



## **Specification**

Infrastructure for Stateless Account Abstraction on Fuel

Date: February 2025

## Version Information

**Document Version:** 1.2.0  
**Release Date:** February 2025  
**ZapWallet version tag:** v0.8.0  
**zap-contracts branch:** dev\_testing  
**commit:** 135a6c628e458dbde1aa804dd746bb90e50a97df  
**Compatible with:**

- Sway v0.66.6
- Fuel-Core v0.40.0

### Version History

---

1.0.0	Initial specification release for code tag v0.8.0
1.1.0	Adding sections for Modules 00, 01, for code tag v0.8.0
1.2.0	Adding sections for Modules 02,03,04,05,07, for code tag v0.8.0

### Notes:

- This specification describes the ZapWallet implementation as of February 2025
- All version numbers follow semantic versioning (MAJOR.MINOR.PATCH)

# 1 Introduction

The following specification is broken down into the core parts that describe the Zap wallet architecture.

## **Predicate Wallet:**

The predicate wallet (ZapWallet) is a stateless account abstraction wallet written in Sway for use on the Fuel network. The "wallet" is built from multiple predicates called "Modules" and a "Master" predicate. Both the Master and Modules contain the logic to validate specific transaction types signed by the owner of the wallet. The "Master" predicate is the asset holding address and serves as the central point of validation control for ZapWallet transactions.

## **Modules:**

Modules in the ZapWallet architecture serve as specialized validation components that enable specific functionality while maintaining the wallet's security. Each module validates specific types of transactions and have strict input, output and validation criteria. A Module consists of the predicate code, a unique AssetId and a unique Address.

## **Manager:**

The manager contract (ZapManager) serves as a coordination point in the ZapWallet architecture, managing critical aspects of wallet creation, operation and lifecycle. The ZapManager maintains three primary functions:

**1. Wallet Initialization.** The contract controls the initialization process for new ZapWallets by:

- Minting and distributing initial nonce native assets required for new ZapWallets using Modules 1-3
- Minting and distributing Module Assets unique to each owner's ZapWallet
- Managing associations between Ethereum addresses and their corresponding-ZapWallet
- Ensuring a ZapWallet can not re-initialize.

**2. Asset Management.** As the central authority for asset creation, the contract:

- Acts as the sole minter for all module assets
- Controls nonce token creation and distribution
- Maintains integrity of module asset allocation

**3. Upgrade.** Controls the ability for version upgrades:

- Verifies wallet ownership through nonce asset validation
- Manages phased transition from initialization to upgrade states
- Tracks upgrade status through module asset verification
- Maintains version pair numbering for both V1 and V2 wallet implementations

## 1.1 ZapWallet Architecture

The ZapWallet architecture consists of a master predicate that coordinates with multiple specialized module predicates, as shown in Figure 1.




Figure 1: ZapWallet Architectural Overview

The Master predicate serves as the central authority for transactions and asset storage, while Modules provide specific functionality:

- **Module 00 (Upgrade):** Handles wallet upgrade operations
- **Module 01 (Legacy EVM Tx):** Processes legacy Ethereum transactions (first-price auction model)
- **Module 02 (EIP-1559 EVM Tx):** Processes Ethereum EIP-1559 transactions (base fee + priority fee model) for Fuel BASE\_ASSET only
- **Module 03 (EIP-1559 EVM Tx):** Processes ERC20 style Ethereum EIP-1559 transactions (base fee + priority fee model) for Fuel native assets; SRC20 etc
- **Module 04 (TXID Witnessing):** Processes any type of Fuel transaction with the owner witnessing the transaction ID
- **Module 05 (Native Transfer):** Processes any Fuel native asset transaction (with the ability to have gas sponsorship) validated through a typed data structure.
- **Module 06 (Not implemented):** Not implemented.
- **Module 07 (Gas Sponsor):** Supports gas sponsorship operations from an owners ZapWallet.
- **Module 08 (Not implemented):** Not implemented.
- Additional modules provide various other functionalities

Each module is identified by a unique AssetId and Address, ensuring secure and isolated operation.

## 2 Zap Stateless Predicate Wallet - "ZapWallet"

The Zap wallet enables stateless account abstraction through the use of secp256k1 elliptic curve cryptography. Let  $(sk, pk)$  be a key pair where  $sk$  is a private key and  $pk$  is its corresponding public key on the secp256k1 curve. For a ZapWallet predicate  $P$ , we define:

$$P : \mathbb{T} \times \mathbb{S} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$$

where  $\mathbb{T}$  is the set of valid transactions,  $\mathbb{S}$  is the set of valid signatures, and the output  $\{0, 1\}$  represents validation success or failure.

The "owner" of the predicate wallet possesses the private key  $sk$  used to generate signatures  $\sigma \in \mathbb{S}$  that validate transactions spending UTXOs at the ZapWallet master predicate address. Thus, account abstraction is achieved by mapping:

$$f : (sk, pk) \rightarrow P$$

where  $f$  is the function that associates the key pair with the predicate's validation logic, enabling stateless control of the wallet's assets through standard elliptic curve signatures.

To enable diverse transaction types and functionality, the predicate  $P$  coordinates with a set of module predicates  $\mathbb{M}$ , where:

$$\mathbb{M} = \{M_0, M_1, \dots, M_8\}$$

Each module  $M_i$  is identified by a unique AssetId and predicate address pair:

$$M_i = (a_i, p_i) \text{ where } a_i \in \mathbb{B}_{256}, p_i \in \mathbb{A}$$

where  $\mathbb{B}_{256}$  is the set of 256-bit values and  $\mathbb{A}$  is the set of valid addresses. The predicate  $P$  ensures that exactly one module is active in any valid transaction, except during initialization and upgrades, maintaining the wallet's state integrity.

### 2.1 AssetId Calculation

A ZapWallet requires unique AssetIds for each module and a single associated nonce asset. These AssetIds must be precalculated and provided to the master predicate during rehydration via the configurable code block.

#### 2.1.1 Formula Definition

For any module or nonce asset, the AssetId is calculated using a two-step hashing process:

Let  $a$  be a padded EVM address,  $k$  be a key, and  $c$  be the ZapManager contract ID. Then:

$$\begin{aligned} h_1 &= \text{SHA256}(a \parallel k) \\ h_2 &= \text{SHA256}(c \parallel h_1) \end{aligned}$$

Where:

- $\parallel$  denotes concatenation
- SHA256 is the SHA-256 hash function
- the final calculated AssetID =  $h_2$



## 2.5 Master Predicate Configurables

The calculated Module AssetIds, Module Addresses and Owner Address must be provided to the master predicate through the configurables:

```
1 configurable {
2     // Module 0 (Upgrade Module)
3     ASSET_KEY00: b256 = <calculated_module_asset_id_0>,
4     MODULE00_ADDR: Address = <module_0_predicate_address>,
5
6     // Module 1
7     ASSET_KEY01: b256 = <calculated_module_asset_id_1>,
8     MODULE01_ADDR: Address = <module_1_predicate_address>,
9     // ... modules 2-8
10
11     // Owner Address
12     OWNER_ADDRESS: b256 = <padded_evm_owner_address>,
13 }
```

## 2.6 Security Requirements

**Uniqueness** For any two modules  $i, j$  where  $i \neq j$ :

$$\text{AssetID}_i \neq \text{AssetID}_j$$

**Determinism** For any given inputs  $(a, k, c)$ , the calculation must produce the same AssetID across all implementations of the same version of the ZapWallet:

$$f(a, k, c) = \text{AssetID}$$

where  $f$  is the AssetId calculation function.

## 3 Zap Manager Contract - "ZapManager"

### 3.1 Overview

The ZapManager contract facilitates the initialization and upgrade lifecycle of a ZapWallet through asset management and state control. It serves as the central authority for:

- Wallet initialization through controlled asset minting
- Upgrade path management between wallet versions
- State tracking through unique nonce assets
- Module asset distribution and verification

### 3.2 State Variables

The contract maintains the following state:

- $owner \in Address$ : Contract administrator with privileged access
- $v1\_map : key1 \rightarrow AssetId$ : Nonce asset tracking where:

$$key1 = sha256(evm\_addr || master\_addr)$$

- $can\_initialize \in \{true, false\}$ : Initialization phase flag
- $can\_upgrade \in \{true, false\}$ : Upgrade phase flag
- $v1\_version, v2\_version \in String[5]$ : Version identifiers

### 3.3 Contract Phases

Contract state evolves through distinct phases defined by the tuple  $(can\_initialize, can\_upgrade)$  where:

$$(can\_initialize, can\_upgrade) \in \{(false, false), (true, false), (false, true)\}$$

These phases represent:

- $(false, false)$ : Initial or paused state
- $(true, false)$ : Active initialization phase
- $(false, true)$ : Active upgrade phase

Phase transitions are controlled by the contract owner and must maintain the invariant:

$$\neg(can\_initialize \wedge can\_upgrade)$$



## 3.4 Core Functions

### 3.4.1 Wallet Initialization

The initialization function is called by either the owner of the ZapWallet or a third party. See section 4.6 for further details.

```
1 initialize_wallet(master_addr, owner_evm_addr, initdata) -> EvmAddress
```

#### Preconditions:

- $\neg is\_paused()$
- $can\_initialize = true$  (for InitModules)
- $key1 \notin domain(v1\_map)$  (for InitModules)

#### Effects:

- InitModules: Mints  $(n + 1)$  assets where  $n = |modules|$  where:

$$\forall i \in [0, n]. balance(asset_i, recipient_i) = 1$$

- NewModule: Mints single module asset where:

$$key \neq KEY\_NONCE \wedge balance(asset, recipient) = 1$$

#### Post-conditions:

- For InitModules:

$$key1 \in domain(v1\_map) \wedge balance(v1\_map[key1]) = 1$$

- For NewModule:

$$balance(new\_module\_asset) = 1$$

### 3.4.2 Wallet Upgrade

A ZapWallet version upgrade calls the upgrade function on the ZapManager contract with the sufficient transaction inputs and outputs. See section 5 for further details.

```
1 upgrade(owner_evm_addr, sponsored)
```

#### Preconditions:

- $\neg is\_paused()$
- $can\_upgrade = true$
- $\exists$  nonce asset in inputs where:

$$key1 = sha256(owner\_evm\_addr || nonce\_owner)$$

$$v1\_map[key1] = nonce\_asset\_id$$

#### Effects:

- Verifies nonce asset ownership:

$$balance(nonce\_asset\_id, nonce\_owner) > 0$$

- Records upgrade status
- Processes payment based on *sponsored* flag

### 3.5 Asset Management

Asset balances and ownership are tracked through the balance function:

$$balance : AssetId \times Address \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$$

Key generation for nonce asset tracking:

$$key1 = sha256(evm\_addr || master)$$

Asset invariants must maintain:

- Nonce uniqueness:

$$\forall k_1, k_2 \in domain(v1\_map). k_1 \neq k_2 \implies v1\_map[k_1] \neq v1\_map[k_2]$$

- Balance consistency:

$$\forall k \in domain(v1\_map). balance(v1\_map[k]) > 0$$

### 3.6 Security Invariants

The security properties of the ZapManager contract are defined by the following formal invariants, which must hold true at all times during contract execution:

#### 3.6.1 Asset Mapping Integrity

For any key in the nonce asset mapping:

$$\forall k. v1\_map[k] \neq \emptyset \implies balance(v1\_map[k]) > 0$$

This invariant ensures that any nonce asset recorded in the mapping must maintain a positive balance. This is critical for:

- Preventing double initialization of wallets
- Maintaining unique wallet identities
- Ensuring valid upgrade paths

#### 3.6.2 Phase Exclusivity

The contract phases must remain mutually exclusive:

$$\neg(can\_initialize \wedge can\_upgrade)$$

This enforces strict separation between initialization and upgrade phases, which:

- Prevents state confusion
- Ensures clean wallet lifecycle progression
- Maintains clear operational boundaries

### 3.6.3 Administrative Control

The contract must maintain valid ownership:

$$owner \neq \emptyset$$

This invariant guarantees:

- Continuous administrative control
- Emergency intervention capability
- Proper governance of contract parameters

### 3.6.4 Asset State Consistency

For any wallet  $w$  with nonce asset  $n$  and module assets  $M$ :

$$balance(n) \in \{0, 1\}$$

$$\forall m \in M. balance(m) \leq 1$$

These balance constraints ensure:

- Unique wallet identification through nonce assets
- Proper module asset distribution
- Prevention of asset duplication

### 3.6.5 Verification

These invariants are maintained through:

1. Runtime checks in all state-modifying functions
2. Access control restrictions on administrative operations
3. Balance verification during initialization and upgrades
4. Event emission for off-chain monitoring

### 3.6.6 Events

Event emission follows state transitions:

- InitializeWalletEvent(master\_addr, owner\_evm\_addr, is\_base\_modules)
- UpgradeEvent(owner\_evm\_addr, master\_address, is\_sponsored, verified\_nonce)
- ContractStateEvent(allow\_initialize, allow\_upgrade, sender)
- WalletVersionsEvent(v1\_version, v2\_version, sender)

## 4 Zap Master - "master"

### 4.1 Overview

The ZapWallet Master is a predicate that provides secure asset custody through modular validation. The master serves as the authority to validate ZapWallet transactions, initialization (if paying own gas) and wallet upgrades.

### 4.2 Definitions

#### Basic Types

Let:

- $\mathbb{B}_{256}$  be the set of 256-bit values
- $\mathbb{A}$  be the set of valid Fuel addresses

#### Module

A module  $M$  is defined as a tuple:

$$M = (a, p) \text{ where } a \in \mathbb{B}_{256}, p \in \mathbb{A}$$

where:

- $a$  is the unique AssetId of the module
- $p$  is the predicate address of the module

#### Wallet Configuration

A wallet configuration  $W$  consists of:

$$W = (M_0, M_1, \dots, M_8, o)$$

where:

- $M_0$  is the upgrade module
- $M_1$  through  $M_8$  are the operational modules
- $o \in \mathbb{B}_{256}$  is the owner's address

### 4.3 Transaction Types and Validation

The ZapWallet master predicate's `main()` function accepts an optional `WalletOp` parameter that serves two distinct purposes depending on the transaction type:

1. **Initialization:** When present (`Some (WalletOp)`), validates wallet initialization
2. **Module Operations:** When absent (`None`), validates module-based transactions

### 4.3.1 Initialization

During initialization, `WalletOp` contains:

```
1 pub struct WalletOp {  
2     pub evm_addr: b256,      // padded ETH address of wallet owner  
3     pub compsig: Bytes,      // Compact signature  
4     pub command: String,     // Initialization command  
5 }
```

An initialization transaction  $T_i$  must satisfy:

$$V_i(T_i, s, o) = true$$

where:

- $s$  is a valid EIP712 signature
- $o$  is the owner's address
- $V_i$  is the initialization verification function

$V_i$  verifies:

1. Exactly two inputs: one coin and one contract
2. Valid change output
3. Valid signature recovering to owner
4. No module assets present

### 4.3.2 Module Operations

For all other operations, transaction validation relies on:

- Presence of exactly one module asset in inputs
- Proper return of module asset in outputs
- Module-specific validation logic
- Nonce token accounting (when required)

A module operation transaction  $T_m$  must satisfy:

$$V_m(T_m, M_i) = true$$

for exactly one module  $M_i$  where  $i \in \{1, \dots, 8\}$

$V_m$  verifies:

1. Exactly one module asset present in inputs
2. Module asset returned correctly in outputs
3. Module-specific validation passes

### Upgrade Operation

An upgrade transaction  $T_u$  must satisfy:

$$V_u(T_u, M_0) = true$$

$V_u$  verifies:

1. Only module  $M_0$  present
2. Upgrade module asset handled correctly (sent to ZapManager)
3. No other module assets present

This dual-purpose design allows the `WalletOp` to handle initialization while remaining unintrusive for regular module operations.

## 4.4 State Transitions

### Module State Vector

For any transaction  $T$ , let  $\vec{m}$  be a boolean vector where:

$$\vec{m} = [m_0, m_1, \dots, m_8] \text{ where } m_i \in \{0, 1\}$$

indicating the presence (1) or absence (0) of each module in the transaction inputs.

### Valid States

A transaction is valid if and only if  $\vec{m}$  satisfies exactly one of:

1. Initialization:  $\vec{m} = [0, 0, \dots, 0]$
2. Single Module:  $\vec{m}$  contains exactly one 1
3. Upgrade:  $\vec{m} = [1, 0, \dots, 0]$

## 4.5 Security Properties

### Module Isolation

For any valid transaction  $T$ :

$$|\{i : m_i = 1\}| \leq 1$$

Meaning no more than one module can be active in a single transaction.

### Asset Conservation

For any module  $M_i$  present in transaction inputs:

$$\exists \text{ output } o : o.asset = M_i.a \wedge o.amount = 1 \wedge o.to = M_i.p$$

Meaning any module asset must be properly returned to its predicate.

### State Consistency

The master predicate enforces:

- No double-module usage
- Proper initialization sequence
- Upgrade isolation
- Module asset conservation

### 4.5.1 Implementation Notes

#### Module Detection

The system identifies modules by matching both:

- AssetId ( $\mathbb{B}_{256}$ )
- Predicate Address ( $\mathbb{A}$ )

#### Validation Flow

1. Scan inputs for module assets 2. Build module state vector 3. Determine transaction type 4. Apply appropriate validation rules 5. Verify output conditions

## 4.6 Initialization Flow

The initialization of a ZapWallet can be done in one of two ways; using the owners Fuel BASE\_ASSET to pay for gas OR from a third party that spends their own gas. If the owner is initializing their own ZapWallet (self-initialization) this involves spending a BASE\_ASSET UTXO from the master, which requires a signature from the owner within the `WalletOp` parameter of the master `main()` function call parameters. An initialization by way of a third party does not spend gas (or any other asset) from the owners master.

### 4.6.1 Self-Initialization

A valid self-initialization initialization transaction requires:

- Exactly two inputs:
  - One coin input containing FUEL BASE\_ASSET for gas from the owners master address
  - One contract input referencing the ZapManager contract
- A single change output returning unused FUEL BASE\_ASSET to owners master address

The self-initialization route requires a single distinct signature from the owner. A standard EIP-712 compliant signature over the initialization data structure:

```
1 Initialization(  
2     string command,      // "ZapWalletInitialize"  
3     bytes32 evmaddr,     // Owner's padded EVM address  
4     bytes32 utxoid       // UTXO ID of the gas coin input  
5 )
```

### 4.6.2 Third Part Initialization

A valid initialization transaction made by a third party requires:

- Exactly two inputs:
  - One coin input containing FUEL BASE\_ASSET for gas from whomever is sponsoring the transaction.
  - One contract input referencing the ZapManager contract
- A single change output returning unused FUEL BASE\_ASSET to the transaction sender

### 4.6.3 Contract Interaction

The initialization flow proceeds as follows:

1. The transaction calls the ZapManager contract function

```
1  initialize_wallet()  
2
```

2. The contract verifies no existing nonce token exists for the tuple  $(a, m)$  where:

- $a \in \mathbb{B}_{256}$ : The padded EVM address
- $m \in Address$ : The master predicate address

See Section 3.1 for details regarding the mapping.

3. Upon verification, the contract:

- Mints the nonce tokens
- Sends (NONCE.MAX - 1) to the ZapWallet master predicate
- Retains one token for transaction validation

4. The master predicate verifies:

- The initialization signature
- Transaction structure
- Change output validity

Upon successful completion of the initialize\_wallet function call, the ZapWallet is initialized and ready for module operations.



## 5 Module 00 - "module00\_upgrade"

### 5.1 Overview

Module 00 serves as the upgrade predicate for a ZapWallet, it facilitating secure transitions between Zap wallet versions. This module ensures that upgrades are authorized by the wallet owner and maintains proper asset flow during the upgrade process. The transaction structure for the upgrade procedure can be gas sponsored by a third party or gas can be spent by the owner of the ZapWallet.

### 5.2 Module 00 Core Functionality

The module validates upgrade transactions through:

- Verification of upgrade acknowledgment signatures
- Asset flow validation
- Version control checks
- Ownership verification

### 5.3 Configuration Parameters

The module requires the following configuration:

- OWNER\_ADDRESS: Wallet owner's EVM address
- NONCE\_ASSETID: Wallet's nonce AssetId
- MODULE\_KEY00\_ASSETID: Upgrade module's AssetId
- ZAPMANAGER\_V1: ZapManager V1 contract Address
- VERSION: Module00 version identifier

### 5.4 Asset Requirements

An upgrade transaction must satisfy the following asset conditions:

- Module 00 asset must be sent to the ZapManager V1 contract
- Nonce assets must be present in both inputs and outputs and be amount accounted for
- Nonce asset ownership must be verified in the transaction flow

### 5.5 Upgrade Acknowledgment

The upgrade process requires the owner to sign a structured acknowledgment message that contains crucial upgrade parameters:

```
1  WalletUpgradeAcknowledgment {
2      from_address: b256,      // Current wallet master address
3      to_address: b256,        // Target wallet master address
4      current_version: String,  // Fixed at "1.0.0" for V1
5      target_version: String,   // Target version in X.Y.Z format
6      utxo_id: b256            // UTXO ID of the upgrade module
7  }
```

These parameters are formatted into a human-readable message that the owner must sign:

```

1  "UPGRADE ACKNOWLEDGMENT:
2  I understand and authorize that:\n\
3  1. ALL assets (Tokens, NFTs, and ETH) will be transferred from 0x<from_address> to 0
   ↳ x<to_address>
4  2. This upgrade will change my wallet from version <current_version> to <
   ↳ target_version>
5  3. This action cannot be reversed once executed
6  4. This authorization is valid only for this specific upgrade request
7  5. One time upgrade UTXO ID: <utxo_id>"

```

The explicit acknowledgment ensures the owner understands the scope and implications of the upgrade process.

## 5.6 Validation Flow

The module performs the following verification steps:

1. Verifies module00 asset is properly sent to ZapManager V1
2. Confirms nonce asset presence and ownership in inputs
3. Validates nonce asset destination in outputs
4. Constructs and verifies the upgrade acknowledgment message
5. Recovers signer address from EIP-191 signature
6. Validates signer against wallet owner address

## 5.7 Security Properties

The module enforces several critical security properties:

### 5.7.1 Asset Conservation

The upgrade module must ensure proper handling of the module asset during the upgrade process. For the module00 asset  $M_0$  and ZapManager contract address  $Z$ , the following must be true:

$$\exists \text{ output } o : o.asset = M_0 \wedge o.to = Z$$

This means there must exist a transaction output that sends the module00 asset to the ZapManager contract address. This requirement ensures the module asset is properly transferred for the upgrade process and cannot be diverted elsewhere.

### 5.7.2 Nonce Continuity

The nonce asset  $N$  must maintain proper ownership throughout the upgrade. For addresses  $(from, to)$ :

$$\begin{aligned} \exists \text{ input } i : i.asset = N \wedge i.owner = from \\ \exists \text{ output } o : o.asset = N \wedge o.to = to \end{aligned}$$

This enforces two key requirements:

- The transaction must include the nonce asset from the owner's current wallet address
- The nonce asset must be properly forwarded and the amount be equal.

This mechanism prevents transaction replay attacks in Modules 01-03 and ensures proper Zap-Wallet upgrade.

### 5.7.3 Signature Verification

The upgrade must be authorized by the wallet owner through a cryptographic signature. For owner address  $O$  and upgrade acknowledgment message  $m$ :

$$ec\_recover(signature, hash(m)) = O$$

This validation:

- Recovers the signer's address from the EIP-191 signature
- Verifies it matches the wallet owner's address
- Ensures only the legitimate owner can authorize upgrades

The message  $m$  contains critical upgrade parameters including source and destination addresses, ensuring the owner explicitly acknowledges the upgrade details.

## 5.8 Upgrade Transaction Inputs and Output

The following diagram illustrates the transaction inputs, verification mechanism for each transaction input and resulting outputs. If the upgrade transaction is sponsored then the total amount of ZapWallet owner BASE\_ASSET input should be equal to the BASE\_ASSET output going to the V2 master. The Sponsor should pay for the gas to the transaction. Otherwise if the user is spending their own gas execute the upgrade transaction the BASE\_ASSET input should equal the BASE\_ASSET output minus the network fee.




Figure 2: Module 00 Upgrade Transaction Flow and Verification

## 6 Module 01 - "module01\_evm\_txtype1"

### 6.1 Overview

Module 01 handles Legacy EVM transaction validation within the ZapWallet system. It validates and processes EVM transactions by decoding RLP-encoded transaction data, verifying signatures, and ensuring proper asset flow through the Fuel network. Module 01 only works for Fuel BASE\_ASSET transfers. The receiver address in the RLP transaction data is an EVM address which maps to a corresponding ZapWallet master predicate address.

Formally, for a transaction  $T$  with recipient EVM address  $r_{evm}$ , the receiving ZapWallet address  $w$  is derived:

$$f : r_{evm} \rightarrow w \text{ where } w = P(r_{evm}, c)$$

where:

- $P$  is the predicate address calculation function
- $c$  is the receiver's wallet bytecode
- $w$  is the resulting ZapWallet master predicate address

This mapping and calculation of the receivers address insures that EVM-style transactions are compatible with with ZapWallet's and by extension the Fuel network, while maintaining proper asset custody.

### 6.2 Receiver Address Mapping

For each transaction, Module 01 must verify that the Fuel BASE\_ASSET is sent to the correct ZapWallet address corresponding to the EVM address specified in the RLP transaction data. This mapping is accomplished through a merkle tree-based predicate address calculation.

#### 6.2.1 Merkle Tree Structure

The ZapWallet master predicate address is derived from a two-leaf merkle tree where:

- Left Leaf ( $L_1$ ): Fixed blueprint hash known at compilation
- Right Leaf ( $L_2$ ): Variable leaf containing receiver's EVM address and configurables for the receiver's master predicate.

The derivation process follows these precise steps:

##### 1. Leaf Hashing:

$$H(L_2) = \text{SHA256}(0 \times 00 \parallel \text{bytecode}[EVM_{addr}])$$

where  $0 \times 00$  is the leaf prefix identifying this as a leaf node

##### 2. Node Computation:

$$N = \text{SHA256}(0 \times 01 \parallel L_1 \parallel H(L_2))$$

where  $0 \times 01$  is the node prefix identifying this as an internal node

##### 3. Root:

$$root = N$$

##### 4. Predicate Address:

$$address = \text{SHA256}(0 \times 4655454C \parallel root)$$

where `0x4655454C` represents "FUEL" in ASCII as the contract ID seed. For a complete implementation of Fuel's merkle tree specification, see the official implementation at <https://github.com/FuelLabs/fuel-vm/tree/master/fuel-merkle>.

### 6.2.2 Verification Process

For a transaction with recipient EVM address  $r_{evm}$ , Module 01: 1. Takes the provided right leaf bytecode 2. Inserts  $r_{evm}$  at the predetermined position (6760) 3. Calculates the merkle tree and resulting predicate address 4. Verifies the BASE\_ASSET output is sent to this address

This ensures that funds from EVM-style transactions are always directed to the correct ZapWallet predicate address, maintaining the mapping between EVM addresses and their corresponding ZapWallets.

## 6.3 RLP Transaction Decoding

EVM transactions are encoded using Recursive Length Prefix (RLP) encoding (previous to simple serialize (SSZ)). Modules 01-03 implement RLP decoding systems for Legacy and EIP-1559 transactions (which can include ERC20 transfers). This RLP decoding scheme is similar across Modules 01, 02 and 03 in the ZapWallet and can be broken down into several layers:

### 6.3.1 RLP Encoding Rules

The decoder follows standard Ethereum RLP encoding rules where bytes are categorized by their first byte (prefix):

- `[0x00-0x7f]`: Single byte (transaction type identifier)
- `[0x80-0xb7]`: String with length 0-55 bytes
- `[0xb7-0xbf]`: String with length > 55 bytes
- `[0xc0-0xf7]`: List with total payload 0-55 bytes
- `[0xf7-0xff]`: List with total payload > 55 bytes

### 6.3.2 Legacy EVM Transaction Structure

A Legacy EVM transaction's RLP encoding contains the following fields in order:

```
1 [
2     nonce,           // u64: Transaction sequence number
3     gasPrice,        // u64: Price per unit of gas
4     gasLimit,        // u64: Maximum gas allowed
5     to,              // b256: Recipient address
6     value,           // u256: Amount of ETH to transfer
7     chainId,         // u64: Network identifier (EIP-155)
8     r,               // b256: Signature component
9     s                // b256: Signature component
10 ]
```

### 6.3.3 Decoding Process

The decoding process follows these steps:

#### 1. Payload Identification:

- Reads the first byte to determine the encoding type
- Calculates total payload length
- Validates encoding structure

#### 2. Field Extraction:

$$decode : \text{RLP} \rightarrow (field, ptr, len)$$

where:

- *field* is the decoded value
- *ptr* is the new buffer position
- *len* is the field length

#### 3. Type Conversion: Different utilities handle specific data types:

- `rlp_read_u64`: Converts bytes to unsigned 64-bit integer
- `rlp_read_b256`: Converts bytes to 256-bit value
- `rlp_read_bytes_to_u256`: Converts variable-length bytes to u256

### 6.3.4 EIP-155 Processing

The decoder implements EIP-155 chain ID recovery:

$$chain\_id = \begin{cases} \frac{v-35}{2} & \text{if } v \geq 35 \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

where *v* is the recovery identifier from the signature.

### 6.3.5 Signature Recovery

The final step reconstructs the compact signature:

- Normalizes the recovery ID
- Combines *r* and *s* components
- Sets the recovery bit in the high bit of *s*

### 6.3.6 EVM EIP-1559 Transaction Structure

An EVM EIP-1559 (Type 2) transaction's RLP encoding contains the following fields in order:

```
1 [
2   chainId,           // u64: Network identifier
3   nonce,             // u64: Transaction sequence number
4   maxPriorityFeePerGas, // u64: Max priority fee (tip)
5   maxFeePerGas,      // u64: Maximum total fee per gas
6   gasLimit,          // u64: Maximum gas allowed
7   to,                // b256: Recipient address
8   value,             // u256: Amount of ETH to transfer
9   data,              // bytes: Transaction data (empty for simple transfers)
10  accessList,        // []: List of addresses and storage keys
11  v,                 // u64: Signature recovery identifier
12  r,                 // b256: Signature component
13  s                  // b256: Signature component
14 ]
```

### 6.3.7 EVM ERC20 Transaction Structure

An EVM ERC20 transaction (Type 2) extends the EIP-1559 structure with specific data field encoding:

```
1 [
2   chainId,           // u64: Network identifier
3   nonce,             // u64: Transaction sequence number
4   maxPriorityFeePerGas, // u64: Max priority fee (tip)
5   maxFeePerGas,      // u64: Maximum total fee per gas
6   gasLimit,          // u64: Maximum gas allowed
7   to,                // b256: ERC20 contract address
8   value,             // u256: Must be 0 for ERC20 transfers
9   data: [            // bytes: Encoded transfer function call
10     methodId,        // bytes4: transfer(address,uint256) selector
11     recipient,       // b256: Token EVM recipient address
12     amount            // b256: Amount of tokens to transfer
13   ],
14  accessList,        // []: List of addresses and storage keys
15  v,                 // u64: Signature recovery identifier
16  r,                 // b256: Signature component
17  s                  // b256: Signature component
18 ]
```

**ERC20 Data Field Details:** The data field for ERC20 transfers consists of:

- `methodId`: 0xa9059cbb (transfer function selector)
- `recipient`: 32-byte padded address
- `amount`: 32-byte token amount

The field decoded to the ERC20 contract address is translated to the corresponding Fuel Native Asset ID using the `compare_asset_ids` function. This allows Fuel native assets to be transferred as EVM ERC20 transfers on the Fuel network. See section 8.1.1 for more details.

## 6.4 Module 01 Core Functionality

The module validates transactions through several key steps:

1. RLP decoding of signed EVM transactions
2. Signature and chain ID verification



3. Asset input and output validation
4. Nonce management
5. Gas price and limit verification

## 6.5 Transaction Processing

### 6.5.1 EVM Transaction Decoding

The module decodes Legacy EVM transactions into their constituent fields:

- Chain ID (per EIP-155)
- Nonce
- Gas Price
- Gas Limit
- Recipient EVM Address
- Value (Base Asset amount in Wei)
- Signature Components (v, r, s)

### 6.5.2 Validation Requirements

For a transaction to be valid, it must satisfy:

- Correct chain ID matching Fuel network
- Valid signature from wallet owner
- Sufficient input amounts covering value, gas and builder\_tip
- Proper nonce accounting matching the RLP data
- Valid input and output coins with correct owners

## 6.6 Asset Flow

A transaction containing Module 01 processes three types of assets:

- Module 01 asset (for validation authorization of the signed RLP data)
- Nonce asset (to prevent signature replay)
- BASE\_ASSET (for value transfer, gas and builder\_tip) from the master

The builder\_tip needs be a Coin Output with some value (can be zero). It is not enforced that the transaction builder is required to "tip" themselves. Therefore, the value of the BASE\_ASSET output to the receiver is always the amount specified in the RLP data. The gas consumed by the transaction comes out of the max\_tx\_cost budget, which is made up of:

$$\text{max\_tx\_cost} = \text{network fee} + \text{builder\_tip}$$

Any difference in BASE\_ASSET that is not consumed by the sum of the transaction outputs (for BASE\_ASSET) is sent back to the owners ZapWallet master Address as a Change output. See section 7.3 for further details.

## 6.7 Transaction Structure




Figure 3: Compact Module 01 Legacy EVM Transaction Flow and Verification

## 6.8 Security Properties

### 6.8.1 Asset Conservation

For module01 asset  $M_1$  and predicate address  $P$ :

$$\exists \text{ output } o : o.asset = M_1 \wedge o.amount = 1 \wedge o.to = P$$

### 6.8.2 Signature Replay Prevention

The nonce mechanism in Module 01 serves primarily as protection against signature replay attacks rather than traditional transaction sequencing. For a given transaction signature with nonce value  $t$ , the system maintains a monotonically decreasing counter  $n$ :

$$n = NONCE\_MAX - t$$

$$\exists \text{ output } o : o.asset = N \wedge o.amount = n - 1$$

This ensures each signature can only be used once, as the nonce asset's decreasing value prevents reuse of any previously signed transaction data.

### 6.8.3 Value Transfer

For transaction value  $v$  and max cost  $c$ :

$$\sum \text{inputs} \geq v + c$$

$$\exists \text{ output } o : o.asset = \text{BASE\_ASSET} \wedge o.amount = v \wedge o.to = \text{receiver}$$

## 6.9 Error Handling

The module includes error handling that propagates errors to at maximum the `main()` scope. However as predicates must return boolean results, all errors result in a false returned from the main execution.

## 7 Module 02 - "module02\_evm\_txtype2"

### 7.1 Overview

Module 02 handles EIP-1559 EVM transaction validation within the ZapWallet system. Like Module 01, it processes BASE\_ASSET transfers but implements the EIP-1559 fee market mechanism instead of Legacy EVM's first-price gas auction. For transaction processing details including RLP decoding and address mapping, see sections 6.3 and 6.

### 7.2 Key Differences from Module 01

The primary distinction lies in the fee structure and account of the `max_tx_cost` signed by the owner:

**Legacy (Module 01):**

$$gas\_cost = gasPrice \times gasLimit$$

**EIP-1559 (Module 02):**

$$gas\_cost = (baseFee + maxPriorityFeePerGas) \times gasLimit$$

where:

$$maxFeePerGas \geq baseFee + maxPriorityFeePerGas$$

### 7.3 Gas Calculation and Cost Flow

Module 02 implements a flexible gas fee structure that handles network fees and optional builder tips. The cost structure is derived from the gas parameters in the EIP-1559 transaction:

#### 7.3.1 Gas Parameters

For a transaction with gas parameters ( $g_{limit}, g_{price}$ ):

$$max\_tx\_cost = g_{limit} \times g_{price}$$

#### 7.3.2 Cost Components

The total cost budget consists of:

- **Network fee:** Required cost for transaction execution
- **Builder tip:** Optional incentive for transaction inclusion
- **Change:** Excess funds returned to sender

For input amount  $i$ , receiver value  $v$ , network fee  $f$ , and builder tip  $b$ :

$$\begin{aligned} i &\geq v + max\_tx\_cost \\ 0 &\leq b \leq max\_tx\_cost - f \\ change &= i - (v + f + b) \end{aligned}$$




Figure 4: Gas Parameters and Cost Flow

This structure ensures:

- Sufficient input covers value transfer and maximum costs
- Network fee payment is guaranteed
- Builder tips are optional but bounded
- Excess funds automatically return to sender

## 7.4 Transaction Structure




Figure 5: Module 02 EIP-1559 Transaction Flow and Verification

## 7.5 Security Properties

Module 02 maintains the same security properties as Module 01:

### 7.5.1 Asset Conservation

For module02 asset  $M_2$  and predicate address  $P$ :

$$\exists \text{ output } o : o.asset = M_2 \wedge o.amount = 1 \wedge o.to = P$$

### 7.5.2 Signature Replay Prevention

As in other modules, the nonce mechanism protects against signature replay attacks:

$$n = NONCE\_MAX - t$$

$$\exists \text{ output } o : o.asset = N \wedge o.amount = n - 1$$

### 7.5.3 Value Transfer

For transaction value  $v$  and max cost  $c$ :

$$\sum \text{inputs} \geq v + c$$

$$\exists \text{ output } o : o.asset = BASE\_ASSET \wedge o.amount = v \wedge o.to = receiver$$

All transaction validations and asset flow mechanisms remain identical to Module 01, with the only difference being the fee calculation and structure in the RLP transaction data.

## 7.6 Error Handling

The module includes error handling that propagates errors to at maximum the `main()` scope. However as predicates must return boolean results, all errors result in a false returned from the main execution.

## 8 Module 03 - "module03\_erc20"

### 8.1 Overview

Module 03 enables Fuel native assets to be transferred using the familiar ERC20 token transfer pattern. It processes EIP-1559 EVM transactions that contain ERC20 transfer function calls by mapping the ERC20 contract addresses in these transactions to their corresponding Fuel native AssetIds (see section 8.1.1 for detailed mapping). This allows users to interact with Fuel native assets using standard EVM tooling and interfaces while maintaining the security properties of the ZapWallet architecture.

For a transaction  $T$  with recipient EVM address  $r_{evm}$  and ERC20 contract address  $c_{evm}$ , the transfer is mapped:

$$f : (c_{evm}, r_{evm}) \rightarrow (a_{fuel}, w)$$

where:

- $a_{fuel}$  is the corresponding Fuel native AssetId
- $w$  is the recipient's ZapWallet address derived as described in section 6

#### 8.1.1 ERC20 Address to Fuel AssetId Mapping

The ERC20 contract address from the RLP transaction data must be mapped to its corresponding Fuel native AssetId. This mapping is achieved through a 20-byte comparison mechanism:

**Address Structure:**

- EVM addresses are 20 bytes
- Fuel AssetIds are 32 bytes (use of AssetId or b256 types vary)

For a given ERC20 contract address  $a_{evm}$  and Fuel AssetId  $a_{fuel}$ , the matching is performed as:

$$a_{fuel} = \underbrace{0^{12}}_{\text{prefix}} \parallel \underbrace{a_{evm}}_{20 \text{ bytes}}$$

The comparison function verifies:

```
x: [0x00000000000000000000000000000000] [aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa]
      12 zeros                20-byte EVM address
y: [aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa] [bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb]
      20-byte EVM address                12 arbitrary bytes
```

where:

- $x$  is the expected AssetId layout (32 bytes)
- $y$  is the full Fuel AssetId being compared
- The function compares the last 20 bytes of  $x$  with the first 20 bytes of  $y$

This mapping ensures that ERC20 transfers in EVM transactions can be correctly matched to their corresponding Fuel native assets while maintaining the full 32-byte precision required by the Fuel network.



## 8.2 Core Functionality

The module validates transactions through several key steps:

1. ERC20 transfer data extraction from EIP-1559 transaction
2. ERC20 contract address to Fuel AssetId mapping
3. Signature and chain ID verification
4. Asset input and output validation
5. Nonce management
6. Gas price and limit verification

## 8.3 Asset Flow

The module processes four types of assets:

- Module 03 asset (for validation authorization)
- Nonce asset (to prevent signature replay)
- Fuel Native asset  $\neq$  BASE\_ASSET (mapped from ERC20 contract) for transfer
- BASE\_ASSET (for gas payment and builder tip) from the master.

In the same way as Module 01 and 02, the `builder_tip` needs to exist as a Coin Output with some value (can be zero). It is not enforced that the transaction builder is required to "tip" themselves. See section 7.3 for details.

## 8.4 Transaction Structure




Figure 6: Module 03 ERC20 Transaction Flow and Verification

## 8.5 Security Properties

### 8.5.1 Asset Conservation

For module03 asset  $M_3$  and predicate address  $P$ :

$$\exists \text{ output } o : o.asset = M_3 \wedge o.amount = 1 \wedge o.to = P$$

### 8.5.2 Native Asset Conservation

For native asset  $a$  mapped from ERC20 contract:

$$\sum \text{inputs}(a) = \sum \text{outputs}(a)$$

### 8.5.3 Signature Replay Prevention

The nonce mechanism in Module 03 serves primarily as protection against signature replay attacks rather than traditional transaction sequencing. For a given transaction signature with nonce value  $t$ , the system maintains a monotonically decreasing counter  $n$ :

$$n = NONCE\_MAX - t$$

$$\exists \text{ output } o : o.asset = N \wedge o.amount = n - 1$$

This ensures each signature can only be used once, as the nonce asset's decreasing value prevents reuse of any previously signed transaction data.

## 8.6 Error Handling

The module includes error handling that propagates errors to at maximum the `main()` scope. However as predicates must return boolean results, all errors result in a false returned from the main execution.

## 9 Module 04 - "module04\_txidwit"

### 9.1 Overview

Module 04 provides a simplified transaction validation mechanism based purely on EIP-191 signature verification of the transaction ID. Unlike other modules, it allows arbitrary transaction structures but explicitly forbids the use of the owners ZapWallet nonce assets, making it suitable for flexible operations that don't require a nonce for replay protection as this is already inherited by the UTXO model.

### 9.2 Signature Verification

The module validates transactions through EIP-191 personal sign format:

#### 9.2.1 Message Construction

For transaction ID *txid*, the signed message is constructed as:

$$message = \text{EthereumSignedMessage prefix} \parallel txid$$

where the prefix is the hex-encoded string "x19Ethereum Signed Message: " + newline character and the number 32 for the amount of bytes in the message (the transaction id), represented as:

0x19457468657265756d205369676e6564204d6573736167653a0a3332

The module verifies:

$$signer = ecrecover(signature, keccak256(message)) = owner$$




Figure 7: Module 04 Signature Verification Flow

### 9.3 Input Constraints

While Module 04 is flexible in transaction structure, it enforces one critical constraint:

$$\forall i \in inputs : i.assetId \neq NONCE\_ASSET\_ID$$

This ensures that:

- Nonce-based replay protection remains under control of specific modules
- Blind Signature-based operations cannot interfere with nonce based Modules

### 9.4 Usage Patterns

Module 04 is designed for operations that need flexible input/output structures which can rely on transaction ID uniqueness for replay protection. This can benefit transaction builders from simpler validation logic provided ZapWallet users are willing to sign "blind" hashes.

### 9.5 Security Properties

Module 04 maintains two key security properties that ensure correct operation and prevent misuse:

#### 9.5.1 Signature Verification

The module ensures that each transaction is properly authorized by the owner. For any transaction  $T$  with witness signature  $\sigma$ :

$$\exists \text{ witness } w : w = \sigma \wedge ecrecover(\sigma, hash(T)) = owner$$

This verifies that:

- The transaction contains a valid witness signature
- The signature correctly recovers to the ZapWallet owner's address
- The signature was created over the exact transaction being processed

#### 9.5.2 Nonce Protection

To maintain the integrity of the Nonce asset for use in other Modules, Module 04 explicitly forbids the use of nonce assets. For all inputs  $I$  in transaction  $T$ :

$$\forall i \in I : i.asset \neq N$$

where  $N$  is the nonce asset ID.

This constraint ensures that Nonce-based replay protection remains under the control of specific modules.

## 10 Module 05 - "module05\_eip712\_simple"

### 10.1 Overview

Module 05 is a native transfer predicate that handles both sponsored and unsponsored transactions for transferring BASE\_ASSET or other native assets on the Fuel Network. It supports four types of transactions:

1. Non-Sponsored BASE\_ASSET transfer
2. Non-Sponsored other asset transfer
3. Sponsored BASE\_ASSET transfer
4. Sponsored other asset transfer

Each transaction type has specific input and output requirements that must be met for the predicate to validate successfully. The predicate checks the transaction structure, verifies the signature, and ensures proper asset flow according to the transaction type.

### 10.2 Core Properties

Module 05 implements a flexible native asset transfer system with properties that ensure secure asset movement and optional gas sponsorship.

#### 10.2.1 Transfer Properties

For a transfer operation with value  $v$  and asset  $a$ :

$$\begin{aligned} &\forall i \in \text{inputs}(a) : \sum i.\text{amount} \geq v \\ &\exists \text{output } o : o.\text{asset} = a \wedge o.\text{amount} = v \wedge o.\text{to} = \text{recipient} \end{aligned}$$

#### 10.2.2 Sponsorship Properties

For sponsored transactions with sponsor  $s$ :

$$\begin{aligned} &s \neq \text{owner\_wallet} \\ &\forall i \in \text{inputs}(\text{BASE\_ASSET}) : i.\text{owner} \in \{s, \text{owner}\} \end{aligned}$$

### 10.3 Signature Verification

Module 05 uses EIP-712 typed data signing for transfer authorization. The NativeTransfer type hash is defined as:

```
1 NativeTransfer(  
2     bytes32 assetId,           // The Fuel native asset ID being transferred  
3     uint256 amountIn,         // Amount of asset to transfer  
4     bytes32 from,             // Sender's ZapWallet master predicate address  
5     bytes32 to,               // Recipient's ZapWallet master predicate address  
6     uint256 maxTxCost,        // Maximum gas cost allowed for the transaction  
7     bytes32 utxoID            // Transaction input ID of Module 05's asset  
8 )
```

Each field serves a specific purpose in the transfer:

- `assetId`: Identifies which Fuel native asset is being transferred, either `BASE_ASSET` or another native asset
- `amountIn`: Specifies the exact amount of the asset to transfer to the recipient
- `from`: The sender's ZapWallet master predicate address, which must match the transaction inputs
- `to`: The recipient's ZapWallet master predicate address where the assets will be sent
- `maxTxCost`: Sets a limit on transaction gas costs, protecting against excessive fees
- `utxoID`: The UTXO ID of Module 05's asset being consumed and returned in the transaction, preventing signature replay attacks

This structured data ensures the signed message unambiguously captures all aspects of the intended transfer, providing both security and transparency.

## 10.4 Security Properties

The module enforces three core security properties to ensure safe asset transfers:

### 10.4.1 Asset Conservation

The module ensures that its authorization token (Module 05 asset) is properly maintained:

$$\exists \text{ output } o : o.asset = M_5 \wedge o.amount = 1 \wedge o.to = P$$

This means there must exist exactly one output that returns the Module 05 asset back to the module's predicate address, maintaining the module's ability to validate future transactions.

### 10.4.2 Amount Validation

Verification that input amounts cover the requested transfer:

$$\sum_{i \in I} i.amount \geq v \text{ where } i.asset = a$$

### 10.4.3 Owner Authorization

Every transfer must be authorized by the wallet owner through their signature:

$$ecrecover(\sigma, hash(domain, m)) = owner$$

## 10.5 Asset Flow

The four types of transactions and their asset flow is shown below.

10.5.1 unsponsored BASE\_ASSET transfer

For non-sponsored BASE\_ASSET transfers the inputs come exclusively from the owners ZapWal-  
let master.

Transaction Structure:




Figure 8: Unsponsored BASE\_ASSET Transfer Flow



10.5.2 Unsponsored Native Asset Transfer

For native asset transfers without sponsorship, both gas and the transferred asset come from the owners ZapWallet master.




Figure 9: Unsponsored Native Asset Transfer Flow

10.5.3 Sponsored BASE\_ASSET Transfer

In sponsored BASE\_ASSET transfers, a third party covers gas costs while the owners ZapWallet master provides the transfer amount.




Figure 10: Sponsored BASE\_ASSET Transfer Flow

10.5.4 Sponsored Native Asset Transfer

Sponsored native asset transfers combine third-party gas coverage with native a asset from owners ZapWallet master.




Figure 11: Sponsored Native Asset Transfer Flow

## **11 Module 06 - ""module06\_eip712\_contract""**

Not implemented in v0.8.0 ZapWallet.

## 12 Module 07 - "module07\_sponsor"

### 12.1 Overview

Module 07 handles gas sponsorship operations from the owners ZapWallet. It validates and processes EIP-712 signed gas sponsorship parameters, allowing gas UTXOs to be securely used for asset exchange, free usage, or sponsorship signatures to be cancellation.

The module operates in three modes:

- **Sponsor:** Trade gas for another asset within configurable tolerance bounds
- **Gaspas:** Allow free gas usage with guaranteed return amounts
- **Cancel:** Move a gas UTXO without requiring exchange

Formally, for a transaction  $T$  with gas sponsorship operation  $O$ , the validation is:

$[v : O \rightarrow \text{true}, \text{false} \text{ where } O = (w, p)]$

where  $v$  is the validation function,  $O$  is the sponsorship operation tuple,  $w$  is the EIP-712 signature witness and  $p$  are the sponsorship parameters

This allows gas UTXOs to be used flexibly and securely from the owners ZapWallet, enabling use cases like transaction sponsorship, free trials, and cancellations while enforcing the sponsor's signed intent.

### 12.2 Sponsorship Parameters

The gas sponsorship parameters are defined by the `GasSponsor` struct:

```
1 struct GasSponsor {
2     command: String,
3     returnaddress: b256,
4     inputgasutxoid: b256,
5     expectedgasoutputamount: u256,
6     expectedoutputasset: b256,
7     expectedoutputamount: u256,
8     tolerance: u256,
9 }
```

Where:

- `command`: Operation type ("sponsor", "gaspas", or "cancel")
- `returnaddress`: Expected gas return address
- `inputgasutxoid`: UTXO ID of the input gas coin
- `expectedgasoutputamount`: Expected gas return amount
- `expectedoutputasset`: Expected asset ID for exchange ("sponsor" only)
- `expectedoutputamount`: Expected asset amount for exchange ("sponsor" only)
- `tolerance`: Acceptable deviation from expected exchange amount ("sponsor" only)

These parameters are hashed according to EIP-712 and signed by the gas owner, providing secure authorization for the specified usage of their gas UTXO.

## 12.3 Validation Flow

The core validation logic follows these steps:

1. Extract EIP-712 signature witness
2. Collect and categorize transaction inputs and outputs
3. Validate the specified gas UTXO is present and owned by signer
4. Process outputs according to `command`:
  - `"sponsor"`: Verify asset exchange amounts are within tolerance
  - `"gaspass"`: Verify gas return amount
  - `"cancel"`: Validate gas UTXO movement
5. Rebuild `GasSponsor` struct and verify EIP-712 signature

If all checks pass, the transaction is approved.

## 12.4 Asset Flow

A transaction containing Module 07 processes the following assets:

- **Gas UTXO**: The input gas coin (`BASE_ASSET`) owned by the owners ZapWallet specified by `inputgasutxoid`
- **Exchange Asset** (`"sponsor"` only): The asset traded to the gas owner

For the three different types of transactions `"sponsor"`, `"gaspass"` and `"cancel"` the asset flow is described below.

### 12.4.1 `"sponsor"` Asset Flow

The gas input UTXO must be present and owned by the owner of the ZapWallet. For `"sponsor"` operations, the output exchange asset must match the `expectedoutputasset` and `expectedoutputamount` and no `tolerance` is specified. Any remaining gas not explicitly output is returned to the owner via a Change output.

**Transaction Structure:**




Figure 12: Module 07 Gas Sponsorship Transaction Flow for "sponsor"

#### 12.4.2 "gasspass" Asset Flow

The gas input UTXO must be present and owned by the owner of the ZapWallet. For "gasspass" operations, no exchange asset is required by the third party using the owners ZapWallet gas UTXO. The `expectedgasoutputamount` gas return amount is specified by the owner. No `tolerance` is required. Any remaining gas not explicitly output is returned to the owner via a Change output.

#### Transaction Structure:




Figure 13: Module 07 Gas Sponsorship Transaction Flow for "gasspass"

#### 12.4.3 "cancel" Asset Flow

For "cancel" operations, the UTXO of the owners gas is simply spent and sent back to the owner Zapwallet. This renders an already signed "sponsor" or "gasspass" signature invalid.

#### Transaction Structure:




Figure 14: Module 07 Gas Sponsorship Transaction Flow for "cancel"



## 12.5 Security Properties

### 12.5.1 Signature Integrity

The EIP-712 signature is verified against the rebuilt `GasSponsor` struct, ensuring that all validated parameters match the signer's intent exactly. The signing domain and struct type hash are fixed at deployment, preventing any modification.

$$[s = \text{Sign}(H(\text{GasSponsor}), d_{\text{owner}})] [\text{Verify}(s, H(\text{GasSponsor}), d_{\text{contract}}) = v]$$

Where:

- $s$ : The EIP-712 signature
- $H$ : The EIP-712 struct hash function
- $d_{\text{owner}}$ : The gas owner's signing domain
- $d_{\text{contract}}$ : The contract's verification domain
- $v$ : The boolean validation result

### 12.5.2 Asset Conservation

For command  $c$ , gas amount  $g$ , and exchange amount  $e$ : `command = "sponsor"`:

$$[\sum \text{outputs} = (g - r) + (e \pm t) + r]$$

`command = "gaspas"`:

$$[\sum \text{outputs} = (g - r) + r]$$

`command = "cancel"`:

$$[\sum \text{outputs} = g]$$

This ensures that assets are never lost or created, only moved according to the validated sponsorship parameters.

### 12.5.3 Asset Conservation

The total output amounts are always equal to the input amounts, ensuring no assets are lost or created. For a gas sponsorship transaction with gas amount  $g$ , expected return  $r$ , exchange amount  $e$ , and tolerance  $t$ :

**Sponsor Operation:**  $[\sum \text{outputs} = \underbrace{(g - r)}_{\text{Unused gas}} + \underbrace{(e \pm t)}_{\text{Exchange asset}} + \underbrace{r}_{\text{Returned gas}} =$

$$g + (e \pm t)]$$

**Gaspas Operation:**  $[\sum \text{outputs} = \underbrace{(g - r)}_{\text{Unused gas}} + \underbrace{r}_{\text{Returned gas}} = g]$

**Cancel Operation:**  $[\sum \text{outputs} = \underbrace{g}_{\text{Moved gas}}]$

In each case, the output amounts are conserved:

- **Sponsor:** The sum of unused gas, exchanged asset, and returned gas equals the input gas plus the exchange asset amount (within tolerance).
- **Gaspas:** The sum of unused and returned gas equals the input gas amount.

- **Cancel:** The output gas amount is equal to the input gas amount.

This asset conservation ensures that the gas sponsorship operations only move assets according to the validated parameters, without any loss or unauthorized creation of funds.

#### **12.5.4 Replay Prevention**

The `inputgasutxoid` parameter uniquely identifies the exact gas UTXO authorized for the operation. This ID is signed along with the other parameters, preventing any modification or replay of the sponsorship.

### **12.6 Error Handling**

The module includes error handling that propagates errors to at maximum the `main()` scope. However as predicates must return boolean results, all errors result in a false returned from the main execution.

## **13 Module 08 - ""module08"**

Not implemented in v0.8.0 ZapWallet.