Detailed computation of probabilities of occurrence

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1. Detailed computation of probabilities of occurrence

The un-normalized probability of occurrence is the sum of the three actors attributes: capacity (c), opportunity (o) and motivation (m). The c, o, m values vary from 1 to 4, with 4 corresponding to a higher likelihood. The un-normalized probability of occurrence $P(G_i, S_i, A_k)$ as follows:

$$P(G_i, S_j, A_k) = c(G_i, S_j, A_k) + o(G_i, S_j, A_k) + m(G_i, S_j, A_k)$$

such that:

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f: S_j \mapsto G_i: f \text{ is given by Table 1}
c(G_i, S_j, A_k) \in \{1, 2, 3, 4\}
o(G_i, S_j, A_k) \in \{1, 2, 3, 4\}
m(G_i, S_j, A_k) \in \{1, 2, 3, 4\}
i \in \{1, 2, ..., 5\}
j \in \{1, 2, ..., 22\}
k \in \{1, 2, 3, 4, 5\}
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The Tables 2 to 6 show the rates assigned to $c(G_i, S_j, A_k)$, $o(G_i, S_j, A_k)$, $c(G_i, S_j, A_k)$ for a given attack goal, G_i , scenario, S_j , and actor A_k

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Table 1: Possible scenarios per attack goal

Attack goal	Label	Scenarios
Gain knowledge about the data-market	G_1	$S_1, S_3, S_4, S_7, S_8, S_{10}, S_{12}, S_{20}$
Access sensitive data on the nodes of	G_2	$S_1, S_3, S_4, S_7, S_8, S_{10}, S_{12}, S_{20}$
the network	<u> </u>	3, 5, 5, 4, 5, 7, 5, 6, 5, 10, 5, 12, 5, 20
Manipulate and modify blockchain in-	G_3	$S_1, S_{10}, S_{11}, S_{14}, S_{15}, S_{16}, S_{17}, S_{18}, S_{19}, S_{21}$
formation	0,	3 1, 5 10, 5 11, 5 14, 5 13, 5 16, 5 1/, 5 18, 5 19, 5 21
Sabotage activities	G_4	$S_1, S_2, S_5, S_6, S_7, S_8, S_9, S_{10}. S_{11}, S_{12}, S_{13},$
Subotage activities	04	$S_{14}, S_{15}, S_{16}, S_{17}, S_{18}, S_{19}, S_{21}, S_{22}$
Induce participants in the blockchain	G_5	$S_1, S_2, S_5, S_6, S_7, S_8, S_9, S_{10}. S_{11}, S_{12}, S_{13},$
network to make errors	U5	$S_{14}, S_{15}, S_{16}, S_{17}, S_{18}, S_{19}, S_{21}, S_{22}$

Table 2: Probability of occurrence of identified threats for G_1 - Gain knowledge about the data-market

S _j	A_k	c	0	m	P
	A_1	3	3	2	8
C	A_2	2	3	4	9
S_1	A_3	2 1	3	3	8
	A_4	1	3 2	3 3	6
	A_1 A_2	1		1	4
C	A_2	2	2 2	3	7
S_3	A_3	2	2 1	2	4 7 6
	A_4	1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 1	1	2 2 2	5 4 8 7 7
	A_1	1	1	2	4
S_4	A_2	2	2	4	8
34	A_3	2	1 2 2	3	7
	$\begin{vmatrix} A_2 \\ A_3 \\ A_4 \end{vmatrix}$	2	2 2 2 2 2	3	7
	A_1	2	2	1	5
C	A_2	2	2	2	6
S_7	A_3	1	2	1	4
	A_3 A_4	2	2	1	5
	A_1	3	2 2 1	2	7
C	A_2	2	2	2 2	6
S_8	A_3	2	1	1	4
	A_4	2	1	1	4
	$ \begin{array}{c c} A_3 \\ A_4 \\ \hline A_1 \\ A_2 \end{array} $	2	1	1	4
C	A_2	1	1	2	4
S_{10}	A_3	1	1	2	3
	A_3 A_4	1	1	1	3
	A_1	2	1	1	4
C	A_2	2 2 1 1	1	ı	5 6 4 5 7 6 4 4 4 3 3 3 4 5 3
S_{12}	A_3	1		2 1	3
		1	1 1	1	3
	$\begin{array}{ c c } A_4 \\ A_1 \\ A_2 \end{array}$		2	1	5
C	A_2	2	2	2	6
S 20	A_3	2 2 2 1	2 2 2 2		5 6 5 4
	A_4	1	2	1	4

Table 3: Probability of occurrence of identified threats for G_2 - Access sensitive data on the nodes of the network

S _j	A _k	c	0	m	P
	A_1		3	3	9
	A_2	2	3	3	8
S_1	A_3	2	3 3	3	8
	A_4	1	2	4	7
	A_1	1	1	2	4
C	A_2	2	2	2	6
S_3	A_3	2	2	3	7
	A_{2} A_{3} A_{4} A_{1} A_{2} A_{3} A_{4}	3 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2	2 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 1	3 3 4 2 2 2 3 4	7
	A_1 A_2 A_3 A_4 A_1 A_2 A_3 A_4	1	2	1	4
S_4	A_2	3	2	2	7
34	A_3	3	2	2	7
	A_4	2	1	3	6
	A_1	2	3	1	6
S_7	A_2	2	2	1	5
37	A_3	2	2	2	6
	A_4	2	1	2	5
	A_1	3	2	2	7
S_8	A_2	1	1	2	4
38	A_3	2	2	2	6
	A_1 A_2 A_3 A_4 A_1 A_2 A_3 A_4	2	2	2	6
	A_1	2	2	1	5
S 10	A_2	2	1	1	4
3 10	A_3	2	1	2	5
	A_4	1	1	2	4
	A_1	2	1	2	5
S 12	A_2	1	1	2	4
3 12	A_3	1	1	2	4
	A_4	1	1	2	4
	A_1 A_2 A_3 A_4 A_1 A_2 A_3	2	3 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 1	1 2 2 3 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2	9 8 8 7 4 6 7 7 6 6 5 6 5 7 4 6 6 5 4 5 4 4 4 5 5 6 5 6 5 6 6 5 6 6 6 7 7 7 8 7 8 7 8 7 8 7 8 7 8 7 8 7
S 20	A_2	1	2	2	5
3 20	A_3	2 1 1 1	2	3	6
	A_4	1	1	3	5

Table 4: Probability of occurrence of identified threats for G_3 - Manipulate and modify blockchain information

and modi					P
S_{j}	A _k	c	0	m	
	A_1	2	3	3	8
S_1	A_2	1	2	3	6
	A_3	1	2	3	6
	A_4	2	2	4	8
	A_1	3	1	1	5
S_{10}	A_2	1	1	2	4
	A_3	1	1	1	3
	A_4	3	3	2	8
	A_1	1	1	2 3	4
S_{11}	A_2	1	2		6
	A_3	1	1	2	4
	A_4	4	3	4	11
	A_1	1	1	1	3
S 14	A_2	1	1	1	3
	A_3	1	1	1	3
	A_4	3	2	2	7
	A_1	1	1	1	3
S ₁₅	A_2	1	1	1	3
- 13	A_3	1	1	1	3
	A_4	2	1	2	3 5 3
	A_1	1	1		3
S_{16}	A_2	1	1	1	3
~ 10	A_3	1	1	1	3 5
	A_4	1	1	3	
	A_1	1	1	1	3
S 17	A_2	1	1	2	4
5 17	A_3	1	1	1	3
	A_4	2	2	2	6
	A_1	3	1	2	6
S_{18}	A_2	2	2	2	6 4
5 18	A_3	1	1	2	
	A_4	3	2	2	7
	A_1	1	1	1	3
S 19	A_2	1	1	1	3 3 6
D 19	A_3	1	1	1	3
	A_4	2 1	2	2	
	A_1	2	1	2	5 3 3
S_{21}	A_2		1	1	3
J 21	A_3	1	1	1	3
	A_4	4	2	2	8

Table 5: Probability of identified threats for G_4 - Sabotage activities

Table 6: Probabil	ities	for (G_5	- I	ndı	ice	participants	in	the
blockchain networ	rk to	mak	e e	rro	rs				
	S_j	A _k	c	0	m	P			

S_j	$\mathbf{A}_{\mathbf{k}}$	c	0	m	P
	A_1	3	3	4	10
S_1	A_2 A_3	2 2	2 2	4	8
	A_4	2	2	2	6
	A ₁	4	4	4	12
	A_1 A_2	4	4	4	12
S_2	A_3	4	4	4	12
	A_4	4	4	2	10
	A ₁	3	1	3	7
	A_1 A_2	1	1	2	4
S_5	A_3	1	1	2	4
	A_4	1	2	4	7
	A ₁	2	1	2	5
	A_2	1	1	2	4
S_6	A ₃	1	1	2	4
	A ₄	1	2	2	5
	A ₁	4	1	2	7
	A_2	2	1	1	4
S_7	A_3	2	1	1	4
	A_4	1	1	2	4
	A ₁	4	1	2	7
	A_1 A_2	3	1	2	6
S_8	A_3	3	1	2	6
	A_4	1	2	2	5
	A_4 A_1	2	1	3	6
	A_1 A_2	1	1	2	4
S_9	A12			2	4
	A_3 A_4	1	1 2	2	5
	A_4 A_1	2	1	3	6
		1	1	2	4
S_{10}	A ₂	1	1	2	4
	A_3 A_4	2	2	3	7
	A_1	1	1	3	5
	A_2	1	2	3	7
S_{11}	A_3	1	1	4	6
	A_4	4	3	3	10
	A ₁	3	1	2	6
	A_2	2	1	2	5
S_{12}	A_3	2	1	2	5
	A_4	1	2	1	4
	A ₁	2	2	2	6
	A_2	2	1	2	5
S_{13}	A_3	2	1	2	5
	A_4	1	2	2	5
	A ₁	1	1	1	3
	A_2	1	2	1	4
S_{14}	A_3	1	1	1	3
	A_4	2	2	3	7
	A ₁	1	1	1	3
_	A_2	1	1	1	3
S_{15}	A ₃	1	1	1	3
	A ₄	2	2	2	6
	A ₁	1	1	1	3
	A_2	1	1	2	4
S_{16}	A_3	1	1	2	4
	A ₄	1	1	3	5
	A ₁	1	1	2	4
	A_2	1	1	1	3
S_{17}	A_3	1	1	1	3
	A_4	2	1	2	5
	A ₁	3	1	2	6
	A_2	2	2	2	6
S_{18}	A_3	2	1	2	5
		4	3	2	9
	A_{A}		1	1	3
	A_4 A_1	1			
	A_1	1	1	1	3
S 19	A_1 A_2	1	1	1	3
S 19	A_1 A_2 A_3	1	1 1 2	1	3
S 19	A ₁ A ₂ A ₃ A ₄	1 1 2	1 2	1 2	3 6
	$A_1 \\ A_2 \\ A_3 \\ A_4 \\ A_1$	1 1 2	1 2	1 2 2	3 6 5
S ₁₉	A_1 A_2 A_3 A_4 A_1 A_2	1 1 2 2	1 2 1 1	1 2 2	3 6 5 3
	A ₁ A ₂ A ₃ A ₄ A ₁ A ₂ A ₃	1 1 2 2 1 1	1 2 1 1 1	1 2 2 1 1	3 6 5 3 3
	A ₁ A ₂ A ₃ A ₄ A ₁ A ₂ A ₃ A ₄	1 1 2 2 1 1 4	1 2 1 1 1 2	1 2 1 1 2	3 6 5 3 8
S ₂₁	A ₁ A ₂ A ₃ A ₄ A ₁ A ₂ A ₃ A ₄ A ₁	1 1 2 2 1 1 4	1 2 1 1 1 2	1 2 2 1 1 2 3	3 6 5 3 8 11
	A ₁ A ₂ A ₃ A ₄ A ₁ A ₂ A ₃ A ₄	1 1 2 2 1 1 4	1 2 1 1 1 2	1 2 1 1 2	3 6 5 3 8

rk to	mak			rs	P
S_j	A _k	c	3	m	10
	A_1 A_2	4	2	3	9
S_1	A ₃	4	2	3	9
	A_4	2	2	3	7
	A_1	4	4	4	12
S_2	A_2	4	4	4	12
52	A_3	4	4	4	12
	A_4	4	4	3	11
	A_1 A_2	2	1	2	5
S_5	A ₂	1	1	1	3
	A_4	1	2	3	6
	A ₁	2	1	1	4
S_6	A_2	1	1	1	3
56	A ₃	1	1	1	3
	A4	1	2	2	5
	A_1	3	1	3	7
S_7	A ₂ A ₃	1	1	1	3
	A ₄	1	2	1	4
	A ₁	3	1	3	7
S 8	A_2	2	2	2	6
38	A_3	2	1	2	5
	A_4	1	2	2	5
	A_1	2	1	2	5
S_9	A ₂	1	1	1	3
	A_3 A_4	1	1	2	4
	A ₁	1	1	2	4
c	A_2	1	1	1	3
S_{10}	A_3	1	1	1	3
	A_4	2	1	1	4
	A_1	1	1	2	4
S_{11}	A_2	1	2	2 2	5 4
	A ₃ A ₄	1 4	3	4	11
	A ₁	2	1	3	6
	A_2	1	1	3	5
S_{12}	A_3	1	1	3	5
	A_4	1	1	1	3
	A_1	2	1	2	5
S_{13}	A_2	1	1	2	4
	A_3 A_4	1	1	2	4 3
	A ₁	1	1	1	3
C	A_2	1	1	2	4
S_{14}	A_3	1	1	2	4
	A_4	2	2	4	8
	A_1	1	1	1	3
S_{15}	A ₂ A ₃	1	1	1	3
	A ₃	1	1	2	4
	A ₁	1	1	1	3
c	A_2	1	1	1	3
S_{16}	A_3	1	1	2	4
	A_4	1	1	2	4
	A_1	1	1	2	4
S_{17}	A_2 A_3	1	1	1	3
	A_3 A_4	2	1	2	5
	A ₁	2	1	1	4
¢	A_2	1	1	2	4
S_{18}	A_3	1	1	2	4
	A_4	3	2	3	8
	A ₁	1	1	1	3
S_{19}	A ₂ A ₃	1	1	1	3
	A ₄	1	1	2	4
	A ₁	2	1	2	5
S_{21}	A_2	1	1	1	3
<i>□</i> 21	A_3	1	1	1	3
	A4	3	2	2	7
	A_1 A_2	4	4	4	12 12
S_{22}	A_2 A_3	4	4	4	12
	A_4	4	4	4	12
			_		