

Microchain: A Hybrid Consensus Mechanism for Lightweight Distributed Ledger for IoT

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Abstract—A blockchain and smart contract enabled security mechanism for IoT applications has been reported recently for urban, financial, and network services. However, due to the power-intensive and a low-throughput consensus mechanism in existing blockchain, like Bitcoin and Ethereum, there are still challenges in integrating blockchain technology into resource-constrained IoT platforms. In this paper, Microchain, based on a hybrid Proof-of-Credit (PoC)-Voting-based Chain Finality (VCF) consensus protocol, is proposed to provide a secure, scalable and lightweight distributed ledger for IoT systems. By using a bias-resistant randomness protocol and a cryptographic sortition algorithm, a random subset of nodes are selected as a final committee to perform the consensus protocol. The hybrid consensus mechanism relies on PoC, a pure Proof of stake (PoS) protocol, to determine whether or not a participant is qualified to propose a block, given a fair initial distribution of the credit assignment. The voting-based chain finality protocol is responsible for finalizing a history of blocks by resolving conflicting checkpoint and selecting a unique chain. A proof-of-conception prototype is implemented and tested on a physical network environment. The experimental results verify that the Micorchain is able to offer a partially decentralized, scalable and lightweight distributed ledger protocol for IoT applications

Index Terms—Proof of Credit (PoC), Voting-based Chain Finality (VCF), Consensus, Blockchain, Internet of Things (IoT).



1 INTRODUCTION

The prevalence of Internet of Things (IoT) allows heterogeneous and lightweight smart devices to collaboratively provide services with or without human intervention. With an ever-increasing presence of IoT-based smart applications and their ubiquitous visibility from the Internet, the highly connected smart IoT devices with a huge volume of generated transaction data incur more concerns on security and privacy [9]. IoT systems are deployed in a distributed network environment that includes a large number of IoT devices with high heterogeneity and dynamics. The heterogeneity and resource constraint at the edge necessitate a scalable, flexible and lightweight system architecture that supports fast development and easy deployment among multiple application vendors using non-standard development technology. Furthermore, those smart devices are geographically scattered across near-site network edges, and managed by fragmented service providers that enforce different security policies. Thus, traditional security policies on a centralized authority basis, which suffer from the performance bottlenecks or single point of failures, are not efficient and suitable to address performance and security challenges in IoT systems.

Recently, designing new decentralized security mechanisms for distributed network applications becomes one of the most intensively studied topics in academics and

industries. Blockchain, which acts as the fundamental protocol of Bitcoin [23], has demonstrated great potential to revolutionize the fundamentals of information technology (IT) due to many attractive properties, such as decentralization and transparency [25]. The blockchain enabled security mechanisms for IoT-based applications have been reported recently, for example, smart surveillance system [22], [24], social security system [38], space situation awareness [37], biometric imaging data processing [34], identification authentication [13] and access control [35], [36]. Blockchain and smart contract together are promising to provide a decentralized security mechanism to IoT systems.

Integrating blockchain technologies into IoT systems presents critical challenges in designing scalable and lightweight blockchain protocols. Particularly, the performance of blockchain networks significantly relies on the performance of consensus mechanisms, e.g., in terms of data consistency, speed of consensus finality, robustness to arbitrarily behaving nodes, and network scalability [33]. Unfortunately, existing blockchain protocols are not suitable to be directly merged to IoT scenarios. Most of the existing permissionless blockchain networks (e.g., Bitcoin) require solving a time-consuming hashing puzzle for block generation. Such hashing-intensive proof-of-work (PoW) consensus mechanisms could guarantee the network scalability and mitigate Sybil attacks; however, they are at the cost of low throughput, high energy consumption and ever-increased chain-data. The classical Byzantine consensus protocols, such as Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance (PBFT) [8], demonstrate a better performance with high throughput, lower latency and limited overhead. However, they rely on identity authentication and allow very limited network scalability in terms of the number of nodes.

To address challenges in integrating blockchain tech-

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nologies into IoT systems, we propose Microchain, a hybrid Proof-of-Credit (PoC)-Voting-based Chain Finality (VCF) blockchain architecture that provides a secure, scalable and lightweight distributed ledger. Following the idea of delegation, microchain chooses a small subset of the nodes in the network as validators, and those validators form a final committee, called dynasty, to perform a consensus function. The verifiable random function combining with cryptographic sortition provide a bias-resistant randomness foundation to periodically form a statistical representative dynasty. The proposed novel PoC-VCF based final committee consensus mechanism not only offers higher efficiency over protocols based on proof of physical resources like PoW, but it is also more scalable than those classical BFT enabled consensus solutions. In summary, this paper makes the following contributions:

- 1) A systematic architecture of a microchain is introduced, and key components and work flows are explained;
- 2) A novel PoC-based block proposal mechanism is designed to improve energy efficiency and throughput of PoW-based blockchain;
- 3) A lightweight voting-based chain finality protocol is developed for resolving the chain fork problem in chain extension; and
- 4) A proof-of-concept prototype is implemented as a private blockchain network and tested on Raspberry Pi, and the experimental results validate the feasibility of running microchain on IoT systems with lower energy assumption and communication overhead.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews background knowledge of blockchain consensus protocols. Section 3 introduces the microchain architecture and describes the core features. A novel PoC-based block proposal mechanism is explained in Section 4 and Section 5 illustrates the voting-based chain finality protocol. The experimental results are discussed in Section 6. Finally, a summary is presented in Section 7.

2 BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK

As one of the most fundamental problems in fault-tolerant distributed computing, *consensus* states that the processes have to reach agreement in a non-trivial way. This agreement takes the form of a value (called decision value) that has to be one of the values proposed by the processes to the consensus instance [26]. In the context of a distributed computing environment, the consensus in blockchain networks can be defined as a fault-tolerant state-machine replication problem by maintaining the global blockchain state across the P2P network. Each participating node maintains a local replicate of the blockchain and shares it with other nodes. All nodes make an agreement (consensus) on the unique common replicate of the blockchain in the condition of Byzantine failures [18], [27]. Given variant consensus protocols, the blockchain networks could be categorized into permissionless blockchain (e.g., Nakamoto Consensus Protocols) and permissioned blockchain (e.g., Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerant Consensus).

2.1 Nakamoto Consensus Protocols

To jointly address the critical issues, such as pseudonymity, scalability and poor synchronization in an open-access network environment, the Nakamoto consensus protocol [23] is based on a Proof of Work (PoW) scheme. It is implemented as the consensus foundation of Bitcoin, and widely adopted by other cryptocurrency-based blockchain networks. PoW is essentially an incentive-based consensus protocol in which participants compete for rewards through a cryptographic block-discovery racing game. Nakamoto protocol introduces incentives to probabilistically award the consensus participants to ensure proper functioning of a permissionless blockchain network [23]. The Nakamoto consensus protocols demonstrate scalability in a trustless open-access network environment. However, PoW also incurs several issues, such as limited throughput, high demand of computation and storage resources as well as unsustainable energy consumption.

To reduce energy consumption, Proof-of-Stake (PoS) was proposed by Peercoin [15]. Within a Peercoin network, a metric of “coin age” is proposed to measure a miner’s stake by multiplying the held tokens and the holding time. The PoS kernel protocol allows a miner to use its stake to solve the puzzle solution, the probability of proposing a new block follows the stake distribution. Compared to PoW protocols that use brute-force hashing power to solve computation-intensive puzzle solutions, PoS leverages the distribution of token ownership to simulate a verifiable random function to propose new blocks. Since the block miners only consume limited resources, PoS is also known as a process of “virtual mining” [5].

A number of alternative Proof of Concept (PoC) schemes have been proposed to improve performance of existing PoW in terms of security, fairness and sustainability. To address the issues of centralized computation power pool, the Proof of Memory (PoM), a memory-hard PoW is adopted by ZCash [14] and Ethereum [6] networks. With the purpose of useful resource provision, the idea of “Proof of Useful Resources” (PoUS) has been proposed to tackle the resource wasting problem of PoW [33]. The Proof of Exercise (PoE) is proposed to replace the computation intensive searching problem in PoW with the useful “exercise” of matrix product problems [30]. Based on Trusted Execution Environment (TEE), Resource-Efficient Mining (REM) [40] verifies and measures the software running in an Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX)-protected enclave that randomly determines whether the work leads to a valid block proof.

2.2 Byzantine Fault Tolerant Consensus

The consensus in a distributed system can be expressed abstractly as a Byzantine General Problem [18], which copes with single value agreement among different parts of a system given failure of communication or conflicting information. The problem is solvable if and only if more than two-thirds of the generals are loyal under oral messages. Thus, a consensus protocol is called Byzantine Fault Tolerant (BFT) if it can tolerate one or more byzantine failures while making a correct agreement. For any BFT consensus protocol, the distributed network configuration should satisfy the following requirement: $N \geq 3f + 1$, where f is the number

of Byzantine processes. The PBFT algorithm for Statement Machine Replication (SMR) [17] that tolerates Byzantine faults [8] and has been widely adopted as a basic consensus solution in the blockchain community, like Hyperledge Fabric [2]. The PBFT algorithm offers both liveness and safety in asynchronous network environment given assumption that at most of $\lfloor \frac{n-1}{3} \rfloor$ out of total of n replicas are Byzantine faults. All peering nodes in PBFT are categorized as either a leader node or some validating nodes. These peers will execute three phases of consensus protocol, called Pre-prepare, Prepare and Commit, to make agreement on proposed new blocks. As long as more than 2/3 of all nodes are honest and they have successfully executed the Commit phase, the transactions recorded in the validated blocks are appended to the current chain.

To tackle the weakness of consensus algorithms that suffer from high latency due to the requirement that all nodes within the network communicate synchronously, Ripple [29] is proposed to circumvent this requirement by utilizing collectively-trusted subnetworks within the larger network. In Ripple, all verified transactions will be added directly to the raw ledger rather than through the chain of blocks. To make the verification, each node maintains their own peer list, called a unique node list (UNL), to broadcast the transaction to such subnetworks instead of to nodes of whole network. The intersection of UNL by any two different peers should be at least 1/5 of all the nodes over the network. Since the "trust" required by these subnetworks is in fact minimal and can be further reduced with principled choice of the member nodes. The Ripple provides a low-latency consensus algorithm which still maintains robustness in the face of Byzantine failures [29]. As a variant of Ripple, Steller [21] designed a new model for consensus called federated Byzantine agreement (FBA), which ensures nodes agree on slot contents. Similar to UNL in Ripple, Steller utilizes quorum slices for consensus agreement made between trust nodes, which is the same as validators in Ripple. In Steller consensus process, sub-network level trust decisions are made by nodes in a quorum, which is a set of nodes sufficient to reach agreement. Then, the subset of a quorum work together as a federated committee to determine system-level agreement. Compared to decentralized proof of-work and proof-of-stake schemes, Steller has modest computing and financial requirements, lowering the barrier to entry and potentially opening up financial systems to new participants [21].

2.3 Hybrid Consensus Protocol

To improve limited performance of permissionless consensus without undermining the unique features such as scalability, combining a scalable permissionless consensus (eg., PoW) with a high throughput permissioned consensus (e.g., BFT) becomes a prospective approach. The Bitcoin-NG [11] is proposed to improve performance of PoW-based Nakamoto protocol by decoupling Bitcoins blockchain operation into two planes: leader election and transaction serialization. The protocol divides time into sequential epochs, and only a single leader is in charge of serializing state machine transitions in each epoch. To bootstrap the transaction throughput, the protocol introduces two types

of blocks, namely, the key blocks that require a PoW puzzle solution for leader election and the microblocks that require no puzzle solution and are used for transaction serialization [33]. Although Bitcoin-NG may also experience key block forks, it scales optimally with bandwidth limited only by the capacity of the individual nodes and latency limited only by the propagation time of the network [11].

To design a computationally-scalable Byzantine consensus protocol for blockchain, SCP [19] is proposed through incorporating BFT and sharding into blockchain consensus. The key ideas are inspired by concept of "sharding" [10] in infrastructures of distributed database and cloud. Through securely establishing identities for network participants, whole network are randomly divided into several sub-committees. Each sub-committee performs a classical BFT consensus protocol to process a separate set of transactions and propose blocks in parallel. A final committee is designated to combine the outputs of sub-committees into an ordered blockchain data structure. To extend existing consensus protocol based on SCP, Elastico [20] is proposed to build a secure sharding protocol for open blockchains. In a epoch, the candidates of committees attempt to find a PoW puzzle solution provided a seed called "epochRandomness" that is a public random number string generated in previous epoch. ELASTICO exhibits almost linear scalability throughput with computation capacity with roughly $O(n)$ message complexity. However, the participants have to download full blockchain data to perform the consensus task, which brings latency in bootstrapping process and storage overload on client nodes.

To enable parallelization of both network consensus and data storage, a "full sharding" protocol called named "OmniLedger" [16] is designed to provide "statistically representative" shards for permissionless transaction processing. OmniLedger uses a bias-resistant protocol called RandHound [32] to generate epoch global randomness strings for sharding committees formation. To optimize trade-off between the number of shards, throughput and latency, the intra-shard consensus follows a "Optional Trust-but-Verify Validation" model, where optimistic validators make a provisional but unlikely-to-change commitment and core validators subsequently verify again the transactions to provide finality and ensure verifiability [16]. To secure cross-shard transactions, OmniLedger introduce a novel Byzantine Shard Atomic Commit protocol to handle atomically transactions processing across shards. Furthermore, a gradually in-and-out committee members swap strategy could reduce extra message overhead and bootstrapping latency in shard reconstruction. Another epoch-based, two-level-BFT protocol called RapidChain [39] is proposed for scaling blockchain via full sharding. RapidChain employs block pipelining strategy to achieve very high throughputs in intra-committee consensus. Further more, a novel gossiping protocol for large blocks reduces large overhead on committee-to-committee communication, and ensure an efficient cross-shard transaction verification.

3 SYSTEM DESIGN OF MICROCHAIN

The goal of the Microchain is to enable a lightweight distributed ledger system in resource constrained IoT en-

vironments at the network edge, which is achieved by introducing an efficient consensus mechanism running on a small number of validators. The microchain network proceeds transactions by a final committee in a fixed time periods called dynasty epoch. A random committee formation protocol ensures that committee selection process is unpredictable. In each dynasty life time, a hybrid PoC-VCF consensus mechanism is responsible for proposing block and finalizing chain history given an unbounded time delay. The final-committee consensus which is built on a proof-of-stake based finality mechanism. A Proof-of-Credit (PoC) protocol, which is a pure PoS mechanism, determines whether a participant is selected to propose a block given fair initial distribution of the credit stake to the committee members in a given epoch. While a Voting based chain finality (VCF) mechanism could protect against fork by resolving conflicting checkpoints and finalize the history of blockchain.

The microchain assumes a synchronous network in which operations of processes are coordinated in rounds with bounded delay constraints, and provides two formal proprieties of a robust distributed ledger:

- **Persistence:** ensures a safety goal that all users should agree on the same transactions and finalized transactions should be in the same position in the distributed ledger. If a honest node of the system accepts a transaction tx as finalized in block B_i , then any other nodes could query tx in block B_i .
- **Liveness:** ensures that transactions submitted by honest nodes are confirmed in finalized blocks after a sufficient amount of time.

3.1 Prerequisites

Essentially, a distributed ledger is a partial ordering of the block generating events, thus blocks followed the partial relation denoted by ' \rightarrow '. For two blocks a and b , if a comes before b , then $a \rightarrow b$. Given assumption of synchronous network environment, the time is dividend into discrete units called *slots* to measure upper bounded delay in block proposal and finality operations. In a distributed system, it is hard to say that one of two events occurred first given synchronous time discrepancies among participants. Therefore, we introduce logical clocks called *ticks*, which can be used to totally order the events [17]. In general, each slot sl_t is indexed by tick t , where tick could be represented as monotonically increasing integers $t \in \{1, 2, 3, \dots\}$. To ensure liveness, the length of time window represented by a slot should be sufficient to guarantee that message transmitted by a sender will be received by its intended recipient within that time window (accounting for local time discrepancies and network delays). The upper bounded delay is defined as Δ , then $sl_t \geq \Delta$, where $t \in \{1, 2, 3, \dots\}$. Each participant must finish registration process to join the **permissioned blockchain network**. A asymmetric key pair generation functionality creates a signing-verification keys pair (sk_i, pk_i) for user u_i , and user's credit stake $c_i \leq C_{max}$ where C_{max} is maximum value of credit stake, is associated with user's public key pk_i . All registered users in system can be represented as a set $U =$

$\{(pk_1, c_1), (pk_2, c_2), \dots, (pk_n, c_n)\}$, where n is the registered user's number.

3.2 Basic Concepts

Before introducing the microchain architecture, several basic definitions are defined as following:

Definition 1. Epoch - An epoch is a set of R sub-sequential slots, represented as $e = \{sl_1, sl_2, \dots, sl_t\}$, where $0 \leq t \leq R$. The R value is epoch size that is multiple unit slot sl .

Definition 2. Validator - A validator $v_i \in V$ ($V \subseteq U$) is a registered user who is qualified for final-committee selection and performing a consensus algorithm.

Definition 3. Dynasty - A dynasty is a set of current final-committee members $D = \{(pk_1, c_1), (pk_2, c_2), \dots, (pk_k, c_k) \subseteq V\}$, where $0 \leq k \leq K$, and the K value is committee size.

The dynasty is selected from validator set V based on final committee selection algorithm, and dynamic life time is multiple epochs.

Definition 4. Block - A block generated at a slot sl_t ($t \in 1, 2, 3, \dots$) by validator v_j is represented as $B_i = (pre_hash, height, tx_data, sl_t, pk_j, \sigma_j)$, where the parameters are:

- *pre_hash*: is a λ -bit-length hash string of previous Block B_{i-1} , which is represented as $\mathcal{H}(B_{i-1}) = \mathcal{H}(pre_hash, height, tx_data, sl_{t-1})$, where $\mathcal{H}(\cdot)$ is a pre-defined collision-resistant hash function that output hash string $h \in \{0, 1\}^\lambda$;
- *height*: height of current block in blockchain (ledger);
- *tx_data*: transactions data $d \in \{0, 1\}^*$;
- *sl_t*: block generated time stamp at sl_t ;
- *pk_j*: public key of validator that proposes the block; and
- σ_j : a signature $Sign_{sk_j}(tx_data, pre_hash, height, sl_t)$ signed by sender pk_j .

Definition 5. Genesis Block - The genesis block is a special block which is defined as $B_0 = (pre_hash = 0, height = 0, sl_0 = 0, init_D)$, where *init_D* is the initial dynasty.

Definition 6. Blockchain - A blockchain (or public ledger) \mathcal{C} is a partial order of blocks $B_0 \rightarrow B_1 \rightarrow \dots \rightarrow B_{n-1} \rightarrow B_n$ associated with a strictly increasing sequence of slots sl_t . Each block B_i use $pre_hash = \mathcal{H}(B_{i-1})$ to chain previous block B_{i-1} . The significant parameters are described as follows:

- *length*: is the length of chain denoted $len(\mathcal{C}) = n$ to count number of blocks between genesis block B_0 and confirmed B_n ;
- *head*: indicates the head of chain denoted $head(\mathcal{C}) = B_n$, where B_n is last confirmed block that is extended on finalized main chain.

Given the above definitions, the next sub-section explains how the final committee consensus protocol works on a microchain architecture.




Fig. 1. Microchain architecture overview.

3.3 Architecture Overview

The blockchain structure is illustrated as upper Fig. 1. The blue nodes represent confirmed blocks while red ones indicate finalized blocks. The genesis block is the root node of blockchain, and each block use its *pre_hash* to point to parent block and extend chain. The chain height follows a strictly increasing sequence of finalized blocks (path through red nodes). The head of blockchain is a last confirmed block whose parent is finalized and has largest height. The lower Fig. 1 demonstrates key components in microchain network, and the work flows are described as follows:

- **Initialization:** In initialization process, a special dynasty, which includes a group of validators specified by adminster, acts as initial committee D_{init} to initialize blockchain. Each validator creates genesis block B_0 and sets the local blockchain $\mathcal{C} = B_0$ and $head = B_0$. The initial committee will work as the first dynasty of system until following dynasty change finished. Thus, B_0 is beginning block of initial dynasty epoch.
- **Committee Selection:** If the current dynasty is the initial committee, then skip this step. Otherwise, at the beginning of new dynasty life time, the final-committee formation protocol exploits a Verifiable Random Function (VRF) based cryptographic sortition scheme [12] to randomly choose a subset of validators V as final-committee according to their credit weight. The selected committee members D will be added to current block, which is marked as beginning block of new dynasty epoch. The life time of dynasty epoch starts from committee selection and ends after dynasty change.
- **Block Proposal:** The block proposal mechanism uses a pure PoS protocol, called Proof-of-Credit (PoC), to generate new blocks in each block proposal run. Only validators in the current dynasty is able to propose new block. The probability that a user could proposes a block is associated with its credit distribution of current dynasty. If validator v_j could solve puzzle difficulty problem in slot sl_{t+1} by

computing $H(B_i, pk_j, c_j) \leq d_{cond}$ (d_{cond} is difficulty condition target value), it generates new block $B_{i+1} = (\mathcal{H}(B_i), height + 1, tx_data, T_{stamp}, pk_j, \sigma_j)$ and broadcasts it with a valid signature to all committee members of the current dynasty. Each committee member accept all valid blocks in the current slot, and verifies if blocks meet confirmation requirements. The verified block will be added to local chain \mathcal{C} with $head = B_{i+1}$.

- **Chain Finality:** At the end of an epoch, the head with epoch height becomes a checkpoint which is used to resolve forks and finalize chain history. The chain finality uses a voting-based algorithm to commit checkpoint block and finalizes those already committed blocks on the main chain. The chain finality ensures that only one path including finalized blocks becomes a main chain, as Fig. 1 shows. Therefore, the following blocks in new epoch are only extended on such unique main chain. The chain fork problem is prevent by resolving conflicting checkpoints and finalizing the history of the blockchain.
- **Committee Change:** At the end of dynasty life time, the current committee members make agreement on a new dynasty randomness string. The epoch randomness string generation uses the RandShare mechanism to make agreement on proposing the next epoch randomness string among members of final committee. RandShare is an randomness protocol which is based on Publicly Verifiable Secret Sharing (PVSS) [28], [31] to ensure unbiasedity, unpredictability, and availability in public randomness sharing. The proposed unbiased and unpredictable public randomness string will be used for committee selection process of the next dynasty life time.

As two core functions in epoch life time of blockchain extension: block proposal and chain finality, detail designs are explained in following sections.

4 PoC-BASED BLOCK PROPOSAL MECHANISM

The PoC-based block proposal mechanism is mainly responsible for generating blocks and extending chains. Essentially, our PoC-based block proposal mechanism is a pure chain-based proof of stake, which mimics proof of work mechanics and simulates mining by pseudorandomly assigning block proposal right to validators. The block generation relies on a slot leader selection process which is associated with credit distribution \mathcal{D} of current dynasty. A chain extension rule ensures that new blocks are growing on the finalized main chain and prevents against conflicting blocks.

4.1 Transaction Pooling

Each use could send transactions to interact with blockchain network. The transaction is defined as following:

Definition 7. (Transaction). A transaction is represented as $tx = \{tx_hash, pk_{sender}, pk_{recipient}, T_{stamp}, data, \sigma\}$ ($tx \in \{0, 1\}^*$), where:

- tx_hash : is a λ -bit-length hash string of transaction tx , which is represented as

拥有任期高度的去跨头将成为检查点，使用基于选举的算法提交检查点区块，并最最终确认提交的区块

通过根据参与者的credit权重，VRF随机抽选一个验证者子集作为最终委员会。被选中的委员会成员将被添加到当前区块中，表示当前epoch的起始区块

区块提案机制使用纯PoS协议PoC来生成

$tx_hash = \mathcal{H}(pk_{sender}, pk_{recipient}, T_{stamp}, data)$,
where $\mathcal{H}(\cdot)$ is a pre-defined collision-resistant hash function that output hash string $h \in \{0, 1\}^\lambda$;

- pk_{sender} : is the sender's public key;
- $pk_{recipient}$: is the recipient's public key;
- T_{stamp} : is time stamp of generating transaction;
- $data$: is information $d \in \{0, 1\}^*$ enclosed by transaction;
- σ : a signature $Sign(tx_hash, pk_{sender}, pk_{recipient}, T_{stamp}, data)$ signed by sender's private key sk_{sender} .

After receiving those transactions broadcasted on the network, each validator verifies received transactions according to the following conditions:

- sender and recipient are registered users in U , and $Verify(tx_hash, pk_{sender}, pk_{recipient}, T_{stamp}, data) = \sigma$ by using sender's public key pk_{sender} ;
- transaction tx should neither be existed in transactions pool nor the last κ committed blocks; and
- Time stamp T_{stamp} must fall in either current time slot or past sequential slots of last κ committed block;

The condition i) could prevent against transactions from invalid users or any malicious modification. While condition ii) and iii) are mainly for preventing duplicated tx in $\kappa + 1$ period of time slots. After the verification process, only valid transactions are cached as local transactions pool denoted as $TX = \{tx_1, tx_2, \dots, tx_N\}$, where N is transactions pool size. The validator also uses condition iii) to regularly check local transaction pool to remove those outdated transactions, which has not been confirmed by the last κ committed blocks.

4.2 Slot Leader Selection

For each slot sl_t in Epoch $e = \{sl_1, sl_2, \dots, sl_R\}$, a random slot leader selection process determines if a validator v_i is able to propose a new block for current block given the probability p_i is proportional to its weight by credit c_i in current dynasty. The credit distribution is defined as following:

Definition 8. Credit Distribution - is represented as $\mathcal{D} = \{p_1, p_2, \dots, p_K\}$, where $p_j = \frac{c_j}{\sum_{j=1}^K c_j}$ and K is committee size.

To become a slot leader to propose new block, a validator must show its proof by solving a puzzle problem. Unlike PoW that utilizes a brute-force manner to find a nonce to meet the uniform target difficulty, each validator v_j simply computes proof based on chain head block and its credit c_j . The target difficulty that is associated with its credit weight p_j determines if proof is valid or not. The Proof-of-Credit (PoC) puzzle and solution can be formally defined as follows:

Definition 9. Proof-of-Credit - Given an adjustable difficulty condition parameter ξ , the process of PoC puzzle solution aims to verify a solution string hc , which is the hashcode of concatenation of $\mathcal{H}(head(\mathcal{C}))$, pk_j and c_j , such that the value calculated by taking ξ length lower bits of the hc is smaller than a target value generated by difficulty condition $d_{cond}(\xi, p_j)$:

$$\mathcal{TB}(hc, \xi) \leq d_{cond}(\xi, p_j) \quad (1)$$

where $hc = \mathcal{H}(\mathcal{H}(head(\mathcal{C})), pk_j, c_j)$; $\mathcal{TB}(hc, \xi)$ function outputs lower ξ bits of the hashcode hc ; and difficulty condition function $d_{cond}(\cdot, \cdot)$ is denoted as:

$$d_{cond}(\xi, p_j) = (2^\xi - 1) \cdot p_j \quad (2)$$

where $d_{cond}(\xi, p_j) \in \{0, 1\}^\xi$.

Given the above definition, the PoC-enabled slot leader selection process is described as the following:

- **Block Proposal:** during the current time slot sl_t , each validator v_j in dynasty regularly calculates hashcode hc based on current status of credit stake c_j , and use Eq. (1) to determine if it is qualified to propose a new block. If the candidate solution $\mathcal{TB}(hc, \xi)$ is smaller than target value defined by Eq.2, then he generates a new block $B_{i+1} = (\mathcal{H}(head(\mathcal{C})), height + 1, tx_data, T_{stamp}, pk_j, \sigma_j)$ and broadcasts it to the network. The validator v_j with higher credit weight p_j is easier to calculate solution string hc that falls into range of $[0, (2^\xi - 1) \cdot p_j]$. Thus, he has the higher probability to become a slot leader to propose a new block. Furthermore, parameters used for calculating hashcode hc are not changed in current slot time. Therefore, the hc is a fixed value, and each validator is only allowed to propose one block in current slot time.
- **Block Verification:** after receiving proposed block B_{i+1} , each validator v_j firstly checks if sender pk_j is a valid committee member and verifies signature σ by using the sender's public key pk_j . If block is from valid committee member with correct signature, then he will check if T_{stamp} falls in time slot sl_t duration, $B_{i+1}[height] = head(\mathcal{C})[height] + 1$ and $B_{i+1}[pre_hash] = \mathcal{H}(head(\mathcal{C}))$. Finally, validator verifies proof of solution to block B_{i+1} based on the PoC algorithm defined in Eq.1. If all conditions are true, block is accepted as confirmed status and validator updates head of local chain as $head(\mathcal{C}) = B_{i+1}$. Those sequential verification operations ensure that only valid blocks generated in the current time slot sl_t with correct proof of solution are appended to head of local chain.

Compared to PoW-based leader selection process, like Bitcoin, our PoC have the following advantages:

- **Energy efficiency:** Since input parameters for calculating hc is fixed in one time slot, so a validator just executes the PoC mining task once to know if he is qualified for proposing new block in current leader selection round. Such mining method is more energy efficient than PoW-based solutions, which uses a computation-intensive mechanism to win the puzzle-solving race;
- **High Throughput:** The block proposal operation is only performed by validators in the current committee D with limited K members, it's easier to ensure a synchronous network assumption that time slot sl_t

for block proposal rounds could be no more than upper bounded delay constraints Δ . Given assumption that each block only encloses fixed amount of transactions with same data size, the block confirmation time is only related to length of time slot sl_t . The high throughput rate is achieved by correctly choosing a short $sl_t \geq \Delta$.

4.3 Chain Extension Rule

In general, the chain extension follows a "largest height of confirmed block" rule, which requires that new blocks B_{i+1} are only appended to $head(C)$ by setting $B_{i+1}[pre_hash] = \mathcal{H}(head(C))$. Although slot leader selection process allows that the probability of block generated by validator v_j is proportional to its credit weight p_j , it cannot ensure that only one block is proposed in the current block proposal time slot. The amount of candidate blocks b could be between 0 and dynasty size K . Given candidate block number $b \in [0, K]$ in current time slot, the chain extension rules are described as follows:

链增长遵循最大确认区块高度规则：
1. 只有一个候选区块，则1) 接收该区块并链头设为该区块；
2. 有多个候选区块，则所有区块都被接收为确认区块，链头更新遵守以下规则：
2.1链头为区块提案者拥有最大credit的区域；
2.2若相同credit，则链头为拥有最小TB(hc, ξ)的区域；
3. 若没有候选区块，就提交一个空区块作为该任期接收作为确认区块。

- i) $b = 1$: if there is only one proposed candidate block B_{i+1} , then block is accepted as confirmed status and update the chain head as $head(C) = B_{i+1}$;
- ii) $b > 1$: if more than one candidate blocks are proposed, then all blocks are accepted as confirmed status. The $head(C)$ update follows two sub rules: 1) chain head points to a block whose sender has the highest credit c than other blocks' senders; and 2) if there more than one candidate blocks who have the same highest credit c , the block who has the smallest PoC condition value $TB(hc, \xi)$ becomes the chain head; and
- iii) $b = 0$: if no proposed block is received before the end of current time slot, an empty block denoted as $B_{empty} = (pre_hash, height + 1, null, sl_t, null, null)$ is generated as B_{i+1} and accepted as confirmed status. The chain head update process follows the rule i) $b = 1$.

The rule i) covers a basic scenario to ensure that all blocks are extended on chain head. The rule ii) could handle conflicting blocks scenario when multiple validators propose blocks in current time slot. The rule iii) ensures the liveness, so that there is at least one block is available for chain extension even if none validator is able to propose a new block.

5 VOTING-BASED CHAIN FINALITY MECHANISM

Although the block proposal process follows the pre-defined chain extension rules, the fork issue still happens owing to network latency or attacks like "nothing at stake". In addition, through forcing reorganization of the block chain, attacks could change transactions of ledger to launch double-spending attack. Furthermore, the cost of attack may have been lower, since attackers just need to accumulate amount of credit value to be able to propose blocks with high probability, rather than be punished when their violating behaviors are detected. To prevent above issues, a voting-based chain finality mechanism is introduced to solidify the block chain history and increase cost of attack behaviors by




Fig. 2. Chain finality protocol based on checkpoint tree

way of properly designing punishment strategies. Our chain finality mechanism borrows idea from Casper [7], which is a PoS-based finality system overlaying an existing PoW blockchain.

5.1 Checkpoint Finality Protocol

Under ideal scenarios, the PoC-based block proposal mechanism will propose blocks one after other and extend chain in a linked list, which each parent block has exactly one child block. However, owing to fork issues caused by network latency or deliberate attacks, the block proposal mechanism will inevitably produce multiple conflicting blocks which are children blocks with the same parent block. Therefore, those proposed blocks in fact form an ever-growing *block tree* structure, as shown in Fig. 2. The chain finality protocol is mainly to identify a unique chain path on block tree by choosing a single child block from multiple children blocks with common parent block. For efficiency purposes, the chain finality protocol is only executed on those *checkpoint* blocks rather than whole block tree, and committee members vote for hashes of blocks instead of entire block contents. Before describing the voting-based chain finality protocol, several basic definitions are defined as following:

Definition 10. Checkpoint - An block B_i whose height in block tree is multiple of epoch size R is specified as *checkpoint*. If a block is checkpoint, then $B_i[height] \bmod R = 0$.

Definition 11. Epoch Height - indicates current height of epoch for block B_i , which is denoted as $H_e(B_i) = \lfloor \frac{B_i[height]}{R} \rfloor$.

Definition 12. Vote - A vote for checkpoint block *target* sent by validator v_j at time T_{stamp} is represented as $Vote_j = (vote_hash, h_{source}, h_{target}, H_e(source), H_e(target), T_{stamp}, pk_j, \sigma_j)$. where the parameters are:

- $vote_hash$: is a λ -bit-length hash string of $Vote_j$, which is represented as $\mathcal{H}(Vote_j) = \mathcal{H}(h_{source}, h_{target}, H_e(source), H_e(target), T_{stamp}, pk_j)$, where $\mathcal{H}(\cdot)$ is a pre-defined collision-resistant hash function that output hash string $h \in \{0, 1\}^\lambda$;

- h_{source} : the hash of any committed block;
- h_{target} : the hash of a checkpoint block which is the a decedent of $source$ block;
- $H_e(source)$: epoch height of source block B_s ;
- $H_e(target)$: epoch height of target block B_t ;
- T_{stamp} : time stamp the vote is proposed;
- pk_j : public key of validator that sends the vote; and
- σ_j : a signature denoted as $Sign_{sk_j}(vote_hash, h_{source}, h_{target}, H_e(target), H_e(source), T_{stamp})$ signed by sender pk_j .

During time slot sl_t of chain finality process, every validator v_j in current dynasty casts a $vote_j$ message for committing a checkpoint block. **Given the voting result, the checkpoint block has following properties:**

- **Committed-majority Link:** Given an ordered pair of checkpoint blocks (B_s, B_t) denoted as $B_s \rightarrow B_t$, if more than $2/3$ of validators propose vote for it, then relationship $B_s \rightarrow B_t$ is called a committed-majority link. As Fig. 2 shown, both $B_0 \rightarrow B_3$ and $B_3 \rightarrow B_6$ are committed-majority link.
- **Committed Block:** A checkpoint block B_t is called committed block if 1) B_t is genesis block, or 2) there exists a committed-majority link $B_s \rightarrow B_t$ where B_s is a committed block.
- **Finalized Block:** A checkpoint block B_s is called finalized block if 1) B_s is genesis block, or 2) B_s is a committed block, and there exists a committed-majority link $B_s \rightarrow B_t$, where B_s is parent of B_t in checkpoint tree ($H_e(B_t) = H_e(B_s) + 1$).

The voting-based chain finality protocol utilizes checkpoint blocks to form a checkpoint tree to finalize chain history. Figure 2 illustrates a checkpoint tree with a finalized chain along commit-majority links $B_0 \rightarrow B_3 \rightarrow B_6$. The gray nodes represent all confirmed blocks generated by block proposal mechanism, while all checkpoint blocks are shown as square boxes. Assuming that epoch size $R = 3$, all blocks with $(height \bmod 3) = 0$ are considered as checkpoint blocks, such as B_0, B_3, B'_3 and B_6 . The B_0 and B_3 are finalized blocks while B'_3 and B_6 are committed blocks. **The chain finality workflow is described as follows:**

- **Sending Votes:** during current time slot sl_t for chain finality process, a validator v_j in current dynasty checks if $H_e(head(C)) = H_e(B_c) + 1$, where B_c is the last committed block of local chain C . If yes, it prepares $Vote_j$ which votes for a new committed-majority link $B_c \rightarrow head(C)$, and broadcasts signed vote message $Vote_j$ to committee members.
- **Counting Votes:** After receiving proposed vote $Vote_j$, each validator v_i ($i \in K$) check if $Vote_j$ is from a valid validator and σ_j is correctly signed by sender's pk_j . Then, the validator will verify whether received vote violates the chain fork resolving rules defined in 5.2. If no violation behavior is founded, the validator will updates $vote_count[h_{source}, h_{target}]$ value by adding 1. Each validator keeps tracking votes count until sl_t expiration.
- **Finalizing Checkpoint:** A committed-majority link $B_s \rightarrow B_t$ is only accepted when $vote_count$ is more than a certain threshold $\mathcal{T} \cdot K$, where \mathcal{T} is a fraction




Fig. 3. Illustration of chain fork resolving rules.

of the committee size K . The chain finality process requires that more than $2f + 1$ of participants to be honest with f fault nodes in current committee, so that $\mathcal{T} \geq \frac{2f+1}{N}$ where $N = 3f + 1$. Given $\mathcal{T} = \frac{2}{3}$, if $vote_count > \frac{2K}{3}$ (K is committee size), the checkpoint block B_t is accepted as a committed block, whereas committed block B_s is changed to a finalized block.

Given assumption that time slot $sl_t \geq \Delta$, so that all validators could receive broadcasted votes by end of bounded delay. If no more than $\frac{1}{3}$ of the validators violate the chain fork resolving rule, only a committed block is finalized even if there are conflicting checkpoint blocks in same epoch height.

5.2 Chain Fork Resolving Rule

If two checkpoint blocks B_i and B'_i have the same epoch height H_e but are in distinct branches, they are *conflicting* checkpoint blocks. In other words, the checkpoint blocks in checkpoint tree are sibling nodes who are neither ancestors nor descendants of each other. As shown in Fig. 2, B_3 and B'_3 are conflicting checkpoint blocks in $H_e = 1$. To handle conflicting checkpoint blocks and resolve the fork condition in the chain finality process, a set of chain fork resolving rules are defined as follows:

Rule 1. Given a vote $Vote_j = (vote_hash, h_s, h_t, H_e(s), H_e(t), T_{stamp}, pk_j, \sigma_j)$, if $H_e(t) \neq H_e(head(C))$ or $H_e(t) \neq H_e(s) + 1$, the voter j violates rule and $Vote_j$ will be rejected. This rule ensures that vote for committed-majority $s \rightarrow t$ is accepted only if t is the same epoch height as local chain head and s is parent of t in checkpoint tree.

Rule 2. Given two votes $(vote_hash, h_{s1}, h_{t1}, H_e(s1), H_e(t1), T_{stamp}, pk_j, \sigma_j)$ and $(vote_hash, h_{s2}, h_{t2}, H_e(s2), H_e(t2), T_{stamp}, pk_j, \sigma_j)$ from the same voter j , if $t1 \neq t2$ and $H_e(t1) = H_e(t2)$, the voter j violates rule and all votes from voter will be rejected. This rule prevents one voter from voting for distinct checkpoint blocks with the same epoch height.

Figure 3 demonstrates scenarios that how voter violates above defined fork rules. A validator who voted for distinct target blocks B_3 and B'_3 in the same epoch height violates the rule 2. Since B'_3 is not ancestor of B_6 , any sender voting for link $B'_3 \rightarrow B_6$ violates rule 1. Similarly, voting for link $B_0 \rightarrow B_6$ is also considered as violation of rule 1 owing to condition $H_e(B_6) \neq H_e(B_0) + 1$.

5.3 Incentives

In order to encourage participants to contribute honest protocol operations to distributed ledger, a reward can be given to the validators that are proposing, verifying blocks and voting for finalized checkpoint blocks. The rewards in our setting are fees and credit value. At end of dynasty epoch, all fees of transactions included in a sequence of blocks in current committee are collected as a rewarding fees pool, then it will be distributed to all honest validators who have no record of violating behaviors. In addition, each honest validator v_i will also be added 1 credit value to his credit stake c_i . The higher credit stake c , the more benefit that participant can earn by being selected as committee member and committing honest protocol actions.

Given violations of chain fork resolving rules, a punishment strategy is also introduced to discourage dishonest behaviors. To become a committee member in committee selection process, a participant v_i must deposit a fix number of fees to his special stake sc_i , called *security stake*. If any dishonest behaviors of validator v_i are detected, such as violations of chain fork resolving rules, his balance of sc_i will be slashed as punishment. Furthermore, validator v_i will also lose 1 credit value from his credit stake c_i . Such punishment strategy not only increase economical cost of dishonest behavior by slashing his security stake, but also decrease the capability of attackers by lowering their credit stakes.

6 IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION

To verify the proposed solution, a concept-proof prototype of microchain is implemented in Python, consisting of approximate 3000 lines of code. We use Flask [1], which provide a micro-framework for Python application, to develop networking and web service functions. All security functions are developed by using standard python lib: cryptography [3]. The key generation and signature are implemented over RSA and hash function uses SHA-256. we use SQLite [4], which is an lightweight and embedded SQL database engine, to manage data such as node, block and vote information.

The prototype is deployed on a physical network environment including multiple nodes. Table 1 describes devices used for the experimental setup. Five validators are deployed on desktop while other validators run on sixteen distributed Raspberry Pis to simulate IoTs. Each validator is only deployed on one host machine.

6.1 Network Latency

In this experiment, all validators are running on Raspberry Pis to evaluate network latency of executing microchain on IoT devices. Figure 4 plots the time that takes for microchain

TABLE 1
Configuration of Experimental Nodes.

Device	Dell Optiplex 760	Raspberry Pi 3 Model B+
CPU	3 GHz Intel Core TM (2 cores)	Broadcom ARM Cortex A53 (ARMv8) , 1.4GHz
Memory	4GB DDR3	1GB SDRAM
Storage	250G HHD	32GB (microSD card)
OS	Ubuntu 16.04	Raspbian GNU/Linux (jessie)




Fig. 4. Latency for one round of microchain with different node size.

to complete a entire round of final-committee consensus given the number of validators varying from 4 to 16. The block size is 128KB in test to focus on network performance by reducing block size influence.

The whole process of one round is divided into three parts, which is demonstrated as three lines. The latency of commit transaction \mathcal{T}_{ct} , at the bottom of Fig. 4, is the time for all nodes of dynasty to accept a broadcasted transaction. Since the communication complexity of broadcasting transaction is $\mathcal{O}(K)$. The latency of committing transaction is linear scale to committee size K , and it varies from 162 ms to 246 ms.

The line in the middle of graph indicates latency of block proposal \mathcal{T}_{bp} , which measure how long the proposed blocks could be arrived and verified among validators. Since the block proposal algorithm is proportion to credit distribution \mathcal{D} whth expectation $E(\mathcal{D})$, the latency of block proposal is scale to communication complexity $\mathcal{O}(\frac{K^2}{E(\mathcal{D})})$. Given uniform distribution \mathcal{D} in our test with $E(\mathcal{D}) = K$, so that the middle line is almost linear scale to the $\mathcal{O}(K)$ with vary from 0.5 s to 1.7 s.

Finally, the latency of chain finality, at the top of the graph, is the time it takes voting process for finalize checkpoint block to complete among all nodes. Since voting-based chain finality process has the communication complexity $\mathcal{O}(K^2)$, the top line indicates the latency of chain finality \mathcal{T}_{cf} , which is greatly influenced by the number of nodes. Given 16 validators in committee, the latency could be 21.5 s, while the scenario with four nodes only introduces 1.4 s latency.

The results show that microchain could perform one round of final-committee consensus no more than half minute ($\mathcal{T}_{ct} + \mathcal{T}_{bp} + \mathcal{T}_{cf}$) given committee size $m = 16$.

Although chain finality process introduces larger latency as increasing committee size, properly configuring epoch size R could mitigate the influence. The block confirmation time denotes as $T_{bc} = \frac{T_{cf} + T_{bp} \cdot R}{R}$, given $R = 10$ so that chain finality is triggered every 10 block height increases, $T_{bc} = (21.5 + 2.5 \times 10)/10 \approx 4.6$ s. Compared with block generation time of Ethereum blockchain with 9.35 s in private network [36] and about 15 s in public network, the proposed microchain mechanism demonstrates lower block confirmation time. Since the block confirmation time of network is normalized to committee size K , properly choose committee size and designing committee selection algorithm could improve scalability of microchain in IoT applications.

6.2 Throughput Evaluation

In the following set of experiments, we deploy five validators in committee to focus on throughput and cost evaluation by limiting committee size influence, which are all Raspberry Pi devices. Figure 5 plots the time that takes for microchain to complete a entire round of final-committee consensus with a varying block size between 512K and 4M. The results show that latency of running consensus algorithm is scale to the block size in microchain. Considering the scenario with lowest latency, microchain finalizes a 512 KBytes block in about 8.9 s, which means it could finalize 202 Mbytes of transaction data per hour. For comparison, Bitcoin achieves throughput of processing 6 Mbytes transaction data per hour by committing a 1 Mbytes block per 10 minutes.

The throughput could be specified as $Th = \frac{T_{ct} + T_{bp} + T_{cf}}{Block_size} \times 3600$ (M/h), where M/h means Mbytes per hour. Then we can get throughput with varying block size: $Th_{512K}=202$ (M/h), $Th_{1M}=293$ (M/h), $Th_{2M}=405$ (M/h), and $Th_{4M}=263$ (M/h). The above throughput results with varying block size suggests that increasing the block size allows committing more transaction data, and therefore reach a throughput which maximizes the system capability. In our test, running microchain with 2M block size outputs highest throughput 405 (M/h). As block size increases, however, microchain achieves higher throughput at the cost of increased latency, and throughput is constrained by network and system capability.




Fig. 5. Latency for one round of microchain with different block size.




Fig. 6. Performance of running microchain with different block size.




Fig. 7. Performance of running microchain with different platform.

6.3 Performance of Running Microchain

To evaluate the cost of performing microchain on host machine, running time for key operations are calculated given different block size and hardware platforms. Figure 6 demonstrates the computational overhead of key tasks for completing a entire round of final-committee consensus on Raspberry Pi with varying block size. The results show that computation overhead increases as bloc size grows. Compared with verify transaction and mining block operations, the verify block and verify vote operations introduces major overhead to host machine. Since verify transaction and mining block process rely on database querying to validate chain data, therefore they require more computing resource on data processing and are sensitive to block size growth.

Figure 7 show the cost of running microchain with 1M block size on both desktop and Raspberry Pi. All key tasks for completing a entire round of final-committee consensus introduces higher computational cost on Raspberry Pi B+ owning to constrained resource. The CPU usage for running microchain is modest on both platform. It is about 15% on Raspberry Pi B+ and 10% on desktop, and most of CPU consumption is used for verifying signature, calculating hash value and access to the database. Compared with PoW-based consensus protocol that occupies almost all CPU usage, proposed PoC-VCF based final-committee consensus in microchain only introduced lighter overhead on the host machine.

6.4 Security Discussions

Since the adversary is subject to the usual cryptographic hardness assumptions, he/she is aware of neither the pri-

vate keys of the honest nodes nor the input string x to the VRF function. Therefore, the unpredictability property of the VRF-based randomness string generation allows members of committee be completely random. In addition, the chain finality requires $n \geq 3f + 1$ to make agreements on checkpoints. Therefore, the adversary has at most $m = 1/4$ chance per round to control the checkpoint voting process. As a result, the probability that an adversary controls n consecutive checkpoint is upper-bounded by $P[X \geq n] = \frac{1}{4^n} < 10^{-\lambda}$. For $\lambda = 6$, the adversary will control at most 10 consecutive chain finality runs.

The security proprieties of micorchain could mitigate the following attacks:

- **Double spending attacks:** In a double spending attack, the adversary attempts to revert a transaction which is confirmed in the blockchain network. The chain finality ensures persistence, so that once transaction is finalized in checkpoint block, all other honest nodes will work on finalized chain and disregard the double spending transaction.
- **Transaction denial attacks:** The adversary could start a transaction denial attack by preventing a certain transaction from becoming confirmed. However, such a attack is not feasible owing to the liveness provided by microchain. Once a transaction is successfully enclosed in a proposed block for a sufficient number of time slots, it will be eventually finalized by the chain finality process.
- **Long-range attacks:** In a long-range attacks, the adversary wishes to double spend at a later point of time by locally computing a longer valid chain that starts from genesis block and presenting such longer alternative chain to revert his previous confirmed transaction. Since the committee selection is unpredictable, and any blocks that are not proposed by committee members will be rejected. Therefore, it's difficult for the adversary to control the committee selection, and his local chain cannot be accept by committee member. Furthermore, the chain finality ensures that valid blocks are only extended alone longest finalized chain, so that the adversary's alternative chain is invalid and will be rejected.
- **Selfish-mining:** In a selfish-mining attack, the attacker tries to withhold blocks and release them strategically to reduce chain growth and increase the relative ratio of his proposed blocks. However, our reward and punishment mechanism make such attack become unprofitable. Only honest validators without violating behavior will receive rewards proportionally to their contributions. The rational validators attempt to behave honestly and make contribution to increase credit stake.

7 CONCLUSIONS

This work proposes microchain, a hybrid blockchain network that provides scalable and lightweight distribute ledger for IoT systems. Through performing PoC-VCF consensus protocol in a small group of validators, called final-committee, microchain could effectively reduce communication complexity and improve performance, i.e. in terms

of confirmation time and throughput. The VRF-based cryptographic sortition and unbiased randomness generation allow committee selection be unpredictable, therefore it increases scalability of microchain. The experimental results demonstrate that microchain achieves higher throughput than PoW-based blockchain solutions, and it introduces lower network latency and modest computational overhead on IoT devices like Raspberry Pi. The microchain offers a prospective distributed ledger solution to IoT application scenarios in term of security, scalability and lightweight.

There remains a number of open issues in designing microchain. Although committee selection could improve scalability of microchain, more investigation and test are needed to evaluate how committee selection algorithm scale to network size. Another challenge is redesigning chain structure to address the ever-growing chain data size, which has a great impact on computation and storage capability of IoT devices.

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