Online Appendix

Measuring Higher-Order Uncertainty: Evidence from a Consensus Pricing Service*

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Contents

1	The value of information in the OTC options market	3
2	Demand-based option pricing	5
3	IHS Markit's Totem submission process	7
4	Covariance Matrices for Counterfactuals	9
5	Tables robustness analysis	12

1 The value of information in the OTC options market

This is a simple one-period model to illustrate the value of the consensus price information for dealers in the OTC options market. It shows that dealers that use an interdealer market to share risk are naturally concerned about both fundamental asset values and other dealers' valuation. A dealer is willing to pay for information that reduces its uncertainty in any of these two dimensions.

The model

Before entering the market, every dealer $i \in [0, 1]$ observes a private signal about the fundamental value of an option, given by the random variable θ . She can also pay to receive a public signal about that value. For now, the exact form of these signals is not important. The game proceeds in three steps:

- 1. Dealer $i \in [0,1]$ decides whether to buy the public signal at cost f.
- 2. After observing signal(s), the dealer enters the market and is matched with a client. A client is a buyer or seller of one option contract with equal probability. The dealer can credibly communicate her valuation of the option to the client. The client is willing to pay (receive) at most Δ in excess of (below) the dealer's valuation.
- 3. After buying or selling the option from the client, dealer i enters the interdealer market. She is matched with a dealer with opposite option inventory with probability $0 \le \gamma \le 1$. If matched, dealers trade at the average expectation of fundamental values among active dealers denoted by $\bar{\theta}$.
- 4. If a dealer has not been matched in the interdealer market (probability 1γ) she hedges the option herself. At expiry, she receives the fundamental value θ but hedging physically creates a cost of c > 0.

Pricing after entry

Suppose dealer i is matched with a client that wants to buy. The dealer charges a price a_i to the client. If the dealer is matched in the interdealer market, her profit is $a_i - \bar{\theta}$. Otherwise her profit is $a_i - \theta - c$. We assume that the dealer minimizes a loss function that is quadratic in losses.² The pricing problem is then

¹We do not explicitly model the trading mechanism that would yield this as a market-clearing price of interdealer market.

²This captures the idea that dealers' institutions prefer smooth profits with target level π .

$$\mathcal{L}_{i}^{s} = \min_{a} \mathbb{E}_{i} \left\{ \gamma (a - \bar{\theta} - \pi)^{2} + (1 - \gamma)(a - \theta - c - \pi)^{2} \right\},\,$$

where the expectation is taken over dealer *i*'s information set when she is interacting with the client, that is after entry and having observed signals, but before entering the interdealer market. The first-order condition for *a* yields the optimal price,

$$a_i^* = \pi + \gamma \mathbb{E}_i \bar{\theta} + (1 - \gamma) \mathbb{E}_i (\theta + c).$$

We assume that dealer i can credibly communicate the "fair value" of the option, namely $\gamma \mathbb{E}_i \bar{\theta} + (1 - \gamma) \mathbb{E}_i (\theta + c)$, to her client. For the client to buy, we further assume that the markup in the optimal price is smaller than the client's maximal willingness to pay, that is $\pi \leq \Delta$.

Substituting a_i^* back into the loss function we find

$$\mathcal{L}_{i}^{s} = \gamma \mathbb{E}_{i} \left(\bar{\theta} - \bar{\theta}_{i} \right)^{2} + (1 - \gamma) \mathbb{E}_{i} \left(\theta - \theta_{i} \right)^{2} + \gamma (1 - \gamma) (\delta_{i} + c)^{2},$$
 where $\delta_{i} = \theta_{i} - \bar{\theta}_{i}$.

The case for a dealer buying from a client at price b is symmetric with loss function

$$\mathcal{L}_i^b = \min_b \mathbb{E}_i \left\{ \gamma (\bar{\theta} - b - \pi)^2 + (1 - \gamma)(\theta - b - c - \pi)^2 \right\}.$$

It yields a nearly identical loss function to the case of buying from a client, namely,

$$\mathcal{L}_{i}^{b} = \gamma \mathbb{E}_{i} \left(\bar{\theta} - \bar{\theta}_{i} \right)^{2} + (1 - \gamma) \mathbb{E}_{i} \left(\theta - \theta_{i} \right)^{2} + \gamma (1 - \gamma) (\delta_{i} - c)^{2}.$$

Participation decision

The ex-ante expected loss of dealer i with signals s_i is

$$-\mathbb{E}\left(\frac{1}{2}\mathcal{L}_{i}^{s} + \frac{1}{2}\mathcal{L}_{i}^{b} \mid \mathbf{s}_{i}\right) = -\gamma \operatorname{Var}(\bar{\theta} \mid \mathbf{s}_{i}) - (1 - \gamma)\operatorname{Var}(\theta \mid \mathbf{s}_{i}) - \gamma(1 - \gamma)\mathbb{E}(\delta_{i}^{2} \mid \mathbf{s}_{i}) - \gamma(1 - \gamma)c^{2}.$$

The dealer buys the public signal if the reduction in expected loss exceeds the price of the signal, which is f.

The public signal is valued as it allows for better pricing decisions. Its ability to reduce strategic uncertainty is valued as it helps to predict prices in the interdealer market.

2 Demand-based option pricing

Here, we show how the assumed AR(1) process for the fundamental value of the option (expressed in terms of the logarithm of its implied volatility), i.e.

$$\theta_t = \rho \, \theta_{t-1} + \sigma_u \, u_t \text{ with } u_t \sim N(0, 1),$$

can be obtained within the framework of demand-based option pricing developed in Gârleanu et al. (2009). The framework shows how demand pressures can influence option prices when option dealers are risk averse and asset markets are not frictionless. We refer to the paper for details.

The price of the asset that underlies the options contract follows a geometric Brownian motion, i.e.

$$dS_t = \mu \, S_t \, dt + \sigma \, S_t \, dW_t.$$

In the absence of demand pressure, each option has a constant Black-Scholes implied volatility of σ , that is the volatility surface is flat in all periods.

We assume that the only source of friction is the inability to hedge options continuously. For this case, Gârleanu et al. (2009) show that the Black-Scholes IV for option i changes with a shift in demand for option j according to

$$\frac{\partial \sigma_t^i}{\partial d_t^j} = \frac{\gamma \, r \, Var_t \left((\Delta S)^2 \right)}{4} \, \frac{f_{SS}^i}{\nu^i} \, f_{SS}^j + o \left(\Delta_t^2 \right)$$

where f^i is the Black-Scholes price of option i, f^i_{SS} is option i's Black-Scholes gamma and ν^i is option i's Black-Scholes vega, r is the risk-free rate, and γ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion of the risk-averse dealers with CRRA utility. Δ_t is the time interval between two re-hedging opportunities, the only source of friction in this model.

As the price of the underlying, S, follows Brownian motion we have

$$\Delta S = S_{t+\Delta_t} - S_t \approx \mu \, S_t \, \Delta_t + \sigma \sqrt{\Delta_t} \, S_t \, \varepsilon,$$

where $\varepsilon \sim N(0,1)$. It follows that

$$Var_t\left((\Delta S)^2\right) = Var_t\left(\sigma^2 \,\Delta_t \,S_t^2 \,\varepsilon^2 + 2\mu \,\sigma \,S_t^2 \,\Delta_t^{3/2} \,\varepsilon\right) = 2\sigma^4 \,S_t^4 \,\Delta_t^2 + o\left(\Delta_t^2\right),$$

Black-Scholes gamma of option i is

$$f_{SS}^i = \frac{\phi(d_1)}{\sigma \, S_t \, \sqrt{\tau}},$$

and Black-Scholes vega of option i is

$$\nu^i = S_t \sqrt{\tau} \, \phi(d_1),$$

where

$$d_1 = \frac{\log(S/K) + (r + \frac{1}{2}\sigma^2)\tau}{\sigma\sqrt{\tau}}.$$

Thus, using the above result from Gârleanu et al. (2009), the change in the IV of option i induced by a marginal change in demand for this option is

$$\frac{\partial \sigma_t^i}{\partial d_t^i} = \frac{1}{2} \gamma r \left(\frac{\sigma \Delta_t}{\sqrt{\tau}} \right)^2 \frac{\phi(d_1)}{\sqrt{\tau}} S_t + o\left(\Delta_t^2 \right).$$

Here, d_t^i is client demand for option i in units of options. We define the corresponding dollar demand for option i as

$$\hat{d}_t^i = d_t \, p_t^i = \kappa^i \, S_t \, d_t,$$

where κ^i is a function of moneyness K/S, σ , and τ only. It follows that

$$\frac{\partial \sigma_t^i}{\partial \hat{d}_t^i} \approx \frac{1}{2} \gamma r \left(\frac{\sigma \Delta_t}{\sqrt{\tau}} \right)^2 \frac{\phi(d_1)}{\kappa^i \sqrt{\tau}}.$$

Also note that

$$\frac{\partial \log \sigma_t^i}{\partial \hat{d}_t^i} = \frac{\partial \sigma_t^i}{\partial \hat{d}_t^i} \frac{1}{\sigma_t^i},$$

which, for σ_t^i close to its long-run mean σ^i , implies that

$$\frac{\partial \log \sigma_t^i}{\partial \hat{d}_t^i} \approx \frac{1}{2} \gamma r \left(\frac{\sigma \Delta_t}{\sqrt{\tau}} \right)^2 \frac{\phi(d_1)}{\kappa^i \sigma^i \sqrt{\tau}} \equiv \lambda^i.$$

We assume that the impact of dollar demand for an option $j \neq i$ on the IV of option i is negligible. Let \bar{d}^i denote the mean of \hat{d}^i_t . Then for σ^i_t close to σ^i and \hat{d}^i_t close to \bar{d}^i we approximately have

$$\log \sigma_t^i = \log \sigma^i + \lambda^i \left(\hat{d}_t^i - \bar{d}^i \right) = \left(\log \sigma^i - \lambda^i \bar{d}^i \right) + \lambda^i \hat{d}_t^i$$

Now suppose dollar demand for option i follows an AR1 process,

$$\hat{d}_t^i = (1 - \rho^i)\bar{d}^i + \rho^i \, \hat{d}_{t-1}^i + e_t^i.$$

Substituting this process into the previous expression for $\log \sigma_t^i$ yields an AR1 process for $\log IV$ that is driven by the demand shock e_t^i ,

$$\log \sigma_t^i = (1 - \rho^i) \log \sigma^i + \rho^i \log \sigma_{t-1}^i + \lambda^i e_t^i.$$

3 IHS Markit's Totem submission process




Figure 1: Diagram – Submission process

Figure 1 depicts a diagram of the submission process to IHS Markit's Totem service for plain vanilla index options. On the last trading day of the month, Totem issues a spreadsheet to the N submitters that participate in the service in that month. Submitters have to submit estimates for the mid price, defined as the average of bid price and offer price, of a range of put options with a moneyness between 80 and 100 and a range of call options with a moneyness ranging from 100 to 120 with a time-to-expiration of 6 months. Submitters that want to submit prices for contracts with a different maturity or/and different moneyness are required to submit to all the available strike price and time-to-expiration combinations which lie in between the required contracts and the additionally demanded contracts.

We denote submitter i's estimate for the mid-price of an out-of-the-money (OTM) put with moneyness K, defined as the strike price of the option divided by the spot price

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of the underlying asset times 100, and time-to-expiration T (in days) by $P^{i}(p, K, T)$ and the mid-price estimate for an OTM call option with the same moneyness and time-to-expiration by $P^{i}(c, K, T)$. Submitter i also needs to submit the following input in addition to the mid-price estimate:

- the discount factor $\beta^{i}(T)$,
- the reference level $R^i(T)$, that is the price of a futures contract with maturity date closest to the valuation date,
- and the implied spot level $S^{i}(K,T)$, that is the implied level of the underlying index of the futures contract.

Submitters are provided with precise instructions for the timing of the valuation and the reference level that is to be used. To address any issues which might still arise with respect to valuation timing and the effect it could have on the comparability of prices across submitters, the submitted prices are aligned according to a predefined mechanism. The average consensus-implied spot from the at-the-money 6-month option, that is $\bar{S}(100,6)$, is used for all other combinations of K and T. The submitted prices are restated in terms of $\bar{S}(K,T)$, giving: $\hat{p}^i(\{c,p\},K,T) = P^i(\{c,p\},K,T)/\bar{S}(K,T)$.

Given the submitted quantities, a Totem analyst calculates various implied quantities to validate the individual submissions. The analyst uses put-call parity for ATM options to retrieve the relative forward, i.e.,

$$f^{i}\left(K,T\right) = \frac{\widehat{p}^{i}\left(c,K,T\right) - \widehat{p}^{i}\left(p,K,T\right)}{\beta^{i}\left(T\right)} + 1$$

The above inputs are then used in the Black-Scholes model,

$$\widehat{p}^{i}\left(c,K,T\right) = \beta^{i}\left(T\right) \left[f^{i}\left(K,T\right)N\left(d_{1,i}\right) - KN\left(d_{2,i}\right)\right]$$

$$d_{1,i} = \frac{\ln\left(\frac{f^{i}}{K}\right) + \left(\frac{(\sigma^{i})^{2}}{2}\right)T^{a}}{\sigma^{i}\sqrt{T^{a}}} \quad \text{, where} \quad T^{a} = \frac{T}{365.25}$$

$$d_{2,i} = d_{1,i} - \sigma^{i}\sqrt{T^{a}}$$

to back-out σ^i in the above expression, which yields the implied volatility (IV) corresponding to submitter *i*'s price submission for the given contract. We denote this IV by $\sigma_i(K,T)$. Here N() is the cdf of the standard normal distribution.

When reviewing submissions, Totem analysts compare these IVs against other submitted prices and market conditions. To do so, they take the following points into consideration:

• the number of contributors,

- market activity & news,
- market conventions,
- the distribution and spread of contributed data,
- and, in a "one way market," they check if the concept of a mid-market price is clearly understood.

In addition to these criteria, analysts also visually inspect the ATM implied volatility term structure and the shape of the implied volatility curve for a given term, also referred to as the skew or the smile. After the vetting process, the analyst proceeds to the aggregation of the individual submissions into the consensus data.

Submitters' implied volatilities $\sigma_i(K,T)$ are aggregated into the consensus IV,

$$\bar{\sigma}(K,T) = \frac{1}{N(K,T)} \sum_{i=1}^{N(K,T)} \sigma_i(K,T).$$

Here N(K,T) is the number of accepted prices for the given contract. The exclusions consist of the lowest, highest, and rejected IVs. The highest and lowest accepted $\sigma_i(K,T)$ are deemed to be consistent and reasonable IVs. But they are excluded to obtain a robust consensus IV.⁴ The same process takes place for the submitted prices to calculate a consensus price.

Submitters whose pricing information has been accepted by the Totem service receive the consensus information within 5 hours of the submission deadline. The consensus data include the average, standard deviation, skewness, and kurtosis of the distribution of accepted prices and implied volatilities. They also include the number of submitters to the consensus data.

4 Covariance Matrices for Counterfactuals

Consensus price perfectly reveals past state

If the consensus price perfectly aggregates dispersed information, we have

$$p_t = \theta_t$$
.

In this case all submitters start period t with a common prior about θ_t , namely $\rho \theta_{t-1}$, and there is no higher-order uncertainty before receiving new signals. This is because every submitter knows that every submitter knows (and so on ...) that the average expected value of θ_t before receiving period t signals is $\rho \theta_{t-1}$.

⁴If the number of accepted prices is 6 or below the highest and lowest submissions are included in the consensus price calculations.

Submitter i's expectations about the fundamental given signal $s_{i,t} = \theta_t + \eta_{i,t}$ can be obtained by the standard updating formula as state θ_t and signal $s_{i,t}$ given θ_{t-1} are jointly normally distributed:

$$\mathbb{E}_{i,t}(\theta_t) = \theta_{i,t} = \rho \,\theta_{t-1} + k_1 \,(s_{i,t} - \rho \,\theta_{t-1}) = \rho \,\theta_{t-1} + k_1 (u_t + \eta_{i,t}) \,,$$

where k_1 is the Kalman gain

$$k_1 = \frac{\sigma_u^2}{\sigma_u^2 + \sigma_n^2}.$$

It follows that the average expectation is

$$\bar{\theta}_t = \rho \, \theta_{t-1} + k_1 \, u_t.$$

Now define the random vector

$$X_t = [\theta_t - \rho \, \theta_{t-1} \,,\, \bar{\theta}_t - \rho \, \theta_{t-1}] = [u_t \,,\, k_1 \, u_t]$$

and

$$y_{i,t} = s_{i,t} - \rho \, \theta_{t-1} = u_t + \eta_{i,t}.$$

 X_t and $y_{i,t}$ are jointly normally distributed. Thus, the covariance of X_t given $y_{i,t}$ is

$$Var\left(X_{t}|y_{i,t}\right) = \Sigma_{xx} - \Sigma_{xy}\left(\sigma_{y}^{2}\right)^{-1}\Sigma_{xy}^{\mathsf{T}},$$

where Σ_{xx} is the variance of X_t and Σ_{xy} is the covariance of X_t and $y_{i,t}$, namely,

$$\Sigma_{xx} = \begin{bmatrix} \sigma_u^2 & k_1 \sigma_u^2 \\ k_1 \sigma_u^2 & k_1^2 \sigma_u^2 \end{bmatrix} , \quad \Sigma_{xy} = \begin{bmatrix} \sigma_u^2 , k_1 \sigma_u^2 \end{bmatrix}^\mathsf{T}.$$

As $\rho \theta_{t-1}$ is known in t, $Var((\theta_t, \bar{\theta}_t)^\mathsf{T} | \Omega_{i,t}) = Var((\theta_t, \bar{\theta}_t)^\mathsf{T} | \theta_{t-1}, y_{i,t}) = Var(X_t | y_{i,t})$. It follows that

$$Var((\theta_t, \bar{\theta}_t)^\mathsf{T} | \Omega_{i,t}) = \begin{bmatrix} \frac{\sigma_u^2 \sigma_\eta^2}{\sigma_u^2 + \sigma_\eta^2} & \frac{\sigma_u^4 \sigma_\eta^2}{(\sigma_u^2 + \sigma_\eta^2)^2} \\ \frac{\sigma_u^4 \sigma_\eta^2}{(\sigma_u^2 + \sigma_\eta^2)^2} & \frac{\sigma_u^6 \sigma_\eta^2}{(\sigma_u^2 + \sigma_\eta^2)^3} \end{bmatrix}.$$

No consensus price feedback

Without consensus price feedback, the stationary expectation dynamics of submitter i are given by

$$\theta_{i,t} = \rho \,\theta_{i,t-1} + k_1 \left(s_{i,t} - \rho \,\theta_{i,t-1} \right),\,$$

where k_1 is the stationary Kalman gain. k_1 is the solution to the system of two equations in two unknowns, k_1 and σ^2 ,

$$k_1 = \frac{\sigma^2}{\sigma^2 + \sigma_\eta^2}$$
, $\sigma^2 = \rho^2 (1 - k_1) \sigma^2 + \sigma_u^2$.

The average stationary expectation then evolves according to

$$\bar{\theta}_t = (1 - k_1)\rho\,\bar{\theta}_{t-1} + k_1\rho\,\theta_{t-1} + k_1\,u_t.$$

We can now write the dynamics for $(\theta_t, \bar{\theta}_t)^{\mathsf{T}}$ in state space form, with transition equation

$$\begin{pmatrix} \theta_t \\ \bar{\theta}_t \end{pmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} \rho & 0 \\ k_1 \rho & (1 - k_1) \rho \end{bmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} \theta_{t-1} \\ \bar{\theta}_{t-1} \end{pmatrix} + \begin{bmatrix} 1 \\ k_1 \end{bmatrix} u_t$$

and measurement equation

$$y_{i,t} = (1, 0) \begin{pmatrix} \theta_t \\ \bar{\theta}_t \end{pmatrix} + \eta_{i,t}.$$

The stationary covariance matrix for the state given the history of signals up to t, $Var((\theta_t, \bar{\theta}_t)^\mathsf{T} | \{s_{i,t-j}\}_{j=0}^{\infty})$ can now be derived with a standard Kalman filter.

5 Tables robustness analysis

Table 1: Matching cross-sectional dispersion and consensus price volatility

	60	80	90	95	100	105	110	120	150	200
6	1.021	1.043	1.045	1.050	1.052	1.058	1.115	1.125	0.961	
	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.014)	
12	1.026	1.050	1.039	1.047	1.056	1.049	1.058	1.103	0.988	
	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.013)	
24	1.079	1.052	1.047	1.053	1.064	1.063	1.164	1.082	0.999	0.909
	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.016)
36	1.058	1.040	1.043	1.048	1.052	1.059	1.060	1.061	1.013	0.928
	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.014)
48	1.036	1.033	1.038	1.038	1.033	1.034	1.035	1.041	1.019	0.960
	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.014)
60	0.992	1.028	1.041	1.039	1.038	1.037	1.040	1.043	1.014	1.003
	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.015)
84	0.986	1.026	1.021	1.019	1.015	1.012	1.015	1.023	1.005	0.913
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.021)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.014)

(a) Matching cross-sectional dispersion

	60	80	90	95	100	105	110	120	150	200
6	1.437	1.058	1.138	1.053	1.045	1.401	1.155	1.242	2.595	
	(0.271)	(0.243)	(0.294)	(0.224)	(0.277)	(0.780)	(0.315)	(0.213)	(0.629)	
12	1.110	1.028	1.117	1.320	1.104	0.990	1.120	1.014	2.573	•
	(0.264)	(0.201)	(0.313)	(0.553)	(0.252)	(0.219)	(0.263)	(0.228)	(0.755)	•
24	1.086	1.030	1.050	1.413	1.213	1.033	1.095	1.183	1.483	3.635
	(0.286)	(0.203)	(0.214)	(0.733)	(0.484)	(0.290)	(0.324)	(0.394)	(0.476)	(2.366)
36	1.019	1.158	1.049	2.062	1.199	0.931	1.383	1.017	1.061	1.761
	(0.214)	(0.593)	(0.336)	(1.594)	(0.365)	(0.158)	(0.644)	(0.254)	(0.347)	(0.379)
48	0.987	1.203	1.090	0.985	1.086	1.027	1.346	1.011	0.968	1.490
	(0.203)	(0.561)	(0.327)	(0.203)	(0.339)	(0.229)	(0.838)	(0.244)	(0.246)	(0.420)
60	1.296	1.373	1.157	1.009	1.106	1.043	1.070	1.300	0.980	1.324
	(0.418)	(0.642)	(0.409)	(0.247)	(0.338)	(0.299)	(0.306)	(0.579)	(0.254)	(0.433)
84	0.942	1.149	1.142	1.098	0.968	1.029	0.989	1.054	1.045	1.055
	(0.179)	(0.526)	(0.379)	(0.341)	(0.181)	(0.222)	(0.209)	(0.265)	(0.265)	(0.234)

(b) Matching volatility consensus price

These two tables present the mean and standard deviation of the ratio of the raw moments of the data versus the model implied moments for each contract. The upper table displays the ratio of the model-implied cross-sectional dispersion versus the average cross-sectional standard deviation in the data. The lower table displays the ratio of the model-implied volatility of the consensus price to the empirical counterpart from the data. The model-implied volatility is given by the unconditional volatility of the average first-order belief plus σ_{ϵ} . The unconditional variance of $\bar{\theta}_t$ is the solution to a Lyapunov equation that defines the unconditional variance of the state. The first row and first column of each table denote the moneyness and time-to-expiration, respectively, of the options under consideration. The standard deviation of the posterior distribution of the ratios is given in parentheses below its mean (0.000 signifies standard deviations below 0.0005). The sample period of the data is January 2002 to December 2015.

Table 2: Model parameter estimates $\phi = \{\rho, \sigma_u, \sigma_\varepsilon, \sigma_\eta\}$ (sub-sample 2006-2011)

	60	80	90	95	100	105	110	120	150	200		60	80	90	95	100	105	110	120	150	200
6	0.941	0.901	0.913	0.954	0.903	0.901	0.911	0.952	0.952		6	0.085	0.110	0.117	0.125	0.131	0.140	0.148	0.107	0.162	
	(0.026)	(0.045)	(0.047)	(0.058)	(0.037)	(0.039)	(0.045)	(0.018)	(0.027)			(0.002)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.002)	(0.006)	
12	0.964	0.909	0.916	0.909	0.916	0.909	0.913	0.963	0.957		12	0.051	0.091	0.097	0.101	0.106	0.111	0.116	0.073	0.131	
	(0.020)	(0.038)	(0.036)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.038)	(0.031)	(0.022)	(0.025)			(0.001)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.003)	(0.004)	
24	0.960	0.919	0.916	0.919	0.921	0.925	0.922	0.916	0.949	0.948	24	0.044	0.080	0.084	0.087	0.090	0.093	0.097	0.103	0.079	0.137
	(0.018)	(0.032)	(0.038)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.034)	(0.036)	(0.034)	(0.021)	(0.025)		(0.001)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.002)	(0.005)
36	0.968	0.926	0.928	0.932	0.916	0.916	0.929	0.911	0.956	0.949	36	0.040	0.072	0.075	0.077	0.079	0.082	0.084	0.089	0.063	0.100
	(0.021)	(0.038)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.036)	(0.027)	(0.033)	(0.021)	(0.027)		(0.001)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.002)	(0.003)
48	0.961	0.920	0.916	0.923	0.911	0.909	0.947	0.917	0.932	0.946	48	0.038	0.067	0.070	0.072	0.073	0.076	0.078	0.081	0.080	0.084
	(0.018)	(0.032)	(0.035)	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.039)	(0.045)	(0.033)	(0.039)	(0.026)		(0.001)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.016)	(0.002)
60	0.978	0.930	0.922	0.921	0.917	0.924	0.917	0.913	0.917	0.945	60	0.036	0.063	0.065	0.066	0.067	0.069	0.070	0.073	0.082	0.069
	(0.016)	(0.040)	(0.036)	(0.033)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.021)		(0.001)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.002)
84	0.964	0.915	0.916	0.921	0.916	0.916	0.933	0.915	0.913	0.948	84	0.034	0.056	0.057	0.058	0.059	0.060	0.061	0.063	0.070	0.056
	(0.018) (0.033) (0.031) (0.036) (0.034) (0.037) (0.033) (0.033) (0.034) (0.027) (0.038) (0.0												(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.001)
			() 3.5		1 .	1 1 1	. , .					-	-	/1 \ a.r	-	1 , 1					

(a) Mean and standard deviation ρ

(b) Mean and standard deviation σ_u

	60	80	90	95	100	105	110	120	150	200		60	80	90	95	100	105	110	120	150	200
6	0.104	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.002	0.003	0.152	0.325		6	0.091	0.021	0.015	0.013	0.013	0.017	0.026	0.109	0.321	
	(0.011)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.015)	(0.029)			(0.003)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.003)	(0.020)	
12	0.059	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.055	0.252		12	0.039	0.015	0.011	0.010	0.009	0.011	0.015	0.036	0.220	
	(0.006)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.006)	(0.024)			(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.010)	•
24	0.037	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.098	0.226	24	0.026	0.013	0.010	0.009	0.008	0.010	0.011	0.018	0.074	0.283
	(0.004)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.009)	(0.021)		(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.002)	(0.018)
36	0.029	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.050	0.158	36	0.022	0.012	0.009	0.008	0.008	0.009	0.010	0.015	0.039	0.159
	(0.004)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.005)	(0.015)		(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.008)
48	0.032	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.012	0.116	48	0.024	0.012	0.009	0.009	0.008	0.009	0.010	0.014	0.028	0.111
	(0.004)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.015)	(0.012)		(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.005)
60	0.032	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.002	0.091	60	0.024	0.012	0.010	0.009	0.009	0.009	0.010	0.013	0.022	0.080
	(0.004)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.009)		(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.003)
84	0.035	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.066	84	0.027	0.013	0.011	0.010	0.010	0.010	0.011	0.014	0.022	0.058
	(0.004)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.007)		(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.002)

(c) Mean and standard deviation σ_{ε}

(d) Mean and standard deviation σ_{η}

The panels in this table present the means and standard deviations (in parentheses) of the model parameter estimates. Panel (a) displays estimates of the persistence ρ of the AR1 process for the fundamental value. Panel (b) displays estimates of the standard deviation σ_u of the shock to the fundamental. Panel (c) displays the estimates of the standard deviation σ_{ε} of the noise in the consensus price. Panel (d) displays the estimates of the standard deviation of the noise σ_{η} in private signal. Estimates are obtained using MCMC methods assuming diffuse priors for all parameters. The first row and first column of each panel give moneyness and time-to-expiration, respectively, of the option contracts under consideration. The standard deviation of the posterior distribution of the parameter is given in parenthesis below its mean (0.000 signifies standard deviations below 0.0005). The sample period of the data is December 2006 to December 2011.

0.01

(2.48)

4.92

(2.75)

Table 3: Counterfactual experiments (sub-sample 2006-2011) 90 105 110 120 150 200 60 80 95 100 60 90 95 100 105 110 120 150 200 1.44 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.00*0.01 0.04 1.02 2.35 6 9.97 0.34 0.08 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.23 7.3415.61 (0.26)(0.01)(0.01)(0.01)(0.02)(0.19)(0.41)(0.06)(0.05)(0.05)(0.05)(0.12)(1.18)(0.02)(0.01)(1.57)(0.13)(2.24)12 0.670.030.01 0.00*0.00*0.00*0.01 0.281.91 4.96 0.19 0.040.020.02 0.03 0.072.22 12.86 (0.12)(0.01)(0.01)(0.01)(0.01)(0.01)(0.01)(0.06)(0.37)(0.84)(0.08)(0.07)(0.05)(0.06)(0.04)(0.05)(0.42)(2.06)24 0.50 0.030.00*0.00*0.00*0.01 0.04 1.03 3.20 24 3.77 0.170.04 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.25 20.56 0.010.037.40(0.10)(0.01)(0.01)(0.01)(0.01)(0.00)(0.01)(0.02)(0.18)(0.53)(0.68)(0.07)(0.05)(0.04)(0.05)(0.04)(0.07)(0.10)(1.13)(2.72)0.51 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.00^{*} 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.59 2.24 36 3.81 0.17 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.19 4.39 14.80 (0.10)(0.01)(0.01)(0.01)(0.01)(0.01)(0.01)(0.01)(0.11)(0.38)(0.69)(0.07)(0.06)(0.06)(0.04)(0.06)(0.07)(0.10)(0.74)(2.11)48 0.58 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.33 1.91 48 4.34 0.25 0.08 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.08 0.20 2.19 12.79 (0.12)(0.02)(0.01)(0.01)(0.01)(0.01)(0.01)(0.01)(0.13)(0.34)(0.77)(0.10)(0.06)(0.06)(0.05)(0.05)(0.05)(0.08)(1.06)(1.92)60 0.25 10.570.67 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.19 1.54 4.98 0.33 0.13 0.09 0.07 0.08 0.11 1.08 (0.13)(0.02)(0.01)(0.01)(0.01)(0.01)(0.01)(0.02)(0.06)(0.27)(0.86)(0.12)(0.06)(0.06)(0.06)(0.05)(0.06)(0.10)(0.38)(1.60)0.930.110.050.040.030.040.050.100.321.41 84 6.67 0.650.290.220.200.230.310.591.84 9.72(0.17)(0.04)(0.02)(0.01)(0.01)(0.01)(0.02)(0.03)(0.11)(0.25)(1.09)(0.23)(0.12)(0.09)(0.08)(0.09)(0.12)(0.20)(0.71)(1.49)(b) Decrease in strategic uncertainty: Δ_2^p (a) Decrease in valuation uncertainty: Δ_1^p 60 80 90 95 100 105 110 120 150200 60 80 90 95 100 105 110 120 150 200 32.59-0.01 -0.03 -0.05 32.2660.78 0.00^{*} 6 -0.05-0.03-0.028.82 -0.03-0.02 0.00^{*} -0.02 -0.01 8.27 22.75(7.19)(2.23)(2.12)(2.12)(2.11)(2.10)(2.41)(7.94)(20.23)(4.44)(2.25)(2.07)(2.05)(2.05)(2.08)(2.74)(5.16)(5.64)19.27 -0.040.00*-0.01 0.02 -0.02 `5.83[´] 56.21 -0.040.01 0.00*0.03 0.00*-0.011.17 19.12 -0.014.48 (2.04)(3.26)(2.09)(2.13)(2.16)(2.07)(2.12)(5.31)(2.98)(2.16)(2.26)(2.26)(2.29)(2.15)(2.14)(3.06)(15.08)(2.73)24 23.1024 10.04-0.030.01 -0.020.010.00*-0.0527.36 57.33 2.19-0.020.02-0.010.01 0.00*0.02-0.036.86-0.01(2.67)(2.20)(2.20)(2.25)(2.30)(2.21)(2.20)(2.21)(5.65)(15.83)(2.58)(2.07)(2.09)(2.12)(2.16)(2.10)(2.07)(2.17)(4.14)(4.23)17.22 1.87 0.00*0.010.040.020.030.01 -0.022.24 8.30 -0.010.00*0.03 0.01 0.020.00*-0.0410.0850.99 (2.59)(2.22)(2.32)(2.40)(2.29)(2.37)(2.27)(2.21)(3.40)(10.00)(2.57)(2.07)(2.17)(2.23)(2.15)(2.21)(2.11)(2.11)(3.29)(3.99)2.58 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.36 12.93 48 0.00*0.01 0.00*0.00*0.00*0.01 -0.021.48 42.7311.48 (2.66)(2.27)(2.36)(2.35)(2.30)(2.35)(2.23)(2.23)(7.73)(3.68)(2.08)(2.19)(2.20)(2.16)(2.18)(2.11)(2.10)(5.92)(4.35)(2.62)0.03 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.00^{*} -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 10.27 3.1913.68 0.00^{*} 0.00*0.01 0.03 0.00*-0.03 -0.07 36.63 -0.02(2.64)(2.29)(2.30)(2.32)(2.41)(2.35)(2.27)(2.28)(2.68)(5.95)(2.09)(2.14)(2.23)(2.13)(2.12)(2.55)(3.74)(2.59)(2.16)(2.19)

(c) Reduction in valuation Uncertainty: Δ_1^{θ}

-0.01

(2.46)

 0.00°

(2.42)

0.00*

(2.47)

 0.00^{*}

(2.47)

0.10

(2.94)

0.01

(2.44)

-0.01

(2.46)

(d) Reduction in Strategic Uncertainty: Δ_2^{θ}

-0.02

(2.26)

-0.01

(2.25)

-0.02

(2.22)

-0.19

(2.62)

30.58

(3.28)

-0.01

(2.24)

The panels in this table present the counterfactual percentage decreases in valuation and strategic uncertainty. The two top panels display the reductions in uncertainties when comparing a setting without consensus price to a setting with consensus price. Panel (a) presents the results for the percentage decrease in **valuation uncertainty**, Δ_1^p . Panel (b) shows the percentage increase in **strategic uncertainty**, Δ_2^p . The lower panels shows the counterfactual percentage reductions in valuation and strategic uncertainty when comparing the current information structure to an information structure with a consensus price that perfectly reveals last period's state. Panel (c) shows percentage reduction in **valuation uncertainty**, Δ_1^p . Panel (d) shows the percentage reduction in **strategic uncertainty**, Δ_2^p . The first row and first column of each table give moneyness and time-to-expiration, respectively, of the options under consideration. The standard deviations of the posterior distribution of the parameter is given in parentheses below the means (0.00 signifies standard deviations below 0.005). The sample period is from December 2006 to December 2011.

8.21

(4.19)

20.26

(2.61)

-0.01

(2.21)

-0.02

(2.24)

 0.00^{*}

(2.25)

Table 4: Model parameter estimates $\phi = \{\rho, \sigma_u, \sigma_\varepsilon, \sigma_\eta\}$ (sub-sample 2010-2015)

_																					
	60	80	90	95	100	105	110	120	150	200		60	80	90	95	100	105	110	120	150	200
6	0.910	0.801	0.805	0.811	0.838	0.827	0.829	0.898	0.900		6	0.066	0.099	0.108	0.120	0.135	0.150	0.153	0.130	0.183	
	(0.044)	(0.071)	(0.062)	(0.063)	(0.081)	(0.066)	(0.068)	(0.037)	(0.050)			(0.002)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.003)	(0.009)	
12	0.893	0.895	0.861	0.878	0.861	0.899	0.883	0.853	0.938		12	0.070	0.081	0.089	0.095	0.101	0.109	0.115	0.121	0.130	
	(0.057)	(0.062)	(0.046)	(0.064)	(0.053)	(0.071)	(0.062)	(0.063)	(0.029)			(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.005)	
24	0.908	0.917	0.880	0.858	0.909	0.875	0.870	0.862	0.916	0.972	24	0.061	0.070	0.075	0.079	0.083	0.087	0.091	0.097	0.083	0.118
	(0.058)	(0.061)	(0.049)	(0.052)	(0.062)	(0.051)	(0.065)	(0.057)	(0.036)	(0.019)		(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.002)	(0.006)
36	0.890	0.892	0.896	0.880	0.873	0.872	0.859	0.856	0.936	0.943	36	0.056	0.062	0.067	0.069	0.072	0.074	0.077	0.082	0.061	0.109
	(0.046)	(0.051)	(0.055)	(0.053)	(0.061)	(0.045)	(0.058)	(0.066)	(0.037)	(0.027)		(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.002)	(0.005)
48	0.916	0.888	0.884	0.867	0.887	0.865	0.881	0.860	0.888	0.924	48	0.054	0.059	0.062	0.064	0.066	0.068	0.071	0.075	0.057	0.093
	(0.044)	(0.048)	(0.055)	(0.049)	(0.058)	(0.054)	(0.058)	(0.063)	(0.036)	(0.034)		(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.002)	(0.004)
60	0.927	0.909	0.894	0.882	0.896	0.874	0.873	0.836	0.915	0.934	60	0.051	0.055	0.057	0.058	0.060	0.062	0.064	0.066	0.050	0.072
	(0.054)	(0.057)	(0.046)	(0.049)	(0.054)	(0.049)	(0.061)	(0.056)	(0.047)	(0.040)		(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.002)	(0.003)
84	0.909	0.888	0.898	0.880	0.893	0.892	0.862	0.890	0.813	0.919	84	0.046	0.048	0.050	0.051	0.052	0.053	0.054	0.056	0.062	0.053
	(0.048)	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.047)	(0.041)	(0.049)	(0.044)	(0.065)	(0.063)	(0.033)		(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.002)
			() 3.6		1 ,	1 1 1	. , .						/1 \ a.r		1 , 1		. , .				

(a) Mean and standard deviation ρ

(b) Mean and standard deviation σ_u

	60	80	90	95	100	105	110	120	150	200		60	80	90	95	100	105	110	120	150	200
6	0.064	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.002	0.173	0.325		6	0.049	0.019	0.012	0.010	0.008	0.015	0.031	0.159	0.328	
	(0.008)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.019)	(0.034)			(0.002)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.008)	(0.030)	
12	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.299		12	0.016	0.010	0.008	0.007	0.006	0.008	0.012	0.029	0.269	
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.031)			(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.018)	
24	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.128	0.348	24	0.012	0.008	0.006	0.006	0.005	0.007	0.008	0.014	0.101	0.423
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.014)	(0.032)		(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.005)	(0.037)
36	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.067	0.246	36	0.012	0.008	0.007	0.006	0.006	0.007	0.008	0.012	0.049	0.270
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.007)	(0.024)		(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.002)	(0.021)
48	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.050	0.177	48	0.015	0.010	0.009	0.008	0.008	0.009	0.010	0.013	0.039	0.175
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.006)	(0.018)		(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.012)
60	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.036	0.129	60	0.015	0.011	0.009	0.009	0.009	0.009	0.010	0.012	0.030	0.111
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.005)	(0.013)		(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.007)
84	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.088	84	0.015	0.010	0.010	0.010	0.010	0.010	0.010	0.012	0.020	0.071
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.010)		(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.004)

(c) Mean and standard deviation σ_{ε}

(d) Mean and standard deviation σ_{η}

The panels in this table present the means and standard deviations (in parentheses) of the model parameter estimates. Panel (a) displays estimates of the persistence ρ of the AR1 process for the fundamental value. Panel (b) displays estimates of the standard deviation σ_u of the shock to the fundamental. Panel (c) displays the estimates of the standard deviation σ_{ε} of the noise in the consensus price. Panel (d) displays the estimates of the standard deviation of the noise σ_{η} in private signal. Estimates are obtained using MCMC methods assuming diffuse priors for all parameters. The first row and first column of each panel give moneyness and time-to-expiration, respectively, of the option contracts under consideration. The standard deviation of the posterior distribution of the parameter is given in parenthesis below its mean (0.000 signifies standard deviations below 0.0005). The sample period of the data is December 2010 to February 2015.

Table 5: Counterfactual experiments (sub-sample 2010-2015) 90 105 110 120 150 200 60 80 95 100 60 80 90 95 100 105 110 120 150 200 0.71 0.04 0.01 0.00^{*} 0.00*0.00*0.05 1.51 1.91 6 5.31 0.25 0.03 0.01 0.00*0.02 0.33 10.63 13.43 (0.01)(0.02)(0.31)(0.47)(0.96)(0.05)(0.15)(0.02)(0.01)(0.01)(0.01)(0.13)(0.05)(0.05)(0.06)(0.15)(1.79)(2.39)12 0.10 0.01 0.00*0.00* 0.00*0.00*0.00*0.111.94 0.570.07 0.010.01 0.00*0.010.030.6413.43(0.04)(0.01)(0.01)(0.01)(0.01)(0.01)(0.01)(0.04)(0.43)(0.21)(0.06)(0.05)(0.08)(0.04)(0.05)(0.07)(0.24)(2.36)24 0.06 0.01 0.00*0.00* 0.00*0.00*0.00*0.02 1.253.49 24 0.35 0.06 0.01 22.99 0.01 0.01 0.010.020.118.96 (0.02)(0.01)(0.01)(0.01)(0.01)(0.01)(0.01)(0.01)(0.25)(0.63)(0.14)(0.06)(0.04)(0.06)(0.04)(0.04)(0.06)(0.07)(1.56)(3.26)36 0.07 0.01 0.00*0.00* 0.00^{*} 0.00*0.00*0.02 0.77 2.63 0.43 0.07 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.09 5.70 17.87 (0.03)(0.01)(0.01)(0.01)(0.00)(0.00)(0.01)(0.01)(0.15)(0.50)(0.17)(0.05)(0.08)(0.05)(0.04)(0.04)(0.06)(0.07)(0.98)(2.70)48 0.22 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.63 2.08 48 1.26 0.23 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.20 4.74 14.35 (0.08)(0.02)(0.01)(0.01)(0.01)(0.01)(0.01)(0.02)(0.13)(0.41)(0.49)(0.09)(0.05)(0.05)(0.05)(0.06)(0.06)(0.10)(0.86)(2.28)1.55 11.70 60 0.27 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.58 1.69 0.36 0.17 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.14 0.26 4.32 (0.10)(0.02)(0.01)(0.01)(0.01)(0.01)(0.01)(0.02)(0.13)(0.32)(0.56)(0.15)(0.08)(0.08)(0.07)(0.07)(0.07)(0.11)(0.84)(1.86)0.370.090.060.05 0.050.05 0.050.070.291.36 2.09 0.510.340.300.31 0.290.290.421.64 9.65(0.13)(0.03)(0.02)(0.02)(0.02)(0.02)(0.02)(0.03)(0.10)(0.27)(0.78)(0.20)(0.13)(0.12)(0.12)(0.12)(0.12)(0.16)(0.60)(1.68)(b) Decrease in strategic uncertainty: Δ_2^p (a) Decrease in valuation uncertainty: Δ_1^p

	60	80	90	95	100	105	110	120	150	200		60	80	90	95	100	105	110	120	150	200
6	3.53	-0.02	-0.03	0.00*	0.02	-0.02	-0.09	10.06	18.17		6	15.81	-0.03	-0.04	-0.01	0.01	-0.03	-0.11	37.29	55.41	
	(4.19)	(2.40)	(2.35)	(2.43)	(2.53)	(2.29)	(3.16)	(12.87)	(19.41)			(3.71)	(2.30)	(2.27)	(2.32)	(2.41)	(2.29)	(3.59)	(7.03)	(6.35)	
12	-0.04	-0.02	0.00*	$0.04^{'}$	0.03	0.00*	-0.01	-0.08	23.95		12	-0.04	-0.02	-0.01	0.03	0.02	-0.01	-0.02	-0.11	64.19	-
	(2.60)	(2.47)	(2.46)	(2.90)	(2.73)	(2.46)	(2.46)	(3.10)	(17.00)			(2.36)	(2.32)	(2.35)	(2.70)	(2.63)	(2.36)	(2.33)	(3.48)	(4.62)	
24	-0.01	0.00*	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.01	0.02	0.00*	11.11	39.20	24	-0.02	-0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.01	-0.01	39.91	70.15
	(2.59)	(2.56)	(2.68)	(2.69)	(2.82)	(2.61)	(2.55)	(2.40)	(6.41)	(16.19)		(2.38)	(2.38)	(2.54)	(2.55)	(2.70)	(2.49)	(2.40)	(2.29)	(3.72)	(3.28)
36	0.00*	-0.01	0.03	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	4.56	28.43	36	-0.01	-0.02	0.02	0.00*	0.02	0.01	0.00*	0.00*	19.48	66.18
	(2.66)	(2.61)	(2.73)	(2.68)	(2.70)	(2.67)	(2.66)	(2.51)	(4.19)	(12.86)		(2.41)	(2.44)	(2.55)	(2.52)	(2.59)	(2.53)	(2.51)	(2.36)	(3.52)	(3.34)
48	0.01	-0.02	0.00*	-0.02	-0.01	0.01	-0.02	0.00*	2.66	21.00	48	-0.12	-0.03	0.00*	-0.02	-0.01	0.01	-0.03	-0.02	12.10	58.56
	(2.86)	(2.55)	(2.56)	(2.57)	(2.63)	(2.59)	(2.57)	(2.55)	(3.45)	(10.18)		(2.54)	(2.36)	(2.40)	(2.43)	(2.48)	(2.43)	(2.41)	(2.37)	(3.24)	(3.57)
60	0.03	-0.01	0.01	0.00*	-0.01	0.01	-0.04	0.01	1.80	16.60	60	-0.06	-0.02	0.00*	-0.01	-0.01	0.00*	-0.04	0.00*	8.41	51.76
	(2.93)	(2.70)	(2.68)	(2.66)	(2.64)	(2.65)	(2.61)	(2.62)	(3.27)	(7.50)		(2.54)	(2.42)	(2.46)	(2.46)	(2.47)	(2.46)	(2.44)	(2.41)	(3.20)	(3.37)
84	0.02	-0.03	-0.01	-0.02	0.00^{*}	-0.01	-0.02	-0.04	-0.06	12.95	84	-0.18	-0.03	-0.02	-0.03	-0.02	-0.02	-0.03	-0.04	-0.07	44.61
	(3.18)	(2.86)	(2.81)	(2.82)	(2.80)	(2.83)	(2.84)	(2.77)	(3.19)	(4.66)		(2.77)	(2.56)	(2.56)	(2.55)	(2.55)	(2.57)	(2.58)	(2.52)	(2.75)	(3.07)

(c) Reduction in valuation Uncertainty: Δ_1^{θ}

(d) Reduction in Strategic Uncertainty: Δ_2^{θ}

The panels in this table present the counterfactual percentage decreases in valuation and strategic uncertainty. The two top panels display the reductions in uncertainties when comparing a setting without consensus price to a setting with consensus price. Panel (a) presents the results for the percentage decrease in **valuation uncertainty**, Δ_1^p . Panel (b) shows the percentage increase in **strategic uncertainty**, Δ_2^p . The lower panels shows the counterfactual percentage reductions in valuation and strategic uncertainty when comparing the current information structure to an information structure with a consensus price that perfectly reveals last period's state. Panel (c) shows percentage reduction in **valuation uncertainty**, Δ_1^θ . Panel (d) shows the percentage reduction in **strategic uncertainty**, Δ_2^θ . The first row and first column of each table give moneyness and time-to-expiration, respectively, of the options under consideration. The standard deviations of the posterior distribution of the parameter is given in parentheses below the means (0.00 signifies standard deviations below 0.005). The sample period is from December 2010 to February 2015.

Table 6: Model parameter estimates $\phi = \{\rho, \sigma_u, \sigma_\varepsilon, \sigma_\eta\}$ (Dealers banks submitted >40% of sample period)

											_										
	60	80	90	95	100	105	110	120	150	200		60	80	90	95	100	105	110	120	150	200
6	0.951	0.906	0.923	0.912	0.912	0.913	0.916	0.946	0.945		6	0.080	0.093	0.101	0.109	0.119	0.130	0.133	0.113	0.168	
	(0.021)	(0.028)	(0.039)	(0.028)	(0.031)	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.024)	(0.021)			(0.001)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.002)	(0.006)	
12	0.963	0.938	0.949	0.930	0.921	0.932	0.929	0.921	0.954		12	0.047	0.077	0.084	0.088	0.093	0.099	0.104	0.109	0.140	
	(0.017)	(0.036)	(0.038)	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.025)	(0.017)			(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.003)	
24	0.972	0.934	0.934	0.936	0.939	0.936	0.937	0.916	0.949	0.969	24	0.041	0.068	0.073	0.076	0.079	0.082	0.085	0.091	0.079	0.128
	(0.014)	(0.023)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.029)	(0.027)	(0.029)	(0.025)	(0.019)	(0.019)		(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.001)	(0.005)
36	0.968	0.939	0.942	0.936	0.932	0.943	0.927	0.941	0.963	0.969	36	0.037	0.062	0.066	0.068	0.070	0.073	0.075	0.080	0.061	0.107
	(0.013)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.022)	(0.025)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.036)	(0.017)	(0.024)		(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.001)	(0.003)
48	0.978	0.948	0.935	0.933	0.931	0.937	0.933	0.926	0.956	0.940	48	0.035	0.059	0.062	0.064	0.066	0.068	0.070	0.074	0.057	0.097
	(0.014)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.024)	(0.021)	(0.025)		(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.002)
60	0.972	0.938	0.936	0.938	0.930	0.933	0.938	0.927	0.921	0.946	60	0.033	0.056	0.059	0.060	0.061	0.063	0.065	0.068	0.077	0.089
	(0.013)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.027)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.027)		(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.002)
84	0.975	0.943	0.941	0.943	0.938	0.945	0.930	0.941	0.928	0.963	84	0.033	0.052	0.054	0.055	0.056	0.057	0.058	0.060	0.068	0.058
	(0.015)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.028)	(0.025)	(0.027)	(0.023)	(0.030)	(0.026)	(0.018)		(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.001)
			(a) M	⊇an an	d stand	dard de	wiation	1 0						(b) M	aan and	l stand	ard de	viation	σ		

(a) Mean and standard deviation ρ

(b) Mean and standard deviation σ_n

	60	80	90	95	100	105	110	120	150	200		60	80	90	95	100	105	110	120	150	200
6	0.113	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.002	0.004	0.137	0.338		6	0.095	0.019	0.013	0.012	0.012	0.017	0.028	0.131	0.385	
	(0.008)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.009)	(0.021)			(0.003)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.004)	(0.021)	
12	0.054	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.004	0.260		12	0.041	0.013	0.010	0.009	0.009	0.011	0.014	0.030	0.300	•
	(0.004)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.016)			(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.013)	•
24	0.030	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.108	0.226	24	0.026	0.011	0.008	0.008	0.008	0.009	0.010	0.015	0.094	0.343
	(0.002)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.008)	(0.014)		(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.003)	(0.020)
36	0.023	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.053	0.166	36	0.022	0.010	0.008	0.008	0.008	0.008	0.010	0.014	0.047	0.213
	(0.002)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.004)	(0.011)		(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.011)
48	0.028	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.036	0.112	48	0.024	0.011	0.009	0.008	0.008	0.009	0.010	0.013	0.035	0.152
	(0.002)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.003)	(0.008)		(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.007)
60	0.030	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.077	60	0.025	0.011	0.009	0.009	0.009	0.009	0.010	0.012	0.024	0.112
	(0.002)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.005)		(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.004)
84	0.032	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.059	84	0.028	0.013	0.011	0.011	0.010	0.011	0.011	0.013	0.022	0.063
	(0.002)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.004)		(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.002)

(c) Mean and standard deviation σ_{ε}

(d) Mean and standard deviation σ_n

The panels in this table present the means and standard deviations (in parentheses) of the model parameter estimates. Panel (a) displays estimates of the persistence ρ of the AR1 process for the fundamental value. Panel (b) displays estimates of the standard deviation σ_u of the shock to the fundamental. Panel (c) displays the estimates of the standard deviation σ_{ε} of the noise in the consensus price. Panel (d) displays the estimates of the standard deviation of the noise σ_{η} in private signal. Estimates are obtained using MCMC methods assuming diffuse priors for all parameters. The first row and first column of each panel give moneyness and time-to-expiration, respectively, of the option contracts under consideration. The standard deviation of the posterior distribution of the parameter is given in parenthesis below its mean (0.000 signifies standard deviations below 0.0005). The sample period of the data is December 2010 to February 2015. Dealers banks must have submitted to at least 40% of the full sample period to be included.

Table 7: Counterfactual experiments (Dealers banks submitted >40% of sample period) 95 60 60 80 90 100 105 110 120 150 200 90 95 100 105 110 120 150 200 2.79 0.07 0.01 0.01 0.00*0.01 0.07 6 10.34 0.420.08 0.040.03 11.8218.59 1.50 1.75 0.08 0.44(0.02)(0.01)(0.01)(0.01)(0.01)(0.02)(0.21)(0.35)(1.14)(0.14)(0.04)(0.07)(0.06)(0.14)(1.22)(1.84)(0.19)(0.06)12 0.94 0.030.01 0.01 0.00*0.01 0.01 2.96 6.81 0.08 1.12 19.23 0.190.200.050.03 0.020.04(0.01)(0.36)(0.13)(0.01)(0.01)(0.01)(0.01)(0.01)(0.05)(0.80)(0.07)(0.05)(0.04)(0.06)(0.05)(0.06)(0.30)(1.86)24 0.80 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00*0.01 0.01 0.03 1.54 4.5024 5.77 0.14 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.18 10.57 27.83 0.03(2.46)(0.11)(0.01)(0.01)(0.01)(0.01)(0.01)(0.01)(0.19)(0.52)(0.67)(0.05)(0.06)(0.04)(0.06)(0.06)(0.01)(0.05)(0.05)(1.14)36 0.780.03 0.01 0.01 0.010.01 0.01 0.041.00 3.54 5.58 0.170.06 0.040.04 0.050.07 0.21 7.09 21.94 (0.01)(0.01)(0.01)(0.01)(0.00)(0.01)(0.01)(0.13)(0.42)(0.67)(0.07)(0.05)(0.05)(0.04)(0.04)(0.07)(0.82)(2.01)(0.11)(0.05)0.850.050.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.023.246.10 0.290.100.2520.31 48 0.040.780.11 0.070.06 0.075.65(0.01)(1.91)(0.01)(0.01)(0.01)(0.11)(0.09)(0.09)(0.11)(0.01)(0.01)(0.01)(0.39)(0.72)(0.07)(0.06)(0.04)(0.06)(0.07)(0.68)0.910.06 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.020.04 0.333.2560 6.510.360.140.11 0.10 0.10 0.13 0.231.91 19.88 (0.12)(0.02)(0.01)(0.01)(0.01)(0.01)(0.01)(0.01)(0.09)(0.37)(0.75)(0.10)(0.05)(0.07)(0.04)(0.06)(0.07)(0.07)(0.53)(1.79)1.20 0.15 0.070.060.050.050.060.090.372.00 84 8.39 0.850.400.330.31 0.310.340.512.08 13.13 (0.03)(0.01)(0.01)(0.01)(0.01)(0.02)(0.09)(0.25)(0.10)(0.09)(0.09)(0.16)(0.02)(0.95)(0.20)(0.09)(0.08)(0.13)(0.54)(1.38)

(a) Decrease in valuation uncertainty: Δ_1^p

((b)) Decrease	in	strategic	uncertainty:	Δ_2^p

	60	80	90	95	100	105	110	120	150	200		60	80	90	95	100	105	110	120	150	200
6	11.23	-0.01	0.00*	0.00*	0.01	-0.02	-0.04	9.94	26.04		6	39.31	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.03	-0.07	35.56	63.09	
	(7.45)	(1.75)	(1.64)	(1.71)	(1.70)	(1.69)	(2.20)	(10.24)	(21.58)			(3.77)	(1.76)	(1.60)	(1.59)	(1.60)	(1.81)	(2.59)	(5.58)	(4.54)	
12	5.84	0.01	0.01	0.02	$0.02^{'}$	$0.02^{'}$	0.00*	-0.06	24.67		12	23.48	0.00*	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.00*	-0.01	-0.09	60.49	
	(2.73)	(1.70)	(1.80)	(1.84)	(1.87)	(1.79)	(1.66)	(2.66)	(17.89)			(2.27)	(1.59)	(1.67)	(1.69)	(1.69)	(1.65)	(1.64)	(3.19)	(4.03)	
24	2.65	0.00*	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.00^{*}	10.86	30.07	24	11.20	0.00*	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.01	-0.01	38.15	59.40
	(2.03)	(1.77)	(1.99)	(1.96)	(2.00)	(1.98)	(1.89)	(1.71)	(5.84)	(16.27)		(1.93)	(1.64)	(1.80)	(1.79)	(1.85)	(1.79)	(1.71)	(1.64)	(3.30)	(2.88)
36	2.01	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	4.06	22.95	36	8.52	0.01	0.00*	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.00*	0.00*	16.79	55.51
	(2.01)	(1.82)	(1.94)	(1.93)	(1.96)	(1.86)	(1.74)	(1.75)	(3.36)	(11.26)		(1.99)	(1.64)	(1.78)	(1.77)	(1.81)	(1.73)	(1.63)	(1.61)	(2.87)	(3.17)
48	3.08	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.00*	0.00^{*}	2.08	15.59	48	12.98	0.00*	0.00*	0.01	0.01	0.01	-0.01	-0.02	8.94	44.29
	(2.00)	(1.84)	(1.92)	(1.97)	(1.89)	(1.88)	(1.83)	(1.81)	(2.42)	(9.23)		(1.92)	(1.65)	(1.72)	(1.78)	(1.74)	(1.72)	(1.67)	(1.63)	(2.30)	(3.62)
60	4.03	0.00*	0.02	-0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.02	10.51	60	16.58	-0.01	0.00*	-0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	-0.01	-0.13	32.53
	(2.01)	(1.91)	(1.88)	(1.93)	(1.92)	(1.95)	(1.86)	(1.81)	(2.27)	(7.13)		(1.90)	(1.69)	(1.69)	(1.74)	(1.75)	(1.76)	(1.70)	(1.65)	(2.32)	(3.60)
84	5.62	-0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.00^{*}	-0.01	8.93	84	21.86	-0.02	0.00*	0.01	0.00*	0.00*	0.01	-0.01	-0.10	31.21
	(2.14)	(1.96)	(1.95)	(1.90)	(1.93)	(1.94)	(1.91)	(1.89)	(2.20)	(4.40)		(1.95)	(1.71)	(1.73)	(1.72)	(1.74)	(1.73)	(1.72)	(1.70)	(2.02)	(2.83)

(c) Reduction in valuation Uncertainty: Δ_1^{θ}

(d) Reduction in Strategic Uncertainty: Δ_2^{θ}

The panels in this table present the counterfactual percentage decreases in valuation and strategic uncertainty. The two top panels display the reductions in uncertainties when comparing a setting without consensus price to a setting with consensus price. Panel (a) presents the results for the percentage decrease in **valuation uncertainty**, Δ_1^p . Panel (b) shows the percentage increase in **strategic uncertainty**, Δ_2^p . The lower panels shows the counterfactual percentage reductions in valuation and strategic uncertainty when comparing the current information structure to an information structure with a consensus price that perfectly reveals last period's state. Panel (c) shows percentage reduction in **valuation uncertainty**, Δ_1^{θ} . Panel (d) shows the percentage reduction in **strategic uncertainty**, Δ_2^{θ} . The first row and first column of each table give moneyness and time-to-expiration, respectively, of the options under consideration. The standard deviations of the posterior distribution of the parameter is given in parentheses below the means (0.00 signifies standard deviations below 0.005). The sample period is from December 2002 to February 2015. Dealers banks must have submitted to at least 40% of the full sample period to be included.

References

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