### Zero Knowledge Succinct Arguments: an Introduction


**Alessandro Chiesa** 

UC Berkeley

much of the cryptography used today offers security properties for data


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#### confidentiality



much of the cryptography used today offers security properties for data

confidentiality




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Alice Enc(m) Bob


authenticity




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





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



what about security properties for computation?

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
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
cryptographic proofs offer privacy-preserving integrity for computation

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what about security properties for computation?

cryptographic proofs offer privacy-preserving integrity for computation

one of the exciting crypto deployment frontiers today


a powerful defense against malicious behavior especially, in **distributed protocols** 

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**1980s** securely compute  $y = F(x_1,...,x_n)$  via a multi-party protocol


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


#### **Key properties**

- zero knowledge
- proof of knowledge

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
2010s blockchain technology

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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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


#### Additional key properties


- non-interactive
- publicly verifiable
- succinct

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#### zk-SNARK

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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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







completeness


$$\exists x: y=F(x) \rightarrow \Pr[P(F,y,x) \text{ convinces } V(F,y)]=1$$




completeness	∃ $x$ : $y=F(x) \rightarrow Pr[P(F,y,x) \text{ convinces } V(F,y)]=1$
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


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


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




[GMR85]: ZKPs for certain number-theoretic problems (QR,QNR)




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
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[BGGHKMR88]: ZKPs for all poly-space computable functions F



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
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
[BGGHKMR88]: ZKPs for all poly-space computable functions F

#### Everything Provable is Provable in Zero-Knowledge

Michael Ben-Or Oded Goldreich Shafi Goldwasser Johan Hästad Joe Kilian Silvio Micali Phillip Rogaway Hebrew University
Technion - Israel Institute of Technology
M.I.T. Laboratory for Computer Science
Royal Institute of Technology, Sweden
M.I.T. Laboratory for Computer Science
M.I.T. Laboratory for Computer Science
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


Powerful cryptographic primitive.



### Powerful cryptographic primitive.






### Powerful cryptographic primitive.

BUT

interactive




Powerful cryptographic primitive.

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not succinct




### Powerful cryptographic primitive.

interactive


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
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
communication complexity & verification complexity are proportional to time(F)




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




completeness	∃ $x$ : $y=F(x)$ → $Pr[P(F,y,x)]$ convinces $V(F,y)]=1$
soundness	$\not\exists x: y=F(x) \rightarrow \forall P' \Pr[P' \text{ convinces } V(F,y)] \approx 0$
zero knowledge	$\exists x: y=F(x) \rightarrow \forall V', S(V',F,y) \simeq \text{view of } V' \text{ with } P(F,y,x)$
succinctness	$\mathbf{V}(\mathbf{F}, \mathbf{y})$ runs in time proportional to $ \mathbf{F}  +  \mathbf{y} $ (not time( $\mathbf{F}$ )+ $ \mathbf{y} $ )



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
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succinctness V(F, y) runs in time proportional to |F| + |y| (not time(F) + |y|)
```

[Kilian92][Micali94]

Arguments



```
completeness
```

$$\exists x: y=F(x) \rightarrow Pr[P(F,y,x) \text{ convinces } V(F,y)]=1$$

soundness\*


$$\not\exists x: y=F(x) \rightarrow \forall P' Pr[P' convinces V(F,y)] \approx 0$$


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succinctness

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
<sup>\*</sup> must relax to *computational* soundness: ∀ PPT P' ... [GH98]





#### **Probabilistically Checkable Proof**


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


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
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





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


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
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
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
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
#### **Zero Knowledge Succinct Proof**



#### **Probabilistically Checkable Proof**

#### **Zero Knowledge Succinct Proof**

[BFLS91][FGLSS96][AS92][ALMSS92]



#### **TOFIX**


interactive

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
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
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





bad concrete efficiency


#### **Probabilistically Checkable Proof**


**Zero Knowledge Succinct Proof** 








bad concrete efficiency

















## Achieving Non-Interactivity



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Negative result: constructing them "requires strong assumptions" [GW11]

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Positive results (under strong assumptions):

Knowledge of Exponent [D 92]

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Extractable Hash Functions

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Knowledge of Exponent [D 92]

Extractable Hash Functions

[BC**C**T 12]

[DFH 12]

[GLR 12]

[B**C** 12]

[BC**C**T 13]

[BC**C**GLRT 16]

Negative result: constructing them "requires strong assumptions" [GW11]

Positive results (under strong assumptions):

Knowledge of Exponent [D 92]


Extractable Hash Functions

[BCCT 12] [DFH 12] [GLR 12] [BC 12] [BCCT 13] [BCCGLRT 16]


based on PCPs

10


Negative result: constructing them "requires strong assumptions" [GW11]



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


Negative result: constructing them "requires strong assumptions" [GW11]



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
Positive results (under strong assumptions):



based on linear PCPs

Negative result: constructing them "requires strong assumptions" [GW11]


Positive results (under strong assumptions):



10


#### **Linear PCP**

[IKO07][B**C**IOP13]




#### **Linear PCP**


[IKO07][B**C**IOP13]





#### **Linear PCP**


Zero Knowledge SNARK




























































Distributed Proof Generation

# **Tackling Problem #1**Distributed Proof Generation


#### Approach:

distribute the prover algorithm (which generates a small proof) over the nodes in a computer cluster


#### Distributed Proof Generation



#### Distributed Proof Generation



#### Distributed Proof Generation




#### Approach:

distribute the prover algorithm (which generates a small proof) over the nodes in a computer cluster

#### Goal:

support circuits of ~10<sup>9</sup>/10<sup>10</sup> gates (1 node gets stuck at only ~10<sup>7</sup> gates)

#### Distributed Proof Generation



#### Approach:


distribute the prover algorithm (which generates a small proof) over the nodes in a computer cluster

#### Goal:

support circuits of ~10<sup>9</sup>/10<sup>10</sup> gates (1 node gets stuck at only ~10<sup>7</sup> gates)

#### Work in progress:

#### Distributed Proof Generation



#### Approach:


distribute the prover algorithm (which generates a small proof) over the nodes in a computer cluster

#### Goal:

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#### Work in progress:

#### Distributed Proof Generation



#### Approach:


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#### Distributed Proof Generation



#### Approach:


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#### Work in progress:

#### Distributed Proof Generation



#### Approach:


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
#### Work in progress:

#### Distributed Proof Generation




# Tackling Problem #2: Interactive Oracle Proofs


#### Interactive Oracle Proofs




#### Interactive Oracle Proofs




#### Interactive Oracle Proofs




### Interactive Oracle Proofs




### Interactive Oracle Proofs




### Interactive Oracle Proofs



### Interactive Oracle Proofs



### Interactive Oracle Proofs




	IP	PCP	IOP
randomness	✓	✓	✓
interaction	<b>√</b>		✓
probabilistic checking		✓	✓

New ZK-SNARKs With Random Oracles


### New ZK-SNARKs With Random Oracles

#### **Probabilistically Checkable Proof**




#### New ZK-SNARKs With Random Oracles

#### **Probabilistically Checkable Proof**




#### New ZK-SNARKs With Random Oracles


#### **Probabilistically Checkable Proof**




IOPs are more efficient than PCPs


IOPs are more efficient than PCPs






IOPs are more efficient than PCPs






best proof length without ZK

#### IOPs are more efficient than PCPs







best proof length without ZK

quasilinear [BS08][Din07]

#### IOPs are more efficient than PCPs







linear [B**C**GRS16] best proof length without ZK

quasilinear [BS08][Din07]

#### IOPs are more efficient than PCPs







linear [B**C**GRS16] best proof length without ZK

best proof length with ZK

quasilinear [BS08][Din07]

#### IOPs are more efficient than PCPs






linear [B**C**GRS16] best proof length without ZK


best proof length with ZK

quasilinear [BS08][Din07]

polynomial [KPT97]

#### IOPs are more efficient than PCPs





linear

[B**C**GRS16]

quasilinear [B**C**GV16] best proof length without ZK


best proof length with ZK


quasilinear [BS08][Din07]

polynomial [KPT97]

### **Tackling Problem #2:**

#### IOPs are more efficient than PCPs





linear

[B**C**GRS16]

quasilinear [BCGV16]

cheaper ZK...
[BCFGRS16][BCFS17]

best proof length without ZK


best proof length with ZK


quasilinear [BS08][Din07]

polynomial [KPT97]

#### **Tackling Problem #2:**

#### IOPs are more efficient than PCPs





linear

[B**C**GRS16]

quasilinear [BCGV16]

cheaper ZK... [BCFGRS16][BCFS17] best proof length without ZK


best proof length with ZK

quasilinear [BS08][Din07]

polynomial [KPT97]

Great progress, but still more research is needed for practical deployment.

#### Deployed Today



Finite Field Arithmetic

Polynomial Interpolation/Evaluation (Fast Fourier Transforms, ...)

Fixed & Variable Base Multi-Exponentiation

Routing Network Algorithms

Finite Field Arithmetic

**Arthmetic Circuits** 

Polynomial Interpolation/Evaluation (Fast Fourier Transforms, ...)

Fixed & Variable Base Multi-Exponentiation

Routing Network Algorithms

Finite Field Arithmetic

**Arthmetic Circuits** 

**Boolean Circuits** 

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**Arthmetic Circuits** 

**Boolean Circuits** 

PGHR 13

Groth 16

Polynomial Interpolation/Evaluation (Fast Fourier Transforms, ...)

Fixed & Variable Base Multi-Exponentiation

Routing Network Algorithms

Finite Field Arithmetic

Applications

### libsnark: C++ library for ZK-SNARKs (libsnark.org)

**Arthmetic Circuits** 

**Boolean Circuits** 

PGHR 13

Groth 16

DFGK 14

Groth 16

Polynomial Interpolation/Evaluation (Fast Fourier Transforms, ...)

Fixed & Variable Base Multi-Exponentiation

Routing Network Algorithms

Finite Field Arithmetic

Applications

Frontends

Zerocash B**C**GGMTV

Backends

**Arthmetic Circuits** 

**Boolean Circuits** 

PGHR 13

Groth 16

DFGK 14

Groth 16


Shared Core

Polynomial Interpolation/Evaluation (Fast Fourier Transforms, ...)


Fixed & Variable Base Multi-Exponentiation

Routing Network Algorithms

Finite Field Arithmetic



19



19

### Thanks!

