Note to other teachers and users of these slides: We would be delighted if you found our material useful for giving your own lectures. Feel free to use these slides verbatim, or to modify them to fit your own needs. If you make use of a significant portion of these slides in your own lecture, please include this message, or a link to our web site: http://www.mmds.org

Advertising on the Web

CS246: Mining Massive Datasets
Jure Leskovec, Stanford University
http://cs246.stanford.edu



Infinite data: Online Algorithms

High dim.

Locality sensitive hashing

Clustering

Dimensional ity reduction

Graph data

PageRank, SimRank

Community Detection

Spam Detection

Infinite data

Filtering data streams

Web advertising

Queries on streams

Machine learning

SVM

Decision Trees

Parallel SGD

Apps

Recommen der systems

Association Rules

Duplicate document detection

Online Algorithms

Classic model of algorithms


- You get to see the entire input, then compute some function of it
- In this context, "offline algorithm"

Online Algorithms

- You get to see the input one piece at a time, and need to make irrevocable decisions along the way
- Similar to the data stream model


Sponsored Search: Ads


Query-to-advertiser graph:



[Andersen, Lang: Communities from seed sets, 2006]

Graph Matching for Advertising





Advertiser X wants to show an ad for topic/query Y

Which advertiser gets picked

(1,a)


(2,b)

(3,d)

This is an online problem: We have to make decisions as queries/topics show up. We do not know what topics will show up in the future.

Online Bipartite Matching


Example: Bipartite Matching



Nodes: Boys and Girls; Links: Preferences


Goal: Match boys to girls so that the most preferences are satisfied

Example: Bipartite Matching



M = {(1,a),(2,b),(3,d)} is a matching Cardinality of matching = |M| = 3

Example: Bipartite Matching



M = {(1,c),(2,b),(3,d),(4,a)} is a perfect matching

Perfect matching ... all vertices of the graph are matched **Maximum matching** ... a matching that contains the largest possible number of matches


Matching Algorithm

- Problem: Find a maximum matching for a given bipartite graph
 - A perfect one if it exists
- There is a polynomial-time offline algorithm based on augmenting paths (Hopcroft & Karp 1973, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hopcroft-Karp algorithm)
- But what if we do not know the entire graph upfront?

Online Graph Matching Problem

- Initially, we are given the set boys
- In each round, one girl's choices are revealed
 - That is, the girl's edges are revealed
- At that time, we have to decide to either:
 - Pair the girl with a boy
 - Do not pair the girl with any boy
- Example of application:
 Assigning tasks to servers

Online Graph Matching: Example



(1,a) (2,b) (3,d)

Greedy Algorithm

- Greedy algorithm for the online graph matching problem:
 - Pair the new girl with any eligible boy
 - If there is none, do not pair the girl
- How good is the algorithm?

Competitive Ratio


For input I, suppose greedy produces matching M_{greedy} while an optimal matching is M_{opt}

Competitive ratio = $min_{all\ possible\ inputs\ l}$ ($|M_{greedy}|/|M_{opt}|$)

(what is greedy's worst performance over all possible inputs I)

Analyzing the Greedy Algorithm

- Consider a case: M_{greedy}≠ M_{opt}
- Consider the set G of girls matched in M_{opt} but not in M_{greedy}
- (1) By definition of G: $|\mathbf{M}_{opt}| \le |\mathbf{M}_{greedy}| + |\mathbf{G}|$




- (2) Define set B of boys linked to girls in G
 - Notice boys in B are already matched in M_{greedy} . Why?
 - If there would exist such non-matched (by M_{greedy}) boy adjacent to a non-matched girl then greedy would have matched them

So:
$$|M_{qreedy}| \ge |B|$$

Analyzing the Greedy Algorithm

Summary so far:

- Girls G matched in M_{opt} but not in M_{greedy}
- Boys B adjacent to girls in G
- (1) $|M_{opt}| \le |M_{greedy}| + |G|$
- (2) $|M_{qreedy}| \ge |B|$



- Optimal matches all girls in G to (some) boys in B
 - (3) $|G| \leq |B|$
- Combining (2) and (3):
 - $|G| \leq |B| \leq |M_{greedy}|$

Analyzing the Greedy Algorithm


So we have:

- (1) $|M_{opt}| \le |M_{greedy}| + |G|$
- (4) $|G| \le |B| \le |M_{greedy}|$






- ullet $|M_{opt}| \leq |M_{greedy}| + |M_{greedy}|$
- Then $|M_{qreedy}|/|M_{opt}| \ge 1/2$



Worst-case Scenario



(1,a) (2,b)

Web Advertising

History of Web Advertising

- Banner ads (1995-2001)
 - Initial form of web advertising
 - Popular websites charged \$X for every 1,000 "impressions" of the ad
 - Called "CPM" rate (Cost per thousand impressions)
 - Modeled similar to TV, magazine ads
 - From untargeted to demographically targeted
 - Low click-through rates
 - Low ROI for advertisers



CPM...cost per *mille Mille*...thousand in Latin

Performance-based Advertising

- Introduced by Overture around 2000
 - Advertisers bid on search keywords
 - When someone searches for that keyword, the highest bidder's ad is shown
 - Advertiser is charged only if the ad is clicked on
- Similar model adopted by Google with some changes around 2002
 - Called Adwords

Ads vs. Search Results

Web

Results 1 - 10 of about 2,230,000 for geico. (0.04 seco

GEICO Car Insurance. Get an auto insurance quote and save today ...

GEICO auto insurance, online car insurance quote, motorcycle insurance quote, online insurance sales and service from a leading insurance company.

www.geico.com/ - 21k - Sep 22, 2005 - Cached - Similar pages

Auto Insurance - Buy Auto Insurance

Contact Us - Make a Payment

More results from www.geico.com »

Geico, Google Settle Trademark Dispute

The case was resolved out of court, so advertisers are still left without legal guidance on use of trademarks within ads or as keywords.

www.clickz.com/news/article.php/3547356 - 44k - Cached - Similar pages

Google and GEICO settle AdWords dispute | The Register

Google and car insurance firm GEICO have settled a trade mark dispute over ... Car insurance firm GEICO sued both Google and Yahoo! subsidiary Overture in ...

www.theregister.co.uk/2005/09/09/google_geico_settlement/ - 21k - Cached - Similar pages

GEICO v. Google

... involving a lawsuit filed by Government Employees Insurance Company (GEICO). GEICO has filed suit against two major Internet search engine operators, ... www.consumeraffairs.com/news04/geico google.html - 19k - Cached - Similar pages

Sponsored Links

Great Car Insurance Rates

Simplify Buying Insurance at Safeco See Your Rate with an Instant Quote www.Safeco.com

Free Insurance Quotes

Fill out one simple form to get multiple quotes from local agents. www.HometownQuotes.com

5 Free Quotes, 1 Form.

Get 5 Free Quotes In Minutes! You Have Nothing To Lose. It's Free sayyessoftware.com/Insurance Missouri

Web 2.0

- Performance-based advertising works!
 - Multi-billion-dollar industry
- Interesting problem:
 Which ads to show for a given query?
 - (Today's lecture)
- If I am an advertiser, which search terms should I bid on and how much should I bid?
 - (Not focus of today's lecture)

Adwords Problem

- A stream of queries arrives at the search engine: q_1 , q_2 , ...
- Several advertisers bid on each query
- When query q_i arrives, search engine must pick a subset of advertisers to show their ads
- Goal: Maximize search engine's revenues
 - Simple solution: Instead of raw bids, use the "expected revenue per click" (i.e., Bid*CTR)
- Clearly we need an online algorithm!

The Adwords Innovation

Advertiser	Bid	CTR	Bid * CTR
Α	\$1.00	1%	1 cent
В	\$0.75	2%	1.5 cents
С	\$0.50	2.5%	1.25 cents
		Click through rate	Expected revenue

The Adwords Innovation

Advertiser	Bid	CTR	Bid * CTR
В	\$0.75	2%	1.5 cents
С	\$0.50	2.5%	1.25 cents
A	\$1.00	1%	1 cent

Instead of sorting advertisers by bid, sort by expected revenue

Limitations of Simple Algorithm

Instead of sorting advertisers by bid, sort by expected revenue

Advertiser	Bid	CTR	Bid * CTR
В	\$0.75	2%	1.5 cents
С	\$0.50	2.5%	1.25 cents
Α	\$1.00	1%	1 cent

Challenges:

- CTR of an ad is unknown
- Advertisers have limited budgets and bid on multiple queries

Complications: Budget

- Two complications:
 - Budget
 - CTR of an ad is unknown
- 1) Budget: Each advertiser has a limited budget
 - Search engine guarantees that the advertiser will not be charged more than their daily budget

Complications: CTR

- 2) CTR (Click-Through Rate): Each ad-query pair has a different likelihood of being clicked
 - Advertiser 1 bids \$2 on query A, click probability = 0.1
 - Advertiser 2 bids \$1 on query B, click probability = 0.5
- CTR is predicted or measured historically
 - Averaged over a time period
- Some complications we will <u>not</u> cover:
 - 1) CTR is position dependent:
 - Ad #1 is clicked more than Ad #2

Complications: CTR

- Some complications we will cover (next lecture):
 - 2) Exploration vs. exploitation
 Exploit: Should we keep showing an ad for which we have good estimates of click-through rate?
 or

Explore: Shall we show a brand new ad to get a better sense of its click-through rate?

Online Algorithms The BALANCE Algorithm

Adwords Problem

Given:

- 1. A set of bids by advertisers for search queries
- 2. A click-through rate for each advertiser-query pair
- 3. A budget for each advertiser (say for 1 month)
- 4. A limit on the number of ads to be displayed with each search query
- Respond to each search query with a set of advertisers such that:
 - 1. The size of the set is no larger than the limit on the number of ads per query
 - 2. Each advertiser has bid on the search query
 - 3. Each advertiser has enough budget left to pay for the ad if it is clicked upon

Greedy Algorithm

Our setting: Simplified environment

- There is 1 ad shown for each query
- All advertisers have the same budget B
- All ads are equally likely to be clicked
- Bid value of each ad is the same (=\$1)

Simplest algorithm is greedy:

- For a query pick any advertiser who has bid 1 for that query
- Competitive ratio of greedy is 1/2

Bad Scenario for Greedy

- Two advertisers A and B
 - A bids on query x, B bids on x and y
 - Both have budgets of \$4
- Query stream: x x x x y y y y
 - Worst case greedy choice: B B B B _ _ _ _ _
 - Optimal: AAAABBBBB
 - Competitive ratio = ½
- This is the worst case!
 - Note: Greedy algorithm is deterministic it always resolves draws in the same way

BALANCE Algorithm [MSVV]

- BALANCE Algorithm by Mehta, Saberi,
 Vazirani, and Vazirani
 - For each query, pick the advertiser with the largest unspent budget
 - Break ties arbitrarily (but in a deterministic way)


Example: BALANCE

- Two advertisers A and B
 - A bids on query x, B bids on x and y
 - Both have budgets of \$4
- Query stream: x x x x y y y y
- BALANCE choice: A B A B B B _ _ _
 - Optimal: A A A A B B B B
- In general: For BALANCE on 2 advertisers
 Competitive ratio = ¾

Analyzing BALANCE


- Consider simple case (w.l.o.g.):
 - 2 advertisers, A_1 and A_2 , each with budget B (≥ 1)
 - Optimal solution exhausts both advertisers' budgets
- BALANCE must exhaust at least one budget:
 - If not, we can allocate more queries
 - Whenever BALANCE makes a mistake (both advertisers bid on the query), advertiser's unspent budget only decreases
 - Since optimal exhausts both budgets, one will for sure get exhausted
 - Assume BALANCE exhausts A₂'s budget, but allocates x queries fewer than the optimal
 - So revenue of BALANCE = 2B x (where OPT is 2B)
 - Let's work out what x is!

Analyzing Balance



- Queries allocated to A₁ in optimal solution
- Queries allocated to A₂ in optimal solution


Opt revenue = 2B Balance revenue = 2B-x = B+y



Balance allocation

We claim y ≥ x (next slide).
Balance revenue is minimum for x=y=B/2.
Minimum Balance revenue = 3B/2.
Competitive Ratio = 3/4.


Analyzing BALANCE: What's x?



Queries allocated to A_1 in the optimal solution

Queries allocated to A_2 in the optimal solution

Optimal revenue = 2B Assume Balance gives revenue = 2B-x = B+y Assume we exhausted A₂'s budget



Notice: Unassigned queries should be assigned


to A_2 (since if we could assign to A_1 we would since we still have the budget)

Goal: Show we have $y \ge B/2$

Case 1) BALANCE assigns at $\geq B/2$ blue queries to A_1 .

Then trivially, $y \geq B/2$

Analyzing BALANCE: What's x?



- Queries allocated to A_1 in the optimal solution
- Queries allocated to A_2 in the optimal solution

Optimal revenue = **2B**

Assume Balance gives revenue = 2B-x = B+yAssume we exhausted A_2 's budget

Unassigned queries should be assigned to A₂ (if we could assign to A₁ we would since we still have the budget)

Goal: Show we have $y \ge B/2$

Balance revenue is minimum for x = y = B/2

Minimum Balance revenue = 3B/2

Competitive Ratio: BAL/OPT = 3/4

Case 2) BALANCE assigns \geq B/2 blue queries to A₂.

Consider the last blue query assigned to A_2 .

At that time, A_2 's unspent budget must have been at least as big as A_1 's.

That means at least as many queries have been assigned to A_1 as to A_2 .

At this point, we have already assigned at least B/2 queries to A_2 .

So, $x \le B/2$ and x + y = B then y > B/2


BALANCE: General Result

- In the general case, worst competitive ratio of BALANCE is 1–1/e = approx. 0.63
 - e = 2.7182
 - Interestingly, no online algorithm has a better competitive ratio!
- Let's see the worst case example that gives this ratio

Worst case for BALANCE

- N advertisers: A_1 , A_2 , ... A_N
 - Each with budget B > N
- Queries:
 - N·B queries appear in N rounds of B queries each
- Bidding:
 - Round 1 queries: bidders A₁, A₂, ..., A_N
 - Round 2 queries: bidders A₂, A₃, ..., A_N
 - Round i queries: bidders A_i , ..., A_N
- Optimum allocation:
 Allocate all round *i* queries to *A_i*
 - Optimum revenue N·B

BALANCE Allocation



BALANCE assigns each of the queries in round 1 to N advertisers. After k rounds, sum of allocations to each of advertisers $A_k,...,A_N$ is

$$S_k = S_{k+1} = \dots = S_N = \sum_{i=1}^k \frac{B}{N - (i-1)}$$

If we find the smallest k such that $S_k \ge B$, then after k rounds we cannot allocate any queries to any advertiser

BALANCE: Analysis

B/1 B/2 B/3 ... B/(N-(k-1)) ... B/(N-1) B/N

$$S_1$$
 S_2
 S_2
 $S_k = B$

1/1 1/2 1/3 ... 1/(N-(k-1)) ... 1/(N-1) 1/N

 S_1
 S_2
 S_3
 S_4
 S_4

BALANCE: Analysis

- Fact: $H_n = \sum_{i=1}^n 1/i \approx \ln(n)$ for large n
 - Result due to Euler

1/1 1/2 1/3 ... 1/(N-(k-1)) ... 1/(N-1) 1/N

$$ln(N)$$
 $S_k = 1$

- $S_k = 1$ implies: $H_{N-k} = ln(N) 1 = ln(\frac{N}{e})$
- We also know: $H_{N-k} = ln(N-k)$
- So: $N k = \frac{N}{e}$
- Then: $k = N(1 \frac{1}{e})$

N terms sum to ln(N). Last k terms sum to 1. First N-k terms sum to ln(N-k) but also to ln(N)-1

BALANCE: Analysis

- So after the first k=N(1-1/e) rounds, we cannot allocate a query to any advertiser
- Revenue = B·N (1-1/e)
- Competitive ratio = 1-1/e
- Note: So far we assumed:
 - All advertisers have the same budget B
 - All advertisers bid 1 for the ad
 - (but each advertiser can bid on any subset of ads)

General Version of the Problem

- Arbitrary bids and arbitrary budgets!
- Consider we have 1 query q, advertiser i
 - Bid = x_i
 - Budget = b_i
- In a general setting BALANCE can be terrible
 - Consider two advertisers A_1 and A_2
 - A_1 : $X_1 = 1$, $b_1 = 110$
 - A_2 : $x_2 = 10$, $b_2 = 100$
 - Consider we see 10 instances of q
 - BALANCE always selects A₁ and earns 10
 - Optimal earns 100

Generalized BALANCE

- Arbitrary bids: consider query q, bidder i
 - Bid = x_i
 - Budget = b_i
 - Amount spent so far = m_i
 - Fraction of budget left over f_i = 1-m_i/b_i
 - Define $\psi_i(q) = x_i(1-e^{-f_i})$
- Allocate query \mathbf{q} to bidder \mathbf{i} with largest value of $\psi_i(\mathbf{q})$
- Same competitive ratio (1-1/e) = 0.63