

Léopold Monjoie

Université Paris Dauphine

PSL Research Center, France.

Ph.D. supervisor: Ass. Prof. Fabien Roques.

froques@compasslexecon.com

Born on October 15, 1994

25 rue Simart 75018 Paris, France

Phone: (33)6 64 18 87 10

Email : leopold.monjoie@dauphine.eu

EDUCATION

Ph.D. Economics (in progress), Université Paris Dauphine, France.

Field: Applied Microeconomics – Energy Economics – Industrial Organization – Regulation and Market Design

Expected completion date: 2022.

M.A. Energy and environmental economics, master *Energie Finance Carbone*, Université Paris Dauphine, 2019.

B.S. Applied Economics, Université Paris Dauphine, 2016.

RESEARCH - Work in progress

Simulating the impact of product design and risk on a power plant value: the case of capacity markets

Abstract. We study the effects of different product designs on an investment value in the context of capacity markets. We simulate the future profits of a hypothetical nuclear using a single project valuation model. It allows representing the imperfection of the energy market and the bids associated with the participation in a capacity market. We find that the procurement characteristics, namely the period when investors receive the remuneration, and the length of the obligation period, significantly modify the investment value if we assume they receive what they offer. The introduction of risk aversion doesn't fundamentally change the results of the risk-neutral case even though it can significantly lower the investment value. Furthermore, we find that the approach used to model risk matters when comparing the effect of different capacity products. Further extensions of the model would highlight other indirect effects of capacity markets while giving interesting empirical results.

Keywords. Investment in electricity markets - Capacity markets - Market design - Risk function – Simulation

A survey on electricity market design: How can we model behaviors in capacity markets?

Keywords. Electricity market - Market design - Generation adequacy - Capacity markets - Capacity remuneration mechanisms

How market design affects actors' behaviors and price formation in an imperfect environment: the case of capacity markets.

Keywords. Capacity market - Strategic behavior - Competitive benchmark analysis - Restructured electricity market - Auction design

A review on the state of the art of multi-unit auctions: what implications for the study of capacity market design.

Keywords: Multi-unit auctions - Electricity markets – Market power – Regulation – Market design

TEACHING

Lecturer, Microeconomics - 2d year Bachelor.
Université Paris Dauphine 2019–2020 (2 years)

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

Junior Economist – <i>Intern</i> – RTE	<i>Paris (6 months) 2018</i>
Financial Analyst – <i>Intern</i> – Akuo Energy	<i>Paris (5 months) 2017</i>
Research Officer – <i>Intern</i> – NERA Economic Consulting	<i>Paris (6 months) 2017</i>
Economic Analyst– <i>Intern</i> – France Energie Eolienne	<i>Paris (6 months) 2016</i>
Business Development – <i>Intern</i> – EV Box	<i>New York (3 months) 2015</i>
Assistant – <i>Intern</i> – NGO GreenMap System	<i>New York (4 months) 2015</i>