

EnclaveFuzz: Finding Vulnerabilities in SGX Applications

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
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













SGX Application

 Applications use hardware capabilities to defend against untrusted host.












- Applications are unaware of specific security model.
- Memory unsafe language exacerbates the problem.

```
Untrusted Host
                                          SGX Enclave
                            RetTy ecall_xxx (ecall_args)
    ECall
                    01.
                                                                           Unsafe C/C++
                                                                         & pointer arguments
                    02.
                                // Omit
                    03.
                                 ocall_ret = ocall_xxx(ocall_args);
                    04.
    OCall
                    05.
  Untrusted
                                 load_store_untrusted_host_memory();
                    06.
  memory \triangleleft \longrightarrow \triangleright
   access
                    07.
                                 return ecall_ret;
ECall return <←
                    08.
                    09.
```









- SGX EDL only performs the basic checking rules, enclave itself needs a deeper check.
- But it is easy to invalidate fuzzing input.

```
Untrusted Host
                                                            SGX Enclave
                                                 RetTy ecall_xxx (ecall args)
                                                            /* Enclave t.c */
     /* Enclave.edl */
                                                            static sgx status t SGX CDECL sgx ecall demo(void*pms){
     enclave {
                                                                // check marshalled data outside enclave
         trusted {
                                                                CHECK REF POINTER(pms, sizeof(ms ecall demo t));
04.
              public int ecall demo(
                                                                // unmarshall inputs
                  [in, count=10] int* arg1,
                                                                ms ecall demo t* ms = SGX CAST(ms ecall demo t*, pms);
                  [out, size=arg3] char* arg2,
                                                                int* tmp arg1 = ms->ms arg1;
                  size_t arg3);
                                                                size t len arg1 = 10 * sizeof(int);
         };
                                                                // check size
                                                                if (sizeof(* tmp arg1) != 0
                                                      11.
                                                                    && 10 > (SIZE MAX / sizeof(* tmp arg1)))
                                                      12.
                                                                    return SGX ERROR INVALID PARAMETER; }
                                                      13.
                                                                // check parameter 1 outside enclave
                                                      14.
                                                                CHECK UNIQUE POINTER( tmp arg1, len arg1);
                                                                                                                    Insufficient input check
                                                      15.
                                                                // allocate enclave memory
                                                                                                                 but easy to invalidate random
                                                      16.
                                                                _in_arg1 = (int*)malloc(_len_arg1);
                                                                                                                         tesing input.
                                                                // copy data into enclave memory
                                                                memcpy_s(_in_arg1,_len_arg1,_tmp_arg1,_len_arg1);
                                                      18.
```

20.

// call uRTS to execute the real ECALL function


ms->ms_retval = ecall_demo(_in_arg1,_in_arg2,_tmp_arg3);





Related Works

- 1. TeeRex[SEC'20] and COIN attacks[ASPLOS'20] exploit symbolic execution but face state explosion in large-scale applications.
- 2. SGXFuzz[SEC'22] identifies input structures via page fault feedback, while FuzzSGX[EuroS&P'23] relies on host mutation, and they can only detect crashes or memory corruption.



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input dimension

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3. Lack of SGX-


specific sanitizer

efficiency

EnclaveFuzz Overview

- 1. & 2. A multi-dimensional structure-aware fuzzing harness.
- 3. A sanitizer for SGX-specific and memory corruption vulnerabilities.

4. An optimized SGX SDK to build a Virtual Enclave for faster fuzzing.












Structure-aware Fuzzing

• Extracts information from EDL and generates a structure-aware fuzzing harness, to pass basic input check.









Structure Generation Policy


- Analyzes parameters and handles data directions based on EDL attributes.
- Dynamically provide a random size first and then the buffer when processing user_check.


Type	Dir. Attr.	Size Attr.	Direction	Bytes allocated
ECALL	IN	Fixed:	enter enclave	Fixed:
ECALL	OUT	size count = val.	exit enclave X	value specified
	2	Dynamic:	<u> </u>	Dynamic:
OCALL	IN	size = param.	exit enclave X	runtime decided
	OUT	user_check	enter enclave	





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Multi-dimensional Fuzzing

 Besides E/OCall, EnclaveFuzz also hooks untrusted memory accesses and conditionally modifies them to break consistency at potential TOCTOUs to avoid huge overhead.

```
Untrusted Host
                                                   SGX Enclave
         ECall Input
                             RetTy ecall xxx (ecall args)
                      01.
                      02.
                                 // Omit
                      03.
                                 ocall ret = ocall xxx(ocall args);
        OCall Return
                      04.
                      05.
                                 if (load untrusted host memory for check())
                      06.
                      07.
          Memory
                                     // hook and change related untrusted host memory
          Access
                      09.
                                      load untrusted host memory for use();
                      10.
                      11.
                      12.
                                 return ecall ret;
                      13. }
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```








Vulnerability Detection

1. Miagrated ASan for memory corruption detection. (Normal way)



Not Accessable






Vulnerability Detection

2. TOCTOU detection


Internet Society

- a) Different tags are given to load instructions during compilation.
- b) Hooking load instructions at runtime to detect loads from the same untrusted address forms a TOCTOU.
- c) To avoid huge overhead, only modify untrusted memory to break consistency when a potential TOCTOU is found.






- Snapshot mode is still slow compared to persistent mode.
- Context switching is also expensive.









Optimized SGX SDK

Remove independent memory to reduce creation/destruction overhead.


Intel SGX SDK


Fuzzing-optimized
SGX SDK

Host Code

Host Code

But how to distinguish between memory inside and outside the Enclave?













Remove independent memory to reduce creation/destruction overhead.

Reuse shadow byte to distinguish memory inside and outside the


Byte View


IsEnclave IsAccessable

Shadow Мар

Mapping

Enclave.
















3. Replace expensive context switches with function table lookups

Virtual Enclave











Bugs Found

EnclaveFuzz found 162 bugs in 14/20 real-world open source


enclaves.

Mostly Null-Pointer Dereference & TOCTOU. The nuances of SGX security were overlooked, especially cross-boundary pointers.



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1. Effectiveness of structured test cases is nearly 3 times that of SOTA, and the coverage is nearly 4 times.

Enclave Name	Enclave Cov.		Code Coverage ¹ Interesting Cov.		Effectiveness		Input Validity		Bug Findings	
PARAMETER CALL PARAMETER	SGXFuzz	EnclaveFuzz		EnclaveFuzz	SGXFuzz	EnclaveFuzz	SGXFuzz	EnclaveFuzz	SGXFuzz	EnclaveFuzz
intel-sgx-ssl	0.75%	18.04%	0.02%	18.39%	1.66%	99.66%	0%	100%	0	3
AE LE	3.85%	11.67%	14.29%	32.08%	1.98%	15.25%	26.89%	100%	0	0
AE PCE	4.10%	13.94%	22.53%	45.34%	3.49%	15.30%	17.48%	100%	0	0
AE PVE	2.36%	8.63%	10.05%	16.95%	6.32%	22.62%	33.15%	100%	0	0
AE QE	2.64%	3.20%	13.23%	6.68%	3.60%	16.13%	5.52%	100%	0	0
SGX_SQLite	2.39%	6.78%	1.45%	7.20%	26.64%	99.96%	30.39%	100%	0	3
TaLoS	5.86%	9.78%	4.66%	10.00%	36.56%	99.58%	53.50%	100%	90	96
mbedtls-SGX	6.54%	30.64%	8.16%	32.64%	53.68%	99.66%	21.23%	100%	1	4
wolfssl	3.64%	42.44%	0.38%	45.00%	7.72%	99.78%	38.27%	99.99%	0	0
sgx-wallet	8.52%	33.10%	12.68%	79.39%	1.42%	39.72%	30.06%	99.99%	1	10
sgx-dnet	5.64%	0.97%	1.13%	0.51%	7.00%	34.92%	69.15%	100%	2	2
plinius	3.07%	2.24%	1.10%	2.19%	7.41%	73.47%	68.41%	100%	2	2
sgxwallet	6.33%	51.81%	7.21%	43.50%	7.74%	25.44%	20.74%	100%	2	3
BiORAM-SGX	4.30%	17.95%	0.55%	1.08%	5.45%	1.66%	48.43%	82.95%	0	2
bolos-enclave	6.71%	7.85%	1.17%	0.48%	4.86%	4.01%	40.10%	84.09%	0	0
ehsm	3.69%	16.91%	3.81%	15.00%	76.97%	81.60%	0%	91.79%	0	12
sgx-reencrypt	8.60%	33.31%	14.92%	31.26%	20.26%	28.26%	84.38%	100.00%	2	4
SGXCryptoFile	5.85%	17.62%	15.04%	80.56%	4.15%	5.88%	0%	100.00%	0	2
trusted-function-frame	2.53%	1.97%	2.13%	1.53%	75.64%	75.22%	0%	100.00%	0	3
wasm-micro-runtime	3.95%	1.67%	2.08%	0.94%	32.64%	46.04%	78.04%	100.00%	5	15
average	4.57%	16.53%	6.83%	23.54%	19.26%	49.21%	33.29%	97.94%	5.25	8.05











2. Improve the test speed of real-world applications by nearly 7 times.

Enclave Name	EnclaveFuzz- SIM	EnclaveFuzz- HW	EnclaveFuzz (Opt.SDK)		
	ECALLs executed in 24 hours				
intel-sgx-ssl	18K	217	19K		
AE LE	155M	63M	454M		
AE PCE	153M	58M	483M		
AE PVE	123M	44M	11 M		
AE QE	42M	27M	50M		
SGX_SQLite	40M	15M	160M		
TaLoS	448K	194K	120K		
mbedtls-SGX	1M	122K	1M		
wolfssl	370K	17K	23K		
sgx-wallet	86M	21M	137M		
sgx-dnet	354k	94k	504k		
plinius	71k	54k	501k		
sgxwallet	430k	218k	1.9M		
BiORAM-SGX	1M	26K	9M		
bolos-enclave	96M	30M	505M		
ehsm	227K	163K	212K		
sgx-reencrypt	14M	10M	15M		
SGXCryptoFile	2M	467K	18M		
trusted-function-frame	13M	3M	3M		
wasm-micro-runtime	4M	1M	40M		
Speedup rate	2.67×	1×	6.91×		









Takeaway

 EnclaveFuzz is a multi-dimensional structure-aware fuzzer for SGX applications, with an SGX-specified sanitizer and a fuzzingoptimized SGX SDK.



https://github.com/vul337/EnclaveFuzz



https://netsec.ccert.edu.cn/vul337











