

Get rid of inline assembly

through verification-oriented lifting

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Software is not always reliable


1996



500M\$

2009



400 

2016



Then came formal methods



CODESONAR®  **AbsInt**

With **industrial** success stories in **regulated domains**



A grand challenge



Many barriers to formal methods adoption:

- learnability
- scalability
- ...
- automatization
- feature set
 - mixed-language support
 - ...

Today's challenge :
mixed C & **inline assembly** code

with **reuse** of existing tools

Inline assembly is well spread



ALSA

GMP

libyuv

¹according to Rigger et al.

Inline assembly is a pain



```
WARNING: function "main" has inline asm
ERROR: inline assembly is unsupported
NOTE: ignoring this error at this location
```

```
done: total instructions = 161
done: completed paths = 1
done: generated tests = 1
```



```
done for function main
===== VALUES COMPUTED =====
Values at end of function mid_pred:
  i ∈ [--..--]      i ∈ [-5..5]
Values at end of function main:
  a ∈ {0; 1; 2; 3; 4; 5}
  b ∈ [-5..10]
  c ∈ [-10..0]
  i ∈ [--..--]      i ∈ [-5..5]
```

Incomplete

Imprecise

Common workarounds

```
int mid_pred (int a, int b, int c) {
    int i = b;
#ifdef DISABLE_ASM
    __asm__
        ("cmp    %2, %1 \n\t"
         "cmovg   %1, %0 \n\t"
         "cmovg   %2, %1 \n\t"
         "cmp     %3, %1 \n\t"
         "cmovl   %3, %1 \n\t"
         "cmp     %1, %0 \n\t"
         "cmovg   %1, %0 \n\t"
         : "+&r" (i), "+&r" (a)
         : "r" (b), "r" (c));
#else
    i = max(a, b);
    a = min(a, b);
    a = max(a, c);
    i = min(i, a);
#endif
    return i;
}
```

Manual handling

manpower intensive

error prone

Dedicated analyzer

substantial engineering effort

Common workarounds

```
int mid_pred (int a, int b, int c) {
    int i = b;
#ifdef DISABLE_ASM
    __asm__
        ("cmp    %2, %1 \n\t"
         "cmovg   %1, %0 \n\t"
         "cmovg   %2, %1 \n\t"
         "cmp     %3, %1 \n\t"
         "cmovl   %3, %1 \n\t"
         "cmp     %1, %0 \n\t"
         "cmovg   %1, %0 \n\t"
         : "+&r" (i), "+&r" (a)
         : "r" (b), "r" (c));
#else
    i = max(a, b);
    a = min(a, b);
    a = max(a, c);
    i = min(i, a);
#endif
    return i;
}
```

Manual handling

manpower intensive

error prone


Dedicated analyzer

substantial engineering effort


Want to **reuse** existing analyses!

Our proposition

Automatically **lift** ASM to **equivalent C**



Lift



Analyze



Reuse C tools

Challenges

Widely applicable

architecture – assembly dialect – compiler agnostic

Verification friendly

decent enough analysis outputs

Trustable

usable in sound formal method context

Challenges & key enablers

Widely applicable

architecture – assembly dialect – compiler agnostic

leverage existing binary-to-IR lifters – x86/ARM, GCC/clang

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novel high-level simplifications – improve KLEE & Frama-C

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novel dedicated equivalence checking – 100% in scope success

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Evaluated over 2000⁺ assembly chunks from Debian packages

Panorama of existing works


		Manual	Goanna ¹	Vx86 ²	Inception ³	TINA
Semantic lifting		✓	✗	✓	✓	✓
Widely applicable		✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Trust	Sanity check	✓	✓	✗	✗	✓
	Validation	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
	Verifiability	✓	✗	✓	✓	✓

¹Fehnker et al. Some Assembly Required - Program Analysis of Embedded System Code

²Schulte et al. Vx86: x86 Assembler Simulated in C Powered by Automated Theorem Proving

³Corteggiani et al. Inception: System-Wide Security Testing of Real-World Embedded Systems Software


Lifting: the basic case



```
--asm--
(
  "cmp    %0, %1 \n\t"
  "cmovg  %i, %0 \n\t"
  /* [ ... ] */
  : "+&r" (i), "+&r" (a)
  : /* [ ... ] */
  : /* no clobbers */
);
```

```
--eax__ = (unsigned int)i;
--ebx__ = (unsigned int)a;
--res32__ = __ebx__ - __eax__;
__zf__ = __res32__ == 0u;
__sf__ = (int)__res32__ < 0;
--of__ = ((__ebx__ >> 31)
          != (__eax__ >> 31))
        & ((__ebx__ >> 31)
           != (__res32__ >> 31));
if (!__zf__ & __sf__ == __of__)
  goto l1;
else goto l2;
l1: __tmp__ = __ebx__; goto l3;
l2: __tmp__ = __eax__; goto l3;
l3: __eax__ = __tmp__;
i = (int)__eax__;
```

Lifting: verification threats



```
--asm--
(
    "cmp    %0, %1 \n\t"
    "cmovg  %1, %0 \n\t"
    /* [ ... ] */
    : "+&r" (i), "+&r" (a)
    : /* [ ... ] */
    : /* no clobbers */
);
```

- T1. low-level data & computation
- T2. low-level packing & representation
- T3. unusual & unstructured control flow

```
--eax__ = (unsigned int)i;
--ebx__ = (unsigned int)a;
--res32__ = __ebx__ - __eax__;
__zf__ = --res32__ == 0u;
__sf__ = (int)--res32__ < 0;
__of__ = ((__ebx__ >> 31)
          != (__eax__ >> 31))
        & ((__ebx__ >> 31)
           != (__res32__ >> 31));
if (!__zf__ & __sf__ == __of__)
    goto l1;
else goto l2;
l1: __tmp__ = __ebx__; goto l3;
l2: __tmp__ = __eax__; goto l3;
l3: __eax__ = __tmp__;
i = (int)__eax__;
```


Lifting : running example

```
__asm__  
(  
    "cmp    %0, %1 \n\t"  
    "cmovg  %1, %0 \n\t"  
    /* [ ... ] */  
    : "+&r" (i), "+&r" (a)  
    : /* [ ... ] */  
    : /* no clobbers */  
);
```

- T1. low-level data & computation
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```
__eax__ = (unsigned int)i;  
__ebx__ = (unsigned int)a;  
__res32__ = __ebx__ - __eax__;  
__zf__ = __res32__ == 0u;  
__sf__ = (int)__res32__ < 0;  
__of__ = ((__ebx__ >> 31)  
          != (__eax__ >> 31))  
        & ((__ebx__ >> 31)  
          != (__res32__ >> 31));  
if (!__zf__ & __sf__ == __of__)  
    goto l1;  
else goto l2;  
l1: __tmp__ = __ebx__; goto l3;  
l2: __tmp__ = __eax__; goto l3;  
l3: __eax__ = __tmp__;  
i = (int)__eax__;
```

Lifting : high-level predicate (Djoudi et al.)

```
__asm__  
(  
    "cmp    %0, %1 \n\t"  
    "cmovg  %1, %0 \n\t"  
    /* [ ... ] */  
    : "+&r" (i), "+&r" (a)  
    : /* [ ... ] */  
    : /* no clobbers */  
);
```

- T1. low-level data & computation
- T2. low-level packing & representation
- T3. unusual & unstructured control flow

```
__eax__ = (unsigned int)i;  
__ebx__ = (unsigned int)a;  
__res32__ = __ebx__ - __eax__;  
__zf__ = __res32__ == 0u;  
__sf__ = (int)__res32__ < 0;  
__of__ = ((__ebx__ >> 31)  
          != (__eax__ >> 31))  
        & ((__ebx__ >> 31)  
          != (__res32__ >> 31));  
if (!__zf__ & __sf__ == __of__)  
    goto 11;  
else goto 12;  
11: __tmp__ = __ebx__; goto 13;  
12: __tmp__ = __eax__; goto 13;  
13: __eax__ = __tmp__;  
i = (int)__eax__;
```

Lifting : high-level predicate (Djoudi et al.)

```
__asm__  
(  
    "cmp    %0, %1 \n\t"  
    "cmovg  %1, %0 \n\t"  
    /* [ ... ] */  
    : "+&r" (i), "+&r" (a)  
    : /* [ ... ] */  
    : /* no clobbers */  
);
```

- T1. low-level data & computation
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```
__eax__ = (unsigned int)i;  
__ebx__ = (unsigned int)a;  
__res32__ = __ebx__ - __eax__;  
__zf__ = __res32__ == 0u;  
__sf__ = (int)__res32__ < 0;  
__of__ = ((__ebx__ >> 31)  
          != (__eax__ >> 31))  
        & ((__ebx__ >> 31)  
          != (__res32__ >> 31));  
if ((int)__ebx__ > (int)__eax__)  
    goto l1;  
else goto l2;  
l1: __tmp__ = __ebx__; goto l3;  
l2: __tmp__ = __eax__; goto l3;  
l3: __eax__ = __tmp__;  
i = (int)__eax__;
```

Lifting : slicing

```
--asm--  
(  
    "cmp    %0, %1 \n\t"  
    "cmovg  %1, %0 \n\t"  
    /* [ ... ] */  
    : "+&r" (i), "+&r" (a)  
    : /* [ ... ] */  
    : /* no clobbers */  
);
```

- T1. low-level data & computation
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```
--eax__ = (unsigned int)i;  
--ebx__ = (unsigned int)a;  
--res32__ = --ebx__ --eax__;  
--zf__ = --res32__ == 0u;  
--sf__ = (int)--res32__ < 0;  
--of__ = ((--ebx__ >> 31)  
          != (--eax__ >> 31))  
          & ((--ebx__ >> 31)  
            != (--res32__ >> 31));  
if ((int)--ebx__ > (int)--eax__)  
    goto l1;  
else goto l2;  
l1: --tmp__ = --ebx__; goto l3;  
l2: --tmp__ = --eax__; goto l3;  
l3: --eax__ = --tmp__;  
i = (int)--eax__;
```

Lifting : slicing

```
__asm__  
(  
    "cmp    %0, %1 \n\t"  
    "cmovg  %1, %0 \n\t"  
    /* [ ... ] */  
    : "+&r" (i), "+&r" (a)  
    : /* [ ... ] */  
    : /* no clobbers */  
);
```

```
__eax__ = (unsigned int)i;  
__ebx__ = (unsigned int)a;  
if ((int)__ebx__ > (int)__eax__)  
    goto l1;  
else goto l2;  
l1: __tmp__ = __ebx__; goto l3;  
l2: __tmp__ = __eax__; goto l3;  
l3: __eax__ = __tmp__;  
i = (int)__eax__;
```

- T1. low-level data & computation
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Lifting : structuring

```
__asm__  
(  
    "cmp    %0, %1 \n\t"  
    "cmovg  %1, %0 \n\t"  
    /* [ ... ] */  
    : "+&r" (i), "+&r" (a)  
    : /* [ ... ] */  
    : /* no clobbers */  
);
```

```
__eax__ = (unsigned int)i;  
__ebx__ = (unsigned int)a;  
if ((int)__ebx__ > (int)__eax__)  
    __tmp__ = __ebx__;  
else  
    __tmp__ = __eax__;  
__eax__ = __tmp__;  
i = __eax__;
```

- T1. low-level data & computation
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Lifting : typing

```
--asm--  
(  
    "cmp    %0, %1 \n\t"  
    "cmovg  %1, %0 \n\t"  
    /* [ ... ] */  
    : "+&r" (i), "+&r" (a)  
    : /* [ ... ] */  
    : /* no clobbers */  
);
```

```
int __eax__ = i;  
int __ebx__ = a;  
int __tmp__;  
if (__ebx__ > __eax__)  
    __tmp__ = __ebx__;  
else  
    __tmp__ = __eax__;  
__eax__ = __tmp__;  
i = __eax__;
```

- T1. low-level data & computation
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Lifting : expression propagation

```
__asm__  
(  
    "cmp    %0, %1 \n\t"  
    "cmovg  %1, %0 \n\t"  
    /* [ ... ] */  
    : "+&r" (i), "+&r" (a)  
    : /* [ ... ] */  
    : /* no clobbers */  
);
```

```
int __eax__ = i;  
int __ebx__ = a;  
int __tmp__;  
if (__ebx__ a > __eax__)  
    __tmp__ = __ebx__ a;  
else  
    __tmp__ = __eax__;  
__eax__ = __tmp__;  
i = __eax__;
```

- T1. low-level data & computation
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Lifting : expression propagation

```
__asm__  
(  
    "cmp    %0, %1 \n\t"  
    "cmovg  %1, %0 \n\t"  
    /* [ ... ] */  
    : "+&r" (i), "+&r" (a)  
    : /* [ ... ] */  
    : /* no clobbers */  
);
```

```
int __eax__ = i;  
int __ebx__ = a;  
int __tmp__;  
if (a > __eax__ i)  
    __tmp__ = a;  
else  
    __tmp__ = __eax__ i;  
__eax__ = __tmp__;  
i = __eax__ __tmp__;
```

- T1. low-level data & computation
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Lifting : expression propagation

```
--asm--  
(  
    "cmp    %0, %1 \n\t"  
    "cmovg  %1, %0 \n\t"  
    /* [ ... ] */  
    : "+&r" (i), "+&r" (a)  
    : /* [ ... ] */  
    : /* no clobbers */  
);
```

```
int __eax__ = i;  
int __ebx__ = a;  
int __tmp__;  
if (a > i)  
    __tmp__ = a;  
else  
    __tmp__ = i;  
__eax__ = __tmp__;  
i = __tmp__;
```

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Lifting: high level simplifications




```
--asm--
(
    "cmp    %0, %1 \n\t"
    "cmovg  %i, %0 \n\t"
    /* [ ... ] */
    : "+&r" (i), "+&r" (a)
    : /* [ ... ] */
    : /* no clobbers */
);
```

- T1. low-level data & computation
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- T3. unusual & unstructured control flow


```
int __tmp__;  
if (a > i)  
    __tmp__ = a;  
else  
    __tmp__ = i;  
i = __tmp__;
```

- types consistency
- high-level predicate
- unpacking
- structuring
- expression propagation
- loop normalization

Validation: semantics equivalence




Validation: tailored algorithm



Program equivalence is hard

Validation: tailored algorithm




Program equivalence is hard

But all the process is controlled

Step 1: control flow graph isomorphism
labeled directed graph + debug information

Step 2: pairwise basic block equivalence check
SMT-based check

TInA: prototype



Experimental evaluation

- **Applicability & Trust**

Debian, x86/ARM, GCC/clang

- **Verification friendly**

KLEE and Frama-C

Widely Applicable : Debian 8.11 x86-32bit

	GCC v5.4		GCC v4.7		CLANG 3.8	
All chunks	3039		2955		2955	
Trivial	126		126		106	
Out-of-scope	449		366		404	
Rejected	138		137		412	
Relevant	2326	76%	2326	78%	2033	69%
Lifted	2326	100%	2326	100%	2033	100%
Validated	2326	100%	2326	100%	2033	100%
Average size	8		8		8	
Maximum size	341		341		341	
Translation time	121s		105s		89s	
Validation time	1527s		1528s		1336s	

Verifiability: KLEE (symbolic execution)

	LIFTING		
	NONE	BASIC	TInA
# functions with 100% branch coverage ¹	×	25 / 58	25 / 58
Aggregate time for functions with 100% branch coverage ¹	N/A	121s	106s
# explored paths for all functions	1 336k	1 459k	6 402k

58 functions from ALSA, ffmpeg, GMP & libyuv

¹10min timeout

Verifiability: Frama-C EVA (abstract interpretation)

	TINA	
Functions with returns (non void)	20	
Better return precision	11	55%
Functions with initial C alarm	27	
Alarm reduction in C	23	82%
New memory alarms ASM	17	26%
Positive impact	45	77%

58 functions from ALSA, ffmpeg, GMP & libyuv

Verifiability: Frama-C WP (deductive verification)

FUNCTION	# INSTR	LIFTING		
		NONE	BASIC	TINA
saturated_sub	2	×	✓	✓
saturated_add	2	×	×	✓
log2	1	×	×	✓
mid_pred	7	×	×	✓
strcmpeq	9	×	×	✓
strlen	16	×	×	✓
memset	9	×	×	✓
count	8	×	×	✓
max_element	10	×	×	✓
cmp_array	10	×	×	✓
sum_array	20	×	×	✓
SumSquareError_SSE2	24	×	×	✓

Limits

Engineering

- floating point operations
- builtin crypto-operations

would challenge SMT & analyzers too

Genericity

- syscall
- hardware dependent

each analyzer has its own way to handle it

Conclusion

Inline ASM hinders the adoption of formal methods

TInA: Automated lifting

- Widely applicable
- Verification-friendly
- Trustable

Successful experimental evaluation over:

- 2000⁺ x86 Debian chunks – *ARM experiments too*
- KLEE & Frama-C friendly – *principled approach*

Conclusion

Inline ASM hinders the adoption of formal methods

TInA: Automated lifting

- Widely applicable
- Verification-friendly
- Trustable

Post-analysis considerations:

- **567** compliance issues
- ffmpeg coding flaws

Successful experimental evaluation over:

- 2000⁺ x86 Debian chunks – *ARM experiments too*
- KLEE & Frama-C friendly – *principled approach*

- Have a look @ the paper
- Meet us @ the conference



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up to Thursday night



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up to Thursday noon

Any questions?