Econ 101

Professor Dan Friedman

HW 4 Solution

**Part 1**

13)

Charge $500 for a bundle containing skis and bindings. All consumers will purchase a bundle at this price, so your total profits from this strategy are ($500)(60) - $30,000 = $0.

15)

Set P = MC to obtain 3 - .5Q = 1 and solve to obtain the optimal package size, Q = 4 units. The total value to a consumer of package of 4 muffins is $8 (computed as (.5)($3 – $1)(4) + ($1)(4) = $8).

18)

Probably the best you can do in this instance is charge different per-unit prices on weekends and weekdays. The optimal decision on weekends is determined by  (MR = MC). Solving yields Q = 6,500. The optimal price on weekends is thus P = 15 – .001(6500) = $8.50. The optimal decision for weekdays is determined by . Solving yields Q = 4,000. The optimal weekday price is thus P = 10 –.001(4000) = $6.

**Part 2**

**1**.

*qH* = 100 − 2 *pH*(Demand function for home market)

*qF* = 200 − 5 *p F*(Demand function for foreign market)

*C* (*q* ) = 20 +10 *qt T*, and *qT =qH + q F*

**(a)** The total profit function is

*profit =TR* − *TC = pH qH +pF qF -C*( *q T* )

Set MRH = MC and MRF=MC

PH = 50 - .5qH (by rearranging demand function)

TRH = PH \* qH = (50 - .5qH) \* qH = 50qH - .5qH2

MRH= 50-*qH* (by taking derivative of Total Revenue with respect to quantity)

PF = 40 -.2qF (by rearranging demand function)

TRF = PF \* qF = (40 -.2qF) \* qF = 40qF - .2qF2

MRF = 40-0.4*qF* (by taking derivative of Total Revenue with respect to quantity)

MC = 10

50-*qH*= 10 , *qH*= 40

40-0.4*qF*= 10 , *qF*= 75

The corresponding price levels will be

*PH* = 50 − 0.5*qH* = 30

*Pf* = 40 − 0.2*qf* = 25

b) now you can have only one price, so set *p=pf=p h*

The profit function can be written as a function of *p* and maximized as follows:

Profit = p (qf + qh ) – c(qf + qh )

= p (100-2p+200-5p) - 20 - 10 (100-2p+200-5p)

FOC: 300 – 14p + 70=0 , P=26.4

**(c)** The maximum amount of willingness to pay is the difference between the present values of profits streams under part (a) and the profit under part (b)

Profit (a)= 30 x 40 + 25 x 75 − 20 −10 x (40 + 75) = =1,905

Profit (b) = 300 x 26.4 - 7 x 26.42 - 20 - 3000 + 70 x 26.4 = 1,869.28

Remember that the present value of a constant profit stream *c* at interest rate *r* is *c/r.*

Assuming the interest rate is r = 10%, the willingness to pay is:

(1,905-1,869.28) /0.10 = 357.2

2. Answer will appear here after Dec 4…

**Part 3**

**(a)**. There are 10 Nash equilibria in the coordination game. In each one, every member of the group chooses the same number, e.g., 7. The equilibria are Pareto ranked; only the NE in which everybody chooses 10 is efficient.

There is only one Nash equilibrium for the motivation game. In Nash equilibrium every member of the group chooses 0, because it is a dominant strategy that always earns the player 4 more than choosing 1. The Pareto optimal outcome (not a NE in this game) is when everybody chooses 1.

(b) Graph total payoffs (∑Li) on the vertical axis and the period on the horizontal axis. NB. Information is not available on the actual payoffs. The sum ∑Li is an UPPER BOUND on the POSSIBLE actual total.

**(c)** Comment on the relation between predicted and actual data.

For the coordination game:

From period 0 through 3, the Pareto efficient Nash equilibrium L = 10 wasn’t achieved when there is no talk among the members in the same group, and data are closer to L = 1. In subsequent periods when talk is allowed, the payoff is close to the efficient NE and in period 8 the 4 front groups all choose 10, which is Pareto efficient. In this game, players have common interests. Thus, the direct communication between players helped raise total payoffs to near the Pareto efficient Nash equilibrium.

For the motivation game:

The Nash equilibrium (everyone chooses 0) was not achieved in any period. On the other hand, it’s difficult to get the Pareto optimal outcome since in this game the players have a personal interest diametrically opposed to the common interest. It is an acute social dilemma. Data from period 1 to 4 have less cooperative behavior (choosing x = 1) when there is no communication, and they are closer to NE. Actual outcomes were always in between these two extremes and tended to be much closer to NE in most periods. Allowing talk helped at first, but not nearly as much as in the coordination game. Only with the group Z option (move to a group where x=1 was enforced) was an efficient (Pareto optimal) outcome closely approximated.