

Lessons Learned from Implementing a Privacy-Preserving Smart Contract in Ethereum

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Abstract—Real-world smart contracts which preserve the privacy of both, their users and their data, have barely been proposed theoretically, let alone been implemented practically. In this paper, we are the first to implement a privacy-preserving protocol from the energy domain as a smart contract in Ethereum. We elaborate on and present our implementation as well as our practical findings, including more or less subtle traps and pitfalls. Despite major optimizations to our implementation, we find that while it is currently possible, it is not feasible to implement a privacy-preserving protocol of modest complexity in the Ethereum blockchain due to the high cost of operation and the lack of privacy by design.

I. INTRODUCTION

Since the inception of Bitcoin [1], [2], the capabilities of blockchains have been significantly expanded [3]. Three noteworthy examples are Zerocash [4], Ethereum [5] and the protocol proposed by [6]. While Zerocash and the protocol from [6] extend the privacy properties of blockchains limited in their computational capabilities, Ethereum allows for much more complex (Turing-complete) operations, referred to as *smart contracts* [7], [8]. However, Ethereum by itself is not privacy-preserving since all calculations are publicly visible to all participants, similar to Bitcoin [9].

In [10], an approach for privacy-preserving smart contracts is presented, but requires a trusted party, which in many use cases is undesired. As an alternate approach to achieve privacy for complex operations in existing blockchains, an additional layer of cryptography can be added [11]. Even though some authors propose privacy-preserving smart contracts, e.g., [11]–[13], none of them show practical implementations. While [12] does not provide an implementation, [11] only discusses a game of rock-paper-scissors as a toy example and [13] does not consider privacy.

In this paper, we implement a smart contract from the energy domain initially proposed in [14], which is both, privacy-preserving and of a practical level of complexity. This protocol solves a problem in a way that is representative for state-of-the-art privacy enhancing technologies, as will be shown. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first paper to describe such an implementation. In order to facilitate similar implementations for others, we provide insights from our hands-on experiences in developing and deploying a smart

contract in the (public) Ethereum blockchain. This includes a discussion ranging from implementation pitfalls to deployment and execution costs.

This paper is structured as follows: In Section II, we describe the privacy-preserving protocol that we implement in Ethereum in Section III. In Section IV, we summarize our observations from the implementation and evaluation processes, before concluding the paper in Section V.

II. PRIVACY-PRESERVING LOAD PROFILE MATCHING

In [14], a protocol for privacy-preserving smart grid tariff-decisions is described. The protocol allows a customer to choose an optimal tariff based on their energy consumption from a variety of tariffs offered by different utility providers. Among other guarantees, the implementation of the protocol assures that neither the customer's energy consumption data nor their final tariff choice is revealed.

This is achieved by the use of embeddings [15], oblivious transfer [16], and commitment schemes [11]. Embeddings allow transforming energy consumption data into a binary representation that is hard to reverse, but still allows for the required comparisons. For permanent storage, transparency and immutability this comparison is handled in a smart contract which returns (simplified) a once usable pointer to the best-matching tariff to the customer. Oblivious transfer is then used (off-chain) by the customer for retrieving the actual tariff without revealing the decision to the utility provider. To guarantee non-repudiation, i.e., values that are not fully revealed at the time of submission cannot be changed later, a commitment scheme based on cryptographic hashes is used. A formal description of the protocol can be found in Appendix A. Further details of the protocol as well as a detailed privacy analysis can be found in [14], [17].

The smart contract implementing the protocol must be structured as follows [14]:

- `create(sender, energy_data_hash)`: This method is called upon the initial creation of the smart contract. The customer (sender) calculates an embedding of the energy consumption data used as the basis for matching and provides the hash to the smart contract as a commitment.
- `commit(sender, tariff_data_hash)`: This method is called after `create` by each utility (sender) wanting to offer a tariff. The utility calculates an embedding of the energy consumption data corresponding to each of its offered tariffs and submits the hashes as a commitment.

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


Fig. 1. Sequence diagram that illustrates the function calls between the participants of the implemented protocol. * denotes that every utility provider calls the function.

This method can only be called once per utility for this instance of the smart contract.

- `smopen(sender, energy_data, random_number)`: This method is called by the customer (sender) in order to open the commitment with the required random number. It is verified whether the commitment is valid and, if so, the embedded energy data is stored for later matching.
- `uopen(sender, tariff_data, random_numbers)`: Similar to `smopen`, each utility (sender) opens its commitment.
- `evaluate(sender)`: This method is called by the customer (sender) after `smopen` and `uopen` have been called by all participants. The best-matching tariff is determined using the embedded values and a once-usable pointer for the oblivious transfer is returned.

The sequence of calls to functions of the smart contract is illustrated in Figure 1. While the smart contract in [14] is only provided in pseudo-code, here we describe an actual implementation in Ethereum in the following section.

III. IMPLEMENTATION IN ETHEREUM

We implemented the smart contract from Section II in Solidity 0.4.0 (<https://solidity.readthedocs.io/en/develop/>), which allows to design such contracts with public and private methods and provides a set of basic data types. Programs compile to EVM (Ethereum Virtual Machine) code that can be deployed as a smart contract into the Ethereum blockchain [3].

Each smart contract and each caller of such a contract is assigned a unique address. Smart contracts can communicate with each other through messages. The caller of a function, i.e., the sender of a message, is implicitly available in the function body as `msg.sender` in Solidity and therefore does not need to be passed as an additional argument. Thus, the signatures of the implemented smart contract differ from the ones from Section II in that they do not need an explicit `sender` parameter.

In order to call smart contracts, each party of the protocol needs to create an Ethereum account. For the proposed protocol, this means that the customer as well as each individual

utility provider are assigned a unique ID. For privacy, the customer can either create one account for each execution of the smart contract or change its ID frequently so that it cannot be tracked. Conversely, the utility providers should (but not necessarily need to) re-use their IDs for transparency and accountability for their offered tariffs.

The data types used in the implemented smart contract are

- `uint`: a 256-bit unsigned integer type used to store distance values. When smaller values are stored, types such as `uint8` or `uint16` are used;
- `bytes32`: an array of 32 bytes, i.e., 256 bits, size used to store the output of a cryptographic hash function;
- `string`: a character array used to pass error messages in function return values;
- `address`: a special data type used to store the address of a message caller;
- `mapping`: a hashmap used to store the commitments of each utility provider's tariff-related data;

and arrays of the aforementioned types, e.g., `bytes32[]`.

The actual implementation closely follows the pseudo-code from [14]. Since storing and executing EVM code incurs fees depending on the data size and type (specified in detail in [5]), some implementation details differ from the original version in order to reduce these costs. The three major optimizations are:

- **Use of built-in cryptographic primitives**: Since the EVM provides a relatively cheap instruction for computing a SHA-3 hash, the latter is used in favor of SHA-2. The availability of cryptographic primitives for smart contracts is favorable for the implementation of privacy-preserving protocols.
- **Mathematical tweaks**: Calculating the absolute difference between two binary vectors is equivalent to an element-wise `xor` operation. The Hamming distance of the difference vector can be calculated by counting the number of bits set to one in this vector, which can be simplified with a lookup table for groups of elements. The lookup table size is a trade-off between storage costs (larger tables require more storage) and execution costs (larger tables require less lookups and iterations). Using such mathematical tweaks can be essential to keep costs low, similar to any other programming language.
- **Avoiding unnecessary storage**: `uopen` computes and saves distances to the customer's embedding instead of saving the larger embedding data in a variable and computing the distance at the call of `evaluate`. Conversely, `evaluate` just computes the smallest distance from the ones stored. This reduces costs since the large embeddings (kilobytes in size each) from the utility providers do not need to be saved in the blockchain. In general, refining the program flow in order to avoid storage costs is desirable.

Note that, in addition to these optimizations as well as further minor optimizations, embeddings are already calculated off-chain as originally proposed in [14] and therefore induce no

execution costs. In order to illustrate the syntax as well as the aforementioned optimizations, Appendix B shows sample code in Solidity for selected portions of the implemented smart contract. The full source code is available at <https://www.en-trust.at/downloads/>.

To represent embeddings of 8192 bits size in Solidity, there are several possibilities, e.g., using fixed-sized arrays of base data types like `uint256` or `bytes32`, both of which are capable of storing 256 bits. We found that operations on these types are significantly cheaper than on variable-length types like `string` or `bytes`, which is why we used fixed-sized arrays of `bytes32` for our main computations.

As mentioned above, each operation in the EVM induces costs in a unit called *gas*. These costs are a fee paid to the miner for executing the code of the smart contract. The fee is paid in the built-in crypto-currency Ether. The conversion rate between gas and Ether is set by each miner individually before executing the smart contract. For testing smart contracts, a test net exists which allows executions free of charge. In contrast, using the Ethereum blockchain induces non-negligible costs. Thus, in the following section, we implemented, deployed and assessed our smart contract in the (pay-to-use) Ethereum network.

IV. LESSONS LEARNED

This section describes the lessons learned from deploying the smart contract from Section III to the Ethereum network. We determine the total amount of fees required to deploy and run the smart contract with example data from [17]. Furthermore, we report our insights from this experiment with respect to the practicability of running a privacy-preserving smart contract in Ethereum.

We used the default tariffs from [17] to get representative example data for calling the smart contract. For simplicity, each of the three utility providers (denoted U1 to U3) is assigned two of the six sample tariffs each (denoted T1 and T2). The smart contract was deployed into the Ethereum blockchain in block 4368541 with address `0x45f7e9b2096b995b5082d410470000c0d6626e78`. Note that our smart contract is not limited to specific customers, utilities or tariffs and is available to anyone for running the protocol. The source code and tariff data is available at <https://www.en-trust.at/downloads/>.

Table I summarizes the processing costs for our experimental setup in gas as well as the respective value in ETH and € for convenience. We used <http://etherscan.io> to determine the actual gas costs for each call to the smart contract. The cost for 1 unit of gas was on average $21 \text{ Gwei} = 21 \cdot 10^{-9} \text{ ETH}$, which is also the average gas cost listed by <https://ethstats.net/> and others at the time of execution for “fast” processing, i.e., the rate at which the transaction only takes little time to mine. The exchange rate between € and ETH as of October 15, 2017 is 284.00 €/ETH according to https://www.coingecko.com/en/price_charts/ethereum/eur. Note that we execute the smart contract only once. While future fees (and exchange

rates) may differ, their order of magnitude can be determined by our experiment.

As can be seen from Table I, the deployment of the smart contract through `create` by the customer requires 11.74 € worth of gas. `commit` is called by each utility once, as described in Section II, and costs each utility 0.57 € on average for two tariffs. `smopen` is called by the customer at the price of 4.38 €. Each utility needs to call `uopen` for each tariff individually, resulting in costs of 13.61 € on average per utility. Finally, `evaluate` is called by the customer at the rate of 0.32 €. In total, the customer needs to pay 16.44 € and each of the three utilities pays on average 14.18 €. This results in total costs of 59.00 € for deploying and executing the smart contract. While it is clear that this is much more than any party in this protocol would be willing to pay (to potentially find a better energy tariff likely to reduce the energy bill by only a fraction of this amount), these costs may be acceptable in other use cases.

Even though it may be possible to further reduce the amount of required gas in our implementation, the actual costs in € above are at least two orders of magnitude higher than would be acceptable for this use case. In addition, further optimizations would be time-consuming and therefore also cost-intensive, illustrating that the total costs for implementing and executing privacy-preserving protocols are far too high for practical use.

Despite the popularity of Ethereum, we would like to point out that this issue is not specific to Ethereum. There are privacy-preserving blockchains, e.g., HAWK [10], but no public implementation of them is available at the time of writing (October 2017). We expect the costs to decrease significantly when using blockchains which provide privacy by design, since many computations are performed implicitly.

It is crucial to note that our conclusions regarding costs are also not specific to the protocol from [14] that we implemented. The embeddings used therein are comparable to state-of-the-art cryptography in the energy domain [18], [19] in terms of ciphertext size and complexity. For example, comparisons to the more commonly used Paillier cryptosystem [20] as in [14], [17] show that embeddings require fewer computations and less overhead, i.e., the costs for using the Paillier cryptosystem or similar privacy-preserving technologies are expected to be even more costly than the embeddings used in our evaluation.

Although it may be possible to redesign the protocol, e.g., such that `uopen` can be performed once for multiple customers, this would impact privacy and a rigorous security re-evaluation of the protocol would be required. We do not consider it to be feasible to modify proven and well-tested protocols so that they minimize (gas) costs. Thus, we conclude that it is currently not feasible to use Ethereum to implement state-of-the-art privacy-preserving protocols. This may change in the future, if more cheap EVM instructions for cryptographic primitives, like the one for built-in SHA-3 computation, are offered. Until then, the costs exceed any practical bounds for many potential use cases.

TABLE I

COSTS FOR GAS FOR EACH FUNCTION OF THE IMPLEMENTED SMART CONTRACT FOR THE DEFAULT TARIFFS USED FOR EVALUATION [17]. THE GAS PRICE IN ETH AS WELL AS THE CONVERSION RATE FROM ETH TO € IS FROM THE DATE OF EXECUTION, SUNDAY, OCTOBER 15, 2017.

Method	Gas U1T1	Gas U1T2	Gas U2T1	Gas U2T2	Gas U3T1	Gas U3T2	Price (ETH)	Price (€)
create	1967802						0.041 323 842	11.74
commit	96114		96114		96114		0.006 055 182	1.72
smopen	734762						0.015 430 002	4.38
uopen	1138523	1161962	1144225	1146476	1114087	1141398	0.143 780 091	40.83
evaluate	54418						0.001 142 778	0.32
Sum							0.207 731 895	59.00

Apart from costs, we observed the following traps and pitfalls that we would like to share with future developers of privacy-preserving smart contracts:

- **Determining gas limit:** Each call to a smart contract is assigned a caller-specified gas limit, which, once reached, terminates the execution of the EVM. Since the amount of gas the caller is willing to spend determines whether and when a transaction is executed by a miner, in practice, it is hard to set proper limits. One needs to find a tradeoff between cost-effectiveness and throughput. Since gas is a non-refundable fee to the miner, setting the gas limit too low results in a costly and aborted function call.
- **Undocumented language limitations:** At the time of writing (October 2017) Solidity comes with a number of limitations, only some of which are documented. Examples are very limited stack size, which is problematic when dealing with multiple ciphertext variables, e.g. embeddings;
- **Handling large data:** Ethereum is not inherently designed to handle larger amounts of data within smart contracts. As discussed above, custom solutions for this are necessary, which might be cost intensive.
- **Transaction delay:** Despite the high gas price, it takes between around 2 and 15 minutes for each transaction to be confirmed. Reducing the gas price and limit would increase this delay further, which would be unacceptable for this use case. Conversely, increasing the gas price and limit would make the transactions even more expensive without significantly reducing the delay.
- **Staging costs:** Transitioning from a development environment (test network) to the productive Ethereum blockchain is very convenient and greatly simplifies testing in advance to deployment. However, costs can differ significantly between the two networks, making cost estimations difficult. In our example, the total costs increased by about 16.66% during staging.

In summary, smart contracts are a promising way to implement complex privacy-preserving protocols without the need to rely on a single trusted third party. However, for practical use, there are still many limitations to overcome, especially when advanced state-of-the-art privacy-enhancing technologies are required for the use case. This shows that a blockchain that has not been designed with privacy in

mind cannot be extended with privacy-enhancing technologies without imposing significant additional costs.

V. CONCLUSION

In this paper, we presented the implementation of a tariff matching protocol from the energy domain in Ethereum. We highlighted the availability of certain cryptographic primitives in Solidity and discussed the contrasting lack of privacy by design. Even though we optimized our implementation with off-chain pre-computations and on-chain gas-reducing data handling, we found that the costs for deploying and executing the implemented smart contract are at least two orders of magnitude higher than would be acceptable for the use case. This allows for the conclusion that in order to implement practical privacy-preserving smart contracts, either the price for privacy-preserving operations in Ethereum needs to become significantly cheaper or both, the capabilities and availability of other blockchains with privacy by design have to increase significantly.

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APPENDIX A

DETAILED PROTOCOL DESCRIPTION

This section describes the protocol from [17] formally.

Let the set of participating utilities be denoted as \mathcal{U} . Each utility $u \in \{1, \dots, |\mathcal{U}|\}$ has a list of tariffs $T_{u,l}$ with corresponding template load profiles $\mathbf{L}_{u,l}$ (denoted as set \mathcal{L}_u , where utilities can have different numbers of load profiles $l \in \{1, \dots, |\mathcal{L}_u|\}$). In order to keep the template load profiles private, each utility calculates an embedding $\tilde{\mathbf{L}}_{u,l} \in \{0, 1\}^m$ for each of its original template load profiles $\mathbf{L}_{u,l} \in \mathbb{R}^k$:

$$\tilde{\mathbf{L}}_{u,l} = \left\lceil \frac{\mathbf{A} \cdot \mathbf{L}_{u,l} + \mathbf{W}}{\Delta} \right\rceil \mod 2 \quad (1)$$

\mathbf{A} is a random $m \times k$ matrix with i.i.d. Gaussian elements with mean 0 and variance σ^2 , and \mathbf{W} is a random m -dimensional vector with i.i.d. uniform elements in the range $[0, \Delta]$. Δ is both, a quantization and a security parameter, and described in detail in [21], [22]. The values of k and m are 96 and 8192, respectively.

Similar to the utilities, the customer calculates an embedding from its load profile forecast \mathbf{F} , denoted as $\tilde{\mathbf{F}}$.

In order to find the best matching tariff, the template load profile with the smallest normalized Hamming distance to the forecast is determined, yielding the template (once usable) load profile index l^* as well as the corresponding utility index u^* :

$$(u^*, l^*) = \underset{u, l}{\operatorname{argmin}} \|\tilde{\mathbf{F}} - \tilde{\mathbf{L}}_{u,l}\|_1. \quad (2)$$

This is possible due to the distance-preserving property of the embeddings [21], where the Euclidean distance of the original data vectors is proportional to the normalized Hamming distance of the embedded vectors with a configurable small error ϵ , i.e.,

$$\|\tilde{\mathbf{F}} - \tilde{\mathbf{L}}_{u,l}\|_1 \sim \|\mathbf{F} - \mathbf{L}_{u,l}\|_2 + \epsilon. \quad (3)$$

The indices u^* and l^* can be shuffled in order to avoid the collection of statistics that could break privacy.

After the customer has received both indices, it can contact the corresponding utility u^* and use a one-out-of-many oblivious transfer for retrieving the actual tariff information without revealing the decision to the utility at this time [16]. Since this part of the protocol is not intended to be handled via a blockchain [14], it is not detailed here.

APPENDIX B

SAMPLE CODE

The following sample code shows an optimized version of calculating the Hamming distance required by the evaluate function of the implemented smart contract.

```
//Hamming distance for all 4-bit patterns.
uint8[16] map = [0, 1, 1, 2, 1, 2, 2, 3,
                1, 2, 2, 3, 2, 3, 3, 4];

//Computes Hamming distance of two 8192-bit
//binary vectors.
function getDistance(bytes32[32] memory f,
                    bytes32[32] memory l)
    internal view returns (uint16)
{
    uint16 distance = 0;
    for (uint8 i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
        bytes32 xor = f[i] ^ l[i]; //Bit-wise XOR
        for (uint8 ii = 0; ii < 32; ii++) {
            //Process upper+lower nibble separately.
            distance += map[(uint8)(xor[ii] & 0xf0)
                           >> 0x04];
            distance += map[(uint8)(xor[ii] & 0x0f)];
        }
    }
    return distance;
}
```

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