



Fuzzing 101



 $!8; `kZN(d94LGCS*GN}=j) k:, pWwM?+ || znJ'7q@%ua'6bL@|{'{!~'~-`@-@&\{~'{:'`}}} || znJ'7q@%ua'6bL@|{'{!~'~-`@-@&\{~'{:'`}}} || znJ'7q@%ua'6bL@|} || znJ'7q@%ua'6bL@||$



Fuzzing in Rust

Rust Fuzz Book - https://rust-fuzz.github.io/book/introduction.html

Targets

```
#![no_main]
#[macro_use] extern crate libfuzzer_sys;
extern crate url;

fuzz_target!(|data: &[u8]| {
    if let Ok(s) = std::str::from_utf8(data) {
        let _ = url::Url::parse(s);
    }
});
```

```
cargo fuzz run <fuzz target name>
```

Fuzzing in Rust

Structured Fuzzing

```
// src/lib.rs

#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
#[cfg_attr(feature = "arbitrary", derive(arbitrary::Arbitrary))]
pub struct Rgb {
   pub r: u8,
   pub g: u8,
   pub b: u8,
}
```

```
// fuzz/fuzz_targets/rgb_to_hsl_and_back.rs
libfuzzer_sys::fuzz_target!(|color: Rgb| {
    let hsl = color.to_hsl();
    let rgb = hsl.to_rgb();

    // This should be true for all RGB -> HSL -> RGB conversions!
    assert_eq!(color, rgb);
});
```



The Beacon Chain

• 5 Production Clients












• Network Launched on December 1st, 2020






Differential Fuzzing







Differential Fuzzing for CL










eth2fuzz

- Standalone, coverage-guided fuzzing
 - Targets each implementation separately
 - Supports multiple fuzzing engines
 - libFuzzer, AFL/AFL++, honggfuzz, go-fuzz, JQF, Jazzer
 - Fed valid corpora (beacon states and consensus objects)
- Extended to support structural fuzzing (where possible)
 - Move past the deserialisation to actually hit state transitions
 - Use the arbitrary trait in Rust


eth2fuzz

- Types of bugs identified:
 - Out of bound memory accesses (SSZ)
 - Panics when decoding non-UTF8 characters (ENR)
 - Integer overflows (epoch processing)
 - Memory exhaustion (SSZ)
 - Nil pointer dereference (SSZ)



eth2diff

- Debugging tool to replay samples across all supported clients
 - Wrapper around client utilities (thanks implementers <3)
 - Allows us to feed interesting fuzzing inputs to all clients
- Type of bugs identified:
 - Incorrect attestation validation
 - Incorrect signature validation
 - Lack of Merkle Proof validation




beacon-fuzz-v2

Differential Fuzzing Engine:

- Foreign Function Interfaces (FFI) bindings
- Structural fuzzing support with inputs generated by Lighthouse fuzzers
- Most effective technique for catching consensus-splitting bugs

Type of bugs identified:

- Off-by-one errors (state transitions)
- BLS signature malleability
- Insufficient attestation validation



Showing 22 changed files with 1,702 additions and 439 deletions. Unified Q Filter changed files // attempt to decrypt the static header // attempt to decrypt the static header let iv = data[..IV_LENGTH].to_vec(); let iv = data[..IV_LENGTH].to_vec(); ✓ ■ .github/workflows /* Decryption is done inline /* Decryption is done inline build.yml * This was split into its own library, but brought back to allow re-use * This was split into its own library, but brought back to allow re-use Cargo.toml of the cipher when of the cipher when ✓ ■ examples * performing the decryption * performing the decryption find nodes.rs let key = GenericArray::clone_from_slice(&src_id.raw()[..16]); let key = GenericArray::clone_from_slice(&src_id.raw()[..16]); ✓ ■ src let nonce = GenericArray::clone_from_slice(&iv); let nonce = GenericArray::clone_from_slice(&iv); let mut cipher = Aes128Ctr::new(&key, &nonce); let mut cipher = Aes128Ctr::new(&key, &nonce); config.rs // Take the static header content // Take the static header content discv5.rs let mut static_header = data[IV_LENGTH..IV_LENGTH + let mut static header = data[IV LENGTH..IV LENGTH + ✓ ■ discv5 STATIC_HEADER_LENGTH].to_vec(); STATIC_HEADER_LENGTH].to_vec(); cipher.apply_keystream(&mut static_header); test.rs ∨ **l** handler // double check the size // double check the size if static header.len() != STATIC HEADER LENGTH { if static header.len() != STATIC HEADER LENGTH { ✓ ■ crypto return Err(PacketError::HeaderLengthInvalid(static_header.len())); return Err(PacketError::HeaderLengthInvalid(static_header.len())); ecdh.rs mod.rs // Check the protocol id // Check the protocol id if &static_header[..6] != PROTOCOL_ID.as_bytes() { if &static_header[..6] != PROTOCOL_ID.as_bytes() { tests.rs return Err(PacketError:: HeaderDecryptionFailed); return Err(PacketError::HeaderDecryptionFailed); kbucket.rs // Check the version matches // Check the version matches let version = u16::from_be_bytes(let version = u16::from_be_bytes(bucket.rs static_header[6..8] entry.rs .expect("Must be correct size"), .expect("Must be correct size"), filter.rs lib.rs if version != VERSION { if version != VERSION { return Err(PacketError::InvalidVersion(version)); return Err(PacketError::InvalidVersion(version)); ∨ ■ packet mod.rs let flag = static_header[8]; let flag = static_header[8]; query_pool/peers // Obtain the message nonce // Obtain the message nonce closest.rs let message_nonce: MessageNonce = static_header[9..9 + let message nonce: MessageNonce = static header[9..9 + service.rs MESSAGE_NONCE_LENGTH] MESSAGE_NONCE_LENGTH] ✓ ■ service .expect("Must be correct size"); .expect("Must be correct size"); hashset_delay.rs // The decryption was successful, decrypt the remaining header ip_vote.rs let auth_data_size = u16::from_be_bytes(let auth_data_size = u16::from_be_bytes(static_header[STATIC_HEADER_LENGTH - 2..] static_header[STATIC_HEADER_LENGTH - 2..] በ test.rs .try_into() ✓ ■ socket/filter .expect("Can only be 2 bytes in size"), .expect("Can only be 2 bytes in size"), config.rs let remaining data = data[STATIC_HEADER_LENGTH..].to_vec(); let remaining data = data[IV_LENGTH + STATIC_HEADER_LENGTH..].to_vec(); M mod.rs if auth_data_size as usize > remaining_data.len() { if auth_data_size as usize > remaining_data.len() { return Err(PacketError::InvalidAuthDataSize); return Err(PacketError::InvalidAuthDataSize);

