

Multiple Secret Leaders

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1 Some Notation or Smthng

1. We will have n parties
2. We will have k leaders elected
3. We will have a “bid” published by a user $i \in [n]$ be denoted as b_i
4. We will denote a commitment as comm_i
5. We will denote some generic CRHF as h
6. We will say Enc_{TFHE} and Dec_{TFHE} for TFHE encoding and decoding respectively

2 Sketching shtuff out

Say we want to elect k leaders (maybe with or without repetition) secretly out of n parties, we can run SSLE k times but that’d be painful. Let’s not do that.

2.1 Simple sorting

A simple approach with runtime (assuming $k \leq n$) $O(k + n \log n)$ is to use sorting. At a high level, the idea is to somehow randomly sort the n parties then elect the top k parties in the sort. To do this we can use TFHE in a very similar way to the SSLE paper.

1. **Setup:** Same exact setup with TFHE in SSLE. Setup TFHE and distribute shares. Each party also has some secret s_i and commitment $\text{comm}_i = \text{comm}(s_i)$.
2. **Publish Bid:** Each party samples $r_i \leftarrow U$ and publish $b_i = (\text{Enc}_{\text{TFHE}}(r_i), \text{Enc}_{\text{TFHE}}(\text{comm}_i))$.

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 $\alpha \leftarrow \text{ROM}(b_1, b_2, \dots)$ 
for  $i \in [n]$  do
   $b'_i \leftarrow (\text{Enc}_{\text{TFHE}}(r_i) - \alpha, \text{Enc}_{\text{TFHE}}(\text{comm}_i))$ 
 $\text{sorted} = [b'_{j_1}, b'_{j_2}, \dots] \leftarrow \text{Sort}_{\text{TFHE}}([b'_1, b'_2, \dots])$ 
return first  $k$  elements of  $\text{sorted}$ 
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Figure 1: Simple Sorting Evaluation

3. **Evaluation:** This is done by one party whom may even be an external party. See [fig. 1](#) for details
4. **Decoding:** At least t parties publish their threshold decryptions of the return from the evaluation
5. **Proving:** For a party i to prove that they are the selected leader for the j th slot, they prove that they know the secret to produce comm_i where comm_i is the decrypted commitment for the i th slot

2.2 Distributed/ Streaming Simple Sorting

Assume that n, k are a power of 2. We will keep a lot of the same from sorting but now look at selection as a sort of tournament. As a note, security is slightly reduced here as a participating party can know that they did not win before the final outcome of the election. I do not know if this matters.

For completeness, we will write out each step again

Algorithm 1 PlayGame. Homomorphically plays a game to decide which incoming bid “wins”

Input: Point $\alpha \in \mathbb{F}_q$,

two bids, $b_1 = (\text{Enc}_{\text{TFHE}}(r_1), \text{Enc}_{\text{TFHE}}(\text{comm}_1)), (\text{Enc}_{\text{TFHE}}(r_2), \text{Enc}_{\text{TFHE}}(\text{comm}_2))$

Output: Winning bid. The winning bid should be indistinguishable from a random bid to the non-players

$\text{closer} \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{\text{TFHE}}(r_1 - \alpha > r_2 - \alpha)$

return $\text{closer} \cdot b_1 + (1 - \text{closer}) \cdot b_2$

Algorithm 2 EvalStream. Evaluates a stream of bids as they come in.

Input: L , set of (bid, level) pairs. New bid and level, (b, ℓ) . Also, stop level ℓ_{stop}

Output: New list L with remaining evaluations

if there is some for some $b', (b', \ell) \in L$ **then**

$\alpha \leftarrow \text{ROM}(b, b', \ell)$

$\bar{b} \leftarrow \text{PlayGame}(b, b')$

$L' \leftarrow L \setminus \{ (b', \ell) \}$

if $\ell_{\text{stop}} = \ell - 1$

return $L \cup \{ (\bar{b}, \ell - 1) \}$

else

return $\text{EvalStream}(L', (\bar{b}, \ell - 1))$

else

$L' \leftarrow L \cup \{ (b, \ell) \}$

return L'

1. **Setup:** Same exact setup with TFHE in SSLE. Setup TFHE and distribute shares. Each party also has some secret s_i and commitment $\text{comm}_i = \text{comm}(s_i)$.
2. **Publish Bid:** Each party samples $r_i \leftarrow U$ and publish $b_i = (\text{Enc}_{\text{TFHE}}(r_i), \text{Enc}_{\text{TFHE}}(\text{comm}_i))$ each tagged with level $\log_2 n + 1$.

3. **Evaluation:** This step is different than that in the simple sorting version (section 2.1). Now, we can evaluate in a streaming fashion and even distribute evaluation (though we'll not go into details about the distributed implementation). See algorithm 2 for the algorithm. The idea is that we keep a list of bids and their levels; when a new bid comes in, we greedily remove any bids from the list which we can. We can run algorithm 2 until there is only one bid left in the list or until all bids up to a level have been processed. So, say that we have $k = 4$, we can run the algorithm until we are two levels away (in a tournament tree) from the final level. More formally, when we have processed all bids up to level $\ell_{\text{stop}} = \log_2 k + 2$ (and we only have bids at level $\log_2 k + 1$ in the list) we return the list and stop processing. When there are k elements in this list, all at level $\log_2 k + 1$, we are done.

Remark 2.1. I may have an off by one error here.

4. **Decoding:** At least t parties publish their threshold decryptions of the return from the evaluation
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References