abnormal.

• Result: Pass

2.2 Reentrancy

• Description: An issue when code can call back into your contract and change state, such as withdrawing HT.

• Result: Pass

2.3 Pseudo-random Number Generator (PRNG)

• Description: Whether the results of random numbers can be predicted.

Result: Pass

2.4 Transaction-Ordering Dependence

• Description: Whether the final state of the contract depends on the order of the transactions.

Result: Pass

2.5 DoS (Denial of Service)

• Description: Whether exist DoS attack in the contract which is vulnerable because of unexpected reason.

• Result: Pass

2.6 Access Control of Owner

• Description: Whether the owner has excessive permissions, such as malicious issue, modifying the balance of others.

• Result: Pass

2.7 Low-level Function (call/delegatecall) Security

• Description: Check whether the usage of low-level functions like call/delegatecall have vulnerabilities.

• Result: Pass

2.8 Returned Value Security

• Description: Check whether the function checks the return value and responds to it accordingly.

• Result: Pass

2.9 tx.origin Usage

• Description: Check the use secure risk of 'tx.origin' in the contract.



• Result: Pass

2.10 Replay Attack

• Description: Check whether the implement possibility of Replay Attack exists in the contract.

• Result: Pass

2.11 Overriding Variables

• Description: Check whether the variables have been overridden and lead to wrong code execution.

• Result: Pass

3. Business Security

In this project, Four "stake rewards" smart contracts were implemented based on the same code structure, namely GeneLavaRewards, FOMPTPTRewards, FOMPUSDTRewards and FOMAUSDTRewards. The code logic of each smart contract implementation code is the same, except for the name and address. The following screenshots are based on FOMPUSDTRewards.

3.1 Stake Initialization

• Description: The "stake-reward" mode of the contract needs to initialize the relevant parameters (rewardRate, lastUpdateTime, periodFinish), call the notifyRewardAmount function by the specified reward distribution manager address rewardDistribution, and enter the initial reward used to calculate the rewardRate, initialize the stake and reward related parameters. This function can be called by the specified address rewardDistribution at any time to control the reward rate and the key time judgment condition, even if the rewardRate is updated when the checkhalve modifier executes the logic, it can still be modified by entering the specified value reward in this function. If the value is too small, the user's reward will not match expectations.

```
function notifyRewardAmount(uint256 reward)
    external
    onlyRewardDistribution
    updateReward(address(0))
{
    if (block.timestamp >= periodFinish) {
        rewardRate = reward.div(DURATION);
    } else {
        uint256 remaining = periodFinish.sub(block.timestamp);
        uint256 leftover = remaining.mul(rewardRate);
        rewardRate = reward.add(leftover).div(DURATION);
    }
    lastUpdateTime = block.timestamp;
    periodFinish = block.timestamp.add(DURATION);
    emit RewardAdded(reward);
}
```



Figure 1 source code of notifyRewardAmount(FOMPUSDTRewards)

- Related functions: notifyRewardAmount, rewardPerToken, lastTimeRewardApplicable
- Result: Pass

3.2 Stake USDT tokens

• Description: The contract implements the *stake* function to stake the USDT tokens. The user need to *approve* the contract address in advance. By calling the *transferFrom* function in the USDT contract, the contract address transfers the specified amount of USDT tokens to the contract address on behalf of the user; This function restricts the user to call only after the "stake-reward" mode is turned on; each time this function is called to *stake* tokens, the reward related data is updated through the modifier *updateReward*.(It should be noted that the rewardRate set by the contract will be updated in the second cycle, and the periodFinish will be updated at the same time. There will be no rewards in the subsequent cycles.)

```
// stake visibility is public as overriding LPTokenWrapper's stake() function
function stake(uint256 amount) public updateReward(msg.sender) checkhalve checkStart{
    require(amount > 0, "Cannot stake 0");
    super.stake(amount);
    emit Staked(msg.sender, amount);
}
```

Figure 2 source code of stake function(1/2)(FOMPUSDTRewards)

```
function stake(uint256 amount) public {
    _totalSupply = _totalSupply.add(amount);
    _balances[msg.sender] = _balances[msg.sender].add(amount);
    y.safeTransferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), amount);
}
```

Figure 3 source code of stake function(2/2)(FOMPUSDTRewards)



```
modifier checkhalve(){
    if (block.timestamp >= periodFinish) {
        if(halveTimes > 0){
            initreward = 768*1e18;
            DURATION = 25 days;
            rewardRate = initreward.div(DURATION);
            periodFinish = block.timestamp.add(DURATION);
            halveTimes = halveTimes.sub(1);
            emit RewardAdded(initreward);
        }
        else{
            rewardRate = 0;
        }
    }
    _;
}
```

Figure 4 source code of modifier checkhalve(FOMPUSDTRewards)

- Related functions: stake, rewardPerToken, lastTimeRewardApplicable, earned, balanceOf
- Result: Pass

3.3 Withdraw USDT tokens

• Description: The contract implements the *withdraw* function to withdraw the USDT tokens. By calling the *transfer* function in the token contract, the contract address transfers the specified amount of USDT tokens to the user; This function restricts the user to call only after the "stake-reward" mode is turned on; each time this function is called to stake tokens, the reward related data is updated through the modifier *updateReward*. (It should be noted that the rewardRate set by the contract will be updated in the second cycle, and the periodFinish will be updated at the same time. There will be no rewards in the subsequent cycles.)

```
function withdraw(uint256 amount) public updateReward(msg.sender) checkhalve checkStart{
    require(amount > 0, "Cannot withdraw 0");
    super.withdraw(amount);
    emit Withdrawn(msg.sender, amount);
}
```

Figure 5 source code of withdraw function(1/2)(FOMPUSDTRewards)

```
function withdraw(uint256 amount) public {
    _totalSupply = _totalSupply.sub(amount);
    _balances[msg.sender] = _balances[msg.sender].sub(amount);
    y.safeTransfer(msg.sender, amount);
}
```



Figure 6 source code of withdraw function(2/2)(FOMPUSDTRewards)

- Related functions: withdraw, rewardPerToken, lastTimeRewardApplicable, earned, balanceOf
- Result: Pass

3.4 Withdraw rewards (fomp)

• Description: The contract implements the *getReward* function to withdraw the rewards (fomp). By calling the *transfer* function in the fomp contract, the contract address transfers the specified amount (all rewards of caller) of fomp to the user; This function restricts the user to call only after the "stake-reward" mode is turned on; each time this function is called to stake tokens, the reward related data is updated through the modifier *updateReward*. (It should be noted that the rewardRate set by the contract will be updated in the second cycle, and the periodFinish will be updated at the same time. There will be no rewards in the subsequent cycles.)

```
function getReward() public updateReward(msg.sender) checkhalve checkStart{
    uint256 reward = earned(msg.sender);
    if (reward > 0) {
        rewards[msg.sender] = 0;
        fomp.safeTransfer(msg.sender, reward);
        emit RewardPaid(msg.sender, reward);
}
```

Figure 7 source code of function getReward(FOMPUSDTRewards)

- Related functions: getReward, rewardPerToken, lastTimeRewardApplicable, earned, balanceOf
- Result: Pass

3.5 Exit the stake participation

• Description: The contract implements the *exit* function to close the participation of "stake-reward" mode. Call the *withdraw* function to withdraw all stake USDT, call the *getReward* function to receive all rewards. The user address cannot get new rewards because the balance of USDT tokens already staked is empty.

```
function exit() external {
    withdraw(balanceOf(msg.sender));
    getReward();
}
```

Figure 8 source code of function exit(FOMPUSDTRewards)

- Related functions: exit, withdraw, getReward, rewardPerToken, lastTimeRewardApplicable, earned, balanceOf
- Result: Pass



3.7 Reward related data query function

• Description: Contract users can query the earliest timestamp between the current timestamp and the *periodFinish* by calling the *lastTimeRewardApplicable* function; calling the *rewardPerToken* function can query the gettable rewards for each stake USDT; calling the *earned* function can query the total claimable stake rewards of the specified address.

• Related functions: lastTimeRewardApplicable, rewardPerToken, earned

• Result: Pass

4. Conclusion

Beosin(ChengduLianAn) conducted a detailed audit on the design and code implementation of the smart contracts GeneLavaRewards, FOMPTPTRewards, FOMPUSDTRewards and FOMAUSDTRewards. The GeneLavaRewards, FOMPTPTRewards, FOMPUSDTRewards and FOMAUSDTRewards contracts passed all audit items, The overall audit result is **Pass**.

