

Econ 101 Notes

Agenda 10/30/12

- Bertrand: Heterogeneous Goods
- Sweezy/KDC
- Contestable Markets
- Score Card
- Preview of Coming attractions

Practice Problems from Baye

CH 9: 7, 8, 12, 14, 20

CH10: 2, 5, 12, 14

Bertrand (1880) Model

Structure: 2 or n firms, no entry or exit **Perfect Substitutes**. Same cost structure

Conduct: each sets own price P_i [lowest price gets all demand]

Performance: Perfect competition: $P = MC$

Q1: What if the firms have different MC?

A: Lowest MC firms gets whole market, sets $P_1 = MC_2 \leftarrow$ second lowest MC

Q2: What if the goods are not perfect subs heterogeneous or **differentiated** goods
This case is very useful in the real world however it is tricky to explain, discussion below

Bertrand- Diff-goods

Demand for #1's output is $Q_1(P_1, P_2) = 16 + 2P_2 - 4P_1 = 16 - 2P_1 - 2(P_1 - P_2)$
↑ Some sensitivity to Price difference

$$\begin{aligned}\Pi_1(P_1, P_2) &= P_1 Q_1 - C(Q_1) = (P_1 - 2) Q_1 \\ &= (P_1 - 2)(16 + 2P_2 - 4P_1)\end{aligned}$$

$$FC_1 = FC_2 = 0$$

$$MC_1 = MC_2 = 2$$

FOC:

$$\begin{aligned}
 0 &= \frac{\partial \pi_1}{\partial P_1} = Q_1 + (P_1 - 2)(-4) \\
 &= 16 + 2P_2 - 4P_1 - 4P_1 + 8 \\
 &= 24 + 2P_2 - 8P_1
 \end{aligned}$$


Nice Reaction (Solve for P_1)

$$P^* = r_1(P_2) = 3 + \frac{P_2}{4}$$

Similarly, firm #2 solves

Max $\pi_2(P_2, P_1)$ Via FOC
 $P_2 \geq 0$

$$P^* = r_2(P_1) = 3 + \frac{P_1}{4}$$



Performance/equilibrium: both firms react optimally to each other

$$\begin{aligned}
 \pi_2 &= P_2 Q - C(Q_2) \\
 &= P_2 (16 + 2P_1 - 4P_2)
 \end{aligned}$$

$$P_1 = 4, P_2 = 4$$

Sweezy / KDC


Set up the same as in Bertrand - Diff - Goods

Except

- Each firm anticipates that the other will **watch** any price decreases from \bar{P}_1 but not a price increase

example of industries: Airlines, gasoline

↑
Prevailing Price



$Q_1(P_1, P_2)$ is
 $Q_1(P_1, \bar{P})$ for price increases

$Q_1(P_1, P_1)$ for
Price decreases
 $P_2 = P_1$ the match



\bar{P} is "sticky" even if MC moves around, optimal price does not. We stay at $P_1 = P_2 = \bar{P}$ until a really large Shift in MC takes it outside the MR gap

Contestable Markets (Baumol ~ 1980)

- Perfect substitutes
- Price setting firms
- Free entry + exit → no sunk cost
- Rivals can react as quickly as consumers to prices (ex. Lunch truck)

Then:

Bertrand Competition drives price to second-lowest MC of any possible entrant

→ A monopoly! But very competitive!

Really? Will they price this low?? ... Game theory

(Whatever it takes to discourage rivals)