# 3906ICT - Digital Forensics

Assessment 2: Major Assignment

Project: Forensic Analysis of Mr. Eason Hunter's Digital Assets.

**Author:** Yasin Çakar

S Number: 2921450

### Table of Contents

Газ	sk I	4
I.	Evide	ence A4
	i.l.1 (	Question 1: Who is the owner of the Desktop5
		Question 2: What programs have been installed on the desktop?
	i.l.3 (	Question 3: Recover details of any files in the recycle bin
		Question 4: Is there evidence that the owner of the desktop ted a crime?
11.	Evide	ence B9
		Question 5: What applications are running on the memory dump
		Question 6: What web pages has the memory dump computer recently?
		Question 7: What is email address of the owner of the memory computer?10
	i.II.4 (	Question 8: What is password of the memory dump computer?14
Ш	. Ev	idence C14
		Question 9: Who are the people communicating in the ission? When does the first transmission begin and the last ission finish?14
	i.III.2 the con	Question 10: What browsers and operating systems are used by nmunication endpoints?15
	i.III.3	Question 11: What was sent for Benji to collect?15
		Question 12: Does the network capture reveal the relationship in Eason Hunter and the people participating in the intercepted inications?16
I۷	′. Ev	idence D16
	i.IV.1 phone?	Question 13: What are the non-stock applications installed on the 16
	i.IV.2 calls ha	Question 14: Who is in the contacts list? What messages and ave been sent and received by the phone?16
	i.IV.3 made?	Question 15: What Internet searches has the owner of the phone 17
		on 16: Is there other evidence on the phone that might indicate the the owner in the bioweapon17
	i.IV.4 evidend	Question 17: Conduct a timeline analysis of the pieces of

		5 Question 18: Provide a brief final analysis of the evidence and conclusions	.20
Tas	sk II.		21
V	. In	troduction	.21
V	l.	Evidence Acquisition	.21
V	II.	Forensic Analysis	.22
V	III.	Forensic Tools	.23
١×	ζ.	Conclusions	.24
ii.	Арр	endix	25

### Task I

### I. Evidence A

### Loading disk image:

```
cat EvidenceA.001 EvidenceA.002 EvidenceA.003 EvidenceA.004 EvidenceA.005 EvidenceA.006 EvidenceA.007 EvidenceA.008 EvidenceA.009 EvidenceA.010 EvidenceA.011 EvidenceA.012 EvidenceA.013 EvidenceA.014 > boathouse.dd
```

### Mount Image:

sudo mount -o ro,loop,offset=28672 boathouse.dd /mnt/windows\_mount

### i.l.1 Question 1: Who is the owner of the Desktop

The registered owner of the laptop is "Jim", ownership analysis was conducted using two forensic methods one that queries for the registered owner and the second that queries the person who uses the computer most often, as shown below:

Method	Result
<pre>\$ rip.pl -r /mnt/windows_mount/WINDOWS/system32/config/software -p</pre>	ProductName Microsoft Windows XP
winver	CSDVersion Service Pack 3
	BuildLab 2600.xpsp.080413-2111
	RegisteredOrganization
	RegisteredOwner Jim
	InstallDate 2022-08-27 12:13:00Z
<pre>rip.pl -r /mnt/windows_mount/WINDOWS/system32/config/SAM -p samparse   grep -C 9 "Login Count"</pre>	Username : Jim [1003]
grep c 3 hogin count	Full Name : Jim
	User Comment :
	Account Type : Default Admin User
	Account Created: 2022-08-27 12:25:06Z
	Name :
	Last Login Date: 2022-08-28 05:29:30Z
	Pwd Reset Date: 2022-08-27 12:25:22Z
	Pwd Fail Date : 2022-08-28 05:29:23Z

### i.l.2 Question 2: What programs have been installed on the desktop? What recent programs have been run?

There were 21 applications found to be installed on the device found in the Programs file directory:

sansforensics@siftworkstation: /mnt/windows\_mount/Program Files

7-Zip

ComPlus Applications

Messenger

Mozilla Firefox

MSN Gaming Zone

**Outlook Express** 

VMware

WindowsUpdate

Adobe

Internet Explorer

microsoft frontpage

Mozilla Maintenance Service

NetMeeting

Uninstall Information

Windows Media Player

xerox

IrfanView

Movie Maker

MSN

Online Services

VideoLAN

Windows NT

The most recently run programs were VideoLAN, Mozilla Firefox, then Notepad respectively in that order.

Recent Apps	<pre>rip.pl -r /mnt/windows_mount/Documents\ and\ Settings/Jim/NTUSER.DAT -p runmru</pre>	Launching runmru v.20200525 runmru v.20200525
		(NTUSER.DAT) Gets contents of user's RunMRU key
		RunMru
		Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\RunMRU
		LastWrite Time 2022-08-28 05:27:56Z
		MRUList = cba
		a notepad\1
		b firefox\1
		c vlc\1

### i.l.3 Question 3: Recover details of any files in the recycle bin.

In the recycling bin the following files were found:

- Dc1.txt
- Dc2.zip
- desktop.ini
- INFO2

The file Dc1.txt contained a string of characters that may have been an encrypted text. Dc2.zip contained two image files that were of type png and jpg the zip file was found to be password protected.

The INFO2 was a binary file leading to clues of two other text files. Following clues in the Recycler using information in INFO2 note1.txt and note2.txt was found in "Documents and Settings/Jim/My Documents"

```
$ cd /mnt/windows mount/RECYCLER/S-1-5-21-790525478-1220945662-725345543-1003/
sansforensics@siftworkstation: /mnt/windows mount/RECYCLER/S-1-5-21-790525478-
1220945662-725345543-1003
$ ls -1
total 257
                         176 Aug 20 09:24 Dcl.txt
-rwxrwxrwx 1 root root
-rwxrwxrwx 1 root root 256110 Aug 20 08:12 Dc2.zip
-rwxrwxrwx 1 root root
                        65 Aug 28 05:20 desktop.ini
-rwxrwxrwx 1 root root 1620 Aug 28 05:29 INFO2
cd /mnt/windows mount/Documents\ and\ Settings/Jim/My\ Documents/
ls -1
-rwxrwxrwx 1 root root
                             56 Aug 28 05:20 note1.txt
                             36 Aug 28 05:20 note2.txt
-rwxrwxrwx 1 root root
$ cat note1.txt
If I let you know where I'm going, I won't be on holiday
sansforensics@siftworkstation: /mnt/windows mount/Documents and Settings/Jim/My
Documents
$ cat note2.txt
Desperate times, desperate measures.
sansforensics@siftworkstation: cd /mnt/windows mount/Documents and Settings/Jim/My
Documents
```

### i.l.4 Question 4: Is there evidence that the owner of the desktop committed a crime?

There no evidence of any cyber crime committed as the installed software were standard. The image files had suspicious names "bio-weapon.png" and "soviet-biological-warfare-installati.jpg". The text files found in the My Documents directory were also suspicious to a degree. However the artifacts collected may lead to findings in a broader investigation.

#### II. Evidence B

#### Initial Analysis:

```
vol.py -f '/home/sansforensics/Downloads/evidence_B/Snapshot1.vmem' imageinfo
vol.py -f Snapshot1.vmem --profile=Win7SP1x64 hivelist
rip.pl -r registry.0xfffff8a000baa010.SOFTWARE.reg -p winver
```

### i.II.1 Question 5: What applications are running on the memory dump computer?

The running applications found on EASON-PC were the Chrome Web Browser, Thunderbird, MyNotepad++, and Internet explorer using the query:

```
vol.py -f Snapshot1.vmem --profile=Win7SP1x64 pslist | cat Running Proccesses.txt
```

Two instances of "csrss.exe" processes were found in the process list, therefore a virus/malware presence is a likelihood as there should be one csrss.exe running at all times in a windows 7 Enterprise operating system

Using procdump, the sha-256 hash of the excutable files and the malware database on virustotal.com: vol.py -f Snapshot1.vmem --profile=Win7SP1x64 procdump -p 328-D Processes/csrss.exe/vol.py -f Snapshot1.vmem --profile=Win7SP1x64 procdump -p 380 -D Processes/csrss.exe/

sudo sha256sum \*

89e4ef8874af1f019714761d9904e82fa3f885d67a7c41ce905da7f43871a559 executable.328.exe 5fedadbe48e52505e0c13e7529c71d24d4618d7e3406f957e73724bb55ed5b8c executable.380.exe

None of the hashes above corresponded to a known virus/malware on virustotal.com

See Appendix 1 for for list of processes

### i.II.2 Question 6: What web pages has the memory dump computer visited recently?

Based on the processes list the search history of the internet explorer browser and Chrome browsers were investigated:

The websites visited using interenet explorer were:

- <a href="https://www.msn.com/?ocid=iehp">https://www.msn.com/?ocid=iehp</a> [2022-08-27 12:45:46 UTC+0000]
- <a href="https://support.microsoft.com/internet-explorer">https://support.microsoft.com/internet-explorer</a> [2022-08-27 12:45:50 UTC+0000]
- @https://www.google.com/search?hl=en-AU&source=hp&q=flight+morocco&iflsig=AJiK0e8AAAAAYwokDulOV3RYIAuYN94dY4wUE7pcN EAr&gbv=1 (GET request regarding flights to morrocco) [2022-08-27 13:03:03 UTC+0000]
- Flight Center (https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.flightcentre.com.au/morocco/flights&sa=U&ved=2ahUKEwiQ9ti0iuf5AhVK4TgGHbzJBTEQFnoECAoQAg&usg=AOvVaw29S2Sgg\_U2GdEyHb3DlbkI) [2022-08-27 13:03:06 UTC+0000]
- A google search for the term syndicate (<a href="https://www.google.com/search?hl=en-AU&gbv=1&oq=&aqs=&q=syndicate">https://www.google.com/search?hl=en-AU&gbv=1&oq=&aqs=&q=syndicate</a>) [2022-08-27 13:03:24 UTC+0000]
- A Wikipedia page on "Syndicate" (<a href="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Syndicate&sa=U&ved=2ahUKEwjimae9iuf">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Syndicate&sa=U&ved=2ahUKEwjimae9iuf</a>

<u>5AhW7xDgGHaJCAMQQFXoECAUQAg&usg=AOvVaw2KKAm60k6iezT6\_PUHj1j1</u>) [2022-08-27 13:03:25 UTC+0000]

- google.com [2022-08-27 13:03:36 UTC+0000]
- Google search for sunscreen (<a href="https://www.google.com/search?hl=en-AU&gbv=1&oq=&aqs=&q=sunscreen">https://www.google.com/search?hl=en-AU&gbv=1&oq=&aqs=&q=sunscreen</a>) [2022-08-27 13:03:37 UTC+0000]
- Sunscreen on chemist warehouse (<a href="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.chemistwarehouse.com.au/shop-online/214/sunscreen,-lotions-">https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.chemistwarehouse.com.au/shop-online/214/sunscreen,-lotions-</a>
  - gels&sa=U&ved=2ahUKEwi1w4PFiuf5AhUT3TgGHSVMA1wQFnoECAoQAg&usg=AOvVaw0Dq0K AMm72n5fYxJHPtCUW) [2022-08-27 13:03:39 UTC+0000]
- <u>www.chemistwarehouse.com.au</u> [2022-08-27 13:03:42 UTC+0000]
- Sunscreens lotions and gels on chemist warehouse
   (<a href="https://www.chemistwarehouse.com.au/category/shop-online/214/sunscreen,-lotions-gels">https://www.chemistwarehouse.com.au/category/shop-online/214/sunscreen,-lotions-gels</a>) [2022-08-27 13:03:43 UTC+0000]
- Sailing to morrocoy on bing search engine (<a href="http://www.bing.com/search?q=sail+morocco&src=IE-SearchBox&FORM=IE8SRC">http://www.bing.com/search?q=sail+morocco&src=IE-SearchBox&FORM=IE8SRC</a>) [2022-08-27 13:04:15 UTC+0000]
- www.bing.com [2022-08-27 13:04:15 UTC+0000]
- Sailing to morrocoy on yatching world.com (<a href="https://www.yachtingworld.com/cruising/sailing-morocco-atlas-coast-123680">https://www.yachtingworld.com/cruising/sailing-morocco-atlas-coast-123680</a>) [2022-08-27 13:04:18 UTC+0000]

### Using the query:

```
vol.py -f Snapshot1.vmem --profile=Win7SP1x64 iehistory -p 3656 >
'/home/sansforensics/Downloads/evidence_B/IE_History/ie_history.txt'
```

The search terms "sunscreen", "sailing from uk to Morocco", "syndicate" and "flight Morocco" where made on the chrome browser.

This information was retrieved using the query:

vol.py --plugins=plugins/ -f Snapshot1.vmem --profile=Win7SP1x64 chromesearchterms

### i.II.3 Question 7: What is email address of the owner of the memory dump computer?

Eason's email address is "<a href="htt317117@gmail.com">htt317117@gmail.com</a>" after finding thunderbird.exe on the process list the filesystem for the thunderbird application was investigated as follows:

Procedure v	ol.py -f Snapshot1.vmemprofile=Win7SP1x64 filescan   grep -i Thunderbird	
"0x000000007e258b70 16 0 RW-rw- \Device\HarddiskVolume1\Users\Eason\AppData\Roaming\Thunderbird\Profiles\nsxx2nq9.default-release\Imap\imap.gmail.com\[Gmail].sbd\All Mail"		
V	ol.py -f Snapshot1.vmemprofile=Win7SP1x64 dumpfiles -Q 0x000000007e258b70 -D '/home/sansforensics/Downloads/evidence_B/Email'	
Source: fi	le.None.0xfffffa801a4451e0.dat	
	Email Messages	
	Email #3	
Base64 Encoded	Base64 Decoded	
SGkgRWFzb24sDQoNCkEgYmV0dGVy ZHJvaWQgZXhwZXJpZW5jZSBpcyB3Y W5nDQoNClRh		
a2Ugb25IIG1pbnV0ZSB0byBzZXQgdXA 91ciBwaG9uZSB3aXRoIEdvb2dsZQ0KI ZXQgc3Rh	A better Android experience is waiting	
cnRIZCAgDQo8aHR0cHM6Ly9ub3RpZr Rpb25zLmdvb2dsZS5jb20vZy9wL0FQT Gk1RHZf	Take one minute to set up your phone with Google	
NTZRRjBEdjNZMzNxaDNfRnNlcEFFN3 83V2VIM08yRIFCMmJVMHpTTkVwQIB QNkpTU3Va	JBTk ITE9 Get started	
d3AzNmpfZlYyOUtjRGJMa0V4MllDbjNv T0tyQ0JZa0ZKMXhPUUYzTGl2OVdscF DU4YVhi	Snow zqZ <a href="https://notifications.google.com/g/p/">https://notifications.google.com/g/p/</a> APNL1Ti5Dv 56QF0Dv3Y33qh3 FsepAE7rANO7Wee3O2FQB2bU0zSNEpBPuLOP6JSSuZwp36j fV29KcDbLkEx2	
cG9DUzdscHR3WG9PWDRZb1YyWmZ BNXRkdFVYQm5kQIJWbzFiMktaaFE0\ RUZtOGhsZzRt	YCn3oJz0OKrCBYkFJ1xOQF3Lb69WlpVjd58aXbpoCS7lptwXoOX4YoV2ZflzSA5tdtUXBndBRVo1b2KZhQ4TpREFm8hlg4mV5ufe0RG9F1W-HHsgU4-VoP_AaxC9VJKb9Qk6lBwOpw5yflyWJOK4nzD-	
VjV1ZmUwUkc5RjFXLUhlc2dVNC1Wb1 WF4QzlWSktiOVFrNklCd09wdzV5Zkl5V SzRuekQt	m1wmiSjBALs6cmmX0304VoC2lQL6GTjhD29zJr9i3VQJnPA2psqHlyl7eMLRcQwmnjQ5ZxhtDiBcxu50M1pmnNfEi nmVJtJcjLN4dwGFVMYliNc1VlYX7il4L_YLvk3ZzwXo0NF4FPX2lh9JWxrpwsdwawlkshMwCDvsS62HnPY5ljtEfl7E_K SjaZeFrAlfGePs6hAEeL09eSGHEzqkquAjwQMQ O2ALSxX0gshY9-WM-O13RpwWC6pH70XJg-	
bTF3bWlTakJBTHM2Y21tWDAzMDRW bFFMNkdUamhEMjl6Snl5aTNWX19RSl QTJwc3FlbHlJ	yĎDrRmt42xLYRvelfuJfZGby4ARI-ĖaĖWp4rqSdsyOolPa3YEBH8I8G3cr08FgEĖ1I7vgWhEq- Phax0AxYwBB6rh1mnT4HMYjTjzOhz4YhOJg90UNSNNLqOyEkr6bf-G8t2OoDlkoUNSHe6j7Tu1X-	
N2VNTFJjUXdtbmpRNVp4aHREaUJjeH E0xcG1uTmZFaW5tVkp0SmNqTE40ZH ZNWUlpTmMx	xsqCaqWXEVuJB1GPSmKowwlhPQKV_Sl31EofW9M_fFhOcoul6Ya73YOJDIXo91G7zl1a5lSYAJRnnWdbliBBLzp2 GMkAg10Q7T-vcdNWT1fcF-1tlBDHKzf7vx46-2J7t7SlqoGxhz>	

VmxZWDdpSTRMX1lMdmszWnp3WG8wTkY 0RlBYMkloOUpXeHJwd3Nkd2F3SWtzaE13Q 0R2c1M2Mkhu

UFk1SWp0RWZsN0VfS1NqYVpIRnJBbGZH ZVBzNmhBRWVMMDIIU0dIRXpxa3F1QWp3 UU1RX08yQUxT

eFgwZ3NoWTktV00tTzEzUnB3V0M2cEg3MF hKZy15RERyUm10NDJ4TFlSdmVsZnVKZlp HYnk0QVJJ

LUVhRVdwNHJxU2RzeU9vbFBhM1IFQkg4S ThHM2NyMDhGZ0VFMWw3dmdXaEVxLVBo YXqwQXhZd0JC

NnJoMW1uVDRITVIqVGp6T2h6NFloT0pnOT BVTINOTkxxT3IFa3I2YmYtRzh0Mk9vRGxrb1 VOU0hl

Nmo3VHUxWC14c3FDYXFXWEVWdUpCM UdQU21Lb3d3SWhQUUtWX1NJMzFFb2ZX OU1fZkZoT2NvdWw2

WWE3M1IPSkRJWG85MUc3ekkxYTVsU1IB SIJubldkYklpQkJMenAyR01rQWcxMFE3VC1 2Y2ROV1Qx

ZmNGLTF0SUJESEt6Zjd2eDQ2LTJKN3Q3U 0lxb0d4aHo+DQoNClRoaXMgZW1haWwgd2 FzIHNlbnQq

dG8gaHQzMTcxMTdAZ21haWwuY29tlDxod DMxNzExN0BnbWFpbC5jb20+IGJIY2F1c2Ug eW91ICAN

CnJlY2VudGx5lHNpZ25lZCBpbnRvlHlvdXlgR 29vZ2xllEFjY291bnQgb24geW91ciBHb29nb GUq

RW11YWx0b3lgZGV2aWNILiBJZiAgDQp5b3 UgZG8gbm90lHdpc2ggdG8gcmVjZWl2ZSBlb WFpbHMq

dG8gaGVscCB5b3Ugc2V0IHVwlHlvdXlgZGV 2aWNlIHdpdGggIA0KR29vZ2xlIHdoZW4geW 91IHNp

Z24gaW50byB5b3VyIGFjY291bnQgb24gdGh IIGRIdmljZSBmb3IgdGhIIGZpcnN0IHRpbWUs ICAN

CnBsZWFzZSB1bnN1YnNjcmliZSAgDQo8aH R0cHM6Ly9ub3RpZmljYXRpb25zLmdvb2dsZ S5jb20v

Zy9wL0FQTkwxVGIJS2FnVE1ybWJnWDhfVk loMjR5bTlzREpCWlc1Qlc4Q0VuQXBYTndLe

This email was sent to <a href="htt317117@gmail.com">htt317117@gmail.com</a> because you

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<a href="https://notifications.google.com/g/p/">https://notifications.google.com/g/p/</a>

APNL1TilKagTMrmbgX8\_Vlh24ym9sDJBZW5BW8CEnApXNwKyiBABNvBBZhGDkh1vW1MFAl5K0jgNCZ4XL\_SK7bUHTFCjM9tHVo5jUkVqQfHjGqbrOfyNDWz9xHPQWLG0-

EZUE7cqnyaZZSMQXoJTUHbyFStnHlBW\_Mh2BFZ98rBF6td5CfXqW5XOhplK5eIIS4q5kuXyBcXcRboWD2\_gR-POdHuPHJ3TQQfWbYFX6RXsRC7j1GAhliWRMqseMzO3kQAQujhfbmJ64HnjpdVMA-EkB6shqVKxzlpamWHcsVe 4>.

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4M4M4N[1wĕ -u

١	WICQUJO
	dkJCWmhHRGtoMXZXMU1GQWw1SzBqZ0 5DWjRYTF9TSzdiVUhURkNqTTl0SFZvNWp Va1ZxUWZlakdn
	YI9yT2Z5TkRXejl4SFBRV0xHMC1FWIVFN2 NxbnlhWlpTTVFYb0pUVUhieUZTdG5lbEJXX 01oMkJG
;	Wjk4ckJGNnRkNUNmWHFXNVhPaHBsSzVl SUITNHE1a3VYeUJjWGNSYm9XRDJfZ1ltU E9kSHVQSEoz
.	VFFRZIdiWUZYNIJYc1JDN2oxR0FoSWIXUk 1xc2VNek8za1FBUXVqaGZibUo2NEhuanBk Vk1BLUVr
(	QjZzaGdWS3h6SXBhbVdIY3NWZV9fND4uD QoNCsKplDlwMjIgR29vZ2xIIExMQyAxNjAwI EFtcGhp
	dGhlYXRyZSBQYXJrd2F5LCBNb3VudGFpbi BWaWV3LCBDQSA5NDA0Mw0K

See Appendix 2 to see all mails.

--0000000000005b35d305e6f58eda

### i.II.4 Question 8: What is password of the memory dump computer?

The password retrieved from the memory dump was "N0Tthing1simpo33ible"

### Using the query:

vol.py -f Snapshot1.vmem --profile=Win7SP1x64 lsadump >
'/home/sansforensics/Downloads/evidence\_B/Password and LSA Keys/lsadump'

### III. Evidence C

## i.III.1 Question 9: Who are the people communicating in the transmission? When does the first transmission begin and the last transmission finish?

The first transmission is at 2022-08-28T02:06:33.094Z initiated by Eason, the last transmission occurs on 2022-08-28T02:20:58.647Z by a chat member aliased as Syndicate2. The whole chat can be seen below:

Time	Person	Message
2022-08- 28T02:06:33.094Z Eason Benji, read this message careful		Benji, read this message carefully. I might not have much time left
2022-08- 28T02:06:46.030Z	Benji	What's wrong Eason?
2022-08- 28T02:06:58.107Z	Eason	Erika Sloane asked me to deliver a package from the Russian embassy in London to Morocco. But it wasnt the real embassy.
2022-08- 28T02:07:08.892Z	Benji	What are you talking Eason? Erika Sloane? That Erika Sloane?
2022-08- 28T02:07:20.726Z	Eason	I have some insurance, in case this whole thing blows up. Its in the usual place. Promise me you will store it in a safe place.
2022-08- 28T02:07:31.836Z	Benji	For sure my friend. I will upload it to my Onedrive. Stay safe
2022-08- 28T02:07:42.549Z	Eason	Thx.
2022-08- 28T02:09:28.542Z	Tony	Eason, the bioweapons came from a previous Soviet biological weapons program
<b>2022-08-</b> Eason Tha <b>28T02:09:50.266Z</b>		Thanks, Tony. I owe you one.
2022-08- 28T02:10:21.807Z","	Tony	Buy me some KFC next time when you are in the office
2022-08- 28T02:10:34.556Z	Eason	I don't know if I can come back
2022-08- 28T02:10:46.128Z	Tony	Its just KFC. don't be stingy
2022-08- 28T02:14:46.186Z	Tony	I just did Eason a favour but he is not willing to buy KFC for me
2022-08- 28T02:14:58.511Z	Benji	idk. he sounds a bit under the weather today
2022-08- 28T02:15:07.670Z	Tony	I know right
2022-08- 28T02:15:27.217Z	Benji	He asked me to store something for him, but I dont know. I have no space on my one drive.

2022-08- 28T02:15:41.093Z	Tony	Free for coffee?
2022-08- 28T02:15:55.121Z	Tony	where to meet?
2022-08- 28T02:16:13.317Z	Benji	where to meet indeed
2022-08- 28T02:20:22.701Z	Syndicate1	Benji Dunn just downloaded something from the drop zone. Its encrypted.
2022-08- 28T02:20:36.021Z	Syndicate2	Dont worry we are on the inside. I will upload the key.
2022-08- 28T02:20:53.507Z	Syndicate1	From Dunn's PC?
2022-08- 28T02:20:58.647Z	Syndicate2	Yes

After viewing the network traffic on wire shark, the mIRC chat structure was of messages stored was recolved. The following instruction was executed to retrieved all chats:

```
strings EvidenceC.pcap | grep -ic msg
strings EvidenceC.pcap | grep -C 9 msg | cat >
'/home/sansforensics/Downloads/evidence C/msg.txt'
```

The participants of the chat are Benji Saulson, Tony, Eason, Syndicate1 and Syndicate2

## i.III.2 Question 10: What browsers and operating systems are used by the communication endpoints?

The operating systems used are: Ubuntu, Windows NT 6.1, Macintosh. And the operating systems are: Firefox/91.0, Safari/537.36, Safari/601.3.9, Safari/537.36, Firefox/15.0.1.

This information can be gathered by tracing http GET headers on wireshark or doing a grep search on the EvidenceC.pcap file as follows:

```
strings EvidenceC.pcap | grep -iE "User-Agent:" | uniq
```

### i.III.3 Question 11: What was sent for Benji to collect?

From the chat it is deducible that the item is a digital asset from Benji's dialog "For sure my friend. I will upload it to my Onedrive. Stay safe" and "He asked me to store something for him, but I dont know. I have no space on my one drive.". The item is of value as Eason refers to it as his "insurance" which is in its "usual place". This could be the bioweapon file in the recycling bin found on an old laptop on a boathouse near Hunter's house. This could be the bioweapon file found in the Recycle bin in EvidenceA as it too was encrypted as Syndicate1 says "Benji Dunn just downloaded something from the drop zone. Its encrypted."

As no explicit reference was made to the digital asset it is not clear what it may have been, however there is ground for suspicion it would be the file mentioned. As no context is given it could be some sort of leverage related to the case that is not the bioweapon file itself.

# i.III.4 Question 12: Does the network capture reveal the relationship between Eason Hunter and the people participating in the intercepted communications?

The participants in the chat seem to be Mr. Hunters colleagues as the mIRC chat room is named "FederalLawEnforcementAgency" see Appendix 3 for a full copy of the intercepted chat with the relevant metadata. The chat was retrieved using the query in Question 9.

#### IV. Evidence D

### i.IV.1 Question 13: What are the non-stock applications installed on the phone?

The non stock applications seem to be all the APK files in the dm-1 disk image, they are: bubbleshooter.orig-z8mJLeCzHzCg32ex5gy2aw==/base.apk com.facebook.katana-o0Et3oUg\_G0Le6fwo\_Pb1A==/base.apk com.rovio.angrybirds-d1xvsHqwbR3wyJJPUnFfDA==/base.apk com.tencent.mm-eJ99iI\_SfXYx1pDwbXPjUg==/base.apk com.twitter.android-ualDxAgdi2NTp6NucGhilA==/base.apk

The application files can be retrieved using sudo mount -o loop, ro, noexec, noload <disk\_img>/mnt/e01

Where disk\_img can be: dm-0, dm-1,vda1 or vde1.

The complete list of all applications can be found in Appendix 5.

# i.IV.2 Question 14: Who is in the contacts list? What messages and calls have been sent and received by the phone?

Eason Hunter only has three contacts:

Name	Contact_last_updated_timesta mp	X_last_time_contact ed	Last_time_contact ed	Times_contact ed
Saulso n, Benji	Wed 24 Aug 2022 04:41:30 AM UTC	Wed 24 Aug 2022 04:41:30 AM UTC	(1661316048.000) Wed 24 Aug 2022 04:40:48 AM UTC	2
Tony	Wed 24 Aug 2022 04:40:53 AM UTC		0	0
Sloane, Erika	Wed 24 Aug 2022 04:39:45 AM UTC		0	0

### The data above was verified using the following queries:

```
sudo mount dm-1 /mnt/e01
sudo su
cd /mnt/e01/data/com.android.providers.contacts/databases/
cp contacts2.db '/home/sansforensics/Downloads/
Evidence_D/Investigation/contacts/dm-1'
sudo chown sansforensics:sansforensics '/home/sansforensics/Downloads/
Evidence_D/Investigation/contacts/dm-1/contacts2.db'
exit
sudo umount /mnt/e01
```

contacts2.db -> view contacts

Only one call was made to the number 11188899966 on Wed 24 Aug 2022 04:40:48 AM UTC for 39 seconds as shown below:

ID	Number	Date	Duration
1	11188899966	(1661316048298)	39
		Wed 24 Aug 2022	
		04:40:48 AM UTC	

This information was retrieved using the queries:

```
sudo mount dm-1 /mnt/e01
sudo su
cd /mnt/e01/data/com.android.providers.contacts/databases/calllog
cp calllog.db '/home/sansforensics/Downloads/ Evidence_D/Investigation/calllog/'
exit
sudo umount /mnt/e01
sudo chown sansforensics:sansforensics '/home/sansforensics/Downloads/
Evidence_D/Investigation/calllog/calllog.db'
```

### Calllog.db -> calls

### i.IV.3 Question 15: What Internet searches has the owner of the phone made?

According to the investigation no web searches were made. This conclusion was reached after accessing the "~data/com.android.chrome/app chrome/Default/" directory:

```
$ sudo mount -o loop, ro, noexec, noload dm-1 /mnt/e01
$ cd /mnt/e01/data/com.android.chrome/app chrome/Default/
$ 1s
blob storage
                                Favicons-journal
                                                      NTPSnippets
previews opt out.db-journal 'Web Data'
Cookies
                                History
                                                      'Offline Pages'
README
                             'Web Data-journal'
Cookies-journal
                                History-journal
                                                      page load capping opt out.db
'Sync Data'
data reduction proxy leveldb 'Local Storage'
page_load_capping_opt out.db-journal 'Top Sites'
'Download Service'
                               'Login Data'
                                                      Preferences
'Top Sites-journal'
Favicons
                               'Login Data-journal'
                                                      previews opt out.db
'Visited Links'
$ cp -r . '/home/sansforensics/Downloads/ Evidence D/Investigation/Search History'
```

## Question 16: Is there other evidence on the phone that might indicate the role of the owner in the bioweapon theft?

The following table shows the sms messages exchanged from Eason's phone:

_id	Date	index_text
1	Wed 24 Aug 2022 04:42:53 AM UTC	Eason, we have a new mission for you. We will need you to deliver these three boxes to this address "6 Grosvenor
		Gardens, London SW1W 0DH" now

2	Wed 24 Aug 2022 04:43:38 AM UTC	Yes, ma'am
3	Wed 24 Aug 2022 04:43:55 AM UTC	The recipient is the "Syndicate", and the code is "Apostles"
4	Wed 24 Aug 2022 04:44:06 AM UTC	Yes ma'am
5	Wed 24 Aug 2022 04:44:18 AM UTC	Remember, you have to dress like a Uber delivery guy
6	Wed 24 Aug 2022 04:44:34 AM UTC	Yes ma'am
7	Wed 24 Aug 2022 04:44:51 AM UTC	May I know what's inside?
8	Wed 24 Aug 2022 04:45:04 AM UTC	You ask too much
9	Wed 24 Aug 2022 04:45:15 AM UTC	I am sorry ma'am
10	Wed 24 Aug 2022 04:46:50 AM UTC	Uber eats for Syndicate
11	Wed 24 Aug 2022 04:47:01 AM UTC	The code?
12	Wed 24 Aug 2022 04:47:11 AM UTC	Apostles
13	Wed 24 Aug 2022 04:47:22 AM UTC	Yes, that's my order
14	Wed 24 Aug 2022 04:47:40 AM UTC	Thanks, Enjoy your night, sir

The dates were derived from mmssms.db->sms
The fields \_id and index\_text were derived from mmssms.db->words
This data was obtained using the queries below:

```
sudo mount dm-1 /mnt/e01
sudo su
cd /mnt/e01/user_de/0/com.android.providers.telephony/databases
cp telephony.db '/home/sansforensics/Downloads/
Evidence_D/Investigation/sms/dm-1'
cp mmssms.db '/home/sansforensics/Downloads/
Evidence_D/Investigation/sms/dm-1'
exit
sudo umount /mnt/e01

sudo chown sansforensics:sansforensics '/home/sansforensics/Downloads/
Evidence_D/Investigation/sms/dm-1/telephony.db'
sudo chown sansforensics:sansforensics '/home/sansforensics/Downloads/
Evidence_D/Investigation/sms/dm-1/mmssms.db'
```

The sms messages captured, suggest a likelihood of the owner or the person managing the operation of a secret delivery operation, which could likely be the bioweapon. In the sms communication Eason is asked to deliver a package to London, in the mIRC chat Eason is asked to deliver a package from the Russian embassy in London to Morocco. There seems to be two deliveries handled by Eason.

The question for Eason is the texting Eason also Erika Sloane? The other important question is what is her role between the owners of the bioweapon and Eason? Is she a colleague of Eason in the Federal Law Enforcement Agency since she is in Eason's contact list on this Nexus phone? Another question that arises is, is she collaborating with fugitives?

### i.IV.4 Question 17: Conduct a timeline analysis of the pieces of evidence.

The Table below shows the order of events as they occurred according to the forensic analysis of the laptop found on a boat house, Eason's work PC and his Android smartphone:

<b>Order of Events</b>	Date	Activity
1	24 Aug 2022 04:41:30	Eason receives a call that lasts for 39 seconds
2	24 Aug 2022 04:42:53 to 04:42:53	Eason it communicating with a female who is giving instructions to Eason regarding a delivery of a packet to London.
3	27 Aug 2022 12:13:00	Windows XP operating system is installed on a laptop found in the boat house. The laptop is Registered to a "Jim:
4	27 Aug 2022 12:25:06	An account is created on the Windows XP laptop.
5	27 Aug 2022 12:45:46 to 13:04:18	<ol> <li>Web searches are made on Eason's work computer in the following order.</li> <li>Flights to Morocco on the Flight Centre website</li> <li>Searches the term "Syndicate" on Wikipedia after obtaining Google search query results.</li> <li>A web search is made for "Sunscreen" on google search engine. Then he click a link that directs him to Chemist Warehouse.</li> <li>Search for "Sunscreens, gels &amp; lotions" on Chemist Warehouse</li> <li>Searches "Sailing to Morocco" on the Bing search engine.</li> <li>The same search ""Sailing to Morocco" is made on yatchingworld.com</li> </ol>
6	28 Aug 2022 05:20:00	Two files are created in the laptop found in the boat house: note1.txt If I let you know where I'm going, I won't be on holiday note2.txt Desperate times, desperate measures.
7	28 Aug 2022 06:33:00 to 20:58:00	Eason appears to have a chat with his colleagues on mIRC with his work computer regarding a delivery he made of a "package" from the Russian Embassy in London.  He also mentions the bioweapons and asks Benji for a favour to store a digital asset into a safe place. He refers to it as his "insurance".

### i.IV.5 Question 18: Provide a brief final analysis of the evidence and your conclusions.

Eason receives a phone call that lasts for 39 seconds, after 44 minutes he receives instructions from a female that instructs Mr. Hunter to deliver a "package" to an address in London. He is instructed how to carry out the covert operation, the recipient, and the passcode to use during the exchange. The content of the package is kept secret from Mr Hunter. This could be the Russian Embassy.

Three days later Windows XP SP3 is stalled on a laptop under the name "Jim". Two picture files are found locked with password protection in the Recycle bin named "bio-weapon.png" and "soviet-biological-warfare-installati.jpg", a document with a string of unintelligible characters that may be an encryption or key.

On the same day twenty-five minutes later from 12:45 to 13:04, on Mr. Hunters work computer, someone is searching for flights to Morocco, then searching the term "Syndicate". Mr. hunter then moves on to search for sunscreen, gels and lotion on the Chemist Warehouse website. Afterwards Mr Hunter is searching for a sailing option from London to Morocco.

Two days later at 5:20am, two files are created that writes "If I let you know where I'm going, I won't be on holiday" and "Desperate times, desperate measures". These files were created on a laptop that was found and seized on a boathouse near Mr. hunter's place of residence.

On the same day, on 28<sup>th</sup> August, an hour and thirty-three minutes later, Mr. Hunter is on a mIRC chat on his PC at work. The chat room seems to be among his colleagues at NACA.

A text document with a string of characters that is unintelligible, possibly a hash, a key. As well as a password protected file was found in the seized laptop. These items were created on the 20<sup>th</sup> of August.

An interesting finding observation was that two processes called "csrss.exe", Windows 7 Enterprise operating systems are meant to contain only one instance of such process.

Further investigations are required about tasks conducted on Mr. Hunter's work PC and further analysis is required to determine if a virus or malware could have been present that played a role in compromising the mission.

The Jury will need an extensive cross examination to determine who the lady on the phone was, was it Erika Sloane? Another pertinent question is how Mr. Hunter was given details of the "wrong" embassy; how can Erika make such a mistake? How Mr Eason make such a mistake? How can staff from NACA be so negligent?

Another important question is what is the contents of Dc.txt is it the key Syndicate2 mentioned in the online chat?

Why did Mr. Eason first look for flights t Morocco, then looked into travelling by Yacht? Were there such directives from the NACA or was it Mr. Hunters prerogative?

The forensic evidence in this document begs for specific questions that need satisfactory testimonies. Wat was the "package" Erika asked Mr. Hunter to deliver to Morocco in Question? And what was in the three boxes that needed to be delivered to "6 Grosvenor Gardens, London SW1W 0DH"? And is the "package" and the three boxes related to the mission.

Regarding the laptop seized from the boathouse, another question arises, which is who is Jim? Or is it an Alias of one of the agents in NACA.

How can Erika and Mr. Hunter explain their version of event that aligns with the forensic evidence in question 17? Did they both make a mistake, or are they both accomplices or is one of them a corrupt agent?

In conclusion, the forensics analysis results elicit pertinent questions that require testimonies that align with the sequence of events in the timeline analysis.

### Task II

### . Introduction

The purpose of memory forensics is to provide insights into the runtime system activity. Sometimes forensic memory analysis in volatile memory can reveal more than forensic disk analysis as programs and processes that

are run are put into memory. This means the candid true state of a process will be revealed as each running processes must show in memory as it is processed as they cannot me concealed from the operating system.

Memory analysis ensures a clear insight of the systems processes for when the memory snapshot was taken as all processes are revealed including encrypted documents of the drives that must be decrypted in order to run. For this reason, memory analysis can be the first step before forensic disk analysis as there many ways of hiding or blocking access to data on the disk. Memory analysis can solve many such mysteries and provide directions for other digital forensic activities.

Memory analysis can also support a hypothesis about an event or sequence of events that is the subject of the investigation. Initial memory analysis can also assist in disk forensics as mentioned as there can be too much data in non-volatile memory, a live snapshot analysis may assist in identifying processes and their related activities such as executable files, devices associated to the process, shared memory used among processes, network connections established.

Analysing volatile memory allows the expert to understand how the process is running, it is an indispensable resource to investigate problems in two broad categories which are stealthy malicious code activity or causes of application or system failures.

A memory dump analysed in this analysis is only a snapshot of processes running when the memory snapshot was captured. This is analogous to a capturing a frame in a video clip, meaning there were processes prior to the snapshot and the processes on the system will move on after the point in time the snapshot is taken.

Memory dumps obtained at the right time can reveal activities for debugging, such as incorrect configurations or malicious code activity, or for experience enhancement such as analysing crash dumps from page files.

Memory forensics is however particularly useful to analyse malicious code as traditional security software tools may struggle to identify stealthy malware written to volatile memory and uncover malicious activity such as fileless malware and RAM scrapers. These types of malicious activities are undetectable by traditional file-type based tools.

As such malicious codes are not stored on the systems file system, they are persistent on the host system through various means including remote exploitable systems, creating services that may run on bootup or login that in turn download a new piece of malware and run it on the machine, or create registry keys.

Memory analysis is most important forensics methods for fileless malwares as they not use the files system and operate on the computer's volatile memory to inject code using the tools trusted by the computers operating system.

### VI. Evidence Acquisition

Volatile data is the data stored in temporary memory on a computer while its running. When a computer system is powered off, volatile data is lost almost immediately. Data that is relevant according to ISO2042 and to a broader investigation would ideally take place when the memory dump capture occurs at the right instant where the processes of interest occurred during memory capture.

A memory dump will always contain usernames and passwords, open clipboard or window contents at the time as well as fifty to ninety-eight percent of recent registry logs at the time.

The easiest memory acquisition process are conducted on virtual machines as the memory is readily stored in a ".vmem" file within the folder the virtual machine is running.

Acquisition of volatile memory is optimal when the system is up and running, however a full memory dump can also be obtained if the system crashes. This is because at that instant the computer takes a snapshot of memory for debugging and stores the last state into a crash dump file.

In cases where a device is put on hibernate, the hibernation file can be accessed if the system is not put on hibernate for a second time, hibernation files can be observed like memory.

However if the system is running the best case scenario is the there is root access, for which there are command line tools in windows and Linux as well as downloadable non-stock application to perform memory dumps without interrupting ongoing processes.

For both Microsoft and Linux systems the built in command "dd" for disk dump can be used to acquire a memory dump. In Windows systems the command pmdump can be used for a particular process, or userdump which is Microsoft's own internal suite. Linux also has the LiME memory extractor that allows acquiring memory either to the file system of the device or over a network. In Linux systems since everything is seen as a file including storage volumes, the memory can be found in /dev/fmem as a file.

Since digital artifacts are easier to tamper with compared to forensic artifacts in disciplines of natural sciences a digital signature of the memory dump using a hash function is required to verify clones of the original artifact before the examination phase of the digital forensics process.

### VII. Forensic Analysis

After verifying the hash digest for data integrity in compliance with the chain of custody requirements. Process IDs help tracing sophisticated activities such as crashes occurring due to misconfigurations, the obscure activities of fileless malware that inject malicious code using tools whitelisted by the operating system can be investigated.

Processes can be linked with other processes, events, registry logs and networking activities through their process IDs.

Processes are programs what were captured at the instance the memory dump was taken. System activity can be traced through the application data and executable code related to the process ID.

The use of process handles revealed related artifacts to the process such as executable files, possible devices associated with the process such as pipes used as shared memory that may link how a process communicates, injects code into another process depending on the context.

Analysing environment variables can uncover how a process executes and the nature of the activity through its configuration settings.

Dll files associated to the process of interest can reveal what the process is doing. This is fileless malicious code is traced and exposed.

Packed executables can also be observed if identified in the process list, their activities can be examined as they are exposed after unpacking from the drive.

When a process is fully captured a process dump can made to execute the process in virtual machine or a separate machine to observe the nature of the code.

Event logs can help expose activities and processes, possibly reveal process executions that may occurred before the memory capture.

Registries can reveal a wide scope of information of the state of the system, helping in reconstructing the activities. Registries captured would be recent data that can reveal recently instantiated programs, recently run applications, user account information, malware that may have tampered traces of memory.

Registry data can also reveal malware persistence, as fileless malicious code use system resources to persist in volatile memory. Looking into programs that run at system start-up or services run at user log in can reveal unusual activity. Such activities can also be uncovered by looking into changes in configuration files that may be logged to the registry.

Usserassist key log programs run with the running count and execution times which may lead to traces of obfuscated activity in the RAM memory.

Analysis of networks captured in memory can reveal backdoors on the network connections such as remote exploits. The nature of network activities and their relations to processes can be uncovered by investigating networks sockets that reveal ports addresses and protocols that can shed light in relation to processes under investigation.

Current and older connections can reveal the existing state of the system at the time of capture and may reveal preceding activities, such as the backdoors to remote attackers or bot process. Other user or malware activities can be explores through browser and DNS caches.

### VIII. Forensic Tools

There are two aspects of memory forensics they are the acquisition of volatile memory and the second aspect is the memory analysis.

The first aspect is acquisition of a RAM dump before the memory analysis stage. Acquisition of volatile memory can be achieved using software process or using hardware devices. In instances where the system to be investigated is not a virtual machine, where it is a running system with no rot access in these cases the only option is to capture volatile memory traffic using hardware. For RAM memory that is greater than 4GB the method is to use the PCI card slots on the motherboard to capture volatile memory data on the BUS between the RAM chip and the CPU chip. For RAM capacity that is greater than 4GB then a firewire is required to capture traffic of volatile memory. Fire wire can also be used to dump on a windows machine, however the windows machine needs to pretend to be an Apple proprietary product using tools such as "pythonraw1394" and is dependencies.

The easiest scenario of memory capture is when working with virtual machines as the investigator can take a snapshot of the VM that will create a vmem file or may even point to the directory where the VM is running and obtain the vmem file that contains the RAM dump.

Memory acquisitions can be achieved using command line tools for graphical user interface tools. It is best practice to capture memory of a running system from a sperate USB device and dump the output of the memory capture across the network of a free volume on the loaded memory stick.

On a Windows system. Command line tools such as pmdump, userdump and dd (for disk dump) can be used. Other tools such as FTK imager KnTDD, MoonSols and F-Response can also be used.

FTK imager is a GUI tool, F-Response tools have two version an GUI and a command line tool version. Using RAM dump tools on the target machine will also image its own process as it runs on the live system, as windows is a very popular Operating system for corporate and personal use there are a number of open source memory imaging tools such a Winpmem.

For Linux based systems there is two options they a LiME and the dd command line tool. The dd tools works with both Windows and Linux based systems.

Using the LiME tools requires the tools to be compiled for the suspect machine's architecture. If the examiner does not know the suspect machine's architecture this would mean the LiME would have to be compiled on the suspect system before acquiring memory. This can take a long time, secondly this process will change a lot of things in the suspect systems memory, compiling on the suspect machine will be much more destructive for potential evidence on the Linux host machine.

The second aspect is the memory analysis, a dedicated software tool is required to interpret the memory dump acquired from the first aspect discussed above. Running memory is not as structured as disk storage, RAM memory is a set of 1s or 0s that need to be interrupted and contextualised, different operating systems will sort and store memory in different ways. For this reason, forensics analysts need to understand the structure of how memory is stored in order to begin examination. Hence there is not an ideal memory forensics tool that catch all cases with greatest accuracy and precision the ideal digital forensic tool kit would possess.

There are various digital forensics tools for memory analysis, however most are not regularly updated or lack community support. The three top tools are Backlight, Volatility and Sans SIFT.

Backlight is ideal for companies and organisations as they are tailor made for quick and effective results in the field. Backlight details user actions and report memory image analysis findings. It can analyse hibernation files, page files, raw dumps and crash dumps.

It can create bulk extraction contents searches of key details. It has a powerful file filter that is much faster than other open-source tools, and is available on all four major platform. The downside is the very high price tag of the product.

Volatility is a cross platform tools written in python, it can extract useful information about network connections, open sockets, running processes, DLLs, cached registry hives, event logs and more. Volatility is available on Windows, MacOSX and Linux OS. Volatility is wise to keep as a staple tool as it is open source with potential to have more plugins added in future.

Sans SIFT is a popular toolkit that comes with all the essential features. It is an open-source tool for known for indepth forensic investigations. Sans sift support AFF, dd and ewf file formats for deep analysis.

Sans Sift also comes with useful tools such as Rifiuti to examine the recycle bin, log2time to generate systems log based timelines, and scalpel used for file carving. It offers better memory utilisation, latest forensic techniques and cross compatibility between Linux and Windows.

There are other various tools that are not regularly updated or lack community support, however have a useful to employ to focus on certain aspects of memory analysis. PeStudio has entropy levels from 0 to 8 to indicate how packed malware is. Process Hacker is a useful tool to show how malware attempt to hide. Process Monitor or ProcMon records activities such as process creations and registry changes, it is very useful when used with Process hacker to examine new processes created by malware.

ProcDot is great tool for visualisation as it can take ProcMon output and visually represent malware activity.

Autoruns is an application to investigate software that launches on start-up. It is a tools that investigates malware persistence and highlight any new persistent software and techniques.

Fidler is tailored to investigate network activities for malwares that create backdoors or exfiltrate data.

Wireshark allows deep packet inspection of multiple protocols. It is an ideal tool for analysis of network packets, use of this program requires domain knowledge of network communication.

There are many more tools, however none which a is an all-in-one perfect suite of tools. Therefore, the best value for money for memory forensics tools is Volatility and Sans SIFT with all round understanding of digital forensics, that is the nature of running memory as mentioned above.

#### IX. Conclusions

The nature of program crashes and fileless malware is a system runtime activity that can only be resolved by analysing the state of a live system. Analysis of live system activity can also enlighten the direction of an investigation for other areas of digital forensic investigation such as disk analysis.

The best source of data for memory analysis is obtaining a memory dump with live memory capture, however if this this is not possible the next best alternative is to acquire the hibernation file if the system has been hibernated.

After capturing runtime processes the examiner can investigate for runtime environment variables to understand the nature of process execution, registries altered by the malware or bug, analysing network connections can reveal the nature of malicious code activity. However if the full process is captured then it is possible to dump the process as an executable to a virtual machine or a separate machine to examine the machinations of the process.

There is a wide range of forensics tolls to investigate RAM dump activity. The most effective and tailored solutions that report activity and are more automated are commercial products.

However there is not an ideal memory forensics tool that serves as a catch-all software solution for analysts that have limited understanding of computer systems and forensics analysis. The two main options for dealing with volatile memory security is to purchase specialised software such as Blacklist for forensic analysis or commercial security software products such as Guardian Digital EnGarde Cloud email security. The second option is to use regularly updated open source software such as Volatility and Sans Sift with a broad understanding of computer systems architecture and memory forensics concepts, and use other analyser software solutions (as mentioned previously) for particular needs of the analysiss.

### ii. Appendix

ii.l.1.1 Appendix 1

Offset(V)		ID PPIC				Sess	W	ow64 Start	Exit
0xfffffa8018		4			 560		0	 2022-08-28 06:42:	08 UTC+0000
0xfffffa8019	9a1950 smss.exe	244	4	2	29		0	2022-08-28 06:42	2:08 UTC+0000
0xfffffa8019f	ff4060 csrss.exe	328	320	9	508	0	0	2022-08-28 06:42	:16 UTC+0000
0xfffffa801a	168b30 csrss.exe	380	372	11	457	1		0 2022-08-28 06:4	42:18 UTC+0000
0xfffffa801a	1914a0 wininit.exe	388	320	3	76	0	C	2022-08-28 06:42	2:18 UTC+0000
0xfffffa8019	2a3060 winlogon.exe	424	372	2 4	11	2	1	0 2022-08-28 06	:42:19 UTC+0000
0xfffffa801a	1e4b30 services.exe	484	388	8	21	5 (	)	0 2022-08-28 06:	42:21 UTC+0000
0xfffffa801a	19fb30 lsass.exe	492	388	8	764	0	C	2022-08-28 06:42	2:22 UTC+0000
0xfffffa801a	1f5720 lsm.exe	500	388	9	148	0	0	2022-08-28 06:42	2:22 UTC+0000
0xfffffa801a	259690 svchost.exe	588	484	11	36	4	0	0 2022-08-28 06	:42:27 UTC+0000
0xfffffa801a	27db30 vm3dservice.ex	64	18 48	34	4 4	<del>1</del> 5	0	0 2022-08-28 06	6:42:28 UTC+0000
0xfffffa801a	280870 svchost.exe	688	484	9	309	9 (	)	0 2022-08-28 06:	42:29 UTC+0000
0xfffffa801a	2c4b30 svchost.exe	776	484	23	58	9	0	0 2022-08-28 06	:42:30 UTC+0000
0xfffffa801a	2d9b30 svchost.exe	816	484	25	47	1	0	0 2022-08-28 06	:42:30 UTC+0000
0xfffffa801a	2e09e0 svchost.exe	840	484	44	103	38	0	0 2022-08-28 06	6:42:30 UTC+0000
0xfffffa801a	307060 audiodg.exe	920	776	5 5	12	4 (	0	0 2022-08-28 06	:42:31 UTC+0000
0xfffffa801a	3349e0 svchost.exe	992	484	19	76	2	0	0 2022-08-28 06	:42:32 UTC+0000
0xfffffa801a	35eb30 svchost.exe	324	484	18	47	9	0	0 2022-08-28 06	:42:33 UTC+0000
0xfffffa801a	3b6b30 spoolsv.exe	672	484	13	27	0	0	0 2022-08-28 06	:42:36 UTC+0000
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### ii.I.1.2 Apendix 2

Procedure	vol.py -f Snapsl	vol.py -f Snapshot1.vmemprofile=Win7SP1x64 filescan   grep -i Thunderbird					
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	vol.py -f Snapsl	shot1.vmemprofile=Win7SP1x64 dumpfiles -Q 0x00000007e258b70 -D '/home/sansforensics/Downloads/evidence_B/Email'					
Source:	file.None.0x	file.None.0xfffffa801a4451e0.dat					
	Email Messages						
		Email #1					
Base64 Encode	ed	Base64 Decoded					
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bWFpbC5jb20NCldllG5vdGljZWQgYSB uZXcgc2lnbi1pbiB0byB5b3VylEdvb2ds ZSBBY2NvdW50		ht317117@gmail.com					
IG9uIGEgV2luZG93cyBkZXZpY2UuIEI mDQp0aGlzlHdhcyB5b3UslHlvdSBkb2 7igJl0IG5lZWQg		We noticed a new sign-in to your Google Account on a Windows device. If					
		this was you, you don't need to do anything. If not, we'll help you secure					
dG8gZG8gYW55dGhpbmculElmlG5vd Cwgd2XigJlsbCBoZWxwlHlvdSBzZWN		your account.					
		Check activity					
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aWV3LCBDQSA5NDA0MywgVVNBDQ o=

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Email #2					
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21haWwuY29tDQoNCklm	ht317117@gmail.com				
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JGFuZCBzZWN1cmUgeW91cg0KYWN	account.				
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RDaG9vc2VyP0VtYWlsPWh0MzE3MT	%3D320990981383141100%26et%3D0>				
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b250aW51ZT1odHRwczovL215YWNjb 3VudC5nb29nbGUuY29tL2FsZXJ0L25	https://myaccount.google.com/notifications				
0LzE2NjE2MDUwNDkw	You received this email to let you know about important changes to your				
MDA/	Google Account and services.				
cmZuJTNEMTI3JTI2cmZuYyUzRDEIMj ZlaWQIM0QzMjA5OTA5ODEzODMxN	© 2022 Google LLC, 1600 Amphitheatre Parkway, Mountain View, CA 94043, USA				
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a2Ugb25llG1pbnV0ZSB0byBzZXQgdX	A better Android experience is waiting	
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{"name":"<mark>#FederalLawEnforcementAgency</mark>","state":1,"id":3,"messages":
[],"totalMessages":0,"key":"","topic":"","type":"channel","firstUnread":0,"unread":0,"highlight":0,"users":
[]},"index":1}]m
42["msg",{"chan":3,"msg":{"from":{"mode":"","nick":"Benji"},"time":"2022-08-
28T02:05:33.419Z","hostmask":"user2@127.0.0.1","type":"join","self":true,"id":22,"previews":
[],"text":""}}]m
42["users",{"chan":3}]m
42["users",{"chan":3}]m
42["msg",{"chan":5,"msg":{"from":{"mode":"","nick":"Benji"},"time":"2022-08-
28T02:05:33.420Z","hostmask":"user2@127.0.0.1","type":"join","self":false,"id":40,"previews":
[],"text":""}}]m
42["users",{"chan":5}]m
u42["names",{"id":5,"users":[{"nick":"Eason","mode":"@","lastMessage":0},
{"nick":"Benji","mode":"","lastMessage":0}]}]m
42["msg",{"chan":3,"msg":{"type":"mode_channel","text":"+nt ","from":{},"id":23,"previews":
[],"self":false,"time":"2022-08-28T02:05:35.425Z"}}]o
L42["join",{"network":"fbf22ec7-012d-4e49-87e5-40046557dd7d","chan":
{"type":"special","special":"list channels","name":"Channel List","data":{"text":"Loading channel list, this
can take a moment..."},"id":3,"messages":
[],"totalMessages":0,"key":"","topic":"","state":0,"firstUnread":0,"unread":0,"highlight":0,"users":
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[]},"index":1}]
C42["msg:special",{"chan":3,"data":{"text":"Loaded 2 channels..."}}]
42["msg:special",{"chan":3,"data":
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{"channel":"#thelounge","num users":1,"topic":"[+nt] ","tags":{}}]}]
42["msg",{"chan":5,"msg":{"from":{"mode":"","nick":"Tony"},"time":"2022-08-
28T02:06:03.738Z","hostmask":"user3@127.0.0.1","type":"join","self":false,"id":41,"previews":
[],"text":""}}]
42["users",{"chan":5}]
42["msg",{"chan":3,"msg":{"from":{"mode":"","nick":"Tony"},"time":"2022-08-
28T02:06:03.738Z", "hostmask": "user3@127.0.0.1", "type": "join", "self": false, "id": 24, "previews":
[],"text":""}}]
42["users",{"chan":3}]
42["join",{"network":"fbf22ec7-012d-4e49-87e5-40046557dd7d","chan":
{"name":"#FederalLawEnforcementAgency","state":1,"id":4,"messages":
[],"totalMessages":0,"key":"","topic":"","type":"channel","firstUnread":0,"unread":0,"highlight":0,"users":
[]},"index":1}]
42["msg",{"chan":4,"msg":{"from":{"mode":"","nick":"Tony"},"time":"2022-08-
28T02:06:03.739Z","hostmask":"user3@127.0.0.1","type":"join","self":true,"id":25,"previews":
[],"text":""}}]
42["users",{"chan":4}]
42["users",{"chan":4}]
42["msg",{"chan":4,"msg":{"type":"mode_channel","text":"+nt ","from":{},"id":26,"previews":
[],"self":false,"time":"2022-08-28T02:06:05.742Z"}}]
42["msg",{"chan":5,"msg":{"from":{"mode":"@","nick":"Eason"},"type":"message","time":"2022-08-
28T02:06:33.050Z", "text": "Benji, read this message carefully. I might not have much time
left", "self":true, "highlight":false, "users":["Benji"], "id":42, "previews":[]}}]
42["msg",{"chan":3,"msg":{"from":{"mode":"@","nick":"Eason"},"type":"message","time":"2022-08-
28T02:06:33.094Z", "text": "Benji, read this message carefully. I might not have much time
left", "self": false, "highlight": true, "users": ["Benji"], "id": 25, "previews": []}}]
42["msg",{"chan":4,"msg":{"from":{"mode":"@","nick":"Eason"},"type":"message","time":"2022-08-
28T02:06:33.095Z", "text": "Benji, read this message carefully. I might not have much time
left", "self": false, "highlight": false, "users": ["Benji"], "id": 27, "previews": []}}]
42["msg",{"chan":3,"msg":{"from":{"mode":"","nick":"Benji"},"type":"message","time":"2022-08-
28T02:06:46.030Z","text":"Whats wrong Eason?","self":true,"highlight":false,"users":
["Eason"],"id":26,"previews":[]}}]
42["msg",{"chan":5,"msg":{"from":{"mode":"","nick":"Benji"},"type":"message","time":"2022-08-
28T02:06:46.030Z","text":"Whats wrong Eason?","self":false,"highlight":true,"users":
["Eason"],"id":43,"previews":[]}}]
42["msg",{"chan":4,"msg":{"from":{"mode":"","nick":"Benji"},"type":"message","time":"2022-08-
28T02:06:46.031Z","text":"Whats wrong Eason?","self":false,"highlight":false,"users":
["Eason"],"id":28,"previews":[]}}]
642["msg",{"chan":5,"msg":{"from":{"mode":"@","nick":"Eason"},"type":"message","time":"2022-08-
28T02:06:58.107Z", "text": "Erika Sloane asked me to deliver a package from the Russian embassy in
London to Morocco. But it wasnt the real embassy.", "self":true, "highlight":false, "users":
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[],"id":44,"previews":[]}}]
742["msg",{"chan":3,"msg":{"from":{"mode":"@","nick":"Eason"},"type":"message","time":"2022-08-
28T02:06:58.107Z", "text": "Erika Sloane asked me to deliver a package from the Russian embassy in
London to Morocco. But it wasnt the real embassy.", "self":false, "highlight":false, "users":
[],"id":27,"previews":[]}}]
742["msg",{"chan":4,"msg":{"from":{"mode":"@","nick":"Eason"},"type":"message","time":"2022-08-
28T02:06:58.108Z", "text": "Erika Sloane asked me to deliver a package from the Russian embassy in
London to Morocco. But it wasnt the real embassy.", "self":false, "highlight":false, "users":
[],"id":29,"previews":[]}}]
42["msg",{"chan":3,"msg":{"from":{"mode":"","nick":"Benji"},"type":"message","time":"2022-08-
28T02:07:08.892Z", "text": "What are you talking Eason? Erika Sloane? That Erika
Sloane?". "self":true. "highlight":false. "users":["Eason"]. "id":28. "previews":[]}}]
42["msg",{"chan":5,"msg":{"from":{"mode":"","nick":"Benji"},"type":"message","time":"2022-08-
28T02:07:08.893Z", "text": "What are you talking Eason? Erika Sloane? That Erika
Sloane?", "self": false, "highlight": true, "users": ["Eason"], "id": 45, "previews": []}}]
42["msg",{"chan":4,"msg":{"from":{"mode":"","nick":"Benji"},"type":"message","time":"2022-08-
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Sloane?", "self": false, "highlight": false, "users": ["Eason"], "id": 30, "previews": []}}]
?42["msg",{"chan":5,"msg":{"from":{"mode":"@","nick":"Eason"},"type":"message","time":"2022-08-
28T02:07:20.726Z", "text": "I have some insurance, in case this whole thing blows up. Its in the usual
place. Promise me you will store it in a safe place. ","self":true,"highlight":false,"users":
[],"id":46,"previews":[]}}]
@42["msg",{"chan":3,"msg":{"from":{"mode":"@","nick":"Eason"},"type":"message","time":"2022-08-
28T02:07:20.727Z", "text": "I have some insurance, in case this whole thing blows up. Its in the usual
place. Promise me you will store it in a safe place. ","self":false,"highlight":false,"users":
[],"id":29,"previews":[]}}]
@42["msg",{"chan":4,"msg":{"from":{"mode":"@","nick":"Eason"},"type":"message","time":"2022-08-
28T02:07:20.727Z", "text": "I have some insurance, in case this whole thing blows up. Its in the usual
place. Promise me you will store it in a safe place. ", "self":false, "highlight":false, "users":
[],"id":31,"previews":[]}}]
42["msg",{"chan":3,"msg":{"from":{"mode":"","nick":"Benji"},"type":"message","time":"2022-08-
28T02:07:31.836Z", "text": "For sure my friend. I will upload it to my Onedrive. Stay
safe", "self":true, "highlight":false, "users":[], "id":30, "previews":[]}}]
42["msg",{"chan":5,"msg":{"from":{"mode":"","nick":"Benji"},"type":"message","time":"2022-08-
28T02:07:31.837Z", "text": "For sure my friend. I will upload it to my Onedrive. Stay
safe", "self": false, "highlight": false, "users": [], "id": 47, "previews": []}}]
42["msg",{"chan":4,"msg":{"from":{"mode":"","nick":"Benji"},"type":"message","time":"2022-08-
28T02:07:31.837Z", "text": "For sure my friend. I will upload it to my Onedrive. Stay
safe", "self": false, "highlight": false, "users": [], "id": 32, "previews": []}}]
42["msg",{"chan":5,"msg":{"from":{"mode":"@","nick":"Eason"},"type":"message","time":"2022-08-
28T02:07:42.549Z","text":"Thx. TTYL","self":true,"highlight":false,"users":[],"id":48,"previews":[]}}]
42["msg",{"chan":3,"msg":{"from":{"mode":"@","nick":"Eason"},"type":"message","time":"2022-08-
28T02:07:42.549Z","text":"Thx. TTYL","self":false,"highlight":false,"users":[],"id":31,"previews":[]}}]
42["msg",{"chan":4,"msg":{"from":{"mode":"@","nick":"Eason"},"type":"message","time":"2022-08-
28T02:07:42.554Z","text":"Thx. TTYL","self":false,"highlight":false,"users":[],"id":33,"previews":[]}}]
42["msg",{"chan":5,"msg":{"from":{"mode":"","nick":"Tony"},"type":"message","time":"2022-08-
28T02:09:28.542Z", "text": "Eason, the bioweapons came from a previous Soviet biological weapons
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program", "self":false, "highlight":true, "users": ["Eason"], "id":49, "previews": []}}]X
42["msg",{"chan":3,"msg":{"from":{"mode":"","nick":"Tony"},"type":"message","time":"2022-08-
28T02:09:28.542Z", "text": "Eason, the bioweapons came from a previous Soviet biological weapons
program", "self":false, "highlight":false, "users": ["Eason"], "id":32, "previews": []}}]X
42["msg",{"chan":5,"msg":{"from":{"mode":"@","nick":"Eason"},"type":"message","time":"2022-08-
28T02:09:50.266Z", "text": "Thanks, Tony. I owe you one.", "self": true, "highlight": false, "users":
["Tony"],"id":50,"previews":[]}}]n
42["msg",{"chan":3,"msg":{"from":{"mode":"@","nick":"Eason"},"type":"message","time":"2022-08-
28T02:09:50.267Z", "text": "Thanks, Tony. I owe you one.", "self": false, "highlight": false, "users":
["Tony"],"id":33,"previews":[]}}]n
42["msg",{"chan":4,"msg":{"from":{"mode":"@","nick":"Eason"},"type":"message","time":"2022-08-
28T02:09:50.267Z","text":"Thanks, Tony. I owe you one.","self":false,"highlight":true,"users":
["Tony"],"id":35,"previews":[]}}]n
42["msg",{"chan":3,"msg":{"from":{"mode":"","nick":"Benji"},"type":"part","time":"2022-08-
28T02:10:13.335Z","text":"The Lounge -
https://thelounge.chat","hostmask":"user2@127.0.0.1","self":true,"id":34,"previews":[]}}]
42["msg",{"chan":5,"msg":{"from":{"mode":"","nick":"Benji"},"type":"part","time":"2022-08-
28T02:10:13.335Z", "text": "The Lounge -
https://thelounge.chat","hostmask":"user2@127.0.0.1","self":false,"id":51,"previews":[]}}]
42["msg",{"chan":4,"msg":{"from":{"mode":"","nick":"Benji"},"type":"part","time":"2022-08-
28T02:10:13.336Z","text":"The Lounge -
https://thelounge.chat", "hostmask": "user2@127.0.0.1", "self":false, "id":36, "previews":[]}}]
42["msg",{"chan":4,"msg":{"from":{"mode":"","nick":"Tony"},"type":"message","time":"2022-08-
28T02:10:21.807Z", "text": "Buy me some KFC next time when you are in the
office", "self":true, "highlight":false, "users":[], "id":37, "previews":[]}}]
42["msg",{"chan":5,"msg":{"from":{"mode":"","nick":"Tony"},"type":"message","time":"2022-08-
28T02:10:21.807Z", "text": "Buy me some KFC next time when you are in the
office", "self":false, "highlight":false, "users":[], "id":52, "previews":[]}}]
42["msg",{"chan":5,"msg":{"from":{"mode":"@","nick":"Eason"},"type":"message","time":"2022-08-
28T02:10:34.556Z", "text": "I dont know if I can come back", "self": true, "highlight": false, "users":
[],"id":53,"previews":[]}}]
42["msg",{"chan":4,"msg":{"from":{"mode":"@","nick":"Eason"},"type":"message","time":"2022-08-
28T02:10:34.556Z", "text": "I dont know if I can come back", "self": false, "highlight": false, "users":
[],"id":38,"previews":[]}}]
42["msg",{"chan":4,"msg":{"from":{"mode":"","nick":"Tony"},"type":"message","time":"2022-08-
28T02:10:46.128Z", "text": "Its just KFC. dont be stingy", "self": true, "highlight": false, "users":
[],"id":39,"previews":[]}}]
42["msg",{"chan":5,"msg":{"from":{"mode":"","nick":"Tony"},"type":"message","time":"2022-08-
28T02:10:46.129Z","text":"Its just KFC. dont be stingy","self":false,"highlight":false,"users":
[],"id":54,"previews":[]}}]
42["msg",{"chan":5,"msg":{"from":{"mode":"@","nick":"Eason"},"type":"part","time":"2022-08-
28T02:11:31.165Z","text":"The Lounge -
https://thelounge.chat","hostmask":"user1@127.0.0.1","self":true,"id":55,"previews":[]}}]
42["part",{"chan":5}]
42["msg",{"chan":4,"msg":{"from":{"mode":"@","nick":"Eason"},"type":"part","time":"2022-08-
28T02:11:31.167Z","text":"The Lounge -
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https://thelounge.chat","hostmask":"user1@127.0.0.1","self":false,"id":40,"previews":[]}}]
L42["join",{"network":"9a5ab82b-ec8c-4582-9b47-0730a8deaff2","chan":
{"type":"special","special":"list channels","name":"Channel List","data":{"text":"Loading channel list, this
can take a moment..."},"id":4,"messages":
[],"totalMessages":0,"key":"","topic":"","state":0,"firstUnread":0,"unread":0,"highlight":0,"users":
[]},"index":1}]{
42["join",{"network":"9a5ab82b-ec8c-4582-9b47-0730a8deaff2","chan":
{"name":"#FederalLawEnforcementAgency","state":1,"id":5,"messages":
[],"totalMessages":0,"key":"","topic":"","type":"channel","firstUnread":0,"unread":0,"highlight":0,"users":
[]},"index":1}]
42["msg",{"chan":5,"msg":{"from":{"mode":"","nick":"Benji"},"time":"2022-08-
28T02:14:24.383Z", "hostmask": "user2@127.0.0.1", "type": "join", "self": true, "id":35, "previews":
[],"text":""}}]
42["users",{"chan":5}]
42["users",{"chan":5}]
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28T02:14:24.384Z","hostmask":"user2@127.0.0.1","type":"join","self":false,"id":41,"previews":
[],"text":""}}]
42["users",{"chan":4}]
42["names",{"id":4,"users":[{"nick":"Benji","mode":"","lastMessage":0},
{"nick":"Tony","mode":"","lastMessage":1661652646128}]}]
42["msg",{"chan":5,"msg":{"type":"mode channel","text":"+nt ","from":{},"id":36,"previews":
[],"self":false,"time":"2022-08-28T02:14:26.387Z"}}]
42["msg",{"chan":4,"msg":{"from":{"mode":"","nick":"Tony"},"type":"message","time":"2022-08-
28T02:14:46.186Z", "text": "I just did Eason a favour but he is not willing to buy KFC for me
","self":true,"highlight":false,"users":[],"id":42,"previews":[]}}]
42["msg",{"chan":5,"msg":{"from":{"mode":"","nick":"Tony"},"type":"message","time":"2022-08-
28T02:14:46.186Z", "text": "I just did Eason a favour but he is not willing to buy KFC for me
","self":false,"highlight":false,"users":[],"id":37,"previews":[]}}]
42["msg",{"chan":5,"msg":{"from":{"mode":"","nick":"Benji"},"type":"message","time":"2022-08-
28T02:14:58.511Z","text":"idk. he sounds a bit under the weather
today", "self":true, "highlight":false, "users":[], "id":38, "previews":[]}}]
42["msg",{"chan":4,"msg":{"from":{"mode":"","nick":"Benji"},"type":"message","time":"2022-08-
28T02:14:58.511Z", "text": "idk. he sounds a bit under the weather
today", "self": false, "highlight": false, "users": [], "id": 43, "previews": []}}]
42["msg",{"chan":4,"msg":{"from":{"mode":"","nick":"Tony"},"type":"message","time":"2022-08-
28T02:15:07.670Z","text":"I know right","self":true,"highlight":false,"users":[],"id":44,"previews":[]}}]
42["msg",{"chan":5,"msg":{"from":{"mode":"","nick":"Tony"},"type":"message","time":"2022-08-
28T02:15:07.671Z", "text": "I know right", "self": false, "highlight": false, "users": [], "id": 39, "previews": []}}]
42["msg",{"chan":5,"msg":{"from":{"mode":"","nick":"Benji"},"type":"message","time":"2022-08-
28T02:15:27.217Z", "text": "He asked me to store something for him, but I don
t know. I have no space on my one drive.", "self":true, "highlight":false, "users":[], "id":40, "previews":[]}}]
42["msg",{"chan":4,"msg":{"from":{"mode":"","nick":"Benji"},"type":"message","time":"2022-08-
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t know. I have no space on my one drive.", "self":false, "highlight":false, "users":[], "id":45, "previews":[]}}]
28T02:15:41.093Z","text":"Free for coffee?","self":true,"highlight":false,"users":[],"id":46,"previews":[]}}]
42["msg",{"chan":5,"msg":{"from":{"mode":"","nick":"Tony"},"type":"message","time":"2022-08-
28T02:15:41.093Z","text":"Free for coffee?","self":false,"highlight":false,"users":[],"id":41,"previews":[]}}]
42["msg",{"chan":4,"msg":{"from":{"mode":"","nick":"Tony"},"type":"message","time":"2022-08-
28T02:15:55.121Z","text":"where to meet?","self":true,"highlight":false,"users":[],"id":47,"previews":[]}}]
42["msg",{"chan":5,"msg":{"from":{"mode":"","nick":"Tony"},"type":"message","time":"2022-08-
28T02:15:55.122Z","text":"where to meet?","self":false,"highlight":false,"users":[],"id":42,"previews":[]}}]
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28T02:16:13.317Z", "text": "where to meet indeed", "self": true, "highlight": false, "users":
[],"id":43,"previews":[]}}]
42["msg",{"chan":4,"msg":{"from":{"mode":"","nick":"Benji"},"type":"message","time":"2022-08-
28T02:16:13.318Z", "text": "where to meet indeed", "self": false, "highlight": false, "users":
[],"id":48,"previews":[]}}]
42["join",{"network":"d0effdca-0c7f-425f-8829-f0f659a4f30e","chan":
{"name":"#Syndicate","state":1,"id":7,"messages":
[],"totalMessages":0,"key":"","topic":"","type":"channel","firstUnread":0,"unread":0,"highlight":0,"users":
[]},"index":1}]
42["msg",{"chan":7,"msg":{"from":{"mode":"","nick":"Syndicate1"},"time":"2022-08-
28T02:16:39.484Z","hostmask":"user4@127.0.0.1","type":"join","self":true,"id":68,"previews":
[],"text":""}}]
42["users",{"chan":7}]
42["users",{"chan":7}]
42["open",7]
O42["names",{"id":7,"users":[{"nick":"Syndicate1","mode":"@","lastMessage":0}]}]
O42["names",{"id":7,"users":[{"nick":"Syndicate1","mode":"@","lastMessage":0}]}]
O42["names",{"id":7,"users":[{"nick":"Syndicate1","mode":"@","lastMessage":0}]}]
42["msg",{"chan":7,"msg":{"type":"mode channel","text":"+nt ","from":{},"id":69,"previews":
[],"self":false,"time":"2022-08-28T02:16:41.062Z"}}]
L42["join", {"network": "65167699-1c87-4cc5-ad52-fda442d06e36", "chan":
{"type":"special", "special": "list channels", "name": "Channel List", "data": {"text": "Loading channel list, this
can take a moment..."},"id":3,"messages":
[],"totalMessages":0,"key":"","topic":"","state":0,"firstUnread":0,"unread":0,"highlight":0,"users":
[]},"index":1}]
C42["msg:special",{"chan":3,"data":{"text":"Loaded 3 channels..."}}]
42["msg:special",{"chan":3,"data":
[{"channel":"#FederalLawEnforcementAgency","num_users":2,"topic":"[+nt] ","tags":{}},
{"channel":"#thelounge","num_users":1,"topic":"[+nt] ","tags":{}},
{"channel":"#Syndicate","num users":1,"topic":"[+nt] ","tags":{}}]}]
                                                                      +@
42["msg",{"chan":7,"msg":{"from":{"mode":"","nick":"Syndicate2"},"time":"2022-08-
28T02:16:53.396Z","hostmask":"user5@127.0.0.1","type":"join","self":false,"id":70,"previews":
[],"text":""}}]
42["users",{"chan":7}]
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42["join",{"network":"65167699-1c87-4cc5-ad52-fda442d06e36","chan":
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[]},"index":1}]
42["msg",{"chan":4,"msg":{"from":{"mode":"","nick":"Syndicate2"},"time":"2022-08-
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[],"text":""}}]
42["users",{"chan":4}]
42["users",{"chan":4}]
42["names",{"id":7,"users":[{"nick":"Syndicate1","mode":"@","lastMessage":0},
{"nick":"Syndicate2","mode":"","lastMessage":0}]}]
42["names",{"id":4,"users":[{"nick":"Syndicate1","mode":"@","lastMessage":0},
{"nick":"Syndicate2","mode":"","lastMessage":0}]}]
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{"nick":"Syndicate2","mode":"","lastMessage":0}]}]
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{"nick": "Syndicate2", "mode": "", "lastMessage": 0}]}]
42["msg",{"chan":4,"msg":{"type":"mode_channel","text":"+nt ","from":{},"id":21,"previews":
[],"self":false,"time":"2022-08-28T02:16:55.405Z"}}]
42["msg",{"chan":7,"msg":{"from":{"mode":"@","nick":"Syndicate1"},"type":"message","time":"2022-08-
28T02:20:22.701Z", "text": "Benji Dunn just downloaded something from the drop zone. Its
encrypted.", "self":true, "highlight":false, "users":[], "id":71, "previews":[]}}]
42["msg",{"chan":4,"msg":{"from":{"mode":"@","nick":"Syndicate1"},"type":"message","time":"2022-08-
28T02:20:22.702Z", "text": "Benji Dunn just downloaded something from the drop zone. Its
encrypted.", "self":false, "highlight":false, "users":[], "id":22, "previews":[]}}]
42["msg",{"chan":4,"msg":{"from":{"mode":"","nick":"Syndicate2"},"type":"message","time":"2022-08-
28T02:20:36.021Z","text":"Dont worry we are on the inside. I will upload the
key.", "self": true, "highlight": false, "users": [], "id": 23, "previews": []}}]
42["msg",{"chan":7,"msg":{"from":{"mode":"","nick":"Syndicate2"},"type":"message","time":"2022-08-
28T02:20:36.022Z", "text": "Dont worry we are on the inside. I will upload the
key.", "self":false, "highlight":false, "users":[], "id":72, "previews":[]}}]
42["msg",{"chan":7,"msg":{"from":{"mode":"@","nick":"Syndicate1"},"type":"message","time":"2022-08-
28T02:20:53.507Z", "text": "From Dunn's PC?", "self": true, "highlight": false, "users": [], "id": 73, "previews":
[[}}]
42["msg",{"chan":4,"msg":{"from":{"mode":"@","nick":"Syndicate1"},"type":"message","time":"2022-08-
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42["msg",{"chan":4,"msg":{"from":{"mode":"","nick":"Syndicate2"},"type":"message","time":"2022-08-
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