

Fun with FRIIDA



Dynamic Binary Instrumentation on Android

Workshop by

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Dynamic *what?*

- Dynamic Binary Instrumentation (DBI)
- **Modify** and **analyze** a process / binary at runtime
- Do stuff you can do with a debugger **without** a debugger
- **Script it!**

Hello, **FRIDA**



www.frida.re

- Supports Windows, Linux, Mac, iOS, QNX, and **Android**
- Developed by a nice Norwegian guy ([@oleavr](#))
- Open Source (License: *wxWindows Library Licence*)
- Works by injecting a Javascript runtime (GumJS)

FRIDA

FЯIDA helps you to


- Intercept network traffic, crypto calls, file access etc.
- Pentest and fuzz apps
- Overcome protection mechanisms
- Analyse unknown apps (Malware)
- Solve crackmes
- Build your own analysis scripts and frameworks

Demo: Counting in C

```
int main (int argc, char * argv[])
{
    int i = 0;
    printf("f() is at %p\n", f);
    while (1)
    {
        f (i++);
        sleep (1);
    }
}
```

```
void f (int n)
{
    printf ("Number: %d\n", n);
}
```


Demo: Counting in C



A screenshot of a terminal window titled "C - test - Konsole". The terminal shows the execution of a C program. The prompt is "\$./test". The output shows "f() is at 0x556bbad846da" (the address is highlighted), "PID: 10922", and a list of numbers from 0 to 20, each preceded by "Number: ". The terminal has a dark background and a light blue title bar.

```
$ ./test
f() is at 0x556bbad846da
PID: 10922
Number: 0
Number: 1
Number: 2
Number: 3
Number: 4
Number: 5
Number: 6
Number: 7
Number: 8
Number: 9
Number: 10
Number: 11
Number: 12
Number: 13
Number: 14
Number: 15
Number: 16
Number: 17
Number: 18
Number: 19
Number: 20
```


How does it work?



Instrumentation


- **Interceptor API**
 - Hooking functions with trampoline Jumps
 - No “real” instrumentation, easily detectable (e.g. code checksums)
 - Still effective and common approach
- **Stalker API**
 - Dynamic recompilation, modified version gets executed
 - Stealthier
 - Better performance
 - More complicated and error prone

How does it work?

A screenshot of a terminal window titled "test - Remote". The terminal shows the execution of a program named "test". The first line is a prompt "\$" followed by the command "./test". The output shows "f() is at 0x556bbad846da" with the address highlighted in a light blue box. Below this, the PID is shown as "PID: 10922". Then, a series of lines follow, each starting with "Number:" followed by a number from 0 to 20.


```
$ ./test
f() is at 0x556bbad846da
PID: 10922
Number: 0
Number: 1
Number: 2
Number: 3
Number: 4
Number: 5
Number: 6
Number: 7
Number: 8
Number: 9
Number: 10
Number: 11
Number: 12
Number: 13
Number: 14
Number: 15
Number: 16
Number: 17
Number: 18
Number: 19
Number: 20
```

Hooking (Interception)



```
[0x556bbad846da]> pd 12
;-- f:
0x556bbad846da  55          push rbp
0x556bbad846db  4889e5     mov rbp, rsp
0x556bbad846de  4883ec10   sub rsp, 0x10
0x556bbad846e2  897dfc     mov dword [rbp - 4], edi
0x556bbad846e5  8b45fc     mov eax, dword [rbp - 4]
0x556bbad846e8  89c6       mov esi, eax
0x556bbad846ea  488d3df30000. lea rdi, str.Number:__d ; 0x556bbad847e4 ; "Number: %d\n"
0x556bbad846f1  b800000000 mov eax, 0
0x556bbad846f6  e8b5feffff call sym.imp.printf
0x556bbad846fb  90         nop
0x556bbad846fc  c9        leave
0x556bbad846fd  c3        ret
[0x556bbad846da]> 
```

Hooking (Interception)



```
[0x556bbad846da]> pd 13
:-- f:
|
|= 0x556bbad846da      e929190000      jmp 0x556bbad86008
| 0x556bbad846df      90              nop
| 0x556bbad846e0      90              nop
| 0x556bbad846e1      90              nop
| 0x556bbad846e2      897dfc         mov dword [rbp - 4], edi
| 0x556bbad846e5      8b45fc         mov eax, dword [rbp - 4]
| 0x556bbad846e8      89c6           mov esi, eax
| 0x556bbad846ea      488d3df30000.   lea rdi, str.Number:__d ; 0x556bbad847e4 ; "Number: %d\n"
| 0x556bbad846f1      b800000000     mov eax, 0
| 0x556bbad846f6      e8b5fefeff     call sym.imp.printf
| 0x556bbad846fb      90              nop
| 0x556bbad846fc      c9             leave
| 0x556bbad846fd      c3             ret
[0x556bbad846da]> |
```



Try it yourself - C counter demo

- Start the counter
- Run Frida
- Check & modify the script

Injected Mode

Installation

```
pip install frida
adb push frida-server /data/local/tmp/
adb root
adb shell "chmod 755 /data/local/tmp/frida-server"
adb shell "/data/local/tmp/frida-server &"
```



FRIDA


Modes of Operation (on Android)

- **Injected** into a process
 - Possible on rooted devices
 - Frida handles the injection
- **Embedded** as shared library (frida-gadget.so)
 - non-rooted devices
 - *Repackaging* and *resigning* required, adapt permissions & smali

Tracing low level calls

- Trace low level calls to C function
 - E.g. trace `send*`, `write*`, `open*`, `recv*` to track network and file communication
 - trace native library calls easily
- Generates handler script
 - Check `__handlers__` directory
 - modify & reuse

Tracing low level calls



FRIIDA

Excercise - low level call tracing with Frida (Linux)

- Start Firefox
- Go to your working directory in the shell
- Use frida-trace to trace low level calls in the application (try open, recv, ...)
- Afterwards, find the script (__handler__)
- Modify it (add additional logging statements) and run the modified version

Excercise - low level call tracing with Frida (Android)

- Start the emulator
- Start an application
- Go to your working directory in the shell
- Use frida-trace to trace low level calls in the application.
- Find the script, modify it, run the modified version

Frida Java Api

- `Java.perform(fn)` ensure that the current thread is attached to the VM and call `fn`
- `Java.enumerateLoadedClasses(callbacks)` enumerate loaded classes
 - `callbacks` **object**:
 - `onMatch`: called for **each** loaded class
 - `onComplete`: called when **all** classes have been enumerated

Example: Discovering Classes

```
Java.perform( function() {  
    Java.enumerateLoadedClasses(  
        {  
            "onMatch":function(match){  
                console.log(match);  
            },  
            "onComplete":function(){  
                console.log("Finished");  
            }  
        }  
    );  
});
```

FRIDA

```
frida -U -l ./frida-scripts/list_classes.js  
com.example.app
```

```
...  
[*] java.util.HashMap  
[*] sun.security.jca.ProviderList$3  
[*] java.util.Arrays  
[*] java.util.regex.MatchResult  
[*] [Ljava.util.Comparators$Natural  
...  
Finished
```

FRIDA

Excercise

- Start an app in the emulator
- Create an enumeration script
- Log all loaded classes to the console

Interacting with frida: Messages

- Send messages between processes
 - python wrapper \longleftrightarrow injected javascript
- You can send messages from the app running on Android back to the Python script in your console
- Useful if you want to write stuff to a file or store it in a local database directly (without having to transfer it from the emulator)

Interacting with Frida: Messages

```
from __future__ import print_function
import frida, sys

#Arguments
script_name = sys.argv[1]
app_name = sys.argv[2]

#Message function: output messages from frida
def on_message(message, data):
    print("[*] {0}".format(message['payload']))

#Read script from file
with open(script_name, 'r') as scriptfile:
    script_data=scriptfile.read()

#Attach
process = frida.get_usb_device().attach(sys.argv[2])

#Create frida script and register message function
script = process.create_script(script_data)
script.on('message', on_message)

#Start
print('[*] Loading script...')
script.load()
sys.stdin.read()
```

```
Java.perform( function() {
    Java.enumerateLoadedClasses(
        {
            "onMatch":function(match){
                send(match);
            },
            "onComplete":function(){
                send("Finished");
            }
        }
    );
});
```

Overwriting various stuff with Frida's Java API

- Frida provides a javascript wrapper for Java objects and classes
- Easily intercept / hook / modify:
 - instance variables
 - instance methods
 - static class variables
 - static class methods
 - private and public methods
- Create new objects (`$new`)
- Find existing objects on the heap (`Java.choose`)

Hooking Methods Example

```
01 // Get wrapper for class
02 main = Java.use("com.example.app.MainActivity");
03
04 // Overwrite function definition
05 main.myFunction.implementation = function(arg1,arg2){
06
07     console.log("arg1: " + arg1 + ", arg2: " + arg2)
08
09     //call original function with modified args
10     return this.myFunction("foo","bar");
11 }
```

Reminder: Disassembling APKs

You still might want to disassemble an APK to identify methods and classes

- APK = ZIP
- E.g. APKTOOL to extract Manifest and decompile to smali
- Or just throw DEX into a disassembler / decompiler (maybe use dex2jar before)
- Various decompilers for Java available, BytecodeViewer has a nice GUI
- For native libraries: Usual stuff like Radare2, IDA, Binja, etc.
- Deobfuscation: E.g. Simplify, dex2jar & Deobfuscator

Try it yourself - overwriting methods with Frida

- Open “Fun With Frida 1” in the emulator
- You see a bunch of “Hello, World” strings
- **Task: Convert all “Hello, World” strings to “Hello, Frida”**
- Hints:
 - Disassemble the APK to make it more realistic - or get the source from github (<https://github.com/mhelwig/funwithfrida1>)
 - Get classes via `my_class = Java.use(...)`
 - You can overwrite variables with the “value” property (`my_class.my_var.value = ...`)
 - You can overwrite methods with `implementation`
 - You can overwrite overloaded methods with `overloaded`
 - You will find stuff on the heap
 - **You don’t need to dive into the native library (we will get to that later)**
 - <https://www.frida.re/docs/>

Try it yourself - Make the interception interactive

- Open “needleRemover” in the emulator
- Task: When a new text is set in the text activity intercept the call and interactively replace the message
- Hints:
 - Use the skeleton in `tasks/2`
 - For an example how sending/receiving works check:
 - `/home/frida/tasks/enumeration/*`
 - Messages: <https://www.frida.re/docs/messages/> : Blocking receives in the target process

Timing

- When you attach frida to a running process, the app has already started
- Frida can also hook into Zygote and spawn the app for you
- Inject code before the app has started
- Start frida with “-f” option
- Frida pauses at startup to give you the chance for input. This easily runs into a timeout. Use “--no-pause” to skip this.

Root detection

```
Java.perform(function() {  
    main = \  
    Java.use("net.codemetrix.funwithfrida2.MainActivity");  
  
    main.detectRoot.implementation = function(){  
        return false;  
    }  
});
```

App Code (MainActivity)

```
private boolean detectRoot() {  
    String[] a = new String[8];  
    a[0] = "/system/xbin/su";  
    a[1] = "/system/app/Superuser.apk";  
    a[2] = "/system/xbin/daemonsu";  
    a[3] = "/system/etc/init.d/99SuperSUDaemon";  
    a[4] = "/system/bin/.ext/.su";  
    a[5] = "/system/etc/.has_su_daemon";  
    a[6] = "/system/etc/.installed_su_daemon";  
    a[7] = "/dev/com.koushikdutta.superuser.daemon/";  
  
    int i = 0;  
    while(i < a.length)  
    {  
        if (new java.io.File(a[i]).exists())  
        {  
            return true;  
        }  
        i++;  
    }  
    return false;  
}
```

Try it yourself - circumventing root detection

- Open “Fun with Frida2” in the emulator
- Start the app - what is happening?
- Hint:
 - The name of the root detection method is “detectRoot”
 - When should the method be overwritten? (Check the “-f” option of frida)

A word on native methods

- You can also use Frida to modify native methods
- Didn't work (on Android) when we were preparing the workshop, but worked in the past (and could work again in the future)
- You can still locate loaded module addresses and overwrite arbitrary stuff in memory (so you can still do it but it takes more effort)
- Check the "Module" und "Interceptor" in the api docs

A word on native methods

- This is what hooking native methods could look like (compare frida-trace):

```
var functionPtr =  
Module.findExportByName("libnative-lib.so", "Java_net_codemetrix_funwithfrida_MainActivity_stringFromJNI");  
  
Interceptor.attach(functionPtr, {  
  onEnter: function(args) {  
    console.log("[*] On Enter called");  
  },  
  onLeave: function(retval) {  
    var stringClass = Java.use("java.lang.String");  
    var stringInstance = stringClass.$new("Hello, Frida");  
    retval.replace(stringInstance);  
  }  
});
```

Overwriting strings in memory

- Another solution to change the native method in FunWithFrida1:
 - Determine Module base address
 - Determine String address from offset
 - Change memory protection and overwrite
 - x86 solution:

```
base_address = Module.findBaseAddress("libnative-lib.so");  
string_offset = parseInt("0x00020de0",16);           //Determined via disassembler  
string_address = parseInt(base_address,16) + string_offset;  
  
pointer = new NativePointer(string_address);  
Memory.protect(pointer,32,"rw-");                    //Change memory protection  
Memory.writeUtf8String(pointer,"Hello, Frida");
```

Overwriting strings in memory

Want to try it?

- What's the offset of the string in your native library?
- Use `Module.findBaseAddress` to find the base address of the module in memory
- Calculate the position of the string
- Use a `NativePointer` to access the memory with frida
- etc.

HTTPS Interception

Until Android **6.0**

- Install your Burp Certificate in Android
- Set Burp as Proxy
- Intercept traffic
- Done!

HTTPS Interception

Since Android **7.0**

- Install your Burp Certificate in Android
- Set Burp as Proxy → Certificate is ignored
- ToDo:
 - Do not use 7.0
 - Fallback to old behaviour

HTTPS Interception on Android 7.0

```
class NetworkSecurityConfig

...

public static final Builder getDefaultBuilder(int targetSdkVersion, int
targetSandboxVersion) {

...
if (targetSdkVersion <= Build.VERSION_CODES.M) {
// User certificate store, does not bypass static pins.
builder.addCertificatesEntryRef(
    new CertificatesEntryRef( UserCertificateSource.getInstance(), false));
}
...
}
```

HTTPS Interception (with Pinning)

- New with Android 7.0
- XML based
- Easy to use (for developers)
- Defeat
 - Get APK
 - Unpack
 - Modify
 - Rebundle/Sign
 - Redeploy

HTTPS Interception (with Pinning)

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Task: use Frida

- install `tasks/3/pinning.apk` on the emulator
- Go to the `SSLActivity`
- Hint: use `adb log` or `pidlog` to see what is going wrong

Links & Stuff

Frida Project Page

<https://www.frida.re>

Curated list of resources

<https://github.com/dweinstein/awesome-frida>

OWASP Mobile Security Testing Guide

<https://github.com/OWASP/owasp-mstg>