




POLITECNICO
MILANO 1863


Towards a Formally Verified Identity-Aware Architecture for Autonomous Systems

The IDEA Framework [1]



[1] Gavidia-Calderon, C., Kordoni, A., Bennaceur, A., Levine, M., & Nuseibeh, B. The IDEA of Us: An Identity-Aware Architecture for Autonomous Systems. Submitted to TOSEM.


The IDEA Framework [1]



Which properties are
guaranteed to hold under the
generated strategy?

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
Uppaal Stratego [2]



[2] David, A., Jensen, P. G., Larsen, K. G., Mikučionis, M., & Taankvist, J. H. (2015). Uppaal stratego. In TACAS 2015, Proceedings 21 (pp. 206-211). Springer Berlin Heidelberg.

[3] Behrmann, G., Cougnard, A., David, A., Fleury, E., Larsen, K. G., & Lime, D. (2007). UPPAAL-Tiga: Time for Playing Games! (Tool Paper). In CAV 2007. Proceedings 19 (pp. 121-125). Springer Berlin Heidelberg.


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
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
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The IDEA Framework [1] + Formal Verification




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
The IDEA Framework [1] + Formal Verification



- How can the two strategies be compared? Empirically or is there mathematical evidence?
- Should the two strategies be compared on the fly? Is it even possible?
- Can the formally verified strategy realistically be computed at runtime?


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
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


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
The IDEA Framework




The IDEA Framework + Formal Verification: Option 1




The IDEA Framework + Formal Verification: Option 2




The IDEA Framework + Formal Verification: Option 2




The IDEA Framework + Formal Verification: Current state




Formal Model



Formal Model



Formal Model



Formal Model: How to deal with uncontrollable unobservable actions?

Re-calibrate the expected payoff value to account for the probability to reach the corresponding state (where act is either call-staff or do-help):

$$U(\langle \text{GI}, \text{act} \rangle) \rightarrow U(\langle \text{GI}, \text{act} \rangle) \times P(\text{GI})$$

$$U(\langle \text{NOT_GI}, \text{act} \rangle) \rightarrow U(\langle \text{NOT_GI}, \text{act} \rangle) \times (1 - P(\text{GI}))$$

Formal Model: How to deal with uncontrollable unobservable actions?

Re-calibrate the expected payoff value to account for the probability to reach the corresponding state (where act is either call-staff or do-help):

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$$U(\langle \text{NOT_GI}, \text{act} \rangle) \rightarrow U(\langle \text{NOT_GI}, \text{act} \rangle) \times (1 - P(\text{GI}))$$

Extracted from Uppaal strategy

Estimated (at runtime) by NN

Formal Model: How to deal with uncontrollable unobservable actions?

Re-calibrate the expected payoff value to account for the probability to reach the corresponding state (where act is either call-staff or do-help):

$$U(\langle \text{GI}, \text{act} \rangle) \rightarrow U(\langle \text{GI}, \text{act} \rangle) \times P(\text{GI})$$

$$U(\langle \text{NOT_GI}, \text{act} \rangle) \rightarrow U(\langle \text{NOT_GI}, \text{act} \rangle) \times (1 - P(\text{GI}))$$

	contact-staff	do-help
GI	1.3	0.77
NOT_GI	0.85	1.28

Formal Model: How to deal with uncontrollable unobservable actions?

Re-calibrate the expected payoff value to account for the probability to reach the corresponding state (where act is either call-staff or do-help):

$$U(\langle \text{GI}, \text{act} \rangle) \rightarrow U(\langle \text{GI}, \text{act} \rangle) \times P(\text{GI})$$

$$U(\langle \text{NOT_GI}, \text{act} \rangle) \rightarrow U(\langle \text{NOT_GI}, \text{act} \rangle) \times (1 - P(\text{GI}))$$

$P(\text{GI}) = 0.8$	contact-staff	do-help
GI	$1.3 * 0.8 = 1.04$	$0.77 * 0.8 = 0.62$
NOT_GI	$0.85 * 0.2 = 0.17$	$1.28 * 0.2 = 0.26$

Formal Model: How to deal with uncontrollable unobservable actions?

Re-calibrate the expected payoff value to account for the probability to reach the corresponding state (where act is either call-staff or do-help):

$$U(\langle \text{GI}, \text{act} \rangle) \rightarrow U(\langle \text{GI}, \text{act} \rangle) \times P(\text{GI})$$

$$U(\langle \text{NOT_GI}, \text{act} \rangle) \rightarrow U(\langle \text{NOT_GI}, \text{act} \rangle) \times (1 - P(\text{GI}))$$

$P(\text{GI}) = 0.8$	contact-staff	do-help
GI	$1.3 * 0.8 = 1.04$	$0.77 * 0.8 = 0.62$
NOT_GI	$0.85 * 0.2 = 0.17$	$1.28 * 0.2 = 0.26$
	1.21	> 0.88 (contact-staff is preferable)

Formal Model: How to deal with uncontrollable unobservable actions?

Re-calibrate the expected payoff value to account for the probability to reach the corresponding state (where act is either call-staff or do-help):

$$U(\langle \text{GI}, \text{act} \rangle) \rightarrow U(\langle \text{GI}, \text{act} \rangle) \times P(\text{GI})$$

$$U(\langle \text{NOT_GI}, \text{act} \rangle) \rightarrow U(\langle \text{NOT_GI}, \text{act} \rangle) \times (1 - P(\text{GI}))$$

$P(\text{GI}) = 0.12$	contact-staff	do-help
GI	$1.3 * 0.12 = 0.156$	$0.77 * 0.12 = 0.09$
NOT_GI	$0.85 * 0.88 = 0.75$	$1.28 * 0.88 = 1.12$

Formal Model: How to deal with uncontrollable unobservable actions?

Re-calibrate the expected payoff value to account for the probability to reach the corresponding state (where act is either call-staff or do-help):

$$U(\langle \text{GI}, \text{act} \rangle) \rightarrow U(\langle \text{GI}, \text{act} \rangle) \times P(\text{GI})$$

$$U(\langle \text{NOT_GI}, \text{act} \rangle) \rightarrow U(\langle \text{NOT_GI}, \text{act} \rangle) \times (1 - P(\text{GI}))$$

$P(\text{GI}) = 0.12$	contact-staff	do-help
GI	$1.3 * 0.12 = 0.156$	$0.77 * 0.12 = 0.09$
NOT_GI	$0.85 * 0.88 = 0.75$	$1.28 * 0.88 = 1.12$

0.9 < 1.21
(do-help is preferable)

Experimental Results

Experimental results?