```
Run #1
Bob in role A
─────────────
A -> Bob
B -> Alice
─────────────
Fresh k#1
─────────────
Var n -> n#2
```

```
send_1 to Alice
{ k#1 }pk(Alice)
```

fake sender Eve

```
Run #2
Alice in role B
─────────────
A -> Eve
B -> Alice
─────────────
Fresh n#2
─────────────
Var k -> k#1
```

```
recv_1 from Eve
{ k#1 }pk(Alice)
```

```
send_2 to Eve
(h(Alice,n#2),{ { n#2 }k#1 }pk(Eve))
```

Initial intruder knowledge

decrypt — sk(Eve)

pk(Bob)

select h(Alice,n#2)
redirect to Bob

{ n#2 }k#1

encrypt

```
recv_2 from Alice
(h(Alice,n#2),{ { n#2 }k#1 }pk(Bob))
```

```
send_3 to Alice
{ n#2 }pk(Alice)
```

```
claim_A6
Nisynch
```

[Id 3] Protocol myProtocol, role A, claim type Nisynch