Computational Theory of Mind

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General problems in the philosophy literature are demonstrated in this paper: the overuse of jargon, and preference for convoluted explanations. An example of the former is "Eliminativism is a strong form of anti-realism about intentionality". All subjects in that sentence are jargon (what is anti-realism?!), and it gives off a sense of snobbery - it purposely makes philosophy more exclusive. An example of the latter is in the section describing Mentalese, that there is a common misconception "Mentalese symbols resemble expressions in a natural language." Instead of the simple statement that "Mentalese symbols need not be structured propositionally (i.e. in sets of strings)", the paper goes on about a "pluralistic line", and "subpersonal processes". In all its convoluted digressions, there are still of lucidity.

The most interesting question to me is how does a brain built from slow neurons execute sophisticated computations so quickly. No major model of the mind (computational or connectivist) has a satisfactory answer. Hard questions like these should drive our search for new modifies or refinements to existing ones. My hypothesis is that individual neurons don't perform many computations/activations, but the massively parallel connection our neurons have allows **parallelization of operations at a lower level than what is currently feasible with digital computers**. For example, adding 2 32 bit integer numbers cannot be sped up by having multiple threads. This is because our computer computational model (structure of logic gates for adding)has addition as one of its atomic operations, which may not be true for how our brain works.