Punchscan

Paper-based voting with E2E auditing capabilities

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Motivation

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To provide a voting system, where:

- · The vote is managed by a central election authority
- And voters get a paper-based receipt
- · Which does not allow votes to be bought nor coerced
- · Yet allows them to verify their votes are cast-as-intended
- · And auditors provide resilience against a malicious EA

Ballot layout

Ballot layout

- · Ballot consists of two pages, stacked on top of each other
- · Both pages have serial number identifying ballot




Figure 1: Top (left) and bottom (right) halves of ballot

Ballot layout: Top page

- Top page has question and answers, mapped to symbols (here: letters)
- · This mapping is randomized per ballot
- · Circular cutouts allow seeing bottom page




Figure 2: Top half of ballot

Ballot layout: Bottom page

- Bottom page has answer symbols (here: letters)
- · Order of these is randomized per ballot
- · Symbols can be seen through cutouts in top page




Figure 3: Bottom half of ballot

Voting process

Voting process: Voting

- · Voter receives ballot, both pages stacked atop each other
- Voter marks their choice using a dauber (huge highlighter)
- This leaves stain on both top and bottom page




Figure 4: Ballot after voting

Voting process: Scanning

- Voter destroys one half of the ballot
- Other half gets scanned, and kept by voter as receipt
- Unable to learn vote by looking at one half only
- But: What to do in tally phase?




Figure 5: Top (left) and bottom (right) halves of ballot after voting

References

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