Formulas for Econ 200, UCSC, Fall 2016

Equations for Competitive Markets

 $\begin{array}{ll} \textbf{Linear Demand:} \ q_d = a - bp & \textbf{Linear Supply:} \ q_S = x + yp \\ \textbf{Log-linear demand:} \ \ln(q_d) = \ln(a) + \varepsilon_d \ln p & \textbf{Log-Linear Supply:} \ \ln(q_S) = \ln(x) + \varepsilon_S \ln p \end{array}$

Total Surplus=Consumer Surplus+Producer Surplus; Revenue=Producer Surplus + Variable Cost

Total Cost=Fixed Cost + Variable Cost; Profit=Revenue-Total Cost=Producer Surplus-Fixed Cost

Quantity Tax (tax per unit): $p_d = p_S + t$; Value Tax (tax on percentage spent): $p_d = (1 + t)p_S$

 $\textbf{Tax Incidence Formula: } p_{\mathcal{S}}(t) = p^* - \frac{t|D'|}{S' + |D'|}; p_{d} = p^* + \frac{tS'}{S' + |D'|}; \text{If } \varepsilon_{d} \text{ is constant: } \frac{\partial p_{d}}{\partial t} = \frac{\varepsilon_{\mathcal{S}}}{|\varepsilon_{\mathcal{A}}| + \varepsilon_{\mathcal{S}}}$

Equations for Consumer Choice and Demand

Marginal Utility: $MU_i = \frac{\partial u}{\partial x_i}$; Marginal Rate of Substitution: $MRS_{ji} = \frac{MU_i}{MU_j}$ and at interior optimum $= \frac{p_i}{p_j}$

 $\textbf{Perfect Substitutes: } u(x_1,x_2) = x_1 + cx_2; \textbf{Cobb-Douglas: } u(x_1,x_2) = \ln(x_1) + c\ln(x_2)$

CES Utility: $u(x_1, x_2) = \frac{1}{\rho} \ln(x_1^{\rho} + x_2^{\rho}); \rho \in (-\infty, 1];$ **Quasilinear**: $u(x_0, x_1) = x_0 + g(x_1)$

Marshallian Demand: $\mathbf{x}^* = (x_1^*(\mathbf{p}, m), x_2^*(\mathbf{p}, m), ...)$ is the solution to $\max_{\mathbf{x} \geq 0}$ s.t. $m - \mathbf{p} \cdot \mathbf{x}$. The Lagrangian is

 $\mathcal{L} = u(\mathbf{x}) + \lambda(m - \mathbf{p} \cdot \mathbf{x})$. The FOCs can be written $MU_i = \lambda p_i$ or $MRS_{ji} = \frac{p_i}{p_i}$.

The solutions $x_i^*(\mathbf{p},m)$ are homogeneous degree 0.

Demand Elasticity identity for product i: $\varepsilon_{im} + \varepsilon_{ii} + \sum_{j \neq i} \varepsilon_{ij} = 0$

Equations for Cost and Technology

 $\mbox{Technical Rate of Substitution: } TRS_{ij} = -\frac{\frac{OJ}{\partial x_j}}{\frac{\partial f}{\partial x_i}} = -\frac{mp_i}{mp_j} < 0;$

 $\begin{array}{l} \mathbf{MC} \colon MC(y) = \frac{\partial c}{\partial y} = \frac{\partial c_U}{\partial y}, \text{ and } \int MC = VC. \\ \mathbf{Factor\ Prices} \colon \mathbf{w} = (w_1, w_2, ..., w_n); \mathbf{Production\ Function} \colon y = f(x_1, y_2) \end{array}$

Cost Function with two factors: $c(\mathbf{w},y) = w_1 x_1^*(w_1,w_2,y) + w_2 x_2^*(w_1,w_2,y)$

 $= \min_{x_1, x_2 \ge 0} w_1 x_1 + w_2 x_2 \text{ s.t. } y = f(x_1, x_2)$

Shepard's Lemma conditional factor demand: $x_i^*(\mathbf{w},y) = \frac{\partial c(\mathbf{w},y)}{\partial w_i}$ Learning Curve: The typical specification is for $Y_t = \Sigma_{s \leq t} y_s$, AC falls proportionately, $\ln AC_t = AC_0 - b \ln Y_t$

Equations for Competitive Firms

 $\textbf{SR Profit Maximization:} \ \max_{y,x_{\mathcal{U}} \geq 0} \pi = \max_{y \geq 0} [\max_{x_{\mathcal{U}} \geq 0} R(y) - w_{\mathcal{U}} x_{\mathcal{U}} - w_f x_f \text{ s.t. } y = f(x_{\mathcal{U}},\bar{x}_f)] = \max_{y \geq 0} [R(y) - c(y)]$

Revenue if firm is competitive: $R(y) = py = pf(x_{\mathcal{U}}, \bar{x}_f)$ **FOC of unconditional factor demand**: $p\frac{\partial f(x_{\mathcal{U}}, \bar{x}_f)}{\partial x_{\mathcal{U}}} = w_{\mathcal{U}}$

Hotelling's Lemma, Supply: $y^*(p, \mathbf{w}) = \frac{\partial \pi(p, \mathbf{w})}{\partial p}$; unconditional factor demands: $x_i(p, \mathbf{w}) = -\frac{\partial \pi(p, \mathbf{w})}{\partial w}$.

Shutdown Condition (Competitive Firms): $-F > py - c_{\mathcal{U}}(y) - F \implies AVC = \frac{c_{\mathcal{U}}(y)}{y} > p$