

# Portfolio Dynamics and the Supply of Safe Securities

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## Abstract

This paper explores a notable development in securitization—the use of dynamic portfolios as collateral in Collateralized Loan Obligations (CLOs). I model the endogenous formation of CLOs within an industry equilibrium of nonbank lending. The model highlights CLOs’ portfolio rebalancing, which maintains higher collateral quality by replacing deteriorated loans. This “self-healing” mechanism creates larger safe tranches and lowers CLOs’ funding costs. In equilibrium, the capital structure of nonbanks depends on secondary loan prices, which deviate from fundamentals because of price pressure exerted by CLOs. Overall, dynamic portfolios increase nonbank lending and the supply of safe securities but may threaten financial stability.

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Investors often place special value on highly-rated securities with low default risk.<sup>1</sup> Catering to this preference, financial institutions engage in securitization, transforming risky loan portfolios into securities that are safer than the original loans. Traditionally, the portfolios used as collateral for these securities were static. However, in recent decades, there has been an increasing use of dynamic portfolios as collateral for safe securities.

This practice is exemplified by Collateralized Loan Obligations (CLOs). By 2023, these nonbank institutions have created over \$1 trillion of securities backed by corporate loans. Senior CLO tranches, accounting for 65% of these securities, are AAA-rated and have zero historical defaults.<sup>2</sup> Notably, CLOs dynamically rebalance portfolios by trading loans with peer institutions. The rapid growth of this market has attracted significant attention, but its core function—safety transformation—is not well understood. What are the benefits and costs of using dynamic portfolios as collateral? How does trading in the secondary loan market affect nonbank lending and the supply of safe securities?

The key to these questions is CLOs’ mechanism of creating safe debt tranches. In general, the size of safe debt tranches is sensitive to the underlying portfolio’s future cash flows, which might be very low if the quality of loans deteriorates after securitization. By rebalancing portfolios, CLOs can replace deteriorated loans before the cash flows are realized. This mechanism, referred to as “self-healing” by practitioners (e.g., Blackstone, 2020; Mellinger, 2023), allows CLOs to issue *larger* highly-rated tranches and, thus, enjoy lower funding costs. Nevertheless, portfolio rebalancing by many CLOs may exert pressure on loan prices, hence the widespread use of this mechanism has market-wide implications.

This paper studies the implications of portfolio dynamics in safety transformation. To illustrate the self-healing mechanism, I first present stylized facts on CLOs’ loan sales and

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<sup>1</sup>Recent literature documents a special demand for highly-rated safe securities, which arises from these securities’ liquidity and regulatory advantages (e.g., Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2012; Gorton, Lewellen, and Metrick, 2012; Nagel, 2016; Van Binsbergen, Diamond, and Grotteria, 2022).

<sup>2</sup>Senior CLOs, while not riskless, satisfy investor demand for safe assets and relieve regulatory capital charges (Benmelech and Dlugosz, 2009; Cordell, Roberts, and Schwert, 2023). This provides lower risk-adjusted funding costs to CLO equity investors. See Section 1 for details on the demand for senior CLOs.

purchases, showing that these trades substantially improve collateral quality while exerting pressure on loan prices. I then develop a theoretical model to analyze this mechanism's market-wide implications. The model microfound nonbank lenders including CLOs, which endogenously arise and trade loans after ex-ante identical institutions make lending and financing decisions. Trading helps CLOs restore collateral quality, but it generates pressure on loan prices. I show that although this mechanism pushes prices away from fundamental values, it can raise overall nonbank lending, safe debt creation, and total surplus.

Like many securitization vehicles, CLOs create long-term securities backed by long-term loans, and the quality of loans might deteriorate over time. But, unlike other loans, the loans held by CLOs ("leveraged loans") are rated by credit rating agencies and traded in secondary markets. This makes the self-healing mechanism possible. By imposing constraints tied to time-varying loan ratings, CLOs' contracts obligate the managers to maintain collateral quality. Since the leveraged loan market is populated by a large number of CLOs and loan funds, collateral quality can be maintained by trading loans with peer institutions.

I analyze the interactions of these institutions within an industry equilibrium model of nonbank lending. The model has two groups of agents: investors, who enjoy a non-pecuniary benefit from safe debt, and institutions, who can create safe debt backed by risky loans. There are three periods. Initially, institutions issue debt and equity tranches to investors and originate loans. Given the non-pecuniary benefit, safe debt tranches are issued at a premium, offering a source of cheap funding. Yet, the size of safe tranches is constrained by the payoffs of loan portfolios, which are realized in the last period. This constraint is tight because after issuance, idiosyncratic shocks cause a random fraction of every institution's loan portfolio to deteriorate, potentially leading to very low payoffs.

My model highlights a novel dynamic link between debt safety and loans of different quality. Low-quality loans are riskier with a lower worst-case payoff, therefore high-quality loans are better collateral for safe debt. But loan quality is unpredictable when tranches are issued and is revealed only after the interim shocks. So the size of safe tranches, if

backed by static portfolios, is limited by the uncertainty in collateral quality. Nevertheless, institutions may rebalance portfolios. I assume that, by initially paying a fixed cost, they can credibly commit to sell low-quality loans and buy high-quality loans when quality reveals. This commitment raises the portfolio’s worst-case payoff beyond that of a static portfolio, thereby enabling the institution to issue a larger safe tranche.

While all institutions are ex-ante identical, I show that in equilibrium they make distinct financing choices: Some institutions, which resemble CLOs, specialize in creating safe debt, whereas other institutions, like loan funds, do not create any safe debt. This endogenous mix of institutions is both the cause and result of non-fundamental price deviations. Since CLOs are obligated to maintain collateral quality, the price pressure exerted by their trades decreases the relative price of low-quality and high-quality loans. As such, the safety premium captured by CLOs will be shared with loan funds as a reward for liquidity provision. Because operating CLOs incurs a fixed cost, in equilibrium, the sharing of surplus will be partial—similar to that prices partially reveal costly information in Grossman and Stiglitz (1980)—and CLOs and loan funds will coexist.

This equilibrium framework helps interpret a variety of empirical findings. For example, CLOs typically sell deteriorated loans to mutual and hedge funds (Giannetti and Meisenzahl, 2021), and their loan sales exert downward pressure on secondary market prices (e.g., Elkamhi and Nozawa, 2022; Kundu, 2021; Nicolai, 2020). Conversely, CLOs buy higher-rated loans from mutual funds, supporting the prices of these loans (Emin et al., 2021). Different from these papers, which separately examine CLOs’ sales and purchases, my model highlights portfolio rebalancing, a unique pattern of CLOs’ loan trading: empirically, there is a strong linear relationship between a CLO’s loan sales and loan purchases.

Through the lens of the model, I find that safety transformation with dynamic portfolios raises the total supply of safe debt through two channels: lending volume and risk sharing. First, since institutions could always use static portfolios as collateral to issue safe debt, they prefer dynamic portfolios if and only if doing so improves the payoffs of debt-financed

lending. Better payoffs lead to higher lending volumes and hence more loans to back safe debt. Second, risk sharing increases safe debt backed by each unit of loans because after idiosyncratic shocks, CLOs with deteriorated portfolios can restore quality by trading with other institutions. These two channels are complementary: risk sharing raises lending by improving the collateral value of loans, and higher lending generates more loans to be traded among institutions. Overall, while only a subset of institutions operate CLOs, the market produces more safe debt in total.

My analysis explains that price deviation from fundamental values is an inherent feature of equilibrium in the leveraged loan market. Usually, such deviations are interpreted as a symptom of frictions constraining liquidity provision (e.g., Coval and Stafford, 2007; Mitchell, Pedersen, and Pulvino, 2007; Ellul, Jotikasthira, and Lundblad, 2011). In my model, however, loan price deviation occurs without such frictions, and the magnitude of deviation is larger precisely when the market's total surplus is greater. This is because, when safe debt is backed by dynamic portfolios, a subset of institutions give up issuing safe debt and instead profit from providing liquidity to CLOs. This liquidity provision is optimally imperfect, which allows them to share the safety premium with CLOs. As equilibrium prices equalize the expected payoffs of all institutions, market total surplus is greater when liquidity provision is better rewarded, or equivalently, when price deviation is larger.

Finally, although dynamic portfolios improve total surplus under my rational, complete-information setup, they may also threaten financial stability in the presence of behavioral or information frictions. For example, investors might underestimate potential low-quality loans in CLO portfolios or large outflows from loan funds. If so, senior debt of CLOs failing to satisfy collateral constraints via portfolio rebalancing will no longer be safe, which in turn gives CLO managers shift-shifting incentives. Moreover, asymmetric or unverifiable information on the quality of loans might lead to contractual failures, especially when verifiable signals of quality (i.e., loan ratings and prices) become noisy in bad states of the world. Under such frictions, dynamic portfolios might amplify the probability of default and loss given default relative to

static portfolios, exposing banks and insurers that invest in senior CLOs to potential losses and triggering financial instability.

This paper extends the literature on safe debt creation, which dates back to Gorton and Pennacchi (1990). Focusing on banks' short-term safe debt, Stein (2012) presents a model in which the liquidation price of bank assets, set by exogenous buyers, constrains banks' debt capacity. My paper differs by studying how dynamic portfolios increase CLOs' long-term safe debt and how loan funds endogenously arise as trading counterparties.<sup>3</sup> This mechanism is also distinct from existing theories of securitization, which focus on static collateral pools (e.g., DeMarzo and Duffie, 1999; DeMarzo, 2005; Hanson and Sunderam, 2013). More broadly, the literature has studied the specific ways in which intermediaries create safe debt, including risk management (DeAngelo and Stulz, 2015), early liquidation (Stein, 2012; Hanson et al., 2015), deposit insurance (Hanson et al., 2015), asset opacity (Dang et al., 2017), and diversification (Diamond, 2020). My analysis adds a new perspective to these studies.

There is a growing body of empirical research on leveraged loans and CLOs. Recent papers, including the aforementioned by Giannetti and Meisenzahl (2021), Elkamhi and Nozawa (2022), Kundu (2021), Nicolai (2020), and Emin et al. (2021), study loan trades driven by CLOs' debt covenants. Consistent with a premium for safe tranches, Cordell, Roberts, and Schwert (2023) find that CLO equity earned positive abnormal returns. Foley-Fisher, Gorton, and Verani (2024) and Griffin and Nickerson (2023) examine CLO tranches' bid-ask spreads and credit ratings, respectively, in the COVID-19 crisis.<sup>4</sup> To the best of my knowledge, this paper is the first to analyze dynamic portfolios in safety transformation. It contributes a theoretical framework that unifies empirical findings around an important, yet understudied, mechanism that drives the two sides of CLOs' balance sheets.

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<sup>3</sup>The feedback between ex-post trading prices and ex-ante investment and financing choices also exists in theories of fire sales (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 1992; Gorton and Huang, 2004; Diamond and Rajan, 2011). My model differs in that no liquidation is triggered by short maturity or moral hazard; Instead, long-term contracts obligate CLOs to rebalance portfolios, resulting in a pressure on relative prices.

<sup>4</sup>Griffin and Nickerson (2023) find that CLOs' loan trades improved rating agencies' collateral pool risk metrics. However, they do not study the relationship between these loan trades and CLOs' financing contracts, or its equilibrium implications.

The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents empirical facts that motivate my theoretical analysis. Section 2 introduces model setup. Section 3 characterizes the equilibrium. Section 4 discusses the model’s implications, and Section 5 concludes.

## 1. Stylized Facts

This section introduces institutional background and empirical facts on leveraged loans and CLOs. Details on data can be found in Appendix IA.1.

### The Leveraged Loan Market

Leveraged loans are broadly syndicated loans issued by corporations with a high financial leverage.<sup>5</sup> These loans are originated through syndication deals, where underwriters organize select groups of lenders to privately contract with the borrowers. In this paper, I restrict attention to term loans, which are mostly held by nonbank institutional investors, and exclude loan commitments held by banks (Federal Reserve Board, 2022).

[Add Figure 1 here]

**Collateralized Loan Obligations.** CLOs are the largest group of nonbanks that hold leveraged loans. As Figure 1 shows, US leveraged loans grew from \$130 billion to \$1.2 trillion between 2001–2020, and CLOs consistently held at least half of these loans. While other types of securitization are mostly backed by static collateral, CLOs’ portfolios, consisting of 100–300 loan shares with \$300-600 million total par values, are actively managed during a reinvestment period. CLO debt tranches mature in around 10 years, and the reinvestment period is around 5 years and often extended. After this, the CLO enters its amortization period and gradually repays debt principal.<sup>6</sup> The vast majority of CLOs are “open-market

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<sup>5</sup>S&P Global Market Intelligence defines a loan as leveraged if it is rated below Baa3/BBB-, or if it is secured and has a spread of at least 125 basis points.

<sup>6</sup>In the amortization period, CLO managers can buy loans using only prepaid principal of existing loans. See Fitch’s report for more details: [Reinvestment in Amortization Period of U.S. CLOs](#).

CLOs”, whose managers are independent from banks. The manager’s compensation consists of size-based fixed fees and performance fees based on equity tranche returns.

**Demand for Safe Debt.** A primary force behind the growth of CLOs is the demand for highly-rated securities.<sup>7</sup> Senior CLO tranches, which account for about 65% of the capital structure, are AAA-rated. With higher yields than typical safe assets (e.g., US Treasuries) and fairly low regulatory risk weights, senior CLOs are attractive to, and mostly held by, banks and insurers. For example, Fitch (2019) reports that \$94 billion, \$113 billion, and \$35 billion of senior CLOs are held by banks in the US, Japan, and Europe, respectively. Since the 1990s, more than two thousand senior tranches have been issued, and none of them ever defaulted.<sup>8</sup> While senior CLOs are not riskless, they can earn a “safety premium” as capital-constrained investors are willing to accept a lower *risk-adjusted* return for holding highly-rated securities. This premium is a source of cheap funding for CLOs.

## **Fact 1: Asset Managers Operate Both CLOs and Loan Funds**

The leveraged loan market consists of two types of nonbank institutions: CLOs and loan funds. Most of the loan funds are mutual funds and hedge funds, and Appendix IA.2 provides a detailed summary for the amount of loans held by these funds. Loan funds generally do not use their loans to back safe securities and face limited restrictions on portfolio choices.

[Add Figure 2 here]

Notably, CLOs and loan funds are often operated by a common group of asset managers. Figure 2 displays the largest asset managers that operate these nonbanks. For example, CVC Credit Partners only operates CLOs, whereas Fidelity Investments mainly manages leveraged

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<sup>7</sup>The safety of senior CLOs is with respect to default risk, as measured by credit ratings. While these floating-rate notes are insensitive to interest-rate risk, they can be exposed to liquidity and inflation risks.

<sup>8</sup>A subset of senior CLOs were downgraded during 2007–09 but mostly recovered to original ratings (Cordell, Roberts, and Schwert, 2023). No AAA tranche was downgraded in the 2020 COVID-19 crisis.



loan mutual funds. These managers' choices lead to a coexistence of two types of nonbanks that both invest in leveraged loans but are financed by distinct liabilities.

## **Fact 2: CLOs' Binding Collateral Constraints**

The size of leveraged loans, typically hundreds of million or even multiple billion dollars, creates economies of scale in information production. As a result, leveraged loans have credit ratings reflecting changes in loan quality and are traded in the secondary market. By contracting on loan ratings, CLO managers can credibly commit to dynamically replacing deteriorated loans as their quality evolves.

CLO contracts implement this commitment with regular (e.g., monthly) collateral tests that are tied to managerial compensation. The most important is the over-collateralization (OC) test, which calculates a ratio of quality-adjusted loan holdings to the total size of tranches senior to a particular tranche, including itself. If an OC test fails, the manager stops receiving fees for that tranche until the ratio recovers to a preset threshold. The manager can raise the OC ratio through either debt acceleration (i.e., repay the principal of senior tranches) or portfolio rebalancing (i.e., replace deteriorated loans with qualified loans).

[Add Figure 3 here]

Collateral constraints imposed by these contracts play a critical role in governing the dynamics of the CLO balance sheet. Figure 3 shows quarterly cross-sectional distribution of the slackness of senior OC constraints between 2010–2019. Among CLOs in reinvestment period, the average senior OC score is slightly (8%) above the threshold and stable over time.<sup>9</sup> In the cross section of CLOs, the slackness is tightly distributed around the average. These persistently binding constraints suggest that managers fully use safe debt capacity provided by their loan portfolios. By contrast, in amortization period, as CLO leverage decreases with principal repayment, the slackness becomes larger and much more dispersed.

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<sup>9</sup>In my data, the senior OC thresholds can be that of AAA and AA tranches, so my calculation may overstate the actual slackness of AAA OC constraints.

### **Fact 3: CLOs Rebalance Portfolios In Response to Adverse Shocks**

Given that the collateral constraints are binding, shocks to the quality of CLOs’ underlying loans are likely to trigger secondary market trades. This paper highlights an empirical pattern that is less discussed in the literature: CLOs’ loan trades consist of both sales and purchases. Hence, the portfolio’s size remains similar, but its composition changes over time.

[Add Figure 4 here]

Figure 4 presents CLO balance sheet dynamics before and around the onset of COVID-19 crisis in 2020. Panel (a) shows quarterly average CLO portfolio size for each age cohort. For all cohorts, portfolio size remained stable over time. This implies that overall CLOs did not shrink in size. Indeed, Panel (b) shows that accelerated repayment of senior debt actually decreased.<sup>10</sup> While the size of portfolios did not change, their composition changed drastically. In Panel (c), the average numbers of loan purchases and sales both nearly doubled upon the arrival of the adverse shock.<sup>11</sup> To understand the nature of these trades, Panel (d) examines buys and sells *within* individual CLOs in the first two quarters of 2020. As the scatterplot shows, there is a strong positive, nearly one-to-one relationship between a CLO’s purchases and sales: when a CLO sells loans, it also buys loans to replace them. In other words, CLOs rebalance portfolios instead of liquidating loans.

### **Fact 4: Portfolio Rebalancing Improves Collateral Quality**

Using granular data on CLO loan holdings, I examine how loan trades affect collateral quality in 2020. Figure 5 presents the changes from February 15 (“pre”) to June 30 (“post”). Panel (a) shows senior OC slackness before and after the shock. As the pandemic caused massive downgrades of leveraged loans, the overall slackness decreased, and the dispersion across CLOs increased. When the crisis settled, however, only 1.2% of CLOs failed senior OC tests.

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<sup>10</sup>Earlier cohorts repaid more of their senior tranches when the non-call period ends (typically 2–3 years). Such early repayment discontinued in 2020.

<sup>11</sup>Purchases generally exceed sales because loan holdings generate coupon and principal payments.

[Add Figure 5 here]

The reason that test failures are rare, as Fact 3 suggests, could be portfolio rebalancing. To quantify its causal effect, I track individual loans' quality changes and measure each CLO's counterfactual collateral quality in the absence of loan trades. Details of this step can be found in Appendix IA.1.3. Panel (b) shows portfolio value-weighted average ratings.<sup>12</sup> Overall, portfolio ratings worsened, but managers' trading mitigated deterioration, improving the realized ex-post distribution relative to the counterfactuals.

Despite similarly binding ex-ante constraints, CLOs had idiosyncratic exposures to the shock. I measure a CLO's exposure using the difference in rating between the pre and counterfactual portfolios. Panel (c) shows that almost all CLOs replaced downgraded loans and that the effect on quality linearly increases in exposure: on average, trading offsets 60% of deterioration caused by COVID-19. Panel (d) replaces the outcome with value-weighted average loan spread, which measures quality based on priced risk. In response to a 1-notch downgrading, the manager's trades reduced average spread by 30 basis points, or roughly one standard deviation. Panels (e) and (f) show further evidence based on the direction of loan trades by comparing ratings and spreads between the loans bought and sold by a CLO.

Overall, CLO contracts triggered portfolio rebalancing trades that substantially improved collateral quality. As this self-healing mechanism reduces the uncertainty of portfolio cash flows, it helps keep a larger senior tranche safe.

## **Fact 5: CLOs Exert Pressure on Secondary Loan Prices**

Replacing deteriorated loans is costly to CLOs' equity (and managers) because these trades not only reduce portfolio payoff uncertainty, but also exert pressure on loan prices. In Appendix IA.3, I document that during market downturns, the magnitude of transitory price drops is decreasing in loan quality, ranging from nearly 15% for "B-" to only 5% for

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<sup>12</sup>A larger numeric rating corresponds to a better letter rating, as detailed in Table IA.2. Note portfolio average ratings are different from OC tests, as the OC score is nonlinear in loan ratings.

“BB+”. Consistent with price pressure from CLOs, this monotonic pattern is observed among leveraged loans but not high yield bonds. Admittedly, isolating loan price changes caused by CLOs from changes in fundamentals is difficult. While the nature of this evidence is suggestive, given various findings of price pressure in the literature, it is plausible that when a large number of CLOs rebalance portfolios in the same direction, they cause the prices of bad loans to decrease relative to the prices of good loans.

## 2. Model

The empirical facts above suggest a tradeoff between the ex-ante benefit of issuing more safe debt and the ex-post cost of replacing deteriorated loans. It is still unclear how this tradeoff affects the choices of individual institutions that operate CLOs and loan funds, as well as the equilibrium prices and quantities of risky loans and safe debt. To analyze these issues, I develop a model in which nonbank lending institutions can flexibly choose external financing and rebalance portfolios. The economy has three periods,  $t \in \{0, 1, 2\}$ , and two types of agents: investors and nonbank institutions.

**Investors.** There is a unit mass of investors. They can be banks, insurance companies, and other entities that invest in CLOs and loan funds. Some of these investors face risk-based regulatory requirements and prefer securities with sufficiently low default risks (e.g., AAA rated). To capture this important preference, I abstract away the default risk of senior CLOs and follow the safe asset literature (e.g., Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2012; Stein, 2012; Nagel, 2016) by assuming that investors maximize additively separable utility<sup>13</sup>

$$U = \mathbb{E}_0 \left[ \sum_{t=0}^2 C_t \right] + \gamma D, \quad (1)$$

where  $C_t$  is consumption in period  $t$ , and  $D$  is safe debt held at  $t = 0$ . Parameter  $\gamma \geq 0$  is

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<sup>13</sup>Therefore,  $\gamma$  should be interpreted as the risk-adjusted return that investors are willing to give up for holding highly-rated low-risk securities. Empirically, senior CLO securities indeed offer lower risk-adjusted returns (Cordell, Roberts, and Schwert, 2023).

a non-pecuniary benefit from holding safe debt. Its value is exogenous and determined by forces outside of this model.

At  $t = 0$ , investors are endowed with an amount  $e$  of perishable consumption goods. They cannot directly lend out resources but can buy financial claims backed by loans. Hence, they allocate between consumption and financial claims, taking claim prices as given. I assume  $e$  to be sufficiently large, so investors always choose strictly positive consumption.

**Nonbank Institutions.** There is a continuum of identical nonbank institutions, uniformly populated on  $\mathcal{I} = [0, 1]$ . Their preference is similar to (1), except for that they do not derive any non-pecuniary benefit from safe debt. Each institution, indexed by  $i \in \mathcal{I}$ , can make loans to generate a risky payoff. Institutions receive zero endowment and finance their lending by issuing senior and junior financial claims. In particular, a senior claim is referred to as *safe debt* if it is backed by loans whose payoff is enough for repaying the claim with certainty. Since investors cannot store or lend, safe debt can only be supplied by institutions as their senior liabilities.

**Investment Technology.** Institutions make loans as follows. Each of them can turn  $x$  consumption goods into  $x$  units of loans at a private cost  $c(x) - x$ . This private cost captures the effort of participating in syndication deals and forming a diversified loan portfolio.  $c$  is twice continuously differentiable and satisfies  $c(0) = 0$ ,  $c' > 1$ ,  $c'' > 0$  on  $\mathbb{R}_+$ . Every unit of loans generates a risky payoff that depends on state  $s \in \{g, b\}$  at  $t = 2$ .<sup>14</sup> The loans have two quality types, denoted by  $j \in \{h, l\}$ . In state  $g$ , which realizes with probability  $p \in (0, 1)$ , both types of loans pay  $R_j = R > 1$ . In state  $b$ , which realizes with probability  $1 - p$ , high-quality loans ( $h$ ) pay  $R_h = 1$ , and low-quality loans ( $l$ ) pay  $R_l = 0$ .

**Timeline.** All institutions simultaneously choose lending and financing in period  $t = 0$ . Specifically, each institution  $i$  raises  $x_i$  units of consumption goods from investors by issuing safe debt  $d_i \geq 0$  and external equity shares. Meanwhile, the institution makes  $x_i$  units of

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<sup>14</sup>For simplicity, I assume that corporate borrowers' output is fully pledgeable and that lenders extract all the rents, an approach often used in the literature (e.g., Diamond and Dybvig, 1983).

loans without knowing loan types. In this period, the institutions may opt into keeping its portfolio static until  $t = 2$ . This choice is denoted by a binary variable  $s_i \in \{0, 1\}$ .

In period  $t = 1$ , an idiosyncratic shock determines loan quality:  $\alpha_i$  fraction of institution  $i$ 's loans deteriorate to low-quality, and  $1 - \alpha_i$  fraction are high-quality. Across institutions,  $\alpha_i$  is independently drawn from a common distribution with support  $[0, \bar{\alpha}] \subseteq [0, 1]$  and mean  $\alpha \in (0, \bar{\alpha})$ . Loan quality is publicly observable and contractible, and institutions with dynamic portfolios (i.e.,  $s_i = 0$ ) can trade loans in a Walrasian market. In period  $t = 2$ , payoffs realize. As internal equity holders, institutions repay safe debt and external equity and collect residual portfolio payoffs. All goods are consumed, and the economy ends.

**Commitment.** The distribution of loan payoffs implies that, if the portfolio is static, each unit of loans can back no more than  $\rho_s = 1 - \bar{\alpha}$  of safe debt. To increase its debt capacity beyond  $\rho_s$ , an institution may opt for a dynamic portfolio. However, the ability to trade loans, if not disciplined, may compromise the creation of safe debt. The reason is a classic agency problem (Jensen and Meckling, 1976): as equity holders, institutions privately prefer loans with riskier payoffs, which makes their debt default with a positive probability.

Given empirical facts in the last section, I assume the existence of a technology that enables institutions to credibly commit to maintain collateral quality. This *commitment technology* can be thought of as third-party trustees that regularly perform collateral tests, monitor cash flows, and enforce contracts on behalf of investors. Adopting the technology at  $t = 0$  incurs a fixed cost  $\xi \geq 0$ , which captures the unique costs of operating CLOs, including the expenses of drafting indentures, performing regular collateral tests, and administering the cash flows of complex structures.

**The Institution's Optimization Problem.** Institutions with dynamic portfolios make sequential choices to maximize their payoffs. I describe their optimization problem backwardly and consider repayment only in the final period.<sup>15</sup>

Let secondary market prices of the two types of loans be  $q = (q_l, q_h) \in \mathbb{R}_+^2$ . When  $\alpha_i$

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<sup>15</sup>The option of repaying debt in period  $t = 1$  will be discussed in Section 4.

realizes, institution  $i$ , with balance sheet  $(x_i, d_i, \alpha_i)$ , chooses trades  $\Delta \mathbf{x}_i = (\Delta x_{i,h}, \Delta x_{i,l})$  to maximize conditional expected payoff to equity

$$v(x_i, d_i, \alpha_i) = \max_{\Delta \mathbf{x}_i} ((1 - \alpha_i)x_i + \Delta x_{i,h})\mathbb{E}[R_h] + (\alpha_i x_i + \Delta x_{i,l})\mathbb{E}[R_l] - d_i. \quad (2)$$

These trades are subject to a budget constraint

$$((1 - \alpha_i)x_i + \Delta x_{i,h})q_h + (\alpha_i x_i + \Delta x_{i,l})q_l \leq (1 - \alpha_i)x_i q_h + \alpha_i x_i q_l, \quad (3)$$

a maintenance collateral constraint

$$d_i \leq (1 - \alpha_i)x_i + \Delta x_{i,h}, \quad (4)$$

and short-sale constraints  $\Delta x_{i,h} \geq -(1 - \alpha_i)x_i$ ,  $\Delta x_{i,l} \geq -\alpha_i x_i$ . Constraint (3) requires the trades to be self-financed by the loan portfolio. Constraint (4) reflects the ability to credibly commit to replacing deteriorated loans: After trades, safe debt investors must receive full repayment at  $t = 2$  with probability one. This constraint keeps the institution solvent, which is why equity payoff in (2) is linear in portfolio payoff.

All market participants rationally anticipate loan trades at  $t = 1$  when institutions choose lending and financing at  $t = 0$ . Because investors are price-taking, institutions optimally price their safe debt and external equity such that investors break even in expectation. This implies a safety premium: an institution can raise  $1 + \gamma$  from issuing each unit of safe debt. The rest of funding is raised from external equity, whose expected return will be set to zero. Taking loan prices as given, the institution chooses lending  $x_i$  and safe debt  $d_i$  to maximize the expected payoff to internal equity:

$$V_i = \max_{x_i, d_i \geq 0} \mathbb{E}_0[v(x_i, d_i, \alpha_i)] - (x_i - (1 + \gamma)d_i) - (c(x_i) - x_i) - \mathbb{1}\{d_i > 0\}\xi, \quad (5)$$

$$s.t. \ 0 \leq d_i \leq \rho x_i, \quad (6)$$

where  $v(x_i, d_i, \alpha_i)$  is the  $t = 1$  maximized total equity value in (2). The second term is the funding raised from (equals the expected payoff of) external equity, and the third term is

the institution's private cost of effort. The last term is the fixed cost of commitment:  $\xi$  is incurred if and only if safe debt  $d_i > 0$  is backed by a dynamic portfolio.

Importantly, the maximization is subject to a price-dependent collateral constraint (6), where  $\rho := \rho_s + \bar{\alpha} \frac{q_l}{q_h}$  is the debt capacity provided by each unit of loans. By selling and buying loans, an institution can generate a higher worst-case payoff than that of a static portfolio. This allows for more safe debt than  $\rho_s$ , and  $\bar{\alpha} \frac{q_l}{q_h}$  is the maximum incremental debt capacity provided by the use of a dynamic portfolio as collateral.

Different from the above, if an institution chooses a static portfolio (i.e.,  $s_i = 1$ ), it optimizes lending and financing at  $t = 0$  without the ability to trade loans at  $t = 1$ .

## 2.1. Equilibrium Definition

In equilibrium, all institutions take loan prices as given and optimally choose lending, financing, trading, and whether to use dynamic collateral for safe debt. Formally, a market equilibrium in this economy is a collection  $\{(s_i, x_i, d_i, \Delta x_i)_{i \in \mathcal{I}}, \mathbf{q}\}$  such that given  $\mathbf{q}$ , institution  $i$ 's choice of  $s_i$  maximizes its expected payoff, taking into account that  $(x_i, d_i)$  solves the its lending and financing problem at  $t = 0$  and that if  $s_i = 0$ ,  $\Delta x_i$  solves its trading problem at  $t = 1$ ; Moreover, the secondary market clears:

$$\int_i \Delta x_{i,j} di = 0 \quad \text{for } j \in \{h, l\}. \quad (7)$$

Because of the collateral constraints, institutions' ex-ante lending and financing choices affect their ex-post trades, which in turn affect the lending and financing problem through endogenous loan prices.

Before analyzing the model, I introduce two notations for expositional convenience. First, let  $y_0 = pR + (1 - p)(1 - \alpha)$  be the expected hold-to-maturity payoff per unit of lending. Second, I define a function  $f(y) := y \cdot c'^{-1}(y) - c(c'^{-1}(y))$ , where  $c'^{-1}(\cdot)$  is the inverse function of the first-order derivative of  $c$ . As will be clear in Section 3, this function has an



intuitive interpretation: it maps per-unit lending payoff under a given financing choice to the institution's maximized expected payoff,  $V_i$ .

I impose two parametric conditions to restrict my analysis to interesting cases. First, I require lending to have a positive NPV for some positive quantity, which ensures that institutions always participate in lending:

**Condition 1.**  $y_0 \geq c'(0)$ .

Second, the average fraction of low-quality loans in an institution's loan portfolio is sufficiently large:

**Condition 2.**  $\frac{\alpha}{\bar{\alpha}} > \frac{1-p+\gamma}{pR+1-p+\gamma}$ .

Under this condition, CLOs in aggregate demand liquidity in the secondary market as they to maintain collateral quality by replacing low-quality loans with high-quality loans.<sup>16</sup>

## 2.2. Discussion of Model Setup

The key feature of my model is that safe debt provides cheap funding, but the underlying loans are overall scarce because of a convex cost of lending. Therefore, committing to replace low-quality loans with high-quality loans allows institutions to create more safe debt from a given quantity of lending. The loan payoff distribution is starker than necessary. What is crucial is the existence of a strictly positive minimum payoff  $R_h$ , which makes long-term safe debt possible.<sup>17</sup> Moreover, since only safe debt provides a non-pecuniary benefit, capital structure below the safe tranche is irrelevant, and it is without loss of generality to treat risky junior debt as equity.

The commitment technology is crucial for dynamic collateral to be viable. In practice, CLOs hold only fairly standardized corporate loans that have credit ratings. As a result, their

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<sup>16</sup>This condition rules out equilibria in which all institutions simultaneously face binding collateral constraints at  $t = 0$ , which I discuss in Appendix A.

<sup>17</sup>This positive lower bound is consistent with the leveraged loan market, where senior secured first lien term loans' default recovery rate is typically greater than 50%.

portfolios can be disciplined by enforceable contracts. With simple collateral, CLOs differ from pre-crisis collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), which held enormous complex derivatives (Cordell, Huang, and Williams, 2011). Consistent with these facts, in my model, every institution's portfolio consists exclusively of risky loans. This occurs because consumption goods are nonstorable, cross-holdings of liabilities are unprofitable, and state-contingent bilateral contracts (e.g., derivatives) are not available.

### 3. Equilibrium Analysis

#### 3.1. Static Benchmark

For now, suppose the commitment technology (or the secondary loan market) does not exist, and as a result, safe debt can only be backed by static portfolios. The lemma below gives institutions' lending and financing choices in this benchmark case.

**Lemma 1.** *If safe debt can only be backed by static portfolios, all institutions fully use their debt capacity:  $x_i = x_s$  and  $d_i = d_s$  for all  $i \in \mathcal{I}$ , where  $x_s := c'^{-1}(y_0 + \gamma\rho_s)$  and  $d_s := \rho_s x_s$ .*

*Proof.* See Appendix B. □

Since safe debt offers a source of cheap funding, every institution collateralizes its loans to issue safe debt and fully uses its debt capacity.<sup>18</sup> Lending  $x_s$  increases in  $\gamma$  because loans not only generate monetary payoffs but also can back safe debt, and debt capacity is more valuable when the safety premium is greater. As institutions make identical choices, aggregate lending  $X_s = x_s$ , and the supply of safe debt  $D_s = \rho_s X_s$ .

In the rest of this section, I show how the lending and financing choices differ from this static benchmark when institutions can use dynamic portfolios as collateral for safe debt. I first analyze individual institutions' lending, financing, and trading choices for given secondary

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<sup>18</sup>This market structure resembles traditional banking, where every bank creates safe debt (deposits), and loans stay on bank balance sheets.

market prices. I then study balance sheets and loan prices that clear the secondary market. At last, institutions' choices between static and dynamic portfolios will be determined in equilibrium.

### 3.2. Secondary Market Trades

The lending and financing choices at  $t = 0$  depend on continuation value  $v$ . To derive  $v$ , in this subsection I analyze the institution's secondary market problem (2) in period  $t = 1$ .

In this period, budget constraint (3) binds, and since  $d_i \geq 0$ , constraint (4) implies that  $\Delta x_{i,h} \geq -(1 - \alpha_i)x_i$  is slack. Omitting predetermined terms, the problem simplifies to

$$\max_{\Delta x_{i,l}} \left( \mathbb{E}[R_l] - \frac{q_l}{q_h} \mathbb{E}[R_h] \right) \Delta x_{i,l}, \quad (8)$$

subject to constraints  $\Delta x_{i,l} \frac{q_l}{q_h} + d_i \leq (1 - \alpha_i)x_i$  and  $\Delta x_{i,l} \geq -\alpha_i x_i$ .

Essentially, the institution substitutes between high-quality and low-quality loans. This substitution is constrained by safe debt outstanding  $d_i$  and a short-sale constraint on  $\Delta x_{i,l}$ . I proceed to solve problem (8) based on the following observation.

**Lemma 2.** *If an equilibrium with dynamic portfolios exists, secondary loan prices deviate away from their fundamental values:  $\frac{q_l}{q_h} < \frac{\mathbb{E}[R_l]}{\mathbb{E}[R_h]}$ .*

*Proof.* See Appendix B. □

Lemma 2 reflects a market-wide implication of the self-healing mechanism: portfolio rebalancing exerts pressure on secondary loan prices. Intuitively, after idiosyncratic shocks are realized, some institutions are obligated to buy high-quality loans and sell low-quality loans, which puts them in demand for liquidity. The natural providers of liquidity are institutions that hold similar loans but do not face binding collateral constraints. But for the latter to be willing to provide liquidity, low-quality loans, which are inferior as collateral for safe debt, must offer a higher expected return. As a result, low-quality loans must have a lower price-to-fundamental ratio relative to that of high-quality loans.

The solution to (8) below indicates that, consistent with Fact 3, the institution's optimal trades lead to portfolio rebalancing:

$$\Delta x_{i,h} = d_i - (1 - \alpha_i)x_i, \quad \Delta x_{i,l} = \frac{q_h}{q_l}((1 - \alpha_i)x_i - d_i) \quad (9)$$

for any  $i$ . These trades reallocate loans among institutions. An institution with  $d_i > (1 - \alpha_i)x_i$  optimally sells just enough low-quality loans to increase its holding of high-quality loans and keep its debt safe. Such portfolio rebalancing is costly to equity holders because it not only decreases the portfolio's payoff uncertainty, but also moves prices in unfavorable directions. By contrast, an institution with  $d_i < (1 - \alpha_i)x_i$  sells its high-quality loans and buys low-quality loans to profit from the deviation of loan prices from fundamentals.

### 3.3. Lending and Financing Choices

Next, I characterize the institution's optimal lending and financing choices at  $t = 0$  for given loan prices. Optimal secondary market trades in (9) imply that for any given  $(x_i, d_i, \alpha_i)$ , equity continuation value  $v$  at  $t = 1$  is

$$v(x_i, d_i, \alpha_i) = x_i p R \left( \alpha_i + \frac{q_h}{q_l} (1 - \alpha_i) \right) - d_i p \left( R \left( \frac{q_h}{q_l} - 1 \right) + 1 \right). \quad (10)$$

Substitute  $v$  into (5) and take expectation over  $\alpha_i$ , the institution's lending and financing problem becomes

$$\max_{x_i, d_i} x_i p R \left( \alpha + \frac{q_h}{q_l} (1 - \alpha) \right) - d_i p \left( R \left( \frac{q_h}{q_l} - 1 \right) + 1 \right) + (1 + \gamma) d_i - c(x_i) - \mathbb{1}\{d_i > 0\} \xi \quad (11)$$

subject to constraint (6). Because the objective function is discontinuous at  $d_i = 0$ , in what follows, I consider two cases separately.

**Equity Financing.** In the first case, institution  $i$  issues only equity and gives up safe debt:  $d_i = 0$ . The optimal lending choice,  $x_e$ , is given by first-order condition

$$y = c'(x_e), \quad (12)$$

where  $y := pR\left(\alpha + (1 - \alpha)\frac{q_h}{q_l}\right)$  is the expected payoff per unit of lending when portfolios are dynamic.<sup>19</sup> The choice  $x_e$  is determined by a tradeoff between this payoff and the marginal cost of lending. Different from the hold-to-maturity payoff  $y_0$ , here  $y$  depends on loan prices at  $t = 1$ : It is decreasing in price ratio  $q_l/q_h$  since the prices' deviation from fundamentals (Lemma 2) generates an expected profit that rewards liquidity provision.

**Debt Financing.** In the second case, institution  $i$  issues both safe debt and equity and commits to maintain collateral quality. Let  $\eta$  be the shadow price of debt capacity constraint  $d_i \leq \rho x_i$ . The conditions for optimality are

$$y + \eta\rho = c'(x_d), \quad (13)$$

$$\eta = \gamma - \left(pR\left(\frac{q_h}{q_l} - 1\right) - (1 - p)\right), \quad (14)$$

$$\eta \geq 0, \eta(d_i - \rho x_d) = 0. \quad (15)$$

When  $\eta > 0$ , the collateral constraint binds ( $d_i = \rho x_d$ ): the institution fully uses debt capacity to exploit cheap funding. On the asset side, as characterized by equation (13), optimal lending  $x_d$  exceeds  $x_e$ . The additional investment is due to  $\eta\rho$ , the collateral value of loans. Since both debt capacity ( $\rho$ ) and its per-unit value ( $\eta$ ) decrease in price ratio  $q_l/q_h$ , price pressure reduces the collateral value that can be extracted from lending.

### 3.4. Industry Equilibrium of Nonbank Institutions

Optimal choices in the two cases above determine the balance sheets of institutions that hold dynamic portfolios. Substitute these choices into objective (11), we can write these institutions' payoffs as  $V_e = f(y)$  and  $V_d = f(y + \eta\rho) - \xi$  for equity financing and debt financing, respectively, where function  $f$  was defined in Subsection 2.1. Similarly, using Lemma 1, the payoff of an institution with a static portfolio can be written as  $V_s = f(y_0 + \gamma\rho_s)$ . In equilibrium, every institution achieves its highest possible expected payoff: it obtains

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<sup>19</sup> $x_e > 0$  is guaranteed by Condition 1 and Lemma 5 below:  $z \leq \bar{z} < \frac{pR}{pR+1-p}$ , which implies  $y > y_0$ .

$\max\{V_e, V_d, V_s\}$  from its optimal choices.

The primary interest of this section is an equilibrium with dynamic portfolios. In such an equilibrium, a key endogenous variable is price ratio  $\frac{q_l}{q_h}$ , or equivalently, the rate of portfolio substitution via secondary market trading. As analyzed earlier, this ratio affects institutions' optimal lending and financing choices and hence  $V_e$  and  $V_d$ . Since only the ratio, rather than the levels, of loan prices is relevant, I use notation  $z = q_l/q_h$  hereafter for convenience. The lemmas below characterize the equilibrium's properties.

**Lemma 3.** *The lower bound of price ratio is  $\underline{z} := \frac{pR}{pR+1-p+\gamma}$ .*

*Proof.* See Appendix B. □

While the safety premium is directly captured by institutions creating safe debt, part of the surplus is transferred to peer institutions that provide liquidity in the secondary market. The price ratio determines this surplus sharing. If the price ratio is as low as  $\underline{z}$ , the sharing would be perfect, and equity financing would strictly dominate debt financing:  $V_d = V_e - \xi < V_e$ . Similar to the Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) paradox, here if the benefit of creating safe debt is fully shared through prices, then no institution would use dynamic collateral because adopting the commitment technology is privately costly. Therefore in equilibrium, price ratio must be higher than  $\underline{z}$  whenever  $\xi > 0$ .

**Lemma 4.** *Equity financing and debt financing must coexist among institutions that choose dynamic portfolios.*

*Proof.* See Appendix B. □

Obviously, an equilibrium in which institutions with dynamic portfolios all use equity financing cannot exist: facing loan prices' deviation from fundamentals, they would all trade in the same direction. It is also impossible for all institutions with dynamic portfolios to use debt financing. While some institutions using debt financing can also provide liquidity at  $t = 1$  as long as their portfolios do not experience severe quality deterioration (i.e.,  $\alpha_i < 1 - \rho$ ),

Condition 2 guarantees that the quantity of high-quality loans they sell is always less than the demand from institutions that are forced to replace low-quality loans. Therefore, the two financing choices must coexist among institutions that hold dynamic portfolios, which in turn implies  $V_e = V_d$  in such an equilibrium.

**Lemma 5.** *The upper bound of price ratio is  $\bar{z} := \frac{pR}{pR+1-p+\gamma\frac{1-\alpha}{1-\alpha}}$ .*

*Proof.* See Appendix B. □

Institutions using equity financing are rewarded for liquidity provision. Suppose the price ratio is higher than  $\bar{z}$ , the reward is too low, and these institutions would prefer static portfolios: they would be better off issuing their own safe debt by collateralizing loans. Given Lemma 4, this in turn prevents any institution from using dynamic portfolios to back safe debt. As a result, all institutions would end up holding static portfolios.

The next lemma shows that institution payoffs are monotone in  $z$  over  $[\underline{z}, \bar{z}]$ , the range of price ratio identified by Lemma 3 and Lemma 5.

**Lemma 6.**  *$V_e$  is strictly decreasing in  $z$ , and  $V_d$  is strictly increasing in  $z$ .*

*Proof.* See Appendix B. □

If price ratio  $z$  is lower, liquidity provision is more profitable, and replacing low-quality loans is more costly. This makes equity financing more attractive relative to debt financing. By contrast, if  $z$  is higher, maintaining collateral quality is less costly, and providing liquidity to others is less profitable. In an equilibrium with dynamic portfolios, the price ratio adjusts until  $V_e = V_d$ , and institutions' lending and financing choices collectively equalize the demand and supply for the two types of loans in the secondary market.

**Proposition 1.** *When  $\xi > 0$  is small, there exists a unique equilibrium. All institutions hold dynamic portfolios, price ratio  $z^* \in (\underline{z}, \bar{z})$ , and two distinct financing choices coexist: a fraction  $\lambda \in (0, 1)$  of institutions fully use their debt capacity (CLOs), and  $1 - \lambda$  of institutions*

*do not issue any safe debt (loan funds). In the secondary market, overall CLOs sell low-quality loans and buy high-quality loans, and loan funds sell high-quality loans and buy low-quality loans.*

*Proof.* See Appendix B. □

Proposition 1 characterizes the unique equilibrium with dynamic loan portfolios. Notably, while all institutions are ex-ante identical, there is an endogenous mix of two distinct financing choices: Consistent with Fact 1, CLOs and loan funds emerge and coexist. The CLOs fully use debt capacity, which they maximize by paying a fixed cost to commit to replace deteriorated loans. Binding collateral constraints generated by this commitment and the resulting portfolio rebalancing are consistent with Fact 2, Fact 3, and Fact 4. Institutions operating CLOs enjoy cheap funding from larger safe tranches and receive high payoffs if realized portfolio deterioration is relatively low.

By contrast, institutions operating loan funds completely give up issuing safe debt. They do so because market-clearing loan prices deviate from the loans' fundamental values (i.e.,  $z^* < \mathbb{E}[R_l]/\mathbb{E}[R_h]$ ), which is consistent with Fact 5. Such price pressure makes providing liquidity in the secondary market as profitable as operating CLOs. After loan quality realizes, loan funds sell their high-quality loans and buy low-quality loans sold by CLOs. The loans they sell are used by CLOs as collateral to keep senior debt tranches safe.

[Add Figure 6 here]

Figure 6 illustrates how this equilibrium is determined. As the price ratio increases over  $[\underline{z}, \bar{z}]$ ,  $V_e$  decreases because liquidity provision becomes less profitable, whereas  $V_d$  increases because replacing deteriorated loans becomes less costly. An equilibrium with dynamic portfolios exists and is unique if and only if  $z^*$ , the single-crossing point between  $V_e$  and  $V_d$ , is below  $\bar{z}$ . By contrast, when  $\xi$  is sufficiently large,  $z^* \in (\bar{z}, \bar{\bar{z}})$  where  $\bar{\bar{z}} := \mathbb{E}[R_l]/\mathbb{E}[R_h]$ . In this case,  $V_d = V_e < V_s$  at  $z^*$ , and there exists no equilibrium with dynamic portfolios as all institutions would prefer static portfolios.



## 4. Implications

### 4.1. The Supply of Safe Debt

How does the presence of dynamic loan portfolios and trading between different institutions affect the market's total supply of safe debt? Through the lens of the model, this subsection analyzes the effects of safety transformation based on dynamic portfolios on individual institutions and total quantities.

**Lending Volume.** Ex ante, every unit of lending generates an uncertain quantity,  $\alpha_i$ , of high-quality loans. Each unit of such loans pays off  $R_h \geq 1$  regardless of which state realizes at  $t = 2$ . Hence, others equal, a higher lending volume always provides greater debt capacity. My model demonstrates that in equilibrium, both CLOs and loan funds lend more than what they would had they chosen static portfolios.

**Lemma 7.** *When institutions hold dynamic portfolios, they choose higher lending volumes than with static portfolios:  $x_i > x_s$  for all  $i \in \mathcal{I}$  if  $\mathfrak{s}_i = 0$ .*

*Proof.* See Appendix B. □

Lending increases because the self-healing mechanism helps institutions extract surplus from the safety premium. Specifically, trading interactions among institutions relax individual debt capacity constraints (via Risk Sharing, see below), which allows for more cheap funding to be raised for a given quantity of lending. While loan funds do not use their debt capacity, they share part of the safety premium captured by CLOs through equilibrium loan prices. Therefore, when holding dynamic portfolios, all institutions face a higher payoff per unit of lending (i.e.,  $y + \eta\rho > y > y_0 + \gamma\rho$ ) and optimally raise their lending volumes.

**Risk Sharing.** Ex post, the commitment to replacing deteriorated loans facilitates risk sharing across institutions. While institutions are risk-neutral, risk sharing is valuable because the interim shocks, which cause loan quality deterioration and limit ex-ante debt capacity, are unpredictable and idiosyncratic. After these shocks realize, CLOs that experienced

severe deterioration can restore collateral quality by trading with institutions whose collateral constraints are slack. This reallocation of loans among institutions achieves a more efficient use of overall collateral.

The value of risk sharing is reflected in total debt capacity. The market-clearing condition (7) and loan trades in (9) jointly imply that with dynamic portfolios, total safe debt

$$D = \int_{i \in \mathcal{I}} d_i di = (1 - \alpha)X. \quad (16)$$

Hence in aggregate, debt capacity per unit of loans in this market is determined by the average ( $\alpha$ ), rather than the worst ( $\bar{\alpha}$ ), realization of individual portfolio deterioration. So by relaxing collateral constraints, risk sharing increases total debt capacity for any given total quantity of lending.

Overall, despite that only a subset of institutions, namely the CLOs, issue safe debt, they produce more safe debt in total because of larger lending volumes and risk sharing. The next proposition summarizes these effects.

**Proposition 2.** *When safe debt is backed by dynamic portfolios, the market's total supply of safe debt exceeds that in the static benchmark:  $D > D_s$ . This increase in supply comes from two complementary channels: (i) Dynamic portfolios increase the payoff, and therefore the quantity, of lending:  $X > X_s$ . (ii) Risk sharing across institutions allows for greater total debt capacity for any given quantity of loans:  $(1 - \alpha)X > \rho_s X$  for any  $X$ .*

The aggregate quantities generated by dynamic portfolios can be compared with those in the equilibrium with static portfolios. The total lending  $X$  exceeds  $X_s$ , which translates into greater total debt capacity, even if individual debt capacity per unit of loans remained at  $\rho_s$ . The actual total safe debt  $D = (1 - \alpha)X$  is even greater than  $\rho_s X$  because of risk sharing.

## 4.2. Price Deviations and Total Surplus

An important consequence of the self-healing mechanism is that when CLOs rebalance portfolios, they exert a pressure on relative loan prices. As a result, the price of low-quality loans will decrease relative to the price of high-quality loans. My model shows that this price pressure is an inherent equilibrium result, which arises as institutions facing external demand for safe debt optimize their balance sheets without financing frictions.

Interestingly, the magnitude of this price pressure is informative about the market-wide total surplus achieved with the self-healing mechanism. Given that price-taking investors break even in expectation, this total surplus equals the sum of expected payoffs across all institutions:  $TS := \int_{i \in \mathcal{I}} V_i di$ . In equilibrium  $V_d = V_e$ , so  $TS = V_e = f(y)$ , where  $y = pR(\alpha + \frac{1-\alpha}{z^*})$ . Thus, given the exogenous investment technology  $(p, R, \alpha)$ , total surplus  $TS$  is summarized by a single endogenous variable: equilibrium price ratio  $z^*$ . Moreover, since  $f$  is strictly increasing,  $TS$  and  $z^*$  are negatively associated with each other.

**Proposition 3.** *When safe debt is backed by dynamic portfolios, the market's total surplus is greater if and only if loan prices deviate more significantly from fundamental values.*

Intuitively, as individual lending and financing choices are functions of loan prices, the equilibrium price ratio is sufficient to summarize all the gains from lending and safe debt creation. The positive relationship between the magnitude of price deviations and total surplus arises from the mechanism of this market's equilibrium. Because the equilibrium loan prices always adjust to equalize CLOs' and loan funds' expected payoffs, the total surplus is greater whenever institutions operating loan funds are better off. This occurs precisely when the price pressure is more severe and liquidity provision is more profitable. Therefore, my model suggests that in this market, price deviation is a sign of value creation rather than a symptom of frictions that constrain liquidity provision.

### 4.3. Potential Threat to Financial Stability

So far, all institutions and investors are fully rational with perfect foresight on the distribution of future shocks. Under this complete-information setup, CLOs' safe debt never default, and dynamic portfolios strictly improve total surplus relative to the static benchmark. While this framework offers novel insights on the mechanism of CLOs and the equilibrium of nonbanks, it is silent on potential risks associated with this mechanism. This subsection explores the implications of CLOs on financial stability. Specifically, I examine alternative scenarios where dynamic portfolios amplify CLOs' probability of default and loss given default: unexpected loan deterioration, fund outflows, and information frictions.

**Loan Deterioration.** Suppose investors underestimate idiosyncratic shocks to loan portfolios: they incorrectly believe that the support of  $\alpha_i$  is  $[0, \hat{\alpha}]$ , rather than its true support  $[0, \bar{\alpha}]$ , for some  $\hat{\alpha} < \alpha$ . This could occur when they neglect tail states (Gennaioli, Shleifer, and Vishny, 2012, 2013) or naively rely on credit rating agencies (Bolton, Freixas, and Shapiro, 2012). Such a misbelief raises default probability when debt is backed by static portfolios, but dynamic portfolios may further worsen loss given default.

Consider a CLO that experiences unexpectedly large shocks:  $\alpha_i > \hat{\alpha}$ . The CLO's debt outstanding is determined by incorrect beliefs,  $d_i = \hat{\rho}x_i = (1 - \hat{\alpha} + \hat{\alpha}\frac{q_l}{q_h})x_i > \rho x_i$ , hence it cannot possibly satisfy the maintenance collateral constraint (4).<sup>20</sup> In this scenario, the debt tranche will default if the bad state realizes at  $t = 2$ . As the debt becomes defaultable, the CLO manager's trading objective differs from (2): now it maximizes expected equity payoff of only the good state:  $p((x_i + \Delta x_{i,h} + \Delta x_{i,l})R - d_i)$ . Using the budget constraint (3), this objective is strictly increasing in  $\Delta x_{i,l}$ . Hence, such a CLO will replace high-quality loans with low-quality loans, shifting risk to debt investors. Therefore, dynamic portfolios may amplify loss given default, reducing banks' and insurers' capital in bad states of the world.

**Loan Fund Outflows.** Suppose some loan funds (e.g., open-ended funds) experience

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<sup>20</sup>Here we ignore the second-order impact on equilibrium loan prices when a relatively small fraction of CLOs experience unexpectedly large loan quality shocks.

outflows when the market value of their portfolios drops significantly. At  $t = 1$ , if a fund's portfolio turns out to have a large fraction  $\alpha_i$  of low-quality loans, the resulting outflows would force it to downsize. That is, after selling its high-quality loans, the fund pays out cash instead of using the cash to buy low-quality loans. Since CLOs are net sellers of low-quality loans, some of these loans must be sold to outside buyers, who tend to require a significant discount in  $q_l$ . This pricing effect of fund outflows, if unexpected ex ante, lowers the price ratio and makes it harder for CLOs to restore collateral quality. As a result, CLOs with a larger  $\alpha_i$  will fail to satisfy collateral constraints, and their debt tranches will have a positive default probability, which wouldn't occur if they were backed by static portfolios.

**Information Frictions.** The quality of loans  $(h, l)$  might be better known by institutions than investors, and it may be non-contractible even if information is symmetric between institutions and investors. To induce desired actions under these frictions, contracts rely on verifiable signals (Parlour and Rajan, 2020), such as loans ratings and prices used in CLO contracts.<sup>21</sup> If these signals are highly informative about loan quality, then contracts can implement the self-healing mechanism by inducing CLO managers to replace low-quality loans with high-quality loans. However, if these signals become noisy, CLO managers' strategic portfolio choices (e.g., Loumiotis and Vasvari, 2019) may compromise the safety of senior tranches and expose banks and insurers to potential losses.

## 4.4. Discussions

### 4.4.1. The Roles of Banks in Leveraged Lending

As explained earlier, this paper restricts attention to syndicated term loans, most of which are provided by nonbank lenders.<sup>22</sup> For this reason, my model has abstracted away from banks.

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<sup>21</sup>Secondary loan prices are often available and more informative for distressed borrowers, and CLO contracts typically use par values except for severely deteriorated loans.

<sup>22</sup>For example, \$1,037.6 billion (more than 80%) of non-investment-grade term loans identified by the Federal Reserve Board's Shared National Credit (SNC) Program are held by nonbanks.

While banks are no longer major lenders of syndicated term loans, they still play at least three roles in the leveraged loan market. First, as lenders, banks provide most of the revolving credit lines (Pitchbook, 2022; SNC, 2023). Second, as underwriters, banks arrange syndication deals and help discover nonbank investors' loan demand via a bookbuilding procedure (Bruche, Malherbe, and Meisenzahl, 2020; Bruche, Meisenzahl, and Xu, 2023). Finally, as broker-dealers, banks serve as market makers in the over-the-counter secondary loan market (Phillips, 2023). Understanding the linkage between these roles played by banks and CLOs' dynamic portfolios is left to future research.

#### **4.4.2. Why Do CLO Securities Have Long Maturities?**

My focus on long-term debt leaves the question open as to why CLOs do not issue short-term debt, which can rollover in normal times and trigger liquidation in bad times. I argue that the observed CLO debt maturity is an equilibrium outcome: Given that the leveraged loan market is segmented from public securities markets and that it is difficult for outsiders to buy liquidated loans, issuing long-term safe debt is optimal for CLOs.

This argument can be formalized by introducing a costly storage technology that allows investors to purchase loans at  $t = 1$  and institutions to repay debt early. When investors' storage cost is high, so is their required return from liquidated loans. As a result, liquidating loans and repaying debt will be costly to CLOs. Thus, long-term contract, which helps CLOs maximize cheap leverage, will be optimal in equilibrium.

#### **4.4.3. Will Institutions Internalize Loan Trades?**

My model allows institutions to flexibly choose external financing. In principle, an institution can operate two entities with very different liabilities (e.g., a CLO and a loan fund), which might seem appealing as the institution can then internalize loan trades after the quality of its loans reveals. That is, instead of buying and selling loans in the secondary market, the asset manager could reallocate loans between the entities it operates.

However, doing so is suboptimal for the institution. This is because without trading in the secondary market, the quantity of safe debt the institution can create is constrained by its initial loan portfolio ( $d_i \leq \rho_s$ ), which is dominated by its choices in equilibrium ( $V_d = V_e > V_s$ ). Therefore in equilibrium, institutions tend to specialize, consistent with empirical Fact 1.

#### 4.4.4. Valuation of CLO Securities

The intuition provided by my analysis suggests that it is important to consider portfolio dynamics in the valuation of CLO securities. Since CLO managers are obligated to maintain collateral quality, assessing the risk of a CLO’s securities solely based on its current balance sheet understates both the safety of senior tranches and the risk of junior tranches. In presence of the self-healing mechanism, the manager’s portfolio rebalancing transfers value from junior tranches to senior tranches.<sup>23</sup> As a result, in bad states of the world, senior (junior) tranches tend to lose less (more) value than they would with static portfolios. A forward-looking framework that incorporates such pro-cyclical and counter-cyclical value transfers may further improve recently developed approaches of CLO valuation (Cordell, Roberts, and Schwert, 2023; Elkamhi, Li, and Nozawa, 2024).

#### 4.4.5. Dynamic Collateral Pools in Other Markets

While my paper focuses on the leveraged loan market, dynamic collateral pools have been also used in other financial markets. For example, in commercial real estate market, CRE CLOs create tranches backed by actively-managed mortgage portfolios.<sup>24</sup> In the securitization of credit card receivables, the sponsors often purchase high-quality accounts and remove delinquent accounts in the collateral pool under the monitoring of a rating agency. Similarly, to improve debt capacity and keep loans solvent, a cryptocurrency-backed lending platform named ALEX developed a Collateral Rebalancing Pool (“CRP”) technology. The CRP

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<sup>23</sup>The manager’s loan trades reduce the uncertainty in the portfolio’s future cash flows, which benefits senior tranches at the cost of junior tranches.

<sup>24</sup>According to [BofA Global Research](#), during the COVID pandemic, active portfolio management helped CRE CLOs achieve considerably lower delinquency rates than the conduit and SASB deal.

uses algorithms to dynamically rebalance collateral pools between riskier digital assets (e.g., Bitcoins) and less risky tokens as market conditions evolve. Therefore, the framework in this paper can also help interpret findings and inform policies in other markets.

## 5. Conclusion

This paper analyzes safety transformation with dynamic collateral pools. Before the 2007–09 financial crisis, the securitization industry manufactured large quantities of senior tranches backed by static loan portfolios. Many of these tranches defaulted because their underlying loans deteriorated and failed to generate sufficient cash flows for repayment. By contrast, in the leveraged loan market, CLOs have been creating AAA-rated securities for more than three decades without any default record.

The distinct feature of CLOs is a long-term contract that obligates CLO managers to dynamically maintain collateral quality by replacing deteriorated loans. This contract generates an intertemporal tradeoff: it helps CLOs create larger safe tranches ex ante and triggers costly portfolio rebalancing, which exerts price pressure in the secondary market. I develop an industry equilibrium model to understand how this self-healing mechanism affects loan prices and the quantities of nonbank lending and safe debt. My model provides a framework that rationalizes the coexistence of CLOs and loan funds and the trades that reallocate loans across these institutions. It also sheds light on how portfolio dynamics raises the supply of safe debt, improves total surplus, and poses risks to financial stability.

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


**Figure 1: Leveraged Loans and CLOs Outstanding in the US, 2001–2020.**  
 This figure plots annual total par values outstanding for leveraged loans (i.e., institutional term loan facilities) and CLOs in the US market. Data source: SIFMA.




**Figure 2: Asset Managers and the Mix of Nonbank Institutions.**

This figure presents assets under management for US CLOs and public loan funds (the sum of open-end mutual funds, closed-end mutual funds, and exchange-traded funds) operated by the 30 largest asset managers at the end of 2019. Data come from Creditflux CLO-i, Morningstar, and the SEC’s Form ADV databases.



(a) CLOs in Reinvestment Period



(b) CLOs in Amortization Period

**Figure 3: CLOs' Binding Collateral Constraints.**

This Figure presents quarterly time series of cross-sectional dispersion in the slackness of CLO senior tranche over-collateralization (OC) constraints between 2010–2019. The slackness is defined as extra OC score scaled by the OC test's predetermined threshold level. Dashed lines indicate 5th and 95th percentiles in each cross section. Panel (a) reports CLOs in reinvestment period, and panel (b) reports CLOs in amortization period.



(a) Portfolio Total Loan Holdings



(b) Accelerated Debt Repayment



(c) Quarterly Loan Trades



(d) Buys and Sells of Loans

Figure 4: **CLO Balance Sheets Around the Onset of COVID-19 Pandemic.**

This Figure shows quarterly changes in CLOs' assets and liabilities before and during the COVID-19 shock in 2020. Panel (a) plots average portfolio size by CLO age cohort. Panel (b) plots average accelerated repayment of AAA tranches by CLO age cohort. Panel (c) plots quarterly average numbers of loan purchases and sales. Panel (d) is a scatter plot that groups CLOs into 100 bins based on the dollar volumes of individual CLOs' loan purchases and sales during the first two quarters of 2020. Only CLOs in reinvestment period are included.





(a) Slackness of OC Constraint (%)



(b) Portfolio Average Credit Rating




(c) Quality Improvement: Rating



(d) Quality Improvement: Spread



(e) Trading Direction: Rating



(f) Trading Direction: Spread

**Figure 5: Portfolio Rebalancing Improves Collateral Quality.**

This Figure shows the effect of portfolio rebalancing on CLOs' collateral quality between February 15 and June 30 of 2020. Panel (a) plots kernel density estimates for the distribution of senior OC constraint slackness before and after the onset of COVID-19 pandemic. Panel (b) plots kernel density estimates for the distribution of value-weighted average credit rating for portfolios before and after the shock as well as counterfactual static portfolios. Panels (c)–(f) are scatter plots that group CLOs into 100 bins by counterfactual collateral deterioration and depict the average effect of loan trading within each bin. The fitted lines represent OLS estimates, and t-statistics are based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. Only CLOs in reinvestment period are included.



Figure 6: **Determination of Equilibrium.**

This figure illustrates how the equilibrium is determined. Solid lines  $V_d$ ,  $V_e$ , and  $V_s$  indicate the payoffs of CLOs, loan funds, and institutions issuing safe debt backed by static portfolios, respectively, as functions of secondary market loan price ratio  $z = q_l/q_h$ . A unique equilibrium with dynamic portfolios exists and has price ratio  $z^*$ . Parameter values and functional forms:  $p = 0.9$ ,  $R = 1.2$ ,  $\alpha = 0.4$ ,  $\gamma = 0.15$ ,  $\bar{\alpha} = 0.7$ ,  $\xi = 0.05$ , and  $c(x) = \frac{4}{5}x^{\frac{5}{4}}$ .

## Appendix A Equilibria Without Loan Funds

My model shows the existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium under Condition 2. In this equilibrium, CLOs and loan funds coexist, and overall CLOs maintain collateral quality by replacing low-quality loans with high-quality loans. This result aligns with empirical facts and thus forms the basis for the positive implications.

This appendix analyzes equilibria when Condition 2 is violated, i.e.,

$$\frac{\alpha}{\bar{\alpha}} \leq \frac{1 - p + \gamma}{pR + 1 - p + \gamma}. \quad (\text{A.1})$$

That is, the average fraction of low-quality loans in institutions' portfolios is relatively small. The following propositions show that in this case, there exist equilibria in which all institutions issue safe debt, with their collateral constraints simultaneously binding at  $t = 0$ . Such equilibria yield similar implications on the quantities of nonbank lending and safe securities, but the composition of institutions differs: no institution chooses equity financing, so there is no loan fund.

**Proposition A.1.** *When  $\frac{\alpha}{\bar{\alpha}} \in \left(\frac{1-p}{pR+1-p}, \frac{1-p+\gamma}{pR+1-p+\gamma}\right]$  and  $\xi$  is small, there exists an equilibrium in which all institutions hold dynamic portfolios and fully use debt capacity, price ratio  $z^* = 1 - \frac{\alpha}{\bar{\alpha}} < \frac{\mathbb{E}[R_l]}{\mathbb{E}[R_h]}$ , and  $d_i = (1 - \alpha)x_i$  for all  $i \in \mathcal{I}$ . In the secondary market, institutions with  $\alpha_i > \alpha$  sell low-quality loans and buy high-quality loans, and institutions with  $\alpha_i < \alpha$  sell high-quality loans and buy low-quality loans.*

*Proof.* See Appendix B. □

Proposition A.1 shows that when the average fraction of low-quality loans is in a medium range, there exists an equilibrium in which all institutions operate CLOs. Depending on the realization of idiosyncratic shocks, some of these CLOs provide liquidity to others. In this equilibrium, secondary loan prices also deviate away from fundamental values. But because in aggregate, the quantity of low-quality loans is moderate, liquidity provision by other CLOs is sufficient for keeping all CLOs' debt safe.

**Proposition A.2.** *When  $\frac{\alpha}{\bar{\alpha}} \leq \frac{1-p}{pR+1-p}$  and  $\xi$  is small, there exists an equilibrium in which all institutions hold dynamic portfolios and fully use debt capacity, price ratio  $z^* = \frac{\mathbb{E}[R_l]}{\mathbb{E}[R_h]}$ , and  $d_i = (1 - \bar{\alpha} + \bar{\alpha}z^*)x_i$  for all  $i \in \mathcal{I}$ . In the secondary market, institutions with  $\alpha_i > (1 - z^*)\bar{\alpha}$  sell low-quality loans and buy high-quality loans, and some of institutions with  $\alpha_i < (1 - z^*)\bar{\alpha}$  sell high-quality loans and buy low-quality loans.*

*Proof.* See Appendix B. □

Proposition A.2 addresses the case where the average fraction of low-quality loans is relatively low. In this case, there also exists an equilibrium in which all institutions operate CLO, but loan prices exhibit no deviation from fundamentals. As a result, institutions are indifferent about secondary market trades. CLOs with larger realized fractions of low-quality loans are forced to rebalance portfolios, and their demand for liquidity is fully satisfied by other CLOs without exerting any pressure on loan prices.

## Appendix B   Proofs

**Proof of Lemma 1.** When  $\Delta x_i = 0$ ,  $v(x_i, d_i, \alpha_i) = x_i(pR + (1 - \alpha_i)(1 - p)) - d_i$ , and the institution's  $t = 0$  problem simplifies to

$$V_s = \max_{x_i, d_i \geq 0} x_i y_0 + \gamma d_i - c(x_i) \quad (\text{A.2})$$

$$s.t. \ 0 \leq d_i \leq \rho_s x_i \quad (\text{A.3})$$

Since the objective strictly increases in  $d_i$ , constraint  $d_i \leq \rho_s x_i$  binds. The first-order condition with respect to  $x_i$  is  $y_0 - c'(x_i) + \eta_s \rho_s = 0$ , where  $\eta_s = \gamma$  is the shadow price of the binding collateral constraint. This gives  $x_s = c'^{-1}(y_0 + \gamma \rho_s)$  and  $d_s = \rho_s x_s$ .

It remains to show that given these choices, institutions participate in lending, i.e.,  $V_s \geq 0$ . Substitute  $x_s, d_s$  into the objective (A.2) and use function  $f$  defined earlier,  $V_s = f(y_0 + \gamma \rho_s)$ . By construction,  $f$  is continuously differentiable, and

$$f'(y) = c'^{-1}(y) + y \cdot \frac{d}{dy} c'^{-1}(y) - c'(c'^{-1}(y)) \cdot \frac{d}{dy} c'^{-1}(y) = c'^{-1}(y) > 0. \quad (\text{A.4})$$

Hence  $f$  is strictly increasing. Given Condition 1,  $f(y_0) \geq f(c'(0)) = c'(0) \cdot c'^{-1}(c'(0)) - c(c'^{-1}(c'(0))) = c'(0) \cdot 0 - c(0) = 0$ . Therefore,  $V_s = f(y_0 + \gamma \rho_s) > f(y_0) \geq 0$ .

**Proof of Lemma 2.** Suppose  $\frac{q_l}{q_h} > \frac{\mathbb{E}[R_l]}{\mathbb{E}[R_h]}$ , the objective in program (8) would be strictly decreasing in  $\Delta x_{i,l}$ , and the optimal choice would be  $\Delta x_{i,l} = -x_{i,l}$  for all  $i \in \mathcal{I}$ . This contradicts with market clearing.

Suppose instead,  $\frac{q_l}{q_h} = \frac{\mathbb{E}[R_l]}{\mathbb{E}[R_h]}$ , then in problem (2),  $v(x_i, d_i, \alpha_i) = y_0 - d_i$  would be independent with trading choices, and the objective in problem (5) would be strictly increasing in  $d_i$ . Hence,  $d_i = \rho x_i = (1 - \bar{\alpha} + \bar{\alpha} \frac{q_l}{q_h}) x_i$  for all  $i$ . Then constraint  $\Delta x_{i,l} \frac{q_l}{q_h} + d_i \leq (1 - \alpha_i) x_i$  in (8) implies

$$\Delta x_{i,l} \leq \frac{q_h}{q_l} ((1 - \alpha_i) x_i - d_i) x_i = \frac{q_h}{q_l} \left( \bar{\alpha} - \alpha_i - \bar{\alpha} \frac{q_l}{q_h} \right) x_i, \quad (\text{A.5})$$

and hence,

$$\int_{i \in \mathcal{I}} \Delta x_{i,l} di \leq \frac{q_h}{q_l} \left( \bar{\alpha} - \alpha - \bar{\alpha} \frac{q_l}{q_h} \right) x_i, \quad (\text{A.6})$$

where

$$\bar{\alpha} - \alpha - \bar{\alpha} \frac{q_l}{q_h} = \bar{\alpha} - \alpha - \bar{\alpha} \frac{pR}{pR + 1 - p} < \bar{\alpha} - \alpha - \bar{\alpha} \frac{pR}{pR + 1 - p + \gamma}. \quad (\text{A.7})$$

By Condition 2,  $\bar{\alpha} - \alpha < \bar{\alpha} \frac{pR}{pR + 1 - p + \gamma}$ , therefore  $\int_{i \in \mathcal{I}} \Delta x_{i,l} di < 0$ , again a contradiction to market clearing.

**Proof of Lemma 3.** Suppose  $\frac{q_l}{q_h} < \underline{z}$ , optimal choice in (11) would be  $d_i = 0$  for all  $i$  such that  $s_i = 0$ , and their trades would be  $\Delta x_{i,h} = -(1 - \alpha_i)x_e$ . This implies  $\int \Delta_{i,h} di < 0$ , which contradicts market clearing.

**Proof of Lemma 4.** Let  $\mathcal{I}' \subseteq \mathcal{I}$  denote the set of institutions that choose dynamic portfolios. As shown in the proof of Lemma 3, it is impossible for all these institutions to use equity financing. Now suppose they all use debt financing:  $d_i = \rho x_d$  for all  $i \in \mathcal{I}'$ . Then

$$\Delta x_{i,h} = d_i - (1 - \alpha_i)x_d = (\alpha_i - \bar{\alpha} + \bar{\alpha}z)x_d, \quad (\text{A.8})$$

and the total demand for high-quality loans would be

$$\int_{i \in \mathcal{I}'} \Delta x_{i,l} di \propto \alpha - \bar{\alpha} + \bar{\alpha}z \geq \alpha - \bar{\alpha} + \bar{\alpha}\underline{z}, \quad (\text{A.9})$$

where the last inequality follows from Lemma 3. By Condition 2,  $\alpha - \bar{\alpha} + \bar{\alpha}\underline{z} > 0$ , so  $\int_{i \in \mathcal{I}'} \Delta x_{i,l} di > 0$ , a contradiction to market clearing. Therefore, equity financing and debt financing must coexist among institutions in  $\mathcal{I}'$ .

**Proof of Lemma 5.** Note that  $y \geq y_0 + \gamma\rho_s$  if and only if  $z \leq \bar{z}$ . Since  $f$  is strictly increasing, this implies that  $V_s \leq V_e$  if and only if  $z \leq \bar{z}$ . If  $z > \bar{z}$ ,  $V_s > V_e$ , and no institution would use equity financing, and by Lemma 4, all institutions choose static portfolios.

**Proof of Lemma 6.** Given that  $f$  is strictly increasing and that  $y = pR(\alpha + z^{-1}(1 - \alpha))$ ,

$V_e = f(y)$  is strictly decreasing in  $z$ . Also, by Condition 2,  $\underline{z} > 1 - \frac{\alpha}{\bar{\alpha}}$ , so

$$\frac{d(y + \eta\rho)}{dz} = \bar{\alpha}(pR + 1 - p + \gamma) - pR \frac{\bar{\alpha} - \alpha}{z^2} \quad (\text{A.10})$$

$$> \bar{\alpha} \left( pR + 1 - p + \gamma - pR \frac{\underline{z}}{z^2} \right) \quad (\text{A.11})$$

$$\geq \bar{\alpha} \left( pR + 1 - p + \gamma - pR \frac{1}{\underline{z}} \right) = 0, \quad (\text{A.12})$$

where the last equation follows from the definition of  $\underline{z}$ . Since  $V_d = f(y + \eta\rho) - \xi$ , this implies that  $V_d$  is strictly increasing in  $z$ .

**Proof of Proposition 1.** Define the utility differential between debt financing ( $V_d$ ) and equity financing ( $V_e$ ) as a function of the price ratio,  $\Delta v : [\underline{z}, \bar{z}] \mapsto \mathbb{R}$ . By Lemma 6,  $\Delta v(z) = V_d - V_e$  is strictly increasing. At  $z = \underline{z}$ ,  $\eta = 0$  and  $V_d = V_e - \xi$ , so  $\Delta v(\underline{z}) < 0$ . Moreover, given that  $f$  is strictly increasing, for any  $z > \underline{z}$ ,

$$V_d + \xi = f(y + \eta\rho) > f(y) = V_e, \quad (\text{A.13})$$

so  $\Delta v(\bar{z}) > 0$  whenever  $\xi$  is not too large. Since  $\Delta v$  is continuously differentiable by construction, by intermediate value theorem, equation  $\Delta v(z) = 0$  has a unique solution  $z^* \in (\underline{z}, \bar{z})$ . By Lemma 5, at  $z = z^*$ ,  $V_d = V_e > V_s$ , hence all institutions hold dynamic portfolios.

Given the optimal lending and financing choices, as well as trades in (9), market clearing requires  $\lambda(\rho - (1 - \alpha))x_d = (1 - \lambda)(1 - \alpha)x_e$ , where  $\lambda$  is the fraction of institutions choosing  $d_i = (1 - \rho)x_d$ . By Lemma 3 and Condition 2,

$$\rho - (1 - \alpha) = \alpha - \bar{\alpha} + \bar{\alpha}z \geq \alpha - \bar{\alpha} + \bar{\alpha}\underline{z} > 0, \quad (\text{A.14})$$

therefore  $\lambda = \frac{(1 - \alpha)x_e}{(1 - \alpha)x_e + (\rho - (1 - \alpha))x_d} \in (0, 1)$ .

**Proof of Lemma 7.** In equilibrium  $V_d = V_e > V_s$ , or equivalently,  $f(y + \eta\rho) > f(y + \eta\rho) - \xi = f(y) > f(y_0 + \gamma\rho_s)$ . Since  $f$  is strictly increasing, this implies  $y + \eta\rho > y > y_0 + \gamma\rho_s$ . Therefore,  $x_d = c'^{-1}(y + \eta\rho) > x_e = c'^{-1}(y) > x_s = c'^{-1}(y_0 + \gamma\rho_s)$ .

**Proof of Proposition A.1.** Similar argument in the proof of Lemma 2 gives  $z < \frac{\mathbb{E}[R_l]}{\mathbb{E}[R_h]}$ . Note that without Condition 2,  $\frac{\alpha}{\bar{\alpha}} > \frac{1-p}{pR+1-p}$  still implies that  $\int_{i \in \mathcal{I}} \Delta x_{i,l} di < 0$  using (A.7). Given optimal trades in (9), the market clears if and only if

$$\int_{i \in \mathcal{I}} (d_i - (1 - \alpha_i)x_i) di = 0. \quad (\text{A.15})$$

If  $d_i = \rho x_i = (1 - \bar{\alpha} + \bar{\alpha}z)x_i$  for all  $i \in \mathcal{I}$ , equation (A.15) implies  $\alpha - \bar{\alpha} + \bar{\alpha}z = 0$ , and hence price ratio  $z^* = 1 - \frac{\alpha}{\bar{\alpha}}$ . Note that  $z < \frac{\mathbb{E}[R_l]}{\mathbb{E}[R_h]}$  since  $\frac{\alpha}{\bar{\alpha}} > \frac{1-p}{pR+1-p}$ . Substitute  $z^*$  into debt choice gives  $d_i = (1 - \alpha)x_i$ . For this debt choice to be indeed optimal, Lemma 3 indicates it is necessary that  $z^* \geq \underline{z}$ , which is satisfied because  $\frac{\alpha}{\bar{\alpha}} \leq \frac{1-p+\gamma}{pR+1-p+\gamma}$ . It can also be verified that  $y + \eta\rho > y_0 + \gamma\rho_s$ . Therefore when  $\xi$  is sufficiently small,  $V_d = f(y + \eta\rho) - \xi \geq f(y_0 + \gamma\rho_s) = V_s$ , and the conjectured  $d_i$  and  $z^*$  are indeed an equilibrium.

**Proof of Proposition A.2.** If  $z^* = \frac{\mathbb{E}[R_l]}{\mathbb{E}[R_h]}$ , using argument in the proof of Lemma 2, the total demand for low-quality loans satisfies

$$\int_{i \in \mathcal{I}} \Delta x_{i,l} di \leq \frac{1}{z} \left( \bar{\alpha} - \alpha - \bar{\alpha}z \right) x_i. \quad (\text{A.16})$$

Since the objective in problem (2) at  $t = 1$  is independent with trading choices,  $\int_{i \in \mathcal{I}} \Delta x_{i,l} di = 0$  can be satisfied if and only if  $\bar{\alpha} - \alpha - \bar{\alpha}z^* \geq 0$ , which is satisfied because  $\frac{\alpha}{\bar{\alpha}} \leq \frac{1-p}{pR+1-p}$ . Moreover,  $y_0 + \gamma\rho > y_0 + \gamma\rho_s$ . Therefore when  $\xi$  is sufficiently small,  $f(y_0 + \gamma\rho) = V_d \geq V_s = f(y_0 + \gamma\rho_s)$ , and the conjectured  $d_i$  and  $z^*$  are indeed an equilibrium.