

# Ekiden: A Platform for Confidentiality-Preserving, Trustworthy, and Performant Smart Contracts

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**Abstract**—Smart contracts are applications that execute on blockchains. Today they manage billions of dollars in value and motivate visionary plans for pervasive blockchain deployment. While smart contracts inherit the availability and other security assurances of blockchains, however, they are impeded by blockchains’ lack of *confidentiality* and *poor performance*.

We present Ekiden, a system that addresses these critical gaps by combining blockchains with Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs). Ekiden leverages a novel architecture that separates consensus from execution, enabling efficient TEE-backed confidentiality-preserving smart contracts and high scalability. Our prototype (with Tendermint as the consensus layer) achieves example performance of 600x more throughput and 400x less latency at 1000x less cost than the Ethereum mainnet.

Another contribution of this paper is that we systematically identify and treat the pitfalls arising from harmonizing TEEs and blockchains. Treated separately, both TEEs and blockchains provide powerful guarantees, but hybridized, though, they engender new attacks. For example, in naïve designs, privacy in TEE-backed contracts can be jeopardized by forgery of blocks, a seemingly unrelated attack vector. We believe the insights learned from Ekiden will prove to be of broad importance in hybridized TEE-blockchain systems.

## I. INTRODUCTION

Smart contracts are protocols that digitally enforce agreements between or among distrusting parties. Typically executing on blockchains, they enforce trust through strong integrity assurance: Even the creator of a smart contract cannot feasibly modify its code or subvert its execution. Smart contracts have been proposed to improve applications across a range of industries, including finance, insurance, identity management, and supply chain management.

Smart contracts inherit some undesirable blockchain properties. To enable validation of state transitions during consensus, blockchain data is public. Existing smart contract systems thus *lack confidentiality or privacy*: They cannot safely store or compute on sensitive data (e.g., auction bids, financial transactions). Blockchain consensus requirements also hamper smart contracts with *poor performance* in terms of computational power, storage capacity, and transaction throughput. Ethereum, the most popular decentralized smart contract platform, is used almost exclusively today for technically simple applications such as tokens, and can incur costs vastly (eight orders of magnitude) more than ordinary cloud-computing environments. In short, the *application complexity of smart contracts today is highly constrained*. Without critical performance and confi-

dentiality improvements, smart contracts may fail to deliver on their transformative promise.

Researchers have explored cryptographic solutions to these challenges, such as various zero-knowledge proof systems [41] and secure multiparty computation [81]. However, these approaches have significant performance overhead and are only applicable to limited use cases with relatively simple computations. A more performant and general-purpose option is use of a *trusted execution environment* (TEE).

A TEE provides a fully isolated environment that prevents other software applications, the operating system, and the host owner from tampering with or even learning the state of an application running in the TEE. For example, Intel Software Guard eXtensions (SGX) provides an implementation of a TEE. The Keystone-enclave project [4] aims to provide an open-source TEE design.

A key observation driving our system design is that TEEs and blockchains have complementary properties. On the one hand, a blockchain can guarantee strong availability and persistence of its state, whereas a TEE cannot guarantee availability (as the host can terminate TEEs at its discretion), nor can it reliably access the network or persistent storage. On the flip side, a blockchain has very limited computation power, and must expose its entire state for public verification, whereas a TEE incurs minimal overhead compared with native computation, and offers verifiable computation with confidential state via remote attestation. Thus it appears appealing to build hybrid protocols that take advantage of both.

Harmonizing TEEs with blockchains, though, is a challenge. Subtle pitfalls arise when the two are naïvely glued together.

One such pitfall arises from a fundamental limitation of TEEs: A malicious host can arbitrarily manipulate their scheduling and I/O. Consequently, TEEs might terminate at any point, posing the risk and challenge of lost and/or conflicting state. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that the so-called trusted timer in TEEs (SGX, in particular) can in fact only provide a “no-earlier-than” notion of time, because a malicious host can also delay the clock read (a message transmitted over the bus). Thus, while it’s tempting to use a blockchain to checkpoint a TEE’s state (e.g. [40]), the lack of a reliable timer renders it tricky for a TEE to ascertain an up-to-date view of the blockchain. As we’ll show later, naïve state-checkpointing protocols open up rewinding attacks (Section III). Another interesting and dangerous consequence

is that seemingly unrelated attack vectors come into play. For example, the confidentiality of TEE-protected content could be jeopardized by integrity attacks against the blockchain: e.g., an attacker could circumvent a privacy budget enforced by a TEE by providing a forged blockchain to rewind its execution and sent it arbitrarily many queries. Other challenges include tolerating compromised TEEs, supporting robust and consistent failover when TEEs crash, and key management for enclaves. We systematically identify and treat each of these pitfalls in this paper.

Following the above design principles, we present Ekiden, a system for highly performant and confidentiality-preserving smart contracts. To the best of our knowledge, Ekiden is the first confidentiality-preserving smart contract system capable of thousands of transactions per second. The key to this achievement is a secure and principled combination of blockchains and trusted hardware. Ekiden combines any desired underlying blockchain system (permissioned or permissionless) with TEE-based execution. Anchored in a formal security model expressed as a cryptographic ideal functionality [17], Ekiden’s principled design supports rigorous analysis of its security properties.

Ekiden adopts an architecture where *computation* is separated from *consensus*. Ekiden uses *compute nodes* to perform smart contract computation over private data off chain in TEEs, then attest to their correct execution on chain. The underlying blockchain is maintained by *consensus nodes*, which need not use trusted hardware. Ekiden is agnostic to consensus-layer mechanics, only requiring a blockchain capable of validating remote attestations from compute nodes. Ekiden can thus scale consensus and compute nodes independently according to performance and security needs.

By operating compute nodes in TEEs, Ekiden imposes minimal performance overhead relative to an ordinary (e.g., cloud) computing environment. In this way, we avoid the computational burden and latency of on-chain execution. TEE-based computation in Ekiden provides confidentiality, enabling efficient use of powerful cryptographic primitives that a TEE is known to emulate, such as functional encryption [29] and black-box obfuscation [58], and also provides a trustworthy source of randomness, a major acknowledged difficulty in blockchain systems [16].

To address the availability and network security limitations of TEEs, Ekiden supports on-chain checkpointing and (optional) storage of contract state. Ekiden thereby supports safe interaction among long-lived smart contracts across different trust domains. To address potential TEE failures, such as side channel attacks, we propose mitigations to preserve integrity and limit data leakage (Section III-A). Assuming blockchain integrity, users need not trust smart contract creators, miners, node operators or any other entity for liveness, persistence, confidentiality, or correctness. Ekiden thus enables self-sustaining services that can outlive any single node, user, or

development effort.<sup>1</sup>

**Technical challenges and contributions.** Our work on Ekiden addresses several key technical challenges:

- *Formal security modeling:* While intuitively clear, the desired and achievable security properties required for Ekiden are challenging to define formally. We express the full range of security requirements of Ekiden in terms of an ideal functionality  $\mathcal{F}_{\text{Ekiden}}$ . We outline a security proof in the Universal Composability (UC) framework that shows that the Ekiden protocol matches  $\mathcal{F}_{\text{Ekiden}}$  under concurrent composition.
- *A principled approach for hybridized TEE-blockchain systems:* We systematically enumerate the fundamental pitfalls arising from fusing blockchains and TEEs and offer general techniques for overcoming them. Further, we show that by appealing to cryptographic ideal functionalities, these techniques can be applied in a principled, provably secure, and performant way that we believe can be generalized to a broad range of hybridized TEE-blockchain systems.
- *Performance:* The blockchain is likely to be a performance bottleneck of a TEE-blockchain hybrid system. We provide optimization that minimize the use of blockchain without degrading security: We show that they realize the same  $\mathcal{F}_{\text{Ekiden}}$  functionality as the unoptimized protocol.

**Evaluation.** We evaluate the performance of Ekiden on a suite of applications that exercise the full range of system resources and demonstrate how Ekiden enables application deployment that would otherwise be impractical due to privacy and/or performance concerns. They include a machine learning framework, within which we implement medical-diagnosis and credit-scoring applications, a smart building thermal model, and a poker game. We also port an Ethereum Virtual Machine implementation to Ekiden, so that existing contracts (e.g., written in Solidity), such as Cryptokitties [1] and the ERC20 token, can run in our framework as well. We report on development effort, showing that the programming model in Ekiden lends itself to simple and intuitive application development. Contracts in Ekiden process transactions 2–3 orders of magnitude both faster and higher throughput over Ethereum. Our performance optimizations also greatly compress the amount of data stored on the blockchain, yielding a 2–4 order of magnitude improvement over the baseline. (The advantage is greater for read-write operations on contracts with large state, such as our token contract.)

## II. BACKGROUND

*a) Smart Contracts and Blockchains:* Blockchain-based smart contracts are programs executed by a network of participants who reach agreement on the programs’ state. Existing smart contract systems replicate data and computation on all nodes in the system, so that individual node can verify correct execution of the contract. Full replication on all nodes provides

<sup>1</sup>Our system name Ekiden refers to this property. “Ekiden” is a Japanese term for a long-distance relay running race.

a high level of fault tolerance and availability. Smart contract systems such as Ethereum [27] has demonstrated their utility across a range of applications.

However, several critical limitations impede wider adoption of current smart contract systems. First, on-chain computation of fully replicated smart contracts is inherently expensive. For example in August 2017, it cost \$26.55 to add 2 numbers together one million times in an Ethereum smart contract [27], a cost roughly 8 orders of magnitude higher than in AWS EC2 [66]. Furthermore, current systems offer no privacy guarantees. Users are identified by pseudonyms. As numerous studies have shown [64], [53], [56], [65], pseudonymity provides only weak privacy protection. Moreover, *contract state and user input must be public* in order for miners to verify correct computation. Lack of privacy fundamentally restricts the scope of applications of smart contracts.

*b) Trusted Hardware with Attestation:* A key building block of Ekiden is a trusted execution environment (TEE) that protects the confidentiality and integrity of computations, and can issue proofs, known as *attestations*, of computation correctness. Ekiden is implemented with Intel SGX [5], [34], [52], a specific TEE technology, but we emphasize that it may use any comparable TEE with attestation capabilities, such as the ongoing effort Keystone-enclave [4] aiming to realize open-source secure hardware enclave. We now offer brief background on TEEs, with a focus on Intel SGX.

Intel SGX provides a CPU-based implementation of TEEs—known as *enclaves* in SGX—for general-purpose computation. A host can instantiate multiple TEEs, which are not only isolated from each other, but also from the host. Code running inside a TEE has a protected address space. When data from a TEE moves off the processor to memory, it is transparently encrypted with keys only available to the processor. Thus the operating system, hypervisor, and other users cannot access the enclave’s memory. The SGX memory encryption engine also guarantees data integrity and prevents memory replay attacks [32]. Intel SGX supports attested execution, i.e., it is able to prove the correct execution of a program, by issuing a *remote attestation*, a digital signature, using a private key known only to the hardware, over the program and an execution output. Remote attestation also allows remote users to establish encrypted and authenticated channels to an enclave [5]. Assuming trust in the hardware, and Intel, which authenticates attestation keys, it is infeasible for any entity other than an SGX platform to generate any attestation, i.e., attestations are existentially unforgeable.

However, attested execution realized by trusted hardware isn’t perfect. For example, SGX alone cannot guarantee availability: a malicious host can terminate enclaves or drop messages arbitrarily. Even an honest host could accidentally lose state (e.g. when power cycles). The weak availability of SGX poses a fundamental challenge to the design of Ekiden. Also, the current SGX implementation is vulnerable to side-channel attacks [77], [60]. Ekiden is compatible with existing defenses [13], [58], [48], [75], [63]. We discuss side-channel resistance in Section III-A.

### III. TECHNICAL CHALLENGES IN TEE-BLOCKCHAIN HYBRID SYSTEMS

Before diving into the specifics of Ekiden, we first describe and address the fundamental pitfalls that arise when harmonizing TEEs and blockchains. The solutions serve as building blocks of the Ekiden protocol, and we believe the insights learned from Ekiden will prove to be of broad importance in hybridized TEE-blockchain systems.

#### A. Tolerating TEE failures

Although designed to execute general purpose programs, trusted hardware is not a panacea. Here we analyze the limitations of TEEs and their impact on TEE-blockchain hybrid protocols.

*a) Availability failures:* Trusted hardware in general cannot ensure availability. In the case of SGX, a malicious host can terminate enclaves, and even an honest host could lose enclaves in a power cycle. A TEE-blockchain system must tolerate such host failures, ensuring that crashed TEEs can at most delay execution.

Our high-level approach is to treat TEEs as expendable and interchangeable, relying on the blockchain to resolve any conflicts resulting from concurrency. To ensure that any particular TEE is easily replaced, TEEs are *stateless*, and any persistent state is stored by the blockchain. We discuss later how TEEs can also keep soft state across invocations as a performance optimization, but we emphasize that the techniques in Ekiden ensure that losing such state at any point does not affect security.

*b) Side channels:* Although TEEs aim to protect confidentiality, recent work has uncovered data leakage via side-channel attacks. Existing defenses are generally application- and attack-specific (e.g., crypto libraries avoid certain data-dependent operations [13]); generalizing such protections remains challenging. Thus, Ekiden largely defers protections to the application developer.

Even though there is perhaps no definitive and practical panacea to all side-channel attacks, it is still desirable to limit the impact of compromised TEEs and provide graceful degradation in the face of small-scale compromise. Our approach is to compartmentalize both spatially and temporally. We design critical components in Ekiden, such as the key manager, against a strong adversarial model, allowing an attacker to break the confidentiality of a small fraction of TEEs, and limit the access to the key manager from other components. We also employ proactive key rotation [33] to confine the purview of a leaked key. Key management is fundamental to the availability of a TEE-blockchain system, as discussed below.

*c) Timer failures:* TEEs in general lack trusted time sources. In the case of SGX, although a trusted relative timer is available, the communication between enclaves and the timer (provided by an off-CPU component) can be delayed by the OS [38], [37]. Moreover server-grade Intel CPUs offer no support for SGX timers at the time of writing. Thus a TEE-blockchain hybrid protocol must minimize reliance on the TEE timer.

Our approach is to design protocols that do not require TEEs to have a current view of a blockchain. Specifically, instead of requiring a TEE to distinguish stale state from current state (without a synchronized clock, there is no definitive countermeasure to a network adversary delaying messages from the blockchain), our techniques rely on the blockchain to proactively reject any update based on a stale input state (a hash of which is included in the update).

The missing timer also makes it hard for TEEs to verify that an item has been persisted in the blockchain, i.e. to establish “proofs of publication,” as coined by [40]. However [40] doesn’t consider threats caused by lack of trustworthy time in TEEs—e.g., injection of old, fake, easily minable blocks—that are critical in PoW-based blockchains. One of our contributions is a general, time-based proof-of-publication protocol that is secure against network adversary delaying clock read, as we now briefly explain.

#### B. Proof of Publication for PoW blockchains

In order to leverage blockchains as persistent storage, a TEE must be able to efficiently verify that an item has been stored in the blockchain. For permissioned blockchains, such a proof can consist of signatures from a quorum of consensus nodes. To establish proofs of publication for PoW-based blockchains, TEEs must be able to validate new blocks. As noted in [21], a trusted timer is needed to defend against an adversary isolating an enclave and presenting an invalid subchain. Unfortunately, timing sources over secure channels (e.g. SGX timers) cannot guarantee a bounded response time, as discussed above. To work around this limitation, we leverage the confidentiality of TEEs so that an attacker delaying a timer’s responses cannot prevent an enclave from successfully verifying blockchain contents. Our solution can even work without SGX timers given trust in, e.g. TLS-enabled NTP servers. Due to lack of space, we relegate our proof-of-publication protocol for PoW blockchains to Section V-A.

#### C. Key management in TEEs

A fundamental limitation of using a blockchain to persist TEE state is the lack of confidentiality. We showed previously how to avoid this problem by encryption. This, however, leads to another problem: how can one persist the encryption keys?

Generally the method is to replicate keys across multiple TEEs. However, the flip side is the challenge of minimizing the key exfiltration risk in the face of confidentiality breach (e.g. via side-channel attacks). There is in general a fundamental tension between exposure risk and availability: A higher replication factor means not only better resiliency to state loss, but also a larger attack surface. Therefore the tradeoff and achievable properties would depend on the threat model.

Since there is perhaps no definitive and practical full-system side-channel mitigation, our approach is to design the key manager against a stronger adversarial model where the attacker is allowed to break the confidentiality of a small fraction of TEEs, and limit the access from other components. We outline the key management protocol in Section V-B.

#### D. Atomic delivery of execution results

In blockchain systems, ensuring the atomicity of executions, namely either both executions  $e_1, e_2$  finish or none of them, has been a fundamental problem, as exemplified by work on atomic cross-chain swaps [10]. A similar but more complicated problem arises in TEE-blockchain hybridization.

For a general stateful TEE-blockchain protocol, TEE execution yields two messages:  $m_1$ , which delivers the output to the caller, and  $m_2$ , which delivers the state update to the blockchain, both via adversarial channels. We emphasize that it is critical to enforce **atomic delivery** of the two messages, i.e. both  $m_1$  and  $m_2$  are delivered or the system has become permanently unavailable.  $m_1$  is delivered when the caller receives it. The new state  $m_2$  is delivered once accepted by the blockchain. Rejected state update are not considered delivered.

To see the necessity of atomic delivery, consider possible attacks when it’s violated, i.e., when only one of the two messages is delivered. First, if only the output  $m_1$  is delivered, a *rewind attack* becomes possible. Since TEE cannot tell whether an input state is fresh, an attacker can provide stale states to resume a TEE’s execution from an old state. This enables grinding attacks against randomized TEE programs. An attacker may repeatedly rewind until receiving the desired output. Another example is that rewinding could defeat budget-based privacy protection, such as differential privacy. On the other hand, if only the state update  $m_2$  is delivered, the user risks permanent loss of the output, as it might be impossible to reproduce the same output with the updated state.

We specify the atomic delivery protocol in Section V-C.

### IV. OVERVIEW OF EKIDEN

In this section, we provide an overview of the design and security properties of Ekiden.

#### A. Motivation

As an example to motivate our work, consider a credit scoring application—an example we implement and report on in Section VII-A. Credit scores are widely used by lenders, insurers, and others to evaluate the creditworthiness of consumers. Despite its considerable revenue (\$10.8B in 2017 [36]), the credit reporting industry in the U.S. is concentrated among a handful of credit bureaus [36]. Such centralization creates large single points of failure and other problems, as highlighted by a recent data breach affecting nearly half the US population [12].

Blockchain-based decentralized credit scoring is thus an attractive and popular alternative. Bloom [45], for example, is a startup offering a credit scoring system on Ethereum. Their scheme, however, only supports a static credit scoring algorithm that omits important private data and cannot support predictive modeling. Such applications are bedeviled by two critical limitations of current smart contract systems: (1) A lack of *data confidentiality* needed to protect sensitive consumer records (e.g., loan-service history for credit scoring) and the proprietary prediction models derived from them and





are executed atomically, i.e.  $\text{outp}$  is revealed to  $\mathcal{P}$  if and only if  $(\text{st}'_{\text{ct}}, \pi)$  is accepted by consensus nodes. Consensus nodes verify  $\pi$  before accepting the new state as valid and placing it on the blockchain.

A key distinction between Ekiden and existing smart contract platforms (e.g. Ethereum [27]) is Ekiden decouples request execution from consensus. In Ethereum, request execution is replicated by all nodes in the network to reach consensus, rendering the entire network as slow as a single node. Whereas in Ekiden, request is only executed by  $K$  compute nodes for some small  $K$  (e.g. in Figure 1, we set  $K = 1$ ) and consensus nodes just verify  $K$  proofs of correct execution without repeating the execution

In our implementation, a proof of correct execution takes the form of a signature  $\pi$ . Specifically, a compute node  $\text{Comp}$  obtains  $\pi$  as follows. Suppose the execution on  $\text{Comp}$  results in an output  $\text{st}'_{\text{ct}}$  and an attestation  $\sigma_{\text{TEE}}$  (a signature [15] over the contract code and  $\text{st}'_{\text{ct}}$ ).  $\text{Comp}$  then sends  $\sigma_{\text{TEE}}$  to the Intel Attestation Service (IAS), which verifies  $\sigma_{\text{TEE}}$  and replies with  $\pi = (b, \sigma_{\text{TEE}}, \sigma_{\text{IAS}})$ , where  $b \in \{0, 1\}$  indicates the validity of  $\sigma_{\text{TEE}}$  and  $\sigma_{\text{IAS}}$  is a signature over  $b$  and  $\sigma_{\text{TEE}}$  by IAS.  $\pi$  is then submitted to consensus node as a proof of correctness for  $\text{st}'_{\text{ct}}$ . As  $\pi$  is just a signature, consensus nodes need neither trusted hardware nor to contact the IAS to verify it.

#### D. Ekiden Security Goals

Here we summarize the security goals of Ekiden. Briefly, Ekiden aims to support execution of general-purpose contracts while enforcing the following security properties:

**Correct execution:** Contract state transitions reflect correct execution of contract code on given state and inputs.

**Consistency:** At any time, the blockchain stores a single sequence of state transitions consistent with the view of each compute node.

**Secrecy:** During a period without any TEE breach, Ekiden guarantees that contract state and inputs from honest clients are kept secret from all other parties. Additionally, Ekiden is resilient to some key-manager TEEs being breached.

**Graceful confidentiality degradation:** Should a confidentiality breach occur in a computation node (as opposed to a key-manager node), Ekiden provides forward secrecy and reasonable isolation from the affected TEEs. Specifically, suppose a confidentiality breach happens at  $t$ . The attacker can at most access the history up to  $t - \Delta$  where  $\Delta$  is a system parameter. Moreover, a compromised TEE can only affect a subset of contracts.

**Non-goals:** Ekiden does *not* prevent contract-level leakage (e.g. through covert channels, bugs or side channels). Thus contract developers are responsible for ensuring that no secret is revealed through public output, and that the contract is free of bugs and side channels. We discuss supported mitigation in Section VI-D.

#### E. Assumptions and Threat Model

*a) TEE:* Recent work demonstrates that the confidentiality of SGX enclaves may be compromised via side-channel attacks. In light of this threat, we assume the adversary can compromise the confidentiality of a small fraction of TEEs. As noted above, the impact depends on whether the breaches affect key-manager or computation nodes. We assume that TEE hardware is otherwise correctly implemented and securely manufactured.

*b) Blockchain:* Ekiden is designed to be agnostic to the underlying consensus protocol. It can be deployed atop any blockchain implementation as long as the requirements specified below are met.

We assume the blockchain will perform prescribed computation correctly and is always available. In particular, Ekiden relies on consensus nodes to verify attestations. We further assume the blockchain provides an efficient way to construct proofs of item inclusion on the blockchain, i.e., proofs of publication, as discussed in Section III-B.

*c) Threat Model:* All parties in the system must trust Ekiden and TEE. We assume the adversary can control the operating system and the network stack of all but one compute nodes. On controlled nodes, the adversary can reorder messages and schedule processes arbitrarily. We assume the attacker can compromise the confidentiality of a small fraction (e.g.  $f\%$ ) of TEEs. The adversary observes global network traffic and may reorder and delay messages arbitrarily.

The adversary may corrupt any number of clients. Clients need not execute contracts themselves and do not require trusted hardware. We assume honest clients trust their own code and platform, but not other clients. Each contract has an explicit policy dictating how data is processed and requests are serviced. Ekiden does not (and cannot reasonably) prevent contracts from leaking secrets intentionally or unintentionally through software bugs.

### V. BUILDING BLOCKS

Before diving to protocol details, we first present key building blocks of the Ekiden protocol, addressing the general technical challenges in TEE-blockchain systems, as reviewed in Section III.

#### A. Proof of Publication

We now present a proof of publication protocol for permissionless blockchains. Please refer to Section III-B for background and motivation. A proof of publication is an interactive proof between a verifier  $\mathcal{E}$ , in the form of a contract TEE, and a untrusted prover  $\mathcal{P}$ . The high level idea is to only give  $\mathcal{P}$  a limited amount of time to publish the message in a block within a subchain of sufficient difficulty so that an adversary cannot feasibly forge it. The protocol is formally specified in the online version [20]. We give text description below so the formal specification is not required for understanding.

$\mathcal{E}$  stores a recent checkpoint block  $CB$  from the blockchain, from which a difficulty  $\delta(CB)$ , e.g. the number of leading zeroes in the block nonce, can be calculated.  $\mathcal{E}$  will emit an

(attested) version of  $CB$  to any requesting client, enabling the client to verify  $CB$ 's freshness. Given a valid recent  $CB$ ,  $\mathcal{E}$  can verify new blocks based on  $\delta(CB)$ , assuming the difficulty is relatively stationary. (For simplicity in our analysis here, we assume constant difficulty, but our analysis can be extended under an assumption of bounded difficulty variations.)

To initiate publication of  $m$ ,  $\mathcal{E}$  calls the timer to get a timestamp  $t_1$ . As discussed,  $\mathcal{E}$  may receive  $t_1$  after a delay. After receiving  $t_1$  (maybe at a time later than  $t_1$ ),  $\mathcal{E}$  generates a random nonce  $r$  and requires the prover to publish  $(m, r)$ . Upon receiving a proof  $\pi_{(m,r)}$  (a subchain containing  $(m, r)$ ) from  $\mathcal{P}$ ,  $\mathcal{E}$  calls the timer again for  $t_2$ . Let  $n_c$  be the number of confirmations in  $(m, r)$ ,  $\tau$  be the expected block interval (an invariant of the blockchain), and  $\epsilon$  be a multiplicative slack factor that accounts for variation in the time to generate blocks, which is a stochastic process. E.g.,  $\epsilon = 1.5$  means that production of  $\pi_{(m,r)}$  is allowed to be up to 1.5 times slower than expected on the main chain.  $\mathcal{E}$  accepts  $\pi_{(m,r)}$  only if  $t_2 - t_1 < n_c \times \tau \times \epsilon$ .

Setting  $\epsilon$  to a high value reduces the probability of false rejections (i.e., rejecting proofs from an honest  $\mathcal{P}$  when the main chain growth was unluckily slow during some time-frame). However, a high  $\epsilon$  also increases the possibility of false acceptance, i.e. accepting a forged subchain. For any  $\epsilon > 1$ , it is possible to require a large enough  $n_c$  so that the probability of a successful attack becomes negligible. However, a large  $n_c$  means that an honest  $\mathcal{P}$  needs to wait for a long time before  $\mathcal{P}$  can obtain the output, may affecting the user experience.

For example, for a powerful attacker with 25% hash power (roughly the largest mining pool known to exist in Bitcoin and Ethereum at the time of writing), setting  $n_c = 80$  and  $\epsilon = 1.6$  means the attacker needs an expected  $2^{112}$  hashes to forge a proof of publication<sup>2</sup>, while an honest proof will be rejected with probability  $2^{-19}$ . Similar block-synchronization techniques and analysis are used in the recently proposed Tesseract TEE-based cryptocurrency exchange [10].

It is easy to see that delaying the timer's responses does not give the attacker more time than  $t_2 - t_1$ . Delaying timestamp  $t_1$  shrinks this apparent interval of time, disadvantaging the attacker.  $\mathcal{E}$ 's checkpoint block can be updated with the same protocol, by publishing an empty message. Note that once a message is successfully published by a TEE, other TEEs can obtain the proof via secure channels established by attestations, saving the cost of repeating the protocol.

## B. Key Management

Each Ekiden contract is associated with a set of keys, including a symmetric key for state encryption and a key pair to encrypt client input. Here we discuss the generation, distribution, and rotation of these keys.

1) *Adversarial model*: We consider an adversary that can break the confidentiality, e.g., via side-channel attacks, of some fraction (e.g.  $f\%$ ) of the TEEs. The exact value of  $f$  depends on the deployment and enrollment model.  $f$  can be a very

<sup>2</sup>as the time of writing, it takes roughly  $2^{73}$  hashes to mine a Bitcoin block.

low value if enrollment is limited to well-managed nodes, e.g., ones hosted by capable and reputable organizations. But when deployed in a more open environment,  $f$  needs to be reasonably high. We assume the participating hosts have (at least partially) Sybil-resistant identities. One way to achieve this is to require a security deposit to join the protocol.

In addition, we assume there are sufficiently many (e.g. more than  $2f\%$  of) participants online at any time so that the availability of keys are retained. In practice, participation can be motivated by economic rewards and penalties. We leave the incentive design for future work.

2) *Desired properties*: Since decryption keys are eventually revealed to a contract TEE, which itself may also be compromised, actively used keys (i.e. hot keys) must be short-live, derived from a less-exposed long-term master secret. Ideally, a key management protocol should satisfy the following properties:

- *Confidentiality*: The adversary (within our model) cannot exfiltrate the long-term master key.
- *Availability*: An honest contract TEE can always access decryption keys.
- *Forward secrecy*: If a short-term key is compromised at time  $t$ , it cannot be used to decrypt messages encrypted before  $t - \Delta$ , for some system parameter  $\Delta$ .

3) *Preliminaries*: Below we outline a key management protocol that satisfies the above requirements. We first review the building blocks, including distributed key generation (DKG) protocols and distributed pseudo-random functions (PRFs).

a) *Distributed Key Generation (DKG)*: A DKG protocol (e.g. [30]) allows a set of  $N$  parties to generate unbiased, random keys. The outcome of a run of a DKG protocol is a secret  $s$ , but shared among parties using a secret-sharing scheme (typically Shamir's).

b) *Distributed PRF*: Informally, a PRF is a collection of functions  $\mathcal{F} = \{f_s\}_{s \in S}$ , such that for a random index  $s \leftarrow S$ ,  $f_s(\cdot)$  is indistinguishable from a random function.

Naor *et al.* [57] introduce distributed PRFs, which are such that parties with shares of  $s$  can evaluate  $f_s(\cdot)$  without reconstructing  $s$ . Specifically, let  $G$  be a Schnorr group and  $g$  be a generator. Let  $H : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow G$  be a hash function, [57] shows that  $f_s(x) = H(x)^s$  is a family of PRF.

Suppose  $s$  is shared among parties using a  $(k, n)$ -secret sharing scheme. To evaluate  $f_s(x)$ , party  $i$  simply computes and outputs  $y_i = H(x)^{s_i}$ , computed with its share  $s_i$ . After collecting at least  $k + 1$  of  $\{y_i\}$ , one can derive  $f_s(x)$  by polynomial interpolation in the exponent:

$$f_s(x) = H(x)^S = H(x)^{\sum_{i \in A} S_i \lambda_i} = \prod_{i \in A} y_i^{\lambda_i}$$

where  $\lambda_i$  are Lagrange coefficients  $\lambda_i = \prod_{j \neq i} \frac{-j}{i-j}$ .

## 4) Protocol:

a) *Key management committees and long-term keys*:

Assuming Sybil-resistant identities, we can sample  $N$  nodes from the participants to form a key management committee (KMC).  $N$  is a system parameter. When initializing a contract

$c$ , KMC runs the DKG protocol to generate a long term key  $k_c$ , so that  $k_c$  is secret-shared among KMC members using a  $(\lceil fN \rceil, N)$ -secret sharing scheme. Previous work on proactive secret sharing (e.g. [33], [68]) can be used to periodically rotate the committee without changing the secret. [68] also allows a committee to be dynamically expanded.

b) *Generating short-term keys*: Suppose short-term keys expire every epoch. To get the short-term key for contract  $c$  at epoch  $t$ , a compute node Comp first establishes secure channels and authenticates itself with members in KMC. Once verified that Comp is indeed executing  $c$ , each KMC member  $i$  computes  $k_{c,t,i} = H(t)^{k_c^i}$  and sends  $k_{c,t,i}$  to Comp. After collecting  $f + 1$  outcomes from  $A \subseteq \text{KMC}$ , Comp can construct the short-term key for epoch  $t$  by  $k_{c,t} = \prod_{i \in A} k_{c,t,i}^{\lambda_i}$  where  $\lambda_i$  are Lagrange coefficients.

c) *Breach isolation*: We proactively quarantine confidentiality breaches by enforcing a privacy budget for each compute node. For this to work, we assume contract TEEs have unforgeable host identities (e.g., the linkable EPID public key in SGX provides one). Key-manager nodes maintain a counter  $\kappa_{\text{Comp}}$  for each compute node Comp to record the number of queries. The counter is reset along with epoch advancement. Key-manager nodes fulfill a query only if  $\kappa_{\text{Comp}} < \kappa$  for some system parameter  $\kappa$ . With this in place, no matter how many TEEs a breached compute node spawns, it can at most obtain  $\kappa$  keys. In practice, requests to a depleted honest compute node can be redirected to other nodes, resulting in only a modest overhead.

### C. Atomic Delivery

Recall that TEE execution yields two messages:  $m_1$ , which delivers the output to the caller, and  $m_2$ , which delivers the state update to the blockchain, both via adversarial channels. As discussed in Section III-D, it is critical to enforce atomic delivery of the two messages, i.e. both  $m_1$  and  $m_2$  are delivered or the system has become permanently unavailable. Now we specify a protocol for atomic delivery.

Assuming a secure communication channel between a TEE and the calling client  $\mathcal{P}$  (which in practice can be constructed with remote attestation), we realize atomic delivery of  $m_1$  and  $m_2$  (defined above) via the following two-phase protocol: To initiate atomic delivery, TEE obtains a fresh key  $k$  from the key manager and sends an attested  $m_1^c = \text{Enc}(k, m_1)$  to  $\mathcal{P}$  over a secure channel. Once  $\mathcal{P}$  acknowledges receipt of  $m_1^c$ , the TEE sends  $m_2$  to the blockchain. Finally, after seeing  $\pi_{m_2}$ , a proof of publication for  $m_2$ , TEE sends  $k$  to  $\mathcal{P}$ .

The above protocol realizes atomic delivery. On the one hand, as a TEE can ascertain the delivery of  $m_2$  by verifying  $\pi_{m_2}$ ,  $k$  is revealed *only if*  $m_2$  is delivered. On the other hand, *if*  $m_2$  has been delivered,  $k$  will be released eventually because at least one TEE is available and the key management protocol ensures that the availability of  $k$ .

## VI. PROTOCOL DETAILS AND SECURITY PROOF

In this section, we specify  $\text{Prot}_{\text{Ekiden}}$ , the protocol realization of Ekiden. It aims to realize a Universal Composability

(UC) [17] ideal functionality  $\mathcal{F}_{\text{Ekiden}}$  that we defer to Appendix A for lack of space and encourage the reader to consult. Looking ahead,  $\text{Prot}_{\text{Ekiden}}$  UC-realizes  $\mathcal{F}_{\text{Ekiden}}$ .

### A. Preliminary and Notation

a) *Attested Execution*: To formally model attested execution on trusted hardware, we adopt the ideal functionality  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{att}}$  defined in [62]. Informally, a party first loads a program  $\text{prog}$  into a TEE with an “install” message. On a “resume” call, the program is run on the given input, generating an output  $\text{outp}$  along with an attestation  $\sigma_{\text{TEE}} = \Sigma_{\text{TEE}}.\text{Sig}(\text{sk}_{\text{TEE}}, (\text{prog}, \text{outp}))$ , a signature under a hardware key  $\text{sk}_{\text{TEE}}$ . The public key  $\text{pk}_{\text{TEE}}$  can be obtained from  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{att}}.\text{getpk}()$ . See [62] for details.

In practice it’s useful to allow a TEE to output data that is not included in attestation. We extend  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{att}}$  slightly to allow this: if a TEE program  $\text{prog}$  generates a pair of output  $(\text{outp}_1, \text{outp}_2)$ , the attestation only signs  $\text{outp}_1$ , i.e.  $\sigma_{\text{TEE}} = \Sigma_{\text{TEE}}.\text{Sig}(\text{sk}_{\text{TEE}}, (\text{prog}, \text{outp}_1))$ . A common pattern is to include a hash of  $\text{outp}_2$  in  $\text{outp}_1$ , to allow parties to verify  $\sigma_{\text{TEE}}$  and  $\text{outp}_2$  separately. Similar technique is used in [78].

Following the notation in [41], [75], we use contract wrappers (defined in Fig. 9) to abstract away routine functionality such as state encryption, key management, etc. A contract  $c$  augmented with the wrapper is denoted  $\hat{c}$ .

b) *Blockchain*:  $\mathcal{F}_{\text{blockchain}}[\text{succ}]$  (given in Appendix A) defines a general-purpose append-only ledger implemented by common blockchain protocols (formally defined in Figure 7 in the Appendix). The parameter  $\text{succ}$  is a function that specifies the criteria for a new item to be added to the storage, modeling the notion of transaction validity. We retain the append-only property of blockchains but abstract away the inclusion of state updates in blocks. We assume overlay semantics that associate blockchain data with id’s. In addition to read and write interfaces,  $\mathcal{F}_{\text{blockchain}}$  provides a convenient interface by which clients can ascertain whether an item is included in the blockchain. In practice, this interface avoids the overhead of downloading the entire blockchain.

c) *Parameterizing  $\mathcal{F}_{\text{blockchain}}$* : In Ekiden, the contents of storage are parsed as an ordered array of *state transitions*, defined as  $\text{trans}_i = (H(\text{st}_{i-1}), \text{st}_i, \sigma_i)$ , a tuple of a hash of the previous state, a new state, and a proof from TEE attesting to the correctness of a state transition. (Note that as a performance optimization, large user input—e.g. training data in an ML contract— may not be stored on chain.) Storage can be interpreted as a special initial state followed by a sequence of state transitions:  $\text{Storage} = ((\text{Contract}, \text{st}_0, \sigma_0), \{\text{trans}_i\}_{i \geq 1})$ .

For a state transition to be *valid*, it must extend the latest state and the attestation must verify. Formally, this is achieved by parameterizing  $\mathcal{F}_{\text{blockchain}}$  with a successor function  $\text{succ}(\cdot, \cdot)$  such that  $\text{succ}(\text{Storage}, (h, \text{st}_{\text{new}}, \sigma_{\text{TEE}})) = \text{true}$  if and only if  $h = H(\text{st}_{\text{old}})$  where  $\text{st}_{\text{old}}$  is the latest state in Storage and  $\Sigma_{\text{TEE}}.\text{Vf}(\text{pk}_{\text{TEE}}, \sigma_{\text{TEE}}, (h, \text{st}_{\text{new}}))$ . This guarantees that at any time there is a single sequence of state transitions consistent with the view of each party, i.e. the chain of state transitions is fork-free.



## B. Formal Specification of the Protocol

The Ekiden protocol is formally specified in  $\text{Prot}_{\text{Ekiden}}$  (Fig. 2).  $\text{Prot}_{\text{Ekiden}}$  relies on  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{att}}$  and  $\mathcal{F}_{\text{blockchain}}$ , ideal functionality for attested execution and the blockchain.  $\text{Prot}_{\text{Ekiden}}$  also use a digital signature scheme  $\Sigma(\text{KGen}, \text{Sig}, \text{Vf})$ , a symmetric encryption scheme  $\mathcal{SE}(\text{KGen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$  and an asymmetric encryption scheme  $\mathcal{AE}(\text{KGen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ .

a) *Sharing state keys*: Each contract is associated with a set of keys. As discussed in Section V-B, contract TEEs delegate key management to key manager TEEs. In  $\text{Prot}_{\text{Ekiden}}$ , communication with key managers is abstracted away with the `keyManager` function.

b) *Contract creation*: To create a contract in Ekiden, a client  $\mathcal{P}_i$  calls the `create` subroutine of a compute node `Comp` with input `Contract`, a piece of contract code. `Comp` loads the `Contract` into a TEE and starts the initialization by invoking the “`create`” call. As specified in Fig. 9, the contract TEE creates a fresh contract `cid`, obtains fresh  $(\text{pk}_{\text{cid}}^{\text{in}}, \text{sk}_{\text{cid}}^{\text{in}})$  pair and  $\text{k}_{\text{cid}}^{\text{state}}$  from the key manager and generates an encrypted initial state  $\text{st}_0$  and an attestation  $\sigma_{\text{TEE}}$ . The attestation proves the  $\text{st}_0$  is correctly initialized and that  $\text{pk}_{\text{cid}}^{\text{in}}$  is the corresponding public key for contract `cid`. The compute node `Comp` sends  $(\text{Contract}, \text{cid}, \text{st}_0, \text{pk}_{\text{cid}}^{\text{in}}, \sigma_{\text{TEE}})$  to  $\mathcal{F}_{\text{blockchain}}$  and waits for a receipt. `Comp` returns the contract `cid` to  $\mathcal{P}_i$ , who will verify that contract `cid` is properly stored on  $\mathcal{F}_{\text{blockchain}}$ .

c) *Request execution*: To execute a request to contract `cid`, a client  $\mathcal{P}_i$  first obtains the input encryption key  $\text{pk}_{\text{cid}}^{\text{in}}$  from  $\mathcal{F}_{\text{blockchain}}$ . Then  $\mathcal{P}_i$  calls the `request` subroutine of `Comp` with input  $(\text{cid}, \text{inp}_{\text{ct}})$ , where  $\text{inp}_{\text{ct}}$  is  $\mathcal{P}_i$ ’s input encrypted with  $\text{pk}_{\text{cid}}^{\text{in}}$  and authenticated with  $\text{spk}_i$ . `Comp` fetches the encrypted previous state  $\text{st}_{\text{ct}}$  from  $\mathcal{F}_{\text{blockchain}}$  and launches an contract TEE with code `Contract` and input  $(\text{cid}, \text{inp}_{\text{ct}}, \text{st}_{\text{ct}})$ .

As specified in Fig. 9, if  $\sigma_{\mathcal{P}_i}$  verifies, the contract TEE decrypts  $\text{st}_{\text{ct}}$  and  $\text{inp}_{\text{ct}}$  with keys obtained from the key manager and executes the contract program `Contract` to get  $(\text{st}_{\text{new}}, \text{outp})$ . To ensure the new state and the output are delivered atomically, `Comp` and  $\mathcal{P}_i$  conduct an atomic delivery protocol as specified in Section V-C:

- First the contract TEE computes  $\text{outp}_{\text{ct}} = \text{Enc}(\text{k}_{\text{cid}}^{\text{out}}, \text{outp})$  and  $\text{st}'_{\text{ct}} = \text{Enc}(\text{k}_{\text{cid}}^{\text{state}}, \text{st}_{\text{new}})$ , and send both and proper attestation to  $\mathcal{P}_i$  in a secure channel established by  $\text{epk}_i$ .
- $\mathcal{P}_i$  acknowledges the reception by calling the `claim-output` subroutine of `Comp`, which triggers the contract TEE to send  $m_1 = (\text{st}'_{\text{ct}}, \text{outp}_{\text{ct}}, \sigma)$  to  $\mathcal{F}_{\text{blockchain}}$ .  $\sigma$  protects the integrity of  $m_1$  and cryptographically binds the new state and output to a previous state and a input, thus a malicious `Comp` cannot tamper with it.
- Once  $m_1$  is accepted by  $\mathcal{F}_{\text{blockchain}}$ , the contract TEE sends the decryption of  $\text{outp}_{\text{ct}}$  to  $\mathcal{P}_i$  in a secure channel.

## C. Security of $\text{Prot}_{\text{Ekiden}}$

Theorem 1 characterizes the security of  $\text{Prot}_{\text{Ekiden}}$ . A proof sketch is given in the online version [20].

**Theorem 1** (Security of  $\text{Prot}_{\text{Ekiden}}$ ). *Assume that  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{att}}$ ’s attestation scheme  $\Sigma_{\text{TEE}}$  and the digital signature  $\Sigma$  are existen-*

*tially unforgeable under chosen message attacks (EU-CMA), that  $H$  is second pre-image resistant, and that  $\mathcal{AE}$  and  $\mathcal{SE}$  are IND-CPA secure. Then  $\text{Prot}_{\text{Ekiden}}$  securely realizes  $\mathcal{F}_{\text{Ekiden}}$  in the  $(\mathcal{G}_{\text{att}}, \mathcal{F}_{\text{blockchain}})$ -hybrid model, for static adversaries.*

## D. Mitigating app-level leakage

While Ekiden protects within-TEE data, it is not designed to protect data at contract interfaces, i.e., data leakage resulting from the contract design. (E.g., a secret prediction model may be “extracted” via client queries [74].) Common approaches to minimizing such leakage, e.g., restricting requests based on requester identity and/or a differential-privacy budget [25], [39], require persistent counters. The monotonic counters in SGX are untrustworthy, however [50].

Ekiden instead supports stateful approaches to mitigate application-level privacy leakage by enabling persistent application state—e.g., counters, total consumed differential privacy budget, etc.—to be maintained securely on chain. Moreover, the aforementioned atomic delivery guarantee ensures that the output is only revealed if this state is correctly updated.

## E. Performance Optimizations

Given an additional mechanism for revocation, a simple modification *eliminates reliance on the IAS apart from initialization*. When initialized, an enclave creates a signing key  $(\text{pk}, \text{sk})$ , and outputs  $\text{pk}$  with an attestation. Subsequently, attestations are replaced with signatures under  $\text{sk}$ . Since  $\text{pk}$  is bound to the TEE code (by the initial attestation), signatures under  $\text{sk}$  prove the integrity of output, just as attestations do. As with other keys,  $(\text{pk}, \text{sk})$  are managed by the key manager (c.f. Section V-B).

In the online version [20] we discuss an extended version of the protocol with several other performance optimizations.

## VII. IMPLEMENTATION

We implemented an Ekiden prototype in about 7.5k lines of Rust. We also implemented a compiler that automatically builds contracts into executables that can be loaded into a compute node, using the Rust SGX SDK [23].

Ekiden is compatible with many existing blockchains. We have built one end-to-end instantiation, *Ekiden-BT*, with a blockchain extending from Tendermint [44], which required no changes to Tendermint.

### A. Programming Model

We support a general-purpose programming model for specifying contracts. A contract registers a mutable struct as its state, which Ekiden transparently serializes, encrypts, and synchronizes with the blockchain after method calls. Contract methods must be deterministic and terminate in bounded time. Within this model, we implemented two smart-contract programming environments. In the Rust backend, developers can write contracts using a subset of the Rust programming language, and thus benefit from a range of open source libraries. We also ported the Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM), thereby supporting any contract written for

$\text{Prot}_{\text{Ekiden}}(\lambda, \mathcal{AE}, \mathcal{SE}, \Sigma, \{\mathcal{P}_i\}_{i \in [N]})$	
1: <b>Clients</b> $\mathcal{P}_i$ :	22: <b>Compute Nodes Subroutines</b> (called by clients $\mathcal{P}_i$ ):
2: Initialize: $(\text{ssk}_i, \text{spk}_i) \leftarrow \Sigma.\text{KGen}(1^\lambda)$	23: <b>On input</b> create(Contract):
3: $(\text{esk}_i, \text{epk}_i) \leftarrow \mathcal{AE}.\text{KGen}(1^\lambda)$	24: send ("install", $\widehat{\text{Contract}}$ ) to $\mathcal{G}_{\text{att}}$ , wait for $\text{eid}$
4: <b>On receive</b> ("create", Contract) from environment $\mathcal{Z}$ :	25: send ( $\text{eid}$ , "resume", ("create")) to $\mathcal{G}_{\text{att}}$
5: $\text{cid} := \text{create}(\text{Contract})$ ; assert $\text{cid}$ initialized on $\mathcal{F}_{\text{blockchain}}$	26: wait for $((\text{Contract}, \text{cid}, \text{st}_0, \text{pk}_{\text{cid}}^{\text{in}}, \sigma_{\text{TEE}}))$
6: output ("receipt", $\text{cid}$ )	27: send ("write", $(\text{Contract}, \text{cid}, \text{st}_0, \text{pk}_{\text{cid}}^{\text{in}}, \sigma_{\text{TEE}})$ ) to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{blockchain}}$
7: <b>On receive</b> ("request", $\text{cid}$ , $\text{inp}$ , $\text{eid}$ ) from environment $\mathcal{Z}$ :	28: wait to receive ("receipt", $\text{cid}$ )
8: $\sigma_{\mathcal{P}_i} := \text{Sig}(\text{ssk}_i, (\text{cid}, \text{inp}))$	29: <b>On input</b> request( $\text{cid}$ , $\text{inp}_{\text{ct}}$ ):
9: get $\text{pk}_{\text{cid}}^{\text{in}}$ from $\mathcal{F}_{\text{blockchain}}$ :	30: send ("read", $\text{cid}$ ) to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{blockchain}}$ and wait for $\text{st}_{\text{ct}}$
10: let $\text{inp}_{\text{ct}} := \mathcal{AE}.\text{Enc}(\text{pk}_{\text{cid}}^{\text{in}}, (\text{inp}, \sigma_{\mathcal{P}_i}))$	31: // non-existing $\text{eid}$ is assumed to be created transparently
11: $(\text{st}'_{\text{ct}}, \text{outp}'_{\text{ct}}, \sigma) := \text{request}(\text{cid}, \text{inp}_{\text{ct}})$	32: send ( $\text{eid}$ , "resume", ("request", $\text{cid}$ , $\text{inp}_{\text{ct}}$ , $\text{st}_{\text{ct}}$ )) to $\mathcal{G}_{\text{att}}$
12: parse $\sigma$ as $(\sigma_{\text{TEE}}, h_{\text{inp}}, h_{\text{old}}, h_{\text{outp}}, \text{spk}_i)$	33: receive $((\text{"atom-deliver"}, h_{\text{inp}}, h_{\text{old}}, \text{st}'_{\text{ct}}, h_{\text{outp}}, \text{spk}_i), \sigma_{\text{TEE}}, \text{outp}_{\text{ct}})$
13: assert $H(\text{inp}_{\text{ct}}) = h_{\text{inp}}$ ; assert $\text{outp}_{\text{ct}}$ is correct by verifying $\sigma$	34: // $\sigma_{\text{TEE}} = \Sigma_{\text{TEE}}.\text{Sig}(\text{sk}_{\text{TEE}}, (h_{\text{inp}}, h_{\text{old}}, \text{st}'_{\text{ct}}, h_{\text{outp}}, \text{spk}_i))$
14: $o := \text{claim-output}(\text{cid}, \text{st}'_{\text{ct}}, \text{outp}'_{\text{ct}}, \sigma, \text{epk}_i)$	35: let $\sigma := (\sigma_{\text{TEE}}, h_{\text{inp}}, h_{\text{old}}, h_{\text{outp}}, \text{spk}_i)$
15: // retry if the previous state has been used by a parallel query	36: return $(\text{st}'_{\text{ct}}, \text{outp}_{\text{ct}}, \sigma)$
16: if $o = \perp$ then jump to the beginning of the "request" call	37: <b>On input</b> claim-output( $\text{cid}$ , $\text{st}'_{\text{ct}}$ , $\text{outp}'_{\text{ct}}$ , $\sigma$ , $\text{epk}_i$ ):
17: parse $o$ as $(\text{outp}'_{\text{ct}}, \sigma_{\text{TEE}})$	38: send ("write", $\text{cid}$ , $(\text{st}'_{\text{ct}}, \sigma)$ ) to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{blockchain}}$
18: assert $\Sigma_{\text{TEE}}.\text{Vf}(\text{pk}_{\text{TEE}}, \sigma_{\text{TEE}}, \text{outp}'_{\text{ct}})$ // $\text{pk}_{\text{TEE}} := \mathcal{G}_{\text{att}}.\text{getpk}()$	39: if receive ("reject", $\text{cid}$ ) from $\mathcal{F}_{\text{blockchain}}$ then: return $\perp$
19: output $\mathcal{AE}.\text{Dec}(\text{esk}_i, \text{outp}'_{\text{ct}})$	40: send ( $\text{eid}$ , "resume", ("claim output", $\text{st}'_{\text{ct}}$ , $\text{outp}'_{\text{ct}}$ , $\sigma$ , $\text{epk}_i$ )) to $\mathcal{G}_{\text{att}}$
20: <b>On receive</b> ("read", $\text{cid}$ ) from environment $\mathcal{Z}$ :	41: receive ("output", $\text{outp}'_{\text{ct}}, \sigma_{\text{TEE}}$ ) from $\mathcal{G}_{\text{att}}$ or abort
21: send ("read", $\text{cid}$ ) to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{blockchain}}$ and relay output	42: return $(\text{outp}'_{\text{ct}}, \sigma_{\text{TEE}})$

Fig. 2. Ekiden Protocol. The contract TEE program  $\widehat{\text{Contract}}$  is defined in Figure 9, in Appendix A.

the Ethereum platform. The system currently does not support calling contract functions from another contract. We leave this for future work.

### B. Applications

We now describe several different applications we developed to show the versatility of Ekiden's programming model. Figure 3 highlights the secret state and application complexity of each contract.

*a) Machine Learning Contracts:* To demonstrate shared learning on secret data, we implemented two example contracts: (i) credit scoring based on financial records [8] and (ii) predicting the likelihood of heart disease based on medical records [67]. In both of these, we used a version of the rusty-machine [7] machine learning library, which we ported to run inside our contracts. The training data given to these example contracts is treated as sensitive data (we use data from the UCI machine learning repository [46] in our experiments) and never exposed as plaintext outside the contract.

Our example contracts train the models with added noise for differential privacy. This prevents information about the training data from leaking [70] during inference. Ekiden's private computation guarantee allows the noise to be added centrally, which results in better accuracy and utility at the same level of privacy, compared to having clients add noise before submitting their data [26]. Additionally, after training, multiple compute nodes can run serve inference requests at high capacity without affecting correctness or privacy.

*b) Smart Building Thermal Modeling:* We ported an implementation of non-linear least squares, which is used to predict temperatures based on time series thermal data from smart buildings [22]. We have deployed this smart contract to train a shared model across real-time data from select buildings in Berkeley, CA. These buildings sample their temperature sensors every 20 seconds, generating data used to update the predictive model. Ekiden allows the contract to run its model while keeping the sensor data and model secret, demonstrating that our system is sufficiently responsive for highly interactive workloads in an online setting.

*c) Tokens:* The most popular kind of Ethereum contract is the ERC20 token standard. Using the Ethereum port (Section VII-A), we can run existing ERC20 token contracts. We also implemented a token contract written directly in Rust, which yields moderate performance improvement (see Section VIII). In either case, Ekiden automatically provides privacy and anonymity, which the contract would not receive on the Ethereum mainnet. The secret state in the token the account balance for each user.

*d) Poker:* We also implemented a poker contract, where users take turns submitting their actions to the contract, and the smart contract contains all of the game logic for shuffling and (selectively) revealing cards. Poker is a common benchmark application for blockchain systems and secure multi-party computation called *mental poker* [11], [43], [42], [6]. Ekiden is significantly more robust than these prior implementations in how it handles player aborts. In most mental poker, if

Application	Language	LoC	Secret Input/Output	Secret State
Machine Learning	Rust	806	Training data, predictions	Model
Thermal Modeling	Rust	621	Sensor data, temperature	Building model
Token	Rust	514	Transfer (from, to, amount)	Account balances
Poker	Rust	883	Players' cards	Shuffled deck
Ethereum VM	Rust	1411	Input and output	Contract state
CryptoKitties	EVM Bytecode	54*	Random mutations	Breeding algorithm
Origin Demo	Solidity, JS	19*	Purchase orders	Purchase history

Fig. 3. Ekiden smart contracts. For each, we specify the implementation language, development effort (LoC), as well as secret inputs, outputs, and state. Secret inputs and outputs are only accessible to the contract and the invoking user. Secret state is only accessible to the contract. For the EVM, we only include the cost of porting Parity-Ethereum's runtime. For CryptoKitties and Origin Demo, we only include LoC specific to porting, as marked by \*.

a party aborts, its secret hand cannot be reconstructed by others, so the game aborts. Handling faults in secure multi-party computation requires application-specific changes to the cryptographic protocol [18]. Because Ekiden persists state to the blockchain after each action, and can be accessed from any enclave, secret cards can still be revealed if a player aborts.

*e) CryptoKitties:* CryptoKitties [1] is an Ethereum game that allows users to breed virtual cats, which are stored on chain as ERC721 tokens [2]. Each cat has a unique set of genes that determine its appearance and therefore its value. The traits of offspring are determined by a smart contract that mixes the genes of its parents. The source code of the gene mixing contract is not publicly available: The game developers aimed to make the breeding process unpredictable.

We obtained the bytecode for the gene mixing contract from the Ethereum blockchain and executed it using our Ekiden EVM port. We verified correct behavior by reproducing real transactions from the Ethereum network.

This example demonstrates that Ekiden can execute an Ethereum contract even when source code is not available. Further, Ekiden can provide unique benefits for smart contracts requiring secrecy or unpredictability such as CryptoKitties. These properties are difficult to achieve with Ethereum. E.g., the CryptoKitties gene mixing algorithm has been reverse-engineered [80], which allows strategic players to optimize their chance of breeding cats with rare traits, thus undermining the game's ecosystem. By contrast, an Ekiden contract has access to a source of randomness in hardware and allows secret elements of a game's algorithm to be stored in encrypted state.

*f) Origin:* Origin [61] is a platform for building online marketplaces on top of Ethereum. We ported a demo application which allows users to list and purchase items with Ether. This application further demonstrates that development frameworks built for Ethereum can be easily used by Ekiden: the smart contracts used in the demo work without modification; we were able to integrate the rest of the demo, namely, a user-facing web server, with minor modifications. Built on Ekiden, users' transaction history in the blockchain are kept private, and transactions are confirmed faster than on Ethereum.

## VIII. EVALUATION

In this section, we present evaluation results for end-to-end latency and peak throughput. We evaluated the five applications of Section VII-B: a Rust token contract **Token**, implementing an ERC20-like token in the Rust language, two Ethereum contracts, **ERC20** and **CryptoKitties**, running in the ported EVM, and two machine learning applications, **Credit** and **Thermal**. Compared to an ERC20 contract on Ethereum mainnet, Ekiden-BT can support a token contract with 600x greater throughput, 400x less latency, at 1000x less monetary cost. While we expect some mild performance degradation when deployed with a larger scale blockchain, our performance optimizations significantly reduce the effect of the blockchain's speed, as shown below. Furthermore, we demonstrate that Ekiden can efficiently support computation-intensive workloads such as machine learning applications which would be cost-prohibitive on Ethereum. We also quantify the performance gains from each of the optimizations described in the online version [20]. We show that batching, caching, and a write-ahead log improve performance and reduce the network costs of synchronizing state with the blockchain.

### A. Experimental Setup

To evaluate the performance of Ekiden-BT, we ran experiments with four consensus nodes hosted on Amazon EC2 across different availability zones and one compute node (with a Core i7-6500U CPU with 8GB of memory) hosted locally, as EC2 does not offer SGX-enabled instances at the time of writing. Transactions are only run once on the compute node ( $K = 1$ ). Each consensus node was run on an `t2.medium` instance, with 2 CPU cores and 4 GB of memory. As shown in Section VIII-C, we do not expect throughput performance to be significantly impacted by a larger slower blockchain, because many transactions can be compressed into a single write onto the blockchain. By separating execution from consensus, these layers can work in parallel. However achieving consensus among a larger group of consensus nodes will result in higher end-to-end latencies.




Fig. 4. End-to-end latency of client requests for various contracts, plotted on a log scale. Running Rust token and ERC20 token contracts on Ekiden-BT yields transactions 2-5 orders of magnitude faster than Ethereum. Read-write transactions on the Ekiden-BT blockchain take about a second, dominated by the underlying blockchain. Caching avoids writes to the blockchain for read-only transactions (e.g. `get`). We only compare Ethereum for the ERC20 contract, as there are no comparable machine learning contracts on Ethereum.

### B. End-to-End Latency

Figure 4 shows end-to-end latency for calling the token, CryptoKitties, and machine learning contracts, plotted on a log scale. For the “Ekiden-BT” plot, we start our timer when the client triggers a request and end when the smart-contract response, committed on chain, is decrypted. For read-only transactions like “Token:transfer” or “Credit:infer”, compute nodes use a locally cached copy of state. Writes to the Ekiden-BT blockchain take up to a second to confirm. Latencies in Ekiden are dominated by the time to commit on chain. This relative cost is lower for compute-intensive workloads like machine learning training. For comparison, we include a bar (“compute-only”) that measures computation time only.

For the three transactions that could be run on the Ethereum network, we plot the publicly reported block rates of the Ethereum mainnet in March 2018 [28], which represents the optimistic case that transactions are incorporated in the next block. Compared to the proof-of-work protocol used in Ethereum, Ekiden-BT has 2-3 orders of magnitude faster confirmations, in part due to the use of a faster blockchain. For the ERC20 token, which runs on the EVM in Ekiden-BT, we see similar performance to the Rust token contract, because both use the same consensus protocol.

### C. Throughput

To measure Ekiden-BT’s peak performance, we conducted an experiment with 1000 clients, each sending 100 serialized requests to a compute node. For each data point, we disregard the first and last 10% of requests, averaging the stable performance under stress. Figure 5 shows the results for the token, CryptoKitties, and machine learning contracts. For the baseline, we implement the simplest Ekiden-BT protocol, where each request triggers a full state checkpoint on our blockchain. In the “Ekiden-BT” bar, we include our optimizations, as described in the online version [20]. Batching compresses multiple state checkpoints into a single commit on the blockchain. We then cache the latest state on compute nodes and use




Fig. 5. Throughput comparison across contracts and systems. Our baseline reads and writes to a blockchain for every request. Throughput is limited by blockchain performance. Our optimizations improve performance by 2–4 orders of magnitude over the baseline, with more advantage for read-write operations on contracts with large state (e.g. Token). In-EVM operations incur about 10x higher cost compared to our Rust token. For ERC20, we achieve 1–2 orders of magnitude higher performance than Ethereum.




Fig. 6. Peak throughput performance of token transfers under different consensus layer commit times. Because contract execution occurs in parallel to state agreement, we show that good throughput performance for a wide range of commit times on the consensus layer. We expect Ekiden to perform well on a variety of blockchains.

a write-ahead log for state updates. Our optimizations have the greatest benefit for read-write operations, like `transfer`. They have less benefit for contracts with smaller states, such as the machine learning contract with small models. Conversely, writes to the blockchain significantly impact performance for read-write transactions, compared to read-only transactions with cached state. For comparison on the transactions that could be run on the Ethereum network, we plot the publicly reported transaction throughput of the Ethereum mainnet in March 2018 [28]. Because CryptoKitties incurs higher computational cost, we can fit fewer transactions in a block due to the gas limit, compared to ERC20 transactions.

### D. Impact of Consensus on Throughput

To understand the impact of using different consensus protocols with Ekiden, we measured peak throughput performance of token transfers as a function of the time to commit state to the blockchain. In order to simulate slower consensus protocols, we inject a variable delay for writes to the consensus nodes. Figure 6 shows that token transfers have good performance for a wide range of commit latencies seen in popular blockchains.



Because state is cached at compute nodes, compute nodes can opportunistically execute new transactions without waiting for a response from consensus nodes. Periodically, compute nodes asynchronously commit the state to the blockchain, as defined by the batch size. By separating contract execution from agreement on state, the layers can operate in parallel.

In contrast, Ethereum transactions are broadcast to all miners. Miners execute transactions sequentially, and all contracts are serialized onto a single blockchain. At the time of writing, there are 36974 ERC20 token contracts, all using the Ethereum blockchain [28]. In contrast, Ekiden parallelizes contracts across compute nodes, eliminating computational bottlenecks for better performance. However, implementation of full cross-contract calls remains future work.

#### E. Transaction Costs

In March 2018 on Ethereum, it cost 52K gas (\$0.17 USD) to perform a transfer on an ERC20 token contract and 130K gas (\$0.39 USD) to compute the breeding algorithm on CryptoKitties [3]. By contrast, IBM rents machines with Intel SGX processors useable by Ekiden for \$260.00 per month. These can do a token transfer in 2ms and CryptoKitties breeding in 100ms, at a cost of roughly  $10^{-7}$  and  $10^{-5}$  dollars respectively, and a cost of  $10^{-5}$  dollars for each call to *train* in our machine learning contract. For these contracts, the cost to commit state to the Ethereum blockchain ranges from \$0.0688 for CryptoKitties to \$1.92 to store a 1KB machine learning model. Because Ekiden can compress results from multiple requests into a single write to the blockchain, our system has a total cost vastly less than that of on-chain execution. There are no current public deployments of Tendermint for comparison.

### IX. RELATED WORK

**Confidential smart contracts:** Hawk [41] is a smart contract system that provides confidentiality by executing contracts off-chain and posting only zero-knowledge proofs on-chain. As the zero-knowledge proofs in Hawk (zk-SNARKs) incur very high computational overhead, Ekiden is significantly faster. Additionally, Hawk was designed for a single compute node (called the “manager”), and thus cannot (as designed) offer high availability. While Ekiden does require trust in the security of Intel SGX, Hawk’s “manager” must be trusted for privacy. Hawk supports only a limited range of contract types, not the general functionality of Ekiden.

The idea of combining ledgers with trusted hardware for smart contract execution is briefly mentioned in Hawk and also treated in [21], [40]. [21] combines blockchain with TEE to achieve one-time programs that resemble smart contracts but only aim for a restricted functionality (one-shot MPC with  $N$  parties providing input). [40] includes a basic prototype, but omits critical system design issues; e.g., its permissionless “proof-of-publication” overlooks the technical difficulties arising from lack of trusted wall-clock time in enclaves.

Ekiden is also closely related to and influenced by Hyperledger Private Data Objects (PDO) [14] from Intel. PDOs use smart contracts, executed in SGX enclaves, to mediate access

to data objects shared amongst mutually distrusting parties. To the best of our knowledge, PDOs target permissioned and managed settings (requiring, e.g., special-purpose validation rules), while Ekiden supports permissionless and open settings as well. This leads to key technical differences. For example, PDO uses a set of Provisioning Services to store encryption keys without worrying about availability risk, which cannot be easily realized in the Ekiden setting where churn is possible. In contrast, Ekiden uses a secret-sharing-based key management protocol that tolerates churn and allows flexible committee reconfiguration.

The Microsoft Coco Framework [54] is concurrent and independent work to port existing smart contract systems, such as Ethereum, into an SGX enclave. To the best of our knowledge, only a whitepaper containing a high-level overview has been produced. No details of a protocol or implementation have yet been released.

**Blockchain transaction privacy:** Ekiden’s goals relate to mechanisms for enhancing transaction privacy on public blockchains. Maxwell proposed a confidential transaction scheme [51] for Bitcoin that conceals transaction amounts, but not identities. Zerocash [9] as well as Cryptonote [71], [76], Solidus [19], and Zerocoin [55] provides stronger confidentiality guarantees by concealing identities. These schemes, however, do not support smart contracts.

**Privacy-preserving systems based on trusted hardware:** Trusted hardware, particularly Intel SGX, has seen a wide spectrum of applications in distributed systems. M<sup>2</sup>R [24], VC3 [69], Opaque [79] and Ohrimenko *et al.* [59] leverage SGX to offer privacy-preserving data analytics and machine learning with various security guarantees. Ryoan [35] is a distributed sandbox platform using SGX to confine privacy leakage from untrusted applications that process sensitive data. These systems do not address state integrity and confidentiality over a long-lived system. In comparison, Ekiden provides a stronger integrity and availability guarantees by persisting contract states on a blockchain.

**Blockchains for verifiable computations and secure multi-party computations:** Several related works offer blockchain-based guarantees of computation integrity, but cannot guarantee privacy [49], [73], [72]. Other works have used a blockchain for fairness in MPC by requiring parties to forfeit security deposits if they abort [11], [43], [42], [6], [81], [21]. Compared to these, Ekiden can guarantee that all data can be recovered if *any* compute node remains online. TEE-based computation is also far more performant than MPC. A theoretical scheme [31] combines witness encryption with proof-of-stake blockchains to achieve one-time programs that resemble smart contracts but avoid use of trusted hardware. This scheme is regrettably even more impractical than MPC.

### X. CONCLUSION

Ekiden demonstrates that blockchains and trusted enclaves have complementary security properties that can be combined effectively to provide a powerful, generic platform

for confidentiality-preserving smart contracts. The result is a compelling programming model that overcomes significant challenges in blockchain smart contracts. We show that Ekiden can be used to implement a variety of secure decentralized applications that compute on sensitive data.

In future work we plan to extend Ekiden to operate under a stronger threat model, leveraging techniques such as secure multi-party computation [47], [21], [6], to protect the system's more critical features, such as key management and coordination across compute nodes. Coordination can also facilitate parallelism in contract execution, merging concurrent output from multiple enclaves to obtain still higher performance from Ekiden.

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## APPENDIX

### A. Supplementary Formalism

1) *Ideal Blockchain*: We specify the ideal functionality for a blockchain in Fig. 7.

2) *Ideal functionality  $\mathcal{F}_{\text{Ekdin}}$* : We specify the security goals of Ekdin in the ideal functionality  $\mathcal{F}_{\text{Ekdin}}$  defined in Figure 8.

$\mathcal{F}_{\text{Ekdin}}$  allows parties to create contracts and interact with them. Each party  $P_i$  is identified by a unique id simply denoted  $P_i$ . Parties send messages over *authenticated channels*. To capture the allowed information leakage from the encryption, we follow the convention of [17] and parameterize  $\mathcal{F}_{\text{Ekdin}}$  with a leakage function  $\ell(\cdot)$ . We use the standard *delayed output* terminology [17] to model the power of the network adversary. Specifically, when  $\mathcal{F}_{\text{Ekdin}}$  sends a delayed output outp to  $\mathcal{P}$ , this means that outp is first sent to the adversary

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 $\mathcal{F}_{\text{blockchain}}[\text{succ}]$ 
1 : Parameter: successor relationship  $\text{succ} : \{0, 1\}^* \times \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ 
2 : On receive ("init"):  $\text{Storage} := \emptyset$ 
3 : On receive ("read", id): output  $\text{Storage}[\text{id}]$ , or  $\perp$  if not found
4 : On receive ("write", id, inp) from  $\mathcal{P}$ :
5 :   let  $\text{val} := \text{Storage}[\text{id}]$ , set to  $\perp$  if not found
6 :   if  $\text{succ}(\text{val}, \text{inp}) = 1$  then
7 :      $\text{Storage}[\text{id}] := \text{val} \parallel (\text{inp}, \mathcal{P})$ ; output ("receipt", id)
8 :   else output ("reject", id)
9 : On receive (" $\in$ ", id, val):
10 :   if  $\text{val} \in \text{Storage}[\text{id}]$  then output true else output false

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Fig. 7. Ideal blockchain. The parameter  $\text{succ}$  defines the validity of new items. A new item can only be appended to the storage if the evaluation of  $\text{succ}$  outputs 1.

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 $\mathcal{F}_{\text{Ekiden}}(\lambda, \ell, \{\mathcal{P}_i\}_{i \in [N]})$ 
1 : Parameter: leakage function  $\ell : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^*$ 
2 : On receive ("init"):  $\text{Storage} := \emptyset$ 
3 : // Create a new contract
4 : On receive ("create", Contract) from  $\mathcal{P}_i$  for some  $i \in [N]$ :
5 :    $\text{cid} \leftarrow \mathcal{S} \{0, 1\}^\lambda$ 
6 :   notify  $\mathcal{A}$  of ("create",  $\mathcal{P}_i$ , cid, Contract); block until  $\mathcal{A}$  replies
7 :    $\text{Storage}[\text{cid}] := (\text{Contract}, \vec{0})$ 
8 :   send a public delayed output ("receipt", cid) to  $\mathcal{P}_i$ 
9 : // Send queries to a contract
10 : On receive ("request", cid, inp, eid) from  $\mathcal{P}_i$  for some  $i \in [N]$ :
11 :   notify  $\mathcal{A}$  of ("request", cid,  $\mathcal{P}_i$ ,  $\ell(\text{inp})$ )
12 :    $(\text{Contract}, \text{st}, \_) := \text{Storage}[\text{cid}]$ ; abort if not found
13 :    $(\text{outp}, \text{st}') := \text{Contract}(\mathcal{P}_i, \text{inp}, \text{st})$ 
14 :   let  $\ell_{\text{st}} = \ell(\text{st})$ 
15 :   notify  $\mathcal{A}$  of (cid,  $\ell_{\text{st}}'$ ,  $\ell(\text{outp})$ , eid)
16 :   wait for "ok" from  $\mathcal{A}$  and halt if other messages received
17 :   update  $\text{Storage}[\text{cid}] := (\text{Contract}, \text{st}', \ell_{\text{st}}')$ 
18 :   send a secret delayed output outp to  $\mathcal{P}_i$ 
19 : // Allow public access to encrypted state
20 : On receive ("read", cid) from  $\mathcal{P}_i$  for some  $i \in [N]$ :
21 :    $(\_, \_, \ell_{\text{st}}) := \text{Storage}[\text{cid}]$ ; abort if not found
22 :   send  $\ell_{\text{st}}$  to  $\mathcal{P}_i$ 
23 :   if  $\mathcal{P}_i$  is corrupted: send  $\ell_{\text{st}}$  to  $\mathcal{A}$ 

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Fig. 8. The ideal functionality of Ekiden.

$\mathcal{A}$  and forwarded to  $\mathcal{P}$  after acknowledgement by  $\mathcal{A}$ . If the message is secret, only the allowed amount of leakage (i.e., that specified by the leakage function) is revealed to  $\mathcal{S}$ .

A Contract is a user-provided program. Each smart contract is associated with a piece of persistent storage where the contract code and  $\text{st}$  can be stored. The storage is public; therefore  $\mathcal{F}_{\text{Ekiden}}$  allows any party, including  $\mathcal{A}$ , to read the storage content. The information leakage through such reading is also defined by the leakage function  $\ell$ .

Users can send queries to  $\mathcal{F}_{\text{Ekiden}}$  to execute the contract code with user-provided input. The execution of a contract will result in a secret output (denoted  $\text{outp}$ ) returned to the invoker and a secret transition to a new contract state (denoted  $\text{st}'$ ), equivalent intuitively to black-box contract execution (modulo leakage). Although any party may send messages to

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Contract TEE wrapper  $\widehat{\text{Contract}}$ 
1 : On input ("create") :
2 :    $\text{cid} := \text{H}(\text{Contract})$ 
3 :    $(\text{pk}_{\text{cid}}^{\text{in}}, \text{sk}_{\text{cid}}^{\text{in}}) := \text{keyManager}(\text{"input key"})$ 
4 :    $\text{k}_{\text{cid}}^{\text{state}} := \text{keyManager}(\text{"state key"})$ 
5 :    $\text{st}_0 := \mathcal{SE}.\text{Enc}(\text{k}_{\text{cid}}^{\text{state}}, \vec{0})$ 
6 :   return (Contract, cid,  $\text{state}_0$ ,  $\text{pk}_{\text{cid}}^{\text{in}}$ )
7 : On input ("request", cid,  $\text{inp}_{\text{ct}}$ ,  $\text{st}_{\text{ct}}$ ):
8 :   // retrieve  $\text{sk}_{\text{cid}}^{\text{in}}, \text{k}_{\text{cid}}^{\text{state}}$  from a key manager as above
9 :    $(\text{inp}, \sigma_{\mathcal{P}_i}) := \mathcal{AE}.\text{Dec}(\text{sk}_{\text{cid}}^{\text{in}}, \text{inp}_{\text{ct}})$ 
10 :   assert  $\forall (\sigma_{\mathcal{P}_i}, \text{spk}_i, (\text{cid}, \text{inp})) \parallel \text{spk}_i$  is publicly known
11 :    $\text{st}_{\text{old}} := \mathcal{SE}.\text{Dec}(\text{k}_{\text{cid}}^{\text{state}}, \text{st}_{\text{ct}})$ 
12 :    $\text{st}_{\text{new}}, \text{outp} := \text{Contract}(\text{st}_{\text{old}}, \text{inp}, \text{spk}_i)$ 
13 :    $\text{st}'_{\text{ct}} := \mathcal{SE}.\text{Enc}(\text{k}_{\text{cid}}^{\text{state}}, \text{st}_{\text{new}})$ 
14 :   // initiate atomic delivery
15 :    $\text{k}_{\text{cid}}^{\text{out}} := \text{keyManager}(\text{"output key"})$ 
16 :    $\text{outp}_{\text{ct}} := \mathcal{SE}.\text{Enc}(\text{k}_{\text{cid}}^{\text{out}}, \text{outp})$ 
17 :   let  $h_{\text{inp}} := \text{H}(\text{inp}_{\text{ct}})$ ,  $h_{\text{old}} := \text{H}(\text{st}_{\text{ct}})$ ,  $h_{\text{outp}} := \text{H}(\text{outp}_{\text{ct}})$ 
18 :   return ("atom-deliver",  $h_{\text{inp}}, h_{\text{old}}, \text{st}'_{\text{ct}}, h_{\text{outp}}, \text{spk}_i$ ),  $\text{outp}_{\text{ct}}$ )
19 : On input ("claim output",  $\text{st}'_{\text{ct}}, \text{outp}_{\text{ct}}, \sigma, \text{epk}_i$ ):
20 :   parse  $\sigma$  as  $(\sigma_{\text{TEE}}, h_{\text{inp}}, h_{\text{old}}, h_{\text{outp}}, \text{spk}_i)$ 
21 :   assert  $\text{H}(\text{outp}_{\text{ct}}) = h_{\text{outp}}$ 
22 :   send (" $\in$ ", cid,  $(\text{st}'_{\text{ct}}, \sigma)$ ) to  $\mathcal{F}_{\text{blockchain}}$ 
23 :   receive true from  $\mathcal{F}_{\text{blockchain}}$  or abort
24 :    $\text{k}_{\text{cid}}^{\text{out}} := \text{keyManager}(\text{"output key"})$ 
25 :    $\text{outp} := \mathcal{SE}.\text{Dec}(\text{k}_{\text{cid}}^{\text{out}}, \text{outp}_{\text{ct}})$ 
26 :   return ("output",  $\mathcal{AE}.\text{Enc}(\text{epk}_i, \text{outp})$ )

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Fig. 9. Contract TEE wrapper.

the contract, the contract code can enforce access control based on the calling pseudonym passed to the contract.

a) *Corruption model:*  $\mathcal{F}_{\text{Ekiden}}$  adopts the standard corruption model of [17].  $\mathcal{A}$  can corrupt any number of clients, and up to all but one contract executors. When  $\mathcal{A}$  corrupts a TEE (or similarly a party),  $\mathcal{A}$  sends the message ("corrupt", eid) to  $\mathcal{F}_{\text{Ekiden}}$ . If a query includes an invalid TEE id,  $\mathcal{F}_{\text{Ekiden}}$  aborts if instructed by  $\mathcal{A}$ . Otherwise the ideal functionality ignores eids, which are included in  $\mathcal{F}_{\text{Ekiden}}$  only as a technical requirement to ensure interface compatibility with  $\text{Prot}_{\text{Ekiden}}$ , given below.

3) *Contract TEE wrapper:* The contract TEE wrapper Contract is specified in Fig. 9.