Climate Change, Analyst Forecasts, and Market Behavior

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Motivation

- An emerging literature in whether climate change affects firm performance.
- Sell-side equity analysts play a crucial role in financial markets.
- Analysts should provide earnings forecasts that reflect the potential impact of climate change. But do they?
 - Not all analysts can see the link between climate change and firm performance.
 - guess: analysts located in areas where firms are more affected by climate change are more likely to understand how climate change affects firm performance.



Question

- Face large temp increase, how analyst forecast firm performance?
 - High sensitive firm area analysts issue lower forecasts relative to the consensus.
 - High sensitive firm area analysts are more accurate.
- Why high-TS area analysts' less optimistic forecasts is accurate?
 - High-TS firms contribute above result.
 - High-TS firms' earnings are negatively affected by large temp increases.
- How market react to forecast revisions?
 - No stronger reaction: investors do not anticipate high-TS area analyst's accuracy.
 - High-TS firms with more High-TS analysts: higher earnings surprises, higher CAR and weak PEAD for earnings announcements.



Contribution

- contributes to literature that how climate change affects financial outcomes.
 - Hugon & Law(2019): unusually warm climate negatively affect firm earnings.
 - extend using temp sensitivities.
- contribute to the literature that factors that affect analyst forecast.
 - limited attention (Dong & Heo,2016), extreme negative events (Cuculiza, 2020) ···
 - analysts anticipate temp extremes affect part of earnings shocks.(Bobea, 2019)
 - extend: how to understand the affect and adjust forecasts
- contribute to the literature that how political beliefs affect financial decisions.
 - affect mutual fund managers, retail investors' portfolio, firms' CSR policies (Hong& Kostovetsky, 2012; Ke, 2020; Giuli & Kostovetsky, 2014).
 - find:local political beliefs affect analysts' view of climate change & earnings.



Introduction

Design: Q1

Estimate Firm level Temp Sensitivity

 $+\epsilon_{i,t}$

 $r_{i,t} - r_{f,t} = \alpha_i + \beta_i (r_{mkt,t} - r_{f,t}) + \theta_i Temp Anomoly_t$ rolling window avg temp in t -15Y(180M), $\geq 10Y$ avg temp in past 30 years top quintile of θ_i (q5) as high temp-sensitivity firms in t. top quintile of $\hat{\theta}$ (VW- θ_i of U.S. states) high TS states.

Exogenous: Facing Large Temp Extreme:

 $Temp\ Anomoly_t > avg(Temp\ Anomoly_t), 1.96$ treated month t

t-3

treated group: High TS state analysts; control: others

DID : affect analyst forecast analyst i at t is in H-TS state & issue foreast in $t=[0,3] \rightarrow 1$ Relative Optimis $m_{i,j,t} = \alpha + \beta HTSA_{i,t} + \gamma X_{i,j,t} + \delta_{analyst} + \iota_{firm} + \zeta_{time} + \epsilon_{i,j,t}$

analyst i in t forecast for firm i > control group consensus forcast $\rightarrow 1$

 $PMAEF_{i,i,t} = \alpha + \beta \ HTSA_{i,t} + \dots PMAEF_{i,j,t} = \frac{AFE_{i,j,t} - \widehat{AFE}_{j,t}}{\widehat{AFE}} \quad \widehat{AFE}_{j,t}$ is the median absolute error for firm j at t.

 $X_{i,i,t}$: Forecast Horizon, No.Companies, Firm Experi ence, General Experience, Broker Size, All Star, No. Industries, Lagged AFE

Design: Q2

- less optimistic,accurate——High TS state analyst understand climate risk well
- To further pin down: High ST firm v.s.other firm
- Risk? large increases in temperature affect firm performance.

$$\textit{Earning}_{j,t+1} = \alpha + \beta \; \; \textit{Temp.Lnc.}_{1 \; \textit{year} \; j,t} + \gamma \; \textit{X}_{j,t} + \iota_{\textit{firm}} + \zeta_{\textit{time}} + \epsilon_{i,j,t}$$

- $Temp.Lnc._1$ $_{year\ j,t}=1$ if the fiscal-year-end-date for a firm is within 1 year (12 months) after a large temp increase
- $X_{i,t}$ includes firm characteristics and local economic measures.



Design: Alternative Explanations

- Large Temperature Increases and State-Level Political Affiliations.
 - McCright & Dunlap(2011): liberals and Democrats are more likely to express concern about climate change than conservatives and Republicans.
 - X: (dummy:liberal, H-ST=1; conservatives, H-ST=0)×TF(issue in t=[0,3]).
 - Y: Relative optimism; PMAEF.
- Large Changes in Temperature and Bold Forecasts.
 - Clement and Tse(2005): analysts systematically issue bold forecasts, regardless of the direction, with private information.
 - Y: Bold Revision =1 when $forecast_t > or < (con_forecast \& own_forecast)_{t-1}$.



Design: Q3 Market Reaction

- If investors anticipate for these analysts to be more accurate?
 - X: Forecast Revision($forecast_{i,j} pre_forecast_{i,j}$) \times HTSA,
 - Y: three-day market-adjusted excess return centered on the revision date.
- After earnings announcement reaction?
 - Unexpected Earning
 - X: $HTSA(F) \times High\ TS$, HTSA(F) = 1 if the firm belongs to the highest H-ST analysts following and the earnings announcement occurs in t=[0,3]
 - Y: Unexpected Earning (UE), $Earning_t E(Earning_t)$)
 - Stock market reaction
 - $X: HTSA(F) \times High \ TS \times \ UE$
 - Y: CAR[-1.1], PEAD[2,60]



Data

- Temperature Data. National Centers for Environment Information (NCEI)
- Equity Data: CRSP and COMPUSTAT.
- Sample period is from 1996 to 2017.


Results: relative optimistic

	Large '	Temperature I	ncrease	La	rge Temperature
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
HTSA	-0.026***	-0.046***	-0.041**	-0.014	-0.004
	(-3.28)	(-2.90)	(-2.82)	(-1.50	(-0.44)
Forecast Horizon	-0.001	-0.001	-0.002	0.000	0.001
	(-0.76)	(-0.63)	(-1.02)	(0.20)	(0.32)
No. Companies	-0.010	0.038	0.037	-0.000	-0.002***
	(-0.32)	(0.67)	(0.57)	(-1.40	(-3.22)
irm Experience	0.004	0.005	0.003	0.002	0.003
	(1.71)	(1.66)	(0.90)	(0.38)	(0.37)
General Experience	-0.007*	-0.017	-0.009	-0.000	0.017
	(-1.99)	(-1.53)	(-0.72)	(-0.02	(0.93)
Broker Size	-0.030***	-0.031*	-0.034*	-0.000	-0.000*

• treated analysts are 4.1% more likely to issue a less optimistic forecast face a large temp increase than untreated.



Results: relative optimistic



• diff becomes significant in the third month (t-statistic = 3.59), it takes a couple of months for the effect to be fully reflected in analysts' forecasts.



	(1)	(2)	(3)
HTSA	0.077**	0.079**	0.068**
	(2.70)	(2.69)	(2.26)
Forecast Horizon	0.037***	0.034***	0.036***
	(3.74)	(3.78)	(3.71)
No. Companies			
	-0.046	-0.045	0.310
	(-0.37)	(-0.31)	(0.98)
Firm Experience	0.021	0.021	0.024
	(1.47)	(1.45)	(1.66)
General Experience	0.009	0.030	0.005
	(0.58)	(1.59)	(0.11)
Broker Size	0.001	-0.002	-0.023
	(0.03)	-(0.06)	(-0.53)
No. Industries	-0.015	-0.021	-0.018
	(-1.14)	(-1.26)	(-1.01)
All Star	-0.037	-0.041	-0.042

• after large temp increases, analysts in H-ST area forecast more accurate



Results: High-TS Firms

	Panel A: Rela	tive Optimism		
	High-T	'S Firms	Other	Firms
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
HTSA	-0.071**	-0.080***	-0.032*	-0.026*
	(-2.66)	(-3.47)	(-1.85)	(-1.73)
Forecast Horizon	0.001	0.004	-0.002	-0.004*
	(0.25)	(0.81)	(-1.63)	(-1.78)
No. Companies	0.333*	0.470*	0.094	-0.023
	(1.78)	(1.78)	(1.28)	(-0.26)

Panet B: Analyst Forecast Accuracy							
	High-T	S Firms	Other	Firms			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)			
HTSA	0.142***	0.126**	0.060	0.056			
	(3.87)	(2.63)	(1.70)	(1.43)			
Forecast Horizon	0.019	0.021	0.041***	0.041***			
	(1.61)	(1.72)	(3.55)	(4.18)			
No. Companies	-0.327	0.852	0.046	0.467			

Daniel D. Analyst Foresant Assumen

• the results are mostly driven by high-TS firms



Results: Firm Performance

	Panel A: An	nual Firm Earni	ings Within A	I-Year Window			
	High-TS	High-TS Firms		Other Firms		All Firms	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	
Temp. Inc. _{1 year}	-0.015***	-0.011**	-0.004	-0.006	-0.005	-0.005	
	(-3.25)	(-2.01)	(-0.87)	(-1.20)	(-1.37)	(-1.36)	
Size		0.020**		0.005		0.009	
		(2.23)		(0.58)		(1.18)	
Log(BM)		-0.037***		-0.051***		-0.049***	
		(-3.14)		(-2.84)		(-3.15)	

• lower forecasts that are more accurate for high-TS firms, as these have lower earnings following unusually hot climates.



Alternative Explanations: State-Level Political Affiliations

Panel A: Relative Optimism							
_	(1)	(2)	(3)				
TF* Democrat	-0.043**	-0.089***	-0.124***				
_	(-2.33)	(-4.09)	(-3.51)				
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes				
Time Fixed Effect	Yes	Yes	Yes				
Analyst Fixed	Yes	Yes	Yes				
Firm Fixed Effect	No	No	Yes				
N	6,451	6,960	6,466				
Adj. Rsq.	0.005	0.049	0.119				

Panel B: Analyst Forecast Accuracy							
	(1)	(2)	(3)				
TF*Democrat	0.100***	0.137***	0.132***				
_	(3.30)	(3.38)	(3.84)				
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes				
Time Fixed Effect	Yes	Yes	Yes				
Analyst Fixed	No	No	Yes				
N	7,603	6,241	7,541				
Adj. Rsq.	0.004	0.005	0.023				

• forecasts made by analysts located in high-TS + Democratic are more accurate

Alternative Explanations: bold forecasts

	Bold Re	Bold Revision		Downward Bold Revision		Upward Bold Revision	
	High-TS Firms Other Firms		Firms Other Firms High-TS Firms Other		High-TS Firms	Other Firms	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	
HTSA	-0.051	-0.002	0.059**	-0.018	-0.053*	0.016	
	(-1.65)	(-0.14)	(2.27)	(-1.30)	(-1.79)	(0.99)	
Forecast Horizon	0.030***	0.027***	-0.016	-0.016**	0.038***	0.043***	
	(4.07)	(7.55)	(-1.54)	(-2.29)	(3.89)	(7.07)	

• rules-out the potential alternative explanation for our findings that analysts are more accurate because they systematically issue bold forecasts.



Results: Market Reaction—investor

	I	Dependent V	ariable:3-day	Market Adj	usted Return	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
HTSA	-0.135	0.028	-0.085	-0.022	-0.279	-0.262
	(-0.77)	(0.13)	(-0.51)	(-0.10)	(-0.78)	(-0.74)
Forecast Revision	0.735***	0.739***	0.641***	0.648***	0.700***	0.157
	(41.10)	(38.57)	(33.51)	(31.70)	(25.72)	(1.17)
HTSA* Forecast Revision	0.016	0.002	-0.001	-0.012	-0.156	-0.146
	(0.22)	(0.02)	(-0.02)	(-0.15)	(-1.47)	(-1.39)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm Fixed Effect	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
Analyst Fixed Effect	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	No
Firm*Analyst Fixed Effect	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Controls* Forecast Revision	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
N	47,560	47,079	47,206	46,703	36,561	36,561
Adj. Rsq.	0.069	0.087	0.226	0.225	0.091	0.094

• investors do not consider analysts in high-TS states as more accurate when they issue forecasts following a large increase in temperature

Results: Market Reaction—Unexpected Earnings

	(1)	(2)
HTSA(F)*High TS	0.170***	0.165***
	(4.73)	(4.33)
HTSA(F)	0.019	0.019
	(1.14)	(1.11)
High TS	0.035*	0.034*
	(1.91)	(1.79)
Log(ME)		0.029**
		(2.10)
Log(BM)		0.063***
		(5.69)
Beta		0.012
		(0.77)

• when more treated analysts follow a high-TS firm, their less optimistic forecasts generate a lower consensus forecast-higher unexpected earnings.



Results: Market Reaction—Earnings Announcements

	Dependent Variable: CAR		Dependent V	ariable: PEAD
•	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
HTSA(F)*High TS* UE	1.926***	1.550***	0.045	0.573
	(4.42)	(3.01)	(0.03)	(0.38)
HTSA(F)*High TS	0.656*	0.687	-0.317	-0.076
	(1.70)	(1.62)	(-0.31)	(-0.07)
HTSA(F)* UE	0.296	0.262	0.250	1.282*
	(1.41)	(1.12)	(0.42)	(1.89)
High TS* UE	0.759***	0.726***	0.002	0.012
	(5.88)	(5.38)	(0.01)	(0.03)
HTSA(F)	-0.149	-0.107	-0.937**	-0.974**
	(-1.04)	(-0.64)	(-2.31)	(-2.14)

• stronger CAR, weaker PEAD—market incorporates the information contained in the earnings announcement faster



New ideas

- 是否可以迁移到中国;是否可以使用温度波动(二阶)作为 X;或者替换温度为新闻气候指标;
- 中介变量分析师预测可以换为投资者感知、投资者情绪……

Results

Thanks!