

# Secure Execution of Java Applets using a Remote Playground\*

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## Abstract

*Mobile code presents a number of threats to machines that execute it. We introduce an approach for protecting machines and the resources they hold from mobile code, and describe a system based on our approach for protecting host machines from Java 1.1 applets. In our approach, each Java applet downloaded to the protected domain is rerouted to a dedicated machine (or set of machines), the playground, at which it is executed. Prior to execution the applet is transformed to use the downloading user's web browser as a graphics terminal for its input and output, and so the user has the illusion that the applet is running on her own machine. In reality, however, mobile code runs only in the sanitized environment of the playground, where user files cannot be mounted and from which only limited network connections are accepted by machines in the protected domain. Our playground thus provides a second level of defense against mobile code that circumvents language-based defenses. The paper presents the design and implementation of a playground for Java 1.1 applets, and discusses extensions of it for other forms of mobile code including Java 1.2.*

**Keywords:** Java, mobile-code, security, remote method invocation.

## 1 Introduction

Advances in mobile code, particularly Java, have considerably increased the exposure of networked computers to attackers. Due to the “push” technologies that often deliver such code, an attacker can download and execute programs on a victim's machine without the victim's knowledge or consent. The attacker's code could conceivably delete, modify, or steal data on the victim's machine, or otherwise abuse other resources available from that machine. Moreover, mobile code “sandboxes” intended to constrain mobile code have in many cases proven unsatisfactory, in that implementation errors enable mobile code to circumvent the sandbox's security mechanisms [9, 20].

One of the oldest ideas in security, computer or otherwise, is to physically separate the attacker from the resources of value. In this paper we present a novel approach for physically separating mobile code from those resources. The basic idea is to execute the mobile code somewhere other than the user's machine, where the resources of value to the user are not available, and to force the mobile code to interact with the user only from this sanitized environment. The challenge is to achieve this physical separation without eliminating the benefits derived from code mobility, in particular reducing load on the code's server and increasing performance by co-locating the code and the user.

In order to achieve this protection at an organizational level, we propose the designation of a distinguished machine (or set of machines), a *playground*, on which all mobile code served to a protected domain is executed. That is, any mobile code pushed to a machine in this protected domain is automatically rerouted to and

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\*Preprint of a paper to appear in IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering.

executed on the domain’s playground. To enable the user to interact with the mobile code during its execution, the user’s computer acts as a graphics terminal to which the mobile code displays its output and from which it receives its input. However, at no point is any mobile code executed on the user’s machine. Provided that valuable resources are not available to the playground, the mobile code can entirely corrupt the playground with no risk to the domain’s resources. Our playground thus provides a second level of defense against mobile code that circumvents language-based defenses. Moreover, because the playground can be placed in close network proximity to the machines in the domain it serves, performance degradation experienced by users is minimal. There can even be many playgrounds serving a domain to balance load among them.

In this paper we report on the design and implementation of a playground for Java 1.1 applets. As described above, our system reroutes all Java applets retrieved via the web to the domain’s playground, where the applets are executed using the user’s browser essentially as an I/O terminal. This approach enjoys two advantages: (1) The playground is centrally controlled by a security administrator and can be reinforced for security, e.g., by a secure operating system or with various add-on security tools; consequently it is not sensitive to a blunder that may be caused by a user setting a security policy in a browser or to weaknesses exposed in less secure configurations in the network. (2) At the same time, the domain’s resources can be protected even if the playground is completely corrupted, by disallowing the playground to mount protected file systems or open arbitrary network connections to domain machines—in the limit, locating the playground just “outside” the domain’s firewall. Our system is largely transparent to users and applet developers, and in some configurations requires no changes to web browsers in use today. While there are applets that are not suited to execution on our present playground prototype, e.g., due to performance requirements or code structure, in our experience these are a small fraction of Java applets.

As described above, the playground need not be trusted for our system to work securely. Indeed, the only trusted code that is common to all configurations of our system is the browser itself and a small “graphics server”, itself a Java applet, that runs in the browser. The graphics server implements interfaces that the untrusted applet, running on the playground, calls to interact with the user. The graphics server is a simply structured piece of code, and thus should be amenable to analysis. In one configuration of our system, trust is limited to *only* the graphics server and the browser, but doing so requires a minor change to browsers available today. If we are constrained to using today’s browsers off-the-shelf, then a web proxy component of our system, described in Section 3, must also be trusted.

The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we review related work. We describe the architecture of our system in Section 3, and discuss its security in Section 4. We provide implementation details and examples in Section 5. Transparency of applet execution is discussed in Section 6. We discuss the extension of our approach to Java 1.2 in Section 7 and conclude in Section 8.

## 2 Related work

There are three general approaches that have been previously proposed for securing hosts from mobile code. The first to be deployed on a large scale for Java is the “sandbox” model. In this model, Java applets are executed in a restricted execution environment (the sandbox) within the user’s browser; this sandbox attempts to prevent the applet from performing illegal actions. This approach has met with mixed success, in that even small implementation errors can enable applets to entirely bypass the security restrictions enforced by the sandbox [9]. Several systems were built that reinforce the JVM and enhance the sandbox security model in various ways. These include add-on commercial solutions that enhance the security of the JVM through additional mechanisms installed in the environment. Finjan’s SurfinShield (see [www.finjan.com](http://www.finjan.com)) enhances standard browsers with utilities to monitor and manage mobile code. eSafe’s Protect (see [www.esafe.com](http://www.esafe.com)) provides an additional sandbox to run applets in, which places resource limitations on applets. Security7’s SafeAgent (see [www.security7.com](http://www.security7.com)) isolates active code on a workstation from any other executables and resources. Some of these products are coupled with applet filtering mechanism’s at the firewall (see below). Other efforts explore extending the JVM into a more fully capable language-oriented (Java) operating system. Alta and GVM [3] and the J-Kernel/JRes system [8, 15] are examples of Java operating systems supporting multiple Java applications and providing enhanced resource protection and management among them. Some of the issues concerning multi-processing in Java are explored in [5]. Joust [14] is a Java operat-

ing system exploiting the *paths* abstraction in Scout [24] to provide higher degree of control and security of Java interaction with its environments. These systems can better separate Java applications co-running on a JVM (e.g., on low-end devices) as well as provide better control and monitoring of Java applet behavior. Additionally, a vast amount of previous research is dedicated to operating systems security mechanisms in general. This research is beyond the scope of this paper.

The second general approach is to execute only mobile code that is *trusted* based on some criteria. For example, Balfanz and Felten proposed a *Java filter* that allows users to specify the servers from which to accept Java applets [4]. Here the criterion by which an applet is trusted is the server that serves it. A related approach is to determine whether to trust mobile code based on its author, which can be determined, e.g., if the code is digitally signed by the author. This is the approach adopted for securing Microsoft’s ActiveX content, and is also supported for applets in JDK 1.1. Combinations of this approach and the sandbox model are implemented in JDK 1.2 [12, 13] and Netscape Communicator (see [31]), which enforce access controls on an applet based on the signatures it possesses (or other properties). A third variation on this theme is *proof-carrying code* [26], where the mobile code is accompanied by a proof that it satisfies certain safety properties. This approach moves the intensive portions of checking memory safety and type safety of mobile code expressed in unsafe languages to the code producer, and it has been demonstrated in several settings [25]. However, proof-carrying code is limited in its ability to prove arbitrary security properties of code, and in the case of Java, is less essential because the memory and type safety properties of Java bytecodes can be efficiently checked by the code consumer. (On the other hand, flaws in these checks have been a source of security vulnerabilities of Java [9].)

Our approach is compatible with both of the approaches described above. Our playground executes applets in sandboxes (hence the name “playground”), which could be reinforced by various add-on security tools. Likewise, it could easily be adapted to execute only “trusted” applets based on any of the criteria above. Our approach provides an orthogonal defense against hostile applets, and in particular, in our system a hostile applet is still physically separated from valuable resources after circumventing these other defenses.

The third approach to securing hosts from mobile code is simply to not run mobile code. A course-grained approach for Java is to disable Java in the browser. Another approach is to filter out all applets at a firewall [23] (see also [20, Chapter 5]), which has the advantage of allowing applets served from behind the firewall to be executed, but as pointed in [23], has several limitations. Several companies provide products that attempt to “blacklist” potentially harmful applets at the firewall based on various criteria or on content inspection, e.g., Finjan’s SurfinGate and SurfinCheck, Security7’s SafeGate, and eSafe’s Protect Gateway.

Independently of our work, a system with very similar goals and architecture has recently been marketed by Digitivity, Inc., and subsequently acquired by Citrix.<sup>1</sup> In Digitivity’s terminology [16], an AppRouter redirects any applet loaded from the Internet onto a Cage machine, which is designated to run applets while porting their GUI remotely to the user’s browser. The Cage differs from our playground in several ways: First, the Cage JVM contains a graphics driver that reduces all the Java GUI to a proprietary graphics protocol, and ports all GUI from the Cage over a proprietary asynchronous communication protocol onto the user’s browser. Compared with our pure Java implementation, the remote GUI for the Cage is less available for public scrutiny and use, and is less portable, but has several notable advantages: First, the proprietary communication protocol is tuned by Digitivity for performance and security. Second, their system is fully transparent, whereas our design does not support a small (in our experience) class of applets (see Section 6). Third, Digitivity’s system is developed to a marketable product level that our research prototype has not reached. For example, the Cage itself contains operating system reinforcement mechanisms to increase the security and control of the Cage JVM. As another example, class file loading onto the Cage bypasses the AppRouter to prevent a potential bottleneck forming there. Such mechanisms are compatible with our architecture and can be added to it, but are outside the scope of our effort. On the other hand, Digitivity’s architecture relies on trusting AppRouter for redirecting applets onto the Cage, whereas we have an alternative that excludes this proxy component from our trusted base, as discussed in Section 4.1.

The idea of allowing proxying graphics/windows interaction is itself not new. The most closely related tool to ours is Remote AWT (RAWT) [30], recently developed by IBM; more information on RAWT is available from [www.alphaworks.ibm.com](http://www.alphaworks.ibm.com). Similar to our design, RAWT is a Java implementation porting the AWT—i.e., the standard API for implementing graphical user interfaces (GUI) in Java 1.1 programs—

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<sup>1</sup>Digitivity’s system is subject to patent application in the U.S., U.K., and other parts of the world.




Figure 1: Playground architecture

onto a remote Java graphics server. RAWT is shipped as a standalone tool supporting networked operation and resource sharing for Java applications. It can also be used for securely executing Java applets, but will require additional modules interacting specifically with browsers to automate applet redirection to some sanitized environment, as in our proposal. RAWT's implementation differs from ours in several respects, some of which are detailed in Section 6 when we discuss transparency of applet execution. More remotely related to our work are several prior tools that enable X11 clients to interact with multiple and/or remote displays [1, 22], support mobile X11 users [29], and even direct X11 connections across the Internet onto a Java X11-display emulator [32]. All of these tools rely on platform specific X11 server modules. We chose to implement our remote graphics server in Java, and thus it is portable to any Java-compliant environment, regardless of the host windows environment. Moreover, the connection between our graphics server and the playground applet can be passed safely across a packet-filtering firewall, avoiding the security concerns associated with X11 connections [6, Ch. 3.3.3].

Finally, the idea of using a *sacrificial lamb machine* (also termed a *bastion host*) to execute various services, especially Internet services, has been used by numerous systems in the past, specifically in firewalls (see [7, Ch. 5] for a thorough treatment).

### 3 Architecture

The core idea in this paper is to establish a dedicated machine (or set of machines) called a *playground* at which mobile code is transparently executed, using users' browsers as I/O terminals. In this section we give an overview of the playground and supporting architecture that we implemented for Java, deferring many details to Section 5.

To understand how our system works, it is first necessary to understand how browsers retrieve, load, and run Java applets. When a browser retrieves a web page written in Hypertext Markup Language (HTML), it takes actions based on the HTML *tags* in that page. One such tag is the `<applet>` tag, which might appear as follows:

```
<applet code=hostile.class ...>
```

This tag instructs the browser to retrieve and run the applet named `hostile.class` from the server that served this page to the browser. The applet that returns is in a format called *Java bytecode*, suitable for running in any JVM. This bytecode is subjected to a bytecode verification process, loaded into the browser's JVM, and executed (see, e.g., [19]).

In our system, when a browser requests a web page, the request is sent to a *proxy* (Figure 1, step 1). The proxy forwards the request to the end server (step 2) and receives the requested page (step 3). As the page

is received, the proxy parses it to identify all `<applet>` tags on the returning page, and for each `<applet>` tag so identified, the proxy replaces the named applet with the name of a trusted *graphics server* applet stored locally to the browser (i.e., stored in a directory named by the `CLASSPATH` environment variable). The proxy then sends this modified page back to the browser (step 4), which loads the graphics server applet upon receiving the page. For each `<applet>` tag the proxy identified, the proxy retrieves the named applet (steps 5–6) and modifies its bytecode to use the graphics server in the requesting browser for all input and output. The proxy forwards the modified applet to the playground (step 7), where it is executed using the graphics server in the browser as an I/O terminal (step 8).

To summarize, there are three important components in our architecture: the graphics server applet that is loaded into the user’s browser, the proxy, and the playground. None of these need be executed on the same machine, and indeed there are benefits to executing them on different machines (this is discussed in Section 4). In particular, since untrusted code is imported into both the proxy and the playground, they should both be isolated, to the degree possible, from any sensitive resources in the protected domain (in the limit, they should both be placed outside a firewall). The graphics server and the playground are implemented in Java, and thus can run on any Java compliant environment; the proxy is a Perl script. The same proxy can be used for multiple browsers and multiple playgrounds. In the case of multiple playgrounds, the proxy can distribute load among playgrounds for improved performance. In the following subsections, we describe the functions of these components in more detail. Security issues are discussed in Section 4.

### 3.1 The graphics server

In this section we give an overview of the graphics server that is loaded into a user’s browser in place of an applet provided by a web server. Because the graphics server is a Java applet, we must introduce some Java terminology to describe it. In Java, a *class* is a collection of data fields and functions (called *methods*) that operate on those fields. An *object* is an instance of a class; at any point in time it has a state—i.e., values assigned to its data fields—that can be manipulated by invoking the methods of that object (defined by the object’s class). Classes are arranged in a hierarchy, so that a *subclass* can inherit fields and methods from its *superclass*. A running Java applet consists of a collection of objects whose methods are invoked by a runtime system, and that in turn invoke one another’s methods. For more information on Java see, e.g., [11].

#### 3.1.1 Remote AWT classes

The Abstract Window Toolkit (AWT) is the standard API for implementing graphical user interfaces (GUI) in Java programs. The AWT contains classes for user input and output devices, including buttons, choice boxes, text fields, images, and a variety of types of windows, to name a few. Virtually every Java applet interacts with the user by instantiating AWT classes and invoking the methods of the objects so created.

The intuitive goal of the graphics server is to provide versions of the AWT classes whose instances can be created and manipulated from the playground. For example, the graphics server should enable a program running on the playground to create a dialog window in the user’s browser, display it to the user, and be informed when the user clicks the “ok” button. In the parlance of distributed object technology, such an object—i.e., one that can be invoked from outside the virtual machine in which it resides—is called a *remote object*, and the class that defines it is called a *remote class*. So, the graphics server, running in the user’s browser, should allow other machines (the playground) to create and use “remote AWT objects” in the user’s browser for interacting with the user.

Accordingly, the graphics server is implemented as a collection of remote classes, where each remote class (with one exception that is described in Section 3.1.2) is a remote version of a corresponding AWT class. The (modified) Java applet running on the playground creates a collection of graphical objects in the graphics server to implement its GUI remotely, and uses *stubs* to interact with them (see Section 3.3). To minimize the amount of code in the graphics server, each remote class is a subclass of its corresponding AWT class, which enables it to inherit many method implementations from the original AWT class. Other methods must be overridden, for example those involving event monitoring: in the remote class, methods involving the remote object’s events (e.g., mouse clicks on a remote button object) must be adapted to pass back the event to the stubs residing in the playground JVM. In our present implementation, the remote classes

employ Remote Method Invocation (RMI) to communicate with the playground. RMI is available on all Java 1.1 platforms, including Netscape Communicator, Internet Explorer 4.0, JDK 1.1, and HotJava 1.0.

### 3.1.2 The remote Applet class

As described in Section 3.1.1, most classes that comprise the graphics server are remote versions of AWT classes. The main exception to this is a remote version of the `java.applet.Applet` (or just `Applet`) class, which is the class that all Java applets must subclass. The main purpose of the `Applet` class is to provide a standard interface between applets and their environment. Thus, the remote version of this class serves to provide this interface between the applet running on the playground and the environment with which it must interact, namely the user's browser.

More specifically, this class implements two types of methods. First, it provides remote interfaces to the methods of the `Applet` class, so that applets on the playground can invoke them to interact with the user's environment. Second, this class defines a new "constructor" method for each remote AWT class (see Section 3.1.1). For example, there is a `constructButton` method for constructing a remote button in the user's browser. This constructor returns a reference to the newly-created button, so that the remote methods of the button can be invoked directly from the playground. Similarly, there is a constructor method for each of the other remote AWT classes.

When initially started, the graphics server consists of only one object, whose class is the remote `Applet` class, called `BrowserServer.class`. The applet on the playground can then invoke the methods of this object (and objects so created) to create the graphical user interface that it desires for the user.

## 3.2 The proxy

The proxy serves as the browser's and playground's interface to the web. It retrieves HTML pages for the browser and Java bytecodes for the playground, and transforms them to formats suitable for the browser or playground to use. Like the playground, the proxy can be placed outside the protected domain (e.g., outside the firewall) to limit trust in it.

When streaming in an HTML page for the browser, the proxy parses the returning HTML, identifies all `<applet>` tags in the page, and replaces them with references to the remote `Applet` class of the graphics server (see Section 3.1.2). Thus, when the browser receives the returned HTML page it loads this remote `Applet` class (stored locally), instead of the applet originally referenced in the page.

When retrieving a Java bytecode file for the playground, the proxy transforms it into bytecode that interacts with the user on the browser machine while running at the playground. It does so by replacing all invocations of AWT methods with invocations of the corresponding remote AWT methods at the browser, or more precisely, with invocations of playground-side stubs for those remote AWT methods (which in turn call remote AWT methods). This involves parsing the incoming bytecode and making automatic textual substitutions to change the names of AWT classes to the names of the representative stubs of the corresponding remote AWT classes. Though the cost of this function itself is unnoticeable, diverting all incoming applets through the proxy may form a bottleneck at the proxy, and hence, this function could instead be performed at the playground.

## 3.3 The playground

The playground is a machine that loads modified applets from the proxy and executes them. As described above, the proxy modifies the applet's bytecodes so that playground-resident stubs for remote AWT methods are called instead of the (non-remote) AWT methods themselves. So, when a modified applet runs on the playground, a "skeleton" of its GUI containing stubs for corresponding remote graphics objects is built on the playground. The stubs contain code for remotely invoking the remote objects' methods at the user's browser and for handling events passed back from the browser. For example, in the case of a dialog window with an "ok" button, stubs for the window and for button objects are instantiated at the playground. Calls to methods having to do with displaying the window and button are passed to the remote objects at the user's browser, and "button press" events are passed back to methods provided by the button's stub to

handle such events. These stubs are stored locally on the playground, but aside from this, the playground is configured as a standard JVM.

A playground is a centralized resource that can be carefully administered. Moreover, investments in the playground (e.g., upgrading hardware or performing enhanced monitoring) can improve applet performance and security for all users in the protected domain. There can even be multiple playgrounds for load-balancing.

## 4 Security

The security goal of our system is to protect resources in the protected domain from hostile applets that are downloaded by users in that domain. As mentioned above, this is done by isolating untrusted applets from the protected resources.<sup>2</sup> In this section we detail how this is achieved, in three components. First, we show how our system prevents applets from being loaded into user's browsers. Second, we describe how private resources in the protected domain are guarded from access by (even privileged) processes on the playground. Third, we show how our system prevents other known attacks that can be mounted through legitimate use of resources from the playground (e.g., denial of service). We address each of these issues in a separate subsection below, and then conclude this section with a discussion of RMI security.

### 4.1 Preventing hostile applets from entering the protected domain

Achieving strong protection for the domain's private resources relies on preventing the JVM in the user's browser from loading any classes from the network (i.e., from outside the `CLASSPATH`). This can be achieved in one of two ways in our system.

**Trusted proxy** One approach is to depend on the proxy to intercept and deny entry to any classes destined for protected machines. To achieve this, it does not suffice for the proxy to simply rewrite `<applet>` tags in incoming HTML pages, as it already does for functional reasons as described in Section 3. For example, if the playground passes an object of an unknown class to the graphics server in the browser (e.g., as a parameter to a remote method call), or if an `<applet>` tag is not rewritten by the proxy because it is disguised (e.g., emitted by JavaScript code in a page, or otherwise encoded), then the browser may request a class from the network. In this case, the proxy must intercept the request or the incoming class, and prevent the class from reaching the browser. In [23], several mechanisms for filtering class files are discussed, as well as some difficulties. As mentioned in Section 2 above, several companies (Finjan, Security7, eSafe) offer commercial products that identify class files at the firewall and filter them based on various security policies. The advantage of this approach is that it works with any browser “off-the-shelf”: it requires no changes to the browser beyond specifying the proxy as the browser's HTTP and SSL proxy, which can typically be done using a simple preferences menu in the browser. A disadvantage, however, is that the proxy becomes part of the trusted computing base of the system, and as shown in [23], effectively blocking classes can be costly. For this reason, the proxy must be written and maintained carefully, and we refer to this approach as the “trusted proxy” approach.

**Untrusted proxy** A second approach to preventing the browser from loading classes over the network is to directly disable network class loading in the browser. The main disadvantage of this approach is that it requires either configuration or source-code changes to all browsers in the protected domain. In particular, for most popular browsers today (including Netscape Communicator and Internet Explorer 4.0), a source-code change seems to be required to achieve this, but we expect such changes to become easier as browser's security policies become more configurable. An advantage of this approach is that it excludes the proxy from the trusted computing base of the system, and hence we call this the “untrusted proxy” approach. In this approach only the browser and the graphics server classes are in the trusted computing base.

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<sup>2</sup>We limit our attention to protecting data that users do not offer to hostile applets. Protecting data that users offer to hostile applets by, e.g., typing it into the applet's interface, must be achieved via other protections that are not our concern here (though we can utilize them on our playground if available).

To more precisely show how the above approaches prevent network class loading by the browser, below we describe what causes classes to be loaded from the network and how our approaches prevent this.

1. Section 3 briefly described the process by which a browser loads an applet specified in an `<applet>` tag in an HTML page. As described in Sections 3 and 5.3, the proxy rewrites the `code` attribute of each `<applet>` tag to reference the trusted graphics server applet that is stored locally to the browser. If this rewriting fails for some reason (e.g., because the `<applet>` tag is dynamically emitted by JavaScript code), then in the untrusted proxy approach, the browser still will not issue a request for the untrusted applet. In the trusted proxy approach, the browser will issue the request, but the proxy will deny the applet's passage.
2. Once an applet is loaded and started, the *applet class loader* in the browser loads any classes referenced by the applet. If a class is not in the core Java library or stored locally (i.e., in the directory specified by `CLASSPATH`), the applet class loader would normally retrieve the class over the network. However, in our approach, since only the graphics server applet executes in the browser, and since this applet refers only to other local classes, the applet class loader will ever need to load only local classes.
3. As described in Section 3, the modified applet on the playground invokes remote methods in the graphics server. Because our present implementation uses RMI to carry out these invocations, the *RMI class loader* can load additional classes to pass parameters and return values. As above, the RMI class loader first looks in local directories to find these classes before going to the network to retrieve them. It is possible that the playground applet passes an object whose class is not stored locally on the browser machine (particularly if the playground is corrupted). In the trusted proxy approach, the RMI class loader goes to the network, via the proxy, to retrieve the class, but the class is detected and denied by the proxy. In the untrusted proxy approach, the RMI class loader returns an exception immediately upon determining that the class is not available locally.

## 4.2 Isolating untrusted applets

Once untrusted applets are diverted to the playground, security relies on preventing those applets from accessing protected resources. Applets on the playground are obviously subject to the security mechanisms enforced by the JVM. Unfortunately, several bugs in the type safety mechanisms of Java have provided ways for applets to bypass Java sandboxes, including some in popular browsers [9, 20]. These penetrations typically enable the applet to perform any operation that the operating system allows. We anticipate that in the foreseeable future, type safety errors will continue to exist, and therefore we must presume that applets running on our playground may run unconstrained by the sandbox. However, they are still confined by the playground operating system's protections and, ultimately, to attack only those resources available to the playground. In this section, we described several approaches to limit what resources are available to processes—and thus to applets—running on the playground. We expect that through proper network and operating system configuration, hostile applets can be effectively isolated from protected resources.

A first step is for the playground's JVMs (and thus the applets) to execute under accounts different from actual users' accounts and that have few permissions associated with them. For some resources, e.g., user files available to the playground, this achieves security equivalent to that provided by the access control mechanisms of the playground's operating system. (Similarly, JVMs on the playground execute under different accounts, to reduce the threat of inter-JVM attacks; see Section 4.3.)

Further configuration of the network may provide additional defenses. For example, if network file servers are configured to refuse requests from the playground (and if machines' requests are authenticated, as with AFS [17]), then even the total corruption of the playground does not immediately lead to the compromise of user files. Similarly, if all machines in the protected domain are configured to refuse network connections from the playground, except to designated ports reserved for browsers' graphics servers to listen, then the compromise of the playground should gain little for the attacker.

In the limit, an organization's playground can be placed outside its firewall, thereby giving applets no greater access than if they were run on the servers that served them. However, because most firewalls disallow connections from outside the firewall to inside, additional steps may be necessary so that communication can proceed uninhibited between the graphics server in the browser and the applet on the playground.



In particular, RMI in Java 1.1 (used in our prototype) opens network connections between the browser and the playground in both directions, i.e., from the browser to the playground and vice versa. One approach to enable these connections across a firewall is to multiplex them over a single connection from the graphics server to the playground (i.e., from inside to outside). This can be achieved if both the graphics server and the playground applet interpose a customized connection implementation (e.g., by changing the `SocketImplFactory`), but for technical reasons this does not appear to be possible with all off-the-shelf browsers (e.g., it appears to work with HotJava 1.0 but not Netscape 3.0). Another alternative is to establish reserved ports on which graphics servers listen for connections from playground applets, and then configure the firewall to admit connections from the playground to those ports.

### 4.3 Other attacks

In this section, we review the effect of several remaining, known types of attacks that applets can mount within their legitimate use of resources, and describe the extent to which our system can defend against them.

**Denial of service** In a denial of service attack, a hostile applet might disable or significantly degrade access to system resources such as the CPU, disk, network and interactive devices. Ladue [18] presents several such applets, e.g., that consume CPU even after the user clicks away from the applet origin page, that monopolize system locks, or that pop up windows on the user's screen endlessly. Using our Java playground, most of these applets have no effect on the protected domain, and only affect the playground machine. However, an applet that pops up windows endlessly causes the graphics server running in the user's browser to create an infinite stream of windows. Uncontrolled, this may prevent access to the user terminal altogether and require that the user reboot her machine or otherwise shut off her browser. One approach to defend against this is to configure the graphics server and/or the playground to limit the number or rate of window creations. This can be done using several commercially available products, e.g., due to Finjan and eSafe, and is in fact an integral part of Digitivity's Cage environment [16]. However, it is not the focus of our work here.

In another type of denial of service, an applet may deny service to other applets within the JVM, e.g., by killing off others' threads [18]. Although the sandbox mechanisms of most browsers are intended to separate applets in different web pages from one another, several ways of circumventing this separation have been shown [9, 18]. This can be prevented in our system if the applets for each page run in a separate JVM on the playground under a separate user account, and hence are unable to directly affect applets from another page (except by attacking the playground itself).

**Violating privacy** The Java security policy in browsers is geared towards maintaining user privacy by disallowing loaded applets access to any local information. In some cases, however, a Java applet can reveal a lot about a user whose browser executes it. For example, in [18], Ladue presents an applet that uses a *sendmail* trick to send mail on the user's behalf to a sendmail daemon running on the applet's server. When this applet is downloaded onto a Unix host (running the standard *ident* service), this mail identifies not only the user's IP address, but also the user's account name. In our system, the applet runs on the playground machine under an account other than the user's, and the information that it can reveal is limited only to what is available on the playground.

### 4.4 RMI security

Even if the protected domain is secured against access from the playground machine, there is still one way in which hostile applets might attempt to penetrate protected resources, namely through the RMI connection established between the playground and the user's browser. In particular, RMI is a relatively new technology that could conceivably present new vulnerabilities. A first step toward securing RMI is to support authenticated and encrypted transport, so that a network attacker cannot alter or eavesdrop on communication between the browser and the playground. This can also be achieved by interposing encryption at the object serialization layer (see [27]).

A more troubling threat is possible vulnerabilities in the object serialization routines that are used to marshal parameters to and return values from remote method invocations. In the worst case, a corrupted playground could conceivably send a stream of bytes that, when unserialized at the browser, corrupt the type system of the JVM in the browser. Here our decision to generally pass only primitive data types (e.g., integers, strings) as parameters to remote method invocations (see Section 5) would seem to be fortuitous, as it greatly limits the number structurally interesting classes that the attacker has at its disposal for attempting such an attack. However, the possibility of a vulnerability here cannot yet be ruled out, and several research efforts are presently examining RMI in an effort to identify and correct such problems. This process of public scrutiny is one of the main advantages to building our system from public and widely used components.

## 5 Implementation

### 5.1 An example

In order to understand how the components described in Section 3 work together, in this section we illustrate the execution of a simple applet. This example describes how the applet is automatically transformed to interact with the browser remotely, and how the graphics server and its playground-side stubs interact during applet execution. This section necessarily involves low-level detail, but the casual reader can skip ahead to the next section without much loss of continuity.

The applet we use for illustration is shown in Figure 2. This is a very simple (but complete) applet that prints the word “Click!” wherever the user clicks a mouse button. For the purposes of this discussion, it implements two methods that we care about. The first is an `init()` method that is invoked once and registers `this` (i.e., the applet object) as one that should receive mouse click events. This registration is achieved via a call to its own `addMouseListener()` method, which it inherits from its `Applet` superclass. The second method it implements is a `mouseClicked()` method that is invoked whenever a mouse click occurs. This method calls `getGraphics()`, again inherited from `Applet`, to obtain a `Graphics` object whose methods can be called to display graphics. In this case, the `mouseClicked()` method invokes the `drawString()` method of the `Graphics` object to draw the string “Click!” where the mouse was clicked.

The `Click` applet is a standalone applet that is not intended to be executed using a remote graphics display for its input and output. Thus, when our proxy retrieves (the bytecode for) such an applet, the applet must be altered before being run on the playground. For one thing, the `addMouseListener()` method invocation must somehow be passed to the browser to indicate that this playground applet wants to receive mouse events, and the mouse click events must be passed back to the playground so that `mouseClicked()` is invoked.

In our present implementation, passing this information is achieved using Java Remote Method Invocation (RMI). Associated with each remote class is a stub for calling it that executes in the calling JVM. The stub is invoked exactly as any other object is, and once invoked, it marshals its parameters and passes them across the network to the remote object that services the request. Below, the stubs are described by *interfaces* with the suffix `Xface`. For example, `BrowserXface` is the interface that is used to call the `BrowserServer` object of the graphics server.

RMI provides the mechanism to invoke methods remotely, but how do we get the `Click` applet to use RMI? To achieve this, we exploit the subclass inheritance features of Java to interpose our own versions of the methods it invokes. More precisely, we alter the `Click` applet to subclass our own `PGApplet`, rather than the standard `Applet` class. This is a straightforward modification of the bytecode for the `Click` applet. By changing what `Click` subclasses in this way, the `addMouseListener()` method called in Figure 2 is now the one in Figure 3. `PGApplet`, shown in Figure 3,<sup>3</sup> passes calls, when necessary, to the remote applet object of the graphics server described in Section 3.1.2. The `addMouseListener()` method simply adds its argument (the `Click` applet) to an array of mouse listeners and, if this is the first to register, registers itself as a mouse listener at the graphics server.

This registration at the graphics server is handled by the `addPGMouseListener()` remote method of `BrowserServer`, the class of the remote applet object running on the browser (see Section 3.1.2). The relevant

---

<sup>3</sup>For readability, in Figures 3–6 we omit `import` statements, error checking, exception handling (`try/catch` statements), etc.

```

import java.applet.*;
import java.awt.*;
import java.awt.event.*;

public class Click extends Applet
    implements MouseListener {

    public void init() {
        // Tell this applet what MouseListener objects
        // to notify when mouse events occur. Since we
        // implement the MouseListener interface ourselves,
        // our own methods are called.
        this.addMouseListener(this);
    }

    // A method from the MouseListener interface.
    // Invoked when the user clicks a mouse button.
    public void mouseClicked(MouseEvent e) {
        Graphics g = this.getGraphics();
        g.drawString("Click!", e.getX(), e.getY());
    }

    // The other, unused methods of the MouseListener
    // interface.
    public void mousePressed(MouseEvent e) {}
    public void mouseReleased(MouseEvent e) {}
    public void mouseEntered(MouseEvent e) {}
    public void mouseExited(MouseEvent e) {}
}

```

Figure 2: An applet that draws “Click!” wherever the user clicks

code of **BrowserServer** is shown in Figure 5. Recall that **BrowserServer** implements the **BrowserXface** *interface* that specifies the remote methods that can be called from the playground. The **addPGMouseListener()** method, which is one of those remote methods, records the fact that the playground applet wants to be informed of mouse events and then registers its own object as a mouse listener, so that its object’s **mouseClicked()** method is invoked when the mouse is clicked. Such an invocation passes the mouse-click event—or more precisely, a reference to a **BrowserEvent** remote object that holds a reference to the actual mouse-click event object—back to the **PGMouseClicked()** remote method of the **PGApplet** class. The **PGMouseClicked()** method invokes **mouseClicked()** with a **PGMouseEvent** object, which holds the reference to the **BrowserEvent** object. That is, the **PGMouseEvent** object translates invocations of its own methods (e.g., **getX()** and **getY()** in Figure 2) into invocations of the corresponding **BrowserEvent** remote methods, which in turn translates them into invocations of the actual **Event** object in the browser. For brevity, the **BrowserEvent** and **PGMouseEvent** classes are not shown.

The call to **getGraphics()** in **Click** is also replaced with the **PGApplet** version. As shown in Figure 3, the **getGraphics()** method of **PGApplet** retrieves a reference to a remote **BrowserGraphics** object, via the **getBrowserGraphics()** method of Figure 5. The **getGraphics()** method of **PGApplet** then returns this **BrowserGraphics** reference encapsulated within a **PGGraphics** object for calling it. So, when **Click** invokes **drawString()**, the arguments are passed to the browser and executed (Figures 4,6).

## 5.2 Passing by reference

In the example of the previous section, all parameters that needed to be passed across the network were *serializable*. *Object serialization* refers to the ability to write the complete state of an object to an output stream, and then recreate that object at some later time by reading its serialized state from an input stream [27, 11]. Object serialization is central to remote method invocation—and thus to communication between the graphics server and the playground stubs—because it allows for method parameters to be passed to a remote method and the return value to be passed back. In the example of Section 5.1, the remote method

```

public class PGApplet
    extends Applet implements PGAppletXface {
    BrowserXface bx;
    MouseListener ml_array[] = new MouseListener[...];
    int ml_index = 0;

    // Adds a MouseListener. If this is the first, then
    // register this object at the graphics server as a
    // MouseListener.
    public synchronized void
        addMouseListener(MouseListener l) {
        ml_array[ml_index++] = l;
        if (ml_index == 1) {
            bx.addPGMouseListener(this);
        }
    }

    // Part of the PGAppletXface remote interface.
    // Invoked from the browser graphics server when the
    // mouse is clicked.
    public void PGMouseClicked(BrowserEventXface e) {
        int i;
        PGMouseEvent pme = new PGMouseEvent(e);
        for (i = 0; i < ml_index; i++)
            ml_array[i].mouseClicked(pme);
    }

    // Returns an object that encapsulates the remote
    // graphics object of the browser applet.
    public Graphics getGraphics () {
        return new PGGraphics(bx.getBrowserGraphics());
    }
    ...
}

```

Figure 3: Part of the PGApplet class (executes on the playground)

```

public class PGGraphics extends Graphics {

    // Reference to the BrowserGraphics remote object
    // in the graphics server.
    private BrowserGraphicsXface bg;

    // The constructor for this object. Calls its
    // superclass constructor and saves the reference
    // to the BrowserGraphics remote object.
    public PGGraphics(BrowserGraphicsXface b) {
        super();
        bg = b;
    }

    // Invokes drawString in the graphics server.
    public void drawString(String str, int x, int y) {
        bg.drawString(str, x, y);
    }
    ...
}

```

Figure 4: Part of the PGGraphics class (executes on the playground)

```

public class BrowserServer
    extends Applet
    implements BrowserXface, MouseListener {

    // Reference to the MouseListener object on
    // the playground
    PGMouseListenerXface ml;

    // Part of the BrowserXface remote interface. Invoked
    // from the playground to add a remote MouseListener.
    public void
        addPGMouseListener(PGMouseListenerXface pml) {
        ml = pml;
        addMouseListener(this);
    }

    // Invoked whenever the mouse is clicked. Passes the
    // event to the MouseListener on the playground.
    public void mouseClicked(MouseEvent event) {
        ml.PGMouseClicked(new BrowserEvent(event));
    }

    // Returns a remote object that encapsulates the
    // graphics context of this applet.
    public BrowserGraphicsXface getBrowserGraphics() {
        Graphics g = getGraphics();
        return new BrowserGraphics(g);
    }
    ...
}

```

Figure 5: Part of the BrowserServer class (executes in the browser)

```

public class BrowserGraphics
    extends Graphics implements BrowserGraphicsXface {

    private Graphics g;

    // The constructor for this class. Calls the
    // superclass constructor, saves the pointer to the
    // "real" Graphics object (passed in), and exports
    // its interface to be callable from the playground.
    public BrowserGraphics(Graphics gx) {
        super();
        g = gx;
        UnicastRemoteObject.exportObject(this);
    }

    // Part of the BrowserGraphicsXface remote interface.
    // Invoked from the playground to draw a string.
    public void drawString(String str, int x, int y) {
        g.drawString(str, x, y);
    }
    ...
}

```

Figure 6: Part of the BrowserGraphics class (executes in the browser)

invocation `bg.drawString(str, x, y)` in the `PGGraphics.drawString()` method of Figure 4 causes no difficulty because each of `str` (a string) and `x` and `y` (integers) are serializable.

However, not all classes are serializable. An example is the `Image` class, which represents a displayable image in a platform-dependent way. So, while the previous invocation of `bg.drawString(str, x, y)` succeeds, a similar invocation `bg.drawImage(img, x, y, ...)` fails because `img` (an instance of `Image`) cannot be serialized and sent to the graphics server. Even if all objects could be serialized, serializing and transmitting large or complex objects can result in substantial cost. For such reasons, an object that can be passed as a parameter to a remote method of the graphics server is generally constructed *in the graphics server* originally (with a corresponding stub on the playground). Then, a reference to this object in the browser is passed to graphics server routines in place of the object itself. In this way, only the object reference is ever passed over the network.

To illustrate this manner of passing objects by reference, we continue with the example of an `Image`. When the downloaded applet calls for the creation of an `Image` object, e.g., via the `Applet.getImage()` method, our interposed `PGApplet.getImage()` passes the arguments (a URL and a string, both serializable) to a remote image creation method in the graphics server. This remote method constructs the image, places it in an array of objects, and returns the array index it occupies. Playground objects then pass this index to remote graphics server methods in place of the image itself. For example, the `BrowserGraphics` class in the graphics server implements versions of the `drawImage()` method that accept image indices and display the corresponding `Image`.

Conversely, there are circumstances in which objects that need to be passed as parameters to remote methods *cannot* first be created in the browser. This can be due to security reasons—e.g., the object’s class is a user-defined class that overrides methods of an AWT class—or because the class of the parameter object is unknown (e.g., it is only known to implement some interface). In these circumstances, a reference is passed in the parameter’s place, and method invocations intended for the object are passed back to the playground object for processing. Continuing with our `Image()` example, such “callbacks” can occur when the downloaded applet applies certain *image filters* to an image before displaying it. One such filter is an `RGBImageFilter`: A subclass of `RGBImageFilter` defines a per-pixel transformation to apply to an image by overriding the `filterRGB()` method. To avoid loading untrusted code in the browser, such a filter must be executed on the playground with callbacks to its `filterRGB()` method.

In some circumstances, the need to pass objects by reference can considerably hurt performance. Continuing with the `RGBImageFilter` example above, filtering an image may require that *every image pixel* be passed from the browser to the playground, transformed by the `filterRGB()` method, and passed back. This can result in considerable delay in rendering the image, though our experience is that this delay is reasonable for images whose pixel values are indices into a colormap array (i.e., for images that employ an `IndexColorModel`).

### 5.3 Addressing

The previous sections described how an applet running on the playground is coerced into using the user’s browser as its I/O terminal. Before any I/O can be performed at the browser, however, the applet running on the playground and the graphics server running in the user’s browser must be able to find each other to communicate. This is complicated by the fact that an HTML page can contain any number of `<applet>` tags that, when modified by the proxy, result in multiple instances of the graphics server running in the browser. To retain the intended function of the page, it is necessary to correctly match each applet running on the playground with its corresponding instance of the graphics server in the browser.

The addressing scheme that we use requires that the proxy make additional changes to the HTML page containing applet references prior to forwarding it to the browser. Specifically, if the page contains an `<applet>` tag of the form

```
<applet code=hostile.class ...>
```

then the proxy not only replaces `hostile.class` with `BrowserServer.class` (as described in Section 3), but also adds a *parameter tag* to the HTML page, like this:

```
<applet code=BrowserServer.class ...>
<param name=ContactAddress value=address>
```

Parameter tags are tags that contain name/value pairs. This one assigns an *address* value, which the proxy generates to be unique, to be the value of **ContactAddress**. The `<param>` tags that appear between an `<applet>` tag and its terminator (`</applet>`, not shown) are used to specify parameters to the applet when it is run. In this case, the **BrowserServer.class** object (i.e., the remote Applet object of the graphics server; see Section 3.1.2) looks for the **ContactAddress** field in its parameters and obtains the address assigned by the proxy. Once the **BrowserServer** object is initialized and prepared to service requests from the playground, it binds a remote reference to itself to the address assigned by the proxy; this binding is stored in an RMI name server [28].

The proxy remembers what address it assigned to each `<applet>` tag and provides this address to the playground in a similar fashion. That is, the proxy loads applets into the playground by sending to the playground an HTML page with identical **ContactAddress** `<param>` tags to what it forwarded to the browser (for simplicity, this step is not shown in Figure 3). A JVM on the playground loads the referenced applets (via the proxy) and uses the corresponding `<param>` tags provided with each to look up the corresponding graphics servers in the RMI name server.

## 6 Transparency

In our experience, our system is transparent to users for most applets. There are, however, applets for which our playground architecture is not transparent, and indeed our system may be unable to execute certain applets at all. In particular, the remote interface supported by the graphics server supports the passage of certain classes as parameters and return values of its remote methods. If the code running on the playground attempts to pass an object parameter whose class is an unknown subclass of the expected parameter class, then the browser is required to load that subclass to unserialize that parameter. However, because class loading from the network is prevented in our system (see Section 4.1), the load does not complete and an exception is generated. In addition, our prototype presently does not offer transparent execution for applets that invoke methods by reflection [11, Ch. 12]. At the time of this writing, however, the number of applets that cannot be supported due to these limitations does not seem significant.

A more subtle limitation in the transparency of our approach is that by moving the applet away from the machine on which the user's browser executes, the applet's I/O incurs the overhead of communicating over the network. Our research prototype is not intended for production use and hence is not optimized for best performance. Nevertheless, we observe that no significant delays are visible for applets with low-intensity graphics, e.g., a clock applet or an interactive drawing tool.

Experience with commercial tools that realize similar architectures for remote Java windowing, e.g., IBM's RAWT and Citrix's Cage, indicates several issues that are crucial for the performance of our approach. First, the serialization of objects that are passed between the playground and the graphics server are costly operations and can often be avoided. Second, the RMI protocol incurs certain overheads, e.g., performing all remote calls synchronously, that a native protocol can avoid. By avoiding unnecessary serialization and synchrony, these companies have reported significant speedups with their proprietary graphics-aware protocols, which are implemented directly on top of TCP/IP, compared with their initial RMI implementations. For example, IBM reports performance comparable to, and sometimes surpassing, that of X Windows [30], and Citrix representatives have claimed performance superior to X. Similar optimizations to our playground architecture will be necessary to support applets that generate heavy graphics traffic, such as animated applets.

## 7 Other mobile code technologies

Java is not the only mobile code technology that raises security issues for the machines that execute it. For example, security risks are also associated with ActiveX controls and web scripting languages (e.g., [2]),

and with interactions between such technologies: for example, it is possible for JavaScript code running in a browser to invoke Java methods through Netscape's LiveConnect tool. Even changes to Java itself raise new challenges. Since the initial work for the conference version of this paper [21], a new version of Java (1.2) has been shipped and is now being supported by both Netscape and Microsoft. One of the main differences in Java 1.2 is that it provides a significantly richer and more flexible security model for the JVM. In this section, we briefly examine these other mobile code technologies and consider the extent to which our playground architecture impacts them and, where possible, can be modified to support them and to enhance their security.

**Java 1.2** The security model in Java 1.2 provides the mechanism for defining protected target resources that can be accessed only by classes signed by certain trusted principals. As in the sandbox model, protection of target resources, such as code for accessing the file system, is provided by the SecurityManager. Unlike the sandbox model, the user controls the security policy that guards the use of protected targets. A user can also define new targets to be protected. For any protected target, the user determines a set of trusted principals that are allowed to access it. Thus, a security policy can be specified as an access control matrix: on one dimension are protected targets and on the other are trusted principals; entries indicate which principals are allowed to access each target. In order to realize its privilege, code must carry the digital signature of a trusted principal.

By physically isolating applets on the playground, our system coarsely denies access to protected resources. The challenge in supporting Java 1.2 flexibility in our system is thus to enable applets with appropriate signatures to access the resources allowed by the user while still guarding all protected resources, especially from unsigned applets. A viable solution is to route applets containing certain credentials to one "trusted" playground, and other applets to another playground, and then support remote access from the trusted playground to certain resources, according to the security policy. In the limit, the "trusted playground" could be the user's browser itself, so that applets containing certain credentials would be allowed to run in the browser (subject to the browser's enforcement of the user's security policy). Note that this solution can also be used when trust in an applet is ensured by other means, e.g., due to the host that served it.

To implement this solution, the user's security policy is compiled to produce a list of trusted principals for the proxy. Code signed by any principal in this list is permitted access by the user to certain sensitive resources, and accordingly, is allowed to run on the trusted playground or the user's browser, according to a centralized security policy. Note that it stands to reason to trust this code to run inside the domain, and even in the user's browser, since it is signed by a principal trusted by the user (regardless of the specific target for which it is authorized). The proxy continues routing all unsigned applets to the (untrusted) playground.

An applet may initially contain several class files (in a *jar* file), and furthermore, may require to load additional classes from the network at runtime (see description in Section 4.1). Hence, the security policy for a site should also determine whether every class must be properly signed to run in the protected domain, or whether it suffices for the top class of an applet to be signed to allow all referred classes to be loaded into the domain.

**ActiveX** An ActiveX control is a program that could be written in any language, and could attempt access to any system resource available to users. Certain browsers, e.g., Internet Explorer and Netscape, support importing ActiveX controls embedded in HTML pages, provided that these controls are signed by authorized principals, as specified by a local security policy. Once an ActiveX control is imported by a browser, it is spawned off as a separate process and runs unrestricted. The security of ActiveX hinges on the complete trust placed on its source; if an ActiveX control is malicious, the user's machine is seriously compromised.

Protecting resources from hostile ActiveX controls by running them remotely on a playground machine should be effective, from a security point of view. However, since the authors of ActiveX controls, unlike authors of Java 1.1 applets, anticipate the control having unrestricted access to the user's machine, it is likely that the percentage of legitimate ActiveX controls that take advantage of that access is higher. Consequently, the percentage of controls whose functionality is severely hindered by running on a resource-sanitized playground would be higher than for applets.



**JavaScript** JavaScript is a scripting language that can be embedded in any HTML page and executed in browsers such as Netscape and IE. When loaded by a browser, a JavaScript script within an HTML page can access a hierarchy of objects reflecting the layout of the page in the browser, such as windows and frames, as well as various browser properties, e.g., version and user history. JavaScript does not include any file I/O or networking capabilities, and hence, the security threats associated with it are typically focused on spoofing attacks, e.g., through changing the appearances of various parts of the browser [10], and attacks on the user's privacy, such as tracking her browsing history [2]. These attacks are mounted through legitimate (albeit unplanned) use of its features.

Recent releases of JavaScript attempted to enforce various security measures, specifically denying a script access to JavaScript objects of a page from any domain other than the script's origin domain. Although we are not aware of any break of these security measures, it is quite possible that they are not effectively enforced. To prevent attacks of one script on another, it is conceivable that different scripts could be executed in different address spaces, thereby leveraging operating system protections. If this were done on a playground similar to ours, then external mechanisms outside the JavaScript language would be needed to facilitate interaction between a script running on the playground and the browser. For example, Netscape's LiveConnect tool (see below) could be employed to communicate JavaScript requests from the playground, through Java, to the user's browser, and similarly back.

**LiveConnect** LiveConnect is a technology that facilitates communication between Java and JavaScript (and plug-ins). Applets can interact with JavaScript through LiveConnect's special classes, `JSObject` and `JSEException`. Likewise, JavaScript can invoke any public applet methods and pass them values that are properly wrapped by LiveConnect. We expect that it is possible to support LiveConnect even when Java applets are running remotely on the playground (and JavaScript does not), much like it is possible to support interaction between an applet on the playground and the browser through the `Applet` object. Thus, this would require splitting LiveConnect's special object classes in the way described in Section 5.

## 8 Conclusion

This paper presented a novel approach to protecting hosts from mobile code and an implementation of this approach for Java 1.1 applets. The idea behind our approach is to execute mobile code in the sanitized environment of an isolated machine (a "playground") while using the user's browser as an I/O terminal. We gave a detailed account of the technology to allow transparent execution of Java applets separately from their graphical interface at the user's browser. Using our system, users can enjoy applets downloaded from the network, while exposing only the isolated environment of the playground machine to untrusted code. Although we presented the playground approach and technology in the context of Java 1.1, other mobile-code platforms may also utilize it.

## Acknowledgements

We thank Avi Rubin for many useful discussions. We are grateful to Drew Dean, Ed Felten, Li Gong and the anonymous referees of the 1998 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy and *IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering* for helpful comments.

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