

Are you a Feminist?

The Labeling Effect of Feminism in South Korea

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Abstract

Despite intense public debate over feminism in South Korea, recent empirical research indicates growing consensus on gender equality among younger generations, raising questions about whether opposition targets feminism's substantive principles or the label itself. This study examines whether labeling a politically salient issue as "feminism" influences public attitudes and behavioral intentions. A vignette-based survey experiment was conducted with a nationally representative sample of 1,000 Korean adults in 2025. Respondents were randomly assigned to conditions where the 2024 presidential impeachment was described as led by either a feminist coalition or a general civic coalition. Two outcomes were assessed: impeachment support and protest participation willingness. Results show no significant average treatment effect on impeachment attitudes, but substantial variation emerged across ideological and gender lines. Progressive respondents and women showed increased support while conservative respondents and men showed decreased support. Feminist labeling significantly increased behavioral intentions uniformly across all groups regardless of substantive positions on impeachment. These findings demonstrate that "feminism" functions as a polarizing cognitive cue in attitude formation while simultaneously operating as a mobilizing signal for political action. The label conditionally shapes political judgments through interaction with prior predispositions yet independently mobilizes behavioral engagement. The study contributes to understanding how ideologically charged labels operate in contemporary political discourse and challenges assumptions that such labeling uniformly induces disengagement or backlash.

Keywords: *feminism labeling, framing effects, survey experiment, political attitudes, behavioral intentions, gender politics, South Korea*

1 Introduction

“Not just any feminism — it has to be the proper kind.”

– Yoon Suk-yeol, People’s Power Party presidential candidate, during a lecture in 2021

“Now is not the time to talk about feminism.

This is a time to focus on humanism, not just feminism.”

– Representative Hong Joon-pyo, during a youth policy talk show in 2021

Since the women’s suffrage movement of the 19th century, Western society has gradually built consensus around the importance of women’s rights. However, like other social movements, feminism has evolved in multiple directions over time, creating ongoing debates and controversies that persist today. In recent decades, these debates have become particularly intense in East Asia, with South Korea emerging as one of the most compelling cases for examination.

Following the peak of feminist movements from 2015 through 2018, spanning the “I am a feminist” hashtag campaign to the #MeToo movement, Korea immediately witnessed a fierce anti-feminist backlash centered on claims of ‘misandry’ and reverse discrimination. Public controversies intensified when incidents such as a voice actress being replaced for wearing a feminist T-shirt(Ko, 2016) and female celebrities facing harassment for reading gender-themed literature(Lee, 2018) made headlines. As a result, the term feminism became increasingly stigmatized within public discourse, frequently portrayed as a “dirty word”(Hines and Song, 2021). The more recent so-called “finger pinching controversy,”¹ which swept through the gaming industry and beyond, further illustrates the entrenchment of anti-feminist sentiment in contemporary Korea(Kim, 2024).

In this context, the highly polarized debate over feminism has frequently been mobilized as evidence of “gender conflict”(Lee, 2023; Kim, 2021), emerging as a salient factor contributing to political polarization among younger cohorts. Recent elections have revealed pronounced gender-based cleavages among young voters, with voting patterns among men and women in their twenties diverging markedly in both the 2022, 2025 presidential election and 2022 nationwide local elections.²

However, recent literature has challenged the prevailing discourse of “gender conflict,” emphasizing the paucity of empirical evidence and arguing that the narrative has been substantially overstated. According to the ‘Survey on Young Men in Their Twenties’ conducted by *SisaIN* in 2018, while a distinct anti-feminist subgroup can be identified within the younger generation, the survey found no significant gender-based differences

¹The Finger pinching gesture is accused by amount of young men of being a symbol of extreme feminist, which ridicules the size of Korean men’s genitals. For further context and details, see Jung (2021).

²In the 2022 presidential election, approximately 58% of young men voted for Yoon Suk-yeol, while a similar proportion of young women supported Lee Jae-myung(Choi and Kim, 2022). Even in the 2025 presidential election, which took place immediately following the impeachment, 37% of men in their twenties still voted for the candidate from the former president’s party, compared to only 25% of women in the same age group(Kim and Yang, 2025). In nationwide local election, among voters in their twenties, 65% of men supported the Conservative party(People Power Party), while 66% of women supported the progressive party(Democratic Party), indicating an even greater gender gap than in the presidential election(Seo, 2022).

in broader policy orientations, except for specific gender-related issues(Chun and Jung, 2018). Similarly, Park (2020) contended that ideological differences within the younger generation are relatively modest along gender lines, and that generational divides are more pronounced than gender divides. Likewise, Koo (2023) demonstrated that perceptions of gender conflict declined substantially following the election period, and that attitudes toward gender issues became politicized independently of underlying sexist predispositions.

These findings suggest that opposition to feminism does not necessarily translate to sexist attitudes or rejection of gender equality principles, challenging widespread assumptions about the motivations behind anti-feminist sentiment. Empirical research has consistently shown that men in their twenties exhibit levels of gender egalitarianism comparable to, or even exceeding, those of other age groups(Ma et al., 2018; Park and Kim, 2022; Ahn and yeon Kim, 2014; Choi, 2020; Han and Kim, 2022).

Moreover, several studies have pointed out that the perception of an intensified gender conflict has been largely propelled by political actors and the media(Kim, 2019; Jung, 2025). Although contemporary discourse presumes the emergence of new political cleavages along gender lines among the younger generation, recent empirical evidence suggests that the observed gender gap is better understood as polarization around specific gender-related issues, rather than as a manifestation of a broad-based ideological divide. Nevertheless, the dominant societal narrative continues to portray gender conflict as widespread, despite empirical findings indicating that ideological differences remain limited except in relation to certain contentious issues.

However, existing scholarship has yet to sufficiently address why particular gender issues become politicized and contentious. As recent empirical studies have suggested, if gender equality – the core value of feminism – remains relatively uncontested despite the intensity of public debate surrounding feminism, then contemporary gender conflict may be overstated. This may suggest that the perceived divide is driven less by substantive disagreement over policy goals and more by the negative connotations and symbolic imagery associated with the label “feminism” itself.

Against this backdrop, the present study empirically examines whether mere exposure to the term “feminism” can influence individual political attitudes and behaviors. To test this hypothesis, a vignette survey experiment was conducted, wherein participants were presented with a scenario concerning the impeachment of the president – one of the most politically divisive issues in contemporary Korean society – to determine whether the addition of a “feminism” label alters respondents’ attitudes and behavioral intentions. The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 provides a theoretical overview of political attitude formation and reviews prior research on issue labeling effects and perceptions of feminism; Section 3 outlines the data collection procedures and research design; Section 4 presents the empirical findings and Section 5 summarizes the results and discusses the study’s limitations and broader implications.

2 Literature Review

2.1 Cognitive Mechanisms of Label Processing

Labeling, also known as naming or wording, involves the strategic use of language to assign meaning to phenomena and functions as a mechanism that can reinforce or challenge prevailing social constructs. Numerous experimental studies have demonstrated that even simple labels can dramatically shape how the public interprets and evaluates political issues. For example, characterizing a policy as “citizenship expansion” rather than “amnesty for illegal immigrants” can dramatically influence levels of public support—not because of differences in the policy itself, but due to the distinct connotations each label carries (Merolla et al., 2013).

Research on minority-related policies reveals consistent patterns: the less explicit or negatively connoted a label is, the higher the level of public support it tends to receive (Awad, 2013; Fugère et al., 2016; Verge and Tormos, 2023). Using the term “Positive Action” rather than “Gender Quota” increases support for related policies - even among individuals holding sexist attitudes (Verge and Tormos, 2023). Similarly, Awad (2013) and Fugère et al. (2016) found that the term “Diversity Policy” generated greater public support than “Affirmative Action Policy.” These findings suggest that labeling effects are often driven by whether a label evokes social prejudice or highlights the identity of the policy’s beneficiaries—both of which tend to produce more negative attitudes.

Early research by Converse (1964) established that political information processing is not uniform but varies according to individuals’ personal experiences and belief systems rather than following abstract ideological principles. Building on this foundation, cognitive science and public opinion studies have developed frameworks to explain how labels influence political attitudes. From a cognitive scientific standpoint, labels determine how individuals cognitively define, interpret, and internalize the identity of an object or issue (Pfuhl and Henry, 1993). Studies on human cognition show that individuals simplify their cognitive processing due to inherent limitations in information-processing capacity (Calvert, 1985; Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). Labels therefore operate as heuristics, facilitating faster decision-making by reducing informational complexity and activating pre-existing cognitive schemas stored in individuals’ long-term memory (Nelson et al., 1997).

In political science, Zaller (1992)’s (1992) Receive–Accept–Sample (RAS) model provides the primary theoretical framework for this study. This framework describes public opinion formation as three sequential stages. First, in the receive stage, individuals are exposed to political messages via media or elites. Second, in the accept stage, whether those messages are internalized depends on both the individual’s level of political awareness and their existing predispositions—individuals who are more politically aware are more likely to accept information that confirms their prior beliefs. Finally, in the sample stage, when asked to make a political judgment, individuals draw upon the subset of previously accepted information that is most salient at the moment of decision.

Labels operate as critical contextual cues within this process, functioning as cognitive filters that determine the acceptance threshold for new political information. They do more than convey content; they signal whether an issue aligns or conflicts with preexisting belief systems. When a policy is framed as a "feminist issue," for instance, individuals may bypass consideration of its substantive content and instead assess whether the label "feminism" is congruent with their views on gender equality or broader ideological commitments. If the label is perceived as inconsistent with those predispositions, the message may be rejected outright or cognitively distorted.

This conditional nature of labeling effects has important implications for understanding public responses to feminism-related issues. Given the polarized nature of feminism discourse, the "feminism" label may function as a particularly strong contextual cue that activates individuals' predispositions before they engage with substantive policy content. The RAS model suggests that the effectiveness of feminism labeling should vary systematically across individuals with different ideological orientations and prior attitudes toward gender issues. This study therefore examines whether the feminism label operates conditionally, as predicted by the RAS model, by testing how exposure to this label influences political attitudes and behaviors across different segments of the population with varying predispositions toward feminism and gender equality.

2.2 Perceptions of Feminism: Beyond Gender Equality Support

According to its dictionary definition, feminism refers to "the belief in the social, economic, and political equality of the sexes, a conception that is fundamentally aligned with general commitments to gender equality" (Burkett and Brunell, 2024). However, the contemporary phenomenon of individuals rejecting both feminist identity and the label of sexism cannot be fully explained by simple differences in support for gender equality. This suggests that the label "feminism" itself may carry distinct symbolic meanings that operate independently of substantive policy preferences.

Existing research suggests that attitudes toward feminism derive from three principal factors: collective consciousness, beliefs about gender roles, and perceptions of the feminism label itself (Cowan et al., 1992). However, while extensive research has examined the first two dimensions, systematic empirical investigation of the third factor — attitudes toward the feminism label — remains relatively underdeveloped.

First, collective consciousness captures evaluations of women's current social status and intentions to engage in collective action (Breinlinger and Kelly, 1994; Buschman and Lenart, 1996; Cook, 1989). Higher levels of collective consciousness are generally associated with greater support for feminism, with empirical studies revealing gender-based differences in these evaluations (Breen and Karpinski, 2008; Roy et al., 2007; Anastopoulos and Desmarais, 2015). Second, beliefs about gender roles significantly shape support for feminism. Individuals who reject traditional gender roles or endorse egalitarian beliefs are consistently more likely to support feminist causes (Andersen and Cook, 1985; Levonian Morgan, 1996). Social identity theory explains these patterns by suggesting that

feminism is closely tied to group identity and status considerations. Third, and most relevant to this study, attitudes toward the feminism label itself constitute a critical but underexplored explanatory factor. Early research by Jacobson (1979) found that support for women's movements varied significantly depending on the terminology employed, while Buschman and Lenart (1996) demonstrated that attitudinal differences emerged among self-identified feminists, post-feminists, and anti-feminists. These findings indicate that negative perceptions and stigma associated with the term "feminism" play a pivotal role in explaining contemporary backlash against feminist movements (Breen and Karpinski, 2008; Roy et al., 2007; Anastosopoulos and Desmarais, 2015).

Nevertheless, systematic empirical research on how variation in feminism labeling affects public attitudes toward gender equality advocacy remains limited. Most existing studies focus on measuring attitudes toward feminism as a static concept rather than examining how the strategic use of feminist labels influences political responses. This gap is particularly significant given that the first two dimensions alone cannot fully explain cross-national variations in feminist attitudes, particularly in contexts where individuals who profess support for gender equality frequently disavow feminist identity.

Recent research on anti-feminist sentiment has focused primarily on group-based explanations. Since Faludi (1991)'s *Backlash*, anti-feminism has been interpreted as a reaction among groups perceiving feminism as a threat to their privileged status (Krook, 2015). However, these group-centered analyses have limitations in explaining the broader diffusion of anti-feminist attitudes across different demographic segments and political contexts.

This study addresses these limitations by examining the effects of feminism labeling at the individual level. Rather than focusing on group characteristics or demographic differences, it investigates how exposure to the feminism label influences individual political attitudes and behaviors when attached to a contentious political issue. This approach allows for a more precise understanding of labeling effects as a cognitive mechanism that operates across different social groups and political contexts.

2.3 Labeling Effect of Feminism

Empirical research has consistently demonstrated that the terms "feminist" and "feminism" evoke distinct and often negative responses from the public. Jacobson (1979) was among the first to empirically demonstrate that public attitudes vary depending on the specific term used to describe the women's movement. Comparing phrases such as "equal rights for women," "feminism," "women's lib," and "women's liberation," he found that "feminism" and "women's liberation" elicited more negative responses. More recent experimental evidence has reinforced these findings. Anastosopoulos and Desmarais (2015) distinguished between public contexts (e.g., how identifying as a feminist affects hiring decisions) and private contexts (e.g., how the label influences personal evaluations or relationships). Their results demonstrated that while feminist-related behaviors – such as advocating for women's rights or opposing sexism – did not significantly alter per-

ceptions, the mere application of the “feminist” label negatively affected how individuals were evaluated. This suggests that the symbolic effects of the label operate independently of substantive content or behavior.

Building on this evidence, previous studies have primarily focused on attitudes toward feminists as individuals or feminism as a social movement. Subsequent studies, including those by Buschman and Lenart (1996) and Callaghan and Schnell (2001), investigated how the naming of feminist movements shaped public opinion. These studies primarily focused on attitudes toward feminists as individuals or feminism as a social movement, assuming that negative views of feminism directly translate into unfavorable evaluations of those associated with it.

However, in real-world political contexts, the effects of feminist labeling may extend beyond evaluations of individuals to influence how people respond to political issues with which feminist actors are involved or merely associated. In South Korea, where anti-feminist sentiment is particularly salient, this study contributes to the literature by empirically examining how the feminism label shapes public responses to a highly politicized issue. This approach extends existing research on labeling effects by exploring how symbolic language influences opinion formation in contentious political discourse. Understanding how symbolic language influences opinion formation in contentious political discourse requires examining labeling effects in actual political contexts, rather than limiting analysis to interpersonal evaluations or abstract movement assessments.

As noted earlier, research has identified two primary psychological mechanisms through which feminist labeling influences political attitudes and behaviors. First, the feminism label activates negative stereotypes about feminists. Several studies point out that the term “feminist” carries ambivalent connotations—negative traits such as aggressive, stubborn, or non-traditional, as well as positive ones like intelligent and logical—termed stereotypical ambivalence (Rudman and Phelan, 2007; Anastopoulos and Desmarais, 2015; Anderson, 2009; Williams, 2023). Feminists are often perceived as low in warmth but high in competence, a combination that negatively affects interpersonal evaluations and public support. Research has demonstrated that these stereotypes can be activated by the feminism label, thereby influencing individual evaluations and responses (Hall et al., 2015; Rios, 2013). In South Korea, survey evidence highlights the salience of such perceptions: in 2022, only 9.5% of male and 28.4% of female university students reported favorable views of feminism (Kim, 2022a).

When applied to political issues, this stereotype activation mechanism suggests that feminist labels will reduce public support independent of substantive policy content. Labels serve as cognitive cues that activate pre-existing associations before individuals engage with actual issue details. The consistent evidence of negative stereotypical associations with feminism should therefore translate into reduced support for any political issue carrying the feminist label. Based on this theoretical framework, the first hypothesis is formulated as follows:

H1 :The policy issue labeled as “feminist” is less likely to gain public support compared to those

without such a label.

Second, the mechanism underlying the feminism labeling effect may also be explained by the concept of anticipated stigma. While many individuals support the principles of gender equality, they often refrain from identifying as feminists — a phenomenon frequently summarized by the phrase “I’m not a feminist, but. . .”. Since Schneider (1985)’s foundational work, studies have highlighted that young women in particular tend to avoid group identification with feminism, primarily due to negative stereotypes and fears of social disapproval (Breen and Karpinski, 2008; Zucker, 2004; McLaughlin and Aikman, 2020).

When a label is linked to socially discredited meanings, individuals may avoid expressing affiliation with that label or participating in behaviors associated with it. Social identity theory (Tajfel et al., 1979) shows that group identification forms a central component of self-concept, and individuals maintain a positive social identity by avoiding association with negatively perceived groups. Anticipated stigma refers specifically to the expectation that being identified as a feminist will result in negative social evaluation, thereby suppressing overt expression of one’s beliefs or preferences (Quinn et al., 2015; Meyer, 1995; Bos et al., 2013). In the South Korean context, young women often report expressing their views cautiously—or refraining from public expression altogether—due to the stigma surrounding feminism (Jung and Moon, 2024; Oh, 2019; Hines and Song, 2021).

This anticipated stigma mechanism has particularly strong implications for political behavior. Unlike attitudinal responses, which can remain private, political actions such as protest participation or public advocacy inherently involve social visibility and potential judgment. The symbolic weight of the feminism label may therefore create stronger barriers to behavioral engagement than to private attitude formation, as public association with feminist-labeled causes carries social costs and reputational risks. The second research hypothesis follows:

H2 :Individuals will be less likely to engage in political action when an issue is labeled as “feminist” than when it is not.

However, consistent with Zaller (1992)’s RAS model, the effects of feminism labeling are unlikely to be uniform across all individuals. Rather, labeling effects should vary systematically based on individuals’ predispositions and social identities. Citizens are more likely to accept messages congruent with their predispositions while resisting incongruent ones. Applied to feminism labeling, this suggests that individuals whose predispositions align with feminist principles may not only resist negative stereotypes associated with the label but may even experience positive mobilization when exposed to it.

Gender represents a fundamental social identity that shapes responses to feminism. Research consistently shows that women are more likely to hold positive attitudes toward feminism and feminist identity compared to men (Breen and Karpinski, 2008; Burn et al., 2000; Kook et al., 2022). Social identity theory suggests that feminism is closely tied to women’s collective identity and status enhancement, making women more receptive to

feminist-labeled issues(Breen and Karpinski, 2008; Wang and Dovidio, 2017; Baek and Choi, 2021). By contrast, men are more likely to perceive feminism as challenging existing gender hierarchies, generating discomfort or resistance when exposed to feminist cues(Faludi, 1991; Benstead et al., 2023; Chun and Jung, 2018). These gendered predispositions imply that feminist labeling should have systematically different consequences: for women, the label signals value congruence and group solidarity, thereby encouraging both greater support for feminist-labeled issues and stronger willingness to participate in related collective actions; for men, the same label is more likely to be received as incongruent or threatening, reducing attitudinal support and suppressing behavioral intentions.

H3: Female participants are expected to show more favorable attitudes and stronger protest intentions toward feminist-labeled initiatives than male participants.

Similarly, ideological orientation should condition the effects of feminism labeling on both attitudes and behavioral engagement. Political ideology represents a broad belief system that encompasses attitudes toward social change, equality, and traditional institutions. Progressive individuals are generally more supportive of social movements advocating for marginalized groups, including feminist movements, while conservative individuals tend to prefer maintaining existing social arrangements(Becker, 2020; Brown and Mourão, 2022; Jost et al., 2018). Psychological research on system justification further supports this view, showing that conservatives are motivated to defend and legitimize existing social hierarchies, which makes them less receptive to labels associated with social change(Jost and Van der Toorn, 2012). For progressives, feminist labels may serve as mobilizing cues that signal value congruence and activate their predisposition toward social justice activism. The feminist label may thus function as a “rally signal” that enhances both support and willingness to engage in political action among those whose ideological framework embraces social change and equality advocacy. Conversely, conservatives may view feminist-labeled issues as threatening to traditional values, leading to both attitudinal resistance and behavioral avoidance.

This ideological conditioning effect should be particularly pronounced in the South Korean context, where gender issues have become increasingly polarized along partisan lines. Following the 2018 #MeToo movement and subsequent political developments, progressive parties have adopted pro-women policies while conservative parties have embraced anti-feminist rhetoric, including pledges to abolish the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family(Kang, 2023; Kim, 2022b). This partisan realignment has created a political environment where feminism serves as a clear ideological marker, making the feminist label a powerful cue for both progressive mobilization and conservative resistance. Therefore:

H4 : Ideologically progressive individuals are expected to show more favorable attitudes and stronger protest intentions toward feminist-labeled initiatives than conservative individuals.

3 Data & Method

3.1 Case Selection

To examine the effects of feminism labeling, this study selected the impeachment of the president – one of the most prominent political controversies in recent Korean society – as the vignette topic. Public attention toward presidential impeachment surged between December 2024, when President Yoon Suk-yeol declared martial law, and April 2025, when the Constitutional Court rendered its ruling. Both domestic and international media outlets closely followed Korea's second presidential impeachment, with many accounts highlighting political polarization as the primary catalyst for the declaration of martial law (Mackenzie, 2025; Yuhas, 2024). As the impeachment proceedings continued, public opinion regarding impeachment began to differentiate from attitudes toward the martial law declaration itself. Recent survey results indicate that although more than 70% of respondents expressed opposition to the declaration of martial law, support for presidential impeachment was relatively less widespread (Han, 2025). These figures illustrate that presidential impeachment had become one of the most salient and divisive issues in contemporary Korean politics. Simultaneously, the impeachment controversy acquired an additional dimension as a gender-related issue. The slogan "In the name of feminists, we will remove Yoon Suk-yeol!" was prominently displayed at impeachment rallies (Na, 2025). Notably, unlike previous impeachment movements, women in their twenties and thirties—the so-called "2030 generation" – played a leading role in organizing and participating in the protests. The image of young women filling public squares with symbolic props, such as light sticks, attracted considerable media attention to the gender gap in political participation among the younger generation (Korea, 2024). Meanwhile, far-right YouTube channels, which had previously mobilized around anti-feminist agendas, actively participated in counter-protests opposing the impeachment, thereby further intensifying gender-related tensions (Yoo et al., 2025; Lee, 2025).

Thus, presidential impeachment serves as an ideal case for this experimental study: while politically highly salient, the issue can be plausibly framed as a "feminist" cause without appearing artificially manipulated. Most importantly, by selecting a case that is not only the most politically contentious issue of its time but also one where the feminism label is least likely to be an arbitrary prime, this study seeks to rigorously test the explanatory power of its hypotheses even under conservative conditions.

3.2 Research Design

To examine the labeling effect of feminism, I implemented a vignette survey experiment using a nationally representative sample of 1,000 Korean adults, administered by Korean Research in 2025. The operationalization of the feminism labeling treatment proceeded as follows. Participants were presented with an excerpt from a news article reporting on public opinion regarding the impeachment of President Yoon Suk-yeol. In this excerpt, the leading group organizing pro-impeachment rallies was described either as a

"feminist coalition" or as a "general coalition," depending on the randomly assigned condition. Apart from this labeling manipulation, the content of the article was held constant across all experimental conditions.

Following exposure to the vignette, participants answered a series of questions measuring two primary dependent variables: (1) their level of agreement with the impeachment of President Yoon, and (2) their willingness to participate in related protests. Participants were introduced to the vignette with the following prompt:

"Below is an excerpt from a news article reporting on public opinion regarding the impeachment of President Yoon Suk-yeol. Please read the article carefully and answer the subsequent questions."

The vignette text read as follows:

*"In December 2024, following the declaration of martial law, the National Assembly passed an impeachment motion against President Yoon Suk-yeol. However, public reactions remain sharply divided. Anti-impeachment protesters expressed support for President Yoon's claim that martial law was a legitimate act to counter anti-state forces and criticized the impeachment initiated by the Democratic Party as hasty and reckless. In contrast, pro-impeachment protesters voiced frustration over the slow progress of the proceedings. A (**feminist coalition / general coalition**) leading the pro-impeachment rallies stated, 'A president who has pointed the guns of the military at the National Assembly and the people no longer has the right to serve as the head of state,' and urged the Constitutional Court to expedite the trial process and immediately remove President Yoon from office."*


The primary dependent variables in this study are participants' agreement with the impeachment issue ("What is your opinion on the impeachment of President Yoon Suk-yeol?", coded as 1 = Support, 0 = Oppose) and their intention to participate in protests ("Are you willing to participate in protests related to the impeachment in the future?").

4 Results

4.1 Main Analysis

This study utilizes experimental survey data collected from a nationally representative sample of 1,000 Korean adults, recruited by Korea Research in 2024. The survey was administered online between March 7 and March 10, 2025. Prior to hypothesis testing, a balance check was conducted to evaluate the success of random assignment between the treatment and control groups. The pre-treatment balance test revealed no statistically significant differences across key demographic variables, including gender, age, region of residence, educational attainment, and income level (all p-values > .05). These results suggest that randomization was successful and that concerns regarding internal validity due to pre-existing group differences are unwarranted. (For further details, check Appendix).

Figure 1: Estimated Treatment Effects on Dependent Variables



Note: Confidence intervals are at the 95% level.

To test Hypotheses 1 and 2, logistic regression and ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analyses were conducted for the two dependent variables: support for impeachment and intention to participate in protests, respectively. The results of these analyses are presented in Table 1 and 2 and the estimated treatment effects are visualized in Figure 1. As shown in the figure, the feminism labeling treatment did not produce a statistically significant effect on support for impeachment. However, respondents in the treatment group exhibited a significantly higher level of protest participation intention compared to those in the control group, contrary to expectations. Thus, both hypotheses are rejected: Hypothesis 1 lacks statistical support, while Hypothesis 2 is contradicted by the opposite directional effect.

To examine these effects in greater detail, table 1 reports the results of a series of regression models estimating the effect of the feminism labeling treatment on support for impeachment. The baseline specification (Model 1) shows that the treatment estimate does not reach conventional levels of statistical significance, suggesting no overall effect of feminist labeling on impeachment support. However, this null finding masks important heterogeneity in treatment effects. Model 3, which includes interaction terms with political ideology, reveals statistically significant treatment effects that vary by ideological orientation. These results lead to the rejection of Hypothesis 1, indicating that public support for the impeachment issue was formed independently of feminism labeling at the aggregate level. More precisely, these results indicate that while the average treatment effect (ATE) is null across the full sample, significant conditional effects emerge when accounting for ideological heterogeneity. This pattern suggests that the influence of the feminism label


Table 1: Regression Results for Issue Support

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Impeachment Support		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
treatment	−0.029 (0.139)	0.049 (0.202)	1.615** (0.705)
male		−0.223 (0.197)	
ideology			−0.658*** (0.074)
treatment × male		−0.142 (0.278)	
treatment × ideology			−0.249** (0.115)
Constant	0.886*** (0.098)	0.997*** (0.141)	4.538*** (0.445)
Observations	1,000	1,000	944
Log Likelihood	−606.546	−604.177	−425.638
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,217.093	1,216.353	859.276
<i>Note:</i> *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01			

on support for impeachment is not uniform but contingent on individuals' pre-existing dispositions.

Regarding the moderating effect of gender to test Hypothesis 3, Model 2 shows no statistically significant interaction effects. Although the statistical significance is weak, Figure 2 reveals that the direction of labeling effects by gender aligns with the research hypothesis: negative effects for men and positive effects for women were observed. These findings suggest a tentative trend in which the feminism label may decrease support for impeachment among male respondents while increasing it among female respondents. However, the magnitude and statistical robustness of this interaction effect remain limited. In other words, while the term "feminism" may elicit political discomfort or psychological resistance among some male respondents, its influence does not appear sufficiently strong to meaningfully alter attitudes toward a specific policy issue such as presidential impeachment.


Figure 2: Treatment Effect on Impeachment Support by Gender



Note: Confidence intervals are at the 95% level.

To examine Hypothesis 4, the moderating effect of ideology was analyzed (Model 3), which revealed statistically significant interaction effects. As shown in more detail in Figure 3, the labeling effect was positive for more progressive individuals and negative for more conservative individuals, confirming that feminist labeling operates conditionally based on ideological orientation. Specifically, among progressive respondents (i.e., those with lower ideology scores), the feminism frame increases support for impeachment. In contrast, among conservative respondents, support for impeachment declines more sharply in the treatment group than in the control. These findings are consistent with the Receive-Accept-Sample (RAS) model proposed by Zaller (1992), which posits that individuals are more likely to accept political messages that are congruent with their pre-

Figure 3: Marginal effect of treatment on Impeachment Support by Ideology



Note: Shaded areas indicate 95% confidence intervals.

disposition, and reject those that contradict them. From this perspective, conservative respondents are more likely to perceive the feminism label as incongruent with their ideological predispositions, thereby triggering a reactive rejection or negative evaluation of the message. Especially, the effect of feminism labeling was more pronounced among individuals with moderate to progressive ideological orientations. This suggests that when existing ideological commitments are weaker, labeling may have a greater influence on shaping political opinions – once again, providing empirical support for the theoretical claims of Zaller’s.

Turning to the regression results for protest participation intention, Table 2 shows that the treatment variable exerts a statistically significant positive effect on the dependent variable in Models (1). In other words, respondents exposed to the feminism labeling condition exhibit significantly higher intentions to participate in protests compared to those in the control group. This finding, runs counter to Hypothesis 2. Moreover, if we additionally conduct subgroup analyses splitting the sample by respondents’ stance on presidential impeachment, this tendency gets more clear. In table 3, among impeachment supporters, the feminism label exerts no discernible influence on behavioral intention, and the results remain consistent regardless of model specification. By contrast, among impeachment opponents, the treatment effect is positive and reaches statistical significance at the 0.10 level in the baseline specification. these findings suggest that the mobilizing effect of the feminism label is concentrated among impeachment opponents, whereas supporters’ behavioral in-

Table 2: Regression Results for Behavioral Intention

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Protest Participation Intention			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
treatment	0.170** (0.085)	0.164 (0.120)	−0.064 (0.236)	0.260* (0.157)
male		−0.070 (0.121)		
ideology			−0.135*** (0.029)	
impeachment support				0.292** (0.132)
treatment × male		0.014 (0.171)		
treatment × ideology			0.046 (0.041)	
treatment × impeachment support				−0.126 (0.187)
Constant	2.618*** (0.060)	2.652*** (0.084)	3.376*** (0.166)	2.411*** (0.111)
Observations	1,000	1,000	944	1,000
R ²	0.004	0.005	0.035	0.010
Adjusted R ²	0.003	0.002	0.032	0.007
Residual Std. Error	1.349 (df = 998)	1.350 (df = 996)	1.323 (df = 940)	1.346 (df = 996)
F Statistic	3.972** (df = 1; 998)	1.507 (df = 3; 996)	11.254*** (df = 3; 940)	3.490** (df = 3; 996)
<i>Note:</i>			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

tention appears unaffected. While these results should be interpreted with caution due to the reduced statistical power in the subgroup analysis, the overall pattern provides tentative evidence that labeling can activate behavioral engagement particularly among groups less predisposed to the underlying issue.

To test the conditional effects hypothesized in H3 and H4, Models (2) and (3) examine the moderating roles of gender and ideology, respectively. However, neither the gender interaction term nor the ideological interaction term reaches statistical significance, leading to the rejection of both Hypothesis 3 and Hypothesis 4. These null interaction effects suggest that, unlike attitudes toward impeachment, behavioral intentions regarding protest participation show consistent treatment effects across different demographic and ideological groups. Rather than being conditional on individual predispositions, the mobilizing effect of feminist labeling appears to operate uniformly across the sample, indicating a different mechanism underlying behavioral responses compared to attitudinal responses.

As illustrated in Model (4), this pattern persists even after accounting for respondents' stance on the impeachment. Whereas it was initially hypothesized that feminism labeling would suppress behavioral expressions such as protest participation – given its potential to induce political burden or negative perceptions – the results reveal the opposite. Rather than deterring action, the feminism label appears to stimulate protest participation intentions. This suggests that the term “feminism” may activate critical awareness or emotional mobilization among certain respondents, thereby encouraging behavioral engagement independently of their substantive position on the impeachment issue. In particular, given the influential role of emotions in shaping political behavior, it is plausible that the feminism frame activated emotional motivations such as anger or moral outrage, thereby legitimizing and reinforcing participation intentions.

4.2 Robustness Check

To assess the robustness of the main findings, this study first examined whether the treatment effects were replicated in a full model that included a broader set of covariates. Although treatment was randomly assigned - as confirmed by a balance test - additional controls were introduced to account for potential confounding factors that may influence perceptions of the feminism label. In particular, gender egalitarian attitudes were included as a key attitudinal control. These attitudes were measured using selected items from the Korean Gender Egalitarianism Scale-Revised (KGES-R) developed by Lee et al. (2019).³

Overall, the main findings were successfully replicated across all model specifications. In the baseline model, for impeachment support, the interaction between treatment and ideology is negative and statistically significant (see Appendix Table 6 for full model specifications). After adding demographic and attitudinal controls, the coefficient remains negative and comparable in size, though it falls just short of conventional significance lev-

³The KGES-R comprises six subdimensions: (1) attitudes toward gender equality in the public sphere, (2) attitudes toward women's rights claims, (3) attitudes toward traditional female gender roles, (4) attitudes toward traditional male gender roles, (5) attitudes toward patriarchal family structures, and (6) attitudes toward gender equality in the private sphere.

els. The stable direction of the effect, however, indicates that the result is not spurious but somewhat attenuated when overlapping covariates are considered. Notably, the treatment effect on behavioral intention remained statistically significant at the 0.05 level even after the inclusion of control variables, indicating that the effect is relatively robust to the addition of demographic and attitudinal covariates (see Appendix Table 7 for full model specifications).

Table 3: Regression Results for Behavioral Intention (by impeachment support)

	Pro Group		Anti Group	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treatment	0.134 (0.102)	0.127 (0.141)	0.260* (0.153)	0.253 (0.228)
Male		-0.119 (0.145)		0.092 (0.219)
Treatment × Male		0.015 (0.205)		0.007 (0.309)
Constant	2.703*** (0.072)	2.759*** (0.099)	2.411*** (0.109)	2.362*** (0.159)
Observations	705	705	295	295
R ²	0.002	0.004	0.010	0.011
Adjusted R ²	0.001	-0.0001	0.006	0.001
Residual Std. Error	1.358 (df = 703)	1.358 (df = 701)	1.317 (df = 293)	1.321 (df = 291)
F Statistic	1.723 (df = 1; 703)	0.967 (df = 3; 701)	2.878* (df = 1; 293)	1.082 (df = 3; 291)

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Additionally, Table 3 examines the effect of the feminism label on protest participation intention by splitting the sample according to respondents' stance on impeachment. The analysis shows that the positive impact of the label is primarily driven by those who oppose impeachment. This finding suggests that labels do not merely reinforce support among already sympathetic groups but can also stimulate behavioral engagement among those predisposed to resist the underlying issue. At the same time, it is noteworthy that the coefficients remain positive in both groups: while the effect is statistically significant only among impeachment opponents, the consistently positive direction across both supporters and opponents indicates that feminist labeling tends to mobilize protest participation regardless of baseline attitudes toward the issue. One possible explanation is that impeachment opponents, when exposed to the term "feminism," may have experienced a form of emotional reactance that heightened their willingness to participate. While this interpretation remains tentative, the results highlight that labeling effects may operate in distinct

ways across supportive and opposing audiences, revealing the potential for political labels to generate unexpected mobilization effects.

5 Discussion and Conclusions

This study empirically examined how labeling a politically salient issue as “feminism” shapes public attitudes and political behaviors. A vignette-based survey experiment was conducted with a nationally representative sample of 1,000 Korean adults, comparing responses between a treatment group where impeachment was framed as a “feminism” issue and a control group where it was presented as a general civic movement. Two key outcomes, support for impeachment and protest participation intention, were analyzed.

The analysis revealed that feminist labeling had no significant effect on attitudes toward impeachment but significantly increased behavioral intentions for protest participation. While ideological moderation effects were statistically significant for attitudes, no such conditional effects emerged for behavioral intentions, suggesting that the mobilizing effect of feminist labeling operates uniformly across ideological groups regarding political action.

The findings reveal several key implications. First, although the average treatment effect of feminism labeling on political attitudes was not statistically significant, its direction and magnitude varied by individual predispositions, particularly ideological orientation. This suggests “feminism” operates as a politically charged cue eliciting backlash or perceived identity threat depending on respondents’ attitudinal profiles. Progressive respondents and women interpreted the feminism frame as consistent with their values, increasing impeachment support. Conversely, conservative respondents and men perceived the label as threatening or incongruent, reducing support. The feminism label operated as a cognitive filter modulating information acceptance thresholds contingent upon preexisting attitudes. These findings underscore that political judgment results not from direct information processing but from interaction between new stimuli and prior belief structures.

Second, the findings highlight that in South Korea’s political context—where political actors and the media actively deploy the term “feminism” as a symbolic tool—the label may function as a mobilizing cue that influences behavioral intentions even when attitudes remain unchanged. While impeachment attitudes were anchored by strong partisan predispositions, leaving little room for additional cues to shift opinions, the feminism label appears to have operated as a mobilizing signal heightening collective identity, affective arousal, or perceived action efficacy. Because behavioral intentions are more sensitive to emotional and mobilizing cues than cognitive evaluations, respondents expressed willingness to act even when substantive attitudes remained unchanged. This pattern emerged regardless of respondents’ substantive positions, suggesting “feminism” may exert independent mobilizing effects on political action separate from issue-specific agreement. These findings suggest avoiding feminist language is not always necessary

or effective. Rather than uniformly provoking backlash, the feminism label may mobilize supportive constituencies without significantly alienating the broader public under certain conditions. While not a universal prescription, this highlights the need to reconsider assumptions that discursive distancing is invariably prudent.

Finally, individuals' attitudes toward gender issues are shaped not only by substantive political content but also by symbolic meanings attached to labels like "feminism." This suggests gender conflict in South Korea cannot be fully accounted for by generational or gender-based value differences alone but must be understood within broader contexts where contested terms become focal points of ideological struggle. This pattern extends beyond South Korea. Polarized reactions surrounding "woke culture" in the United States demonstrate that strategic use of symbolic identity labels characterizes contemporary politics broadly. These findings provide theoretical foundations for future research identifying discursive common ground in evolving gender politics debates while highlighting the need for comparative studies examining how identity-based framing shapes political polarization across diverse contexts.

This study has limitations requiring consideration. First, impeachment served as a "hard case" for testing opinion change, as attitudes were likely crystallized when surveyed. Detecting labeling effects under such rigid conditions demonstrates findings' robustness, since treatment effects remained detectable despite highly stable opinion environments. However, this context implies observed effect magnitudes may have been constrained by limited scope for attitudinal shifts. Second, the treatment manipulation — embedding the feminism label within vignettes — may not have been sufficiently salient for all respondents to fully recognize, potentially diluting observed effects. Some participants may have overlooked the label, underestimating its true impact. However, significant effects on behavioral intentions suggest most respondents recognized the feminism framing. Finally, this study did not directly test mechanisms—such as stereotypes, stigma, or affective responses—through which labeling operates. This absence limits deeper causal inference and highlights the need for future research investigating these pathways systematically. The lack of attitudinal effects on impeachment suggests labeling dynamics may depend on issue context. Highly salient or partisan issues may leave little room for symbolic cues to shift opinion, whereas less familiar domains—such as workplace policies or local governance—could provide conditions where labels exert stronger influence. Comparative studies across issues with varying salience and complexity would clarify boundary conditions of labeling effects.

Despite these limitations, the study provides empirical evidence that feminism labeling operates not merely as descriptive terminology but as a symbolic signal conditionally altering political attitudes and behavioral intentions through interaction with individuals' prior predispositions. These findings contribute to deeper understanding of ideologically charged language's symbolic potency in South Korean political discourse and underscore the importance of developing more nuanced theoretical frameworks for analyzing framing and labeling effects in political communication research.

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Appendix

5.1 Descriptive Statistics

Table 4: Balance Test Results

	Variable	estimate	statistic	p.value
1	Age	1.250	1.178	0.239
2	Male	0.013	0.397	0.691
3	Ideology	0.185	1.351	0.177
4	Impeachment Support	−0.005	−0.179	0.858
5	Region	—	0.594	0.735
6	Income	—	1.402	0.237
7	Education	—	0.001	0.974

Table 5: Frequency table

Variables	Values	Frequency
Sex	Female	507
	Male	493
Age	20s	155
	30s	149
	40s	175
	50s	195
	60s	177
	Over 70s	149
Region	Seoul	185
	Gyeonggi/Incheon	323
	Daejeon/Chungcheong	108
	Gwangju/Jeolla	97
	Daegu/Gyeongbuk	98
	Busan/Ulsan	148
	Gangwon/Jeju	41
Education	Under Uni. grad	402
	Over Uni. grad	597
Income	Lower	287
	Middle	407
	Higher	304
Ideology	Progressive	161
	Mediate	539
	Conservative	242
Impeachment Support	Oppose	295
	Agree	705

5.2 Robustness Check

Table 6: Regression Results for Issue Support (Full)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Impeachment Support		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
treatment	0.159 (0.179)	0.432 (0.263)	1.265* (0.719)
age	−0.027*** (0.006)	−0.026*** (0.006)	−0.026*** (0.006)
male	−0.134 (0.195)	0.115 (0.262)	−0.141 (0.195)
ideo	−0.730*** (0.059)	−0.735*** (0.060)	−0.646*** (0.077)
region2	0.877*** (0.250)	0.907*** (0.252)	0.879*** (0.250)
region3	0.471 (0.319)	0.498 (0.320)	0.451 (0.319)
region4	2.089*** (0.495)	2.119*** (0.498)	2.050*** (0.492)
region5	0.105 (0.329)	0.121 (0.330)	0.105 (0.331)
region6	0.745** (0.294)	0.750** (0.295)	0.748** (0.294)
region7	0.502 (0.469)	0.568 (0.470)	0.471 (0.470)
education(L)	0.176 (0.141)	0.181 (0.141)	0.171 (0.141)
income(L)	−0.059	−0.045	−0.059

	Impeachment Support (continued)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
	(0.176)	(0.177)	(0.176)
income(Q)	0.402*** (0.149)	0.397*** (0.150)	0.394*** (0.150)
gender equality	0.083 (0.144)	0.086 (0.144)	0.083 (0.143)
treatment × male		−0.515 (0.362)	
treatment × ideology			−0.186 (0.117)
Constant	5.573*** (0.823)	5.413*** (0.829)	5.050*** (0.875)
Observations	944	944	944
Log Likelihood	−396.521	−395.505	−395.237
Akaike Inf. Crit.	823.042	823.011	822.474
<i>Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01</i>			

Table 7: Regression Results for Behavioral Intention (Full)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Protest Participation Intention			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
treatment	0.178** (0.086)	0.138 (0.123)	−0.036 (0.238)	0.292* (0.157)
male	−0.048 (0.089)	−0.088 (0.124)	−0.046 (0.089)	−0.050 (0.089)
age	0.006** (0.003)	0.006** (0.003)	0.006** (0.003)	0.006** (0.003)
education(L)	0.063 (0.068)	0.063 (0.068)	0.063 (0.068)	0.065 (0.068)
ideo	−0.109*** (0.025)	−0.109*** (0.025)	−0.129*** (0.032)	−0.110*** (0.025)
region2	−0.055 (0.127)	−0.058 (0.127)	−0.053 (0.127)	−0.052 (0.127)
region3	0.009 (0.164)	0.005 (0.165)	0.012 (0.164)	0.006 (0.164)
region4	0.183 (0.175)	0.180 (0.176)	0.184 (0.175)	0.183 (0.176)
region5	−0.114 (0.173)	−0.115 (0.173)	−0.114 (0.173)	−0.114 (0.173)
region6	−0.093 (0.149)	−0.093 (0.149)	−0.097 (0.149)	−0.091 (0.149)
region7	−0.332 (0.239)	−0.340 (0.239)	−0.321 (0.239)	−0.320 (0.239)

Table continues on next page

	<i>Dependent variable: (continued)</i>			
	Protest Participation Intention			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
income(L)	−0.022 (0.084)	−0.025 (0.084)	−0.021 (0.084)	−0.020 (0.084)
income(Q)	−0.009 (0.072)	−0.009 (0.072)	−0.006 (0.072)	−0.008 (0.072)
impeachment support	0.011 (0.114)	0.013 (0.114)	0.016 (0.114)	0.089 (0.145)
treatment × male		0.080 (0.174)		
treatment × ideology			0.040 (0.042)	
treatment × impeachment support				−0.164 (0.189)
Constant	2.978*** (0.258)	3.000*** (0.263)	3.083*** (0.280)	2.933*** (0.263)
Observations	944	944	944	944
R ²	0.045	0.045	0.046	0.045
Adjusted R ²	0.030	0.029	0.030	0.030
Residual Std. Error	1.324 (df = 929)	1.324 (df = 928)	1.324 (df = 928)	1.324 (df = 928)
F Statistic	3.099*** (df = 14; 929)	2.904*** (df = 15; 928)	2.954*** (df = 15; 928)	2.942*** (df = 15; 928)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

5.3 Questionnaire

다음은 윤석열 대통령 탄핵에 대한 여론을 보도하고 있는 기사의 일부입니다. 기사를 읽고 이어지는 문항에 답해주세요.

2024년 12월 비상계엄 선포 이후 국회는 윤석열 대통령의 탄핵소추안을 가결하였지만, 이에 대한 시민들의 반응은 극명하게 갈리고 있다. 탄핵 반대 집회측은 “비상계엄이 반국가 세력에 대응하기 위한 정당한 통치 행위였다는 윤대통령의 주장에 동의한다”면서 민주당의 졸속 탄핵을 비판했다. 반면, 찬성측은 오히려 더딘 진행 과정에 답답하다는 반응이다. 탄핵 찬성 집회를 주도하고 있는 한 **페미니스트연합단체/연합단체**는 “국회와 국민을 향해 총부리를 겨누게 한 대통령은 더이상 국가 원수의 자격이 없다”면서 “헌재는 조속한 심리를 거쳐 윤석열을 즉각 파면해야 한다”고 촉구했다.

G05. 귀하는 윤석열 대통령 탄핵에 대해 어떻게 생각하십니까?

1. 찬성한다
2. 반대한다

G06-1. 그렇다면, **탄핵 찬성 집회**에 한 번이라도 참석하신 경험이 있으십니까?

1. 있다
2. 없다

G06-2. 그렇다면, **탄핵 반대 집회**에 한 번이라도 참석하신 경험이 있으십니까?

1. 있다
2. 없다

G07. 귀하께서는 앞으로 탄핵 관련 집회에 참석하실 의향이 있으십니까?

1. 매우 있다
2. 대체로 있다
3. 보통이다
4. 별로 없다
5. 전혀 없다