1 Crypto Recap

1.1 Objectives:

- **Confidentiality**
- **Integrity**
- **Authenticity**
- **Availability**
- Authorization
- Non-Repudiation, Accountability
- Freshness
- Anonymity, Unlinkability
- Intervenability, Contro
- Transparency

1.2 Confidentiality-Encryption

1.2.1 Symmetric Ciphers

- Secret key for en- and decryption
- Much more efficient
- **Block cipher:** encryps a plaintext block of fixed len e.g.: *Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)*
- **Stream cipher:** encrypts a bitstream e.g.:*ChaCha20*

1.2.2 Asymmetric Ciphers

- Public key for encryption
- Private key for decryption
- Ex.: RSA-based encryption

1.3 Integrity, Authenticity-Signatures, MACs

1.3.1 MACs

- Symmetric cryptography
- Protects data integrity & authenticity
- Ex.: Hash-based MAC

1.3.2 Digital Signatures

- Asymmetric cryptography
  - **Signing with** private key
- Protects data integrity & authenticity
- Provices non-repudation

1.4 Block Cipher Modes of Operation

1.4.1 Electronic Code Book (ECB)

- Each plaintext block is encrypted seperatly
- Inheritly insecure! -> Smae block = Same cipher

1.4.2 Cipher Block Chainning (CBC)

- Plaintext is chained to previous ciphertext by XOR and encrypted afterwards
- Difficult to apply securely -> implementations often vulnerable

1.4.3 Galois Counter Mode (GCM)



2 Tranport Layer Security (TLS)

2.1 TLS handshake protocol

- Parameter Negotiation
- Key exchange
- Authentication

2.2 TLS record protocol

- Protection of integrity, authenticiy and confidentiality
- **Symmetric Cryptography:** e.g., block cipher, usually AES

3 Wireless Security

3.1 WiFi Security

3.1.1 Historic Overview

- 1999: WEP (Wired Equivilaent Privacy)
  - Goal: äs secure as a wired LAN"
  - Insecure, various attacks known
- 2003: WPA (WiFi Protected Access)
  - Improved protocols; most known attacks on WEP prevented
  - Enterprice Mode
  - But: Requirement ofr hardware-compatibility with WEP devices => Encryption improved, but still based on obsolete stream cipher
- 2004: WPA2 (still used)
  - Similar to WPA, but AES-based encryption: AES-CCMP
- 2018: WPA3 (supported by new devices)
  - Serveral improvements: Prevention of offline-attacks on pre-shared keys, forward secrecy, encryption for öpen"WLANs

3.1.2 WPA/WPA2 Security

- Personal Mode
  - Pre-Shared Keys
- Enterprise Mode
  - EAP-TLS, PEAP, EAP-TTLS

AES-CCMP

- Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AED)
- AES-CCM
  - Authentication: CBC-MAC
  - Encryption: Counter Mode (CTR)
  - MAC and encyprion: computed simultaneously

4-Way Handshake

- Based on Pairwise Master Key (PMK)
  - Personal Mode (WPA-PSK): Computed from passphrase and SSID (as ßalt") using PBKDF2 (password-based key derivation function)
  - Enterprise Mode: Established by key exchange protocol (e.g. EAP-TLS, PEAP)
- 4-Way HS to derive Pairwise Transient Key (PTK)
  - Exchance nonces
  - PTK is derived by hashing PMK, nonces, MAC addrs
  - Furhter key (for differnet purposes) derived from PTK
  - Client gets Group Temporary Key from AP (encrypted)
  - Message Integrity Code(MIC): MACs for integrity protection, key confirmation
- KRACK (2018): Key reinstallation attacks => meanwhile prevented by software/firmware updates
- Problem: Offline attacks against passphrase

3.1.3 WPA 3 Improvements

- Mandatory Protected Managment Frames
  - Prevents deauthentication attacks (DoS)
- Replace PSK Authentication with SAW protocol
  - Simultaneous Authentication among Equals (SAE): "Dragonfly"handshake
  - Prevents offline attacks on passphrase
  - Based on elliptic curve cryptography by default
- Forward Secrecy based on Diffie-Hellman
- 192-bit Security Mode (optional)
  - AES-256 (GCM)
  - SHA-384
  - 284-bit elliptic curves or RSA with at least 3K bits

3.1.4 Simultaneous Authentication among Equals

- SAE "Dragonflyäuthenicates participants and establishes PMK
  - Based on passphrase and (EC-)Diffie-Hellman
  - Can be initiated simultaneously by both parties (useful for mesh networking)
- 4-Way Handshake
  - Esablishes PTK basen on PMK
  - Same as in WPA2
  - But now: PMK with much higher entropy => Offlione attacks not practical
- Hash-to-Group: "Hunting and Pecking"
  - Generate point on elliptic curve from pasphrase (and MAC addresses, etc.)
  - Cryptographic has function generates pseudo random numbers (by including a counter in the input)
    - ⋆ Both parties must use the exact same inputs in the same order
  - Fixed procedure to derive x-coordinate
    - ⋆ Check if point on curve can be generated
    - ⋆ If check fails: increase coutner and try again
- Auth-Commit messages
  - Exchange ECDH shares
- Auth-Confirm messages
  - Key confirmation, authentication of messages

3.2 Bluetooth Security

- Authentication: device authentication, no user authentication
- Pairing/bondig: create shared keys; used in connections later on
- Confidentiality: encryption of BT communication
- Message Integrity: MACs (authenticated encryption) to protect BT communication
- Authorization: control access to resources (based on devices, not users)
- Security Modes
  - Mode 1: no security
  - Mode 2: service level (only for backward compatibility)
  - Mode 3: link-level enforces security (only for backward compatibility)
  - Mode 4: authenticated link key using SSecure Connections", based on device pairing
- Eavesdroppting not trivial: Bluetooth uses frequency hoppting (not a security feature)

3.2.1 Device Pairing

- Authentication and generation of link key / long term key
- PIN/Legacy Pairing: enter PIN on both devices
  - Key generation based on PIN, device address, and random values
- Secure Simple Pairing (SSP): since Bluetooth 2.1
  - Numeric Comparison
    - ⋆ Compare 6-digit numbers
  - Passkey Entry
    - ⋆ Read 6-digit form one device, enter on the other one
  - Just Works
    - ⋆ User accepts connection without verification
  - Out of Band (OOB)
    - ⋆ Transmit data using other communication channels (e.g. NFC)

3.2.2 Simple Secure Pairing (SSP)

- Unauthenticated ECDH
- 2-Stage Authentication
  - Stage 2: depends on pariing method
  - Stage 2: Cryptographic authentication based on Stage 1 values and ECDH secret
- Key derivation to generate link key / long term key

3.2.3 Secure Authentication

- Paired (bonded) devices authenticate each other
- Challange-Response scheme
  - 128-bit random challanges
  - Response: HMAC of BT addresses and challanges (using link key from pairing)
    - ⋆ Before Bluetooth 4.1: based on Bluetooth-specific algorithm E1
- Authenication failure: introcude delay (exponential back-off)

3.2.4 Confidentiality

- Bluetooth-specific stream cipher E0
  - Designed for efficiency
  - Serious attacks hve been published
  - "Practicalïn theory (but complex, hard to apply in practice)
- AES-CCM
  - Used since Bluetooth 4.1
  - Key derived from link key (pairing) and the authentication step

3.2.5 Privacy

- Privacy problem: Devices (users) can be identified by Bluetooth MAC addresses
- Mitigation: BLE private device addresses
  - Resolvable Private Address (RPA) is changed periodically
  - Identity Address remains constant (but is not transmitted over the air)
  - Identity Resolving Key to map RPA to Identity Address
  - Especially imprtant to discoverable devices (which advertice identity info)

3.2.6 5.x Security

- No major changes to security protocols and algorithms
- Bluetooth 5.0
  - PHY improvements, no relevant security changes
- Bluetooth 5.1
  - HCI support for debug keys (should not be relevant in production systems)
- Bluetooth 5.2: adds new features (Extended Attributes, Isochronous Communication, ...)
  - Isochronous communication: connection-oriented or connection-less
    - ⋆ Group communication: group keys need to be established
    - ⋆ Broadcast Authenication
- Bluetooth 5.3: Key Size Negotiation
  - Enables host to define minimun key size

3.2.7 BLUFFS

- BLUFFS: New attacks against bluetooth
  - Breaks Forward Secrecy and Future Secrecy
  - Enables man-in-the-middle attacks, impersonation if one session key compromised
  - Forces weak key: spec allows minimus of 7 Bytes entropy (56 Bits)
    - ⋆ Brute-force attack: offline, parallelizable
    - ⋆ Forces reuse of compromised key
  - Attack against bluetooth spec (BR/EDR: "Bluetooth Classic"versions 4.2 to 5.4): All compliant devices are affected
  - Published and presented at ACM CCS 2023

3.2.8 implementations Vulnerabilities

- BlueBorn(2017): Collection of implementation Vulnerabilities
  - On Windows, IOS, Linux, Android
  - Buffer overflow, integer overflows, ..
- Android (2018): implementation flaws in L2CAP and SMP
  - Remote Memory Disclousure
- BleedingTooth(2020): several bugin in Linux
  - Can even lead to arbitrary code execution in kernal mode
- Windows (2021): BT Driver Elevation of Privilege
- BrakTooth(2021)
  - Bluetooth controllers: SoC firmware Vulnerabilities(Link Manager)
  - Estimation 1400 bluetooth chips/modules affected

3.2.9 Summary

- Complex protocol stack, not easy to implement
- Many attacks in the past
  - on cryptography algorithms
- Bluetooth versions before 2.1 are basically completely insecure
- Bluetooth versions sinde 4.2 are relativly secure (...but: "BLUFFS"!)
  - But the implementations not necessarily!
- Bluetooth 5.2 architecture similar to 4.x
  - Introduces new features and minor security improvements